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 Preface 
 
The primary purpose of this book is to set forth the actual working of the English 
Constitution.  Its method is mainly analytical; but no one can apprehend the genius of 
an historical Constitution from mere analysis.  I have, therefore, traced the historical 
evolution of the principal organs of the Body Politic, both as they function in England 
and in the British Dominions.  With constitutional history and political analysis there 
mingles also a certain amount of political philosophy; for neither philosophy nor history 
can yield their appropriate fruit unless cultivated in close conjunction.  The method 
adopted in this work is indeed the outcome of a strong conviction that the Political 
Institutions of any one country cannot profitably be studied in isolation.  Accordingly, to 
the main body of this work short studies are prefixed of three types of 'Democracy' 
which severally present a sharp contrast with each other and with the parliamentary 
type of Democracy gradually established by a prolonged process of evolution in this 
country.  I have not, however, attempted a comprehensive survey of the democratic 
communities of the modern world.  That task has been accomplished once for all in 
Lord Bryce's masterly treatise on Modern Democracies, but Lord Bryce has nothing to 
say of British Democracy (save in its newer homes oversea), which supplies my central 
theme.  Where I have strayed from that central theme (conspicuously in Books II, VI, 
and VIII) it has been for purposes of illustration and comparison, in order to bring into 
clearer relief the characteristic features of the English Polity.  
 
More than three hundred and fifty years ago Sir Thomas Smith thus described the 
scope and purpose of his De Republica Anglorum, and I can find no words which more 
[begin page vi] aptly indicate the purpose I have myself had in view.  I therefore quote 
his:  
 
‘I have declared summarily as it were in a charte or map, or as Aristotle 
termeth it ώς  έν  τύπψ  the forme and manner of the Government of 
England, and the policie thereof. . . Wherefore, this being as a project or 
table of a common wealth truely laide before you, not famed by putting a 
case: let us compare it with Commonwealthes, which be at this day in esse, 
or doe remaine discribed in true histories, especially in such pointes 
wherein the one differeth from the other, to see who hath taken the righter, 
truer, and more commodious way to governe the people as well in warre as 
in peace.  This will be no illeberall occupation for him that is a Philosopher 
and hath a delight in disputing, nor unprofitable for him who hath to doe and 
hath good will to serve the Prince and the Commonwealth in giving 
Counsell for the better administration thereof.'  (28 March 1565.)  
 
The present work, then, is an attempt to epitomize the work of a life which has been 
consistently devoted to ‘Politics'.  That term does not, of course, mean merely or mainly 
the interesting 'game' by which the term is frequently but improperly monopolized.  By 
'Politics' we should understand, on its abstract side, the Theory or Science of the State: 
as a practical adventure, the service of the State.  This book represents a portion of my 
personal contribution both to Science and to Service.  The main lines of the work were 
laid down some twenty-five years ago, but my interest in the subject dates much farther 
back.  By a curious freak of memory I can trace it to the day when, as a schoolboy, I 
picked up a copy of A. de Fonblanque's How we are Governed.  The book is not 
attractive either in style or mode of presentation, but it laid hold on one schoolboy's 
imagination and largely determined the tenor of his life.  Interest in political Institutions 
led me first to the study, and later to the teaching and writing, of History; later still it 
carried me into an active political career. 
[begin page vii] 
 The completion of the present work has been unduly delayed, but the delay has, 
perhaps, had its compensations.  Fifteen years ago I published two preliminary studies 
-  Second Chambers: an Inductive Study in Political Science, and  English Political 
Institutions; and those books were followed by many others.  In the interval I have had 
the opportunity of studying in situ some foreign systems of government, and in 
particular of studying at close quarters our own.  The experience of the actual 
machinery of government gained as a member of the Select Committee on Public 
Expenditure (1917-18), of the Public Accounts Committee, and above all as Chairman 
of the Estimates Committee, not to mention the Second Chamber Conference (Bryce 
Committee, 1917-18), has been invaluable to me, and will, I trust, be reflected 
throughout this book, and particularly in the chapters on Parliamentary Procedure, on 
the Civil Service, and on the Structure of the Legislature. 
 
In the long course of my investigations I have incurred innumerable obligations.  Some 
can only be acknowledged in general terms, since several who have rendered me 
conspicuous help are responsible members of foreign Embassies and Legations, and 
others are high officials in our own Public Departments.  The traditions of both services 
discourage, if they do not forbid, public acknowledgement, and must of course be 
respected by me; but I may without impropriety gratefully acknowledge my debt to Sir T. 
Lonsdale Webster, K.C.B., the Principal Clerk of the House of Commons, who read in 
manuscript the chapters on Procedure, and by his careful correction has relieved me of 
all anxiety as to the accuracy of my treatment of that intricate subject; to Sir Malcolm 
Ramsay, K.C.B., the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who similarly read and corrected 
the Appendices on Financial Procedure; to Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., Clerk 
to the Privy Council and Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the 
Cabinet Secretariat, who kindly allowed me to discuss with him certain points in relation 
to the [begin page viii] Executive, and gave me much valuable information; and to Mr. 
Austin Smyth, Principal Librarian of the House of Commons, and to his assistants, who 
have been uniformly patient and kind in helping me in the toilsome task of verification 
of references, especially to Parliamentary Papers and other 'Blue-books'.  Without the 
help of my friend Dr. R.W. Macan, formerly Master of University College and Reader in 
Ancient History, I should hardly have ventured to analyse Athenian Democracy.  The 
index owes much to my wife. 
 
I have incorporated in the present work a good deal of material published in the two 
preliminary studies mentioned above, and a few paragraphs from my England Since 
Waterloo  (Eighth Edition: Methuen), and have also availed myself (with kind 
permission) of matter originally published in the Quarterly and Monthly Reviews.  I 
append a list of the articles, on subjects cognate to those treated in the present work, 
contributed by me to those Reviews.  The list will serve as a more specific 
acknowledgement to their proprietors and editors, and will also acquit me of any 
suspicion of having undertaken, without long and assiduous preparation, a task so 
ambitious as that discharged in these volumes.  I must also acknowledge the courtesy 
of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office in permitting the reproduction (notably in the 
Appendices) of much copyright material contained in Rules, Orders, Treasury Minutes, 
and other Official Publications.  It is hardly necessary to add that the sole responsibility 
for statements of fact or opinion is mine alone. 
 
I have appended numerous references to the text, mainly as a guide to students who 
may desire to probe more deeply than is possible in a general work into particular 
topics, and have also added a full and classified Bibliography which will, I trust, be 
similarly helpful.  In it are, I hope, included all the works to which I am consciously 
indebted; but in a work which has extended over a long period, and been exposed to 
many interrup- [begin page ix] tions (notably five Parliamentary Elections), there may be 
omissions.  For any such omissions, and in particular for unacknowledged borrowings 
in the text of the work, if any there be, I crave pardon.  
 I also ask pardon if in this Preface I have entered into personal details unbecoming to 
an author.  I have done so because I am gratefully aware that my previous works have 
gained me many friends - personally unknown to me - in different parts of the world.  To 
them and to the men and women to whom at Oxford and elsewhere I have spoken of 
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 I. 
Introductory 
The State  
‘La Greece . . . a fonde dans toute I'etendue du terme l'humanisme rationnel 
et progressif. . .  Le cadre de la culture humaine cree par la Grėce est 
susceptible d'etre indefiniment elargi, mais il est complet dans ses parties.  
Le progres consistera eternellement a developper ce que la Grece a conçu, a 
remplir les desseins qu'elle a, si I'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, excellemment 
echantillonnes,' - Renan.  
 
The State for the Greeks was from first to last an ethical institution, and it 
was a copy of the city of God of which the type is laid up in Heaven.' - Dean 
Inge.  
 
‘The State is the divine idea as it exists on Earth. . . all the worth which the 
human being possesses, all the spiritual reality which he possesses, he 
possesses only through the State.  The existence of the State is the 
movement of God in the world.' - Hegel.  
 
"The State is “natural” (Φύσει).  The impulse to political association is 
natural (Φύσει) to man. . . He who by nature and not by mere accident is 
State-less is either above humanity or below it. . . Man, in his condition of 
complete development, is the noblest of animals; apart from law and justice 
he is the vilest of all.  The State was formed to make life possible; it exists 
to make life good.' - Aristotle.  
 
The State is the complete union of free men who join themselves together 
for the purpose of enjoying law and for the sake of public welfare.' - 
Grotius. 
 
The State is merely a means with which man, the true end of the State, must 
never be satisfied.' - Wilhelm Von Humboldt.  
 
The Modern State. 
The State is the outstanding and characteristic phenomenon of the modern world.   
Intimate, not to say intrusive, as regards the daily life of the citizen, it is imposing in 
authority, and claims, if not omniscience, something approaching to omnipotence.  The 
modern State, with its agents and regulations, dogs the footsteps of the individal 
literally from the cradle to the grave.  Of birth, marriage, death the State demands to be 
made officially cognizant.  Registration, certification, enumeration - these are required 
of the citizen at every turn in the wheel of life. 
  
Scope and purpose of this work 
With the mechanism of this majestic Institution, the machinery by which its innumerable 
functions are [begin page 4] performed, the present work will be concerned.  In 
particular it will attempt to analyse the operation of the machinery of State in England 
and in the British Commonwealth; to trace the development of English political 
institutions and to describe the main organs of English government.  Only, however, by 
comparison with the institutions of other States, their working, and their history, can the peculiar characteristics of our own be adequately appreciated.  While, therefore, 
English political institutions form the central theme of this book, frequent reference will 
be made to the institutions which have been evolved or adopted by other peoples of 
the modern world. 
  
What is a State? 
A preliminary question obtrudes itself: What do we mean by the State?  
 
If the State is an imposing phenomenon, it is also a singularly complex conception, and 
we may achieve a better understanding of it if we clearly distinguish the term from other 
terms with which the State is not infrequently confounded.  
 
Not necessarily a ‘nation’. 
First: a State is not necessarily identical or co-extensive with a Nation.  An attempt was 
made in the Peace Treaties of 1919 to bring the reconstructed states system of modern 
Europe into conformity with the theory and the facts of 'Nationality'.  The attempt was 
only partially successful; and naturally so, since the conception of the State is 
something distinct from the idea of the Nation, and much more definite.  'Nation’ and 
nationality are singularly elusive terms and the attempt to analyse and define them has 




Vico defined nationality as 'a natural society of men who by unity of territory, of origin, 
of custom, and of language are drawn into a community of life and of social 
conscience'.  But is unity of territory essential to the idea of nationality?  Or even 
'community of life'?  If so, we must deny nationality to the Jews after their dis- [begin 
page 5] persion, and to the Poles after the partition of their State.  Is identity of 
language essential; or of religion?  If so, we must refuse to recognize a Swiss nation, 
since the Swiss embrace three, if not four, creeds, and speak three, if not if four, 
different languages.  And is there no American nation?  
 
It is evident, then, that we shall involve ourselves in difficulties and contradictions if we 
lay overmuch emphasis either on community of religion or of language as an essential 
ingredient in the idea of nationality. Yet it would seem difficult in the absence of these 
ingredients to preserve nationality when it is divorced from state-hood. 
 
Swiss nationality and American nationality are respectively the resultant of a Swiss 
State and of an American State.  In other cases the State may be due to the realization 
of common race, or common language, in a word, of nationality.  The Triune Kingdom, 
commonly designated Jugo-Slavia, and the resuscitated Poland are apposite 
illustrations of the latter process.  By exclusions and inclusions, therefore, we seem 
impelled to acceptance of some such definition as that suggested by Professor Henri 
Hauser of Dijon:  
 
La nationalite est un fait de conscience collectif, un vouloir-vivre collectif. . 
. . Race, religion, langue, tous ces - elements sont ou ne sont pas des 




Will a 'collective consciousness' suffice to constitute a Nationality?  A doubt obtrudes 
itself whether a collective consciousness could be generated without a sentimental or 
traditional attachment to a territorial home.  To take a conspicuous illustration.  Jewish 
                                                  
1   [5/1]  Le Principe des Nationalites, p. 7. nationality was sustained during two thousand years of exile mainly, no doubt, by 
devotion to a particular creed, partly by wonderful persistency and purity of blood, but 
not least by collective affection for the common home of the race:  ‘When I forget thee, 
O Jerusalem'.  Except for the [begin page 6] sentiment known as Zionism, modern 
Palestine would never have been called into being as a State by the Paris Conference.  
Similarly the Poles in dispersion drew their inspiration from and sustained their 
patriotism by the knowledge that many of their co-nationals were still living, though 
under alien rulers, on the plains of the Vistula. 
 
A modern writer would seem, then, to get near the heart of the matter when he writes: 
  
Nationality is more than a creed or a doctrine, or a code of conduct, it is an 
instinctive attachment; it recalls an atmosphere of precious memories; of 
vanished parents and friends, of old customs, of reverence, of home, and a 
sense of the brief span of human life as a link between immemorial 
generations spreading backwards and forwards. . . It implies a particular 
kind of corporate self-consciousness, peculiarly intimate, yet invested at the 
same time with a peculiar dignity. . . and it implies, secondly, a country, an 
actual strip of land associated with the nationality, a territorial centre where 
the flame of nationality is kept alight at the, hearth-fire of home.'
2
  
The same writer draws a series of instructive contrasts between Nationality and 
Statehood.  'Nationality, like religion, is subjective; Statehood is objective.  Nationality is 
psychological; Statehood political.  Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a 
condition in law.  Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood an enforceable 
obligation.  Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking, and living; Statehood is a condition 
inseparable from all civilized ways of living.'
3  
 
A State then must not be confused, however much modern political practice may tend 
to co-extension, with a nation, still less with a race.  
 
The State and the Government. 
 Nor must we confound the terms State and Government.  A Government of one kind or 
another is, plainly, essential to a well-ordered State; a collection of individuals without a 
Government would be a mob.  The Executive Govern- [begin page 7] ment is constantly 
called upon to speak and act on behalf of the State: with the unfortunate result that in 
common parlance we frequently use the one term when we mean the other.  Thus, in 
reference to some enterprise or item of expenditure, we say that 'the Government will 
finance it', when we mean that the Administration acting on behalf of the whole 
community or State will for that purpose extract the money from the pockets of the 
taxpayers.  Hence it is important to distinguish between the two terms.  A less common 
use of the term is as a synonym for a republican or non-monarchical form of 
Commonwealth.  Thus Thomas Hobbes wrote: 'When Augustus Caesar changed the 
State into a monarchy'.  And similarly Dryden:  
 
Well Monarchys may own Religions name 
But States are atheists in their very frame.  
 
But this use is virtually obsolete and need not detain us.  What, then, is a State?  
 
                                                  
2   [6/1]  A.E. Zimmern, Nationality and Government, pp. 78, 84. 
3   [6/2]  Ibid., p. 51. The State Invisible. 
We may dismiss, for purposes of political definition, the State Invisible, however 
attractive the conception may have proved to mystical philosophers from Plato 
downwards.  That a vision of the Eternal is essential to the well-being of the temporal 
State is assuredly true.  It may further be conceded that the happiness and 
contentment of the mass of the citizens of a State will be in large measure 
proportionate to the degree in which they are in communion with the Invisible.  For the 
Greek, Political Philosophy was interpenetrated with Ethics; the State was for him, as 
one of the greatest of living philosophers has truly said, 'an ethical institution; and it 
was a copy of the city of God of which the type is laid up in Heaven '.  
 
‘To the Platonist’, writes Dean Inge, '. . . the actual reality of the Invisible State is 
independent of its realization on earth.  It remains and always will remain the spiritual 
home of the good man, to which he can flee away and be at rest when he will.  It is a 
sanctuary where God can hide him privily by His own presence from the provoking of 




None the less, although the Invisible State be to the mystical philosopher a spiritual 
reality, and although, as Plutarch said, a city might sooner subsist without a 
geographical site than without a belief in the Gods, yet the Invisible State is not a 
political reality.  We have still to ask what the political reality which we describe as the 
State does, in fact, connote. 
 
Aristotle's Theory of The State. 
Plato's theory of the State was, as we have learnt, mystical, though he himself refused 
to admit that it was Utopian, or impossible of realization.  Yet it is, as he does admit, 
'founded on words’, and he frankly confesses that to him 'it is no matter whether his city 
exists or not'.  For the most representative Greek thought on the subject of the State we 
must go, therefore, not to Plato, but to Aristotle. 
 
Aristotle conceived of the State as an association or community (κοινωία) which came 
naturally into existence to make life possible and which continues to enable man to live 
the highest life.  The origin of the State must therefore be sought, not in law or 
convention (νόμψ), but in nature (Φύσει).  The impulse to citizenship or political 
association is implanted in all men by nature, and only as a member of a political 
community can man achieve the highest of which he is capable.  Nay, since the virtue 
of the individual is relative to and conditioned by the Polity to which he belongs, it is 
only in the perfect State that the individual can attain to the perfect life.  Aristotle finds 
the proof of his proposition that the State is a creation of nature and 'prior to the family 
and the individual' in the fact that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing, and 
therefore is like apart in relation to the whole.  'The man who is unable to live in society, 
or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a 
God.'
5  Citizenship is not for him.   [begin page 9] 
 
Difficult as it is to the modern mind to accept this complete interdependence of Ethics 
and Politics, paradoxical as it seems to us to deny to the individual the possibility of 
living the highest life even under imperfect political conditions, we must nevertheless 
admit that the Aristotelian theory of the State does set a standard in Politics to which 
neither States nor individuals find it easy to attain.  Moreover, the theory illustrates the 
problem as to the due relation between the rights and the duties of citizenship.  It was, 
as Thomas Hill Green observed,  
 
                                                  
4   [8/1]  Outspoken Essays, Series II, p. 91 
5   [8/2]  Politics, i. 2. ‘because Plato and Aristotle conceived the life of the πόλις so clearly as the 
τέλος of the individual that they laid the foundation of all true theory of 
rights'.  For 'Aristotle regards the State as a society of which the life is 
maintained by what its members do for the sake of maintaining it, by 
functions consciously fulfilled with reference to that end, and which in that 
sense imposes duties; and at the same time as a society from which its 
members derive the ability through education and protection to fulfil their 
several functions, and which in that sense confers rights.'
6  
 
It is imperative, however, to recall the fact that of a State in the sense in which the term 
is commonly understood in the modern world neither Plato nor Aristotle had any 
conception whatever.  They had exclusively in mind the city-state typical of ancient 
Greece, a form of political organization most clearly exemplified for the modern world 
by one of the Swiss cantons such as Bern, with its capital city and circumjacent 
territory. 
  
The ancient world, in fine, knew not the State, as we conceive it.  Cities it knew, such 
as Athens and Sparta; great empires it knew, such as the Empires of Persia and of 
Macedon; but of the intermediate form - the nation-state - it was wholly ignorant.  
 
The Middle Ages 
The Middle Ages knew as little as the ancient world of the nation-state.  The Roman 
Empire bequeathed to the Ages Middle Ages the idea of a world-empire; but the 
execution of the terms of the bequest was complicated by the [begin page 10] 
appearance of a rival executor.  In one aspect the Papacy was, as Hobbes pungently 
phrased it, 'the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting on the grave thereof'.  But a great 
philosopher of our own time has conjectured that ‘if Christ had never lived a spiritual 
Roman Empire not very unlike the Catholic Church would have appeared'.
7  Be that as 
it may, the legacy of Rome was divided, in very unequal proportions, between the 
Papacy, aiming at spiritual world-empire, and a revived Western Empire which in virtue 
of the patronage of the Pope was designated 'Holy'.  Essentially, however, the Holy 
Roman Empire was little more than an elected German kingship exercising jurisdiction 
none too effective over the German princes and even less effective over Burgundy and 
the cities and principalities of Italy.  Long before its actual dissolution (1806) at the 
dictation of Napoleon that somewhat mysterious institution had, in Voltaire's mordant 
phrase, ceased to be either Holy or Roman or an Empire.  
 
Dante's Vision of the Empire. 
Yet it existed; and the greatest genius of the Middle Ages attempted to give substance 
to the shadow.  Empire Dante's concern was primarily for an Italy distracted by the 
endless strife of cities and princes; but his vision went beyond the bounds of Italy.  To 
the great Ghibelline poet it seemed clear that in its temporal mission the Papacy had 
lamentably failed.  But where Pope had failed, might not Emperor succeed?  The De 
Monarchia presents an elaborate argument for an Empire or world-power.  The Empire, 
no less than the Catholic Church, was ordained of God; both were dependent upon 
God; each was in its peculiar sphere supreme; the supreme pontiff in the spiritual 
sphere was ordained' to lead the human race in accordance with revelation to life 
eternal'; the Emperor, in the secular sphere, was ordained to guide humanity to 
temporal felicity in accordance with the teaching of philosophy. 
 
Such, in brief, is the argument of Dante's famous [begin page 11] treatise.  In his 
scheme there was no room for the nation-state; hardly for the city-state, or the 
                                                  
6   [9/1]  Green, Political Obligations, § 39. 
7   [10/1]  Inge, op. cit., p. 99. independent feudal principality.  Yet the feudal principality shared with the Empire and 
the Papacy practical dominion until near the close of the fifteenth century.  Not, indeed, 
until the oecumenical pretensions of the Catholic Church were restricted by the 
Protestant Reformation; not until the division of Germany between two, if not three, 
rival creeds had still further reduced the effective power of the German King who still 
bore the proud title of Roman Emperor; not until the disintegrating forces of feudalism 
had been subdued by the rising power of centralizing monarchies could the nation-
state, as the modern world knows it, finally emerge. 
 
The Nation-State. 
Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia had, indeed, for some time past shared with England 
the dignity of state-hood.  Among the States of Western Europe France was (after 
England) the first to achieve national unity and self-conscious identity.  A succession of 
remarkably able kings of the Capet and Valois dynasties; the absorption by conquest or 
marriage of the great feudal duchies and counties; frontiers well defined-on three sides 
by mountain ranges, the ocean, and the channel, but highly debatable on the fourth 
side; an administrative system ever increasing in efficiency as it increased in 
centralization the Hundred Years War against the Angevin Kings of England and the 
Dukes of Burgundy - all these factors contributed to the making of modern France; and 
by the end of the fifteenth century France was made. 
 
By a process parallel though not identical Spain reached a similar stage of national 
evolution early in the sixteenth century.  The contest between Spain and the seven 
northern provinces of the Netherlands gave to the latter sufficient cohesion and self-
consciousness to entitle them to be regarded as a nation-state from the end of the 
sixteenth century. 
 
Austria emerged from the devastating ruin of the Thirty Years War a State though its 
dynastic con- [begin page 12] nexion with the Czech kingdom of Bohemia and the 
Magyar kingdom of Hungary, to say nothing of its own conglomeration of races, denied 
to it the attributes of a nation'.  Prussia was manufactured into a State by the genius of 
its Hohenzollern rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Russia, though 
more loosely compacted, must be counted among nation-states from the reign of Peter 
the Great.  Portugal had regained its while from the dissolution of the independence in 
1640, union of Calmar (1523) Sweden had played an influential part in the politics of 
Northern Europe. 
 
The nineteenth century witnessed the birth of Belgium (1830); of Greece in the same 
year, and later of other Balkan States; of Switzerland, and most imposing of all, of 
modern Italy and modern Germany.  The last two owed much, Switzerland, and 
perhaps Jugo-Slavia, owed something, to the first Napoleon.  The importance of his 
work as the maker of nations has indeed been under-estimated; but this is not the 
place for a correction of the balance. 
 
America 
Meanwhile, a great nation-state, though of an unfamiliar type, had before the close of 
the eighteenth century come to the birth on the American continent, and early in the 
nineteenth century the dissolution of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires opened the 
way for the creation of several nation-states in South America.
8
 
                                                  
8   [12/1]  Cf. The National Spirit in the Modern World, an essay which contributed 
to Peoples of All Nations (Harmsworth), and from which, in the preceding 
paragraphs, I have borrowed. The British Dominions 
The position of the British Dominions is somewhat more ambiguous.  While loyal to the 
British flag they have evidently attained to nation-hood; can they accurately be 
described as States? 
 
To that question we must return.  Meanwhile this survey, though of necessity rapid and 
incomplete, has brought us back to the question from which we started, and may, 
incidentally, have helped towards an answer. 
 
What do we mean by a State? 
 
Definitions. 
Aristotle defined the State as 'the association of clans [begin page 13] and village-
communities in a complete and self-sufficing life'.  Hugo Grotius defined it as 'the 
complete union of free men who join themselves together for the purpose of enjoying 
law and for the sake of public welfare.’ 
 
Of Aristotle's conception of the State something has already been said; the definition of 
Grotius seems so far to recall the ideas of Aristotle in that the State is defined by its end 
(τέλος) -public welfare.  Further, by insisting that it must be a voluntary union of free 
men, he comes near to identifying the State with the particular form of it distinguished, 
as we saw, by Hobbes and Dryden.  Strictly interpreted, his definition would seem to 
exclude from the category of States any which did not more or less conform to the 
'constitutional' or democratic type.  But this would seem to be unnecessarily narrowing.  
Sir John Seeley defined a State as 'a political aggregate held together by the principle 
of government'; but here as also in the definition of Hobbes we miss any reference to a 
definite territory.  Dr. Matthew Arnold introduced another element: 'The State is 
properly. . . the nation, in its collective and corporate capacity.'  Hegel set the fashion in 
Germany of deifying the State: 'The State is the divine will as the present Spirit 
unfolding itself to the actual shape and organisation of a world . . . It is the ultimate end 
which has the highest right against the individual.'  Nor have his countrymen been slow 
to follow the fashion he set.  Thus the text of Die Politik of Treitschke is: 'The State is 
Power.'  That the State ' has no superior on earth 'had indeed become the common 
creed of Imperial Germany.  Bluntschli, however, was less apostrophic and more 
scientific in his definition of the State as 'a combination or association of men, in the 
form of Government and governed, on a definite territory, united together into a moral, 
organized, masculine personality'.  On this definition, apart from its cumbrous 
language, it would not be easy to improve, though Mr. Woodrow Wilson's has the merit 
of brevity: 'A State is a people organised for law within a definite territory.'  [begin page 
14] 
 
From these definitions, which are evidently typical rather than exhaustive, certain 
conditions essential to state-hood seem clearly to emerge.  A State implies a defined 
territory; without a defined territory an aggregation of people may constitute a nation, 
but they cannot form a State.  It implies an ordered and permanent Government, 
served by regular officials and in a position to command the services and the 
contributions of its subjects in order to perform the elementary functions of government: 
the protection of its borders and its people from external attack and the maintenance of 
order at home.  It implies, further, laws, rules, or regulations which the governors and 
the governed alike accept.  Finally it implies a body of men and women, conscious of a 
certain community of interests, anxious to enjoy the rights and willing to fulfil the 
obligations of citizenship. 
 
Object of this book 
With the State, as thus understood, the present work will deal; but only, as indicated 
above, with a particular aspect of the State; with the art or practice more than with the science or theory of Government.  Already there exists a vast literature dealing with 
Political Theory and with the functions of the State: the literature which deals with the 
mechanism of the State is comparatively scanty.  It is therefore to the latter subject the 
this book is intended to make its modest and severely restricted contribution. 
 
Its Method 
The method pursued in this book will be that which in other branches of learning is 
known as the comparative method.  Political Science in England has tended overmuch, 
like other things English, to insularity.  It is a truism to say that in no two countries are 
political conditions identical, and in the discussion of political problems it is always 
prudent to take account of environment.  But so large a part of the world has, for good 
or ill, accepted the fundamental principles of Democracy, so manifestly are those 
principles beginning to influence peoples which for long centuries have been 
dominated by other ideas, that the time seems not inopportune to [begin page 15] 
attempt, in the light of accumulating experience, a comparative treatment of some of 
the constitutional problems by which the citizen-rulers of these democratic 
Commonwealths are, with increasing insistence, perplexed. 
 
Democracy and Democracies. 
For such a survey the moment would seem to be peculiarly opportune.  The root 
principles of Democracy have been generally accepted; but the principle has worked 
out in diverse forms, and one type of Democracy differs widely from another.   
Moreover, in many States political institutions are now subject to a process of 
exceptionally rapid transformation, and in some, if not in all, the principle of 
Representative Democracy is definitely challenged.  Should that principle fail to justify 
itself we may anticipate, in the near or distant future, a profound modification in the type 
of government now prevalent.  But, even should there be no fundamental modification 
in the general outline of government, the influences, in part philosophical, in part 
practical, which in are contributing to the prevailing dissatisfaction can hardly fail to 
effect the existing mechanism of the State.  Theory and practice are today more closely 
conjoined than in any recent period of world-history.  They have never perhaps been 
severally so self-contained as Englishmen have been apt to suppose.  Impatience of 
philosophical theory has been, in the past, the characteristic, if not of English politics, 
at least of English politicians and of English jurists. 
 
To illustrate this thesis - a commonplace of historical criticism-we need only compare 
Blackstone's Commentaries with Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, Burke's Reflections on 
the French Revolution with Rousseau's Contrat Social, or, perhaps more fairly, Lord 
Bryce's description of the American Commonwealth with De Tocqueville's study of 
Democracy in America.  The concreteness of the English intellect only reflects the 
peculiar course of political development in England.  Constitutional changes have been 
effected in this country not in deference to political theory but under the pressure of 
practical [begin page 16] grievances.  The denial of the right of personal liberty to five 
recalcitrant knights; the attempt to levy, without the authority of Parliament, an 
imposition upon John Hampden; the necessity of raising an annual force to suppress 
an Irish insurrection - these were the immediate antecedents of the Great Rebellion.  
O'Connell's election for County Clare procured the repeal of the Test Act and the final 
emancipation of the Roman Catholics.  This is the English mode and it reflects the 
English temper. 
 
Other peoples have been more deferential to theory and there is some ground for the 
belief that even in England the influence of abstractions upon political conduct has of 
late become more powerful than it had hitherto been.  Those who lack both experience 
of affairs and a knowledge of the past are prone to be captured by phrases and to 
become the slaves of formulae.  Events now move with a rapidity which leaves little 
leisure for reflection, and the dissemination of news does not necessarily guarantee the formation of sound opinions.  A formula constantly reiterated and tenaciously adopted 
may serve, therefore, as an easy substitute for personal investigation and independent 
judgement. 
 
The aim of the present work is then essentially concrete.  It will deal less with functions 
than with machinery; more with historical facts than with Political Theory. 
 
Plan of the work. 
After a brief consideration of constitutional forms and categories, I propose to proceed 
to a rapid analysis of the political institutions of three typical Democracies; of Athens as 
illustrating the working of Direct Democracy; of the Helvetic Confederation which, 
besides affording one of the best examples of a Federal State, has evolved a type of 
Democracy most nearly akin to the Direct Democracy of a city-state, a type which we 
may label as Referendal; and of the United States of America which is both Federal 
and distinctively Presidential.  These chapters must be regarded as introductory, being 
intended mainly to avoid unnecessary repetition in later stages of the work, though in a 
work which is partly historical [begin page 17] and partly analytical, some repetition can 
hardly be avoided. 
 
Book III will be devoted to an examination, in some detail, of the salient characteristics 
of English Political Institutions, and the historical development of that species of 
Democracy to which the label of Responsible Government has been attached, alike in 
Great Britain and in the Oversea Dominions of the British Crown. 
 
Finally we shall proceed to an analysis of the main organs of government, central and 
local, primarily with reference to England, but not without frequent glances at the 
working of parallel institutions in other typical States of the modern world.  The 
comparative anatomy of the structure of the State is indeed the central subject under 
investigation in this book.  The method which it is proposed to adopt is less critical than 
analytical; but criticism is hardly separable from analysis, especially if the analysis be 
comparative.  One pledge, however, I can give.  Criticism, if unavoidable, will always be 
tempered by the caution begotten of long experience in exposition.  No student to 
whom it has fallen to expound to foreigners the intricacies of the unwritten Constitution 
of England, or to analyse for the benefit of Englishmen the Constitutions of foreign 
States, can fail to appreciate the difficulties and dangers which lurk in both paths.   
Baffled by the absence of a Constitutional Code in England, foreign jurists have, 
perhaps wisely, shrunk from the exposition of a Constitution which as De Tocqueville 
complained 'does not exist'.  Englishmen may be lured into the greater danger of 
supposing that they can apprehend the working of foreign Constitutions by a study of 
texts.  I have not been unmindful of this danger, but whether I have successfully 
avoided the pitfalls only foreign jurists can tell.  Let them, however, be assured, that 
where I have ventured to invade their preserves, it has been primarily for the purpose 
of elucidating the mechanism not of their Government but of our own.  Only, however, 
by the application of the comparative [begin page 18] method to Political Science can 
any conclusions of real value be drawn, or any real apprehension of the working of 
Institutions be attained.  'What does he know of England who only England knows?'  
Who can appreciate the mechanism of the English Government whose knowledge of 
political machinery extends farther than the institutions evolved in England, an 
accepted, not without important modification, by the British Dominions beyond the 
Sea? 
 
To expound the working of English Political Institutions, but to do this with constant 
reference to the politic, machinery of other typical States of the modern work is then the 
task which, in the following pages, I have essayed. 
 
[begin page 19] II.  
The Classification of States  
 
A constitution is the arrangement of offices in a state, especially of the 
highest of all.  The government is everywhere sovereign in the state and the 
constitution is in fact the government. . . the supreme power must be vested 
either in an individual, or in the few, or in the many.' - Aristotle, Politics, iii. 
6, 7. 
 
‘Constitution signifies the arrangement and distribution of the sovereign 
power in the community, or the form of the government.' - Sir Cornewall 
Lewis.  
 
‘In every practical undertaking by a state we must regard as the most 
powerful agent for success or failure the form of its constitution.'- Polybius, 
Histories, vi. I.  
 
English Impatience for Practical Analysis. 
The English people admittedly possess a genius for government which is second only, 
if it be second, to that of the Romans.  In this sense they are in the highest degree 
political - apt for the discharge of the duties of citizenship.  Like the Romans, however, 
they have little disposition towards political introspection.  They have exhibited, in 
unique measure, a capacity for self-government; they have been successful, beyond 
most, in the government of other peoples; but confronted with a demand for an analysis 
of their methods, they have shown themselves to be less ready and capable; their 
instinct, in fine, tends rather to practice than to speculation.  
 
For subtle analysis in the science of politics we turn to the ancient Greek; for 
painstaking research, for persistent exercises in the comparative method, we turn 
among the moderns to the American.  In politics, as in other spheres of activity, the 
average Englishman is content to do a thing, and leave others to explain, if they can, 
how it is done.  Pope embodied in a familiar epigrammatic couplet the prevalent temper 
of his countrymen:  
 
For forms of government let fools contest, 
Whate’er is best administered is best. 
[begin page 20] 
Like most epigrams, Pope's contained a half-truth.  It is true, in more homely phrase, 
that the proof of the political pudding is in the eating.  Logical precision will not atone 
for practical incompetence.  The more perfect the form of a Constitution, the less 
successful it often proves to be in actual operation.  Had it been otherwise, the name of 
the Abbe Sieyes, instead of being a byword for contemptible incompetence, would be 
honoured among the greatest of political architects. 
  
Yet the importance of correct analysis and scientific classification will hardly be denied.  
Loose thinking, even in. politics, is apt to engender careless administration.   
Imperfections of style, if an athletic analogy be permitted, matter little so long as 
physical powers are at their highest; an outstanding genius may at all times disregard 
them.  But the moment the muscles begin to stiffen, or sight grows a trifle more dim, 
youthful neglect of form exacts a disproportionate penalty.  So is it both in the art of 
government and in the sphere of industry.  As long as all goes well, before competition 
becomes severe, the rule of thumb may suffice; as conditions become more exacting 
and competitors multiply, results, even approximately equal, can be secured only by recourse to more scientific methods, by the generous use of fertilizers and the constant 
application of fresh capital.  In the language of the economist, the stage of diminishing 
returns is sooner or later, yet inevitably, reached.  But no sooner do we realize the need 
for precise thinking in politics than we turn instinctively to the Greeks and in particular 
to Aristotle. 
 
The Terminology of Politics 
Nor is the reason far to seek.  From Aristotle Political Science has derived alike its 
method and its terminology; from him it still draws much of its vital inspiration.  Aristotle 
occupies, indeed, a unique place in the development of the theory of the State.  Writing 
at the close of a great epoch in the history of mankind, he was able to survey a wide 
field of human experience, and from his survey to draw conclusions of permanent value 
to the [begin page 21] seeker after political truth.  The day of the autonomous city-state 
of Greece was over, and Aristotle's was the last word in Greek political philosophy.  The 
decay of the city-state and the oncoming of the world-empire were alike so rapid that 
Aristotle writing in the fourth century B.C. was probably unconscious of the imminent 
change.  His observations, taken before the symptoms of decay were palpable, 
possess therefore unique significance.  
 
Greek Politics. 
Happy in his time, Aristotle enjoyed other advantages.  Ancient Greece was as opulent 
in the variety of political phenomena as it was fortunate in their simplicity.  There were 
hundreds of city-states, each with its distinctive ethos, its dominant principle of 
government, its own inspiring spirit.  But the variety of phenomena was not more 
remarkable than their relative simplicity.  To this feature of Greek politics further 
reference will be made in the next chapter. 
 
Relieved of many anxious questions that obtrude themselves upon the modern citizen, 
alike in the sphere of religion and in that of Economics, the Greek could devote himself 
wholeheartedly to politics, and thus Aristotle could with accuracy insist that' man is a 
being designed by nature for citizenship'.  To critics absorbed in the affairs of the 
modern world the aphorism may appear to be exaggerated, perhaps even false, and 
certainly both inadequate and misleading.  Yet the phrase embodies, as no other single 
phrase does, the characteristic attitude of the Greek towards the theory and practice of 
politics.  So closely did the Greek identify the well-being of the citizen with the well-
being of the State, the health of the individual with that of the body politic, that he could 
not conceive of them apart.  Man, such is Aristotle's contention, cannot fulfil his 
manifest destiny except as a member of a political community.  The teleological 
principle, however different the application, is not less familiar to students of St. Paul 
than to students of Aristotle.  Just as, in Pauline phrase, the Christian 'fulfils himself' - 
accomplishes his purpose - in Christ, so in Aristotelian phrase [begin page 22] the 
'political animal' - the being whose' end' (τέλος) is the State - cannot, except as a 
member of a State, accomplish the purpose for which he came into the world. 
 
The Form of the State. 
  Aristotle, with inexorable logic, carries the argument even farther.  The form of the 
State was, in his view, of supreme importance to the moral life of the individual citizen.  
Since the State exists in order to enable the individual to live the highest life of which 
man is capable, so 'the virtue of the citizen must be relative to the Polity'.  A defect in 
the Constitution reacted unfavourably upon the life of the citizen.  To attain to the 
highest' virtue - the term in Greek is much more comprehensive than in English-man 
must live under an ideal Constitution.  The State being 'prior to the individual', the 
health of the member must be dependent upon the health of the whole body politic.   
 The Identity of the State. 
This identification explains the anxiety of the Greek as to the form of government.  The 
Constitution was to the State as the soul to the body.  More than that: the Constitution 
was the State.  Hence any alteration of the Constitution fatally impaired the identity of 
the State.  It was not with the Greeks a question of identity of territory or even of 
population. 
 
‘It would’, says Aristotle, 'be a very superficial view which considered only 
the place and the inhabitants; for the soil and the inhabitants may be 
separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in 
another. . . . 
 
Since the State is a community of citizens united in sharing one form of 
government, when the form of the government changes and becomes 
different, then it may be supposed that the State is no longer the same, just 




The modern view is characteristically different.  Identity is territorial not constitutional.  
France, for example, did not suffer any loss of identity in 1792 in consequence of the 
fundamental change in the form of government; nor in 1805; nor in 1814; nor in 1815; 
nor in 1830; [begin page 43] nor in 1848; nor in 1852; nor in 1870.  Debts are held to 
attach to territories, not to governments: consequently when Venetia passed from 
Austria to Italy, Italy became responsible for a portion of the Austrian debt.  The Greek 
view was much less material.  Each State had its own distinctive ethos, which not only 
impressed itself upon the character of the individual citizen, but demanded its 
appropriate type of education.  'That which most contributes to the permanence of 
constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government.'  
 
The point is so admirably brought out by the greatest of Aristotelian commentators that 
it is permissible to quote the passage in full:
2  
 
‘To Plato and Aristotle’, writes Mr. Newman, the constitution is a powerful 
influence for good or evil: it is only in the best State, says the latter, that the 
virtue of the good man and the virtue of the citizen coincide, whence it 
follows that constitutions other than the best require for their maintenance 
some other kind of virtue than that of the good man.  In the vaster States of 
today opinion and manners are slower to reflect the tendency of the 
constitution: in the small city-states of ancient Greece they readily took its 
colour.  It was thus that in the view of the Greeks every constitution had an 
accompanying ήθος, which made itself felt in all the relations of life.  Each 
constitutional form exercised a moulding influence on virtue; the good 
citizen was a different being in an oligarchy, a democracy, and an 
aristocracy.  Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended, 
consciously or not, to bring the lives of those living under it into harmony 
with its particular scheme.' 
 
The modern critic may hesitate, for obvious reasons, to accept, in a form so 
uncompromising, the Greek view as to the independence of Ethics and Politics, their 
insistence upon the close relation between the form of the Constitution and the 
character of the individual citizen.  Yet it is easy to perceive the ennobling influence 
                                                  
1   [22/1]  Politics, iii. 3.  
2   [23/1]  F.W. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, i. 209. which in the best minds it exerted upon the whole conception of Politics [begin page 24] 
and upon the performance of public duties. Of the actual conditions of government in 
the Greek city-states something will be said hereafter.  The philosophical conception of 
the State is a topic which, fascinating though it be, is too remote from the concrete 
problems with which this book is concerned to be permitted to detain us. 
 
So much, however, has seemed necessary in order to explain the importance attached 
by Greek thinkers to the form of the government and the classification of constitutions.  
To that subject we now pass.  
 
Aristotle's Classification of States. 
 In the demarcation of his political categories Aristotle started from, the conception of 
Sovereignty.  In every States State there is a supreme organ in which power is 
concentrated and to which all other organs are subordinate.  ‘The supreme power' he 
says, 'must be vested either in an individual, or in the few, or in the many.'  But to this 
purely quantitative basis of classification he was quick to add a qualitative differentia.  
The numerical principle must be corrected by an ethical standard.  That standard is 
found in concern for the good of the community.  The 'one' may rule either for the 
common good or for his own personal advantage; the 'few' or the ‘many' may equally 
have regard primarily to their own class interests or to those of the State.  Personal rule 
may be either selfish or altruistic; in the former case it is a Tyranny; in the latter a 
Monarchy (βσαιλεία).  Similarly, an Aristocracy is the rule of a minority exercised for the 
best interests of the State, while the rule of a few aiming at the promotion of their class 
interests is an Oligarchy.  The term Democracy having in Aristotle's day become 
discredited by the degeneration of the Greek cities, he applied it to the arbitrary rule of 
the many, while he described the unselfish rule of the masses as a Polity.   
Constitutions, therefore, were divided into two classes: (i) normal constitutions (δρθαί); 
and (ii) deviation-forms, corruptions, perversion (παρεκβάσεις).  As Tyranny is the 
perversion of Kingship, so is Oligarchy of Aristocracy, and Democracy of Polity. 
[begin page 25] 
 
A difficulty, however, suggests itself.  How shall we classify a Constitution in which the 
rich ruling in the interests of the rich are in a majority, or the poor ruling in the interests 
of the poor are in a minority?  Are we to have regard primarily to numbers or to wealth?  
Aristotle finally decides that the question of numbers is accidental, that of wealth is the 
essential point.  Oligarchy, therefore, is the rule of the rich, ruling in the interests of the 
rich, be they few or many.  Democracy is the rule of the poor, be they many or few, 
ruling in the interests of the poor.  To the modern critic the discussion may seem 
tiresome and even otiose, yet one of the greatest of Aristotelian commentators takes 
assuredly a correct view of the matter.  
 
‘The principle of classification’, says Mr. Newman, ‘adopted by Plato and 
Aristotle has the merit of directing attention to the ήθος and aim of 
constitutions as distinguished from their letter: we learn from it to read the 
character of a State, not in the number of its rulers, but in its dominant 
principle, in the attribute-be it wealth, birth, virtue, or numbers, or a 
combination of two or more of these-to which it awards supreme authority, 
and ultimately in the structure of its/ social system and the mutual relation 
of its various social elements.  If they erred in their principle of 
classification, it was from a wish to get to the heart of the matter.'
3.  
 
Aristotle defined the terminology of Political Science for many centuries.  The Romans, 
with all their genius for government, made but a meagre contribution to Political Theory. 
                                                  
3   [25/1]  Newman, Politics, i. 2, 25.  
Polybius on the Classification of States. 
Polybius did indeed include in his Histories  a brilliant disquisition on the Roman 
Constitution; but Polybius was a Greek.  The difficulty of analysis was, as he 
complained, increased not merely by the fact that he was a foreigner, but also by the 
intrinsic complexity of his subject.  These obstacles were, however, so successfully 
surmounted that the chapters devoted to this subject are perhaps the most arresting in 
his whole work, and, with [begin page 26] all respect to Mommsen, have stood 
remarkably well the tests imposed by the higher criticism. 
 
Incidentally Polybius discusses the classification of polities.  
 
It is undoubtedly the case', he writes, ' that most of those who profess to 
give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of 
constitution, which they designate kingship, aristocracy, democracy.  But in 
my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name 
these as being the only ones or the best.  In either case I think they are 
wrong.  For it is plain that we must regard as the best constitution that which 
partakes of all three elements. . . . Nor can we admit that these are the only 
forms; for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical 
forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from 
kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which 
account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the 
title of king.  Again, there have been many instances of oligarchical 
governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, 
if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be.' 
4
 
Upon the classification preferred by Polybius himself Aristotle's influence is evident.  
The numerical differentia will not, by itself, suffice.  The rule of one may be held to be a 
kingship only when his rule 'is accepted voluntarily and is directed by an appeal to 
reason rather than to fear and force'.  Otherwise it is a despotism.  Nor can every 
oligarchy be properly described as an aristocracy, but only where' the power is wielded 
by the justest and wisest men selected on their merits'.  Similarly the rule of the many 
may easily become nothing but mob-rule; the honourable designation of a democracy 
must be reserved for a government where' reverence to the gods, succour of parents, 
respect to elders, obedience to laws are traditional and habitual'.  Such communities, if 
the will of the majority prevail, are rightly spoken of as democracies; but it is not 
enough to constitute a demo- [begin page 27] cracy that' the whole crowd of citizens 
should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose "  
 
Cicero and Tacitus 
The criticism of Polybius is as pertinent as it is sound.  Cicero in his treatise on the 
State appears to claim originality for his analysis of a mixed form of government, and, 
in a passage of doubtful authenticity, accords to that form the palm of superiority, 
holding that 'the best form of government is a moderate mixture of royalty, nobility and 
democracy'.  In fact, however, Cicero was merely following the lead of Polybius, 
Tacitus, on the other hand, though ready to pay tribute to the theoretical merits of a 
'mixed' form of government, categorically denies its superiority in practice.  'All nations 
and cities', he writes, 'are ruled either by the people, or the nobles, or a single person: 
a form of commonwealth selected and combined from all these kinds is more easily 
praised than evolved, or if evolved, is not likely to endure.'
5
                                                  
4   [26/1]  Histories, vi. 3. 
5   [27/1]  Tacitus, Annals, Bk. IV, c, 33.   
The Middle Ages. 
Save for these exceptions there is little to detain the student of Political Theory 
between the decline of the Greek city-state and the revival of Greek learning in the 
Renaissance.  The Middle Ages, as Lord Bryce justly remarked, were essentially 
unpolitical.  The interval is, however, partially broken by two works which, despite the 
eminence of their authors, make little effective contribution to Political Science. 
 
Dante and Aquinas 
Dante's De Monarchia, inspired by the distracted condition of Italian politics, was, as 
we have seen, an elaborate argument in favour of the restoration of the world-empire of 
Rome.  The De Regimine Principum of Thomas Aquinas is on a somewhat different 
plane.  Aquinas was as much an apologist for the Papacy as was Dante for the Empire.  
None the less his work is truly representative of the Middle Ages.  As a French critic 
has said: 'it summarizes the Middle Ages, nay it is the Middle Ages; there you have 
collected, apparently for ever, all that the Middle Ages thought, and knew.'
6  It is more 
to our present purpose to observe that the De [begin page 28] Regimine contains a 
renewed attempt at classification.  In the earlier books of his treatise Aquinas 
endeavours to reconcile Aristotle and St. Augustine, treating the one as the highest 
exponent of purely human reason, the other as the apologist of Christian doctrine.   
Following in general the Aristotelian classification, particularly in regard to normal and 
perverted forms, Aquinas differs from him in holding Monarchy to be the best form of 
Polity.  'The chief good of Society’, he says, 'is that its unity be preserved which is 
called peace'; and this unity, he contends, is most likely to be preserved 'by that which 
is itself a unit'.  
 
Sir John Fortescue 
The last two books of the De Regimine are commonly regarded as spurious, the 
product of a hand later than that of Aquinas.  But spurious or not, they possess for the 
student of English political thought a special interest.  
 
From them Sir John Fortescue would seem to have derived the categories set forth in 
his  Governance of England.  Fortescue, following the later classification of the De 
Regimine, differentiates the forms of government as follows: (i) Dominium Regale or 
absolute monarchy; (ii) Dominium Politicum or republican government; and (iii) 
Dominium Politicum et Regale, a combination of the two, resulting in a constitutional 
monarchy.  The difference between the first and the third forms lies mainly, he insists, 
in the fact that' in the latter the subjects are not bound to obey any laws or pay any 
taxes to which they have not given their consent'.  To this latter category, Fortescue 
contends, the English constitution belongs.  Thus in the De Laudibus Legum Angliae 
he writes:  
 
‘A King of England cannot at his pleasure make any alterations in the laws 
of the land, for the nature of his government is not only legal but political. . . 
. He can neither make any alteration or change in the laws of the realm 
without the consent of the subjects nor burden them against their wills with 
strange impositions, so that a people governed by such laws as are made by 
their own consent and approbation [begin page 29] enjoy their properties 
securely and without the hazard of being deprived of them either by the 
King or any other.  . . . For he is appointed to protect his subjects in their 
lives, properties, and laws; for this very end and purpose he has the 
                                                  
6   [27/2]  B Paul Janet, Histoire de la Science politique, i, 3?9. delegation of power from the people and he has no just claim to any other 
power but this.'  
 
Sir John Fortescue, the exponent of Lancastrian Constitutionalism’, stood in the strict 
line of juristic apostolical succession.  His words, written in the middle of the fifteenth 
century, re-echo those of Bracton, the great jurist of the thirteenth: 
 
‘Rex autem habet superiorem, Deum scilicet; item legem per quam factus 
est rex; item curiam suam, videlicet comites, barones, quia comites dicuntur 
quasi socii regis, et qui habet socium habet magistrum: et ideo si rex fuerit 
sine fraeno, id est sine lege, debent ei fraenum ponere, nisi ipsimet fuerint 
cum rege sine fraeno.'  
 
As Fortescue echoes Bracton, so he anticipates the language of Sir Thomas Smith.  
The latter was writing, be, it noted, at the zenith of the Tudor dictatorship :  
 
Sir Thomas Smith. 
The most high and absolute power of the realm of England consisteth in the 
Parliament. . . . The Parliament abrogateth old laws, maketh new, giveth order for 
things past and for things hereafter to be followed, changeth rights and possessions of 
private men, legitimateth bastards, establisheth forms of religion, altereth weights and 
measures, giveth forms of succession to the Crown, defineth of doubtful rights whereof 
is no law already made, appointeth subsidies, tailles, taxes and impositions, giveth 
most free pardons and absolutions, restoreth in blood and name, as the highest court, 
condemneth or absolveth them whom the prince will put to that trial.  And to be short, 
all that ever the people of Rome might do, either in centuriatis comitiis or tributis, the 
same may be done by the Parliament of England, which representeth and hath the 
power of the whole realm, both the head and the body.  For every Englishman is 
intended to be there present, either in person or by procuration and attorney, . . . from 
the prince, (be he king or queen) to the lowest person of England.  And the consent of 
the parliament is taken to be every man's consent. . . .' 
[begin page 30] 
 
Hooker 
The language of the great jurist is endorsed by that of the philosopher-ecclesiastic.  
'Lex facit regem’, writes the ‘judicious' Hooker; the king's grant of any favour made 
contrary to the law is void; what power the king hath he hath it by law, the bounds and 
limits of it are known.' 
 
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury 
In constitutional doctrine there is, therefore, unbroken continuity; but it is not until the 
publication of the Leviathan (1651) that the attempt to obtain a scientific basis of 
classification is renewed.  Hobbes, like Aristotle, starts from the theory of Sovereignty, 
but, unlike Aristotle, he declares unequivocally for the simple numerical differentia:  
 
‘The difference of Commonwealths', he writes, ' consisteth in the difference 
of the Sovereign or the Person representative of all and everyone of the 
multitude.  And because the Sovereignty is either in one Man, or in an 
assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either Every man hath 
right to enter, or not everyone, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; 
it is manifest there can be but Three kinds of Commonwealth.  For the 
Representative must needs be One man or more; and if more then it is the 
Assembly of all, or but of a part.  When the Representative is one man then 
is the Commonwealth a Monarchy; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a Democracy or Popular Commonwealth: when an 
Assembly of a part only, then it is called an Aristocracy.  Other kind of 
Commonwealth there can be none: for either One or more or all must have 
the Sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.'  
 
Of Aristotle's deviation forms or perversions Hobbes will have none:  
 
‘There be other names of Government', he writes, ‘in the Histories and 
books of Policy; as Tyranny and Oligarchy: but they are not the names of 
other forms of Government, but of the same formes misliked.  For they that 
are discontented under Monarchy call it Tyranny; and they that are 
displeased with Aristocracy call it Oligarchy; so also they which find 
themselves grieved under a Democracy call it Anarchy (which signifies 
want of Government): and yet I think (he adds) no man believes that want of 
Government is any new kind of Government; nor by the same reason [begin 
page 31] ought they to believe that the Government is of one kind when 




Other supposed varieties of the three normal forms, as for instance elective monarchy, 
are really due, so Hobbes contends, to loose thinking.  An elected king, if he has the 
right to nominate a successor, is virtually hereditary; if he has not the right, he is not 
Sovereign.  Sovereignty would in 'that case reside with those who have the right to 
elect the successor'.  Similarly in regard to so-called 'limited Monarchy’, the 
Sovereignty resides not in the Monarchy, but in the Assembly, be it democratic or 
aristocratic, which imposes the limitation.  Hobbes, therefore, is at one with Rousseau 
in holding that though power may be delegated, Sovereignty is indivisible, and, with 
one qualification, irresponsible.  The Sovereign must, he admits, submit to the law of 
nature; that is, he must fulfil the purpose for which the State exists and provide for the 
peace and security of the people.'  The difference between these three kinds of 
Commonwealth consisteth not in the difference of Power, but in the difference of   
Convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people for which end 
they were instituted.'
8  And of these three kinds of Commonwealth which best attains 
the supreme end of Government?  
 
Without hesitation Hobbes answers 'Monarchy'.  There are inconveniences attaching to 
this as to all forms of government; a subject, for instance, may be arbitrarily deprived of 
all his property for the enrichment of some favourite or flatterer.  But Assemblies, both 
Aristocratic and Democratic, are open to the same objection and greater.  For while a 
monarch has but few favourites, an assembly has many; and the subject will suffer the 
degradation not of one man or a few, but of many.  Again, it is inconvenient when the 
Sovereignty descends upon an infant or an idiot.  There is apt to be a struggle for the 
Guardianship or Protectorate; but this [begin page 32] difficulty is in a Monarchy only 
exceptional; in aft Assembly it is normal, Assemblies being constantly exposed to the 
danger of party factions and disputes.  
 
On the other hand, Monarchy has advantages which are all its own.  First: in 
Monarchies private and public interests coincide: 'The riches, power, and honour of a 
Monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects.  For no 
king can be rich nor glorious nor secure; whose subjects are either poor, or 
contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their 
enemies.'  In the other two forms the private interests of a corrupt or ambitious 
                                                  
7   [31/1]  Leviathan, c. xix. 
8   [31/2]  Ibid. statesman often runs counter to the welfare of the State.  Secondly: a king can always 
command the best advice and can obtain it in confidence.  An assembly acts on advice 
of silver-tongued orators.  Thirdly: a king is less inconstant than a shifting assembly, 
and is likely therefore to pursue a steadier and more consistent policy.  Fourthly: a 
monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest; but an assembly may; 
and that to such a height as may produce a civil war.'  The Leviathan was, in one 
sense, a livre de circonstance.  Hobbes's views are manifestly coloured, indeed 
inspired, by the chaotic condition of the country at the time at which he wrote.  He 
looked to the strong hand of a Protector, not yet proclaimed, to redeem it.  Still, 
whatever permanent value may attach to his conclusions, no other English philosopher 
has been at equal pains to analyse the 'different kinds of Commonwealth', or to discuss 
in so much detail the problem, which to the Greeks appeared of super-eminent 
significance, as to the form of the State. 
  
Locke 
If Hobbes is the apologist of absolute Sovereignty, whether exercised by hereditary 
Monarch or by Protector, Locke is the purveyor of political philosophy to the Whig 
aristocracy of the eighteenth century.  He provided, perhaps superfluously, a 
philosophical apology for the Revolution of 1688, and the strictly limited monarchy 
which ultimately emerged therefrom.  Ac- [begin page 33] cording to Locke the true 
basis for the classification of States is to be found in the position of the Legislature.  At 
the dawn of civil society all power is vested in the majority.  If this majority retains the 
legislative power in its own hands and keeps the Executive in subordination to it then 
'the form of the Government is a perfect Democracy'.  If they put the legislative power 
into the hands of a few select men and their heirs and successors, it is an oligarchy; if 
into the hands of one it is a monarchy, either hereditary or elective.  The true criterion is 
found in the position of the Legislature.  
 
The form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power 
which is the legislative (it being impossible to conceive that an inferior 
power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws) 





From the English philosophers of the seventeenth century to the greatest of the political 
philosophers of France it is a long step.  The Esprit des Lois (1748) is separated 
chronologically from the Two Treatises of Government (1689) by little more than half a 
century but philosophically and critically there is a great gulf between.  The method of 
Locke, like that of Hobbes, is purely abstract; Montesquieu has some claim to be 
regarded as the father of the modern historical method.  As regards the form of the 
State he does not depart widely from his predecessors.  His categories are republics, 
monarchies, and tyrannies.  A Republican government was one in which the people as 
a body or even apart of the people has the sovereign power; monarchical that in which 
a single person governs, but only by fixed and established laws; while in despotic 
government a single person, without any law or rule, administers everything according 
to his will and caprice.
10  
 
Burke is concerned rather with the art of Government [begin page 34] than with the 
science of Politics; and though much his teaching fulfils Aristotle's 'law of the universal’ 
makes no direct contribution to the theory of classification.  To him the State is not a 
human but a divine institution, and he pours ridicule alike upon Locke’s doctrine of the 
                                                  
9   [33/1]  Second Treatise on Government, c. x, § 132.  
10   [33/2]  Esprit des Lois, Bk. II, c. i. 'Social Contract' and upon Rousseau’s Sovereignty of the People.  The English 
utilitarians gave little thought or at any rate little space to the question under review. 
  
German Philosophy 
To the German philosophers, on the contrary, it makes, as would be expected, a more 
direct appeal.  Schleiermacher,
11 F. Rohmer,




15 all devoted considerable space to this branch of Political Theory; but it is 
to Treitschke
16 that we turn for the characteristic German treatment of this problem of 
government.  Treitschke is a pure Aristotelian in method if not in conclusions, and he 
subjects the various forms of government to a peculiarly penetrating analysis. 
 
Treitschke’s Theory of The State. 
With the discussion as to the ideal form of government Treitschke will have nothing to 
do; every constitution must be judged exclusively with reference to the circumstances 
of the State and people for which it is designed.  He is thus in accord with the best 
traditions of Positivist philosophy: 'The historian must be content to ask “Which form of 
state and of law was best suited to a particular nation at a particular time".  For the 
modern State, Theocracy may be ruled out since it implies a bondage to a primitive 
moral code which could not be tolerated in any free and progressive nation.   
Democracy fares little better at his hands: ' for the very word "Democracy" contains a 
contradiction in terms.  The notion of ruling implies the existence of a class that is 
ruled; but if all are to rule where is this class to be found?  A genuine democracy, 
logically carried out, [begin page 35] aims at a goal which, like that of a Theocracy, is 
impossible.  Both have in common the convulsive effort to attain an idea which by its 
nature is unattainable.'  To Aristocracy, as exemplified by England in the eighteenth 
century, he cannot and does not refuse his meed of admiration.  His ‘own dear teacher 
Dahlmann' was an ardent advocate for constitutional monarchy, but it is significant that 
it was the English constitutional monarchy of the eighteenth century that Dahlmann 
also had in mind.
17  Constitutional monarchy is, however, to the Prussian school of 
publicists an English exotic.  It would obviously be undesirable,' writes Treitschke, 'even 
if it were possible, that a monarchical system like the English, which is the product of 
peculiar historical circumstances, should be adopted in its entirety by other States.'  As 
worked by the English aristocracy it was admirably suited to the English genius, and 
achieved great things for the people to whom it owed its birth.  The English Parliament 
in its great days was a worthy counterpart of the Roman Senate.  England was then an 
aristocratic republic in the grand style. . . . The necessity for an aristocratic party 
government was based on the whole history of the State.  And this party government 
accomplished great things.  It raised England to the position of the leading commercial 
power; but it could endure only so long as the aristocracy was really the first class in 
the land and was recognized as such.  After the beginning of the nineteenth century 
this state of things began gradually to change.'  For the English democracy - the 
Parlamentarismus - of the nineteenth century Treitschke has the contempt 
characteristic of the school to which he belonged.  He admits that the democratic idea 
'has a certain sublimity' and even that 'at a certain stage of national civilization a 
democracy may assist the progress of culture '; but it is for monarchy of the Prussian 
type, an autocracy served by a devoted and efficient civil service, that his real 
                                                  
11   [34/1]  Ueber die Begriffe der verschiedenen staatsformen. 
12   [34/2]  Lehre van den palitischen Parteien. 
13   [34/3]  Staatswissenschaft.  
14   [34/4]  Grundzuge der Palitik. 
15   [34/5]  Lehre vam modernen staat (Eng. trans., Clarendon Press, 1885).   
16   [34/6]  Die Palitik. 
17   [35/1]  His treatise on Politics was published in 1835. admiration is reserved.  To him the essential forms of government are three:  [begin 
page 36] 
 
Theocracy, Monarchy, and Democracy: and although he declines to arrange them' in 
order of moral rank', he unhesitatingly prefers, for his own country, the second. 
 
Treitschke's treatise on Politics is in some respects the most comprehensive since the 
days of Aristotle; nor is it in criticism the least acute; but to the scientific problem of 
classification it makes, as we have seen, but a slender contribution. 
 
Seeley 
Sir John Seeley's lectures on Political Science were posthumously published in the 
year of Treitschke's death (1896).  The biographer of Stein had something in common 
with the Prussian school.  Like Treitschke, Seeley drew much of his inspiration from 
Pertz's Life of Stein, but he approached the problems of statecraft from the point of 
view not of a Prussian Regierungscommissar but of an English constitutionalist.  His 
Cambridge lectures, despite an inevitable tenuity of treatment, represent the first real 
attempt to review, in the light of modern history, the accepted canons of classification.  
The style, as befits oral teaching, is hortatory and discursive rather than literary; none 
the less it must be conceded that Seeley was the first to perceive or at least to proclaim 
that the 'accepted classification suggested originally by the very partial and peculiar 
experience of the Greek philosophers' must be abandoned as inadequate and 
inapplicable to the conditions of the modern world.  He held that a fresh classification 
was the primary duty which lay before the modern student of Political Science, and he 
accordingly devoted the main portion of a course of academic lectures at Cambridge to 
this problem.
18  He did not underrate the difficulty of his task, but he regarded its 
importance as proportioned to its complexity. 
 
He proposed as his first and perhaps most comprehensive differentia the motive or 
binding force which holds States together.  On this basis of classification States may be 
placed (in an ascending political scale) in three categories: first, tribal communities 
which, like primitive [begin page 37] Rome, are held together by the tie of kindred; 
secondly, the Theocratic State which depends upon community of religion; and thirdly, 
the Political State which is based upon community of interest.  Manifestly, however, 
there is another tie which cannot be ignored, force. 
 
‘Sheer superiority of force on the part of the ruling class inspiring first terror 
and after a certain time inert passive resignation - this is the explanation of 
perhaps half the States in the world.  But force is not in pari materia with 
kindred, religion or interest, and such States, due to violent incorporation, 
must be described as “inorganic”, since they rest upon something quite 
unlike the natural organic union out of which the living State grows.’ 
  
The formula thus proposed can hardly be accepted as scientifically satisfactory.   
Valuable as an historical generalization it seems to be analytically inadequate.  It 
neither covers nor explains the facts by which, in the modern world, we are confronted; 
it does not really i provide a scientific differentia.  Before it can be accepted an initial 
difficulty must indeed be investigated.  Can a tribal community or even a Theocracy be 
properly described as a State?  The Ireland of the tenth century, for example, was not 
strictly a State; it was a congeries of tribal communities.  The Jews under the Mosaic 
dispensation were a self-conscious nation; not until they had asked for and obtained a 
king did they form a State. 
 
                                                  
18   [36/1]  Introduction to Political Science, by Sir J.R. Seeley (1896). We may pass, however, to the second differentia  proposed by Seeley: the 
proportionate sphere occupied by central and local government respectively.  Adopting 
this basis he divided States into (i) the city-state, and (ii) the country-state.  In the 
former category would be included the typical States of ancient Greece; medieval 
States, such as Venice, Florence, and Geneva, and Imperial cities, like Frankfurt and 
Bremen.  In these, local government as distinct from central did not exist.  The latter 
terms would embrace practically all the States of the modern world.  These, however, 
demand further classification as follows: 
 
(a)   Unitary States such as [begin page 38] France, which are highly 
centralized; 
(b)   States like the United Kingdom, in which, though technically unitary, 
local government occupies a very large and important sphere; 
(c)   Federal States where local government actually predominates, as in 
the United States of America; and 
(d)   Confederations, such as the German Bund of 1815 or the old Helvetic 
Confederacy, where the power of central government was reduced to 
a minimum.  
 
We have here a differentiating principle of real value to the student of contemporary 
Politics, and it will demand further and more detailed examination in a later section of 
this chapter.  
 
A third basis of classification is discovered in the kind and degree of 'liberty' enjoyed by 
a State.  Liberty is, of course, an ambiguous term: it may refer primarily to national 
independence, the absence of external restraint; or to the limitation of the province of 
government; or to the participation of the governed in government.  It is in the third 
sense that Seeley presses the word into service as a classifying differentia.  From this 
point of view States are divided by him into (a) despotisms; and (b) governments by 
Assembly.  The latter are distinguished by the possession of a 'government-making 
organ’ - the absence or presence of organized and recognized machinery by means of 
which the actual government or administrations can be changed within the limits of the 
law and the constitution and without recourse to B revolution.  Under the application of 
this list England only ceased to be a despotism after the Revolution of 1688 and the 
adoption of the principle of' responsible government'.  
 
Here again we seem to possess a differentiating principle of considerable value, 
though the terminology is unnecessarily cumbrous and involved.  
 
Finally, Seeley classifies States according to the basis - broad or narrow - on which 
government rests.  The former he describes as Democracies - States in which the 
many govern in the interests of all; the latter as Aris- [begin page 39] tocracies, which 
show, in fact, a constant tendency towards Oligarchy, where the interests of the many 
are sacrificed to those of the few.  It will be perceived that Seeley is here getting on to 
ground already traversed in connexion with the categories of Aristotle, and further 
discussion is, therefore, unnecessary. 
 
The foregoing investigation into the history of Political Theory, though cursory and 
incomplete, would seem at least to have established one negative conclusion: that the 
classical categories are inadequate to the conditions prevailing in the modern world.  
To divide the great States of today into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies 
would obviously not carry us very far, even if we could anticipate universal assent to 
the resulting classification.  To which of the three categories must we assign, for 
example, the Constitution of Great Britain and the United States respectively?  If the 
term 'democracy’ be claimed, as it must be, for republican America, can it be denied to 
England, still monarchical in form but in some essential respects more democratic than 
the United States?  Again, it is obvious that there were far more points in common between the Constitutions of the German Empire and the American Republic than 
between those of republican America and republican France.  The neighbouring 
republics of France and Switzerland had less in common, again, than Switzerland and 
Imperial Germany.  Monarchical England was less akin to monarchical Russia than to 
republican France. 
  
New bases of classification 
These four instances, which might be indefinitely multiplied, are sufficient to suggest 
the need for a new basis of classification.  They do more; they indicate the direction in 
which it must be sought.  Setting aside certain oriental despotisms of the type of Persia 
or Afghanistan and confining attention to a few of the greater States of the modern 
world, what is the conclusion which emerges?  Let the following States be taken as 
typical: the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, [begin page 40] Belgium, Japan, Chile, 
the United States, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Brazil, Mexico, and the Argentine 
Republic.  On a bare enumeration it will be at once apparent that on one intelligible 
differentia these States fall into two distinct groups; the first seven, differing inter se, 
have this in common: they are all Unitary States; the last seven, similarly differing inter 
se, are all Composite or Federal States.  
 
Unitary and Federal 
The fact which thus emerges would seem to suggest the first and perhaps the most 
fundamental basis of classification: modern States may be divided into Unitary  or 
Federal.  To the former class we must assign, among others, France, Italy, Spain, 
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Portugal, 
Japan, Chile, Peru, Bolivia; to the latter, Germany, Imperial or republican, the United 
States, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Argentine 
Republic.  It is more difficult to classify the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the constitution 
of which, though formerly federal, has tended more and more towards the unitary type; 
but of all the States thus enumerated the most ambiguous as regards constitutional 
position is Great Britain.  Even in the Constitution of the United Kingdom there is, as 
will be shown hereafter, a large admixture of federalism.  In that of the British Empire 
there would seem to be more.  At first sight it is difficult to assign Great Britain, with its 
'Imperial’ Parliament with the statutory and technically subordinate Legislatures in 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and elsewhere, with its vast network of 
Crown Colonies and Dependencies, to the unitary group.  Nor would it always have 
been accurate to do so.  In the past England and even Great Britain would have been 
accurately classified as a Composite State.  Between 1603 and 1707 England and 
Scotland, between 1714 and 1837 Great Britain and Hanover were united in a 
'personal union' - comparable with, but less intimate than, the union which formerly 
existed between Austria and Hungary.  Between [begin page 41] 1782 and 1800 there 
were in Great Britain and Ireland two Parliaments - nominally co-ordinate - and united 
only by the connecting link of a common Monarchy.  But since 1801 there has been no 
independent Legislature in the British Empire; and this must be regarded as the 
ultimate and discriminating test.  For the whole British Empire Sovereignty is vested in 
the 'Imperial' Parliament, i.e. in King, Lords, and Commons sitting at Westminster.  The 
British Empire is, therefore, technically a 'unitary State'.  
 
Rigid and Flexible 
A second basis of classification may be found in the character of the Constitution itself.  
Constitutions may be distinguished as Rigid and Flexible.  A Rigid Constitution is one 
which can be altered and amended only by the employment of some special, and 
extraordinary, and prescribed machinery, distinct from the machinery of ordinary 
legislation.  A Flexible  Constitution is one in which amendment takes place by the 
ordinary process of law-making-and indeed of administration, in which there is no 
formal distinction between 'constitutional' and ordinary laws, between (as Cromwell put 
it) ‘fundamentals’ and 'circumstantials’.  In other words, Constitutions are differentiated by the position, authority, and functions of the Legislature.  Under rigid Constitutions its 
function is merely legislative - to make laws under the limitations of the Constitution; 
under flexible Constitutions its function is not only legislative but constituent; not only to 
enact, to amend, and repeal laws, but to make and modify the Constitution.  At the 
opposite poles, in this respect, stand the Constitutions of England and the United 
States, though the latter is less rigid in practice, if not in theory, than it formerly was. 
 
The mention of England and America necessitates at this point a word of caution.  A 
'rigid' Constitution is no longer - if it ever was - identical with a written Constitution.  As 
a matter of fact a written Constitution is usually ‘rigid’ in the sense that it provides 
special machinery for its own amendment.  But the rule is not invariable, least so in 
Constitutions modelled on that of England.  [begin page 42] Thus the Italian Statuto 
'contains no provision for amendment, but can be, and in fact has been altered by the 
ordinary process of legislation; and the same thing was true of the French Charter of 
1830.  The last Spanish Constitution omits all provision for amendment, but one may 




Nevertheless the distinction between 'written' and ‘unwritten' Constitutions would in 
practice correspond so closely to that between 'Rigid' and 'Flexible' that it is not worth 
while to suggest it as a separate basis of classification.  
 
Parliamentary and Presidential 
A third differentia may be found in the position of the Executive and in particular the 
relation of the Executive to the Legislature.  The Executive may be either superior to, 
co-ordinate with, or subordinate to the Legislature. 
 
In an autocracy the Executive is supreme.  Of such autocracies we have examples in 
the former Russian Empire and in many non-European despotisms such as Persia, 
Abyssinia, or Afghanistan.  The former German Empire tended to the same type, for the 
Bundesrat which shared power to some extent with the Emperor was essentially an 
aggregate of the Executives of the Constituent States rather than a branch of the 
Imperial Legislature.  In no sense was the Imperial Executive responsible to the 
Legislature.  Switzerland stands at the opposite pole in this respect, the Federal 
Council being not merely subordinate to the Legislature, but actually its agent, if not 
indeed the agent of the electorate.
20  In the United States the Executive is co-ordinate 
in authority with the Legislature, and the United States has afforded a model for the 
federal republics of South America-Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Argentine.  In 
France, on the other hand, the Legislature is supreme over the Executive, as it is, 
technically at least, in Great Britain, and in the constitutional monarchies, such as Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, [begin page 43] and Greece,
21 which have adopted the English model.  
To the Executives of non-parliamentary States of the American type we may apply the 
term Presidential; ‘responsible governments’ based upon the English model may be 
distinguished as Parliamentary.  
 
The typical States of the modern world would seem, therefore, to fall into three 
categories, according as their Constitutions are: 
 
(i)   Unitary or Federal; 
(ii)   Rigid or Flexible; 
(iii)   Presidential or Parliamentary. 
                                                  
19   [42/1]  Lowell, The Government of England, i. 3.  
20   [42/2]  See infra, c. iv. 
21   [43/1]  Written before the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship in Italy, and the 
declaration of a Republic in Greece.  
It will, of course, be obvious that the suggested categories involve a 'cross' 
classification; the Constitutions, for example, of Australia and the United States have 
federalism and rigidity in common, but the former is parliamentary and the latter 
presidential.  Similarly, France and England are alike unitary and parliamentary, but the 
Constitution of the former is, technically, rigid, that of the latter in the highest degree 
flexible.  Nevertheless, the suggested categories, it is contended, do afford what the 
classical categories do not, intelligible differentiae on the basis of which the States of 
the modern world may be classified with some approach to scientific accuracy, and with 
some regard to the realities of constitutional procedure.  
 
It will not, however, escape observation that to all these States, whether their 
Constitutions be federal or unitary, rigid or flexible, presidential or parliamentary, the 
title 'democratic' could hardly be denied.  Yet the democracy of Switzerland is obviously 
of a different type, colour, and texture from that of Belgium; that of the United States 
from that of Great Britain; that of Australia from that of France.  It would seem, 
therefore, to be desirable to examine, in some detail, the implications of the term; the 
next Book will consequently be concerned with varying types of 'democracy '.  
  
Book II 




III. Direct Democracy  
The City-State of Greece  
 
‘It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the 
hands of the many and not of the few.  But while the law secures equal 
justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also 
recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred 
to the public service not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. . 
. . There is no exclusiveness in our public life and in our private intercourse 
we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he 
does what he likes. . . . While we are thus unconstrained in our private 
intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented 
from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws. . . as well 
as for those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressors of them the 
reprobation of the general sentiment.' - Pericles, Funeral Oration  ap. 
Thucydides, ii. 37.  
 
‘Athenes n'etait point en effet une democratie, mais une aristocratie tres 
tyrannique, gouvernee par des savants et des orateurs.' - Rousseau, 
Economie publique. 
  
‘Democracy is the progress of all through all under the leading of the best 
and wisest.' - Mazzini, Duties of Man.  
 
‘What is curious is that the same persons who tell you that democracy is a 
form of government under which the supreme power is vested in all the 
members of a state will also tell you that the Athenian Commonwealth was a 
democracy.' - Bentham, Fragment on Government.  
 
Democracy: Direct and Indirect. 
Few words in the terminology of Political Science have given rise to greater confusion 
of thought than 'democracy' and 'democratic'.  Democracy, as defined by the Oxford 
Dictionary, means 'government by the people, direct or representative: the politically 
unprivileged class'.  The second usage, though common, is inaccurate, and throughout 
this work the term will be used to signify a form of government under which supreme 
power is vested in the many. 
 
Within this general definition it is, however, possible and important to distinguish certain 
widely differing types.  Of these the most broadly distinguishable are direct and 
representative democracy.  In the former [begin page 48] supreme power is 
continuously vested in the whole body of citizens; in the latter the actual exercise of 
authority is delegated to elected representatives.  But even of indirect democracy there 
is, as will be shown, more than one variety.   
In order to bring into relief the salient characteristics of various types of government to 
which in common (and not without justification) the term 'democracy' is applied, it is 
proposed to examine, in broad outline, the outstanding features of the democratic 
State, as exemplified respectively by the constitutions of Athens, of the Swiss 
Confederation, of the United States, and of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
  
The Greek City-State. 
It is to the brilliant achievements of Hellas and in particular to the great part played in 
history by the Athenian Commonwealth that the apologists for democracy are wont 
most frequently to appeal.  A closer scrutiny of certain features of Athenian democracy 
would seem, as Bentham suggests, to render the appeal somewhat incautious if not 
incongruous.  Athens, at the zenith of her fame and prosperity, was dominated by the 
genius and character of Pericles.  'Though still in name a democracy Athens’, says 
Thucydides, ‘was in fact ruled by her leading citizen.'
1  Yet, as Pericles himself in the 
classical passage prefixed to this chapter reminded his countrymen, their government 
was described as a democracy, and no attempt to pierce, beyond words, to the heart of 
things can afford to neglect the Athenian example. 
 
Simplification of Political Phenomena. 
There are, moreover, several specific reasons why a study of the structure of the 
modern State should begin with an analysis of the Athenian Constitution.  The first, as 
indicated in the preceding chapter, is the relative simplicity of the phenomena and the 
consequent simplification of the problems which called for solution.  Many of the 
problems by which the citizen-ruler of the modern State is perplexed confronted also 
the Athenians; but the environment was far less complicated.  Take [begin page 40] 
education.  Many of the principles which govern or ought to govern the educational 
systems of modern democracies were first enunciated by Plato and Aristotle, But for 
them educational problems were not complicated, as for better or worse they are in the 
modern State, by questions of creed and ecclesiastical traditions.  Consequently the 
atmosphere of the discussion was sterilized; the Greeks could analyse the phenomena 
in a dry light. 
 
‘Church and State.’ 
It was not only, however, in the sphere of education that Politics were simplified in the 
Greek State by the absence of a 'Church'.  To say that the Greeks had no ‘Church' is 
not, of course, to suggest that they had no religion.  But although their hierarchy of 
Deities was an ample one and though they indulged in elaborate ritual they were not 
like the Hebrews, essentially a religious people; they had little interest in theological 
speculation, and, above all, they had no ecclesiastical organization distinct from and in 
potential antagonism to the State.  To the Greek the State was the Church; the Church 
was the State.  Consequently there could for him be no problem of 'Church and State' 
such as that which perplexed and distracted the citizen of the medieval State, and is, 
even yet, far from complete solution.  Hellas the nurse of man complete as man, 
Judaea pregnant with the living God.'  
 
In order to estimate the measure of simplification thus achieved for the Greek State we 
have only to eliminate from our own history the pages which recite the contest between 
the claims of the Church and those of the secular ruler - personal or democratic.  From 
the days of William the Norman and Pope Hildebrand down to the enactment which 
legalized marriage with a deceased wife's sister, the conflict has been almost 
unceasing, and has supplied material for acute and embittered controversies.  Of this 
conflict of loyalties, of the claims, sometimes irreconcilable, of the Church and the 
                                                  
1   [48/1]  ii. 65. State, the Greek knew nothing, and by the absence of this factor alone political 
problems were immeasurably simplified.  [begin page 50] 
 
Slavery 
Not less important, in the same connexion, was the institution of slavery.  It is a truism 
to say that in the modern State Politics have, to a great extent, been merged in 
Economics.  Even among the free citizens of Athens there were, it is true, violent 
contrasts of wealth and poverty.  Those contrasts were a source of perpetual anxiety 
both to statesmen like Solon, and to philosophers like Aristotle.  But the conflicts which 
arise from the economic organization of the modern State were almost entirely 
eliminated from the Greek State owing to the fact that the economic substratum of 
society was supplied by slaves.  In Aristotle's day the morality and even the political 
expediency of slavery as an institution was seriously impugned.  Aristotle did not 
indeed shrink from a defence of it.  He defended it not only as an institution essential to 
the life of leisure for the free citizen, and fundamentally essential, therefore, to the 
experiment of direct democracy, but also as an institution natural in itself, and mutually 
advantageous alike to master and man. 
  
To the modern mind familiar only with the history of negro slavery Aristotle's argument 
is apt to appear fantastic and paradoxical.  The treatment of Athenian slaves was, 
however, almost invariably gentle and humane, and socially they differed little from the 
poorer classes of free citizens.  Moreover, the institution was commended to Aristotle 
by the 'harmony of nature'.  Not a few men are 'naturally slaves'; the principle of rule 
and subordination pervades all Nature.  The lower animals are subordinated to man; in 
man the body is subordinated to the soul; within the soul appetite is subordinated to 
intellect.  For the 'natural slave' - and there are many such - a life of subjection to a 
noble master is as truly advantageous as the subordination of the body to the soul.  
This doctrine of' natural slavery and its mutual advantage does indeed presuppose, as 
Francis Newman pointed out, 'not only a low intellectual level in the slave, but high 
moral and intellectual excel- [begin page 51] lence in the master.’
2  The weaker nature 
might thus gain by association with the stronger.  But this argument cannot be pursued; 
it suffices for the immediate purpose to indicate the immense simplification of political 
phenomena due to the institution of slavery, and, even more, its fundamental 
importance in the actual working of Athenian democracy.  A modem scholar does not 
go too far in saying that without the slave class Athenian democracy, at least in its final 
form, 
 
‘would not have been possible.  The four hundred thousand Athenian slaves 
of the fifth and fourth century were the “necessary condition” of Athenian 
development.  They were the “living instruments” of the household and the 
farm, they worked for the wealthy contractor in the mines, they manned the 
merchant fleet, and they sometimes formed a class of country tenants who 
paid, like the helots, a fixed proportion of the produce to the leisured 
masters in the City.
3
 
Simplicity and Variety. 
In these, and in other ways, Greek politics were, as compared with politics in the States 
of the modern world, greatly simplified.  Relative simplicity of phenomena was, 
however, combined with a rich variety of constitutional types.  Each of the little Greek 
States had its own distinctive ethos; each was founded upon a dominant principle; each 
was inspired by a spirit peculiar to itself.  Progress in political and social science 
depends largely upon the avoidance of dull and drab uniformity and the preservation of 
                                                  
2   [51/1]  The Politics of Aristotle, i, p. 144. 
3   [51/2]  Greenidge, Handbook of Greek Constitutional History, p. 132. a variety of political types.  Two great teachers have recently borne concurrent 
testimony to this truth: 
 
'The mere fact', writes Mr. H.A.L. Fisher, 'of this variety is an enrichment of 
human experience and a stimulus to self-criticism and improvement. Indeed, 
the existence of small States operates in the large and imperfect economy of 
the European system very much in the same way as the principle of 
individual liberty operates in any given State, preventing the formation of 
those massive and deadening weights of conventional opinion which impair 
the free play of [begin page 52] individuality, and affording a corrective to 
the vulgar idea that the brute force of organised numbers is the only thing 
which really matters in the world.
4
 
Similarly, Professor Ramsay Muir writes:  
 
‘one of the reasons for the gradual decay of civilization in the period of the 
Roman Empire was just that the Romans had succeeded (in spite of their 
tolerance) in impressing too high a degree of uniformity upon the world. . . . 
The greatest security for the progress and vitality of civilization is that there 
should be the greatest possible variety among civilized States.'
5  
 
The Greeks secured this indispensable condition by the continued independence of a 
number of small States and by the multiplication of many types of constitution.  
 
Thus, in more than one way, Greek democracy was, sui generis, but before passing to 
an analysis of the actual Greek Polity, it may be well to examine, very briefly, the theory 
of Greek democracy as expounded by its most brilliant apologist.  In this way we may, 
perhaps, best, avoid the confusion likely to arise from simultaneous excursions into 
history and philosophy, without sacrificing the illumination derived from either. 
 
Aristotle's analysis of the theory of democracy. 
Aristotle, whose general outlook upon politics was, as we have already hinted, 
conservative, has vindicated in a notable passage the political capacity of the many:  
‘Any member of the Assembly taken separate is certainly inferior to the wise man.  But 
the State is made up of many individuals.  And as a feast to which all the guests 
contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better 
judge of many things than any individual.'
6  Plato, on the contrary, held that the science 
of ruling was more likely to be found in the one or the few than the many, and it is 
noteworthy that the species of democracy favoured by Aristotle was of the moderate 
type to which he gave the [begin page 53] name 'Polity' or Constitutional Government 
par excellence (πολιτεία) and which he carefully distinguished from the more extreme 
type, instituted by the Athenians in the fourth century and described in the second part 
of Aristotle's Constitution of Athens.  
 
To Aristotle the basis of a democratic State is liberty and equality; it is founded on the 
assumption that, those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects: because 
men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal'.
7  Liberty, he held, is 
unquestionably the supreme end of democracy.  How does democracy propose to 
attain it?  The primary condition is that all should rule and be ruled in turn; the 
                                                  
4   [52/1]  The Value of Small States, p. 15.  
5   [52/2]  The National Principle and the War, p.5.  
6   [52/3]  Politics, iii. 15. 
7   [53/1]  V. I. 3. magistrates should be selected 'by all out of all, not by vote but by lot; there should be 
no property qualification or only a very low one'; the tenure of office should be brief; 
and no one should hold the same office twice in succession, ‘or not often’ except in the 
case of military officers.  The judges should be popularly elected, but over the Judiciary, 
as over the Executive, the Assembly should be supreme. 
 
Its Dangers. 
Another characteristic of democracy is payment for service: 'assembly, law courts, 
magistrates, everybody receives pay when it is to be had'; but herein lurks a danger, 
especially in the later stages of democracy, when the 'cities have far outgrown their 
original size and their revenues have increased'.  In such circumstances power is apt to 
fall into the hands of the poorest classes, for 'when they are paid the common people 
have the most leisure, for they are not hindered by the care of their own property, which 
often fetters the rich who are thereby prevented from taking part in the Assembly or in 
the courts, and so the State is governed by the poor who are a majority and not by the 
laws'.  To the supremacy of the law Aristotle attaches the highest importance. 
 
Liability to Anarchy 
One type of democracy is indeed distinguished from another by the degree of respect 
for law.  In extreme democracies there is apt to prevail a false idea of freedom:  [begin 
page 54] that 'freedom and equality consist in doing as one likes'.  This, says, Aristotle 
is wrong: 'men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the 
Constitution; for it is their salvation.'  Demagogues, however, ‘made the decrees of the 
mob override the laws,' and thus the mob, no longer under the control of law, develops 
all the vices of a tyrant.  'Such a democracy', he concludes, ‘is fairly open to the 





Nor is such a democracy likely to endure.  It is, indeed, less difficult to establish a 
democracy than to preserve it, for democracy is peculiarly obnoxious to certain 
corroding influences of a subtle kind, and the real test of the soundness of a 
democratic constitution is its capacity for self-preservation.  One conspicuous danger 
lies in the temptation, to which demagogues are prone, to seek popularity with the mob 
by imposing a property tax and 'confiscation by process of law’, and these things, he 
adds, ‘have before now overthrown many democracies.'  Extremes of wealth and 
poverty should, as far as possible, be avoided, and the wise statesman will adopt 
measures for improving the permanent prosperity of the poorer classes but not, be it 
noted, by doles.  'Where there are surplus revenues the demagogues should not be 
allowed after their manner to distribute them; the poor are always receiving and always 
wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask.'  In these 
general reflections upon democracy Aristotle had, of course, in view some of the worse 
features of Athenian government in the day of decline and degeneracy; but the 
warnings are apt for all time.  The oppressive and vindictive taxation of the rich; the 
prevalence of doles and largesses; the increasing demand for payment for civic 
services - 'in all these financial arrangements’, as a modern critic has pertinently 
observed, ‘there appears one of the worst tendencies of democracy, the tendency of 
the people to [begin page 55] shift burdens to the shoulders of the rich and to find for 
itself a source of gain in the use of political power.'
9  
 
From the theory of Aristotle we may pass to the concrete characteristics of Greek 
democracy, and in particular of Athens. 
                                                  
8   [54/1]  iv. 4. 30. 
9   [55/1]  Ernest Barker, Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 458.  
Characteristics features of the Greek City-State. 
The Greek State, it is imperative to insist, consisted invariably of a single walled city 
with a sufficient amount of circumjacent territory to render it economically self-sufficing.  
Attica contained about the same superficial area as Oxfordshire.  Nor was this form of 
organization fortuitous.  It had its origin no doubt in the physical configuration of Hellas; 
in the difficulties presented to inland communication by the mountains, in the facilities 
offered by the sea.  The result was, as Henry Sidgwick points out, that the Greeks 
combined the spirit of independence as regards outsiders, and mutual dependence 
within the community, characteristic of mountaineers with the awakened intellect and 
varied experience of a seafaring people'.
10  Strategical considerations reinforced the 
dictates of physical configuration.  To be reasonably secure against the attacks of 
numerous neighbours, similarly organized and equally tenacious of their independence, 
it was essential that the small community should have the protection afforded by walls.  
 
‘As to walls,' says Aristotle, ' those who say that cities making any 
pretension to military virtue should not have them are quite out of date in 
their notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this 
fancy confuted by facts. . . . To have no walls would be as foolish as to 
choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or 




The walled town afforded security not only to the inhabitants of the actual city, but to 
the husbandmen in the circumjacent country which furnished the city with food and 
guaranteed its economic independence.  [begin page 56] 
 
Limitation of size. 
Such considerations necessarily implied a severe limitation of size or were the reasons 
for this Imitation exclusively economic and military.  Common citizenship implied not 
merely mutual security and economic independence but continuous intellectual 
intercourse; and this could be obtained only in the city provided with its portico and 
market place, its theatre, temples, and gymnasia.  Most important of all: political life, in 
the Greek sense, would be impossible, unless the citizen-rulers were well acquainted 
with each other.  
 
‘If the citizens', says Aristotle, 'are to determine questions of justice and 
distribute offices of State according to merit it is essential that they should 
know each other's characters; where this is not the case things must needs 
go wrong with the appointment of officials and the administration of the 
law; but it is not right to settle either of these matters at haphazard, and that 
is plainly what happens when the population is over large.'
12  
 
On the other hand the population must be large enough to render the State self-
sufficing, though the manual labour will be done by slaves who not being members of 
the State are not reckoned in the population.  What, then, should be the population of 
our ideal State?  'Ten men', says Aristotle, 'are too few for a State; one hundred 
thousand are too many.'  An overgrown city, is a nation not a state, being almost 
incapable of constitutional government'.  Aristotle himself favoured a state with forty to 
fifty thousand inhabitants. 
                                                  
10   [55/2]  European Polity, p. 69. 
11   [55/3]  Politics, vii. II.   
12   [56/1]  Politics, vii. 4.  
According to the computation of Ctesikles, formerly accepted as conclusive, the 
population of Athens numbered about 500,000, of whom no less than 400,000 were 
slaves.  Others put the free population, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, at 
from 120,000 to 140,000, in addition to 10,000 Athenian citizens dwelling in the 
Cleruchies.  Of these, some 40,000 to 47,000 were burgesses - adult citizens in full 
possession of political rights.
13   [begin page 57] 
 
The non-citizen class was computed at 110,000, of whom 10,000 were Metoikoi, or 
duly registered resident aliens, and 100,000 were slaves.  The slaves, therefore, 
outnumbered the burgesses by rather more than two to one. 
 
Direct Democracy 
Whatever the precise numbers, it is certain that the citizen population was relatively 
small and Aristotle in no wise exaggerates the significance attaching to a rigid limitation 
of their numbers.  Only such a limitation rendered feasible the realization in practice of 
the Greek theory of democracy.  Citizenship implied direct and personal participation in 
public affairs.  The citizen of the modern State habituated to exclusion from the duties 
of government, first by the prevalence throughout the Middle Ages of the feudal 
system, and later by the emergence of more or less benevolent autocracies, is apt to 
regard 'public life' as something to be entered upon or avoided according to the whim 
of the individual.  He may even, without loss of self-respect or the regard of his 
neighbours, refuse to exercise the electoral franchise incidental to representative 
democracy.
14  Signs are not indeed lacking that this attitude of indifference to public 
affairs will not be much longer tolerated, or if tolerated will be persisted in only at the 
peril of economic extinction.  But the Greek idea that citizenship implies personal 
participation in the responsibilities of government wins its way slowly among the 
peoples of the modern world.  Yet to the Greek it was the core of his political creed.  
The full citizen was one who in turn ruled and was ruled: who played his part in the 
supreme legislative assembly; who was in turn a member of the smaller executive 
boards; who was in turn soldier, judge, and priest.  To the value of the political 
education thus acquired by the citizen no one has borne more eloquent testimony than 
the late Minister of Education in England. 
 
'Almost everything', writes Mr. Fisher, ‘which is most precious in our 
civilization has come from small states. . .  [begin page 58] the contracted 
span of these communities carried with it three conspicuous benefits.  The 
city-state served as a school of patriotic virtue. . . . It further enabled the 
experiment of a free direct democratic government to be made, with 
incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world.  Finally it 
threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different 
temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might 
otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous, and stimulating through 
the close mutual co-operation which it engendered, an intensity of 




                                                  
13   [56/2]  Bryce, Modern Democracies, puts the adult male citizens at 30,000 to 
35,000. 
14   [57/1]  Contrast with this the reputed law of Solon, which threatened with loss of 
citizenship the citizen who refused to take sides in a 'stasis'. 
15   [58/1]  H.A.L. Fisher, The Value of Small States, pp. 9-11. Athenian Democracy a product of evolution. 
We may now proceed to a description of the political institutions of the greatest of all 
city-states - whether in the antique or the medieval world.  Not, however, without one 
word of caution.  Athenian democracy, no less than our own, was the result of a 
process of evolution, extending throughout at least two centuries, the main stages 
being marked by the legislation of Solon (circ. 594 B.C.) and of Cleisthenes (508 B.C.), 
and by the administration of Pericles (460-429 B.C.).  This truth, long since recognized 




The Athenian Constitution of Aristotle. 
  Aristotle there traces the evolution of the Constitution from its earliest beginnings 
under a monarchy to the final establishment of a complete and unfettered democracy.
17  
He indicates, indeed, no fewer than eleven clearly marked revolutions by which the 
democratic goal was ultimately attained.  The foundations were laid by the original 
settlement of Attica under Ion, the division of the people into the four tribes and the 
creation of tribal kings.  That Aristotle should lay stress upon this elementary stage is 
characteristic and significant in [begin page 59] view of the interweaving of the tribal 
organization (Φμλαί) in the later texture of the Athenian Constitution.  The first change 
is marked by a 'slight deviation from absolute monarchy' under Theseus.  Next came 
the Draconian Constitution 'when the first code of laws was drawn up'.  The civil war in 
the time of Solon marked a fourth stage as 'from this the democracy took its rise'.  The 
fourth was the tyranny of Pisistratus; the fifth the Constitution of Cleisthenes 'of a more 
democratic character than that of Solon'. The sixth followed on the Persian Wars ‘when 
the Council of Areopagus had the direction of the State'.  The seventh was the 
Constitution which Aristides sketched out, and which Ephialtes brought to completion 
by overthrowing the Areopagite Council'.  The eighth was 'the establishment of the Four 
Hundred', followed by the ninth, a restoration of democracy.  The tenth was marked by 
an oligarchical reaction, described by Aristotle as 'the tyranny of the Thirty and the Ten'. 
 
The Democratic Constitution was, however, restored in 403 B.C. on the downfall of the 
oligarchy, and the eleventh and final stage 'has continued from that day to this, with 
continual accretions of power to the masses'.  ‘The democracy’, so Aristotle concludes 
his rapid sketch, ‘has made itself master of everything and administers everything 
through its votes in the Assembly and by the law courts, in which it holds the supreme 




With the detailed process of evolution this work cannot concern itself; nor is it feasible 
to give a description of Athenian government, which shall be accurate in respect of all 
the periods of Athenian history.  All that can be attempted is a sketch in general terms 
of the salient features of Athenian democracy, with the special and indeed the exclusive 
object of pointing the contrast between the antique and direct form of democracy of 
which Athens afforded the most perfect example, and the [begin page 60] forms, which 
as subsequent chapters will show, are typical of the modern world.  
 
                                                  
16   [58/2]  The 'Αθηναίων ωολιτεία was first published under the editorship of Sir 
F.G. Kenyon in 1891; Sir Frederic's last edition of his translation is contained in 
vol. x of The Works of Aristotle translated into English, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1920. 
17   [58/3]  op. cit., introd., p. xxxiv. 
18   [59/1]  The Athenian Constitution, § 41. The Ecclesia 
The Sovereignty was vested in the whole body of citizens and was personally 
exercised by them in the Supreme Assembly (Ecclesia) which generally met upon the 
Pnyx.  There were forty ordinary meetings of the Ecclesia in the year; and, in addition, 
extraordinary meetings were held whenever special circumstances required.  Every 
citizen of full age (20) was entitled to attend the Ecclesia and for each attendance to 
receive a fee which gradually rose from one obol to one drachma.  For certain 
purposes a quorum of 6,000 was required.  Proceedings, which took place in the open 
air, were opened by a sacrifice of purification, after which a president was appointed by 
lot, in the fifth century from the Prytaneis and in the fourth from the Proedroi.  
 
Legislative Procedure 
No business could in strictness be initiated except by a preliminary decree presented 
by the Council of Five Hundred (Boule), which had its own chamber (βονλεντηριον).  
Such decree might either embody a definite proposal, in modern phraseology take the 
form of a Bill, or might contain only a general resolution, upon the basis of which the 
Ecclesia could legislate.  The author of the decree in the Council ordinarily moved it in 
the  Ecclesia,  but it was open to any member of the Ecclesia  either to propose 
amendments or to move an alternative resolution on the same subject.  It was also 
competent to a member to move that the Council be directed to prepare and bring 
forward a decree on any subject.  The Ecclesia, before coming to a decision, might call 
for expert advice, or for the opinion of one of the executive departments within whose 
province the matter lay.  Voting took place ordinarily by show of hands; but if the 
division was close a count could be demanded.  In certain delicate matters, as, for 
example, the ostracism of a citizen, voting was by ballot and took place in the agora.
19  
As members [begin page 61] owed no responsibility to any constituents but themselves, 
no exception could be taken to this procedure.  
 
Laws (Νόμοι) and Decrees (ψηΦίσματα). 
At this point we must note a feature of the Athenian Laws Constitution which though 
presenting to the modern jurist a seeming anomaly is nevertheless highly characteristic 
of Athenian democracy.  'Sovereign' though the people was, and 'direct' as was the 
form of democracy, the competence of the Ecclesia - an assembly of the whole people 
- was nevertheless circumscribed by the Constitution.  In this sense, therefore, 
'sovereignty' must be ascribed not to the citizens but to the Constitution, i.e. the organic 
or fundamental laws of the city (Νόμοι).  The distinction between (Νόμοι) and Decrees 
(ψηΦίσματα)  was absolutely fundamental.  The former were constitutional laws 
designed for permanent operation; the latter were rules made with reference to a 
particular occasion or to serve a special purpose, and did not possess the sanctity 
which always attached to the former.  The distinction thus drawn is much more 
intelligible, for reasons which subsequent chapters will reveal, to an American, a Swiss, 
or even to a French than to an English jurist.  The rigid Constitutions of Switzerland and 
the United States are based upon the fundamental laws of their respective 
Constitutions and can be altered only by a special and elaborate process; even France, 
with a Constitution only by a few degrees less flexible than that of England, 
distinguishes between 'organic' and ordinary laws.  To the Athenians, with their respect 
for the Constitution, the distinction between the two forms of legislative enactment was 
vital.  A further safeguard for the Constitution was furnished by the device known as the 
γραΦή  παρανόμων  or indictment for illegality.  This process applied equally to the 
proposer of a decree and the initiator of a law. 
 
                                                  
19   [60/1]  As a fact there was no historical instance of the application of ostracism 
after that of Hyperbolus 417 B. c.). The legality of any proposal could be challenged by any citizen; the matter was 
thereupon decided in the law courts, and if the decision was adverse the proposer was 
punishable by fine, or even, in extreme cases, by death.  Three such condemnations 
involved the loss of the right [begin page 62] to propose motions in the Ecclesia - a 
salutary check upon frivolous proposals.  If the proposals were carried or unchallenged 
the task of final revision, their incorporation in statutes, was committed to a legislative 
commission known as the Nomothetae.  
 
Such were the constitutional limitations imposed upon themselves by the wisdom of the 
sovereign people of Athens in the heyday of their greatness and prosperity.  In later 
and degenerate days the Ecclesia betrayed a disposition to make its decrees override 
constitutional law.  This tendency, as we have seen, was noted by Aristotle as one of 
the indications of the lapse of democracy towards anarchy, and as a powerful 
contribution to that element of instability which seemed to him to be inherent in this 
particular form of government.  Under the malign influence of demagogues 'the people 
which is now a monarch and no longer under the control of law seeks to exercise 
monarchical sway and grows into a despot'.
20  
 
Finance and Justice 
Legislation was not, however, the sole function of the Ecclesia.  The control and 
administration of the finances were vested, as will be seen presently, in the Boule; but 
in every Prytany the Ecclesia received a report on the condition of the finances and a 
provisional audit of expenditure.  In the administration of justice the competence of the 
Ecclesia was limited to two cases: the Probole and the Eisangelia.  The former was a 
criminal information laid before the Ecclesia in regard to the conduct of a citizen who 
had caused a disturbance at the festivals or had failed to keep his promises to the 
people.  No penalty could be imposed by the Ecclesia, but if the vote of the Assembly 
was adverse to the defendant the pursuer could, without prejudice, enter a regular 
lawsuit against him.  The Eisangelia was rather in the nature of a political impeachment 
against those who were accused of treachery to the State either in peace or war, or of 
disaffection towards the Constitution.  [begin page 63] 
 
The  Ecclesia  also exercised functions which in the modern State are more often, 
though not invariably, assigned to the Executive; it decided questions of peace, and 
war, selected the generals, fixed the pay of the soldiers, and controlled the conduct of 
military operations; it decided the fate of conquered towns and territories; appointed 
and instructed ambassadors, and received the envoys of foreign States; it adjudicated 
upon the claims of those who desired admission to citizenship; it regulated the religious 
festivals and decreed the initiation of new priesthoods and even the acceptance of new 
deities; its approval was required for the construction of temples, public buildings, 
roads, walls, and ships, though the execution of these matters was committed to those 
who in modern phrase would be described as departmental officials. In fine, the 




The actual work of government was largely in the hands the Boule or Council of Five 
Hundred.  The primary duties of the Boule  were to prepare the business for the 
consideration of the Assembly and to give effect to its decrees.  
 
The Boule consisted of five hundred (afterwards 600) councillors, fifty being selected 
by lot from each of the ten (afterwards twelve) tribes into which the Athenian 
Commonwealth was divided.  All Athenian citizens of not less than thirty years of age 
were eligible for membership; they held office for one year, and were eligible for 
                                                  
20   [62/1]  Politics, iv. 4, 27. reappointment but only for one further term.  After nomination but before entering upon 
office the councillor-elect was subjected, at the hands of the outgoing council, to a 
Dokimasia, or scrutiny into his private character and public conduct.  From the verdict 
then given, an appeal was, in the later days of the Republic, allowed to the law-courts.  
Councillors received a fee of one drachma a day during their year of office, occupied 
seats of honour in the Theatre, and were quit of military service.  The Council as a 
whole exercised certain disciplinary powers- [begin page 64] such as the power of 
expulsion - over its individual members, but the members were severally responsible 
for their official acts. 
 
In the discharge of its official duties the Council was assisted by an organized 
secretariat, and for administrative purposes was split up into ten standing committees.  
One of the ten tribal groups formed this committee in turn for the period of a Prytaneia - 
the one-tenth of a year into which the Athenian year was divided.
21  Each tribal group 
acted, for its turn, as the executive committee of the Council, and its powers were 
virtually coextensive with those of the demos itself.  It also gave effect to the decrees of 
the  Ecclesia  and superintended their execution.  The Council had limited judicial 
functions, acting as a sort of court of first instance in cases of impeachment 
(Eisangelia); but its principal function was the control of finance.  
 
The financial system. 
There was no regular budget in Athens, but certain revenues were assigned to certain 
services, under the sanction and superintendence of the Council.  The Ordinary 
revenue was derived from custom duties on imports and exports, harbour dues, tolls on 
markets, &c., fees paid by the metoikoi, mining leases, and royalties, rents of State 
lands, houses, and buildings (probably insignificant in amount), court fees and fines, 
and, during the first Athenian League, the tribute of the allies.  The total revenue 
derived from these sources is computed, in the early part of the fifth century, to have 
been nearly 2,000 talents, or approximately £460,000, while the average expenditure of 
Lycurgus during his twelve years' tenure of power (338-326 B.C.) was reckoned at 
1,575 talents or £362,250 per annum.  [begin page 65] 
 
In addition to the ordinary revenues of the State special contributions (Leiturgia) were 
made by the wealthier citizens to the musical and dramatic expenses connected with 
the religious festivals, and to the expenses of athletic competitions and state banquets.  
Finally, there was from time to time an extraordinary income-tax (Eisphora) levied for 
war purposes; there were voluntary contributions for the same purpose, while the 
maintenance of the navy (though not the building and equipment of the ships) was 
largely met by the system of Trierarchies, under which a particular ship was assigned 
for a period of six months to a particular citizen.  The keeping up of an efficient fleet 
was one of the most important responsibilities imposed upon the Council.  Military 
training was universal, and military service compulsory.  
 
Magistrates and Officials. 
Athens cannot be said to have developed a bureaucracy; for a bureaucracy implies 
permanence of tenure, and the tenure of Athenian officials was, except in the case of 
military officers, limited to twelve months.  The principle of rotation of office forbade the 
                                                  
21   [64/1]  The ordinary Attic year was of 354 days divided into twelve lunar months 
of 30 and 29 days alternately.  The deficiency was made up by inserting 
intercalary months from time to time as required.  The year was also divided into 
ten periods of (ordinarily) 36 and 35 days each; or of 39 and 38 days in the 
intercalary years. Each one-tenth corresponding to the duration in office of a tribe 
(the  Φνλή  πρντανεύονσα or presiding tribe) was known as a prytaneia; the 
Committees being known as Prytaneis. development of a bureaucracy of the modern type.  Every citizen was indeed by turns 
civil servant, as he was by turns soldier, executive minister, and even priest.   
Nevertheless, there was a very complete and highly organized official hierarchy, and 
administrative duties were elaborately articulated.  The magistrates were appointed 
either by election or by lot, in such a manner as to give each of the tribes an 
approximately equal share of representation.  Like the councillors all officials had to 
pass a dokimasia and to take an oath before they assumed office.  Each office was 
vested in a Board or Commission of ten members (corresponding roughly to the ten 
tribes), and in every Prytany all magistrates had to make a report, with special regard 
to expenditure, to the Council.  The Council appointed by lot a Board of ten logistae 
whose business it was to audit the accounts in each Prytany, and with special 
elaboration at the close of the official year.  No magistrate could, on the conclusion of 
his year of office, leave the [begin page 66] country until the audit was completed and 
the accounts passed.  
 
The Stragetoi. 
The Highest in the official hierarchy were the strategoi, ten in number, who formed the 
military Board.  Military service was at once the privilege and duty of all citizens; it was 
also their security against foreign enemies and against the servile substratum of the 
State.  The strategoi possessed the extraordinary privilege of summoning the Ecclesia 
and of submitting motions to the Council.  They were responsible for national defence 
and for the conduct not merely of military operations but of foreign affairs and inter-
state diplomacy.  With the Council they raised all the funds for military purposes, took 
part in the assessment of the special income-tax, and assigned to individuals their 
share of the extraordinary burdens due to the exigencies of national defence or war.  
They had the care of the corn supply of the city and the custody of the State seal, and 
they performed at certain sacrifices the religious functions appropriate to their special 
position in the State.  They were assisted in their duties by various grades of 
subordinate officers: Taxiarchs, Hipparchs, and others.  
 
The strategia was, therefore, as a modern critic has said, ‘undoubtedly the highest 
office of the State, the most natural object of ambition, and the surest basis of power. . . 
by the extent of the duties it involved, by its special powers of initiation, and its 
continuity, it offered opportunities of influence far above those presented by any other 
magistracy in the State'.
22  It was also the least democratic of all the magistracies. Re-
election, forbidden in other offices, was in the strategia frequent.
23  A very high 
standard of efficiency was consequently maintained.  
 
Finance Ministers. 
There was no single Treasury or Exchequer, financial administration being vested in a 
number of Boards, too [begin page 67] numerous to specify in detail and each charged 
with certain financial duties.  
 
The Archons 
The Archons, nine in number,
24 formed the link between the administrative and judicial 
sides of the Athenian Constitution.  Appointed by lot they performed their duties partly 
                                                  
22   [66/1]  Greenidge, op. cit., p. 182.  
23   [66/2]  Pericles, £or example, was re-elected fifteen times.  The authority of a 
particular (στρατηγός ) might be further enhanced by his appointment as ήγεμών  
or  αύτοκράτωρ Cf. Thucydides. II. lxv. 4, and Xenophon, Hellenica, I. iv. 20. 
24    [67/1]  It was formerly believed that the nine archons superseded a single 
magistrate in 682 B.C.; but the Constitution of Athens has made it clear that there 
was a pre-existing board of three. as individuals, partly as a College or Board.  Thus the six junior Archons were 
collectively known by the ancient title of Thesmothetae or Lawgivers.  The first Archon 
was the eponymous official of the State; he conducted the great Dionysia and other 
religious festivals; he had jurisdiction in all suits involving questions of family rights, had 
the guardianship of widows, orphans, and heiresses, protected parents against 
children, and generally supervised all family matters in the Commonwealth.  The 
second Archon or Basileus had jurisdiction in all matters of religion and public worship, 
in cases involving blood guiltiness, and was specially charged with the care of the holy 
places and the superintendence of religious rites and ceremonies, and in particular of 
the mysteries.  The third Archon or Polemarch was originally Minister of War, but his 
functions passed to the strategoi, and he was mainly concerned with suits in which 
foreigners, freedmen, or metoikoi  were involved.  The remaining six Archons were 
collectively charged with the revision of the statutes and with the supervision of certain 
specially important judicial business. 
  
The Court of the Areopagus. 
On the conclusion of their term of office the ex-Archons became permanent members 
of the Court of the Areopagus.  This Court is commonly held to have supplied the 
oligarchical element in the Athenian constitution, and the prestige it acquired during the 
Persian war is said by Aristotle to have 'tightened the reins of government’, and to have 
delayed the advent of the extreme form of democracy.  
 
The competence of the Court in the administration of [begin page 68] justice was 
considerably curtailed in the later stages of Athenian democracy, particularly, perhaps, 
after the victory of Salamis which, having been 'gained by the common people who 
served in the fleet, strengthened the more democratic elements in the Constitution.'
25  
Yet the court maintained its dignity and its moral influence and was responsible for the 
observance of religious ritual. 
  
Of other officials only bare mention can be made of the Harbour Commissioners (Civil), 
the Wardens of the War Harbour, the Water Board, the Inspectors of Weights and 
Measures, the Controllers of the Market, the Commissioners of Police and of Prisons. 
  
The Judiciary 
From the Executive we pass to the Judiciary and the Judiciary administration of justice.  
In this sphere Athenian Democracy was perhaps seen at its worst.  If, however, it failed 
it was not from lack of courts nor from paucity of jurors, but rather from neglect of the 
strict rules of law, and from the fatal error of permitting political prejudices and private 
passions to intrude upon the austere domain of judicial administration.  Verdicts were 
too often given not in accordance with law but in deference to sentiment if not actually 
under the influence of corruption.  Small wonder that Aristotle should insist, almost to 
the point of tedium, upon what to us seems a commonplace.  'Surely the ruler cannot 
dispense with the general principle which exists in law; and he is abetter ruler who is 
free from passion than he who is passionate' (Politics, iii. 15. 5).  And again: 'He who 
bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids 
man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts 
the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men.  The law is reason unaffected 
by desire.'
26  Above all, the judges should act only as interpreters of law: 'laws when 
good should be supreme; the magistrate should regulate those matters only on which 
the laws are unable to speak with [begin page 69] precision owing to the difficulty of any 
general principle embracing all particulars.'
27  
                                                  
25   [68/1]  Aristotle, Politics, v. 4.  
26   [68/2]  Ibid.. iii. 16. 5. 
27   [69/1]  iii. II. 19.   
To turn, however, to the actual organization of the Judicature at Athens.  Of Judges 
there were three classes: the permanent judges, who formed the Council of the 
Areopagus; the Arbitrators; and the Heliasts or Dicasts.  No less than five Courts were 
competent to judge varying degrees of homicide from wilful murder to manslaughter 
and accidental killing.  These courts were presided over by the permanent judges.  Civil 
suits come as a rule before the public arbitrators who formed a judicial corporation 
composed of Athenian citizens who, on attaining their sixtieth year, were relieved of the 
duty of military service.  They served for a year and decided cases without a jury.  From 
the decisions of an individual arbitrator an appeal lay to the general body of arbitrators 
or to the Heliastic Court.  
 
The Heliaea 
The Heliaea was the supreme court before which all The offences liable to public 
prosecution were tried. The judges or jurors - for the functions were confused -   
consisted of 6,000
28 citizens above the age of thirty and chosen by lot from the general 
body of citizens.  After the time of Pericles the Heliastic Court was subdivided into ten 
panels of 500 each, with 1,000 dicasts held in reserve to fill vacancies.  The verdict 
was given by a ballot vote.  This democratic procedure was almost a reductio ad 
absurdum of judicial administration, and in time engendered scandals of the gravest 
character.  The courts became infested by professional sycophants who reaped a rich 
harvest from blackmail and similar nefarious practices.  It was this parody of justice 
which evoked the bitter satire of Aristophanes, and inspired the grave warnings already 
quoted from Aristotle. 
 
Yet with all its defects the Government of Athens attained a standard of administrative 
efficiency such as, [begin page 70] down to that day, the world had never known.  With a 
legal system remarkable not less for its elasticity than for its essential 'legality’,  the 
Athenians developed also a system of finance, of justice, and of military and naval 
administration which, compared with any previously known, was indeed remarkable.  
Even more remarkable was the wide diffusion of culture and education resulting from 
the political apprenticeship served by the Athenian citizens in the Demi or parishes, 
which represented the units of local administration.
29  Athenian Democracy was indeed 
an heroic experiment to which modern civilization owes a debt literally beyond 
computation.  No more splendid attempt to reconcile personal liberty and public order 
has ever been made.  Politically the experiment failed, and the causes of its failure 
have become the commonplace of historical criticism and political philosophy.  This 
book is concerned with Politics, not with Ethics or Aesthetics, yet even a politician may 
appreciate and be permitted to emphasize the debt which mankind owes to a political 
failure.  The day of Hellenic efflorescence was, as measured in the history of the ages, 
brief; but, as Ben Jonson sang,  
 
It is not growing like a tree  
In bulk, doth make men better be;  
Or standing long an oak, three hundred year, 
To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sere: 
A lily of a day  
Is fairer far, in May,  
Although it fall and die that night; 
It was the plant and flower of light.  
                                                  
28    [69/2]  This is the round number given by Aristotle (Ath. Const. 24), and cf. 
Aristophanes, Wasps, 660. 
29   [70/1]  The reorganization of the Demes was due to Cleisthenes. Cf. Arist. Ath. 
Const., § 21. In small proportions we just beauties see;  
And in short measures, life may perfect be.  
 
The life of a people who produced Pheidias and Praxiteles, who could laugh with 
Aristophanes and weep with Aeschylus and Sophocles, who sat at the feet of Socrates 
and Aristotle, who applauded Demosthenes and accepted the [begin page 71] rule of 
Pericles, such a life may be pronounced perfect, if ever human life can be.  And if the 
life of Athens was brief the product of that life is immortal.  In the Hymn to the Delian 
Apollo  there is a description of the Ionians assembled at their festival: 'Whosoever 
should meet them at that gathering would deem that they were exempt from death and 
age for ever, beholding their gracious beauty and rejoicing in heart at the sight of the 
deep-girdled women.'  The description is true of the creations of Greek art and Greek 
literature: they are exempt from age and death.  But the form of the Greek polity has 
perished.
30  Yet no student of Aristotle can ignore the intimate connexion between the 
form of the polity and the character of the individual citizen; between the characteristic 
features of Greek Democracy and the characteristic features of Greek literature and 
Greek art.  It is the audience which makes the play, and evokes the sublimest effort of 
the orator.  Life in Athens, if contracted, was intense.  Nowhere in world-history has 
intellect played more freely upon intellect, and wit more constantly sharpened wit.  Nor 
was there among the citizen class any inequality of opportunity.  'Neither’, says 
Pericles, ‘is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country, whatever be the obscurity 
of his condition.' 
 
‘To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid 
it.'  ‘We are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind 
without loss of manliness.  Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when 
there is real use for it.'  In these few but pregnant sentences we penetrate the secret of 
the social and intellectual life of Athens.  
 
Politically, however, we are compelled to record transient success followed by failure, 
and failure ending in obliteration.  
 
One question remains to be asked and if possible to be answered: how far does the 
failure of Athens to maintain [begin page 72] its national independence involve a 
condemnation of that system of Direct Democracy of which Athens was incomparably 
the most brilliant exemplar?  
 
Direct Democracy, it is proper to observe, can hardly exist, much less succeed, save 
under peculiar and appropriate conditions.  If the whole body of citizens are to be not 
merely the ultimate depositories of sovereignty, but actually and individually members 
of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, to say nothing of the army and the 
navy, two conditions would seem to be essential : the size of the State must be strictly 
circumscribed, and the economic wants of the citizen community must be supplied by 
non-citizen labour.  Obviously also the State must be sufficiently organized for 
purposes of defence to enable it successfully to resist external attack.  Apart from the 
assaults of external enemies the Athenian State ultimately succumbed to an 
exaggerated passion for equality.  Democracy was destroyed by its own inherent 
principle.  Payment for attendance in the Ecclesia and the Heliastic Courts removed the 
disabilities of poverty, while inequalities of ability were cancelled by the substitution of 
appointment by lot for the filling of offices by election.  Well might Aristotle despairingly 
insist that if such practice was to prevail the citizen class must be still further limited to 
men of 'complete virtue' and complete leisure, and that not slaves only but all who 
pursued professional, commercial, or manual avocations must be severely excluded 
from the ranks of citizenship.  The nemesis which waits upon the exaggeration of 
                                                  
30    [71/1]  I do not ignore the examples, e.g., of Geneva and Hamburg; but the 
generalization remains substantially true. principles, sound in themselves, could not have been permanently evaded by the 
Athenian polity.  For a time decadence was arrested by the emergence of a great man 
and a great ruler in the person of Pericles.  With his death Athenian greatness suffered 
eclipse. 
 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the success of Greek 'democracy' was in fact 
due not to the democratic principle, but to those elements of aristocracy which Greek 
democracy retained, and in particular to the [begin page 73] economic substratum 
provided for the free community by the institution of slavery.  In proportion as the 
principles of pure democracy successfully asserted themselves the greatness of 
Athens declined, the decline being temporarily arrested by the willing acceptance of the 
autocracy of Pericles.  Support for this conclusion comes from a quarter so unexpected 
that the temptation to cite it is irresistible: 
  
‘If ’, wrote Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb, ‘Democracy means that everything 
which "concerns all should be decided by all,” and that each citizen should 
enjoy an equal and identical share in the government, Trade Union history 
indicates clearly the inevitable result.  Government, by such contrivances as 
Rotation of Office, the Mass Meeting, the Referendum and Initiative, or the 
Delegate restricted by his Imperative Mandate, leads straight either to 
inefficiency and disintegration, or to the uncontrolled dominance of a 
personal dictator or an expert bureaucracy.'
31  
 
In Athens Direct Democracy led straight to disintegration.  A reaffirmation of the same 
principle would seem likely to lead to similar results in the modern world.  Among 
modern States there is, however, one which has retained much of the spirit and 
something of the practice of Direct Democracy without loss of self-esteem, without hurt 
to its prestige among the Powers, and without any infringement of national 
independence.  The circumstances of modern Switzerland are, however, so peculiar 
that they demand detailed investigation.  To that investigation the next chapter will be 
devoted. 
 
                                                  
31   [73/1]  Industrial Democracy, i p. 39. IV. Referendal Democracy  
The Swiss Confederation  
 
‘La Suisse ne ressemble a aucun autre Etat, soit par les evenements qui sont 
succedes depuis plusieurs siecles, soit par les differentes langues, les 
differentes religions, et cette extreme difference de mœurs qui existe entre 
ses differentes parties.  La nature a fait votre Etat federatif, vouloir la 
vaincre n'est pas d'un homme sage.' - Napoleon 
  
‘ Switzerland must be regarded as the best equipped political laboratory in 
the modem world. . . . There is no other state whose constitutions, federal, 
provincial, communal, express such implicit confidence in the present will 
of the majority and admit such facility of fundamental changes to meet new 
conditions.' - J.A. Hobson 
 
‘Switzerland is the most remarkable case of a Federation formed by 
historical causes, in the very teeth, as it might seem, of ethnological 
obstacles.  Three races, speaking three languages, have been so squeezed 
together by formidable neighbours as to have grown into one.' - James 
Bryce.  
 
‘The territory of the Swiss Confederation is both in a military and a political 
point of view one of the most important in Europe. . . . But disunion seems 
stamped upon the soil by the very hand of nature.  .. . The Federal system 
has here out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and religious 
elements raised up an artificial nation full of as true and heroic national 
feeling as ever animated any people of the most unmixed blood.' - E.A. 
Freeman. 
 
‘In respect of continuity of development the Swiss federation is to the 
federal type almost what England is to the unitary type.  And the medieval 
growth and development of the Swiss confederation is one of the few stories 
in later European history which has rivalled in dramatic interest the 
struggles of Greeks and Romans against foreign enemies.' – Henry 
Sidgwick.  
 
Democracy, direct and indirect. 
Incontestablement c'est la Suisse qui marche entete de l'evolution democratique.'
1  To 
an Englishman a Frenchman, or an American, each accustomed to regard his own 
distinctive type of government as leading the democratic van, the claim thus put 
forward by M. Bonjour, on behalf of his own country, must, at first sight, appear 
startling, if not grotesque.  Yet candour demands [begin page 76] fair consideration for 
the claim.  Is it, in any sense, admissible?  A closer examination will probably reveal the 
fact that the answer to this, as to so many other questions, will be found to depend 
largely on the definition of terms. 
 
To the direct democracy of Athens there is, among the States of the modern world, no 
exact parallel.  Nor are the conditions which contributed to the success of that 
                                                  
1   [75/1]  La Democratie suisse. by Felix Bonjour, sometime President of the Swiss 
Confederation, 1919, p. I. experiment ever likely to be precisely reproduced.  The nearest parallel to the Greek 
city-state is now to be found, from one point of view, in the city-states of Bremen and 
Hamburg; but nowhere is the essential ethos of Greek Democracy so faithfully 
preserved as among some of the Swiss cantons, and indeed in the Helvetic 
Confederation as a whole. 
 
In attempting to appraise fairly the value of M. Bonjour's complacent aphorism it is 
essential to remember that by Swiss publicists the term' democracy' is invariably 
employed as the antithesis of 'representative government'.  An Englishman is apt to 
regard the two principles as virtually identical, and is, therefore, startled to come across 
such a passage as the following: 'Soon after 1860 a perfect wave of democracy 
seemed suddenly to sweep over the country, carrying all before it, and in a very short 
space of time the representative system was ousted from the position which up to that 
time it had succeeded in maintaining.'
2  Similarly M. Bonjour himself.  In small 
communes the system is democratic, and in large communes representative.'  A third 
writer, Gengel, with obvious reference to Rousseau, puts the point explicitly: 'To say 
that popular sovereignty and universal suffrage are one and the same thing is 
ridiculous.  Once the elections are past the electors have no possible influence over the 
Chamber.'  To admit this antithesis, so familiar to the Swiss, as indeed to all disciples of 
the Genevan philosopher, demands from Englishmen, accustomed too regard 
representation as the adjunct and [begin page 77] complement of democracy, a radical 
readjustment of their political preconceptions.  The admission is, however, a necessary 
preliminary to the study of Swiss Democracy, and it must, therefore, temporarily and 
tentatively, be made. 
 
The first lesson to be derived from a study of Swiss Democracy tends to reinforce one 
of the oldest maxims of political science, the relativity of all its conclusions.  There is no 
absolutely best in constitutions; the best constitution is that which has been gradually 
evolved by the people who live under it, and which is most closely adapted to their 
peculiar circumstances and conditions.  The Swiss Constitution, or rather the twenty-six 
Swiss Constitutions, are pre-eminently the product of a long process of political 
evolution.  Nor can these constitutions be understood or interpreted except by 
reference to the historical circumstances which have produced them. 
 
Unique position of Switzerland. 
The position of the Swiss Confederation in the general polity of Europe appears, at first 
sight, to be as anomalous as it is certainly unique.  Tried by any of the ordinary and 
political tests a product so apparently artificial would seem to have no right to exist.  Yet 
it is safe to say that there is no European power whose future is more assured.   
Consisting today of twenty-five autonomous and sovereign States, it still seems to defy 
every canon known to political science; ethnology and geography, creed and language, 
history and policy combine to forbid the banns of political union among states and 
people so essentially diverse if not actually discordant.  Yet Switzerland, compact of 
elements which own no common 'nationality' is a factor to be reckoned with in any 
estimate of the forces which go to make up the European economy. 
  
Closer examination accentuates the sense of anomaly.  Why should Ticino, for 
example, not form part of a happily united Italy?  Geography seems to put a veto upon 
its union with Switzerland; race and language point to its union with Italy.  Why should 
the Grisons not have added one more incongruous element to the composite Empire of 
the Habsburgs?  Why should the [begin page 78] rest of the Swiss cantons not be 
divided - in very unequal proportions - between the two great nations whose language 
they speak and whose blood is in their veins?  
 
                                                  
2   [76/1]  Deploige, Referendum in Switzerland, pp. 82, 83. For it is one of the most remarkable features of the Swiss Confederation that the 
geographical boundaries of the several cantons accurately correspond with distinctions 
of race and language.  Eighteen of the cantons are exclusively German, five are 
French, one is Italian, and in one (Graubϋnden or the Grisons) one-third of the people 
speak Romansch.  What compelling force has brought together geographical entities at 
once mutually heterogeneous, and internally homogeneous?  Such questions baffle the 
scientific historian.  But the fact remains.  Out of German-speaking folk and 
Frenchmen, out of Romansch-speaking people and Italians, there has been gradually 
built up a European' power', small but not unimportant; a State whose independence is 
assured; a coherent though conglomerate nation.  
 
Significance of Swiss Democracy 
It is these facts which lend to the study of Swiss democracy a peculiar interest.  No 
other State presents conditions at all parallel.  It is no doubt true that Switzerland - a 
neutralized and non-aggressive power commanding the watersheds of Central Europe 
- is a political convenience, just as Poland was politically inconvenient.  If Switzerland 
did not exist, it might be desirable, if not necessary, to invent it: yet invented, we may 
be sure, it never would have been.  Though an artificial product, and now artificially 
protected by European guarantee, its gradual evolution was entirely spontaneous.  And 
its governmental system is a reflex of its political history.  There is not a single feature 
of the federal Constitution of today - the position of the President; the composition of 
the Standerat; the execution of federal laws by cantonal officials; the Referendum; the 
Constitutional Initiative - which is not explicable by, and only by, the facts of its history 
in the past.  Of that history, therefore, a short sketch is indispensable; but there is one 
point which demands a preliminary word.  
[begin page 79] 
 
Included in the Swiss Confederation of today there are nineteen cantons and six demi-
cantons, each of which claims within its own sphere of jurisdiction to be sovereign.  
There is therefore, as critics insist, 'not one democracy in Switzerland; there are as 
many democracies as there are cantons and demi-cantons'.  Consequently we have to 
study not one constitution but twenty-six.  Each of these democracies has a history of 
its own, and each would repay study, but we must concern ourselves primarily with the 
central government.  The evolution of that curious political formation which to 
foreigners is known as Switzerland falls into seven clearly marked stages. 
 
The old league of High Germany 1291-1353. 
The first is marked by the conclusion of The Perpetual League of the three Forest 
Communities (1291): Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden.  This Swabian League was one of 
the many leagues formed for mutual protection in the later Middle Ages within the 
jurisdiction of the Germanic or Holy Roman Empire. 
 
The Confederation of Eight Cantons 1353-1513 
The 'Old League of High Germany' expanded during the first half of the fourteenth 
century into the Confederation of Eight Cantons.  This remarkable expansion was in 
large measure due to 1353-1513 the resounding victory won by the peasants of the 
Forest Communities over the Habsburg Count on the memorable field of Morgarten 
(1315).  Morgarten with the almost contemporary fights at Bannockburn and Crecy 
sounded the death-knell of feudalism as a military system.  It also baptized in blood the 
infant Confederation, born of the Perpetual League.  The victory naturally brought fresh 
adherents to the League: Lucerne (1332), the Imperial City of Zurich (1351), Glarus 
and Zug (1352), and the Imperial City of Bern (1353).  The new Confederacy won two 
great battles against the Habsburgs, at Sempach (1386) and at Nafels (1388), with the 
result that all political allegiance to the Habsburgs was in 1394 finally renounced.  The 
Confederacy and its 'cantons' (to anticipate a convenient term) became in their turn 
lords and conquerors.  Appenzell was reduced to subjection in [begin page 80] 1411, and St. Gallen, parts of the Valais, Aargau, and Thurgau in the course of the fifteenth 
century.  But these territories, be it noted, came in as subjects, not as confederates.  
The cities of Freiburg and Solothurn were, however, admitted to the Confederacy in 
1481, Basel and Schaffhausen in 1501, while in 1513 Appenzell was raised from 
dependency to membership.  This Confederacy of thirteen cantons subsisted from 
1513 until the French conquest in 1798.  
 
The Confederation of Thirteen Cantons. 
The tie between the confederated cantons was of the loosest possible kind.  When 
occasion demanded they sent their envoys to a Diet, but the functions of the Diet 
Cantons, were purely consultative; the envoys were instructed ad audiendum et 
referendum, but all decisions as to policy had to be referred to the confederate States.  
The tie, never close, was further weakened by the Reformation, and by disputes as to 
the disposal of conquests.  These conquests brought not only Germans but Italians (in 
Ticino) and French-speaking Savoyards, not into the bosom of the Confederacy, but 
under the dominion of its several component members.  The confusion caused by the 
divergent and anomalous position of these 'subject lands’, 'associated districts’, 
'protected lands’, and ‘common bailiwicks' was still further deepened by the contrasts in 
governmental methods presented by the cantons themselves: the peasants of the 
Forest cantons still 'ruling and being ruled' according to the methods of direct 
democracy in their Landsgemeinden  or general-assemblies; the patricians of Bern, 
Lucerne, Freiburg, and Solothurn organized in the most exclusive of oligarchies; and 
the burghers of Zurich, Basel, and Schaffhausen upholding the principles and 
maintaining the forms of civic democracies. 
 
Over this confused conglomeration of sovereign communities, this medley of races and 
tongues, there passed in the last years of the eighteenth century the steam roller of 
Napoleon's armies. 
 
Napoleon and Switzerland 
That the ideas proclaimed by the French Republic should have created much ferment 
in 'French' Switzerland, particularly in the city of Geneva, is not remarkable.  Still less is 
it remarkable that the eye of a master strategist should have been fixed from the outset 
of his career upon the peculiarly advantageous position of the confederated States.  
The opportunity for intervention was not unduly delayed.  Hardly had Bonaparte set up 
the Cisalpine Republic (1797) than he was confronted by a deputation from the 
Valtellina, Chiavenna, and Bormio, which were at that time subject to the Grisons, 
imploring his protection against their masters, and asking for admission to the 
Cisalpine Republic.  Bonaparte forthwith ordered the Grisons to concede independence 
to the Italian provinces.  The Grisons displayed, not unnaturally, some hesitation before 
accepting such disinterested advice.  Brief as the hesitation was, it sufficed for an 
excuse, and Bonaparte, lending a gracious ear to the tale of oppression, incorporated 
the provinces in his new Republic, 'No State’, as he wrote to the Grisons, ‘could without 
violence to civil and natural rights, hold in permanent subjection another State.'  The 
strategical importance of the Valtellina had been recognized by France at least since 
the days of Richelieu, but here, as elsewhere, Bonaparte was the first to realize the 
dreams of the cardinal-minister.  Not less important was the route through the Valais 
between France and Lombardy.  The discontent in French Switzerland offered an 
obvious opportunity for the realization of a military project.  Nor did Bonaparte hesitate 
to seize it.  A movement on the part of the Vaudois democrats against the Bernese 
patricians was sedulously stimulated from Paris; in March 1798 General Brune 
occupied Bern on behalf of the Directory; the prosperous city was compelled to 
disgorge treasure amounting to upwards of 25,000,000 francs; the Helvetic Republic was, as we have seen, proclaimed, and, in all but name, Switzerland became a 
dependency of France.
3  
[begin page 82]  
 
The Helvetic Republic 1798. 
The Constitution, drafted by the democratic leader Peter Ochs of Basel, and imposed 
upon Switzerland by French arms, was closely modelled upon the French Directorial 
Constitution of the year III.  The unified Republic was divided into twenty-three 
cantons,
4 and each canton was placed under a Prefect who represented the central 
Government.  The seat of the central Government was fixed at Lucerne.  The central 
legislature consisted of two chambers: a Grand Council consisting of deputies indirectly 
elected by the several cantons in proportion to population, and a Senate composed of 
four delegates from each canton.  The executive authority was vested in a Directory of 
five members, elected by the two chambers in joint session.  With the Directors were 
associated four heads of administrative departments.  A tribunal was also erected to act 
as the supreme judicial authority for the whole Republic; criminal law was systematized 
and unified throughout the Republic; the same principle of uniformity was applied to the 
coinage and the postal system, and a common Swiss citizenship was established.  But 
this was not all.  Mere constitutional and legal readjustment would have been deemed 
strangely inadequate by a generation which had imbibed the teaching of Rousseau.  
The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people was accordingly proclaimed; the 
principles of civil equality and liberty of conscience were enforced; and all privileges, 
rights, and burdens, alike feudal and ecclesiastical, were summarily abolished.  In fine, 
the fruits of ten years of revolution in Paris, together with all the hard-won experience of 
constitutional experiments, were generously bestowed upon the Swiss people. 
 
The irony of the situation was that nothing could have been less congenial to the 
liberated peoples.  Liberty and equality had to be forced upon them at the point of 
French bayonets.  Nor is the reason of their ingratitude far to seek.  
 
‘The Constitution of the Helvetic Republic of the 12th of April 1798 respected', writes 
Deploige, 'neither the antiquity [begin page 83] of the Landsgemeinden nor the 
independence of the small republics of Central Switzerland. . . . The French spoke to 
them of liberty, of equality, of the sovereignty of the people, and of political 
emancipation.  What meaning had such language for these mountaineers, already 
sovereign legislators, and free as the eagle that soared over their own Alpine snow 
heights, ignorant of the meaning of feudal privileges, and emancipated for centuries 
from the rule of monarchs and aristocrats?  They perceived merely the emptiness of all 
these promises, and felt the hollowness of the revolutionary phraseology.  Their fathers 
had founded a genuine democracy; the democracy the invader would establish was 
only a theory on paper.  A more pertinent argument, a more touching appeal than that 
addressed to the French Directorate on the 5th of April 1798 by the people of 
Switzerland would be hard to find.  “Nothing”, it ran, “can in our eyes equal the 
misfortune of losing the Constitution which was founded by our ancestors, which is 
adapted to our customs and needs, and which has for centuries enabled us to reach 
the highest attainable point of comfort and happiness.  Citizen directors, if you should 
have really come to the determination to change the form of our popular governments, 
allow us to address you on the subject with frankness and freedom.  We would ask you 
if you have discovered anything in our constitutions which is opposed to your own 
principles?  Could any other conceivable form of government put the sovereign power 
so exclusively in the hands of the people, or establish among all classes of citizens a 
more perfect equality.  Under what other constitution could each member of the state 
enjoy a greater amount of liberty?  We wear no other chains than the easy fetters of 
                                                  
3   [81/1]  Fournier, Napoleon (Eng. trans.), i. 41 seq. 
4   [82/1]  The term canton was now, for the first time, officially employed. religion and morality, no other yoke than that of the laws which we have made for 
ourselves.  In other countries, perhaps, the people have still something to wish for in 
these respects.  But we, descendants of William Tell, whose deeds you laud today; we, 
whose peaceful enjoyment of these constitutional privileges has never been interrupted 
up to the present time, and for the maintenance of which we plead with a fervour 
inspired by the justice of our cause, we have but one wish, and in that we are 
unanimous; it is to remain under those forms of government which the prudence and 
courage of our ancestors have bequeathed as a heritage; and what government, 
citizen directors, could more accord with your own?   [begin page 84] 
  
‘ “We who address you are inhabitants of those countries whose 
independence you have so often promised to respect.  We are ourselves the 
sovereigns of our little States.  We appoint and dismiss our magistrates at 
will.  The several districts of our cantons elect the councils which are our 
representatives, the representatives of the people.  These are, in short, the 
very foundations of our constitution.  Are not your own identical?” ’ 
5
  
The pathos of this appeal is equalled only by its simplicity.  None but the simplest could 
have supposed that the Helvetic Constitution was devised solely, or indeed primarily, in 
the interests of the citizens of the new: Republic.  At the same time the force of the 
sentiments expressed in the above letter was not equally distributed throughout the 
several cantons.  To the inhabitants of the subject Provinces the unified Constitution did 
mean political emancipation and the concession of equal rights.  It was far otherwise in 
the Forest Cantons, which still adhered to the primitive form of their direct 
'democracies’.  Consequently, when all the other cantons had - some with greater and 
some with less reluctance - made their submission and accepted the Helvetic 
Constitution, the Forest Cantons maintained a stubborn resistance.  Nor until they had 
received a guarantee of their primitive liberties did these courageous mountaineers 
agree to abate their opposition to the armies of France. 
 
There was more than a little justification for their suspicions.  The real significance of 
the Helvetic Constitution was quickly disclosed.  Geneva was annexed to France, and 
the Swiss people, already taxed up to the hilt, were compelled, in 1799, to conclude an 
offensive and defensive alliance with the French Republic.  The high road through the 
Valais into Italy was further to be kept open to the merchandise and troops of France.  
A similar engagement was concluded in reference to the road along the Rhine to the 
Lake of Constance - a road which gave the French armies access into the heart of 
Germany.  [begin page 85] 
 
Campaigns of 1799 and 1800. 
What this convention meant, in a military and political sense, was clearly revealed in 
the war of the Second Coalition (1798-1800), and more particularly in the campaign 
which culminated in the resounding victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden.  The 
Archduke Charles had achieved a brilliant victory on the upper Rhine in the early part 
of 1799.  Even more brilliant were the achievements of Marshal Kray and General 
Suvaroff in north Italy.  But both successes were rendered barren by the fact that 
France, thanks to the occupation of Switzerland, held the key of the strategical position.  
While Suvaroff was fighting his way through the St. Gothard, Massena inflicted a 
crushing defeat Upon the Russians under Korsakoff at Zurich (26 September), and 
Suvaroff was compelled to abandon the fruits of a most brilliant military achievement 
and to effect a speedy retreat. 
 
Meanwhile, the Swiss peasants, whose land had become the cockpit of Europe, were 
reduced to a condition of abject misery.  Massena, hailed as the 'Saviour of 
                                                  
5   [84/1]  Deploige, Referendum in Switzerland, pp. 18, 19, 20. Switzerland’, levied enormous contributions from the richer cantons.  Basel had to pay 
1,400,000 francs, Zurich 800,000, St. Gall 400,000.  Bread was selling at fifteen sous a 
pound; even the rich were reduced to short rations; the poor starved.  Thousands of 




‘The small cantons', wrote Pichon, the French minister, in November 1799, 
'are a wilderness.  The French army has been quartered three or four times 
between Glares and the St. Gothard within six months. . . . The soldier has 
lived upon the provisions of the inhabitants. . . . As our troops did not obtain 
a single ration from France, everything was eaten up six months ago, even 
before the 25,000 Russians invaded this devastated region.  Urseren alone 
has fed and lodged in one year some 700,000 men. . . . The richest cantons 
are all oppressed by requisitions and have succumbed under the load of 
quartering men and feeding soldiers and horses. . . . Every- [begin page 86] 




Parties in Switzerland 
Domestic strife intensified the miseries caused by a foreign military occupation.  The 
French party was at war with the autonomists; democrats strove with oligarchs; 
federalists with unionists; ‘Jacobins' with ‘Girondins'.  Even the coup d' etat was 
naturalized on Swiss soil: effected now in this interest; now in that; sometimes 
genuinely 'native'; more often stimulated and engineered from Paris. 
 
The Simplion Road. 
Bonaparte, meanwhile, was steadily pursuing his own road projects.  Twice already he 
had demanded from the Helvetic Republic the cession of the Valais in order to secure 
his communications with Italy.  Now, waiting for no leave, he proceeded to construct the 
magnificent road over the Simplon.  The sorry farce of an independent Republic was 
approaching its denouement, and Bonaparte was nearly ready for the next step.  In 
Switzerland itself federalists and unionists were hopelessly at loggerheads, and in 1806 
a constitutional amendment was submitted for the approval of the First Consul at La 
Malmaison.  The project was too unitary for his taste; a different scheme was 
substituted, and was submissively accepted by the Swiss legislature (29 May 1806).  
 
The Projet de la Malmaison 
This Constitution known to Swiss jurists as the Projet de la Malmaison represented on 
paper some small concession to traditional prepossessions in favour of local autonomy.  
It recognized nineteen cantons, the Valais and the Grisons being included, and to each 
it granted a considerable amount of independence, especially in matters of education 
and finance.  Over each canton there was to be a Prefect who was to be instructed to 
administer its affairs with due deference to local customs, and in accordance with local 
requirements.  The unitary principle, on the other hand, was represented by a central 
legislature of two Chambers: a Diet of seventy-seven, [begin page 87] and a Senate of 
twenty-five members, and by a Central Executive.  The latter was vested in a chief 
magistrate, known as a Landammann, who was to be chosen from the Senate and to 
be assisted by a council of four members. 
 
                                                  
6   [85/1]  Daguet, Hist. de la Confed. Suisse. ii. 330. 
7   [86/1]  OechsIi, W., Quellenbuch, p. 468, quoted by MacCracken, p. 312. The compromise attempted in the Malmaison constitution afforded no permanent 
solution of the Helvetic problem, and after a period of misery and anarchy Napoleon 
decided to intervene. 
 
For the Swiss people Napoleon was not without a touch of sympathy if not of 
sentiment.  He appreciated the peculiarities of their situation, both internal and in 
relation to the European polity.  It was in reference to Switzerland that he enunciated 
an aphorism of general validity:  
 
‘Une forme de gouvernement qui n'est pas le resultat d'une longue serie 
d'evenements, de malheurs, d'efforts, d'entreprises de la part d'un peuple, ne 
prendra jamais racine.' 
 
The dogma is profoundly true: and Napoleon not only recognized its truth, but acted 
upon it.  The experience of the years 1798-1802 made it abundantly clear that the 
'Swiss' - the German, French, and Italian peoples combined by a freak of nature or of 
circumstance - were not going to settle down in acceptance of a unified Republic.   
Consequently, in 1803, Napoleon, now First Consul of France, announced his desire to 
mediate.  Delegates from the various parties in Switzerland were summoned to Paris, 
and a new Constitution known as the Act of Mediation was drawn up (19 February 
1803). 
 
The Act of Mediation 1803-14 
The  Act of Mediation was a distinct improvement upon the Helvetic Republic.  It 
recognized the sovereignty of the cantons, adding to the original thirteen six new 
cantons representing the allied and subject lands, such as Vaud, Ticino, and Grisons.  
Into the new cantons the principle of representative democracy was introduced; the old 
ones were divided into rural cantons with their primitive Landsgemeinden and urban 
cantons under burgher aristocracies.  Upon the 'sovereign' cantons, [begin page 88] 
new and old, was superimposed a central government: with a federal Diet, a federal 
army, and federal taxation.  For the next ten or twelve years Switzerland was little more 
than an appendage of the Napoleonic Empire.  Indeed in 1811 the Emperor appears to 
have contemplated the erection of a kingdom of Helvetia for the Elector Charles of 
Baden, the husband of his adopted daughter Stephanie de Beauharnais.  The Swiss 
were spared this culminating affront, but they were brought into the net of the 
'continental system’, and the trade of their towns was ruined. 
  
On the fall of Napoleon the Act of Mediation lapsed, and a new Constitution known as 
the Federal Pact was, after bitter controversies and prolonged gestation, produced, and 
was approved at Vienna by the great Powers by whom the independence and 
neutrality of Switzerland was guaranteed. 
  
The Federal Pact, 1815-48.  
The Federal Pact was essentially centrifugal in character: it recognized the sovereign 
rights of the cantons, now increased to twenty-two by the inclusion of Valais, Geneva, 
and Neuchatel; it set up a Diet of twenty-two delegates - one from each canton; it 
invested with a sort of presidential authority the three principal cantons, Zurich, Bern, 
and Lucerne, each of which was to act in turn as convener and the seat of government 
for periods of two years; and made provision for a federal war chest and a federal 
army.  The compromise embodied in the Pact  was not satisfactory; it impaired the 
independence of the cantons without substituting for it the vigour derived from a strong 
centralized administration; above all, it did nothing to heal the jealousies nor compose 
the antagonisms which, between 1815 and 1848, seemed likely permanently to break 
up the incipient and imperfect unity of the Confederated States.  Consistency and 
continuity of policy, whether foreign or domestic, could hardly be expected of a 
Government which biennially shifted the centre of political power and the seat of administration, while the Diet proved itself hopelessly [begin page 89] ineffective even 
for the performance of the limited functions entrusted to it by the Pact.  
 
That the overthrow of 'Legitimacy' in France should have engendered excitement 
among the Swiss republics is somewhat curious, yet the fact is unquestionable.   
Between 1830 and 1848 no fewer than twenty cantons revised their Constitutions.  The 
doctrines of the sovereignty of the people and the separation of powers were solemnly 
proclaimed; universal suffrage was introduced; the right of petition, freedom of trade, of 
conscience, and of the press was adopted; a powerful impulse was given to education: 
normal and secondary schools were established, and the High Schools of Zurich and 
Bern were erected into universities; above all, the 'veto' was instituted, in various forms, 
in five cantons, while one - the canton of Vaud - established in its widest form the 
popular 'initiative'.  
 
The Sonderbund. 
Despite constitutional changes of high significance in the cantons there was almost 
perpetual discord in the Confederation, and in 1843 actual secession was threatened 
by the Sonderbund, or League of Seven Roman Catholic Cantons.  The Sonderbund 
received cordial encouragement from the absolutist Powers of the Continent, then 
under the domination of Metternich, and even Guizot and Louis-Philippe looked kindly 
upon it.  Palmerston, not sorry to have an opportunity of settling scores with France 
and Austria, vigorously espoused the cause of the 'progressive cantons'.  Civil war 
broke out in 1847, but a brief and almost bloodless campaign sufficed to decide the 
issue.  The Sonderbund  was dissolved, the reactionary Governments in Lucerne, 
Valais, and Freiburg were replaced by Liberals, and the interference of foreign States in 
the internal affairs of the Confederation was firmly and finally repudiated. 
 
The outbreak of the continental Revolution of 1848 relieved Switzerland from all fear of 
further interference at the hands of autocratic neighbours, and left her free to carry out 
a radical revision of the makeshift Constitution of 1815.   [begin page 90] 
 
The scheme adopted in I848 was extensively amended in I874, but it still forms the 
basis of Swiss government.  
 
The Constitution of 1874. 
Under this Constitution the government of Switzerland and its cantons is at once 
genuinely democratic and genuinely federal.  It is commonly affirmed that federalism 
implies duality of sovereignty, and it may certainly be said of the national and the 
cantonal Governments of Switzerland that each within its own sphere is sovereign.  As 
a fact, however, sovereignty is vested in the people who exercise it, alike in national 
and cantonal affairs, by means of the veto, the popular initiative, and in some cases by 
the more extreme methods of the 'recall'.  It is the more necessary to insist upon the 
diarchic character of the Swiss government because many observers have been apt to 
suppose and to insist that cantonalism is everything and nationalism nothing among 
the Swiss.  Yet the larger patriotism exists and grows steadily, if not to the exclusion of, 
at least side by side with, the lesser.  True federalism implies both; and in the course of 
the last seventy years Switzerland has attained to it.  Down to I798 the cantons were 
united in a mere Staatenbund - hardly more than a perpetual league of independent 
States; they now form a real Bundesstaat - a federal State - with highly developed 
organs appropriate thereto. 
 
The Legislature 
Of these the most important is the Legislature.  There is not in the Swiss Constitution 
so strict a separation of powers as there is in the American.  Switzerland is less faithful 
to the doctrine of Montesquieu than to that of Rousseau.  But the Legislature is more 
strictly federal than the Executive.  Like the Imperial Constitution of Germany, the Swiss has assigned to the central legislature a large sphere in the making of laws while 
leaving it to the local Governments to carry them into execution.  The main business of 
the Central Executive - the Federal Council - is to see that the cantonal officials do their 
duty.  Should any conflict arise between the two authorities the Federal Council has two 
weapons ready to hand, both rather clumsy but among the frugal Swiss not ineffective: 
[begin page 91] it may withhold the subsidies due to the recalcitrant canton, or it may 
quarter troops upon it. 
 
In structure the Federal Assembly is bicameral, consisting of a National Council or 
House of Representatives and a Council of States.  The National Council represents 
the people; the Council of States, like the American Senate and the German Reichsrat, 
represents the constituent cantons or States.  The former contains some 200 members 
representing over 50 constituencies.  The electoral districts are as equal as conditions 
permit, but every canton must have at least one member, and districts may not cut 
across cantonal frontiers.  The franchise is extended to all males not under twenty 
years of age, unless they have been deprived of political rights by the laws of their own 
canton, but as all cantonal Constitutions must now be guaranteed by the Federal 
Legislature, and as the latter insists that the cantons must assure to their citizens the 
exercise of political rights, the franchise cannot be arbitrarily withheld.  It is noticeable, 
however, that the country which is in the vanguard of democracy contains only 900,000 
electors out of a population of 3,885,500, or less than 1 in 4, while in the United 
Kingdom the proportion is about 1 in 2¼.  As regards the method of election, the 
principle of Proportional Representation was, after two vain attempts, adopted by 
popular initiative in October 1918, 19½ cantons having voted in its favour, whereas in 
1910 a majority of the cantons withheld their support.  The National Assembly ordinarily 
meets twice a year, for four weeks, in June and December; members of the National 
Council receiving 20 fr. a day from the national treasury, while the wages of members 
of the Standerat are paid, quite logically, by the cantons. 
 
The Standerat consists of forty-four members, the cantons-large and small - being 
equally represented by two members apiece, the demi-cantons by one.  Like the 
American Senate it embodies the federal  as opposed to the national  principle, but 
unlike the Senate it has no special functions which differentiate it from the 'lower' 
House.  [begin page 92] 
 
The initiation of legislation belongs equally to both Houses, and is in fact divided 
between them by their respective presidents at the beginning of each session.  In every 
respect the authority and function of the two Houses are co-ordinate; in the exercise of 
certain electoral and judicial functions - as for instance in the election of federal 
councillors - they act as a single Assembly in joint session.  
 
The Federal Assembly is in no sense a sovereign Parliament; not only is its authority 
shared with the cantonal legislatures, but it is constantly liable to be negatived and 
even superseded by the direct political action of the electors.  To this point we shall 
return.  Meanwhile, the other organs of the central Government demand brief notice. 
 
The Federal Council. 
The position of the Executive is to Englishmen peculiarly interesting.  Executive 
authority resides in the Federal Council, a body of seven members elected by both 
Houses in joint session, nominally for a period of three years or for the duration of the 
Federal Assembly.  Not more than one member may come from anyone canton.  The 
seven principal departments of State - Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice and Police, 
War, Finance and Customs, Industry and Agriculture, Posts and Railways - are allotted 
by mutual arrangement among the seven councillors, one of whom is annually elected 
president and another vice-president of the Confederation.  Nominally the departmental 
offices are reallotted annually; as a fact they are almost invariably held for life.  Since 
1848 there seems to have been only two cases of resignation on political grounds.  Swiss democracy, says a modern critic, worships governmental stability and retains its 
public men in office even to the verge of senility.
8  
 
This is, however, the less remarkable if it be borne in mind that the Federal Council is 
not so much a Cabinet in the English sense, as a Committee consisting of the 
permanent heads of the Civil Service.  It is not politically [begin page 93] homogeneous, 
and its collective responsibility is doubtful, though the Constitution lays down (Article 
103) that decisions shall emanate from the Federal Council as a body, and Deploige 




The administrative acts of the Council are supervised and may be reversed by the 
Legislature; but reversal carries with it no censure and federal councillors never dream 
of resignation if their advice is not taken by the Federal Assembly.  They exist in fact to 
carry out the wishes of the Legislature or the people as the case may be.  Much more 
truly than the members of the.  Executive Council in Russia they might be described as 
the People's Commissaries.  In neither House may they sit or vote; but in both they 
may attend and speak when proposed legislation is under consideration, and in both 
they may be required to answer interpellations connected with the business of their 
several departments.  Their right to attend and speak gives them, moreover, 
considerable influence over the course of legislation. 
 
Except in regard to foreign and military affairs, customs, posts and telegraphs, and one 
or two other matters, the Council has no direct executive authority.  Ordinary laws and 
judgements of the Federal Courts are carried out, as we have seen; by the cantonal 
authorities, though under the control and supervision of the Federal Council.  The 
Council exercises, however, considerable judicial powers, especially in regard to those 
administrative matters which are by the Constitution excluded from the competence of 
the Federal Tribunal.  There is in the Swiss Confederation a considerable amount of 
quasi-administrative law - perhaps a legacy of the Napoleonic occupation - but there 
are not, as in France, any special administrative tribunals; jurisdiction in these matters 
belongs to the Federal Council. 
 
The Presidency of the Swiss Confederation is held for twelve months only, virtually in 
rotation, by the members [begin page 94] of the Federal Council.  The office has no 
political or administrative significance; the holder of it is merely the temporary chairman 
of the Federal Council and not in any real sense the chief magistrate of the Republic.  
The acts and decisions of the President - so far as they are not purely departmental - 
emanate not from him but from the Council as a whole.  The President is not, therefore, 
in the position of an English Prime Minister: he is not a party chief even, nor a 
parliamentary leader; he can neither dismiss his colleagues nor dissolve the 
Legislature, nor control the Executive.  Still less do his powers resemble those of a 
strong President in the United States of America; he is not even like the President of 
the French Republic, a constitutional ruler.  Nevertheless he and his colleagues enjoy 
the confidence and command the respect of their countrymen by their devotion to 
duties which are at once exacting, unexciting, and inadequately remunerated.  
 
The Judiciary 
The Federal Council, as we have seen, possesses certain judicial powers; but there 
exists also a Federal Court of twenty-four judges appointed by the Assembly.  The 
Court exercises both criminal and civil jurisdiction, but the competence of the Court in 
criminal matters is severely restricted and rarely exercised.  In Civil matters the Federal 
Court acts as a Court of Appeal from the cantonal Courts in all cases arising under 
                                                  
8   [92/1]  Bonjous, op. cit., p. 198. 
9   [93/1]  op. cit., p. 234. federal laws, if the amount involved exceeds 3,000 francs.  It has primary jurisdiction in 
all suits between the Confederacy and the cantons, between canton and canton, and 
between individuals and the Government whether central or local.  But its main 
function, according to Swiss jurists, is the exposition of Public Law, or Constitutional 
questions: conflicts of jurisdiction either between cantons or between a cantonal and 
the Central Government.  It is, however, expressly provided that 'conflicts of 
administrative jurisdiction are to be reserved and settled in a manner prescribed by 
federal legislation'.  The truth is, as already indicated, that the separation of powers is 
in the [begin page 95] Swiss Constitution far from precise, either as between the 
different organs of the Central Government, legislative, executive, and judicial; or 
between the Confederation and the cantons.  On the latter point M. Felix Bonjour 
observes: 'The Swiss system is unique in that the spheres of the central authority and 
that of the cantons are not separated into water-tight compartments,' and he adds: 
'Opportunities for friction are not lacking, but in normal times any difficulties which may 
arise are overcome with little effort.'
10  
 
One further point in relation to the Federal Judiciary demands emphasis.  Unlike the 
Supreme Court of the United States that of the Swiss Confederation is not co-ordinate 
in authority with the Legislature.  The American Court, if jurisdiction is invoked on 
application of a suitor, is bound to treat as void all laws whether enacted by the 
National or the State Legislatures if in its judgement such laws are inconsistent with the 
Constitution.  In Switzerland, on the contrary, it is expressly provided that 'the Federal 
Court shall apply the laws passed by the Federal Assembly and the decrees of the 
Assembly which have a general bearing'.  Other points of contrast are not lacking.  The 
Swiss Court, unlike the American, has no power to decide the question of its own 
competence; in Switzerland there are not, as in America, federal tribunals in the States 
subordinate to the Central Court of Lausanne, nor has the Central Tribunal officers of 
its own to execute its judgements; for their execution it must rely upon the readiness 
and obedience of cantonal officials.
11
 
Should the canton or its officials refuse to carry out the judgements of the Federal 
Court or the order of the Federal Council the central authorities have no means of 
enforcing obedience save those to which reference has already been made.  To an 
outside observer this would seem to place the Central Government in a position of 
humiliating dependence upon the cantons.  But the [begin page 96] judgement of the 
outsider matters little: what does matter is that the mutual relations of Confederation 
and cantons are the logical result of historical conditions, and accord entirely with the 
genius of the people and of the Constitution which they have evolved.  
 
The Swiss Cantons. 
It remains, however, profoundly true and profoundly significant that a survey, however 
general, of Swiss Democracy ought to concern itself rather with the cantons than with 
the Confederation.  The difficulty is that the cantonal Governments still present a 
bewildering variety of detail.  Politically, as M. Bonjour observes,
12 'Switzerland offers a 
picture almost as varied in its character as it does physically.  All forms of government 
are or have been practised in Switzerland, and the results of all of them can be studied 
there at the present time.'  It is this, indeed, which constitutes the value to be derived 
from a study of Swiss political institutions.'  The twenty-five more or less autonomous 
States which comprise the Confederation and this Confederation itself are', as he says, 
‘political laboratories always at work.  They are all so many small nations animated by 
a desire to perfect their political organization and to develop their democratic 
institutions.  They borrow from one another those forms of government which appear to 
                                                  
10   [95/1]  Op. cit., p. 23. 
11   [95/2]  Adams and Cunningham, The Swiss Confederation, p. 268. 
12   [96/1]  Op, cit., p, 9. succeed best.'  On one principle, however, all the cantons are agreed.  Since 1860 they 
have all, with the exception of Freiburg, accepted the principle of Direct Democracy.  
 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the principle still permits considerable latitude of 
interpretation.  In the Old League of High Germany, dissolved in 1798, there were no 
fewer than eleven Landsgemeinden.  There are still six survivals of this form of 
primitive and most direct democracy.  The government of these cantons is still vested in 
the whole body of adult male citizens, and in at least one canton (Appenzell-
Ausserrhoden) participation in the Landsgemeinde is a civic duty up to the age of sixty 
years, and non-attendance is punishable by fine.   [begin page 97] 
 
Other cantons enforce the same principle by means of the Referendum  and the 
Initiative.  All the cantons save Freiburg and the six which have primary Assemblies 
(Landsgemeinden) have adopted both these devices.  
 
The Cantonal Referendum. 
The Referendum, in the cantons, assumes three forms: The Compulsory, Optional, and 
Financial.  All cantons are compelled, by federal law, to submit constitutional 
amendments to the popular veto.  As regards ordinary legislation the compulsory 
Referendum  prevails in German Switzerland; the French and Italian cantons are 
content with the optional form.  The financial Referendum  is either compulsory or 
optional according to the canton.  Of the laws or decrees submitted under compulsory 
Referendum,  in the decade 1906-16, about 25 percent were rejected; of those 
submitted, in the same period, under the optional Referendum, 229 were accepted and 
73 rejected.  'The laws or decrees’, writes M. Bonjour, ‘which the people seem to have 
most difficulty in accepting are those fixing the remuneration of magistrates, officials, or 
employees, or creating new offices, new taxes, and laws which restrict individual liberty 
or appear to maintain privileges.'
13  Proposals are, however, not infrequently defeated 
on a first or second presentation and accepted on a third or subsequent occasion; the 
veto in fact is suspensive rather than absolute.  
 
The Popular Initiative. 
More directly democratic even than the Referendum is the Popular Initiative. This again 
is of two kinds: 'general' and 'formulated’, and may be applied either to ordinary 
legislation or to constitutional amendments, or to both.  It is set in motion by a 
prescribed number of electors; 50,000 electors are required in the Confederation; in the 
cantons the number varies according to population.  A 'general' Initiative or ‘motion' 
merely calls upon the Legislature to draft a law or a decree on a particular subject; 
under the 'formulated' Initiative the actual terms of a Bill or a decree are [begin page 98] 
presented to the Legislature, which is bound to submit it, without amendment, to the 
vote of the people.  All that the Legislature may do is to submit an alternative Bill or 
decree on the same subject, in which case the people may by Referendum accept 
either or reject both.  This highly democratic device was first introduced by the canton 
Vaud in 1845, when the right of initiation was conceded to any 8,000 electors.  It now 
extends to all the cantons except Freiburg and those which possess Landsgemeinden, 
and even in Freiburg 6,000 citizens may call for total or partial revision of the 
Constitution.  The results of the cantonal initiatives are far less subversive than might 
be anticipated.  Out of thirty-six proposals initiated between 1905 and 1916 only ten 
were accepted.  When these figures are compared with those of the Referendum it is 
manifest that 'the people is much more circumspect and discreet about proposals 
coming from one or another of its sections than about the laws and decrees passed by 
its representatives'.
14  There can, however, be no doubt that the mere existence of the 
Initiative, and the possibility of its employment, exercises a stimulating effect upon the 
                                                  
13   [97/1]  Ibid., p. 110. 
14   [98/1]  Bonjour, op. cit., p. 143.  Legislature, and it is not without significance that of late years the majority of 
constitutional amendments have been initiated not by the people but by the great 
councils.  
 
The National Referendum 
In the National Government the Referendum has been adopted both in the compulsory 
and the optional form, but not in the financial.  Constitutional amendments, but those 
only,  must  be submitted to a popular vote; to ordinary legislation the veto may be 
applied on the demand either of eight cantons or of 30,000 electors.  No Bill can 
become law unless it receives the assent both of a majority of the electors who take the 
trouble to vote and a majority of the cantons.  Of the forty-five constitutional 
amendments proposed by the Federal Assembly between 1848 and 1925, twenty-nine 
were accepted and sixteen were rejected.  The 'Optional Referendum' yields, [begin 
page 99] as one would expect, somewhat different results. Between 1874 and 1924 a 
Referendum  on ordinary Bills or decrees was demanded in thirty-six cases, and in 
twenty-three of these cases the opposition was successful.  Not infrequently, however, 
the opposition has proved to be temporary; it has proceeded from an objection to the 
details rather than the principles of proposed legislation, and has been overcome when 
the objectionable details have been deleted. 
 
The Initiative has been in operation in the Confederation for about thirty years.  Down 
to 1925 twenty attempts were made by various sections of the people to secure a 
partial revision of the Constitution: in only five cases did they succeed.  Among the 
unsuccessful attempts may be noted a proposal for the recognition of the 'right to 
work’, which was rejected by 308,289 votes to 75,880; a proposal for the direct election 
of the Federal Council; while a third - to institute Proportional Representation - was 
twice rejected, but adopted on a third appeal (October 1918) by 299,550 votes to 
149,035 and by 19½ cantons to 2½t.  In passing, it is proper to observe that the 
distinction between 'constitutional' and 'ordinary’ amendments is, in practice, to a large 
extent illusory.  Virtually any 50,000 citizens can by the use of the Popular Initiative 
obtain a vote of the Swiss people and of the cantons upon any proposal whatever, 
provided it is put in the form of a constitutional amendment, a provision which makes 
no excessive demands upon the ingenuity of a draftsman.
15  
 
On the whole, Swiss publicists are optimistic as regards the results of the Referendum 
and the Initiative  in Switzerland.  Legislative projects, carefully conceived and well 
thought out by the Federal Council and the Assembly are rarely rejected, except 
temporarily, by the votes of the people or the cantons, and so far from weakening the 
responsibility of the elected Legislators, the Referendum, in M. Bonjour's opinion, tends 
to increase it. 
 
Projects of law are, he contends, drafted with greater [begin page 10] care and precision 
and are expounded to the electors with greater intelligence and zeal.  The device may, 
he admits, hinder the 'over-luxuriant growth of legislation’, but it certainly stimulates the 
political education of the individual electors, and, taken in conjunction with the Initiative, 
it affords a real safeguard against revolution.  A conclusion so decided emanating from 
a source so authoritative cannot be lightly set aside.
16
 
M. Simon Deploige's judgement is more ambiguous.  He admits that, for various 
reasons, the Referendum is comparatively harmless in Switzerland, but he is emphatic 
in his opinion that the last thing which is elicited by the device is a clear verdict on a 
particular issue. 
 
                                                  
15   [99/1]  Uebersicht der eidgenossischen Volksabstimmungen seit 1848. 
16   [100/1]  op. cit., cc. v, vi, vii. ‘The result of a vote’, he says, 'may be fortunate or unfortunate, but it has 
been determined as a matter of fact by a thousand different influences, and 
to speak of it as the expression of a thoughtful and conscientious popular 
judgment is only to juggle with words.'
17
 
 M. Deploige's testimony is, it should be said, less recent and less authoritative than M. 
Bonjour's.  
 
Whatever the verdict as regards Switzerland, we must still beware of hasty deductions 
from a single instance.  The Swiss people have with manifest success worked out a 
certain political system for themselves, but it would, as Mr. Lowell observes, be 
dangerous to infer that 'similar methods would produce the same effects under different 
conditions.  The problem they have had to solve is that of self-government among a 
small, stable, and frugal people, and this is far simpler than self-government in a great, 
rich, and ambitious nation.'
18  
 
The caution is very far from superfluous, whether it be addressed to Mr. Lowell's 
countrymen or to our own. Whatever may be said for or against the Referendum and 
the Initiative, this cannot be denied: that in Switzerland they are native products; they 
are devices which have [begin page 101] been engrafted on to the Federal Constitution 
after prolonged and varied experiments in the laboratories of the cantons; they are in 
complete harmony with the ‘spirit of the Polity', and they are employed by a people who 
have had the advantage of a long apprenticeship in the art of self-government. 
  
The Swiss Constitution unique. 
The Polity devised and elaborated for their own use by the Swiss people is, among the 
nations of the modem world, sui generis.  Nowhere else, except possibly in Soviet 
Russia, is the type of modem democracy direct.  Even in Switzerland the 
representative principle has been partially adopted, but the people as a whole are 
sufficiently habituated to the methods of direct democracy to be able to combine the 
two principles without inconvenience.  But the Swiss type of democracy, though 
partially 'representative', is neither 'parliamentary' nor ‘presidential'.  Manifestly it is not 
'parliamentary’ in the English sense, since the Legislature would never dream of 
dismissing the Executive in consequence of the rejection of a Bill proposed to it by the 
ministers; still less would the ministers dream of resigning because their projects of law 
failed to find favour with the Legislature; least of all would the Legislature dissolve itself 
because its legislative schemes were rejected by the people or because the people 
anticipated its action by means of the Initiative.  If Swiss democracy is not in the 
English sense parliamentary, neither is it, in the American, ‘presidential'.  The 
‘President' is not elected by the people nor has he any more influence upon the course 
of administration, nor upon policy, than any other member of the Federal Council.   
Among his colleagues in the Council he is temporarily primus inter pares, but like them 
he is the agent if not the servant of the Federal Council whose orders he and his 
colleagues carry out, in much the same way as the permanent officials of the English 
Civil Service carry out the orders of their political chiefs. 
  
Non-presidential, non-parliamentary, Swiss democracy is, like American democracy, 
federal in texture; like [begin page 102] English democracy it is the outcome of a long 
process of historical evolution; like no other democracy in the modern world it is in 
genius and in essence direct.  Whether or not we can concede the claim that only in 
Switzerland is 'real' democracy to be seen in operation, certain it is that the working of 
                                                  
17   [100/2]  op. cit., p. 293. 
18   [100/3]  A. Laurence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, ii. 
335-6. Swiss democracy is on many grounds of peculiar interest to the student of political 
institutions, and not least on this: that in the modern world it is unique. 
 V. Presidential Democracy 
The Evolution of the American Constitution 
 
‘The basis of our political system is the right of the people to make and to 
alter their constitutions of government; but the Constitution which at any 
time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people 
is sacredly obligatory upon all.' – Washington.  
 
‘Opposition to the Constitution, as a constitution, and even hostile criticism 
of its provisions ceased almost immediately upon its adoption; and not only 
ceased, but gave place to an indiscriminating and almost blind worship of its 
principles, and of that delicate dual system of sovereignty, and that 
complicated system of double administration which it established. . . . The 
divine right of kings never ran a more prosperous course than did this 
unquestioned prerogative of the Constitution to receive universal homage. . . 
. We are the first Americans . . . to entertain any serious doubts about the 
superiority of our own institutions.' - Woodrow Wilson (1884).  
 
‘The makers of our Constitution, wise and earnest students of history and of 
life, discerned the great truth that self-restraint is the supreme necessity and 
the supreme virtue of a democracy.' - Elihu Root (1913), 
 
‘The constitutional history of the United States is as obviously as the 
constitutional history of England the record of an attempt to close political 
contests by means of treaties.' - A.V. Dicey, Introd, to Boutmy, Etudes, p. 
vii.  
 
Switzerland and the U.S.A. 
In the history of Political Institutions and in the practical working of democratic 
machinery the Swiss Confederation occupies a place which is confessedly unique.   
The conditions which have secured for that peculiar experiment a large measure of 
success are not likely to be precisely reproduced in any part of the modern world.  The 
place occupied in the history of political experiment by the United States of America is 
not less distinctive, and even more important.  
 
Personal liberty in the U.S.A. 
The primary aim of Greek democracy was, as we have Personal seen, the realisation 
of the idea of equality.  By the over-emphasis of that idea and by excessive zeal in 
pursuit of it Greek democracy destroyed itself.  Liberty perished in the attempt to 
secure equality.  Modern democracy, [begin page 104] though far from neglectful of the 
root principles of equality, has rather concentrated its attention upon the attempt to 
devise institutions which, while securing public order, shall also preserve to the 
individual certain inalienable rights, and in particular the right of liberty.  Government 
exists, so it is asserted in the Declaration of Independence, ‘to secure these rights'.  
From the duty thus solemnly proclaimed and accepted at the outset of its national 
existence, the United States has never flinched.  By its constitution, as will be seen, it 
has placed the preservation of personal rights beyond the reach of the caprices and 
vicissitudes of ordinary legislation.  Neither the national Legislature nor the State 
Legislatures can with impunity infringe them.  Nothing but the deliberate act of the 
sovereign people can curtail them. 
 Federalism 
Not only in its respect for individual liberty was ism American democracy remarkable.  
The fathers of the American Constitution were the first to devise a new form of Polity.  
The idea of a League of States was not unfamiliar to the ancient or to the medieval 
world.  The Old League of High Germany, out of which was evolved the Helvetic 
Confederation, affords one of many illustrations of such leagues.  Whether the Swiss 
Confederation would develop into federalism of the true type was still, as we have 
seen, in the eighteenth century more than uncertain.  Still more doubtful, as will be 
shown later, was the fate of the Dutch Confederation.  The English in America may, 
therefore, claim the credit of having been the first to work out the details of a new type 
of Constitution.  For the first time in history there was superimposed upon a federation 
of State Governments, a national Government with sovereignty acting directly not 
merely upon the States, but upon the citizens of each State.'
1  This is the distinctive 
quality of true federalism.  
 
American democracy representative 
American democracy is, then, primarily federal.  Secondly, it is representative, a 
characteristic which [begin page 105] differentiates it from the democracies of Greece, 
Rome, and medieval Italy.  The Constitution deliberately confides certain specified 
powers to an elected President and a representative Legislature.  In adopting the 
representative principle it followed the English model, while exhibiting its originality in 
adapting to a federal Commonwealth a device as yet attempted only in a unitary State.  
The bicameral form of the federal legislature - as a Senate and a House of 
Representatives - may also have been due in some measure to deference to English 
models, though the origin and composition of the Senate are, as I shall show, capable 
of another explanation.  But the American Congress differs from the English Parliament 
in a very important respect: unlike its prototype it is not legally omnipotent.  Federalism, 
as the fathers of the Constitution were quick to perceive, demands such limitations 
upon the power of the Legislature as a unitary State can perhaps afford to dispense 
with.  Apart from this, Hamilton and his colleagues were deeply impressed by 
Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers; but such a separation implies a 
definition of boundaries; definition involves rigidity, and both necessitate a custodian 
and interpreter of the Instrument in which the terms of the treaty, the conditions of the 
covenant, shall be enshrined.  The American Constitution is essentially in the nature of 
a covenant between a number of independent commonwealths - an international treaty 
to the observance of which the several parties are solemnly bound. 
 
But not parliamentary 
Representative American democracy is: but it is not, in the modern English sense, 
parliamentary.  Even the Legislature is not parliamentary, but, as Mr. Woodrow Wilson 
has insisted, 'congressional'; the Executive is not 'responsible' but presidential.  The 
President is limited by the Constitution and responsible, ultimately, to the sovereign 
people; but he is in no sense, like an English Prime Minister, responsible to the 
Legislature. 
 
To render these abstractions more intelligible it may [begin page 106] be well to forsake 
for a while the realm of political theory and explore briefly the historical origins of the 
American Constitution.  
 
Genesis of the American Constitution 
On the threshold of the inquiry it is important to correct one or two misapprehensions 
which would seem to be widely prevalent among English critics.  The authority of Mr. 
                                                  
1    [104/1]  Elihu Root, Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the 
Constitution, p. 27. Gladstone gave currency to the belief that the whole federal constitution was due to a 
sort of miraculous conception on the part of a small group of American statesmen 
deliberating in the Convention of I787.  'As the British Constitution', he wrote, ‘is the 
most subtle organism which has proceeded from progressive history, so the American 
Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off by the brain and purpose of 
man.'  For this view there is, it need not be said, some literal justification:  yet the 
impression which the words convey is none the less misleading. 
 
A second view suggests that this American Constitution, is in reality a version of the 
British Constitution, as it must have presented itself to an observer in the second half of 
the last (i. e. the eighteenth) century.  It is, in fact, the English Constitution carefully 
adapted to a body of Englishmen who had never had much to do with an hereditary 
king arid an aristocracy of birth and who had determined to dispense with them 
altogether.'
2  How a political analyst so precise and scrupulous as Sir Henry Maine 
could have been responsible for suggestions so misleading it is difficult to comprehend.  
A third view, even less entitled to respect, though hardly more grotesquely inadequate, 
discovers the model of the American Constitution in that of the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands.  
 
Essentially a native product. 
The actual form of the Constitution as it emerged from the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787 was dictated by the immediate and insistent needs of the thirteen colonies as 
revealed by the bitter experience of the preceding ten years.  It owed some of its more 
striking features to the [begin page 107] dominant influence of Montesquieu's political 
philosophy; but, as a whole, it was essentially an organic product evolved from native 
sources, which, though originally English, had been considerably modified by their 
culture on American soil.  
 
The Thirteen Colonies. 
Of the thirteen original colonies some, like Virginia, The were 'royal’, governed by 
companies located in England under grant from the Crown; others, like Massachusetts, 
were founded under charters from the Crown, which, from the outset, virtually left them 
free to work out their own political salvation in their own way; a third class included the 
'proprietary' colonies which, like Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, were granted 
by the Crown to individual proprietors.  But whatever the original constitutional status 
all the colonies developed along parallel lines.  The English Parliament claimed 
legislative jurisdiction, but as a fact the actual work of legislation was done in local 
assemblies which rapidly assumed the form and functions of provincial parliaments.  
The colonies, says Burke,  
 
‘formed within themselves, either by royal instruction or royal charter 
assemblies so exceedingly resembling a parliament in all their forms, 
functions, and powers. . . . In the meantime neither party felt any 
inconvenience from this double legislature (i.e. the English and Colonial) to 
which they had been formed by imperceptible habits and old custom, the 
great support of all the governments in the world.  Though these two 
legislatures were sometimes found perhaps performing the very same 
functions, they did not very grossly or systematically clash.' 
 
In this dual jurisdiction it is not perhaps fanciful to perceive, if not the germ of 
federalism, at least a practical demonstration of the possibility of two concurrent 
systems of law and an apprenticeship in the difficult art of federal government.  Be that 
as it may, the colonists were gaining invaluable experience in the task of self-
government throughout the whole of the colonial period, a period which, in the case of 
                                                  
2   [106/1]  Popular Government.   Virginia, Massachusetts, and [begin page 108] some of the older colonies, extended 
over a century and a half. 
  
The War of Secession. 
In 1776 these communities exchanged the status of colonies for that of States, and 
under instructions from the Continental Congress of 1775 each colony recast its 
Constitution so far as was rendered necessary by the new and independent status it 
had assumed.  Seven of the new States, including Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
and Pennsylvania, prefixed to their new Constitutions a Bill of Rights, which while 
recalling the familiar claims of English charters of liberties, appeal also, more gallico, to 
abstract principles of political philosophy.  In the case of Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
which were already accustomed to choose their own governors and officials, as well as 
to make their own laws, hardly any modification of the 'charter' was found necessary. 
 
The stern exigencies of war rendered imperative a further and very important step.  
Even for military purposes it was by no means easy to induce the several colonies to 
co-operate; much less to bring about an embryonic political union.  Between the 
colonies there had hitherto been very little community of interest or sympathy.  They 
differed in origin; in economic and physical conditions; in social structure; in religious 
sympathies; in political opinions.  Yet differing between themselves each colony had its 
counterpart in some section of society, some ecclesiastical persuasion, some 
commercial interest, some political party at home.  Maryland, for instance, was the 
home of the Roman Catholics and maintained close relations with fellow religionists at 
home; Virginia and the Carolinas with their large slave-worked plantations, their big 
country-houses, their devotion to the Crown and the Church of England, inherited the 
traditions of Cavalier England and reproduced many of the characteristics of English 
country life.  New England, on the other hand, Puritan in origin, temper, and creed, and 
extorting a more grudging subsistence from a less genial soil, was in close sympathy 
and  [begin page 109] communication with the middle classes at home.  To bring 
together communities so diverse in origin and so divergent in outlook would have been 
impossible save under the pressure of military necessity.  Yet the idea of union was not 
unfamiliar, and more than one attempt had been made to realize it.  Several of the New 
England colonies had, as far back as 1643, united in a League of Friendship for the 
purpose of mutual protection against the Indian tribes which perpetually threatened 
their frontiers.  The League lasted forty years.  William Penn drafted a scheme for 
colonial union and submitted it to the Board of Trade and Plantations in 1697.  Franklin 
drew up a very detailed and elaborate plan in 1754, and not a few of his suggestions 
bore fruit in the Federal Constitution of 1787; but even in 1754 the time for union was 
not ripe, a truth which no one realized more clearly than Franklin himself.  'Their 
jealousy of each other’, wrote Franklin as late as 1763, ‘is so great that however 
necessary a union of the colonies has long been, for their common defence and 
security against their enemies, and how sensible soever each colony has been of that 
necessity, yet they have never been able to effect such a union among themselves nor 
even to agree in requesting the mother country to establish it for them.'  But under the 
stress of war ideas are apt to mature rapidly.  The Seven Years War against France 
and Spain, the war which deprived France of Canada and Louisiana, and Spain of 
Florida, did something.  The quarrel with England in regard to commercial policy did 
more.  
 
The Philadelphia Congresses of 1774 and 1775. 
In September 1774 delegates from all the thirteen colonies except Georgia assembled 
in Congress at Philadelphia; so far had the policy of Grenville and North already gone 
to create, out of a group of heterogeneous and colonies, a homogeneous people.   
Eight months later there met in the same city a Second Congress (May 1775), to which 
for the first time all thirteen colonies sent delegates.  Blood had already been spilt at 
Lexington (April), but the Second Continental Congress, like the [begin page 110] first, avowed the desire of the colonies for peace and their continued loyalty to the mother 
country.  There is every reason to believe that the avowal was sincere: it may be 
inferred, firstly, from the fact that the Congress dispatched the 'Olive Branch Petition' - 
to England asking not for independence but merely for the recognition of the right of 
self-taxation; and secondly from the fact - even more significant - that both the drafts for 
a permanent union - Galloway's as well as Franklin's - considered by the Congress 
assumed an ultimate reconciliation with Great Britain.  But the sands were running out. 
 
The issue was decided by the action of France.  The Second Congress, while avowing 
its desire for peace, had appointed George Washington commander-in-chief of the 
confederate army; but the first months of war made it clear that the colonies could not 
hope to cope successfully with the Imperial forces without outside assistance.  France 
was willing and anxious to afford it; but on terms: the colonies must first declare their 
independence. 
 
The Declaration of Independence 
On 4 July 1776 - one of the memorable dates in the history of mankind - the famous 
declaration was formally made that 'these United Colonies are and of Right ought to be 
Free and Independent States'.  A new nation was born into the world.  
 
The Articles of Confederation 
But the new nation was as yet without a Constitution.  The lack was to some extent 
supplied by the Articles of Confederation to which the Continental Congress agreed in 
1777 and which were formally adopted by the States on 1 March 1781.  The 
Confederation was little more than a league of friendship between sovereign and 
independent States.  An emphatic assertion of the sovereignty of the States was put in 
the forefront of the instrument, though provision was made for an annual meeting of 
delegates from each State in Congress.  Certain powers relating to foreign affairs, 
Indian affairs, peace and war, armaments, coinage, postage, &c., were expressly 
delegated to Congress, but its authority was severely and jealously restricted.   
Consequently the Confederation, [begin page 111] said Alexander Hamilton in 1780, 
was 'neither fit for war nor peace'.  The fundamental defeat of the new Constitution 
was, according to Jefferson, that Congress was not authorized to act immediately on 
the people and by its own officers.  Their power was only requisitory, and these 
requisitions were addressed to the several Legislatures to be by them carried into 
execution without other coercion than the moral principle of duty.  It is allowed, in fact, a 
negative to every Legislature and on every measure proposed by Congress; a negative 
so frequently exercised in practice as to benumb the action of the Federal Government, 
and to render it inefficient in its general objects, and more especially in pecuniary and 
foreign concerns.
3  Moreover, for lack of a' federal' executive and judiciary, the 
Congress was compelled, to the profound disgust of the American disciples of 




Nevertheless, the Articles of Confederation, to say nothing of the Constitutions of the 
individual States, deserve more attention than they have, as a rule, hitherto received in 
this country.  A detailed study of these documents would supply the best corrective to 
the notion that the Federal Constitution of 1787 sprang Minerva-like from the brain of 
Zeus.  Many of the principles and institutions, subsequently elaborated in the Federal 
Constitution, are to be found in embryo in the earlier documents.  Thus the New 
Hampshire Constitution (1776) contains the germ of the Federal Senate; the Virginian 
Constitution anticipates much of the language of the Federal Constitution, and some of 
                                                  
3   [111/1]  Thomas Jefferson, Works, i. 78. its characteristic principle, notably the doctrine of the separation of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers; while the idea of conferring upon the President a 
suspehsory veto on legislation was borrowed from the New York Constitution of 1777. 
 
So long as the war lasted the Confederation from sheer necessity held together; yet 
how badly the machinery worked we may learn from the almost despairing appeals 
[begin page 112] of Washington or from the more critical works of Hamilton.  'The 
States,' writes a modern critic, ‘from memory of British oppression, were deeply 
concerned with a pedantic idea of liberty. . . . Their jealous refusal to delegate power or 
to part with any of their individual rights, even to a Congress elected by their own 
citizens, was the cause of more disasters to their arms and more embarrassment to 
their leaders than all the assaults of the enemy.' 
4  The coming of peace served to 
accentuate the shortcomings of the embryonic Constitution.  'For the five years that 
preceded the adoption of the Federal Constitution,' wrote a great American statesman, 
‘the whole country was drifting surely and swiftly towards anarchy.  The thirteen States, 
freed from foreign dominion, claimed and began to exercise each an independent 




To induce these jealous and jarring republics to adopt any closer form of union was no 
easy task; it was accomplished, partly by the persistent effort and advocacy of a small 
group of enlightened statesmen, and still more by the hard pressure of circumstances.  
Chaos in finance, in commerce, in foreign relations, at last broke down the opposition 
of the most obdurate separatists.  In the autumn of 1786 a Convocation met at 
Annapolis to discuss the commercial situation.  Only five States were represented, but 
before they parted they agreed' to use their endeavours to procure the concurrence of 
the other States - in the appointment of Commissioners to take into consideration the 
situation of the United States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them 
necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the 
exigencies of the Union'. 
 
The Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia. 
The Constitutional Convention met at Philadelphia in may 1787 under the presidency of 
Washington, all the States except Rhode Island being represented.  Sixty-two [begin 
page 113] delegates were appointed, but of these, seven never came to Philadelphia.  
Of the remaining fifty-five 'seven had served as Governors of their respective States, 
twenty-eight had been delegates to the Continental Congress, many had had actual 
experience in the legislative assemblies of the colonies or States'.
6  Hamilton, Madison, 
Franklin, and Randolph were the foremost men in the Convention.  After four months of 
strenuous labour and several threats of disruption they completed a task which is 
perhaps the most memorable in the history of political institutions (17 September 
1787).  It was resolved that the Constitution, as drafted and accepted by the 
Convention, should as a whole be laid before the Congress of the United States; that it 
should afterwards be submitted for ratification to a convention of delegates specially 
chosen for the purpose in each individual State, and that it should come into effect so 
soon as it had been ratified by nine States. 
  
The Federalist. 
The ninth ratification was not obtained until June 1788, and the interval of nine months 
was one of the most critical and momentous periods in the history of the United States.  
During this interval there appeared the essays on the new Constitution which are now 
                                                  
4   [112/1]  F.S. Oliver, Life of Alexander Hamilton, p. 48 
5   [112/2]  Choate, Alexander Hamilton, p. 21. 
6   [113/1]  Kimball, Government of the U.S., p. 2. collected into the famous volume The Federalist.  Of the 85 essays contained therein, 
51 at least were written by Alexander Hamilton, 14 by James Madison, 5 by John Jay, 
and 3 by Hamilton and Madison in conjunction.  As a treatise on Political Theory the 
little volume certainly deserves the eulogies bestowed upon it by the publicists of many 
countries, but its immediate purpose was severely practical: to induce the several 
States to ratify the Constitution drawn up by the Philadelphia Convention.  That 
purpose was attained; but not without difficulty.  
 
So much of historical preface has seemed essential, on the one hand, to dissipate 
certain misconceptions which still prevail in regard to the origins of the American 
Constitution; on the other to an intelligent apprehension of its outstanding 
characteristics.  [begin page 114] 
 
Many of the most characteristic features will demand attention in subsequent chapters, 
dealing with the articulation of the several organs of government.  Only a general 
conspectus will be attempted here; no more indeed is necessary, for the whole field 





10 and Woodrow Wilson,
11 but by two of the most eminent publicists 
produced by France and England respectively, De Tocqueville
12 and Lord Bryce,
13 not 
to mention the slighter studies of Sir Henry Maine
14 and Emile Boutmy.
15
  
General features of the American Constitution 
Before proceeding to examine the provisions of the Federal Constitution there are 
some more general observations which it seems important to emphasize. 
 
Federal and State Governments. 
The first is that the Federal Constitution was superimposed upon the existing State 
Constitutions, and is intelligible only if it is regarded as complementary to them.  This is 
a point which is apt to be ignored by those who are familiar only with unitary 
Constitutions such as those of Great Britain and France.  English and French 
commentators on American institutions are, therefore, wise to insist upon it.  The 
Federal Government, as Lord Bryce points out, does not profess to be a complete 
scheme of government. 
 
‘It presupposes the State governments; it assumed their existence, their wide and 
constant activity.  It is a scheme designed to provide for the discharge of such and so 
many functions of government as the States do not already possess [begin page 115] 
and discharge.  It is therefore, so to speak, the complement and crown of the State 
constitutions, which must be read along with it and into it in order to make it cover the 
                                                  
7   [114/1]  Commentaries on the Constitution (1833). 
8   [114/2]  Civil Government in the United States (1890), and Critical Period of 
American History (1898). 
9   [114/3]  Federal Government (1891) and other works. 
10   [114/4]  Comparative Administrative Law (1903). 
11   [114/5]  Congressional Government (1885) and The State (1899). 
12   [114/6]  Democracy in America (1834-40). 
13   [114/7]  The American Commonwealth (1st edition 1888).   
14   [114/8]  Popular Government (1885).  
15   [114/9]  Studies in Constitutional Law (1888).  To the above I should add Dr. 
Everett Kimball's The National Government of the United States (1920), which 
came under my notice only after much of this chapter was written; but I have been 
fortunately able to avail myself in revision of Dr. Kimball's valuable and recent 




Similarly M. Bout my insists that the Federal Constitution is unintelligible when taken 
alone.  'It is like a body, of which you see nothing but the head, feet, and hands, in fact 
all the parts that are useful in social life, while the trunk containing the vital organs is 
hidden from view.  This essential part, which is hidden, represents the Constitutions of 
the separate States.'
17  Jefferson, with pardonable exaggeration, went so far as to say 
that 'the Federal Government is only one department of foreign affairs'.  
 
The balance shifting. 
Since Jefferson's day centripetal tendencies in the United States as elsewhere, have 
rapidly gained at the expense of centrifugal forces, and consequently the balance 
between the Federal and the State Governments has greatly altered.  To this shifting in 
the balance of the Constitution the first powerful impulse came from the civil war, and 
the successful assertion, in that war, of unionist principles.  To the war are attributable 
the Thirteenth (18 December 1865), the Fourteenth (28 July 1868), and the Fifteenth 
(30 March 1870) amendments of the Constitution.  The Eighteenth and latest 
amendment (29 January 1919) claims for the National Government the right to 
regulate, or rather to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, a matter 
previously left to the discretion of the States.  But notwithstanding this manifest 
tendency, the warnings uttered by Lord Bryce and M. Boutmy are, even now, far from 
superfluous, and the student of the Federal Constitution will do well to remember that, 
in relation to the whole government of the United States, it is in itself but a fragment. 
  
The Constitution itself bears in almost every article the marks of its origin: at every turn 
it reveals the [begin page 116] jealous fears of the constituent republics, lest any form of 
national government should curtail their independence and limit their powers.  Two 
'plans' were, as a fact, submitted to the Philadelphia Convention: the Virginia Plan, by 
Randolph; the New Jersey Plan, by Patterson.  The former was frankly unitarian and 
would in effect have substituted for the existing republics a strong national government.  
The New Jersey Plan on the contrary was designed for the protection of the smaller 
States, and contemplated not a union of the people but a league of independent 
Commonwealths.  The resulting Constitution was a compromise between these two 
diametrically opposed ideals.  The House of Representatives went some way to satisfy 
Virginia; New Jersey secured a safeguard in the Senate.  
 
The Constitution a Treaty. 
Yet when all is said, the essential safeguard for the rights alike of the States and of the 
people is to be found in the Constitution itself.  The significance of this basic truth is apt 
to be missed by Englishmen; but unless and until it be apprehended there can be no 
understanding of the fundamental principle of American government.  The American 
Constitution was the product of no ordinary legislative body, but of a constituent 
assembly convened for the sole and specific purpose of drafting what was in effect an 
inter-state if not an international treaty.  Moreover, the terms of that treaty were to have 
no validity until they had been ratified by at least two-thirds of the parties thereto.  Once 
more, for the purpose of ratification, the ordinary State Legislatures were not permitted 
to suffice; the treaty was submitted in each State to constituent convention, which, like 
the National convention itself, were specially summoned for this exclusive end.  No 
precaution was, therefore, omitted which could either appease jealousy, dispel 
suspicion, or emphasize the all-important truth that the authority to make, as to amend, 
the Constitution was vested in no delegates, Congress, or Convention, but exclusively 
in the sovereign people of the United States.  
                                                  
16   [115/1]  The American Commonwealth, i. 29. 
17   [115/2]  Op cit. p. 69. [begin page 117] 
 
Division of Powers. 
Nevertheless, the precautions, though ample and precise, were not deemed sufficient.  
It was and is a fundamental doctrine of the American Constitution that the National 
Government possesses only such powers as are delegated to it by the States or 
conferred upon it by the people.  By Article I, section 8, of the Constitution certain 
powers are, by enumeration, conferred upon Congress; by section 9 certain other 
things are prohibited; section 10 lays certain limitations upon the States.  But the 
jealous fears of the people were not completely allayed, and during the process of 
ratification no fewer than six States proposed amendments dealing with the delegation 
of powers.  The result of the agitation is seen in the ten amendments which were 
embodied in the Instrument by 1791.  Of these, two are, in this connexion, especially 
noteworthy:  
 
Article IX.   The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.  
 
Article X.    The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
  
No loophole for possible conflict or confusion was to be left: plainly, unmistakably, the 
residuum  of powers was to be vested, not in Congress nor in any branch of the 
National Government, but in the States and the sovereign people.  The principle 
enunciated with so much emphasis is indeed vital to true federalism.  Sovereignty rests 
with those in whom is vested residual authority.  It may, as in Switzerland, or Australia, 
or America, be the States, or it may, as in Canada, be the Federal Legislature - or 
ultimately the Imperial Legislature: where it is, there is sovereignty. 
 
The sphere of federal activity was clearly demarcated from that of the State.  The 
National Government was to concern itself mainly with political affairs, with foreign 
relations, national defence, and so forth; while social and [begin page 118] domestic 
questions, the relations of citizen and citizen, were for the most part reserved to the 
States.  The Instrument itself was indeed intended not to embody a code of laws, but 
rather to create a political system; and the great bulk of its articles are taken up, 
therefore, with a description of political institutions, Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial.
18  But within its own appropriate sphere, alike of legislation and administration, 
the Federal Government is supreme.  This is a point so difficult of apprehension by 
peoples whose minds are imbued (as are those of most Englishmen) with the Austinian 
doctrine of sovereignty, that it may be prudent to enforce it by citation from an American 
jurist of European repute:  
 
‘A dual sovereignty', writes Dr. Choate, 'was successfully established, by 
means of which the Federal Government within its sphere is supreme and 
absolute in all federal matters, and for those purposes able to reach by its 
own arm without aid or interference from the States every man, every dollar, 
and every foot of soil within the wide domains of the Republic, leaving each 
State still supreme, still vested with complete and perfect dominion over all 
matters domestic within its boundaries.  Harmony between the two 
independent sovereignties is absolutely secured by the judicial power vested 
in the United States Supreme Court, to keep each within its proper orbit by 
                                                  
18    [118/1]  For this interesting point and elaboration of it cf. F.J. Stimson, The 
American Constitution, pp. 14 seq., and Kimball, op. cit., pp. 50 seq. declaring void, in cases properly brought before it, all State Laws which 
invade the federal jurisdiction, and all Acts of Congress which trespass upon 
the Constitutional rights of the States.'
19  
 
Separation of Powers. 
If the Constitution was careful to assign to their appropriate spheres the functions of 
the central and local government respectively, it was not less concerned as to the rigid 
separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary.  In no 
Constitution in the world, not even in those of revolutionary France, has more 
superstitious regard been paid to the famous formula of Montesquieu.  
[begin page 119] 
 
Rigidity of the Constitution: has it been exaggerated. 
From all this it might naturally be inferred that the Rigidity American Constitution, with 
its precise demarcation of spheres and its scrupulous separation of powers, is 
exceptionally 'rigid' in character.  In theory indubitably it is.  Yet written though it is and 
rigid as are its terms, it has proved itself in practice far more flexible than its authors, or 
some of them, intended and anticipated.  In nothing have Americans proved more 
conclusively their English descent than in their superiority to their own handiwork; in 
their refusal to be confined within the four corners of their Instrument.  'Rigidity’, as will 
be seen later, is a necessary ingredient in federalism; a document which partakes of 
the nature of an international agreement cannot be treated so cavalierly as a merely 
municipal law; and the process of constitutional revision is in the United States 
exceptionally elaborate.  The formal amendments to the Constitution have 
consequently been singularly few, only eighteen in all; and of these no fewer than ten 
were enacted before November 1791, almost, indeed, before the original Constitution 
had actually come into operation.  The eleventh and twelfth date from 1798 and 1804 
respectively; the last one hundred and sixteen years have yielded only eight.  The 
changes which, in the course of a century and a quarter, the American Constitution has 
undergone have been more subtle in character and more gradual in effect.  'There has 
been', wrote Dr. Woodrow Wilson in 1884, ‘a constant growth of legislative and 
administrative practice, and a steady accretion of precedent in the management of 
federal affairs, which have broadened the sphere and altered the functions of the 
Government without perceptibly affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional 
language.'  Then follow from the same authoritative pen some remarkable words: 'Ours 
is, scarcely less than the British, a living and fecund system.  It does not indeed find its 
rootage so widely in the soil of unwritten law; its tap-root at least is the Constitution; but 
the Constitution is now, like Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, only the [begin page 
120] sap centre of a system of government vastly larger than the stock from which it 
has branched.'
20  Not dissimilar is the comment of Dr. A. B. Hart :  
 
‘The Constitution of 1789 has undergone great changes, most of them in the 
direction of greater centralization. . . . The elasticity and flexibility of the 
Constitution have not only preserved the federation, but have introduced 
anew principle into federal government. . . . The permanence of the United 
States is not due to the constructive skill of its founders; it rests upon the 
fact that the Constitution may, by the insensible effect of public opinion, 
slowly be expanded, within the forms of law, to a settlement or new 
questions as they arise.'
21  
 
                                                  
19   [118/2]  Choate, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 36-7.    
20   [120/1]  Congressional Government, p. 7.  
21   [120/2]  Federal Government, pp. 59, 60.  Does Dr. Hart do justice to the wisdom and prescience of the Fathers of the 
Constitution?  Is it not rather clear from the tenuity of the document that they 
deliberately abstained from detail and contented themselves with the enactment of a 
cadre which posterity might endow with flesh and blood?  Thus a discriminating English 
critic writes of the Constitution: 'At the most it was only a licence to begin governing 




Illustrations of flexibility. 
Illustrations of the subtle changes effected by time and precedent will not be lacking in 
the pages that follow, but attention may, in passing, be called to the change in the 
method of electing the President; to the transformation of the Senate from a 'diet of 
plenipotentiaries' into the most powerful Second Chamber in the world; to the gradual 
but uninterrupted growth in power of the Central Government and the weakening of 
those restraints which it was imagined the States would impose upon it; to the influence 
exerted by 'that puissant doctrine of the “implied powers” of the Constitution' which, as 
Mr. Wilson has justly observed, has been 'the chief dynamic [begin page 121] 
principle'
23 in American constitutional development ; above all, to the profound effect 
produced upon every branch of the administration by the higher and higher perfection 
to which party organization has been brought. 
 
It is not indeed devoid of significance that just as the Parliamentary Government of 
England quickly proved itself to be unworkable without the organized discipline of 
political parties; so the Presidential system of America showed itself equally dependent 
upon the same artificial and apparently adventitious accompaniment. 
 
An adequate appreciation of the influence of the Party System upon politics and society 
in America would demand not a paragraph but a volume.  Lord Bryce devotes to the 
subject no fewer than twenty-three chapters of his American Commonwealth, and to 
that intimate and elaborate study the reader may be referred.
24  The whole question is, 
however, much less unintelligible to an English reader than it was half a century ago, or 
even when Lord Bryce first published the American Commonwealth. Party organization 
is indeed a natural and inevitable accompaniment of the development of democracy.  
The election of candidates for seats in the central and local legislatures is as much a 
matter of moment as their election, and to confer the electoral franchise upon the mass 
of the people and at the same time to deny to them any freedom of choice in the 
selection of candidates is both illogical and irritating.  The caucus is the legitimate 
complement of a popular franchise, and the caucus means elaborate party 
organization.  If such an organization made its appearance sooner in America than in 
England, and if it has been carried farther, the phenomenon must be ascribed to a 




We may now pass in succinct review the chief organs [begin page 122] of the National 
Government, reserving critical comment, for the most part, to subsequent chapters. 
  
                                                  
22   [120/3]  F.S. Oliver, op. cit., p. 185. 
23   [121/1]  Congressional Government, p. 22.  
24   [121/2]  It is also treated in Chapters V and VI of Kimball's National Government 
of the United States, and with characteristic elaboration in Ostrogorsky's 
Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. The Constitution (Article II, section I (I)) provides that 'The Executive power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.  He shall hold office for the term 
of four years.' 
 
The Constitution also provided with great precision for the method of election, both of 
the President and of the Vice-President.  This method was, however, altered by the 
12th amendment to the Constitution (1804).  I will therefore describe not the original but 
existing machinery.  The election is indirect; it is made by an electoral college, the 
members of which are chosen by the people in each of the several States.  The precise 
mode of election in the States is left to the discretion of each State.  Originally, and for 
some time, many States entrusted the selection of Presidential electors to their 
Legislatures, and in South Carolina this method was continued until 1868.  Gradually, 
however, the States adopted the method of direct popular election-a plan which was 
from the first adopted by Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.  There is nothing, 
however, in the Constitution to prevent a reversion to the earlier method, or the 
invention of an entirely new one.  But whatever the method of selection each State may 
prefer to adopt, it is entitled under the Constitution to as many electors as it has 
Senators and Representatives in Congress.  These electors are chosen on the 
Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the year which immediately 
precedes the expiration of a Presidential term.  On the second Monday of the ensuing 
January they assemble in the several State capitals to cast their votes for the 
President.  The votes are counted in the Houses of Congress sitting in joint session on 
the second Wednesday of the following February.  The electors may not be members 
of Congress nor holders of any federal office.  The inauguration of the President thus 
elected takes place on 4 March.  
 
The formal qualifications for the Presidential office are [begin page 123] few.  The 
President must be a natural-born citizen of not less than thirty-five years of age and 
have been for fourteen years a resident within the United States.  He receives a salary 
of 75,000
25 dollars, and it is provided by the Constitution that the salary shall be neither 
diminished nor increased during his term of office.  Should the President die during his 
term his place is taken by the Vice-President, elected at the same time, and in the 
same manner as the President himself.  In the event of the death or disability of both 
President and Vice-President, the office is to be filled ad interim by various members of 
the Cabinet, according to a settled order, but such members must possess Presidential 
qualifications.  The formal functions of the President, according to the Constitution, are 
as follows: 
 
(1)   The command in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and 
of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service 
of the United States; 
(2)   To grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States 
except in cases of impeachment; 
(3)   To make treaties, but only with the assent of two-thirds of the Senate; 
(4)    To nominate all ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and other federal officers; but these 
appointments are subject to the concurrence of a two-thirds majority 
of the Senate. 
 
Congress is, however, permitted to vest in the heads of departments, or in the Courts of 
Law, or in the President, alone, the right of appointing to inferior offices, and this power 
has been largely exercised to relieve the President of a vast amount of inferior 
patronage.
26  
                                                  
25   [123/1]  Also $25,000 as a travelling allowance.  
26   [123/2]  For a further discussion of the position of the American President and the 
'Cabinet’, cf. infra, c. xxvi.  
The Legislature. 
With this brief reference to the Executive we may pass to the federal Legislature.  In 
discussing its position and functions English readers, in particular, will do well to remind 
themselves that Congress, unlike their own [begin page 124] Parliament, is not 
omnipotent, but is, on the contrary, severely restricted by the Constitution: its functions, 
in fine, are not constituent but legislative. 
 
In structure it is, like the English Parliament, bicameral, consisting of a Senate and a 
House of Representatives.  
 
The Senate 
Of all the political institutions of the United States the Senate is in some senses the 
most distinctive and is certainly not the least interesting.  According to the original 
design of the Constitution the Senate was to represent the constituent States of the 
Union and to be elected by the State Legislatures.  Article I, Section iii (I), ran as 
follows: ‘The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators for each 
State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one 
vote.'  In 1912, however, a very important amendment was passed by which, as will be 
seen, direct was substituted for indirect election.  The new article runs as follows:  
 
‘The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
elected by the people thereof for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.  The 
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most 
numerous branch of the State Legislature.  It is further provided that one-third of the 
Senate shall retire every two years, and that no one shall be elected to it who (a) is 
under thirty years of age; (b) has not been a resident of the United States for nine 
years; and (c) is not resident in the State for which he is elected.'  
 
In these Constitutional provisions two points at once arrest attention.  The first is that 
the federal Second Chamber is neither hereditary nor nominated but elected.   
Hereditary it could not under the circumstances have been; but it is significant that the 
method of election was preferred to that of nomination which has since been adopted 
in Canada.  A second point is the continuous existence of the Senate.  The 
membership of the Senate is renewed from time to time, but its members neither come 
in nor go out all together.  One-third of the Senate [begin page 125] retires every two 
years; but two-thirds of its members are always old, and thus stability and continuity 
are secured.  Senators change, the Senate is permanent. 
  
The purpose which the Senate was intended to serve in the general scheme of the 
Constitution is thus clearly stated in the Federalist :   
 
‘Through the medium of the State legislatures, which are select bodies of 
men, and who are to appoint the members of the National Senate, there is 
reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar 
care and judgement; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge 
and more comprehensive information in the national annals; and that on 
account of the extent of country from which will be drawn those to whose 
direction they will be committed they will be less apt to be tainted by the 
spirit of faction and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humours or 
temporary prejudices and propensities which in smaller societies frequently 
contaminate the public deliberations, beget injustice and oppression towards 
apart of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a 
momentary inclination ; or desire, terminate in general distress, 
dissatisfaction, and disgust.'   
It is noticeable, however, that the mode of choosing the Senate which was ultimately 
adopted was not that which had commended Itself to Hamilton and others, and which 
they had originally proposed.  Hamilton would seem to have preferred indirect election 
by an electoral college elected on a high property qualification - on the same principle, 
in fact, as the election of President.  His plan suggested that 'each Senator should be 
elected for a district, and that the number of Senators should be apportioned among 
the several states according to a rule roughly representing population'.  
 
Whether this plan would have worked equally well is far from certain; still less certain is 
it that it would have provided a permanent solution of the difficulties which confronted 
the framers of the Constitution.  On every ground, therefore, it is fortunate that it was 
not adopted.  [begin page 126] 
 
Genesis of the Senate. 
What was the source of the scheme which was finally the Senate adopted?  To this 
question many divergent answers have been given.  Some point to the English House 
of Lords as the original.  But apart from their common bicameral form the American 
Congress and the English Parliament have little in common.  Others find in the 
composition of the Senate the final and conclusive proof of the theory which traces the 
American Constitution to a Dutch original.  And with this degree of plausibility: the 
States-General of the Netherlands, like the American Senate, was representative not of 
the people but of the States, and each State found in it, without regard to size or 
population, equal representation.  Mr. Fisher scornfully repudiates both theories.   
According to him the Senate, like other American institutions, is derived from the 
scientific cultivation of a purely native germ.  That germ is to be found in 'the 
Governor's Council of colonial times'.  This institution was 
 
‘at first a mere advisory council of the Governor, afterwards a part of the 
legislature sitting with the assembly, then a second house of legislature 
sitting apart from the assembly as an upper house; sometimes appointed by 
the Governor, sometimes elected by the people, until it gradually became an 
elective body, with the idea that its members represented certain districts of 
land, usually the counties. It had developed thus far when the National 
Constitution was framed, and it was adopted in that instrument so as to 
equalize the states, and prevent the large ones from oppressing the smaller 
ones.  This was accomplished by giving each state two Senators, so that 
large and small were alike.  The language in the Constitution describing the 
functions of the Senate was framed principally by John Dickinson, who at 
that time represented Delaware-ope of the smaller states-which had suffered 
in colonial times from too much control by Pennsylvania.'
27  
 
Be this as it may, it is indisputably the case that the Senate has from the first 
represented the centrifugal principle in American federalism.  It stands for the inde- 
[begin page 127] pendence of the States, Bearing this in mind, it is not remarkable that 
of all the fundamental principles of the American Constitution the most rigid and 
unalterable should be that of equality of State representation in the Federal Senate, 'No 
state’, so runs the Constitution, ‘can be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate 
without its own consent' - a consent which would, of course, under no circumstances 
be given.  
 
Consisting originally of twenty-six members, the Senate now consists of ninety-six.   
The English Upper House consists of more than 700 members; the French Senate of 
                                                  
27   [126/1]  Evolution of the American Constitution. 34, the Canadian of 87, the Australian of 36, the South African of 40, Relatively to the 
size and population of the Union, the American Senate is therefore the smallest 
Second Chamber in the world - a fact which may in some degree account for the 
efficiency with which it performs the functions entrusted to it by the Constitution. 
  
Functions 
Those functions are threefold: Legislative, Judicial, and Executive.  
 
Its legislative authority is, except in regard to finance, co-ordinate with that of the 
House of Representatives, and is exercised with a freedom to which many Second 
Chambers are strangers.  Any Bill (except a Bill to raise revenue) may originate in 
either House, and owing to the fact that in America the Executive does not, as in 
England, dominate the Legislature, the Senate takes its fair share in initiating 
legislation.  Finance Bills must, however, originate in the House of Representatives, 
though the Senate enjoys and exercises the same powers of amendment and rejection 
in regard to these, as in regard to other Bills, In the event of a disagreement between 
the two Houses a conference committee, composed of members of both Houses, is 
appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.  The report of 
this committee is generally accepted by both Houses.  Not until the Bill is passed in 
identical form by the two Houses is it sent up for the approval of the President, who has 
the right to 'return it, unsigned' to Congress.  Should the Bill again [begin page 128] 
pass by a two-thirds vote in both Houses, the President's veto lapses and it becomes 
law with or without his assent. 
 
If, as sometimes happens, a Bill passes one House and the other House declines to 
deal with it during that session, it may start again in the following session where it left 
off, provided that it is in the same Congress.  Should a new Congress have been 




The part taken by the Senate in legislation is by no means its most characteristic or 
distinctive work.  The fathers of the Constitution intended that the Senate, like the 
English House of Lords, should perform important judicial functions; and, unlike the 
House of Lords, should also have a share in the Executive.  By Article I, § 2, of the 
Constitution the sole power of impeachment is vested in the House of Representatives; 
by § 3 the sole power to try impeachments is vested in the Senate.  When sitting for 
that purpose Senators are to be on oath or affirmation.  When the President of the 
United States is on trial, the Chief Justice is required to preside in place of the ordinary 
presiding officer of the Senate, who being also Vice-President of the Republic is 
naturally supposed to have a direct interest in the conviction and consequent removal 
of the President.  In the trial of other officers the Vice-President presides as usual.  The 
judicial powers of the Senate are, from the nature of the case, infrequently exercised.  
One President of the United States, President Johnson, was impeached in 1868, and 
was acquitted.  Impeachment is the only means by which a federal judge can be got rid 
of, and in certain instances it has proved to be a clumsy and even a brutal weapon.  
Four federal judges have been impeached, of whom two were convicted.  
 
In one case the device was resorted to as the only means of getting rid of a judge who 
had become insane.  In addition to these cases, a Secretary of War and a senator have 
also been impeached.  But few as have been the cases in which recourse has been 
had to this [begin page 129] particular method of proceeding provided by the 
Constitution, it could not, as Lord Bryce says, be dispensed with, and it is better that 
the Senate should try cases in which a political element is usually present, than that 
the impartiality of the Supreme Court should be exposed to the criticism it would have 
                                                  
28   [128/1]  A.L. Dawes, How we are Governed. to bear did political questions come before it.  Most senators are or have been lawyers 





Of all the attributes of the American Senate the most Patronage distinctive, however, is 
the fact that it shares with the President two important executive functions: (i) the right 
of ‘confirming' the appointment of all persons nominated by the President to act as 
ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court and other federal judges, officers, or 
ministers;
30 and (ii) the right to concur in the making of treaties, In each case two-thirds 
of the senators present must concur,  
 
How has the joint executive authority of Senate and President worked in practice?  
 
As regards the appointment of Cabinet ministers, it has become customary for the 
Senate to approve, as a matter of course, the nomination of the President, to whom 
such ministers are solely responsible.  In the appointment of ambassadors, consuls, 
judges, heads of departments, and the chief military and naval officers, the 
concurrence of the Senate is less of a mere form.  In regard to other federal officers 
there has been gradually established what is known as the 'Courtesy of the Senate’, by 
which the nomination to a federal office in any particular State is left by common 
consent to the senators representing that State.  This arrangement is obviously 
advantageous to the party wire-pullers, but it is one against which many of the stronger 
Presidents have from time to time chafed and protested bitterly, though without effect. 
 
In the appointment of minor officials the Senate, as we have seen, takes no part.  
[begin page 130] 
 
Even so, the participation of a branch of the Legislature in the exercise of patronage 
has been generally condemned, alike by native and by foreign critics.  Of the former, 
Mr. Woodrow Wilson maybe accepted as typical; and his opinion is expressed in no 
uncertain terms:  
 
‘The unfortunate, the demoralizing influences which have been allowed to 
determine executive appointments since President Jackson's time have 
affected appointments made subject to the Senate's confirmation hardly less 
than those made without its co-operation; senatorial scrutiny has not proved 
effectual for securing the proper constitution of the public service.’
31
  
Lord Bryce represents the more cautious and balanced opinion of foreign critics:  
 
‘It may be doubted whether this executive function of the Senate is now a 
valuable part of the Constitution.  It was designed to prevent the President 
from making himself  a tyrant by filling the great offices with his 
accomplices or tools.  That danger has passed away, if it ever existed; and 
Congress has other means of muzzling an ambitious chief magistrate.  The 
more fully responsibility for appointments can be concentrated upon him, 




                                                  
29   [129/1]  Op. cit. i. 107.  
30   [129/2]  Constitution, Art, II, § ii. 
31   [130/1]  The State, p. 544.  
32   [130/2]  op. cit. i. 106. In this temperate judgement most English students of American institutions will be 
ready to concur.  In the discharge of its executive functions the Senate sits, debates, 
and votes in camera; and with all deference to Lord Bryce, who regards public 
discussion as 'the plan most conformable to a democratic government’, it seems 
doubtful whether his alternative would not be preferable.  It is true that secret sessions 
may tend to obscure the responsibility both of the President and of the Senate that they 
may lead to a large amount of log-rolling, and not infrequently to positive corruption.  
Nevertheless, public discussion of the claims of rival candidates for the highest 
executive and judicial offices of the State would [begin page 131] not encourage the best 
men to allow themselves to be nominated, or secure for the successful candidate the 
support and respect of the nation as a whole.  Publicity and secrecy alike have 
disadvantages; but in view of the fact that the responsibility for nomination rests with 
the President, and that the function of the Senate is limited to 'concurrence’, I cannot 
doubt that the Senate has chosen the lesser of two evils in maintaining the confidential 
character of its Executive sessions.  
 
Treaty Making 
A similar method of procedure obtains in regard to the confirmation or rejection of 
treaties with foreign States.  The advantages and disadvantages resulting from the 
interposition of the Senate in this delicate function have been hotly canvassed.  It is 
plainly repugnant to English views of propriety that diplomatic engagements should be 
submitted before completion to the rough and tumble of debate in either branch of the 
Legislature.  But in defence of the rule which prevails in America there are several 
points to be urged. In the first place, the Senate was in its inception less a branch of 
the Legislature than an appendage to the Executive.  Or rather it was both.  It 
corresponded at least as closely to the English Privy Council as to the House of Lords.  
Consisting of only twenty-six members, it was intended by the fathers of the 
Constitution to act as 'a council’ qualified by its moderate size and the experience of its 
members, to advise and check the President in the exercise of his powers of appointing 
to office and concluding treaties.  The Constitution says that the President 'shall have 
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties'.
33
 
The question has arisen whether the 'making' of a treaty includes the negotiation of it or 
applies only to the ratification.  This question, with others cognate to it, have been 
learnedly and exhaustively argued in a recent monograph by Dr. Edward Corwin, 
whose conclusion may be summarized in Jefferson's dogmatic aphorism: 'the 
transaction of business [begin page 132] with foreign nations is executive altogether.'   
‘The net result’, adds Dr. Corwin, 'of a century and a quarter of contest for power and 
influence in determining the international destinies of the country remains decisively 
and conspicuously in favour of the President.'
34  The practice has not, however, been 
uniform.  Some Presidents have consulted the Senate both before and during the 
actual process of negotiations, though it is tolerably certain that there rests upon them 
no legal obligation to do so.  Such formal consultation is rare, but informal consultation 
with individual members of the Senate has been so common as almost to become an 
established rule.
35  Until very recent days the President has been accustomed to keep 
himself closely and continuously in touch with the Senatorial Committee for Foreign 
Policy.  The Chairman of the latter body is in effect a sort of' Parliamentary Second 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs'.  Nevertheless, the following paragraph seems 
now to re-echo a vanished past:  
 
‘European statesmen may ask what becomes under such a system of the 
boldness and promptitude so often needed to effect a successful coup in 
                                                  
33   [131/1]  Federalist. 
34   [132/1]  The President's Control of Foreign Relations (1917), p. 207. 
35   [132/2]  J .Kimball, op. cit., p. 549.   Foreign Policy. . . . The answer is that America is not Europe.  The problems 
which the Foreign Office of the United States has to deal with are far fewer 
and usually far simpler than those of the old world.  The Republic keeps 
consistently to her own side of the Atlantic: nor is it the least of the merits of 
the system of senatorial control that it has tended, by discouraging the 
Executive from schemes which may prove resultless, to diminish the taste 
for foreign enterprises, and to save the country from being entangled with 




The dispute with Great Britain in regard to the Venezuela boundaries (1895) proved to 
be the starting-point of a new departure in American diplomacy.  Then came the war 
with Spain (1898) which was followed by the assumption of definite responsibilities in 
the Caribbean [begin page 133] Archipelago and in the Pacific.  The annexation of the 
Hawaiian Islands (1898), the partition of Samoa (1899), the conquest of the Philippines 
and the participation in the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China announced the 
advent of a new world-power.  American intervention in the Great War appeared to 
confirm the announcement; but the Senate has declined to accept the logical results of 
that intervention.  How the attitude of the Senate will react upon the balance of 
constitutional forces in the United States it is premature to attempt to judge. 
 
It remains to notice a third reason for the participation of the Senate in the functions of 
the Executive.  So long as the Americans cling to the theory of the rigid separation of 
powers, some such relaxation in practice is inevitable.  The preponderating power of 
the Executive in England is possible only because the Executive is strictly responsible 
to the Parliamentary majority, and because ministers are conscious that any flagrant 
misuse of power, whether in domestic or in foreign affairs, would be followed by instant 
dismissal at the hands of the Legislature.  No such power resides in the Legislature of 
the United States.  Should the President or his ministers be guilty of a legal offence, 
resort may be had to impeachment.  But impeachment, as the Long Parliament 
discovered to its chagrin in the case of Strafford, is at best a clumsy weapon with which 
to attack a powerful minister.  For the correction of errors, as apart from crime, it is 
wholly inappropriate.  If, therefore, the Executive is, for a fixed term, virtually 
immovable, the immensely important task of concluding treaties with foreign States 
cannot, it would seem, be left to the unchecked and unlimited discretion of the 
President.  If his responsibility is to be shared, there is no body with whom it can be 
shared with less inconvenience and impropriety than with the Senate. 
 
That the Senate is no longer, owing to the inclusion of new States, the select body of 
councillors contemplated by the founders of the Commonwealth is true; but the 
difficulties arising from its inevitable and automatic [begin page 134] enlargement have 
been, in great measure, obviated by the delegation of work to a series of standing 
committees: a committee on Finance to which all questions affecting the revenue are 
referred; a committee on Appropriations which advises the Senate concerning all votes 
for the spending of moneys; a committee on Foreign Affairs, on Railways, and so forth. 
This committee organization, according to Mr. Wilson, may be said to be of the 
essence of the legislative action of the Senate’, and has immense influence upon its 
action in all capacities.
37  
 
Only indeed through these committees, and especially through the chairmen of 
committees, can the Senate keep that touch with the Executive which, denied by the 
theory of the Constitution, is nevertheless in practice essential to its successful 
working. 
                                                  
36   [132/3]  Bryce, op. cit. i. 103. 
37   [134/1]  The State, p. 529.  
How far, it may be asked, has the federal Second Chamber of the United States 
answered the expectations and fulfilled the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution?  The Senate, as we have seen, was intended to be primarily the 
embodiment of the federal principle in the Constitution.  It was hoped that it would 
'conciliate the spirit of independence in the several states by giving each, however 
small, equal representation with every other, however large, in one branch of the 
national government.'
38  In the early days of the Commonwealth this was a point of vast 
importance; the union was ill-compacted and incoherent, and the part played by the 
Senate in cementing it was in no sense nominal or meagre.  With the growth of time 
and the evolution of an American national spirit, this particular function has naturally 
become of less importance, but it is by no means obsolete or superfluous.  As 
compared with the House of Representatives which represents the people, the Senate 
represents primarily the States. 
  
But apart from this, its elementary function, the Senate performs that of an ordinary 
Second Chamber.  It restrains 'the impetuosity and fickleness of the popular [begin page 
135] House, and so guards against the effect of gusts of passion or sudden changes of 
opinion in the people'.  It does, moreover, in an eminent degree, fulfil the intention of its 
founders by providing 'a body of men whose greater experience, longer term of 
membership, and comparative independence of popular election' makes them' an 
element of stability in the government of the nation, enabling it to maintain its character 
in the eyes of foreign States, and to preserve a continuity of policy at home and 
abroad'.
39  How admirably the Senate has attained, in this respect, its object is 
admitted by all who are competent to express an opinion. 
 
The Senate is unquestionably a stronger Second Chamber than the English House of 
Lords.  Not only has it larger powers and more extended functions, but it exercises 
those powers with greater freedom and independence, and in the main with more 
general assent. 
 
Nor is the reason far to seek.  Of the men who go into politics in America the Senate 
attracts the best.  
 
‘If’, says Mr. Wilson, 'these best men are not good, it is because our system of 
government fails to attract better men by its prizes, not because the country affords or 
could afford no finer material. . . . The Senate is in fact, of course, nothing more than a 
part, though a considerable part, of the public service; and if the general conditions of 
that service be such as to starve statesmen and foster demagogues, the Senate itself 
will be full of the latter kind, simply because there are no others available.  .  . No 
stream can be purer than its sources.  The Senate can have in it no better men than 
the best men of the House of Representatives; and if the House of Representatives 
attracts to itself only inferior talent, the Senate must put up with the same sort.  Thus 
the Senate, though it may not be as good as could be wished, is as good as it can be 
under the circumstances.  It contains the most perfect product of our politics, whatever 
that product may be.’
40  
 
More important than the House of Lords as regards its legal functions, the Senate is 
not inferior to it in popular, intelligibility.’  The House of Lords is of course con- [begin 
page 136] spicuously fortunate in this respect.  Its position rests on a principle which if 
no longer generally accepted is at least clearly intelligible.  But the American Senate is 
at no disadvantage here.  It also, as I have shown, is the result of a natural and native 
evolution, and it rests on a principle which is not less intelligible than hereditary 
                                                  
38   [134/2]  Federalist. 
39   [135/1]  Ibid. 
40   [135/2]  Wilson, Congressional Government, pp. 194-5. succession.  Further, it is a principle which differentiates it from the House of 
Representatives just as clearly as the principle of birth differentiates the hereditary 
House of Lords from the elected House of Commons.  And to secure an intelligible 
differentia for a Second Chamber is, as publicists are never weary of insisting, not less 
important than difficult.  That difficulty has been a great stumbling-block in France, and 
hardly less so in the younger democracies of the British Empire.  
 
The American Senate, moreover, is superior to the House of Lords in its efficiency as a 
revising chamber, and in the respect and confidence which it inspires.  The latter 
advantage is due perhaps to the elective basis on which it rests, the former attribute is 
inseparably bound up with its restricted size.  Hence the consensus of opinion among 
all reformers of the English House of Lords that the first and essential step is to reduce 
its overgrown and unwieldy bulk to something like the dimensions of the Second 
Chamber if not of America, at least of France.  To a discussion of this question I 
propose to return.  From the Senate we now pass to the House of Representatives.  
 
The House of Representatives. 
The House of Representatives may be dismissed more briefly than the Senate, for 
although it presents points of interest as regards the development of procedure it is 
less distinctive than the Second Chamber as regards competence and composition.  As 
the Senate represents the federal principle in the Constitution, so the 'House’ 
represents the nation.  Yet even the House bears unmistakable marks of its origin; it is 
still 'congressional' rather than parliamentary; it, no less than the Senate, is based upon 
a recognition of the fact that the [begin page 137] States are politically self-contained 
and in large measure autonomous.  
 
The Constitution ordains (Article I, section 2 (I)) that the House shall be 'composed of 
members chosen every second year by the people of the several states,  and the 
electors in each state shall have the qualifications required for electors of the most 
numerous branch of the State Legislature'; that Representatives shall be apportioned 
by Congress among the several States according to population on the basis of a 
decennial census; that the aggregate number shall not exceed one for every thirty-
thousand but that each State shall have at least one Representative.  My italics will 
sufficiently emphasize the insistence upon the State as the basis of representation. 
 
But other indications of the same principle are not lacking.  It is the State which 
determines not only the electoral franchise (subject to the general directions of the 
Instrument) but also the method of voting, and (where they exist) the electoral districts.  
Consequently States may either elect the whole body of representatives assigned to 
them by one general ticket, or in equal  electoral districts, or partly by one method and 
partly by the other; they may also decide whether the franchise  shall be extended to or 
withheld from women, but the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) forbids the denial or 
abridgement of the right to vote 'on account of race, colour, or previous condition of 
servitude'.
41  This provision the Southern States have found means to evade by 
imposing educational tests or requiring property qualifications.  Again, it is to the 
Governor of his State that a Representative tenders his resignation, and it is the 
Governor, not the Speaker of the House, who issues a writ for the filling of the vacancy. 
  
The present House consists of 435 members, or one (on the basis of the census for 
1910) for every 211,877 of the population.  Every member must be (i) at least [begin 
page 138] years of age; (ii) a citizen of the United States of seven years' standing; (iii) 
an inhabitant, when elected, of the State for which he is chosen.  To the constitutional 
qualification of habitancy of the State custom adds that of residence in the particular 
                                                  
41   [137/1]  An amendment (the 19th) forbidding discrimination on account of sex 
was adopted in 1920.  (This corrects figures on pp. 115 and 119 supra.) district, a custom which forbids a defeated candidate, however eminent, to seek a new 
constituency.
42  Representatives, as well as Senators, receive a salary of $7,500 a 
year, with an addition of $1,500 for 'clerk hire’, ‘mileage’, and free postage.  
 
Powers 
The functions of the House are not distinctive.  It has the sole right to initiate 
impeachments and money-bills and co-ordinate rights in ordinary legislation.  If the 
President vetoes a Bill passed by both Houses it must be referred back, and on 
reconsideration must obtain a two-thirds majority in each House.  If the President takes 
no action on a Bill within ten days it becomes law without his assent.  The right of 
impeachment has been exercised only nine times, and only three times has the Senate 
convicted.  One President (Johnson) and one Justice of the Supreme Court were 
among the acquittals.  Another function somewhat anomalous belongs to the House.  If 
in the presidential election no candidate gains a majority the House must immediately 
by ballot elect a President from among the three highest on the list; the States voting as 
units, and a majority of States being essential to election.  Apart from this, from 
impeachments and taxation, the functions of the House are merely legislative, and 
need not detain us. 
 
Procedure 
Of its procedure the most distinctive feature is the organization of Committees.  It is in 
these Committees, of which there are about sixty in the House, and an even larger 
number in the Senate, that the work of legislation is done, while the Chairman of the 
Committees, especially of the Foreign Relations, the Ways and Means, and the 
Appropriations Committees, may almost be regarded as a sort of supplementary 
Executive.  Down to 1911 the [begin page 139] Committees and their Chairmen were 
appointed by the Speaker; they are now appointed by the House, which means in 
effect, by the legislative caucus.  This caucus, or party organization, is all-powerful, and 
indeed indispensable.  Without it the procedure of the House would be, as to outside 
observers it might well appear to be, simply chaotic.  The proceedings on the floor of 
the House are little more than formal; there are few if any full dress debates; there are 
no ministers to be interpellated; no matters of executive policy to be discussed; no 
divisions critical to the existence of an administration to be taken.  Legislation is the 
task of committees and committees are the creatures of the caucus.  By the party 
caucus the committees are in fact nominated, and to the caucus the committees look 
for the endorsement of their legislative decisions. 
 
The Speaker 
The Speaker is in form elected by the House, in fact he is the nominee of his party, and 
he remains after Speaker election to the Chair a party leader. 
 
His position is, nevertheless, one of great dignity; in the official hierarchy he stands 
next to the President himself, and his powers, though somewhat diminished since 
1911, are immense.  His tenure, however, is brief, being limited to the two years' 
duration of the House, unless his party secures re-election.  In that case, but not 
otherwise, his tenure may be prolonged.  Like his English prototype he presides over 
debates, maintains order, decides disputed points, arranges the business of the House, 
and determines, within limits, the order of speaking by "recognizing" the members who 
desire to address the House.  Until recently he exercised the still more important 
function of nominating the members of all committees and appointing their chairman.  
This function has now, it has been said, been transferred to the House itself, and with 
the consequential result that the Speaker's undivided and unquestioned leadership is 
now shared to some extent with the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means 
                                                  
42   [138/1]  Kimball, op. cit., p. 276. and the Chairman of the Committee on Rates.  These functionaries like himself are 
party nominees and party leaders and with him may be said to constitute a triumvirate 
leadership [begin page 140] of the House.  The Chairman of the former committee now 
generally acts as the “Floor-leader” of his party, and is virtually, therefore, leader of the 
House, while the minority have in their own floor-leader a leader of the "opposition".  
The "opposition" however is purely legislative; it does not provide or represent an 
“alternative government".'  
 
It would be natural to suppose that in the absence of a government and of an 
opposition there would be almost complete equality among members all of whom are 
‘private' and 'back-benchers'.  That it is not so is due if to two reasons: first, to the 
strictness of party organization, the supremacy of the caucus; and, secondly, to the 
brevity of tenure.  No Congress can last more than two sessions: a long session of 
some six months (normally from December to Mayor June); and a short session from 
December to March; but of late years, as in England, sessions have tended to be 
almost continuous.  Even so a new member has little chance of finding his feet before 
the time comes for dissolution and problematical re-election.  His position in Congress 
depends, even more than in the case of an English member, on his position in his 
party.  If he stands well with the caucus he is assured of assignment to important 
committees; if for any reason he does not, he might as well spare himself the trouble of 
a journey to Washington. 
 
With these facts before him English critics are apt to underrate the power of Congress 
and the position of Congressmen.  The President is constantly before their eyes; the 
better informed appreciate the personality of the Secretaries, and the high prestige 
which attaches to membership of the Supreme Court.  Weight is allowed even by 
foreigners to the utterances of the Presidents and Ex-Presidents of the greater 
Universities: but who cares what is said by a Representative or even by a Senator?  
They have been taught by Bagehot that Congress is little more than 'a debating society 
adhering to an Executive'.  A more intimate knowledge of the working of American 
institutions might have led Bagehot, [begin page 141] even in the sixties, to modify the 
terms of his stricture.  In view of the share in executive authority assigned by the 
Constitution to the Senate the generalization was too sweeping even in that day: in 
view of the rapid development of the committee system, alike in the Senate and in the 
House, it would be still less accurate today.  Bagehot's views of the American 
Constitution were largely influenced by the fact that members of the Executive were 
excluded from the Legislature and by the consequent absence of that 'correspondence' 
which he rightly regards as essentially characteristic of our own Constitution. 
 
English critics ought not, however, to forget that the American Constitution was drafted 
at a moment when the jealousy of 'placemen' was still an active force in English 
politics, when the English Crown still sought to influence the Legislature by the 
exercise of patronage, and when Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers 
was still profoundly influential among the publicists of Western Europe.  Under these 
circumstances it is not remarkable that the Americans, like successive constitution-
makers in France, should have attempted to render the Legislature independent by 
excluding the members of the Executive.  But by so doing they deprived Members of 
Congress, as Lord Bryce points out, 'of some of the means which European legislators 
enjoy of learning how to administer, of learning even how to legislate in administrative 
topics.  They condemned them to be "architects without science, critics without 
experience, and censors without responsibility".'
43  Moreover, as the same critic insists, 
the attempt to keep Legislature and Executive rigidly distinct has had a result not 
foreseen by the makers of the Constitution.  It has led the 'Legislature to interfere with 
ordinary administration more directly and frequently than European Legislatures are 
                                                  
43   [141/1]  Ibid. i. 224. wont to do.  It interferes by legislation, because it is debarred from interfering by 
interpellation'.
44  [begin page 142] 
  
Finally, it must be remembered that the Federal Legislature of the United States is, in 
another important respect, on an altogether lower plane than our own Imperial 
Parliament: it is merely legislative and not constituent; it can make laws, but only within 
the four corners of the Constitution; the Constitution itself it cannot touch.  Upon the 
power of the British Legislature there is, of course, no such limitation.  It is hardly open 
to question that the restricted area of legislative activity, combined with the fact that the 
service in the Legislature does not, as in England, open an avenue to a place in the 
Executive, must in the long run affect the supply of really first-rate political talent. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations Mr. Wilson could write of Congress, in 1884, as the 
'central and pre-dominant power' of the federal system of the United States and could 
describe American government as genuinely 'congressional'.  
 
‘The predominant and controlling force,' he wrote, 'the centre and source of 
all motive and of all regulative power, is Congress.  All niceties of 
constitutional restriction and even many broad principles of constitutional 
limitation have been overridden, and a thoroughly organized system of 
congressional control set up which gives a very rude negative to some 
theories of balance and some schemes for distributed powers, but which 
suits well with convenience, and does violence to none of the principles of 
self-government contained in the Constitution.'
45  
 
By 1900 Mr, Wilson had, however, noted some shifting in the balance of the 
Constitution, notably 'the greatly increased power and opportunity for constructive 
statesmanship given the President, by the plunge into international politics'.
46  Should a 
new edition of his classical work be called for m the near future we may anticipate still 
further modification of the views it originally set forth.  On one point, however, there will 
and can be no change.  The Federal Legislature, whether its power [begin page 143] 
waxes or wanes, will in the future, as in the past, exercise its functions in strict 
subordination to the Constitution.  Of that Constitution the guardianship is vested in the 
judicature; but with this, the most interesting and the most distinctive of all the political 
institutions of the United States, it is proposed to deal in some detail in a later chapter. 
 
The State Constitutions. 
Taken by itself the Federal Constitution is, as we have already insisted, a mere torso.  
Its provisions are intelligible only if it be remembered that they refer exclusively to 
powers specifically delegated to the National Government by the Sovereign Republics.  
The whole residue of authority still resides in the States.  Of all the 'balances' reckoned 
as essential to the normal operation of the American Constitution none, says Mr. 
Wilson, 
 
‘is so quintessential as that between the national and the state governments; 
it is the pivotal quality of the system . . . the object of this balance is . . . to 
check and trim national policy on national questions, to turn Congress back 
from paths of dangerous encroachment on middle or doubtful grounds of 
jurisdiction, to keep sharp, when it was like to become dim, the line of 
demarcation between state and federal privilege, to readjust the weights of 
                                                  
44   [141/2]  Ibid. i. 26. 
45   [142/1]  Op. cit., p. II. 




The checks which State sovereignty was deemed likely to impose upon the Federal 
Government have proved less effectual than was intended and expected.  In America, 
as to a lesser degree in Switzerland, the dominant tendency has been centripetal.  The 
tide of governmental activity has set steadily and with increasing force towards 
Washington: so much so that judge Cooley's verdict has won general assent: 
 
'The effectual cheeks upon the encroachments of federal upon state power 
must be looked for, not in state power of resistance, but in the choice of 
representatives, senators and presidents holding just constitutional views, 
and in a federal supreme court with competent power to restrain all 
departments and all officers within the limits of their just authority, [begin 




In this perpetual readjustment of the balance between the Federal and the State 
Governments we have one of the many and multiplying instances of the practical 
flexibility of the American Constitution.  An equipoise so delicate it is not easy for a 
foreign critic to appreciate or to expound with precision.  Some words must, however, 
be added in order to describe, in bare outline, the mechanism of the State 
Governments. 
 
These Governments vary very considerably in details, but in essentials they are 
generally uniform. 
 
All the States possess a written Constitution which, like the Federal Constitution, is 
superior to ordinary statutes, and which usually includes, in addition to a Frame of 
Government and to various miscellaneous provisions, a Bill of Rights.  These 
Constitutions invariably provide for a separation of powers - legislative, executive, and 
judicial - with even greater preciseness than the Federal Constitution.  In every respect 
they are indeed far more detailed than the Federal Instrument and, owing to the 
consistent tendency to incorporate ordinary statutes in the Constitutions, the latter are 
becoming more and more unwieldy in bulk. 
 
The Legislatures  
The State Legislatures are in no case sovereign law-making bodies, and the laws 
which emanate from them occupy, as we have seen, the fourth and lowest place in 
degrees of validity, being inferior not only to the articles of the several Constitutions, but 
to the Federal Constitution and federal laws.  
 
The structure of the State Legislatures is bicameral: Senators being generally elected 
for four, and representatives for two years, but there is no such differentia in the States 
as that which distinguishes the two houses of the Federal Congress.  Like the latter the 
State Legislatures do the bulk of their work in standing committees.  
 
The State Governor 
The State Governor who is directly elected by the [begin page 145] people exercises a 
considerable influence upon legislation by means of his 'message' and by the exercise 
of a veto: but in administration his power is much more circumscribed than that of the 
President.  The executive officials are not appointed by the Governor but directly 
                                                  
47   [143/1]  Op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
48   [144/1]  Principles of Constitutional Law, pp. 43-4. elected by the people, and are responsible neither to the Governor nor to the 
Legislature.  Between these officials and the boards over which they preside there is 
entire lack of connexion or co-ordination, with results disastrous to efficient 
administration. 
 
Alike in the election of officials and of legislators the party organizations are supreme, 
and it is to them that the politicians who are elected owe primary if not exclusive 
allegiance.  Some States have adopted the ultra-democratic principle of the Recall of 
Officials, applying it not merely to the Legislature and the Executive but even to the 
Judiciary. 
  
Each State has a complete judicial hierarchy, entirely distinct from the Federal Courts, 
but the details of judicial organization vary greatly in different States.  Equally varied is 
the mode of appointing judges.  In some States they are appointed by the Governor, in 
others they are elected by the Legislature or directly by the people.  The tenure of 
judges is in some cases 'during good behaviour', in others it is as short as two years.  
In few cases is it sufficiently secure; in some, as already said, it is purely arbitrary.  In 
some States the decisions of the judges in regard to the validity of statutes are subject 
to 'Popular Review', a particular law declared invalid by the Supreme Court of the State 
being validated by a popular vote.  
 
Such in briefest outline is the government of the States: brevity must not, however, 
blind us to the fact that, despite the centripetal tendency already noticed, the American 
States, like the Swiss Cantons, exert the most powerful influence upon the daily life of 
the citizens.  ‘The Federal Government’, said De Tocqueville, ‘is the exception; the 
government of the states is the rule.'   [begin page 146] 
 
Three-quarters of a century later Mr. Woodrow Wilson could not only re-echo De 
Tocqueville's language, but could reiterate, with even greater emphasis, his deliberate 
judgement: 'Even more than the cantons our states have retained their right to rule their 
citizens in all ordinary matters without federal interference.  They are the chief creators 
of law among us. . . . They make up the mass, the body, the constituent tissue, the 
organic stuff of the government of the country.'
49  
 
From a judgement so decided and so authoritative there can be, at any rate for a 
foreigner, no appeal.  
 
Moreover, it sets the final seal upon the genuinely federal character of American 
democracy.  The seeds of personal liberty and of self-government the English colonists 
in America brought with them from the land they left; but the soil upon which they fell 
was not English soil the culture bestowed upon them was not English culture it was 
profoundly modified by the new environment, and by the conditions under which the 
young and tender shoots struggled to maturity.  To drop metaphor: the type of 
democracy which the American people have evolved for themselves is not the English 
type; it is not unitary, but federal, not flexible but exceptionally rigid, not parliamentary 
but presidential.  It boots not to ask which of the two types is the better: the essential 
point is that each is original, each is native, and each has afforded a model for 
imitation.  What Pericles affirmed of Athens is true both of England and of America. 
 
The modern Englishman and the modern American may say with the ancient Greek: 
'We have a form of government not derived from imitation of our neighbours.  We are 
rather a pattern to others than they to us.'  For the modern world the choice would 
seem to lie in outline between the American type of democracy - federal, rigid, 
presidential - and the English-unitary, flexible, and above all parliamentary.  To an 
analysis of the characteristic features of Parliamentary Democracy we now proceed. 
                                                  




Parliamentary Democracy  
The Government of England  
 
‘En Angleterre la Constitution peut changer sans cesse; ou plutôt elle 
n'existe pas.' - De Tocqueville 
 
Great critics have taught us one essential rule. . . . It is this, that if ever we 
should find ourselves disposed not to admire those writers artists, Livy and 
Virgil for instance, Raphael or Michael Angelo, whom all the learned had 
admired, not to follow our own fancies, but to study them until we know 
how and what we ought to admire; and if we cannot arrive at this 
combination of admiration with knowledge, rather to believe that we are 
dull, than that the rest of the world has been imposed on.  It is as good a 
rule, at least, with regard to this admired constitution [of England].  We 
ought to understand it according to our measure; and to venerate where we 
are not able presently to comprehend.' - Edmund Burke. 
 
Le gouvernement d'Angleterre est plus sage parce qu'il y a un corps qui 
l'examine continuellement, et qui s'examine continuellement luimeme: et 
telles sont ses erreurs, qu'elles ne sont jamais longues, et que par l’esprit 
d'attention qu'elles donnent a la nation elles sont souvent utiles.' - 
Montesquieu, Grandeur et Decadence des Romains.  
 
‘An infinitely complex amalgam of institutions and principles, the British 
Constitution is naturally devoid of all comprehensive system; yet to the 
inquirer who brings with him historical sense and political insight this mass 
of seeming inconsistencies is perfectly intelligible.  To no other, however, 
will it yield its secret.' - Dr. Josef Redlich.  
 
There is no civil government that hath been known. . . more divinely and 
harmoniously tuned and more equally balanced as it were by the hand and 
scale of justice than is the Commonwealth of England, where under a free 
and untutored monarch, the noblest, worthiest and most prudent men, with 
full approbation and suffrage of the people, have in their power the supreme 
and final determination of highest affairs.' - Milton, of Reformation in 
England.  
 
General characteristics of the English Constitution. 
To pass from a study of the Constitutions of the United States and Switzerland, to that 
of England is to bid good-bye to waters where every detail of navigation is accurately 
known and noted and to embark upon an uncharted sea.  Foreign critics are, as is 
natural, peculiarly sensible of the difficulties inherent in a study of [begin page 150] 
English political institutions.  One of the most brilliant of French commentators compares it picturesquely to a 'un chemin qui marche’ or, "to a river whose moving 
surface glides away at one's feet, meandering in and out in endless curves, now 
seeming to disappear in a whirlpool, now almost lost to sight in the verdure." '
1  De 
Tocqueville went even farther and in a famous aphorism declared that 'in England there 
is no Constitution'.  It is indeed true that unlike the French, the Swiss, the Americans, 
and in fact most of the other nations of the world we do not possess any 'single 
document, conceived all at once, promulgated on a given day, and embodying all the 




Yet the contrast suggested in these citations must not be pressed too far.  The English 
Constitution is, as will presently be seen, exceptionally flexible, and it is unwritten, in 
the sense that it is not embodied in an Instrument.  Other Constitutions in the modern 
world are mostly written and at least technically more or less rigid; but Mr. Woodrow 
Wilson has warned us that even the American Constitution is less rigid than is 
commonly supposed; that there has been 'a constant growth of legislative and 
administrative practice, and a steady accretion of precedent in the management of 
federal affairs, which have broadened the sphere and altered the functions of the 
government without perceptibly affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional language.  
Ours is scarcely less than the British a living and fecund system.’
3
 
On the other hand, Mr. Lowell, commenting upon the Government of England, has 
pointed out that the distinction between written and unwritten, between rigid and 
flexible Constitutions, has tended, of late years, to lose a good deal of the practical 
importance formerly attached to it.
4  We have already noted the tendency which has 
[begin page 151] manifested itself in Switzerland and in some of the American States to 
blur the distinction between constituent and law-making powers, between fundamental 
laws and ordinary statutes. Consequently the difference between the Constitution of 
England and that of other countries tends to become one of degree rather than of kind.  
It is, however, noteworthy that the tendency results from the approximation of other 
Constitutions to our own, not from the contrary process.  A correct apprehension of the 
outstanding characteristics of the English Constitution is, therefore, alike for ourselves 
and for others, exceptionally important.  
 
Largely ‘unwritten.’ 
No modern Constitution can be adequately apprehended from a study of the text of the 
Instrument.  Nevertheless it is difficult to exaggerate the convenience afforded, 
particularly to foreign commentators, by the existence of such an Instrument.  The critic 
of English Institutions has no such Vade mecum.  There are Statutes and Documents 
which must from their special significance be more particularly studied in connexion 
with the development of the English Constitution.  Conspicuous among them are: 
Magna Carta (1215); Edward the First's Summons to Parliament (1295); the Apology of 
1604; the Petition of Right (1628); the Agreement of the People (1649), and the two 
written Constitutions of the Protectorate; the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Act of 
Settlement  (1701); the Acts of Union with Scotland (1707) and Ireland (1800); the 
Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, 1884, 1885, and 1918, and the Parliament Act (1911).  No 
one, however, can pretend that a study of these and similar documents would afford to 
the student a conspectus of the English Constitution similar or comparable to that 
derived from the text of a written Constitution such as that of America, of Switzerland, 
of Belgium, of Italy, or even of British Dominions like Canada, Australia, or South Africa.  
                                                  
1    [150/1]  M. Emile Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 4. Cf. the same 
writer's English Constitution (Eng. trans). 
2   [150/2]  Ibid., p. 5.  
3   [150/3]  Congressional Government, p. 7.  
4   [150/4]  The Government of England, i, pp. 4-6. Nor is the reason far to seek.  None of the great documents illustrative of the growth of 
the English Constitution goes much, if at all, beyond the immediate [begin page 152] 
necessities of the hour.  Not one of them (except Cromwell's almost still-born 
Constitutions) approaches, even remotely, a constitutional code or Instrument.  Our 
political instincts have been essentially objective.  A specific grievance has manifested 
itself and a specific remedy has been applied.  Provided the momentary ache or pain 
has yielded to treatment, administrative or legislative, scant regard has been paid to 
the remoter effects of the remedy prescribed.  Moreover, the essential point at issue, or 
that which to later commentators appears to be essential, would seem not infrequently 
to have eluded contemporary statesmen. 
  
Constitutional jurists tell us, for example, that the cardinal point of dispute between the 
Stuart sovereigns and their parliaments was the question of the responsibility of 
Ministers - the relations of the Executive to the Legislature.  We search in vain through 
the Petition of Right or the Bill of Rights for any allusion to this capital topic.  So true is 
it that English political liberties have not come 'by observation'.  
 
To this rule there have been exceptions.  The written Constitutions of the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate belong to a revolutionary period, and they did not 
endure.  They may be regarded, therefore, as exceptions that prove the rule.  The 
constitutional Instruments which define the governmental form of the great Oversea 
Dominions - though in form merely enactments of the Imperial Legislature - belong to 
another category and may possibly foreshadow a new constitutional departure.  Of 
these it will be necessary to say something later on.  For the moment it must suffice to 
indicate the exceptions and to call attention to the peculiar genius which underlies the 
history of our constitutional evolution.  The violent have often attempted to take the 
constitutional kingdom by storm, but the method has never yet proved itself to be 
permanently successful; the genius of silent growth has invariably reasserted itself. 
[begin page 153] 
 
This peculiarity of English constitutional development has naturally attracted the 
attention, in the main flattering and appreciative, of foreign commentators.  Thus M. 
Emile Boutmy writes:  
 
‘The English have left the different parts of their Constitution just where the 
wave of History had deposited them; they have not attempted to bring them 
together, to classify or complete them, or to make a consistent and coherent 
whole.  This scattered Constitution gives no hold to sifters of texts and 
seekers after difficulties.  It need not fear critics anxious to point out an 
omission, or theorists ready to denounce an antinomy. . . . By this means 
only can you preserve the happy incoherences, the useful incongruities, the 
protecting contradictions which have such good reason for existing in 
institutions, viz. that they exist in the nature of things, and which, while they 
allow free play to all social forces, never allow anyone of these forces room 
to work out of its alloted line, or to shake the foundations and walls of the 
whole fabric.  This is the result which the English flatter themselves they 
have arrived at by the extraordinary dispersion of their constitutional texts: 
and they have always taken good care not to compromise the result ill any 
way by attempting to form a code.'
5
 
In striking contrast to the English method are, on the one hand, the complete 
Instruments of Federal States like America and Switzerland, and on the other, the 
organic statutes in which unitary States, like France, deem it advisable to embody the 
fundamentals of their Constitution. 
                                                  
5   [153/1]  Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 7.  
It is proper, therefore, and important, again to reaffirm the elementary truth that the 
English Constitution, though resting in part upon the foundations of Acts of Parliament 
and other documents, nevertheless belongs essentially fundamentally, and 
emphatically to the category of unwritten Constitutions.  
 
Not less essentially is it a flexible Constitution.  There exists in England no distinction 
between fundamental or constitutional laws and ordinary laws, between the [begin page 
154] constituent function and the legislative function, between the revision of the 
Constitution and the enactment of ordinary statutes.  The peculiar, perhaps unique 
flexibility of the English Constitution may be ascribed, in particular, to two causes: on 
the one hand to the fact that it is an organic growth, the result of a prolonged process 




The first demands only passing notice; it has long since become the commonplace of 
commentators.  Thus Freeman, in a well-known essay, insisted upon the continuity of 
constitutional development in England, perhaps with unnecessary emphasis but with 
unquestionable accuracy:  
 
‘The continued national life of the people, notwithstanding foreign 
conquests and internal, revolutions, has remained unbroken for fourteen 
hundred years.  At no moment has the tie between the present and the past 
been wholly rent asunder; at no moment have Englishmen sat down to put 
together a wholly new Constitution, in obedience to some dazzling theory.  
Each step in our growth has been the natural consequence of some earlier 
step; each change in our Law and Constitution has been, not the bringing in 
of anything wholly new, but the development and improvement of 
something that was already old.  Our progress has in some ages been faster, 
in others slower; at some moments we have seemed to stand still, or even to 
go back; but the great march of political development has never wholly 
stopped; it has never been permanently checked since the days when the 




Even our Revolutions have been proverbially conservative, and the primary anxiety of 
reformers has been to show that proposed innovations were in reality nothing but 
reversions to an earlier type.  Nor, as a rule, has it been difficult to do so.  'By far the 
greatest portion of the written or statute laws of England consist’, as Palgrave points 
out, ‘of the declaration, the re-assertion, repetition, [begin page 155] or the re-
enactment, of some older law or laws, either customary or written, with additions or 
modifications.  The new building has been raised upon the old groundwork: the 
institutions of one age have always been modelled and formed from those of the 
preceding, and their lineal descent has never been interrupted or disturbed.'  
 
The point is one which demands no elaborate illustration.  Nor is the explanation far to 
seek.  National character has something to say to it; geographical situation has even 
more, and the peculiar genius of the Constitution has most of all.  A good deal of scorn 
- only partially deserved - is sometimes poured upon ‘national character' as the last 
resort of bankrupt criticism.  But the thing exists, and must unquestionably be counted 
among the factors that have gone to the moulding of the English Constitution, and 
particularly to the preservation of its continuity. 
                                                  
6   [154/1]  English Constitution, p. 19.   
‘The best instances of Flexible Constitutions as Lord Bryce has pointed out, 
r have been those which grew up and lived on in nations of a conservative 
temper, nations which i respected antiquity, which valued precedents, which 
liked to go on doing a thing in the way their fathers had done it before them.  
This type of national character is what enables the Flexible Constitution to 
develop; this supports and cherishes it.  The very fact that the legal right to 
make extensive changes has long existed, and has not been abused, disposes 
an assembly to be cautious and moderate in the use of that right.'
7  
 
To this cause, then, we must in the first place ascribe the peculiar degree of flexibility 
inherent in the English Constitution.  
 
The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Not less important in this connexion was the affirmation and acceptance of the doctrine 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the legislative omnipotence of the King in Parliament.  
The classical passage on this subject is in Blackstone's Commentaries: 
[begin page 156]  
 
The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent 
and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any 
bounds.  And of this high court, he adds, it may be fairly said, “Si antiquitatem spectes, 
est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima."  
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, 
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning 
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, 
maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which 




Professor Dicey's illuminating study on the Law of the Constitution is in large part an 
extended Commentary on the same text.  The Sovereignty of Parliament is, he 
declares, from a legal point of view, the dominant characteristic of our political 
institutions, and he resolves the doctrine into three proportions:  
 
1.   There is no law which Parliament - the King in Parliament - cannot 
make. 
 
2.   There is no law which Parliament cannot repeal or modify; and  
 
3.   ‘There is under the English Constitution no marked or clear distinction 
between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional, or laws 
which are.'  
 
There is, first, no law which Parliament cannot make.   By the Act of Settlement, for 
example, it even determined the succession to the throne.  In 1707 it effected by 
ordinary legislative enactment a legislative union with -Scotland and in 1800, by similar 
action, a legislative union with Ireland.  Those Acts fundamentally altered the 
Constitution of the two Houses of the Legislature, and indeed the whole Constitution of 
the United Kingdom. 
 
By the same authority and by similar process they could of course be repealed.  The 
Act of 1800 was in fact, though not in terms, repealed by an Act passed in 1922 to 
                                                  
7   [155/1]  Studies in History and Jurisprudence, i. 166-7. 
8   [156/1]  Bk. I, chap. ii, §3, p. 160 (ed. 1844). [begin page 157] implement the Treaty of 1921.
9  But perhaps the crowning illustration 
of the omnipotence of Parliament is to be found in the Septennial Act of 1716.  That Act 
not merely extended the duration of future Parliaments from three years to seven, but 
actually prolonged the existence of the sitting Parliament for that term.  Constitutional 
purists, like Priestley, were aghast at this violation of the 'rights' of the people; and with 
much show of reason.  For, by the same token, future Parliaments might prolong their 
own existence from seven years to seventy, or, like the Parliament of 1641, make it 
perpetual.  Hallam derides Priestley's 'ignorant assumption'.  But Priestley was right. 
 
If a Parliament elected under the Triennial Act could legally prolong its existence from 
three years to seven, there was nothing to prevent another Parliament, elected under a 
Septennial Act, from extending its term to seven hundred years. 
 
In 1911, by the Parliament Act Parliament limited its own duration to five years; but the 
Parliament which ought to have expired in 1915 at latest was not actually dissolved 
until December 1918.  By successive enactments, renewed at intervals every six 
months, Parliament prolonged its existence for three years beyond its legal term. 
 
The significant point is, however, that there is in fact nothing in the English Constitution 
to prevent such usurpations on the part of Parliament; nothing, that is to say, of a legal 
nature.  Cromwell put a stop to a similar usurpation in April 1653, when he shut the 
doors upon the Long Parliament and ordered the removal of the ‘bauble' of authority-
the mace.  But Cromwell did this, be it observed, not by an appeal to law, nor by an 
appeal to the constituencies - the ultimate depositories of political sovereignty - but by 
an appeal to force.  Inter arma silent leges; in the rattle of musketry you cannot hear 
the voice of the law.  Cromwell's Ironsides were more than a match for the legal 
sophistries of the attenuated [begin page 158] rump of the Long Parliament.  None the 
less, Professor Dicey is justified in his appeal to the Septennial Act as the sufficient and 
conclusive proof of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty.  'That Act,’ as he says, 
'proves to demonstration that in a legal point of view Parliament is neither the agent of 
the electors nor in any sense a trustee of its constituents.  It is legally the Sovereign 
power of the State, and the Septennial Act is at once the result and the standing proof 
of such Parliamentary Sovereignty.'  
 
Secondly, there is no law which Parliament cannot repeal or modify or temporarily set 
aside.  At the time of the Disestablishment of the Irish Church in 1869 there was much 
discussion as to the competence of Parliament virtually to repeal one of the clauses of 
the Act of Union.  Such an argument might have been perfectly valid as a political or 
even a moral ground of objection to Mr. Gladstone's proposal; but it had no legal 
validity whatsoever: nor had the similar objection that the Ministry were, by the passing 
of this Act, virtually compelling the Queen to a violation of her coronation oath.  From 
the point of view of the constitutional lawyer the Act of Union had no superior validity to 
the Act authorizing the construction of the Manchester and Liverpool railway.  Even 
more significant in this connexion are the enactments which, like Acts of Indemnity, are 
'as it were the legalization of illegality’.  For more than a hundred years (1727-1828) 
Parliament regularly passed an annual Act of Indemnity to relieve Dissenters from the 
penalties to which they exposed themselves for having, in violation of the Test Act, 
'accepted municipal offices without duly qualifying themselves by taking the Sacrament 
according to the rites of the Church of England'; and in the year 1920 there was passed 
a very comprehensive Act to indemnify the agents of the Executive who, during the 
continuance of the Great War, had authorized proceedings which, if not legalized 
retrospectively, would have involved penalties to them- [begin page 159] selves and 
large expenditure to the country.  The strenuous opposition offered to the enactment of 
this statute,
10 and the large modifications it underwent in its passage through 
                                                  
9   [157/1]  12 and 13 George V. c. 4. 
10   [159/1]  10 and 11 George V, c. 48.  Parliament, afford testimony alike to the jealousy felt by English citizens at any 
infringement, even in war-time, of personal rights, and to the omnipotence of 
Parliament.  
 
Parliament under the Commonwealth and Protectorate 
Students of history will not, however, need to be reminded that there was a period 
when the legal sovereignty of Parliament was seriously menaced.  Nor is it without 
significance that this period should have coincided with the temporary supersession of 
the monarchy.  It is one of the most curious of historical paradoxes that Cromwell 
should ever have been acclaimed as the forerunner of 'democracy'.  Of the cardinal 
principles of ‘parliamentary democracy' he had no apprehension whatever.  On the 
contrary, though genuinely anxious to restore a representative parliament, he was 
inflexibly determined to restrict its functions within narrow limits.  Legislate it might, but 
only within the four corners of a written Constitution; the Constitution itself Parliament 
must not be allowed to touch.  Its function, in the language of modern jurisprudence, 
was to be merely legislative, not constituent.  On that point his second speech to the 
first Protectorate Parliament is conclusive:  
 
‘It is true, as there are some things in the Establishment which are 
fundamental, so there are others which are not, but are circumstantial.  Of 
these no question but that I shall easily agree to vary, to leave out, according 
as I shall be convinced by reason, but some things are Fundamentals!  About 
which I shall deal plainly with you: these may not be parted with; but will, I 
trust, be delivered over to Posterity, as the fruits of our blood and travail.  
The Government by a single person and a Parliament is a Fundamental!  It 
is the esse,  it is constitutive. . . . In every Government there must be 
somewhat Fundamental, somewhat like a Magna Carla, which should be 
standing, be unalterable.'
11  
[begin page 160] 
 
Parliament would have none of this doctrine but, on manifesting its determination to 
debate ‘Fundamentals’, it was summarily dissolved by the Protector.  
 
Legislature and Executive. 
Upon another question, hardly less important, the views of Cromwell and his 
Parliaments were hopelessly divergent.  The crucial point at issue between the Stuart 
kings and their Parliaments was, as we have seen, the control of the Executive.  It was 
upon this that Sir John Eliot, described by John Forster as ‘the most illustrious 
confessor in the cause of liberty whom that time produced’, with sure instinct fixed.  
The existence of Parliament, as a legislature, was not at stake.  There was no settled 
design on the part of James l or even of Charles I to supersede it.  Charles indeed 
found the parliamentary ‘hydra, cunning as well as malicious'; but had the Stuart 
Parliaments been willing to confine themselves to the functions prescribed to them by 
Bacon - to make laws, vote taxes, and keep the king accurately informed as to the 
state of public feeling-there would have been little cause for dispute between the 
Commons and the Crown.  But such a subordinate position would no longer satisfy 
progressive Parliamentarians like Sir John Eliot and John Pym.  They believed that the 
time had come for a long step forward; for the assumption of a larger function; that 
Parliament should no longer rest content with doing its legislative and taxative work, 
but should boldly claim to exercise a continuous control over the Executive.  Parliament 
was to become in Seeley's phrase a ‘government-making organ'.  Eliot's attack upon 
Buckingham was inspired less perhaps by his desire to rid the country of an 
incompetent favourite than to vindicate the principle of ministerial responsibility.  The 
                                                  
11   [159/2]  Carlyle, Letters and Speeches, iv, p. 60 (12 Sept. 1654). bitterness with which Pym pursued Strafford to the block was not quite empty of 
personal malice; but the swiftness with which, in the first days of the Long Parliament, 
he swooped upon his prey, and the tenacity with which he clung to his victim, testify to 
his grasp upon the principle for the sake of which Eliot had perished in the Tower. 
[begin page 161] 
 
The doctrine implicitly maintained in the impeachment of Buckingham and the attainder 
of Strafford was explicitly asserted in the Grand Remonstrance, when the King was 
bluntly told that he would receive no supplies from Parliament unless his ministers were 
men 'whom Parliament had cause to confide in'.
12  
 
The claim was not conceded; Charles I died on the scaffold; Cromwell, after an interval 
of confusion, was called to the first place in the Commonwealth.  
 
Cromwell and the Executive Power. 
The problem submitted to the Stuarts had not been solved; but the contest between the 
Legislature and the Executive was renewed under conditions vastly different.  The 
Stuart kings could rely only upon the prestige which attached to a monarchy, believed 
by many to be ordained of God and to exercise its functions as God's vicegerent on 
earth.  Cromwell was the General of an army, finely disciplined and flushed with 
victories won in three kingdoms.  Parliament might debate constitutional points, but 
power resided in the army and its chief.  That Cromwell was genuinely anxious to 
restore Parliamentary Government, at any rate in the Baconian sense, need not be 
denied; of Parliamentary Government in the sense maintained by Eliot and Pym he had 
but slight apprehension.  He derived his executive authority direct from the people, as 
reflected in the army, not from Parliament.  'You’, said Cromwell to his first Parliament, 
‘have an absolute Legislative power in all things that can possibly concern the good 
and interest of the public';
13 you may make any laws 'if not contrary to the Form of 
Government'.  Similarly, executive power is vested by the Instrument in a 'single 
person'.  On this point no debate could be permitted.  That the times demanded a 
strong Executive was undeniable; Cromwell alone could provide it, and so long as he 
lived he declined to part with the power which he believed to have come to him from 
the will of the people and with the sanction of God.   [begin page 162] 
  
Thus, the Civil War and the resulting Protectorship retarded rather than advanced the 
principle and the practice of Parliamentary Government.  The process by which it was 
gradually evolved after the Restoration and still more rapidly after the Revolution will be 
disclosed hereafter.  For the moment it suffices to insist i that it is the specific quality of 
English Government that the Executive should be subordinate to the Legislature, and 
that by this quality the Parliamentary type is differentiated alike from the Autocratic and 
from the Presidential. 
 
Parliamentary and Presidential Democracy. 
With autocracies a treatise on the modern State needs not to concern itself.  The 
choice for the democracies of today lies between the Presidential and the 
Parliamentary form.  The Swiss Republic, though, as we have seen, it possesses a 
President, is neither Parliamentary nor Presidential but directly democratic.  The United 
States Is definitely Presidential though, as was explained in the last chapter, there are 
elements in the American Constitution which permitted Mr. Wilson to describe it as 
Congressional.  France and England are, on the contrary, like the kingdoms of Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and others, definitely Parliamentary. 
 
                                                  
12   [161/1]  § 197. 
13   [161/2]  Ibid., p. 69. None of these governments is, however, so unreservedly Parliamentary as that of 
England.  In all of them Parliament has a rival in the shape of the Instrument or 
Constitution; in some of them it has a superior.  In England alone Parliament is without 
either legal superior or legal competitor.  In fine, Parliament is Sovereign.  
  
Parliamentary democracy, or representative government, implies, as we have seen, 
something more than the legislative omnipotence of Parliament; it implies & also a 
continuous control, exercised by the legislative Sovereign; over the Executive.  This 
quality also inheres by means of the Cabinet system in the English Government. 
[begin page 163] 
 
Its impartiality – the Rule of Law. 
Another marked feature of the English Government is its impartiality; the acceptance in 
the fullest sense of the Rule of Law.  With this characteristic we shall be of further 
concerned when we come to deal with the problem of personal liberty.  Summarily it 
may be said that it is by the supremacy of the law, and the 'ordinary' law, that the 
Government of England is most clearly differentiated from that of countries where, as in 
France, there exists side by side with the ordinary law a code of rules constituting the 
droit administratif, and where the legality of the acts of all officials from the highest to 
the lowest is determined not in the ordinary Courts of Justice but in the special 
Tribunaux administratifs.  All Englishmen (save only the King) are legally equal before 
the law; all Frenchmen are not.  In England there is one law for Premier and peasant; 
in France all officials can claim the protection of the droit administratif.  
 
This 'impartiality' is not remotely connected with the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, discussed in the preceding paragraphs.  The great contest of the 
seventeenth century decided the issue between the Crown and Parliament in relation 
to the Executive: it decided with equal finality the issue between a prerogatival and a 
popular judiciary.  The Prerogative Courts established or developed by the Tudors 
might easily, had Bacon had his way, have filled the place of the Tribunaux 
administratifs  in France.  The decision of the judges in the cases of the Levant 
merchant Bate, of Darnel and his fellow knights, above all of Hampden, might have 
established not the rule of law but the principle of droit administratif It was the supreme 
merit of the Long Parliament to have asserted the supremacy of the law over the 
administration, and to have reaffirmed the supreme right of the citizen to the enjoyment 
of legal liberty. 
 
With the principle of personal liberty the whole texture of English Government is 
inextricably interpenetrated: but that principle ultimately rests upon the supremacy 




Hardly less conspicuous than the impartiality of English institutions is their 'unreality'.  It 
has been said with equal accuracy and cynicism that in English government 'nothing 
seems what it is, or is what it seems'.  Bagehot hinted at the same quality when he 
described the English Constitution as a 'veiled Republic'.  The question as to the actual 
functions of the Crown under a 'constitutional' monarchy is not one which need at 
present detain us.  It is certain, however, that they are vastly different from; and in a 
purely political sense less important than, those performed by Henry VIII or Queen 
Elizabeth; yet the legal powers enjoyed by Edward VII were much the same as those 
of Edward VI.  There are many other things in the practical working of English 
institutions which are not less veiled than the political activities of the Crown.  Mr. 
Lowell has gone as far as any writer in penetrating the mysteries, yet even he leaves 
                                                  
14   [164/1]  For an alleged tendency towards the growth of administration law in 
England, cf. infra, chapter xxxi. the curious inquirer not infrequently baffled.  The relations between the two Houses of 
the Legislature depend on many things besides the Parliament Act of 1911; the position 
of a Prime Minister in relation to his Cabinet colleagues varies with each Prime Minister 
and can be stated, therefore, by the books only in the most general terms; the work of 
the permanent officials of the Civil Service and the actual part which they play in the 
national administration - these are all matters in which the practice may differ widely 
from the theory of the Constitution, even if and when the latter can be defined with 
tolerable accuracy. 
 
Unitary or Federal. 
A final question remains to be answered.  The English Constitution is largely unwritten, 
depending as much upon convention as upon law; it is in exceptional if not unique 
measure flexible; it represents organic growth, not a manufactured product; above 
[begin page 165] all it is Parliamentary, not Presidential.  On none of these points is 
there room for doubt.  As to the final basis of classification there is.  Must the English 
Constitution be assigned to the unitary or to the federal category?  
 
That the relations of the different portions of the United Kingdom to each other have in 
the past presented some appearance of federalism is plain; but it was mainly delusive.  
The tie which for more than a century (1714-1837) connected England and Hanover 
was of course purely personal, and was dissolved by the accession of a female to the 
English throne in I837.  Not dissimilar was the tie between England and Scotland 
(1603-1707), until it was drawn closer by the acceptance of the Legislative Union.   
There was something more of the federal element in the connexion between England 
and Ireland from 1496 to 1782; but the total repeal of the Declaratory Act of 6 George I, 
and the partial repeal of Poyning's Law in 1782, weakened the federal connexion, and 
from 1782 to 1800 the Union was hardly more than personal.  George III was King of 
Ireland just as he was Elector of Hanover, just as James VII was King of England; but 
in none of these cases was the tie organic.  Some of the more daring among the 
American Colonists were disposed to argue, especially after 1765, that the tie between 
England and the Colonies was equally personal, and that their allegiance was due only 
to the Crown and not to Parliament.  Legally the plea was inadmissible; the legal 
competence of the English Parliament to legislate for the Colonies and to regulate 
trade, if not to impose internal taxation, was generally admitted on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  Burke would not deny, though he refused to affirm, the right even of taxation.  
Clearly then was the tie more than personal.  Much more than personal was the tie 
which connected England with Scotland and Ireland respectively after the passing of 
the Acts of Union.  In ceasing to be personal did it become ' federal'? 
[begin page 166]  
 
Sir Herbert Samuel has argued that in the existing
15 relations between the three parts 
of the United Kingdom there is much more of federalism than is commonly supposed, 
and he has supported his argument not only with ingenuity but with considerable 
wealth of illustration.  First, with reference to the Executive.  In the Cabinet of 1912 
there were fifteen members concerned with domestic administration.  Of these four 
only - the Premier, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of 
Trade, and the Postmaster-General - exercised their administrative powers uniformly in 
each of the three parts of the United Kingdom; and of the four only one - the 
Postmaster-General - includes in his jurisdiction the Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands.  Of the rest, three - the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the 
Presidents of the Boards of Education and Local Government - are exclusively English 
officials; the jurisdiction of the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries is 
also confined to England (including, of course, Wales) save in respect of the diseases 
of animals which would seem to be common to all parts of the United Kingdom.  The 
                                                  
15   [166/1]  In 1912. Lord President of the Council and the First Commissioner of Works have jurisdiction 
over England and Scotland but not over Ireland; while the Home Secretary is in a 
curiously anomalous position: as regards industrial questions, the admission and 
treatment of aliens, and similar subjects he is the Minister of the United Kingdom; in a 
judicial capacity and as responsible for prison administration his functions are confined 
to England.  In Scotland the Secretary for Scotland doubles or rather quadruples the 
parts of Home Secretary and President of the three Boards of Education, Agriculture, 
and Local Government, while the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland is at 
once Home Secretary and President of the Local Government Board.  Yet both these 
last-named officials, the Scottish and Irish Secretaries, as members of the Cabinet of 
the [begin page 167] United Kingdom are responsible to the Imperial Parliament.
16
  
The Legislature of the United Kingdom is theoretically unitary, but even here there is a 
vestige of federalism in the practice of referring Scottish Bills, after second reading, to a 
Grand Committee consisting of the whole body of Scottish members, with the addition 
of fifteen English or Irish members specially appointed for each Bill.  There are also 
unofficial Committees of Welsh and Irish members which, though purely informal, 
exercise considerable influence upon the actual course of legislation.  Moreover, 
though the Legislature itself is unitary the resulting legislation is not.  Out of 458 public 
Acts passed during the decade 1901-10 only 252 applied uniformly to the whole of the 
United Kingdom. 
  
The Judiciary is more definitely federal in character even than the Executive, much 
more therefore than the Legislature.  Scotland in the Act of Union stipulated for the 
continued existence of the Court of Session, the Courts of Admiralty and Exchequer, for 
an independent panel of Scottish judges qualified by service in the College of Justice, 
and that 'the Court of Justiciary do also after the Union and notwithstanding thereof 
remain in all Time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the laws of that 
kingdom and with the same Authority and Privileges as before the Union'.
17  I n  
particular it was 'ordained that' no causes in Scotland be cognoscible by the Courts of 
Chancery, King's Bench, Common Pleas or in any other Court in Westminster Hall'.  To 
this rule of complete judicial independence there is only one exception: the fact that the 
supreme appellate authority is vested for Scotland as for England in the House of 
Lords: but in that House, under the [begin page 168] terms of the Act of Union, sixteen 
Peers of Scotland have a place.  
 
Ireland, under the Act of Union, was to retain a; Court of Admiralty and a Court of 
Chancery, but the provisions as to a separate judiciary were less precise and elaborate 
than in the corresponding treaty with Scotland. 
 
Both Scotland and Ireland retain their own Law Officers: Attorney (in Scotland known 




Yet notwithstanding many and striking elements of federalism the Government of the 
United Kingdom is technically unitary by reason of the fact that Sovereignty over all 
parts of the kingdom resides in the King in Parliament.  
 
                                                  
16    [167/1]  These and the following paragraphs were written before the changes 
effected by the Irish Government Act of 1922.  The Chief Secretaryship has 
ceased to exist and the Lord Lieutenant has given place to a Governor-General.  
17   [167/2]  Article XIX. 
18   [168/1]  Cf. Herbert Samuel: Paper read to the British Association and reprinted in 
The Nineteenth Century and After, for 1912. By parity of reasoning, but with even less regard to realities, we must describe the 
British Empire as a unitary State, despite the existence of Legislatures, largely though 
not completely independent, in all the great self- governing Dominions.  
 
The unitary character of the Empire is even more conspicuous in the executive sense 
than in the legislative.  The King-in-Council is throughout his Dominions supreme.   
Hence, all questions of foreign policy, and in particular questions of peace and war, are 
still under the exclusive control of the Home Government - a truth conclusively 
demonstrated on 3 August 1914.
19  It should be added that the Judicial unity of the 
Empire is still preserved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  That 
Committee, composed of some of the ablest and most distinguished lawyers in the 
Empire, still acts as a Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction for the whole Empire.  To 
the man gifted with the seeing eye [begin page 169] and the hearing ear there are few 
things more impressive than to penetrate into the dark recesses of the Privy Council 
Office in Downing Street, and, amid surroundings characteristically unpretentious to the 
verge of dinginess, listen in succession to cases which come before this supreme 
tribunal from Canada and Australia, from India and South Africa, from the Bermudas 
and Hong-Kong.  
 
As yet, therefore, it is not merely permissible but obligatory to assign both the United 
Kingdom and the British Empire to the category of unitary States. 
 
                                                  
19   [168/2]  Cf. for fuller treatment of this question, infra, chapters viii, xi, xii. It 
should here be noted that the above words were written at a time (1920) which 
may well prove to be a time of rapid transition. VII. 
The Evolution of Parliamentary Democracy  
 
Igitur communitas regni consulatur 
Et quid universitas sentiat sciatur. 
- Political Poem, Thirteenth Century.  
 
Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus comprobetur.' - Edward I. 
 
The union of all classes of freemen, except the clergy and the actual 
members of the peerage, of all classes, from the peer's eldest son to the 
smallest freeholder or burgess, made the House of Commons a real 
representation of the whole nation, and not of any single order in the ; 
nation.' - Freeman.  
 
The English Parliament strikes its roots so deep into the past that scarcely a 
single feature of its proceedings can be made intelligible without reference 
to history.' - Sir Courtenay Ilbert. 
 
Cardinal Wolsey's ambition first brought in the privy counsellors and others 
of the King's servants into the House of Commons from which they were 
anciently exempted.  The effects are the Commons have lost their chief 
jewel (freedom of speech). - Elsynge, The Manner of Holding Parliaments, 
p. 171.  
 
Those persons made up the Committee of State, which was reproachfully 
afterward called the Junto, and enviously then in Court the Cabinet Council.' 
- Clarendon.  
 
Parliamentary Democracy. 
‘Representative democracy' wrote a distinguished German publicist, 'originated in 
North America.'  If the term democracy' is to be taken as synonymous with republic', Dr. 
Bluntschli was justified in his statement, and the context would seem to indicate that 
such was his intention.  If, on the other hand, by 'democracy' is meant any form of 
government in which the will of the many predominates alike in legislation and in 
administration, then the origin of the representative type of democracy must be 
ascribed to England. 
  
American democracy is, however, undeniably 'representative' not less than that of 
England; it seems necessary, therefore, to seek for a more precise term by which to 
differentiate the English type from the American; and both from the Swiss.  The Swiss 
type we have designated as 'referendal', the American as 'Presi- [begin page 172] 
dential for the English type we have reserved the distinctive epithet of 'Parliamentary'. 
  
The term would seem to be justified by two features brought into strong relief in the 
preceding chapter: on the one hand by the omnipotence of the Sovereign Legislature - 
the King in Parliament - on the other by the responsibility of the Executive to the 
Legislature.  The Constitution of the United States knows neither characteristic: in the 
Government of England both stand out pre-eminent.  
 
The parliamentary type of democracy is peculiar to the modem world; down to the end 
of the eighteenth century it was peculiar to England; but during the last one hundred years several of its distinctive characteristics have been embodied, in avowed imitation 
of England, in many modem Constitutions.  This fact seems to justify an attempt to 
indicate briefly but with precision the main stages in the evolution of this novel form of 
government in the country of its origin. 
 
Primitive Democracy direct. 
Primitive democracy, as it existed among the embryo nations of the modem world, was 
direct; it took the form direct of the Landsgemeinden, which, as we have seen, still 
survive in some of the Swiss cantons.  The same form existed among our Anglo-Saxon 
ancestors, who derived it from the same common stock of Teutonic institutions.   
Ultimate authority was vested in the host in arms: ‘about less important matters,' wrote 
Tacitus, 'the chiefs deliberate; about the more important the whole people.'  In this 
general Assembly of the omnes all questions of high policy - war, peace, alliances - 
were decided; by it the distribution of lands among the communities was regulated; the 
young men were invested with arms and admitted to citizenship; all officers, whether to 
administer justice or to lead the host in war, were appointed. 
 
Direct democracy is applicable, however, in its primitive form, only to the smallest 
communities. 
 
The Village Folkmoot 
The primary political unit of the Anglo-Saxons was the Township, afterwards utilized for 
ecclesiastical purposes by [begin page 173] the organizers of the Church polity in 
England as the Parish.  The affairs of the village community, the township or parish, 
were administered by the men of the locality in their Folkmoot or parish meeting.  In the 
smallest of parishes the primitive form still survives, or rather was revived after the 
lapse of many centuries by the Local Government Act of 1894.  It was not long, 
however, before the idea of representation obtruded itself in English institutions. 
 
In the courts of the hundred and shire the township was represented as a unit by its 
reeve (Praepositus) and four men of the better sort (quatuor meliores homines).  These 
same men also represented the township when the King's justices in eyre (or circuit 
judges) visited the localities. 
 
The Idea of Representation: hundred and Shire Courts. 
The object of these judicial visitations was The Idea threefold: they were intended 
 
(1)    to keep the central administration (the King's Court) in touch with 
local administration; 
(2)   to administer Justice an preserve order; and 
(3)   to collect the King's dues and, later, to assess taxation. 
 
The fiscal and judicial duties of these itinerant justices, or travelling commissioners, 
were indeed inextricably intertwined.  Justitia est magnum emolumentum.  This 
aphorism expressed the literal truth.  It is not too much to say that from this archaic 
confusion the idea of political representation gradually emerged.  What were the four 
good men and the reeve of the township doing in the court of the hundred or shire?  
They were there primarily to answer for the public order of the township, and, 
secondarily, to answer for its contribution to the public exchequer.  In the Shire Court 
the representatives of this political unit came face to face with the King's Justice - the 
representative of the central administration.  Before the end of the twelfth century a 
new principle crept in: to the idea of representation was added the idea of election.  
According to the Form of Proceeding on the Judicial Visitation of 1194, three knights 
and one clerk are to be elected in each shire to act as custodes placitorum coronae or 
coroners: and the election, be it [begin page 174] observed, is to take place in the 
county court.  The introductory clause of the same Forma Procedendi is further significant as providing for the election of the grand jury.  With the idea of 
representation long familiar to every Villager, with that of election becoming more 
common every day, it called for no great effort of political imagination to suggest the 
idea of bringing into the national council representative and elected persons to assent, 
on behalf of their localities, to the taxation demanded by the Crown. 
  
Central Representation. 
This step, almost an obvious one but destined to be of first-rate political importance to 
England, and indeed to the whole modern world, was first taken in 1213.  In that year 
King John, under the stress of financial and political necessity, summoned, by writ 
addressed to the sheriff of every county, four discreet knights to attend a national 
council 'ad loquendum nobiscum de negotiis regni nostri'.  A few months earlier he had 
similarly directed the sheriffs to send to St. Albans four men and the reeve from every 
township in the royal demesne, to assess the amount of compensation to be paid to the 
bishops who had suffered during the interdict.  Here, then, we have the origin of county 
and borough representation in the central assembly of the nation.  One or two points 
are noteworthy.  The machinery employed is that which for long time had been familiar: 
that of the Shire Court and the Sheriff.  Again, the four knights of the county and the 
four men and the reeve of the township have an equally familiar sound.  From time 
immemorial these four men and the reeve have represented their townships in the 
Court of the Shire.  Nothing more is now called for but to send them on, at the King's 
bidding, to St. Albans.  Thus by the easiest of stages was the fateful transition from 
local to national representation accomplished. 
 
The Experimental Period 1213-95. 
Between 1213 and 1295 we have a period of somewhat confused experiment.  It was 
as yet obviously uncertain Period what direction things would take.  The Great Charter 
of 1215, eminently baronial, not to say oligarchical in tone, did nothing to advance 
national representation.  [begin page 175] 
 
During the minority of Henry III a struggle ensued between the English Baronage on 
the one hand, and the Pope and his agents on the other, for supremacy in England.  
No advantage was likely to accrue from such a contest to the cause of Constitutional 
development.  But, nevertheless, the long minority was not void of significance.  The 
Council acquired a new importance.  With the young King's personal assumption of the 
reins of government things began to hasten towards a crisis.  An extravagant weakling, 
a mere tool in the hands of the Papacy, Henry III soon found himself confronted by an 
opposition which had some real claim to be regarded as national.  A leader of 
consummate ability emerged in the person of Simon de Montfort.  As early as 1246 
Matthew Paris speaks of a great national assembly in London as a Parliamentum 
generalissimum.  The bishops were there, abbots and priors, earls and barons.  Plainly, 
this was a national council of the old type, though under a new title.  To the Council of 
1254, however, the King summoned, again by writ addressed to the sheriffs, two 
knights to be elected in each county court, to inform the King what aid he might expect 
from the counties for the relief of his pressing financial embarrassments (quale auxilium 
nobis in tanta necessitate impendere voluerint). 
 
Simon de Montfort. 
The year 1261 afforded still more significant proof of Simon de the increasing 
importance of these county representatives.  The Barons, now in open opposition, 
summoned three knights from each shire to meet them at St. Albans 'to treat of the 
common business of the realm'.  The King, on the contrary, bade the sheriffs dispatch 
the knights to him at Windsor.  To the Parliament of 1264 four knights from each county 
were summoned.  To the famous Parliament of 1265 Simon de Montfort, in the King's 
name, summoned five earls and eighteen barons, a large body of clergy, two knights 
from each shire, and two citizens from each of twenty-one specified towns.  On the strength of this assembly Simon has been styled the 'founder of the House of 
Commons'.  That title cannot be justly attributed to [begin page 176] any single man, not 
even to Edward I, certainly not to Simon de Montfort; yet there is a special significance 
attaching to Simon's Parliament.  It is true that for the first time representatives of the 
towns were brought into political conjunction with barons, knights, and clergy.  The 
conjunction is significant.  But, more closely examined, the assembly of 1265 is seen to 
'wear very much the appearance of a party convention' (Stubbs).  Of barons there were 
only a handful - the partisans of Simon; of the clergy - his strongest supporters - a large 
and wholly disproportionate number; of the towns, only 21, as compared with 166 
summoned in 1295 by Edward I.  The towns, moreover, were selected with obvious 
care, and the writ was directed not to the sheriff of the county, but to the mayors of the 
chosen towns.  There is good ground, therefore, for the cautious insinuation of Bishop 
Stubbs.  None the less, Simon's Parliament, whatever the motives of its convener, does 
mark an important stage in the evolution of the House of Commons.  
 
Edward I. 
From 1265 to 1295 we are once more in the region of uncertainty and experiment.  
There were several 'Parliaments' after the battle of Evesham, but whether knights and 
burgesses were included in them we cannot tell.  In 1273 four knights from each shire 
and four citizens from each town joined the magnates in taking the oath of fealty to the 
absent King.  The Statute of Westminster the First (1275) was, on the face of it, made 
with the assent of the ‘community of the realm' as well as the magnates lay and 
ecclesiastical.  In 1282 a curious experiment was tried.  The King and the magnates 
being in Wales, the sheriffs were bidden to summon to York and Northampton 
respectively representatives of the towns and counties, together with 'all freeholders 
capable of bearing arms and holding more than a knight's fee'.  The Archbishops of the 
two Provinces were similarly enjoined to summon through the bishops the heads of the 
religious houses and the proctors of the cathedral clergy.  For an instant it seemed as 
though the ecclesiastical provincialism of the [begin page 177] Church might overbear 
the tendency to nationalism.  The experiment was not indeed repeated, but the jarring 
tendencies of provincialism and nationalism were not yet reconciled, nor was the 
victory of one or other assured.  In September 1283 two knights were summoned to a 
national council together with two 'wise and fit’ citizens from London and twenty other 
specified towns.  Here it will be observed that Edward I followed exactly the precedent 
of 1265, both as to the number of towns and the mode of summons, the writs being 
addressed to the mayors and bailiffs.  In the Parliaments of 1290 and 1294 the towns 
were left out; with that of 1295, however, we reach the close of the experimental period 
and the real beginnings of regular parliamentary history. 
 
The Model Parliament of 1295. 
The Parliament of 1295 marked a stage of first-rate importance in the evolution of 
representative government.  It contained a full and perfect representation of the Three 
Estates of the Realm - the Baronage, the Clergy, and the 'Commons'.  Of the baronage 
there were forty-eight members, seven earls and forty-one barons, summoned 
individually by name.  They were charged to come upon 'the faith and homage' or the 
'homage and allegiance whereby you are bound to us’.  Similarly, the archbishops, 
bishops, and the greater abbots were summoned individually, but on the ground not of 
homage and allegiance (though the bishops had and still have to do homage for the 
temporalities of their sees) but of 'faith and love'.  Of bishops there were twenty, of 
abbots sixty-seven, besides three heads of monastic orders.  But the representation of 
the Clerical Estate was not confined to the princes of the Church.  The bishops were 
bidden by the Praemunientes  clause to bring with them the dean or prior of the 
cathedral church, the archdeacons, one proctor representing the capitular, and two 
proctors representing the parochial clergy of the diocese.  The Third Estate, that of the 
Commons, was summoned by writs addressed to the sheriffs of the shires who were to 
cause two knights of each shire, two citizens of each [begin page 178] city, and two burgesses of each borough to be elected and bring with them full powers to carry out 
what should be ordained by common counsel.  The knights were elected by the full 
county court; by whom the representatives of the towns were actually elected is less 
clear, though a return of the election was made, it would seem, to the sheriff in the 
shire court.  The number of cities and boroughs represented in the reign of Edward I 
was 166; the number of counties 37; the Commons’, therefore, assuming the summons 
to be regularly and generally obeyed, numbered in all 406.  
 
An Assembly of Estates. 
The theory of representation was, be it observed, by Estates.
1  An assembly of 
Estates’, according to Bishop Stubbs, is an organized collection, made by 
representation or otherwise, of the several orders, states or conditions of men who are 
recognized as possessing political power.'
2  The principle at the root of parliamentary 
government in England was, then, twofold: vocational and local; the idea of the 
representation on the one hand of classes or interests; on the other of places.  The 
baronial estate rested, it would seem, on the idea of tenure; a peer of Parliament (to 
use a later description) was a person who held a baronial estate; a baronial estate was 
one which entitled the holder to an individual summons to Parliament.  
  
The Barons. 
Thus a 'barony' depended in Barons early days upon the caprice of the Crown, and the 
number of ‘peers of Parliament' varied considerably from reign to reign and even from 
Parliament to Parliament.  In 1295 it was, as we have seen, 48; in the first year of 
Edward III it had risen to 86, but by the first year of Richard II it had fallen to 60; by 
1399 to 50, and by 1422 - the first year of Henry VI to 23.  By that time, however, a 
new method for the creation of all peerages had become established.  In 1377 Edward 
III issued Letters Patent creating his son the Black Prince Duke [begin page 179] of 
Cornwall.  Richard II used the same method for creating barons; by Henry VI it had 
become the established method for all grades of the peerage. 
  
As an Estate  the barons originally enjoyed, like the two other Estates, fiscal 
independence, the right of voting separately their aids to the Crown; but before 
Parliament was a century old it had become usual for Lords and Commons to combine 
in their grants of 'tenths and fifteenths', 'tonnage and poundage', and other imposts.  A 
new formula came into use in 1395 which has since been used without variation, grants 
being made by the Commons with the advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal'.  Thenceforward the Commons enjoyed a pre-eminence in finance which 
became more and more pronounced until by the culminating Act of 1911 the peers 
were deprived of all control over Money Bills. 
  
The Clergy. 
The Estate of the clergy was even more unambiguous than that of the baronage.  The 
bishops took their place in Parliament in a double capacity: as holders of ‘baronies’, as 
tenants of land held direct from the Crown, and as rulers of the Church.  The abbots, 
like the lower clergy, were impatient of the obligation to attend Parliament, and pleaded 
that they were not called upon to do so unless they held their lands by military tenure: 
unless, that is to say, they were technically 'barons’.  As a fact the number who were 
summoned to attend rapidly declined: it was sixty-seven under Edward I, but under 
Edward  III had fallen to twenty-seven, the figure at which it remained until the 
dissolution of the monasteries.  The lower clergy refused, almost from the first, to take 
the place in the National Council assigned to them by Edward I, and until the 
                                                  
1   [178/1]  For a contrary view, and an erudite argument in support of it, cf. Pollard, 
Evolution of Parliament, c. iv. 
2   [178/2]  Constitutional History, ii. 163. seventeenth century they maintained all the attributes not merely of a distinct but of a 
separate Estate.  In particular they clung with ever-watchful jealousy to the right of 
separate taxation.  Down to 1294 the clergy, like the barons and the cities, made their 
own grants to the Crown at a rate determined by themselves.  After 1295 it gradually 
became customary for the clergy as regards [begin page 180] the rate, to follow the 
example of the other Estates.  But there was to be no confusion as to the origin of the 
grant: it was to come from the clergy in their separate convocations.  This practice 
continued until the privilege was surrendered by a verbal arrangement between 
Archbishop Sheldon and Lord Chancellor Clarendon in 1663.  Since that date the 
clergy have ceased, for all practical purposes, to be an Estate of the realm, and have 
merged into the general body of the community. 
  
The Knights. 
The For some time it was doubtful whether other Estates might not establish their 
separate existence within the community.  Even more doubtful was the disposition of 
the Three Estates in two Houses of Parliament.  The latter arrangement was indeed, as 
will be seen presently, peculiar to England.  At one time it seemed likely that the 
knights, belonging to the same social class as the barons, and united with them in 
economic interests, would throw in their lot with the baronage.  They followed the 
barons in the rate of their grants to the Crown, and they may have sat with them.  Or, if 
not united with the baronage, they might have formed, as in Aragon, an Estate and 
House of their own.  They are recorded as sitting by themselves in 1331 and in 1332, 
and it may by then have become the practice.  Certain it is, however, that by the middle 
of the same century the knights had definitely separated from the baronage, and, what 
is more remarkable and infinitely more important, had permanently amalgamated with 
the representatives of the towns.  For the causes which operated to produce this union 
- perhaps the most fateful event in the Constitutional history of England - the reader 
must be referred to the classical work of Bishop Stubbs.




The knights or lesser landowners were not the only class who might well have become 
a separate Estate.  The lawyers were in a favourable position for establishing their right 
to this distinction, and seemed at one time not [begin page 181] unlikely to press it.  The 
judges of the High Court and the law-officers of the Crown have from time immemorial 
received a summons to attend the King in Parliament; and they are still enjoined 'to be 
at the said day and place personally present with us and with the rest of our Council to 
treat and give [your] advice upon the affairs aforesaid'.  In obedience to the summons 
the judges attend the opening of Parliament, but they have never established their right 
to a permanent place there.  In the Parliament of 1381 their position appears to have 
been co-ordinate with that of other Estates, for the Commons in that year petitioned the 
Crown that 'the prelates, peers, knights, judges, and all the other Estates,' might 
debate severally.  But their presence was probably due to, and may certainly be 
explained by, the confusion between the House of Lords and the Magnum Concilium 
which practically lost itself in that House and handed on to it the judicial and conciliar 




More substantial than the claim of the lawyers to separate Estateship was that of the 
merchants.  Borough representation was in effect the representation of the traders; but 
its basis was local not vocational.  The merchants were fiscally strong enough to make 
their independent arrangements with the Crown, and the fact that they were 
encouraged to do so by the Crown itself constituted a serious menace to the solidarity 
                                                  
3   [180/1]  Vol. ii, § 191 seq.; iii, § 426 seq. of the Third Estate.  The position was further complicated by the fact that the 'customs’, 
being regarded as fees for licence to trade, were naturally the subject of direct 
bargaining between the King and the merchants, to whom the licences were granted.  
None the less the practice was a dangerous one, and called for decided action on the 
part of the Commons.  The Commons were fully alive to the danger, and in 1362 
Parliament enacted that henceforward 'no subsidy or charge should be set upon wool 
by the merchants or any other body without consent of Parliament'.  There was further 
legislation on the subject [begin page 182] in 1371 and 1387, but how imperfectly the 
confusion was cleared up was proved by the controversy as to impositions 'and. 
tonnage and poundage' under the first two Stuarts.  We may take it, however, that by 
the end of the fourteenth century the doctrine was established that there should be no 
taxation without consent of Parliament; that, in consequence, the danger of the 
multiplication of Estates had been finally dissipated and the principle of local 
representation successfully affirmed. 
  
Bicameral Structure. 
To this result the peculiar structure of the English Parliament powerfully contributed.  
Elsewhere in Europe representative Assemblies were, at about the same time, coming 
into existence.  Of these, some were organized in three, some in four branches.  Under 
a system of ‘Estates’, three Chambers would appear the most obvious formation, and 
the English Parliament would probably have assumed this shape but for two reasons: 
the class-consciousness of the clergy which led them to prefer their provincial 
Convocations to the National Assembly; and the fortunate coalescence of the lesser 
landowners and the burghers, which, in place of an Estate of merchants or towns, gave 
us a House of Commons - a House in which all classes except the peers, temporal and 
spiritual, were ultimately to find representation.  The representatives, however, met at 
Westminster, not as the delegates of special interests, economic or social, but as 
representatives of local communities. 
 
Should it appear to some that undue emphasis has been laid upon this feature of 
English Constitutional development, a sufficient explanation will be found by following 
the history of parliamentary institutions in France and Spain.  The Cortes of Aragon, 
more than a century older than our own Parliament, the Cortes of Castile, and the 
States-General of France, all started with a promise of permanence at least equal to 
that of the English Parliament.  The Spanish Assemblies barely survived into the 
sixteenth century; the States-General never met after 1614 until the eve of the 
Revolution in 1789.  The secret [begin page 183] of the rapid decadence and early 
demise of these Assemblies lay in the fact that the basis of representation was social or 
economic, not political, and that consequently the Crown, both in France and Spain, 
was able to play off one class interest against another - the traders against the 
landowners; the clergy against both and so secure its own supremacy.  A similar fate 
might have overtaken the English Parliament had not the knights, by uniting with the 
burghers, formed a connecting link between the landowners and the merchants, and so 
conserved the  liberties of both. 
 
The bicameral system, in its origin fortuitous, has in modern times approved itself on 
grounds of high expediency alike to political theorists and to the practical architects of 
Constitutions.  Both with the theory and the practice we shall have to concern 
ourselves later.  Here it must suffice to insist that but for the fortunate accidents - they 
were hardly more - which led to the evolution of this structural form in England, it is 
doubtful whether the principle of representative democracy would have survived the 
experimental stage. 
 
Development of Parliament in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.  
By the end of the fourteenth century the English Parliament had not only assumed its 
modem form, but had acquired its essential powers and privileges: its exclusive right over taxation; its right to share with the Crown in the making of laws; and a species of 
control over the administration.  The fifteenth century witnessed centuries a more 
precise and detailed definition of the rights established in the previous period - a 
‘hardening and sharpening' in Stubbs's phrase - but it was chiefly remarkable for the 
premature trial and conspicuous failure of a constitutional experiment which is of 
peculiar interest to students of political institutions. 
  
The ‘Revolution' of 1399 was partly oligarchical in character, partly ecclesiastical, and 
wholly conservative.  Alike by temperament and by necessity, the Lancastrian kings 
were inclined towards parliamentary methods.  Consequently, under Henry IV and 
Henry V, an attempt [begin page 184] was made to secure to Parliament not merely a 
general control over the Executive but the actual appointment of the Council.  Thus in 
1404, 1406, and 1410, Henry IV nominated the members of his Council in Parliament, 
and on the death of Henry V (1422) it was Parliament which nominated the Privy 
Council to be a Council of Regency during the minority of Henry VI.  The attempt to 
make Parliament the direct instrument of government was, however, a disastrous 
failure: partly because it was premature, partly because the time was unpropitious.  The 
reigns of the Lancastrians were throughout 'unquiet', and in the hands of a weak king 
like Henry VI the Executive proved impotent to control the forces of social disorder.  
Consequently, the whole country was plunged into chaos: all the evils of a 'bastard 
feudalism' reappeared without the redeeming features which had justified and 
ennobled the feudal system in earlier days; wars broke out between noble and noble, 
county and county, town and town; the administration of justice became a byword; to 
secure a verdict both judge and jury must be bribed.  In the Letters of the Paston 
Family the England of the fifteenth century lives again: the picture is one of complete 
social disintegration and pitiable administrative impotence. 
  
The Tudor Dictatorship. 
The From this 'lack of governance' England found relief in the dictatorship - in the main 
benevolent and wholly salutary - of the Tudors.  From the discipline of the sixteenth 
century the whole nation emerged braced and invigorated.  Not the least of the 
advantages secured by the strong rule of the Tudors accrued to Parliament.  At the end 
of the fifteenth century Parliament, exhausted by its premature efflorescence, seemed 
like to perish.  By the end of the sixteenth century, broadened by the creation of a large 
number of new constituencies, mainly in growing towns, and infused with the stiff 
temper of Puritanism, Parliament was ready and anxious to embark upon afresh 
struggle for ancient privileges and new prerogatives.  
 
The contest of the seventeenth century. 
The spirit in which Parliament plunged into the [begin page 185] contest is accurately 
reflected in the Commons' Apology of 1604.  From that interesting but lengthy 
document
4 one sentence may be cited in illustration:  
 
‘And contrarywise, with all humble and due respect to your majesty our 
sovereign lord and head, against those misinformations we most truly 
avouch, - first, that our privileges and liberties are our right and due 
inheritance, no less than our lands and goods; secondly, that they cannot be 
withheld from us, denied or impaired, but with apparent wrong to the whole 
state of the realm; thirdly, and that our making of request, in the entrance of 
Parliament, to enjoy our privilege, is an act only of manners, . . .'  
 
The language may be reasonably respectful, but the temper is unmistakably truculent.  
Parliament was obviously spoiling for a fight.  The pedantry of James I and the 
                                                  
4   [185/1]  For full text cf. Statutes and Documents (ed. Prothero), p. 286. obstinate fanaticism of Charles I offered it an opportunity if not an excuse.  With details 
we are not here concerned; it is enough to insist that the prize for which the contest 
was fought was nothing less than the sovereignty of England.  Was sovereignty to 
remain vested in the Crown, or to be transferred to a Parliament consisting of King, 
Lords, and Commons?  In the latter alternative, how was it to be exercised?  
 
For a quarter of a century James I, and his son after him, attempted the task of 
reconciling the Stuart theory of kingship - the doctrine of Divine Right - with the 
advancing claims of Parliament and more particularly of the House of Commons.  The 
principles were in truth irreconcilable.  In the Civil War an attempt was made to cut the 
knot by the sword.  It failed.  The war proved - and the lesson was further enforced by 
the experience of the Commonwealth period - that if Parliament was essential to the 
idea of Constitutional Monarchy, the Crown was essential to the development of 
parliamentary government.  Consequently the Restoration of 1660 was as much a 
restoration of Parliament as a revival of Monarchy.  [begin page 186] 
 
The Cabinet System. 
With the Restoration the revolutionary interregnum ended and the orderly processes of 
evolution were resumed.  But the essential problem of the seventeenth century was 
unsolved: Where did sovereignty reside?  To whom was the Executive responsible?  By 
whom was it to be controlled? 
  
The practical answer to this question was found in the evolution of the Cabinet.  
 
This, most distinctive of English political institutions, came, not by observation, but 
arose in characteristic English fashion, partly as a natural development from existing 
institutions, partly as a result of mere chance.  The principle of ministerial responsibility 
was asserted by Eliot, and insisted upon by Pym, as an essential condition of any 
permanent accord between Crown and Parliament.  Something like a Cabinet was 
evidently in existence in 164O.  'Those persons’, writes Clarendon (meaning 
Archbishop Laud, Lord Strafford, Lord Cottington, Lord Northumberland, Bishop Juxon, 
Sir H. Vane, Sir F. Windebank, and the two Secretaries of State), 'made up the 
Committee of State, which was reproachfully afterwards called the Junto, and enviously 
then in Court the Cabinet Council.'
5
  
One thing, however, was lacking: 'those persons' did not possess - as a body - the 
confidence of Parliament.  A year later the Grand Remonstrance made it plain that 
there could be no lasting harmony between the Executive and the Legislature, unless 
the King were prepared 'to employ such Counsellors. . . as the Parliament may have 
cause to confide in'.  
 
Charles II and the privy Council. 
After the Restoration Charles II found himself confronted by a practical dilemma.   
Policy dictated the advisability of numerous promotions to the Privy Council, but, as a 
result, the Council became impossibly large for the dispatch of business.  Moreover, 
Charles II, quick- witted and pleasure-loving, was frankly bored, as Clarendon tells us, 
by the debates in the Council.  Clarendon [begin page 187] accordingly proposed that 
the administrative work of the Council should be delegated to four small Committees: 
one for foreign affairs; a second for the supervision of the army and navy; a third for 
trade; and a fourth for the consideration of petitions of complaint.  In these Committees 
of the Council the modern administrative system may be said to have its origin.  But in 
addition to these formally recognized Committees there was an informal Committee in 
which we have the germ of the modern Cabinet.  
 
                                                  
5   [186/1]  Clarendon, Rebellion, Bk. II (vol. i, p. 244). Temple’s scheme. 
The new development was regarded with extreme disfavour by old-fashioned 
Constitutionalists, and, in scheme particular, by Parliament.  Although the future of the 
Cabal was very far from being discerned, various schemes were devised to arrest the 
development, and at the same time to evolve order out of the chaos which prevailed in 
Parliament and to restore harmony between Parliament and the King's Ministers.  One 
of these, devised by Sir William Temple, actually came to fruition and was tried in 1679.  
Temple's Privy Council was to consist of thirty members: fifteen office-holders and 
fifteen unofficial members of great wealth and political influence; but a Council of thirty 
is too small for deliberation, and too large for Executive purposes, and things quickly 
relapsed into the position from which Temple's scheme was intended to extricate them.  
Within a few months the King was again holding consultation only with a small knot of 
statesmen.  From this practice neither Charles II nor his successors ever afterwards 
departed.  Temple's short-lived experiment had proved itself impotent either to restore 
to the Privy Council its constitutional place and importance, or to arrest the 
development of the convenient but unconstitutional substitute, soon to take form as the 
Cabinet. 
  
On the initiation of Temple's scheme, in 1679, the King bade farewell to his Privy 
Council in these significant words: 'His Majesty thanks you for all the good advice 
which you have given him, which might have been more [begin page 188] frequent if the 
great numbers of the Council had not made it unfit for the secrecy and dispatch of 
business.  This forced him to use a smaller number of you in a foreign committee, and 
sometimes the advice of some few among them.'
6  These words were in effect a 
funeral oration: the old Privy Council as an Executive body was dead.  
 
The Party system. 
The Meanwhile, the Cabinet developed rapidly.  Its evolution was materially assisted by 
the growth of the party system in Parliament.  The origin of that system is commonly 
ascribed with over-precision to the year 1679.  It was then no doubt that the party 
labels, Whigs and Tories, were first affixed to the two parties which desired respectively 
the passing and the rejection of the Bill for the exclusion of the Duke of York from the 
succession.  The historic parties may, however, more properly be said to originate in 
the debates of the Long Parliament, and particularly in the discussions on the Grand 
Remonstrance.  But be this as it may, Whigs and Tories, as organized parliamentary 
parties, were becoming clearly defined by the Revolution of 1688.  
 
The Whig Junto: 1697. 
For the first years after the Revolution William III selected his Ministers indifferently 
from the two great party camps.  But the expedient, though well meaning, did not work, 
and Sunderland persuaded the King to confide the great offices of State exclusively to 
the leaders of the Whig party, at that time predominant in Parliament.  To this year, and 
to the formation of the Whig Junto, Macaulay seems to attach an exaggerated 
importance.  Sunderland's Junto  of 1697 may indeed be regarded as the first 
homogeneous Ministry, and, as such, it registers an important stage in the evolution of 
the modern Cabinet.  Further, it is the first Cabinet which intentionally reflected the 
parliamentary majority for the time being.  But that evolution was very far from being 
complete in 1697.  The two essential features were still lacking: the Ministry owned no 
conscious subordination to a common political chief; and the King still presided [begin 
page 189] in person at the meetings of his Cabinet.  William III was in fact, as well as in 
theory, the head of the Executive Government.  He was a ‘President'; he had no Prime-
Minister.  Towards the end of his reign another attempt, determined and deliberate, was 
made to arrest the progress already made in the direction of Cabinet government, and 
to reconstitute the authority of the Privy Council.  Section III of the Act of Settlement 
                                                  
6   [188/1]  Temple, Memoirs, iii. 45. (1701) enacted ‘that. . . all matters and things relating to the well governing of this 
kingdom which are properly cognizable in the Privy Council by the Laws and Customs 
of this realm shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be 
signed by such of the Privy Council as shall advise and consent to the same'.  The 
same section further provided ‘that no person who has an office or place of profit under 
the King or receives a pension from the Crown shall be capable of serving as a 
member of the House of Commons'.  Fortunately for the constitutional evolution of 
England neither of these provisions ever became operative.  The first was repealed by 
Statute (4 & 5 Anne, c. 20, § 27) in 1705; the second was modified so as to permit 
Ministers of the Crown to seek re-election to the House of Commons after the 
acceptance of office.  
 
Queen Anne and her Ministers. 
But despite the removal of these obstructions little Queen progress was made with the 
development of the Cabinet and principle under Queen Anne.  The Queen had no 
intention of surrendering to Ministers her personal initiative in matters of State.  Like her 
predecessor she frequently presided at Cabinet Councils, and the policy adopted there 
was to a large extent her own.  But one significant step must be marked.  The Queen's 
sympathies were entirely with the Tory party, and the Whig Ministers who dominated 
the Council during the middle of the reign were forced upon the Queen, despite her 
personal inclinations. 
 
Particularly was this the case with the appointment of Lord Somers to the Presidency of 
the Council in 1708.  The Queen was not without compensation: the irresponsi- [begin 
page 190] bility of the Crown was finally established.  'For some time past’, said 
Rochester in 1711, 'we have been told that the Queen is to answer for everything, but I 
hope that time is over.  According to the fundamental constitution of the kingdom the 
Ministers are accountable for all.  I hope nobody will, nay nobody durst, name the 
Queen in this connexion.'
7  Nevertheless the Queen continued not merely to reign, but 
actually to rule.  The Ministers were still, although to a diminishing extent, her 
'servants'; the policy which they pursued was inspired by her personal wishes. 
 
George I and Walpole. 
The real point of transition is marked by the accession of the first Sovereign of the 
House of Hanover.  George I was the first 'Constitutional' King of England in the 
narrower acceptation of that term; he reigned but he did not rule.  Henceforward the 
dividing lines of English history are to be found not in the accession of successive 
Sovereigns but in the changes of Ministries.  For the consummation at this particular 
juncture of a development which had been long in process two things were in the main 
responsible: first, George I was a German, with no command of the English tongue and 
a languid interest in English politics; and next, supreme power fell into the hands of a 
man of exceptional strength and tenacity of character.  To Sir Robert Walpole belongs 
the distinction of having been the first really to define our Cabinet system, of having 
been himself the first Prime Minister in the true and complete sense of the term. 
 
'At whatever date " writes Lord Morley of Blackburn, 'we choose first to see 
all the decisive marks of that remarkable system which combines unity, 
steadfastness, and initiative in the Executive, with the possession of 
supreme authority alike over men and measures by the House of Commons, 
it is certain that it was under Walpole that its ruling principles were first 
fixed in Parliamentary government and that the Cabinet system received the 
impression that it bears in our own time.'
8
                                                  
7   [190/1]  Parliamentary History, vol. .vi, p. 972.  
8   [190/2]  Walpole, p. 142. [begin page 191] 
‘It was Walpole’, writes another distinguished publicist, ‘who first 
administered the Government in accordance with his own views of our 
political requirements.  It was Walpole who first conducted the business of 
the Country in the House of Commons. It was Walpole who in the conduct 
of that business first insisted upon the support for his measures of all 
servants of the Crown who had seats in parliament.  It was under Walpole 
that the House of Commons became the dominant power in the State, and 
rose in ability and influence as well as in actual power above the House of 
Lords.  And it was Walpole who set the example of quitting his office while 
he still retained the undiminished affection of his King for the avowed 




The several implications of the Cabinet system may be more appropriately discussed in 
a later chapter.
10  By the reign of George II the system was in outline complete.  Down 
to the accession of the Hanoverians the policy of the country was the policy of the 
Crown; the King ruled as well as reigned.  Thenceforward the King was in the main 
bound to accept the advice tendered to him by ministers responsible to Parliament.  
Until that time the Crown had been served by ministers; thenceforward the country was 
governed by a Ministry.  Even in the embryo Cabinets of the seventeenth century there 
was no solidarity; between ministers there was no mutual responsibility; nor were 
individual ministers in any real sense responsible to Parliament.  If the King consulted 
ministers it was merely for his own convenience; consequently, no minister felt bound 
to resign if his advice was ignored.  ‘He always gave good advices,' wrote Burnet of 
Ormond, ’but when bad ones were followed he was not for complaining too much of 
them.'
11  Nor did the King limit his consultations to 'ministers'.  While Clarendon was 
still nominally the chief adviser of Charles II, the King's real councillors were, according 
to Pepys, 'my Lord Bristol, the Duke of Buckingham, Sir Henry Rennet, my Lord [begin 
page 192] Ashley, and Sir Charles Berkeley, who, amongst them have cast my Lord 
Chancellor on his back past ever getting up again.'
12  Clarendon, though the chief 
official adviser of the Crown, was not a Prime Minister, nor was Danby.  The Prime 
Minister was a product of the Cabinet system. 
 
From Walpole's day onwards all was changed: not at once, but as a result of gradual 
evolution.  Politically homogeneous in composition; drawn from and responsive to the 
party commanding a majority in the House of Commons; its members acknowledging 
mutual responsibility and united in subordination to a first minister - such was the 
Cabinet as it finally emerged from the political vicissitudes of the eighteenth century.  
Such it remained down to December 1916.  Did it then reach the term of its 
development?  Will the constitutional upheaval leave this key-institution unscathed?  To 
these questions we shall return.  
 
The evolution of the Cabinet system supplied the solution to the problem of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  The issue of the contest of the seventeenth century 
rendered it certain that supreme power must pass from the Crown to the King-in-
Parliament; it still remained uncertain how the new Sovereign was to exercise the 
power thus transferred.  The answer was found, by a happy combination of design and 
accident, in the Cabinet. 
 
                                                  
9   [191/1]  Hearn, Government of England, p. 220.  
10   [191/2]  infra, c. xxv.  
11   [191/3]  History of my Own Time, p.63. 
12   [192/1]  Pepys's Diary. May 15. 1663; cf. Blauvelt, op. cit., p. 44. The Settlement of 1688. 
Thus were the two main conditions of parliamentary democracy fulfilled.  That peculiar 
form of government implies on the one hand, as we have seen, an omnipotent 
Legislature, and on the other a responsible Executive.  Both doctrines were implicitly 
involved in the success of the parliamentary party in their conflict with the Stuart 
monarchy, but their complete vindication was in no small measure due to the fact that 
the English Constitution is an aggregate of precedents and conventions and has never 
been embodied as a whole in a Constitutional Code.  The [begin page 193] likeliest 
moment for such an attempt was in 1688, Political philosophy was in fashion, Locke's 
Treatises on Civil Government provided an apology for a fait accompli rather than a 
programme of projected reform.  But the Act of Settlement was still to come and might 
have been elaborated into a Constitutional Code.  Was the genius of English 
institutions too strong for the doctrinaires?  Or were the Whig statesmen warned off 
from the attempt by the failure of the written Constitutions of the Commonwealth and 
the Protectorate?  Be the reason what it may, the attempt was not made.  The 
opportunity which French or American statesmen would undoubtedly have seized was 
ignored by the enlightened men who, at one of the most critical moments in her history, 
guided the destinies of England.  All that the occasion actually demanded was included 
in the two great documents of the period: the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement; 
but not a line more than was required to meet the emergency of the moment.  The 
illegal and arbitrary acts of James II were recited and condemned: the suspending 
power and the dispensing power 'as it hath been assumed and exercised of late’, the 
Court of High Commission and similar courts, the levying of taxes and the maintenance 
of a standing army without consent of Parliament, were declared illegal; the rights of 
free speech, freedom of election, and of petition were affirmed, and provision was 
made for the settlement of the Crown on Protestant princes.  No more.  The way was 
left open, in effect if not by design, for the development of the Constitution on such 
lines as further experience might dictate.  
 
The Apogee of Parliamentary Democracy. 
The problem of Sovereignty was solved, the relations of Legislature and Executive 
defined, with unexpected promptitude; Scotland was brought into a legislative union 
within a few years; but it was more an a century before any attempt was made to 
broaden the basis of the electorate or to redistribute the electoral constituencies with 
some regard to the changes in the distribution of population and wealth; the penal laws 
were not formally [begin page 194] repealed nor were Dissenters or Roman Catholics or 
Jews admitted to full civil rights until well on in the nineteenth century; there was no 
legal readjustment of the relations of the two legislative Chambers until the twentieth.  
The processes of political evolution cannot be hurried; conventions need time to 
establish their validity; but the result has thus far been regarded with justifiable 
complacency by ourselves, and for the most part with admiration if not with envy by 
competent observers in other lands.  
 
‘Many persons in whom familiarity has bred contempt, may think it a trivial 
observation that the British Constitution, if not (as some call it) a holy thing, 
is a thing unique and remarkable.  A series of undesigned changes brought it 
to such a condition, that satisfaction and impatience, the two great sources 
of political conduct, were both reasonably gratified under it.  For this 
condition it became, not metaphorically but literally, the envy of the world, 
and the world took on all sides to copying it.'  
 
Apologists and Eulogists. 
It is a full generation since Sir Henry Maine wrote these words.  At the time they were 
written (1885) no man questioned their literal accuracy.  For two hundred years after 
the Revolution of 1688 the English Constitution, despite all its baffling indistinctness of outline and all its perplexing anomalies of structure, afforded a model for political 
architects throughout a considerable portion of the civilized world.  In most modern 
Constitutions there is an attempt to reproduce those features which were deemed to 
have given strength and stability to government in England: a Chief of the State, 
whether hereditary or elected, but in either case technically irresponsible and raised 
above the turmoil of political strife; a bicameral Legislature, and an Executive 
responsible thereto.  By all native eulogists from Milton to Burke, from Burke to 
Bagehot, from Bagehot to Maine, the genius of the English Constitution has been held 
to consist primarily in the exquisite proportion, the 'nice equipoise' of its various parts; 
in the interaction and counteraction of the checks [begin page 195] and balances of a 
'mixed constitution'.  Foreign observers like Montesquieu and Bout my have re-echoed 
the eulogy and reaffirmed the explanation. 
  
Is the Zenith Passed? 
Is the judgement of the world equally eulogistic today?  Do Englishmen themselves 
preserve the simple faith professed by Milton and Maine?  Or has the perfect balance 
been lost?  Was the constitutional zenith passed before the close of the nineteenth 
century?  It was the deliberate judgement of Mr. Lecky, philosopher-historian, that the 
world has never 'seen a better Constitution than England enjoyed between the Reform 
Bill of 1832 and the Reform Bill of 1867'.
13  Mr. Gladstone would seem to have shared 
this opinion: 'As a whole', he wrote in 1877, our level of public principle and public 
action were at their zenith in the twenty years or so which succeeded the Reform Act of 
1832.'
14  Will later generations subscribe to these judgements or will their expression 
be ascribed to the waning enthusiasm that waits upon advancing years?  Be this as It 
may - and the questions will recur - it is a fact not without significance that, alike among 
- foreign observers and native commentators, there has been of late a marked change 
of tone and emphasis.  The points selected for eulogy are not those which evoked 
enthusiasm from Bagehot and the generation which sat at his feet; doubts are plainly 
hinted; reservations cautiously made. 
 
Federalism. 
Is the remarkable extension of the federal principle during the last half century in part 
responsible for some change of tone?  Such guidance as England could offer was pre-
eminently adopted to States organized upon her own unitarian lines.  The 
complications of the Federal State have raised other problems and made fresh 
demands upon the ingenuity of Constitutional architects.  Thus the Judiciary, as we 
have seen, has assumed an importance co-ordinate with that of the Legislature.  
 
Weltpolitik. 
Has the extension of the sphere of foreign policy, the [begin page 196] development of 
Weltpolitik, produced parallel results?  Has the balance between the legislative and the 
executive functions been affected by the demand for a 'strong Executive’?  
 
Has the rapid emergence of economic and social problems, vital and insistent, tended 
to overshadow if not to obliterate the significance attaching to governmental forms and 
constitutional machinery?  
 
These are pertinent questions, but the attempt to answer them must be postponed.  
 
The present chapter has been concerned exclusively with the evolution of 
parliamentary democracy in Great Britain; it remains to show how the principles of 
                                                  
13   [195/1]  Democracy and Liberty, i. 18.  
14   [195/2]  Nineteenth Century, November 1877. Government first enunciated here have been applied to the young communities of 
British blood beyond the seas. 
 VIII. 
The Evolution of Colonial Self-Government  
 
‘Regere imperio populos . . . pacisque imponere morem.' - Virgil.  
 
‘I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot govern an 
Empire.' - Pericles.  
 
‘The relation of a modern state to her highly developed colonies opens out a 
class of unprecedented facts demanding a class of political expedients 
equally unprecedented.' - Sheldon Amos.  
 
‘We are not now to consider the policy of establishing representative 
government in the North American Colonies.  That has been irrevocably 
done, and the experiment of depriving the people of their present 
constitutional power is not to be thought of.  To conduct the government 
harmoniously in accordance with its established principles is now the 
business of its rulers. . . . The Crown must. . . submit to the necessary 
consequence of representative institutions; and if it has to carry on the 
government in unison with a representative body it must consent to carry it 
on by means of those in whom that representative body has confidence.' - 
Lord Durham.  
 
We ought to look upon our colonies as integral portions of the British 
Empire, inhabited by men who ought to enjoy in their own localities all the 
rights and privileges that Englishmen do in England.' - Sir William 
Molesworth.  
 
The normal current of colonial history is perpetual assertion of the right to 
self-government.' - Sir Charles Adderley (afterwards Lord Norton) (1869).  
 
Parliamentary Democracy in the Dominions. 
In the course of the centuries England solved for herself the problem of self-
government.  She has not, however, kept the solution as a monopoly of the homeland, 
but has freely offered it to her children oversea.  All the British Dominions have now 
adopted, with such additions and modifications as their several circumstances 
appeared to require, the essential principles of parliamentary democracy.  Some non-
British Communities within the Empire have also, though more recently, put forward a 
claim that the same principles of government should be extended to them; but with 
these demands we are not immediately concerned.  The present chapter will trace the 
evolution of parliamentary democracy in the self-governing Dominions of the British 
Commonwealth.  [begin page 198] 
 
The main stages of evolution are common to all the Dominions.  Canada, however, was 
the first to attain to the full height of parliamentary democracy, as she was also the first 
British colony to adopt the principle of Federalism.  It will be convenient, therefore, in 
order to avoid tedious iteration, to illustrate the general law of constitutional 
development in the British Commonwealth by special reference to the particular case of 
Canada. 
 Stages in constitutional evolution. 
In their progress towards the goal of complete self-government the British Dominions 
have passed through the following stages:
1
 
1.   Military Government; 
2.   Crown Colony Administration; 
3.   Representative Government;  
4.   Responsible Government; 
5.   Federation or Union.  
 
When Canada passed, by conquest, into the hands of Great Britain in 1760 it was a 
colony of Frenchmen; its society was feudal in structure; the people were habituated to 
the French law of the ancien regime and adhered to the Church of their fathers. 
Subject, in fact, to the military governor sent out from France the immediate rulers of 
the people were the seigneurs and the priests.
2  
 
(i) The Regne Militaire in Canada. 
The first English rulers of Canada were, of course, soldiers, and their rule was 
confessedly admirable.  The period from 1760 to 1764 is known as that of the Regne 
militaire, but of martial law in the technical sense there is no trace.  The citizens of 
Montreal placed on record their gratitude to General Amherst, their conqueror and their 
first British Governor, who has 'behaved to us as a father rather than a conqueror'. 
 
The Peace of Paris, by which Canada was formally transferred to Great Britain, was 
signed in 1763, and in 1764 a Royal Proclamation was issued.  'So soon as the State 
and circumstances of the Colonies will admit thereof' the governors were to ‘summon 
and call general assemblies within the said [begin page 199] Governments respectively, 
in such manner and form as is used in those colonies and provinces in America which 
are under our immediate Government.' 
 
Fortunately, this Proclamation remained a dead letter and Canada continued to be 
governed much in the old manner to the satisfaction of the great mass of its 
inhabitants.  The total population at the time of the Peace of Paris was about 65,000.  
Nearly all these people were French in blood, in speech, and in tradition, and Catholic 
in creed.  After the Peace, however, a small knot of New England Puritans crossed the 
border and made mischief.  They numbered, in 1766, less than 500 all told, but they 
attempted, happily without success, to induce the English Governors, under the pretext 
of establishing' free institutions, to put the French colonists politically and 
ecclesiastically under their heels. 
 
(ii) The Quebec Act, 1774. 
Within ten years of the acquisition of Canada, and partly in consequence of it, Great 
Britain became involved in the quarrel with her own Colonies in North America.  To that 
quarrel English statesmen had no desire to add another with French Canada, and in 
1774 the Quebec Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament.  This singularly 
sagacious piece of legislation must be set down to the credit of the much-abused 
government of Lord North.  It had a twofold significance: on the one hand it secured the 
loyalty of French Canada at a moment of supreme crisis in the history of the Empire; on 
the other, it registered an important stage in the evolution of colonial self-government. 
 
The Quebec Act began by revoking the Proclamation of 1764 as 'inapplicable to the 
state and circumstances of the said province, the inhabitants whereof amounted at the 
conquest to about 65,000 persons professing the religion of the Church of Rome'.  To 
                                                  
1   [198/1]  There have, of course, been varieties of detail.  
2   [198/2]  Cf. Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada. that Church it proceeded to secure a recognized legal position.  The people, subject to 
the taking of a simple oath of allegiance, were to be protected in the exercise of their 
religion, and their clergy were to 'hold, receive, and enjoy their accus- [begin page 200] 
tomed rights and dues with respect to such persons only as shall profess the said 
religion'.  In civil cases French law was to be maintained; but in criminal cases English 
procedure was to be followed by reason of its certainty and lenity'.  Finally (and it is this 
which gives the Act its constitutional significance), a Legislative Council consisting of 
not less than seventeen nor more than twenty-three members was to be appointed by 
the Crown with power to make ordinances, but not to impose taxation.  The Act gave 
great umbrage to the New England Puritans, but corresponding satisfaction in Canada; 
and, largely as a result of it, French Canada, throughout all the troubles with the 
American Colonies, not only remained loyal to the British connexion, but co-operated 
heartily with the imperial troops in repelling American attacks on Canada. 
  
Quebec and Ontario. 
The recognition of American independence in 1783 opened a new epoch in the history 
of Canada, and led directly to a fresh constitutional development.  After the Peace of 
Versailles, large numbers of American loyalists to whom the independent States no 
longer afforded a home found their way over the borders into Canada.  Reinforced by 
emigrants from the mother-country they brought a new element into the political and 
social life of the colony.  The ultimate effect of the introduction of this new strain was in 
the highest degree stimulating and salutary; but the immediate consequences were not 
devoid of embarrassment.  Under one Governor and one Council; under one code of 
laws and one constitutional system, there were now combined two peoples - the one 
French in race and tradition and Roman Catholic in Creed; the other British in blood 
and Protestant in religion.  Before long acute friction arose between them.  Pitt realized 
the gravity of the situation, and in 1791 he introduced and passed into law the 
Constitutional Act.  
 
(iii) The Constitutional Act, 1791.  
The enactment of this statute marks the beginning of the third stage in the 
constitutional evolution of Canada.  The Regne militaire, virtually though not technically 
[begin page 201] prolonged until 1774, gave place to the administration of a Governor 
and nominated Council as prescribed by the Quebec Act.  The nominated Council was 
now to be superseded or rather to be supplemented by an elective House of 
Representatives. 
  
Under the Constitutional Act of 1791 Canada was divided into two Colonies: the one, 
Quebec, was to consist, speaking broadly, of French Roman Catholics; the other, 
Ottawa, of English Protestants.  In each Colony there was to be a Governor, assisted 
by an executive council and a bicameral legislature: a council of nominees and an 
elected House of Representatives.  In each colony land was set apart for the 
endowment of the dominant Church.  For a time all went well; Pitt's hopes were 
realized, and in the war of 1812 the Canadians of both races demonstrated their loyalty 
to Great Britain not less effectively than in the war of American independence. 
 
But in the eyes of men bred in English traditions, the Constitution of 1791 had one 
cardinal defect: the Legislature had no real control over the Executive.  Representative 
without Responsible Government was, in Charles Buller's striking phrase, like a fire 
without a chimney.  True, the makers of the Federal Constitution of the United States 
had set no store by the fruits of the victory won by their Puritan ancestors over the 
Stuart kings.  But the Canadians, French and English alike, regarded the matter 
differently, and It was this defect, combined with fiscal and ecclesiastical difficulties, 
which led to the breakdown of the Constitution of 1791. 
 In Lower Canada, in particular, there was ill the late thirties prolonged conflict between 
the Assembly and the Executive.
3, Having no influence in the choice of any public 
functionary , no power to procure the removal [begin page 202] of such as were 
obnoxious to it merely on political grounds, and seeing almost every office in the 
Colony filled by persons in whom it had no confidence,' the Assembly' had recourse to 
that ultima ratio of representative power to which the more prudent forbearance of the 
Crown has never driven the House of Commons in England, and endeavoured to 
disable the whole machinery of Government by a general refusal of the supplies'.
4  In 
Upper Canada the same root difficulty existed, but, not being complicated by racial 
differences, it presented itself in a less accentuated form.  
 
The Rebellions of 1837. 
Led by a young Frenchman, Louis J. Papineau, a vain and self-seeking rhetorician, the 
French party in Lower Canada raised the standard of independence (1837).  A party in 
Upper Canada led by William Lyon Mackenzie followed suit.  In both colonies the 
rebellion was ultimately suppressed without difficulty, but not before it had compelled 
the attention of the Home Government to the menacing condition of affairs in British 
North America.  Hitherto the English Ministry had been disposed to minimize its 
significance.  Early in 1838, however, they decided to suspend the Canadian 
Constitution and to send out Lord Durham as High Commissioner.  
 
Lord Durham’s Mission and Report. 
From a personal point of view Durham's mission to Canada was a fiasco; but the 
Report in which he embodied and his views of the problem and prescribed remedies for 
its solution is perhaps the most valuable state paper ever penned in reference to 
Colonial self-government.  Lord Durham recommended the union of the two Canadas; 
an increase in the numbers of the Legislative Councils; a Civil List for the support of the 
officials; a reform of municipal government, and, above all, the recognition of the 
principle of the responsibility of the Colonial Executive to the Colonial Legislature.  'We 
are not now to consider the policy of establishing representative Government in the 
North American Colonies.  That has been [begin page 203] irrevocably done. . . the 
Crown must consent to carry on the Government by means of those in whom the 
representative body has confidence.'
5   And again:  
 
‘The responsibility to the United Legislature of all officers of the 
Government, except the Governor and his Secretary, should be secured by 
every means known to the British Constitution.  The Governor. . . should be 
instructed that he must carry on his Government by heads of departments in 
whom the United Legislature shall repose confidence; and that he must look 
for no support from home in any contest with the legislature, except on 
points involving strictly Imperial interests.'
6  
 
Lord Durham's Report  is rightly regarded as the Magna Carta of Colonial self-
government.  The Home Government accepted, frankly and unreservedly, the 
principles it enunciated, and made it the basis of their policy.  But, unfortunately for 
himself, Durham was less circumspect in action than sagacious in counsel.  He had 
                                                  
3   [201/1]  It should be observed that Lord Durham does not lay exclusive emphasis 
on the constitutional difficulty. Cf., e.g., p. 16 (ed. Lucas), 'I expected to find a 
contest between a government and a people: I found two nations warring in the 
bosom of a single state: I found a struggle not of principles but of races.' 
4   [202/1]  Lord Durham.  Report on Canada, p. 81 pp. 73, 75, and 77. 
5   [203/1]  op. cit., p. 278.  
6   [203/2]  Ibid., p. 327.  hardly set foot in Canada (May 1838) before he outraged local feeling by the 
appointment of new and untried men to his Executive Council.  That there was 
something to be said for a fresh start, for a council 'free from the influence of all local 
cabals' is undeniable; and Charles Buller has said it well.
7  The proceeding was not in 
excess of the dictatorial powers with which Lord Durham was endowed; but that three 
out of four Councillors should be his own private Secretaries was regarded as an 
abuse of them.  Yet worse was to come.  On 28 June the Dictator issued an Ordinance, 
proclaiming an amnesty for all who had taken part in the late rebellion, with twenty-
three exceptions.  Of these, eight, who had pleaded guilty of high treason, were exiled 
to Bermuda, and fifteen others, including Papineau, who had fled from Canada, were 
forbidden to return to it on pain of death.  A loud outcry against these high-handed 
proceedings arose both in the Colony and at home.  The deportation of criminals to 
[begin page 204] Bermuda was illegal, and the Imperial Government, therefore, decided 
to disallow the Ordinance, though they accepted a Bill to indemnify the author of it.  
Lord Melbourne was aghast at Lord Durham's indiscretion.  'His conduct’, he wrote to 
the Queen, 'has been most unaccountable.  But to censure him now would either be to 
cause his resignation, which would produce great embarrassment, and might produce 
great evil, or to weaken his authority, which is evidently most undesirable'.
8  Durham 
was deeply hurt at the disallowance of the Ordinance, and in the Proclamation 
announcing its disallowance he justified his own conduct and censured that of the 
Ministry at home.  Having thus added to his original indiscretion he determined to 
resign.  On 1 November 1838 he left Canada, and on landing at Plymouth he boasted 
that he had 'effaced the remains of a disastrous rebellion'.  As a matter of fact there 
was some recrudescence of insurrection in both Provinces immediately after his 
departure, but Sir John Colborne suppressed it with the loss of forty-five British 
soldiers, killed and wounded. 
 
The Canadian Union Act, 1840. 
The Durham Report  was published in 1839, and the Government, both in 
administration and legislation, acted forthwith upon its recommendations.  To Poulett 
Thomson (Lord Sydenham), who succeeded Lord Durham as Governor, Lord John 
Russell wrote thus: 'Your Excellency . . . must be aware that there is no surer way of 
earning the approbation of the Queen than by maintaining the harmony of the 
Executive with the legislative authorities.'  In 1840 the Union Act was passed.  It 
provided for the union of Ontario and Quebec; for a parliament of two chambers; a 
Legislative Council of not fewer than twenty persons nominated by the Crown for life; 
and an elected House of Assembly in which each province was to be equally 
represented by forty-two members; and for a Civil List.  Of the responsibility of the 
Executive there was, curiously enough, no mention.  The [begin page 205] English 
practice was implicitly presupposed, but not until the governorship of Lord Elgin, 1847-
54, was the principle explicitly affirmed.  
 
Meanwhile Lord Durham's brilliant but erratic career had been closed in 1840 by death.  
Lord Melbourne declared that he 'was raised, one hardly knows how, into something of 
a factitious importance by his own extreme opinions, by the panegyrics of those who 
thought he would serve them as an instrument, and by the management of the Press'.  
The principal author of the Reform Bill of 1832 and of the Canadian Report 
9 of 1839, 
whatever his obvious failings, can hardly be so lightly dismissed.  
 
                                                  
7   [203/3]  See Bullers Sketch, op. cit., p. 343. 
8   [204/1]  Letters of Queen Victoria, i. 163. 
9   [205/1]  This is not the place for a discussion of the difficult question of the 
authorship of this Durham Report. 'Wakefield thought it, Buller wrote it, Durham 
signed it - ' represents one estimate. Cf. Reid's Lord Durham. An early Victorian statesman could hardly be expected to realize that the Durham 
mission to Canada-primarily suggested by a desire to be rid of an inconvenient 
colleague - would be accounted by posterity as the most significant single event in the 
two administrations of Lord Melbourne; but thus does the efflux of time alter the 
perspective and confound contemporary values. 
 
United Canada 
'The' first Parliament of United Canada met at Kingston United on 14 June 1841, but it 
was, as we have seen, some years Canada before the Canadian Constitution was 
infused with the spirit of the Durham Report.  To the successful working of the Cabinet 
system many things are essential; not least, organized and coherent parties. Lord 
Sydenham, habituated to the party system in England, was reduced to despair by the 
lack of it in Canada.  He found the House of Assembly 'split into half a dozen different 
parties, the Government having none and no one man to depend on'. 
 
‘Think of a House’, he wrote, 'where there is no one to defend the Government when 
attacked or to state the opinion and views of the Governor.'  Canada, it was plain, could 
not be initiated into all the mysteries of the Cabinet system without a period of 
apprenticeship.  Lord Sydenham was compelled himself to undertake the [begin page 
206] tuition; to act in the dual capacity of constitutional monarch and parliamentary 
Prime Minister.  In this exacting role he displayed both energy and tact, and at the end 
of two years he was able to report to Lord John Russell that the objects of his mission 
had been successfully accomplished.  'The union of the two Canadas is fully perfected, 
and the measures incidental to that great change have been successfully carried into 
effect. . . and the future harmonious working of the Constitution is, I have every reason 
to believe, secured.'  
 
Responsible Government. 
Lord Sydenham unquestionably achieved a great personal success, but his 
complacency as to the Constitution was premature.  After his sudden death in 1841 
there was a period of parliamentary turmoil which was temporarily stilled by the 
concessions made to the 'opposition’ by Sir Charles Bagot (1841-3), but blazed up 
again under Bagot's successor, Lord Metcalfe.  Metcalfe, however, died prematurely in 
1846, and in 1847 was succeeded by Lord Elgin, who was sent out with specific orders 
to carry into effect, promptly and unreservedly, the policy recommended in the Report 
of his father-in-law, Lord Durham.  The new Governor was formally instructed by the 
Colonial Office' to act generally on the advice of the Executive Council, and to receive 
as members of that body those persons who might be pointed out to him as entitled to 
be so by their possessing the confidence of the Assembly'.  Thus was the central 
doctrine of Lord Durham's Report definitely and finally accepted as the ruling principle 
of Canadian Government.  Responsible Government was introduced into New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia in 1847, and four years later into Prince Edward Island.  It 
has since been extended to all the more important Colonies in the British Empire. 
 
The Problem 
Meanwhile, Canada entered upon a period of rapid Problem development, economic 
and social; yet, constitutionally, all was not well with her.  Not many years passed 
before it became obvious that neither the union of the two Canadas nor the attainment 
of responsible government [begin page 207] was destined to register the final stage in 
the constitutional evolution of British North America.  ‘Self-government' had been 
attained.  To all intents and purposes the subjects of the Crown in Canada were as 
‘free' as the subjects of the Crown in the United Kingdom.  That the concession was in 
itself wise no one will be disposed to deny.  ‘I cannot conceive', said Disraeli, speaking 
at the Crystal Palace in 1872, ‘how our distant colonies can have their affairs 
administered except by self-government.'  But ought the concession to have stood 
alone?  Was it not the part of prudent statesmanship to have taken the opportunity of readjusting the constitutional relations of the Empire as a whole?  Disraeli answered 
this question with an emphatic affirmative, in a passage which deserves to be rescued 
from oblivion:  
 
‘Self-government, in my opinion, when it was conceded ought to have been 
conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation.  It ought to 
have been accompanied with an imperial tariff, by securities for the people 
of England, for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged 
to the sovereign as their trustee, and by a military code which should have 
precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies 
should be defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for 
aid from the colonies themselves.  It ought, further, to have been 
accompanied by some representative council in the metropolis which would 
have brought the colonies into constant and continuous relations with the 
home Government.  All this, however, was omitted because those who 
advised that policy - and I believe their convictions were sincere - looked 
upon the colonies of England, looked even upon our connexion with India, 
as a burden on this country, viewing everything in a financial aspect, and 
totally passing by those moral and political considerations which make 




Centrifugal tendencies in Canada. 
Meanwhile, a constitutional change of the highest significance alike to Canada and to 
the Empire at large [begin page 208] had taken place in British North America.   
Responsible Government, clogged with the condition of union between the two 
Canadas, had been working none too well.  The fault lay indeed rather with the 
principle of union than with that of a parliamentary Executive.  For the infelicity of the 
union two causes were mainly responsible.  On the one hand, there was obviously 
much in common between the disunited British Colonies: Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward Island; and more particularly between New Brunswick and Upper 
Canada; on the other hand, there were many elements of disunion between the united 
Colonies of Upper and Lower Canada.  The latter were as a candid historian puts it 
'obviously ill-matched yokefellows’.
11  Lord Durham had perceived; the fact twenty 
years earlier.  But he found in it an argument not for federation but for union.  'The 
French"; wrote Lord Durham, 'remain an old and stationary Society in a new and 
progressive world.  In all essentials they are still French; but French in every respect, 
dissimilar to those of France in the present day.  They resemble rather the French of 
the Provinces under the old regime'.
12  But while Quebec was rigidly conservative, not 
to say reactionary, Ontario was, both in apolitical and economic sense, eminently 
progressive.  Ontario was anxious to attract population; the French Canadians, though 
themselves prolific, were fearful of losing their identity, and discouraged immigration.  
Consequently the balance of population between the two Provinces rapidly shifted.   
Quebec in 1841 numbered 691,000 people, Ontario could claim only 465,000; by 1861 
the latter had increased to 1,396,000; the former only to 1,111,000.
13  Race, religion, 
and tradition all combined to keep apart two peoples who had never really united.  
 
                                                  
10   [207/1]  Speeches of Lord Beaconsfield, ed. Kebbel, .vol. ii, pp. 530-1. 
11   [208/1]  Greswell, Canada, p. 194. 
12   [208/2]  Durham, Report, vol. ii, p. 31 (ed. 1912, Clarendon Press). 
13   [208/3]  Greswell, op. cit., p. 194. The Maritime Provinces 
Among the Maritime Provinces there was, on the contrary, a strong movement towards 
closer union, and [begin page 209] in 1864 the legislatures of Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, and New Brunswick agreed to hold a Convention for the purpose of 
discussing the project.  Meanwhile, in Canada, a constitutional deadlock had been 
solved only by the formation in June 1864 of a coalition Ministry pledged 'to address 
itself in the most earnest manner to the negotiation for a confederation of all the British 
North American Provinces'.  In pursuance of this pledge the Canadian Government 
sought and obtained permission to send delegates to the Convention called by the 
Maritime Provinces. 
 
Project of Federation. 
The Convention met at Charlottetown on 1 September.  The project of the larger 
federation rapidly took shape, and, in October, a second Convention assembled at 
Quebec.  Before the month was out the Delegates had agreed upon seventy-two 
resolutions, which formed the basis of the subsequent Act of Federation.
14  Alexander 
Gait, George Brown, and George Etienne Cartier must share with John A. Macdonald 
the credit of this remarkable achievement; but to Macdonald it belongs in pre-eminent 
degree.  He himself would have preferred to go even farther; believing that 'if we could 
agree to have one Government and one Parliament, legislating for the whole of these 
peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest 
system of Government we could adopt'.  But he realized that his own ideal was 
unattainable.  Neither Lower Canada nor the Maritime Provinces were willing to 
surrender their individuality; they were prepared for union but not for unity, and 
Macdonald expressed his belief that in the Resolutions they had 'hit upon the happy 
medium and had devised a scheme which would give them' the strength of a legislative 
Union, and the sectional freedom of a Federal Union, with protection to local interests.  
Many difficulties were encountered, many jealousies had to be appeased, but the 
scheme was eventually [begin page 210] approved by the two Canadas, Nova Scotia, 
and New Brunswick.  In December 1866 delegates from these Colonies met under the 
Presidency of Lord Carnarvon - then Colonial Secretary - in London.  A Bill embodying 
the details agreed upon in this Conference was submitted to the Imperial Parliament; 
on 29 March 1867 the British North America Act received the Royal Assent; and on 1 
July of the same year it came into operation.  
 
The details of the new Constitution thus enacted for British North America will, later on, 
demand close scrutiny.  Before proceeding to that analysis it may, however, be 
convenient to take a rapid survey of the main stages by which the other Dominions 
reached a similar point of development.  The stages are so closely parallel with those 




New South Wales, the parent of most of the Australian Colonies, was rediscovered by 
Cook in 1770.  But for the loss of the original thirteen colonies in America Cook's 
discovery might have been neglected for years; but after 1783 the Carolinas refused, 
very naturally, to receive English convicts any longer, and in 1787 the British 
Government decided to utilize New South Wales as a penal settlement.  For thirty 
years it was little else; but in 1813 the pressure of drought led to the exploration of the 
Blue Mountains.  It was discovered that New South Wales offered incomparable 
facilities for sheep grazing, and in 1821 the colony was opened to free immigrants.  For 
a time the Free Settlers and the 'Emancipists’ lived side by side; but in 1840 the 
transportation of convicts was forbidden by an Order-in-Council, and New South Wales 
was quickly transformed from a penal settlement into a land of freemen. 
                                                  
14   [209/1]  Cf. Egerton, Federations and Unions in the British Empire, pp. 27 seq.  
This change, combined with the fact that in the same year Canada was endowed with 
the privilege of responsible government, naturally aroused a desire for a change of 
system in Australia.  Hitherto the Colony had been governed under strict military law, 
and even so the task [begin page 211] of government, as may be imagined, was difficult 
enough.  But in 1842 a Legislative Council, consisting of twelve nominated and twenty-
four elected members, was established.  This did not long satisfy the aspirations 
stimulated by the example of Canada, and in 1850 an Act was passed by the Imperial 
Parliament which gave to the several Australian Colonies general powers to settle for 
themselves the exact form of their Constitutions.  They quickly acted on the permission, 
and in this way the parent colony of New South Wales, with its offshoots Victoria, 
Tasmania, and South Australia, attained in 1855 to the dignity of responsible 
government.  Queensland, another offshoot of New South Wales, was entrusted with 
responsible government from its first establishment as an independent colony in 1859.  
New Zealand attained to the same dignity in 1856, and Western Australia in 1890.  In 
each of these colonies there is now a Governor, representing the Crown, a Legislature 
of two Houses, and a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature.  In New South Wales and 
Queensland, as well as in New Zealand, members of the Second Chamber or 
Legislative Council are nominated for life by the Governor, virtually by the Ministry, 
without limit of numbers.
15  In the other colonies they are elected. 
 
South Africa.  
In the Australasian Colonies the problem of self-government, thanks to the racial 
homogeneity of the white population, presented fewer difficulties even than in Canada.  
In South Africa it was vastly more complicated.  
 
Of the South African Colonies, the original nucleus was the Cape Colony.  Had James I 
been less timid and the English East India Company more amply endowed, the Cape 
Colony might have been a British possession from the first.  Occupied by two 
adventurous Englishmen in 1620, it was declined by James I, and in 1652 was 
occupied by the Dutch East India Company, which administered it from Batavia until the 
close of the eighteenth century.  When, in 1795 the United Netherlands was conquered 
by [begin page 212] France, the Dutch Stadtholder begged the English Government to 
occupy the Cape Colony.  The Government complied, but on the conclusion of peace 
(1802) handed the colony back to the Batavian Republic.  Reoccupied in 1806, it was 
retained by England until the conclusion of peace in 1814, when it was purchased from 
the Netherlands for £6,000,000 sterling and formally annexed by Great Britain. 
 
The white inhabitants were, however, predominantly Dutch, and not until after 1820 
was there any considerable English immigration.  Between the English immigrants and 
the Dutch inhabitants friction quickly ensued, and in 1836-40 large numbers of the 
Dutch farmers trekked into the lands north of the Orange River and the Vaal, and thus 
there came into existence the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. 
 
Meanwhile in 1824 a handful of English colonists established themselves at Port Natal, 
and after many vicissitudes Natal was finally proclaimed to be a British colony in 1843.  
Until 1856 It formed part of Cape Colony, but in that year it was established as an 
independent colony, and in 1893 attained to the dignity of ‘responsible’ government.  
Cape Colony had reached the same stage in 1872.  The Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State, having been finally annexed by Great Britain in 1902, were endowed with 
responsible government in 1906 and 1907 respectively. 
 
                                                  
15    [211/1]  In Queensland the Second Chamber - the Legislative Council- was 
abolished in 1922. Dominions and Colonies. 
Such, in brief outline, was the process by which the Oversea Dominions attained to 
'responsible' government.  Thus far self-government in the full sense has been attained 
only by the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the six States now united in the 
Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the four colonies now merged in the 
Union of South Africa.  Other colonies such as Bermuda and Barbados are in the 
intermediate stage, possessing an elective Legislature without a responsible Executive.  
This system, though useful as a temporary and disciplinary device, is full of pitfalls and 
[begin page 213] tends neither to harmony between the Governor, responsible to 
Whitehall, and the Legislature, responsible to a local electorate; nor to goodwill 
between the Colonial and the Imperial Government.  This intermediate type is apt, 
therefore, either, as in the case of the Dominions, to develop by a natural evolutionary 
process into the higher form of 'responsible' government, or to give place, as in 
Jamaica, to Crown Colony administration, that is, to the autocratic rule of the Colonial 
Office in Whitehall. 
 
Self-Government not identical with independence.  
The 'responsibility' even of the self-governing Dominions is not, however, without 
limitations.  Virtually complete as regards internal government and domestic 
administration, it does not extend to the control of external relations or to the conduct of 
foreign affairs.  Nor does self-government imply entire independence of the Imperial 
Parliament, still less of the Imperial Executive, nor even of the Imperial Judicature. 
 
Constitutional links between the Imperial Government and the Colonies. 
On the contrary the King-in-Parliament is legally Sovereign not only in the United 
Kingdom but throughout the Empire.  In theory, Parliament is competent to legislate for 
Canada or New Zealand precisely as it can for Jamaica, Scotland, or Wales.  In 
practice it does legislate to a considerable extent to secure objects which are common 
to the Empire as a whole, but which are beyond the competence of any given Colonial 
Legislature.  A long series of Acts relating to merchant shipping affords a good instance 
of this.  The Imperial Parliament, again, is a constituent Legislature for the Empire; the 
existing Constitutions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa are (i) Legis- all based 
upon the Statute Law of the United Kingdom. 
 
(i) Legislation 
Or, again, the Imperial Parliament intervenes to validate doubtful Acts passed by 
Colonial Legislatures.
16  The legislative authority of the Imperial Parliament is, 
therefore, a reality, albeit within a limited sphere. 
  
Nor is the Crown, acting, of course, on the advice of the Secretary of State, bereft of all 
power in regard to the domestic legislation even of the self-governing Dominions.  
[begin page 214] 
 
The supremacy of the Crown is exercised in several ways.  Of these, two are 
particularly important: the King may veto or disallow any Act passed by a Colonial 
Legislature, even though it has received the assent of his representative - the 
Governor; or he may instruct the Governor to reserve for the Royal considerations 
Statutes passed by the Colonial Legislatures.  Such intervention naturally tends to 
become rarer, but between 1836 and 1864 no fewer than 341 Bills were, under Royal 
instructions, reserved for the consideration of the Crown in the North American 
Colonies alone, and, of these, 47 never received the Royal Assent.
17  
 
                                                  
16   [213/1]  Cf. on this subject Keith, Responsible Government, pp, 176-221. 
17   [214/1]  Keith, op cit. , p. 3.  The right of reservation was expressly recognized in the Acts or Ordinances which 
established 'responsible’ government in the six Australian Colonies, in New Zealand, 
and in the South African Colonies; and it reappears in the Act for the Union of South 
Africa as it did in the British North America Act.  The terms of the Australian 
Commonwealth Act are less explicit on the subject; but in the Commonwealth, as 
elsewhere, the right of the Crown is unquestioned.  
 
As a method of procedure, reservation is plainly preferable to disallowance, but the 
latter power is expressly conferred upon the Crown in the British North America Act, the 
Commonwealth of Australia Act, and in the Constitutions of New Zealand, the six 
Australian States, and the Union of South Africa.
18  
 
The control of the Crown over legislation is exercised mainly in relation to such matters 
as the treatment of native races; the immigration of coloured peoples; treaty relations; 
trade and currency; merchant shipping; copyright; divorce and status; military and 
naval defence; questions affecting the interests of British subjects not resident in the 
Dominions, and all matters affecting the prerogative of the Crown.
19  
[begin page 215] 
 
(ii) Domestic Administration. 
As regards domestic administration in the Dominions, the control of the Crown, 
exercised through the Governor, is of the slightest, though it has been occasionally 
exerted, on Imperial grounds, as for instance when Sir William MacGregor was 
compelled in 1907 to take steps for the publication of the Imperial Order-in-Council in 
regard to the fisheries in Newfoundland, despite the refusal of his Prime Minister to 
publish it. 
 
(iii) External Affairs  
In the domain of foreign policy the Crown occupies a position of supreme and sole 
authority.  The part affairs played by the Dominions in the world-war and their 
participation in the negotiations for peace may necessitate a modification of this 
statement in the near future.  The problems raised by recent events will, however, be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter;
20 for the present it must suffice to lay down certain 
broad propositions, the technical validity of which is not in question. 
  
The right of declaring war and of concluding peace is vested in the Crown, and is 
exercised by the Crown for the Empire as a whole, and for every portion of it.  No 
Dominion or other unit within the Empire could declare its neutrality in a war made by 
or against Great Britain, nor contract out of the liabilities or obligations entailed by such 
a war.  How far, if at all, any particular Dominion should or should not actively 
participate in the war, and the extent of its contribution in men or money, are in practice 
matters within its own control.  Still, as regards war and peace, the Empire is a unity, 
speaking with one voice and acting as a single whole.
21  
 
                                                  
18   [214/2]   Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, ii. 1018-19. and on. 
the whole subject of, the same admirable work, vol, ii, Part V. passim.. 
19   [214/3]  Ibid, ii. 1020. 
20   [215/1]  Infra, cc. xi and xii. 
21   [215/2]  In view of the fact (cf. infra, cc. xi and xii) that the signature of the 
Dominion Representative was attached to the Treaty of Versailles in a dual 
capacity, this statement may be questioned. Treaty Making Power. 
The position of the Dominions in regard to the treaty-making power is less free from 
ambiguity.  Even political treaties, much more commercial treaties, are on the border 
line between Executive and Legislative Acts, since their execution frequently, though 
not invariably, involves legislation.  But though the position as regards treaties [begin 
page 216] is in detail both difficult and delicate, certain broad propositions may with 
some assurance be laid down. 
 
The making of treaties with foreign States is an absolute prerogative of the Imperial 
Crown.  'There is', says Dr. Keith, ‘no case yet known in which any treaty proper has 
been made without the consent of the Imperial Government.'  Nor is it open to doubt 
that treaties made by the Crown are technically binding upon the Colonies whether or 
not the Colonies assent to them.  At the same time the convention is now established 
that, as far as possible, no treaty obligations shall be imposed on any self-governing 
Dominion without its own assent. 
 
This question was raised in an acute form so far back as 1885.  The recent activity of 
Germany in the Pacific, and the acquiescence of the Imperial Government in the 
annexation of parts of New Guinea and the Samoan islands by the latest comer in the 
Colonial field, aroused alarm in Australia and New Zealand.  Mr. (afterwards Sir James) 
Service, at that time Premier of Victoria, gave vigorous expression to the feelings 
aroused by the complaisant policy of the Home Government.  He pointed to ‘the very 
anomalous position which these colonies occupy as regards respectively local 
government and the exercise of Imperial authority'; he argued, not unreasonably, that 
‘the weakness of this position has at times been most disadvantageously apparent and 
its humiliation keenly felt’, and he insisted that Colonial interests were sufficiently 
important to entitle the Colonies 'to some defined position in the Imperial Economy'.  
 
Echoes of this unfortunate controversy were not unnaturally heard when, for the first 
time, a Colonial Conference assembled in London in 1887.  The Conference of 1902 
went beyond the point of criticism and cautiously but distinctly affirmed the principle 
that the Colonies had aright to be consulted in regard to the terms of treaties in which 
they were specially concerned, if not technically to co-operate in the conclusion of 
those treaties.  A resolution was indeed actually accepted that ‘so far as may be [begin 
page 217] consistent with the confidential negotiation of treaties with foreign Powers, 
the views of the Colonies affected should be obtained in order that they may be in a 
better position to give adhesion to such treaties'.  
 
The difficulty was not, however, satisfactorily solved, and the proceedings of the 
Conference of 1907 were chiefly memorable for Mr. Deakin's grave indictment of the 
policy pursued by the Imperial Government in regard to Pacific problems.  With curious 
indifference to Colonial sentiment the Imperial Government had, in 1906, concluded a 
Convention with France in reference to the New Hebrides.  The people of Australia and 
New Zealand held the view, and strongly expressed it, that but for the ‘inaction' of the 
Home Government the difficulty should never have arisen, and consequently that it was 
for them to discover a solution acceptable to the Dominions. 
  
Similar protests have from time to time been made by the Dominion of Canada in 
reference to treaties concluded between the Imperial Government and the United 
States and France.  As a result, it has now become an established convention that, 
even in regard to political treaties, Dominion Governments shall be consulted wherever 
their interests are involved; though the rule remains absolute that the conclusion of 
such treaties is the absolute and exclusive prerogative of the Crown, acting on the 
advice of the Imperial Government. 
 Commercial treaties. 
Commercial treaties stand in a somewhat different category.  The right of the self-
governing Colonies to frame their own tariffs seemed to involve the right to conclude 
separate commercial agreements with foreign Powers.  A step in this direction was 
taken when in 1877 it was agreed that commercial treaties, concluded by the Imperial 
Government, should not be automatically applicable to the self-governing Colonies, but 
that the latter should be given the option of adhering to them within a specified period.  
In 1884 a further stage was reached: Sir Charles Tupper, as High Commissioner, 
obtained for Canada the right to negotiate commercial [begin page 218] treaties with 
Spain,
22 and in 1893 he signed, along with Her Majesty's representative, a treaty which 
he had himself negotiated with France.
23  The principle, however, was carefully 
preserved that by whomsoever the negotiations are conducted the diplomatic 
representative of the Imperial Government must be the plenipotentiary for the signature 
of the treaty, even though a representative of the Colonial Government concerned be 
associated with him.  
 
‘To give the Colonies the power of negotiating treaties for themselves 
without reference to Her Majesty's Government would be to give them an 
international status as separate and Sovereign States and would be 
equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent States, a 
result which Her Majesty's Government are satisfied would be, injurious 




Thus did Lord Ripon, as Secretary of State, define, in 1895, the constitutional position.  
That position has never been explicitly questioned; but there has been, in the last 
twenty-five years, an increasing and not unnatural disposition on the part of individual 
Dominions, and in particular of Canada, to negotiate directly in commercial matters with 
foreign States.  Such, negotiations, issuing in ‘conventions’ and ‘agreements’ have not, 
however, contravened the principle affirmed in Lord Ripon's Dispatch, nor impugned 
the prerogative of the Crown. 
 
How far the new status claimed by and conceded to the Dominions in the Peace Treaty 
negotiations at Paris, and in the Covenant of the League of Nations, will necessitate a 
modification of the established principle is a serious question; but it must not at this 
stage detain us. 
  
Responsible Government not the final goal. 
The evolution of Colonial self-government was beyond question one of the most 
significant among the political [begin page 219] movements of the nineteenth century.  
But responsible government was not the final goal.  Seven States in British North 
America, seven in Australasia, four in South Africa - each entirely independent of the 
other, but each forming a unit in the great Sea-Commonwealth - this could not be the 
term of evolution.  The mid-Victorian statesmen, as we have seen, regarded 'self- 
government' as the prelude to independence.  In the Colonies themselves there was no 
such articulate ambition.  The problem of immediate interest to them was not how to 
achieve independence of the motherland, but how to attain some species of union 
between the units of the several groups, American, Australian, and African. 
 
                                                  
22   [218/1]  Tupper, Recollections, quoted ap, Duncan Hall, op. cit. p. 84. 
23   [218/2]  Keith, op cit., p. 1115. 
24   [218/3]  Cd. 7824, p. 15. In British North America.  
As regards North America, this statement of the problem requires some modification.  
The movement was indeed predominantly centripetal, but it was in part centrifugal.   
The Maritime Provinces desired union among themselves; they were anxious also to 
unite with Ontario and Quebec; but Ontario and Quebec were mainly anxious for the 
dissolution of the bond which had united them since 1840.  The progress of this 
complicated development has been already indicated. 
 
In Australia 
In Australia the problem was relatively simple.  Until the eighties the Australian 
Colonies had no such external incentive to unity as was afforded to British North 
America by the presence of a powerful and none too friendly neighbour.  But when the 
external stimulus was applied there were, as we shall see, fewer internal difficulties to 
be overcome, though there were not lacking the causes of friction common between 
kinsmen and neighbours. 
 
In South Africa. 
The racial homogeneity which was the outstanding characteristic of the Australian 
Colonies was conspicuously Africa absent in South Africa.  From the outset the 
relations between Boers and Britons left much to be desired, and time served only to 
embitter them.  But there was one impulse to union between them at once more 
persistent and more powerful than any which operated either [begin page 220] in 
Canada or in Australia; the two white races, even when combined, constituted a 
minority, numerically contemptible, in the face of the strong and warlike races native to 
South Africa.  Nor were other motives to union lacking.  
 
To a consideration of these matters we shall proceed in the next chapter. 
 IX. Colonial Federalism 
British North America and Australia  
 
The Canadian Constitution is from the federal point of view the best 
constitutional arrangement yet devised.' - F.S. Oliver. 
 
The English have perhaps been more fortunate in Australasia than in any 
other part of the globe.  They have here found a vast extent open for 
settlement, with a climate and geographical position well suited for the 
work: and though England had no right of prior discovery, and attempted no 
colonization in this quarter of the world till very recent years, she has been 
left to go her way unchecked by foreign interference or, except in New 
Zealand, by native wars, and has been allowed to develop this most valuable 
part of her empire in comparative quiet and peace.' - Sir C.P. Lucas 
 
The Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. . . is an adaptation of the 
principles of British and Colonial Government to the federal system.  Its 
language and ideas are drawn, partly from the model of all Governments of 
the British Constitution itself; partly from the Colonial Constitutions based 
on the British model; partly from the Federal Constitution of the United 
States of America; and partly from the Semi-federal Constitution of the 
Dominion of Canada; with such modifications as were suggested by the 
circumstances and needs of the Australian people.' - Quick and Garran .  
 
The British North America Act, 1867. 
As in the movement towards self-government, so in that towards federation, the 
colonies of British North America led the way.  The diverse causes which contributed to 
render those colonies dissatisfied with the unitary system devised in 1840 have been 
analysed in the preceding chapter, and we may, therefore, proceed to examine the 
constitutional provisions which were embodied in the British North America Act, 1867. 
 
The Act, which came into force on 1 July, opens with a preamble the wording of which 
has evoked the caustic criticism of a distinguished jurist.  'Whereas', it runs, ‘the 
Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to 
be federally united into one Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United 
Kingdom’, &c.  [begin page 222] 
 
Professor Dicey denounces the last words as an instance of 'official mendacity' and 
suggests that, in order to be accurate, the word States  should be substituted for 
Kingdom.
1  But the critic would seem, in this case, himself to be in error.  Plainly the 
'principle' to which reference is intended is not that of federalism but that of a 
parliamentary executive in regard to which the Canadian Constitution follows the 
example not of the United States  but of the United Kingdom.  The point is placed 
beyond doubt by a subsequent paragraph of the Preamble: ‘and whereas. . . it is 
expedient not only that the Constitution of the Legislative authority in the Dominion is 
provided for but also that the nature of the Executive Government therein be declared.  
. .’  These words render it clear that the intention of the Legislators was that the 
constitutional conventions, attained, after long centuries of evolution, in the unwritten 
                                                  
1   [222/1]  Law of the Constitution, 2nd ed., p. 153. constitution of the mother-country, should be presupposed in the statutory Instrument 
devised for the daughter-land. 
 
The Executive. 
The Executive power was 'to continue and be vested in the Queen, and in the heirs 
and successors of Her Majesty, Kings and Queens of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland’.  On this point Sir John Macdonald laid great stress.  'With the 
universal approval of the people of this country we have provided that for all time to 
come, so far as we can legislate for the future, we shall have as head of the Executive 
power the Sovereign of Great Britain.'  His hope was in this way to avoid one defect 
inherent in the Constitution of the United States.  By the election of the President by a 
majority and for a short period he never is the Sovereign and chief of the nation. . . . He 
is at best but the successful leader of a party. . . . I believe that it is of the utmost 
importance to have that principle recognized, so that we shall have a Sovereign who is 
placed above the region of party - to whom all parties look up - who is not elevated by 
the action of one party, nor depressed by the action of another, who is the common 
head and Sovereign of all.'  [begin page 223] 
 
 
The Sovereign of Great Britain was to be represented in the Dominion by a Governor-
General, who was to have the ordinary powers of a 'Constitutional' Sovereign in the 
English sense: the command-in-chief of the armed forces of the Crown, and the right to 
appoint and, if necessary, to remove the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces of the 
Dominion.  He was to be aided and advised by the Queen s Privy Council of Canada, 
and the instrument (§II) further provides that 'the persons who are to be members of 
that Council shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the Governor-
General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and members thereof may be from time to 
time removed by the Governor- General'.  It was clearly understood that this body was 
to be a Parliamentary Cabinet on the English model; homogeneous in composition, 
mutually responsible, politically dependent upon the Parliamentary majority, and acting 
in subordination to an acknowledged leader.  But though this was understood, and 
indeed implied, by the terms of the Preamble it was, in curious deference to English 
convention, not specifically set forth in the Constitution.  There was not even a 
provision, as there is in the Australian Commonwealth Act, that the members of the 
Privy Council should be members of the Legislature.  The number of the Dominion 
Cabinet has varied with the growth of new administrative departments, and now
2 
consists of nineteen members: a Premier-President of the Cabinet; a Secretary of 
State, a Postmaster-General, an Attorney-General, fourteen Ministerial heads of public 
departments, such as Trade and Commerce, Justice, Finance, Railways, Labour, 
Militia, and Defence, and two Ministers without portfolio. 
 
In the working of the Cabinet-system in Canada the English customs and conventions 
have in the main been followed with curious fidelity.  The Governor occupies a position 
as closely parallel as circumstances permit with that of the Crown.  Lacking the 
prestige of an [begin page 224] hereditary Sovereign and bereft of the historic 
environment of a Court, a Dominion Governor may, and not infrequently does, exercise 
a real influence not merely upon social but upon political life.  Some years ago Mr. 
Goldwin Smith was moved to write: 'A Governor is now politically a cipher, he holds a 
petty court and bids champagne flow under his roof, receives civic addresses and 
makes flattering replies, but he has lost all power not only of initiation but of salutary 
control.'  But Mr. Goldwin Smith's powerful pen was admittedly dipped in gall, especially 
when he dealt with the affairs of his immediate neighbours.  In the case of a Colonial 
Governor, as indeed of an hereditary Sovereign, much must necessarily depend upon 
political experience and individual personality, but a Governor possesses and, if tactful, 
                                                  
2   [223/1] 1925. is permitted to exercise in political affairs the same sort of power as the Sovereign 
whom he represents.  
 
Thus the adoption of the federal principle in Canada did not affect the formal position of 
the Executive, which was to remain strictly 'parliamentary'.  Nevertheless the 
Constitution of 1867 is of peculiar interest to the student of Comparative Politics as 
representing the first attempt to combine the Cabinet-principle with that of federalism, 
The Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth is in this respect even more 
interesting than that of Canada, since the Canadian Constitution is in several respects 
less genuinely federal than that of Australia. 
  
In neither case, perhaps, has the experience been sufficient to justify any positive 
conclusion as to the compatibility of the two principles.  Whether a parliamentary 
executive, the successful working of which depends almost wholly upon precedent 
custom and convention, can, permanently co-exist with a federal constitution which is 
necessarily written and rigid, is a question which it were premature to attempt to 
answer, It must for the present suffice to say that the experiment has succeeded 
beyond reasonable expectation in Canada, and has by no means failed in Australia.  
[begin page 225]  
 
The Legislature. 
Legislative power was vested in a Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an 
Upper House or Senate, and a House of Commons.  The Governor-General was 
authorized to assent in the Queen's name to Bills presented to him in the two Houses, 
or to withhold the Queen's assent, or to reserve the Bill for the signification of the 
Queen's pleasure.  Bills to which the Governor-General had assented might be 
disallowed by the Queen, by Order-in-Council, at any time within two years after the 
receipt of an 'authentic copy of the Act' by the Secretary of State, Bills reserved for the 
Queen's pleasure were not to come into force unless and until, within two years from 
the day on which they were presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's Assent, 
the Governor-General signified, by Speech or Message to each of the Houses of the 
Parliament or by Proclamation, that they had received the Assent of the Queen-in-
Council.
3 That such reservation was no mere form is clear from the fact that between 




The Federal Parliament, like the Union Parliament established in 1840, was to consist 
of two chambers.  Under the Union Act the Second Chamber or Legislative Council 
was to consist of not fewer than twenty persons nominated by the Crown for life.  But 
the nominated Second Chamber was not a success, and in deference to an agitation, 
more or less persistent, it was decided, in 1856, to abandon the nominee system.  The 
existing members of the Council were to be left undisturbed, but vacancies as they 
occurred were to be filled by election.  The Province was divided into forty-eight 
electoral areas, Ontario and Quebec each returning twenty-four members.  The 
electors were to be the same as those for the House of Commons, but the electoral 
areas were to be larger; the term of service was to be eight years instead of four, and 
[begin page 226] elections were to be held biennially-twelve Senators being elected at a 
time.  Lord Elgin expressed the opinion that ‘a second legislative body returned by the 
same constituency as the House of Assembly, under some differences with respect to 
time and mode of election, would be a greater check on ill considered legislation than 
                                                  
3   [225/1] British North America Act (1867), iv. 56, 57. 
4    [225/2]  Cf. Egerton, Federations, &c., p. 137. After 1877 the practice was 
altered.  For reasons see Can. Sess. Papers, 1877. No. 13, (cited by. Egerton). the Council as it was then constituted'.
5  Lord Elgin's anticipations were not fulfilled.  




The Federal Act of 1867 reverted to the principle of nomination.  The Senate, as then 
constituted, was to consist of seventy-two members, and was, like that of the United 
States, to embody and emphasize the Federal idea.  Quebec, Ontario, and the 
Maritime Provinces, (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) were to be equally: represented 
in the Senate, twenty-four members being nominated from each.  But in subsequent 
amendments this principle has not been maintained.  An Act of the Imperial Legislature, 
in 1871, authorized the Dominion Parliament to provide for the due representation in 
the Senate of any Provinces subsequently admitted to the Federation.  Under these 
powers four Senators each have been assigned to Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and British Columbia.  The Act of 1867 provided (§ 147) that Prince Edward Island, if it 
elected to join the Federation, should have four Senators, but in this event the 
senatorial representation of the other Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, was to be automatically reduced to ten each.  The contemplated event 
having since occurred, the Senate now consists of ninety-six members apportioned to 
the several provinces in accordance with the Acts enumerated above. 
  
Subject to this apportionment, Senators were to be nominated for life by the Governor-
General-in practice  [begin page 227] on the advice of his responsible Ministers.  A 
Senator was to be 
 
(a)   of the full age of thirty years; 
(b)   a British subject; 
(c)   a resident in the Province for which he was appointed; and 
(d)   possessed of real property of the net value of not less than four 
thousand dollars within the Province. 
 
He may at any time, and under certain contingencies must, resign his seat.  
 
No direct provision was made in the Act for a deadlock between the two Houses, but 
power was given to the Crown to nominate three or six additional Senators, 
representing equally the three divisions of Canada.  In 1873 the Canadian Cabinet 
advised the exercise of this power, but the Imperial Government refused to sanction it, 
on the ground that it was not desirable for the Queen to interfere with the Constitution 
of the Senate, 'except upon an occasion when it had been made apparent that a 
difference had arisen between the two Houses of so serious and permanent a 
character that the Government could not be carried on without her intervention, and 
when it could be shown that the limited creation of Senators allowed by the Act would 
apply an adequate remedy.'
7  
 
It will be observed that the Canadian Senate attempts to combine several principles 
which, if not absolutely contradictory, are clearly distinct.  Consequently it has never 
possessed either the glamour of an aristocratic and hereditary chamber, or the strength 
of an elected assembly, or the utility of a Senate representing the federal as opposed to 
the national idea.  Devised with the notion of giving some sort of representation to 
provincial interests, it has, from the first, been manipulated by party leaders to sub 
serve the interests of the central Executive. 
  
                                                  
5   [226/1]  Quoted by Goldwin Smith, Canada and The Canadian Question, p.164.  
6   [226/2]  Cf. J.A.R. Marriott, Second Chambers, pp. 137 seq. 
7   [227/1]  Canadian Sess. Papers, 1877 No. 68, ap. Egerton, p. 129. The House of Commons. 
The House of Commons was to consist of 181 members: 82 being assigned to Ontario, 
65 to Quebec, 19 to Nova Scotia, and 15 to New Brunswick.  Quebec was always to 
retain 65 members; the representation of the other Provinces was to be readjusted 
after each decennial census, [begin page 228] but in such a way that the representation 
of each Province should bear the same proportions to its population as 65 bears to that 
of Quebec.
8  The House of Commons was to sit for five years, and was to have the 
right of originating Money Bills, on the sole recommendation of the Executive.   
Otherwise the powers of the two Houses were to be co-ordinate. 
  
Provincial Constitutions. 
In each Province there was to be a Lieutenant-Governor appointed by the Governor- 
Genera and assisted by an Executive Council; the Legislature was to consist of two 
Houses in Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and one in Ontario.
9  Certain matters 
were specifically assigned to the Provincial Legislatures, but the residue of powers was 
vested in the Dominion Parliament.  This is a feature of primary importance, and it is 
one which differentiates the Canadian Constitution alike from that of the United States, 
and from that of the Australian Commonwealth.  In the latter it is the Federal authority 
to which certain special powers are delegated by the Constituent States, and any 
power which is not so delegated remains vested in the State.  The Canadian solution of 
this crucial problem is an interesting memorial to the historical circumstances under 
which the Constitution came to the birth.  Macdonald, as we have seen, and many of 
his more influential colleagues would have preferred a legislative union.  They were 
baffled by 'the centrifugal nationalism of Quebec'.
10  But, though accepting the 
inevitable, they were resolved to infuse into Canadian federalism as much of unitary 
cohesion as Quebec would tolerate. 
  
Growth of the Canadian Federation. 
The original constituent Provinces of the Dominion were, as already indicated, Quebec, 
Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, but provision was made in the Constitution 
for the admission of other Colonies or territories: in particular Newfoundland, Prince 
Edward [begin page 229] Island, and British Columbia.  Newfoundland has continued, in 
pride of birth, to stand aloof from her younger sisters,
11 but hardly had the British North 
America Act come into force (1 July 1867) when resolutions were adopted in the 
Dominion Parliament in favour of the union of Rupert's Land and the North-West 
Territory.  Before the Crown could give effect to these resolutions a preliminary 
arrangement had to be reached between the Dominion Government and the Hudson 
Bay Company.  The latter agreed, in consideration of the sum of £300,000 and certain 
reserved tracts of land, to surrender its territorial rights to the Crown, and by Order-in-
Council (23 June 1870) Rupert's Land and the North-West Territory were admitted to 
the Union.  In the same year the Province of Manitoba was carved out of the Territory, 
and was formally admitted a member of the Dominion, with representation according to 
population in the Canadian House of Commons, and three Senators in the Upper 
House.  These arrangements were confirmed by an Act of the Imperial Parliament
12 in 
1871, and by the same Act the right of the Dominion Parliament to establish provinces 
in new territories forming part of the Dominion was made clear.  A subsequent Act of 
                                                  
8   [228/1]  The number is now (1925) 245.  
9   [228/2]  All the Provincial Legislatures are now (1925) unicameral except those of 
Quebec and Nova Scotia. 
10   [228/3]  Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, p. 158. 
11    [229/1]  In 1895 Newfoundland made overtures for union but they were not 
accepted by the Dominion.  
12   [229/2]  34 & 35 Vict. C. 28. 1886
13 gave the Canadian Parliament power to provide representation in the Senate 
and House of Commons for territories not yet included in any province.
14  In 1905 two 
further provinces, those of Alberta and Saskatchewan, were carved out of the North-
West Territory, and were admitted with appropriate representation into the Dominion.  
Long before that, in 1871, British Columbia had taken advantage of the provision made 
in the Act of 1867 for its admission to the Dominion, and by Order-in-Council (16 May 
1871) its admission was formally ratified.  Prince Edward Island was similarly admitted 
in 1873.  
 
As yet, however, the Great Dominion was very loosely [begin page 230] compacted.  To 
real political union physical geography opposed in fact an effective barrier.  Between 
the maritime provinces on the Atlantic littoral and the maritime province which occupies 
the Pacific slope there intervened more than three thousand miles of territory, not to 
speak of a chain of mountains apparently insurmountable.  The engineer was 
consequently called in to complete the work of the legislator.  
 
The Canadian Pacific Railway. 
The Nothing less than the construction of a trans-continental railway could overcome 
the categorical negative of Nature.  Such a railway was indeed a condition of the union 
between Canada and British Columbia. 
 
‘The Government of the Dominion' so the agreement ran, ‘undertakes to secure the 
commencement simultaneously, within two years from the date of the union, of the 
construction of the railway from the Pacific towards the Rocky Mountains, and from 
such point as may be selected east of the Rocky Mountains towards the Pacific, to 
connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada; and 
further, to secure the completion of such railway within ten years from the date of such 
union.' 
 
The work of construction ought to have begun in 1873.  As a matter of fact various 
delays interposed, and it was not until 1880 that the great enterprise was actually 
initiated.  The contract stipulated that the work should be completed by 1891, but so 
rapid was the progress that it was finished in half that time, and the line was opened in 
1886. 
  
The Canadian Pacific Railway is from every point of view-political, economic, and 
strategic - of the highest significance, and deserves to rank among the most imposing 
imperial achievements of the century.  Its terminals are at Montreal and Vancouver 
respectively, its total length of line is 2,909 miles, or about half the distance which 
separates Liverpool from Vancouver.  Of the engineering difficulties encountered in its 
construction, some idea may be gleaned from the fact that it crosses the Rocky 
Mountains at an elevation of 5,560 feet.  It was the work of [begin page 231] private 
enterprise, but in order to expedite and encourage its construction the Dominion 
Government granted to the company a subsidy of £5,000,000, together with a land 
grant of 25,000,000 acres, and the privilege of permanent exemption from taxation.  No 
privilege could, however be too great for an enterprise of such high imperial 
significance.  To enable the farmers of Western Canada to feed the mill-hands of 
Lancashire and the miners of South Wales; to bring Liverpool within a fortnight of 
Vancouver; to unite in commercial and political bonds the Pacific slope and the Atlantic 
littoral - this was the purpose and this was the achievement of the Empire-builders who 
planned and constructed the Canadian t Pacific railroad.  Of the work of federation that 
railroad was at once the condition and the complement.  
 
                                                  
13   [229/3]  49 & 50 Vict. c. 35.  
14   [229/4]  Egerton, op. cit., p. 167. The Federal Commonwealth of Australia.  
From the achievement of a federal union in Canada to the history of the movement 
towards federation in Australia the transition is easy.  Not that the circumstances were 
parallel, or that the constitutions are by Australia any means identical.  The Canadian 
movement was, as we have seen, in part centripetal, in part centrifugal; the movement 
in Australia was wholly centripetal.  Canada was confronted with a racial problem; 
Australia is in almost unique degree racially homogeneous.  Between Canada and her 
powerful neighbour there is a land frontier, three thousand miles in length, in many 
parts indefensible and in some almost undefinable.  For the Canadian provinces union 
was an absolute condition of independent existence; in Australia it became a matter of 
high expediency, but only after the relatively recent advent into the Pacific of great 
European Powers.  
 
Earlier Schemes of Union. 
Yet to the prescient mind of Lord Grey, Secretary of Earlier State for the Colonies 
(1846-52),
15 the expediency of union between the several British Colonies in Australia 
became  [begin page 232] apparent as early as 1847, and in that year he drafted a 
scheme for a Federal Constitution.  
 
‘Considered as members of the same Empire, these [Australian] Colonies’, wrote Lord 
Grey, ‘have many common interests the regulation of which in some uniform manner 
and by some single authority may be essential to the welfare of them all.  Yet in some 
cases such interests may be more promptly, effectively and satisfactorily decided by 
some authority within Australia itself than by the more remote, the less accessive, and, 
in truth, the less competent authority of Parliament.'
16  
 
Lord Grey referred the matter to the Committee of the Privy Council on Trade and 
Plantations, recalled into existence for this purpose, and the Committee recommended 
the appointment of a Governor-General of Australia who should be assisted by a 
General Assembly, to be known as the House of Delegates and to be composed of not 
less than twenty and not more than thirty members elected by the several colonial 
legislatures. 
 
The new Assembly was charged with the immediate task of formulating a uniform tariff 
for all the Australian Colonies and of establishing a General Supreme Court, but it was 
to have power to legislate on matters of common interest to all the Colonies 
represented in it, if and in so far as it was empowered to do so by the constituent 
colonies. 
 
A Bill to give effect to these recommendations was introduced into the Imperial 
Parliament in 1849, and a second in 1850, but in consequence of the opposition which 
the attempt evoked both at home and in Australia, it was abandoned, and for the 
moment nothing came of it save the title of Governor-General which was conferred 
upon the Governor of New South Wales.  The distinction thus given to one colony, even 
though it was the oldest and most important, served only to excite the jealousy of the 
rest and thus to retard the movement towards unity.  The title was wisely allowed to 
lapse in 1861.  [begin page 233] 
 
                                                  
15   [231/1]  Sir Henry George, third Earl Grey (1802-94); to be distinguished from Sir 
George Grey, second Baronet (1799-1882), who was Colonial Secretary (1854-5); 
also from Sir George Grey, the celebrated Colonial Governor (1812-98). 
16   ap. Egerton, op. cit., p. 41. Gavan Duffy’s Report. 
The time was not yet ripe for federation; but the Gavan question was kept to the front in 
Australia largely through the efforts of Gavan Duffy, who though deported from Ireland 
for his share in the revolutionary movement of 1848, proved himself a far-sighted 
statesman in Australia.  The Report of the Committee of the Victorian Assembly which 
he drafted has been justly described as one of the ablest documents ever written in 
favour of Australian federation.  
 
‘Neighbouring States of the second rank’, so the Report ran, 'inevitably 
become confederates or enemies.  By becoming confederates so early in 
their career the Australian Colonies would, we believe, immensely 
economize their strength and resources.  They would substitute a common 
material interest for local and conflicting interests, and waste no more time 
in barren rivalry.  They would enhance their material credit and obtain much 
earlier a power of undertaking works of serious cost and importance.  They 
would not only save time and money, but obtain immense vigour and 
accuracy by treating larger questions of public policy at one time and place, 
and in an assembly which it may be presumed would consist of the wisest 
and most experienced statesmen of the colonial legislatures.  They would set 
up a safeguard against violence and disorder, holding it in check by the 
common sense and the common peace of the federation.  They would 
possess the power of more promptly calling new States into existence 
throughout their extensive territory, as the spread of population required it, 
and of enabling each of the existing States to apply itself without conflict or 
jealousy to the special industry which its position and resources render most 
profitable.' 
 
The Committee accordingly proposed to hold a conference of delegates from the 
several Colonies and leave them to decide which plan of union they would recommend 
to the people: a mere Consultative Council, empowered to draft proposals for the 
sanction of the State Legislatures; or a fully equipped Federal Constitution with a 
Federal Legislature and Federal Executive; or a compromise between the two.  The 
Duffy scheme [begin page 234] elicited only a moderate measure of support even in 
Victoria, and encountered active opposition elsewhere; but, not to be denied, he 
persisted in agitation, and in 1862 another Victorian committee, appointed at his 
instance, reported strongly in favour of immediate action.  
 
‘The condition of the world,' it was said, 'the danger of war, which to be 
successfully met must be met by united action, the hope of a large 
immigration, which external circumstances so singularly favour, the desire 
to develop in each Colony the industry for which nature has fitted it, without 
wasteful rivalry, and the legitimate ambition to open a wider and nobler 
field for the labours of public life, combine to make the present a fitting 
time for reviving this project.  It is the next step in Australian development.  
In the eyes of Europe and America what was a few years ago known to them 
only as an obscure penal settlement in some uncertain position in the 
Southern Ocean, begins to be recognized as a fraternity of wealthy and 
important States, capable of immense development; and, if our current 
history and national character are in many respects misunderstood, we shall 
perhaps best set ourselves right with the world by uniting our strength and 
capacity in a common centre and for common purposes of undoubted public 
utility.' 
 Again the efforts of Mr. Duffy and his Victorian supporters proved abortive.  Nor were 
the reasons far to seek: on the one hand, the external dangers to Australia had not yet 
become acute; on the other there had developed between the two leading colonies a 
deeply rooted difference of opinion in regard to tariffs.  Between New South Wales, the 
parent State, and its lusty and ambitious offspring, Victoria, there had already been a 
good deal of friction which was further intensified by the rapid development of the 
Victorian gold-fields, and was brought to a climax by the violence with which Victoria 
espoused the protectionist creed.  The Free Traders of Sydney regarded with mingled 
contempt and alarm the upstart protectionists in Melbourne.  Thus federal projects were 
permitted for some twenty years to slumber.  [begin page 235] 
 
They were reawakened by the repercussion produced in the Pacific by events in 
Europe, and in particular by the development among the European chancelleries of a 
Weltpolitik. 
 
By the eighties the world was palpably shrinking.  The opening of the Suez Canal; the 
new Imperialism proclaimed by Lord Beaconsfield; the purchase of the Khedive's 
shares in the Canal; the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India; the 
acquisition of Cyprus; the occupation of Egypt by England and of Tunis by France; the 
activity of Russia in the Middle East and of France in the Farther East; above all the 
sudden bound of Imperial Germany to the front rank among Colonial Powers; her 
acquisition in a single year of a great empire in Africa and her intrusion into the Pacific - 
all these things announced the dawn of anew era in international affairs.  The 
Australasian Colonies found themselves to their chagrin suddenly drawn into the 
maelstrom of Western politics.  
 
Neighbours in the Pacific. 
The colonists were more quick to perceive the significance of these events than the 
statesmen of the homeland.  In 1883 great excitement was aroused by the Pacific 
escape of some convicts from the French penal settlement of New Caledonia into 
Australia; still more by the rumoured intention of France to annex the New Hebrides, 
and, most of all, by the report that Germany had annexed the North of New Guinea.  
Queensland attempted ‘to force the hands of the Home Government by taking 
possession of the whole island in the name of the Queen'; but Lord Derby disallowed 
its action.
17  Lord Derby's indifference or apathy aroused deep resentment in Australia 
at the time, and produced lasting effects upon colonial opinion as to the necessity for 
some form of federal union, if not of Imperial representation.  In fairness to the Home 
Government it should be remembered, as Mr. Egerton justly observes, that in r876 New 
Guinea, as well as the New Hebrides, might have been [begin page 236] gained for the 
Empire had the Australian Colonies, in Lord Carnarvon's words, been ready 'to give 
trial and effect to the principle of joint action amongst the different members of the 
Empire in such cases'.  The realization of their own shortcomings did not tend to 
sweeten the pill they now had to swallow, but it did impel them to resume, in more 
serious temper, consideration of the question, on the one hand of more effective 
representation in the Imperial Economy, and on the other of closer union among 
themselves:  
 
‘An ambition’, writes Lord Bryce, ' which aspired to make Australia take its 
place in the world as a great nation, mistress of the Southern Hemisphere, 
had been growing for some time with the growth of a new generation born 
in the new home, and was powerfully roused by the vision of a Federal 
Government which should resemble that of the United States and warn off 
intruders in the Western Pacific as the American Republic had announced by 
                                                  




Renewed efforts to achieve union in 1883. 
To meet the new situation a conference was summoned in 1883.  There were present 
delegates from New Zealand union, and Fiji as well as from all the Australian Colonies.  
The 1883 conference endorsed a scheme formulated by Sir Henry Parkes and Sir 
Samuel Griffiths, and in 1885 the Imperial Parliament enacted it as The Federal 
Council of Australasia Act, 1885.  Under this Act the Federal Council was empowered 
to safeguard Colonial interests in the Pacific, and to deal with deep sea fisheries, with 
extradition and various technical matters, and with any other matters referred to it by 
the several Parliaments of the constituent States; but it had no executive power, no 
command of money; participation by any colony - was purely voluntary , and might be 
terminated at any time.  Only four Colonies joined, and one of them, South Australia, 
afterwards withdrew; New South Wales held aloof from the outset, and its attitude 
proved fatal to the success of the experiment.  
[begin page 237] 
 
Nevertheless the need for closer union was generally and increasingly recognized, 
especially in relation to common defence, and in 1888 an important step was registered 
when the Colonies agreed to contribute towards the maintenance of an Australian 
auxiliary naval squadron.  A year later General Bevan Edwards, in reporting upon the 
question of military defence, put in the forefront the urgent necessity of some form of 
federal organization.  In the same year (1889) Sir Henry Parkes delivered at Tenterfield 
a great speech which, according to a colonial authority, 'is usually reckoned the 
beginning of the final converging movement of the six colonies'.
19 Parkes declared that 
the time was come 'to set about creating a great national government for all Australia’, 
and the opinion carried the greater weight as coming from the Prime Minister of New 
South Wales.  The need was primarily local but, as Mr, W, Pember Reeves caustically 
insists, other considerations were not without influence.  
 
‘The air of icy superiority persistently worn by the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office, and the Admiralty when transacting business with separate 
colonies did quite as much perhaps to irritate colonial leaders into 
speculating whether something big - say a federated continent - might not be 
required to impress the official mind at home.'
20  
 
From this time things began to move more rapidly.  A convention consisting of forty-five 
delegates from all parliaments of Australasia - including Tasmania and New Zealand - 
met at Sydney in 1891, and produced a scheme which accurately anticipated the 
ultimate form assumed by the Commonwealth Constitution.  The only material points of 
difference were that the Senate was to be elected by the State Legislatures, and that 
no direct provision was made that the Executive should be 'parliamentary’, New 
Zealand refused to come in, definitely declaring against any federal scheme 'except a 
federation with the mother-country’, but the postponement of [begin page 238] a 
singularly promising scheme was due partly to the persistent hostility manifested by the 
Free Traders and the Labour Party in New South Wales, and partly to the financial 
crisis which supervened.  Negotiations were, however, resumed in 1895, when the 
several Prime Ministers met at Hobart.  As a result of this meeting, enabling Acts were 
                                                  
18   [236/1]  Bryce, Studies in History, i. 481. 
19   [237/1]  W. Pember Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, i. 
145. 
20   [237/2]  op. cit. i. 150. passed by the several Colonial Parliaments under which special delegates were 
elected by popular vote to a convention which met at Adelaide in 1897. 
 
The Adelaide Convention, 1897.  
In this convention the work was practically accomplished; a Constitution based mainly 
on the scheme of 1891 was drafted and was submitted to the several Colonial 
Legislatures, and by them was freely amended.  The Draft as thus amended was 
reconsidered by the Adelaide convention, and was then submitted to a plebiscite in 
each colony.  Only New South Wales failed to ratify it by the prescribed majority, but 
after further amendment at the hands of a second conference of Premiers, the assent 
of New South Wales was obtained, and the Constitution in its penultimate shape was 
sent home for the consideration of the Imperial Parliament.  With one important 
amendment it was approved at Westminster and received the Royal Assent in the last 
year of Queen Victoria's reign.  That assent was more than formal, for it was 
accompanied by the Queen's fervent prayer 'that the inauguration of the 
Commonwealth may ensure the increased prosperity and well-being of my loyal and 
beloved subjects in Australia'.  This tedious enumeration of the stages through which 
the Commonwealth Constitution passed will at least serve to indicate that the 
Constitution was the result of careful circumspection and prolonged deliberation, and 
was devised with ardent anxiety to omit nothing that could contribute towards, to 
include nothing that could militate against, the successful consummation of federal 
unity.  
 
Arguments for Federation. 
 The compelling reason which brought into existence the Federal Commonwealth was 
undoubtedly the presence of European neighbours in the Pacific.  Federation would 
[begin page 239] probably have come in any case, but its coming might have tarried for 
many years had not the French been in the New Hebrides, and had not the Germans 
occupied New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago.  Hardly less insistent than the 
need for a common system of military defence was the problem of devising adequate 
and uniform regulations against the immigration of coloured races.  The commercial 
classes anticipated great advantages from the abolition of intercolonial tariffs, from 
uniformity of railway regulations and rates, from common control of the inland 
waterways and irrigation schemes, from uniformity in commercial legislation, and above 
all perhaps from the improvement in credit.  The Labour Party welcomed the possibility 
of old-age pensions, and other schemes of social reform; suitors hoped to avoid 
expense and delay by the erection of a High Court of Justice which should virtually 
supersede the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council; while all parties and all 
classes were filled with legitimate pride at the birth of a new nation and at the entrance 
of the Commonwealth as a nation-state into world-society.  
 
Provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution. The Commonwealth and the States. 
It remains to indicate the outstanding features of the constitutional machinery, under 
the operation of which these results were to be achieved.   
 
The point of most vital importance in every Federal Constitution is the determination of 
the relations between the Central or Federal Power and the constituent States or 
Provinces.  The Australian Commonwealth Act follows wealth the precedent of the 
United States of America and the Swiss Confederation.  In the former case all powers 
not specifically conceded to the Federal Government, nor specifically prohibited by the 
Instrument to the States, remain vested in the States.  Similarly in Switzerland the 
cantons are sovereign, except in so far as their sovereign rights are specifically 
curtailed by the Federal Constitution: the residue of powers is vested in the cantons.  In 
both cases, as we have seen, historical circumstances explain this division of powers, 
inclining the balance in [begin page 240] favour of the constituent republics whose 
conjunction brought into being the Federal Unions.   
In the case of Canada it is otherwise.  The Dominion Constitution, though federal in 
form, is in spirit unitary.  The Provinces exercise, therefore, only such powers as are 
delegated to them by the Constitution. 
  
Legislation 
The Commonwealth Act provided (§ 107):  
 
‘Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes 
a State shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the 
State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the 
admission or establishment of the State as the case may be.'  
 
The range of powers which are or will be withdrawn from the State Legislatures or 
vested in the Federal Legislature is, however, very wide.  In all there are thirty-nine 
classes of subjects enumerated in Section 51 of the Commonwealth Act in regard to 
which the Federal Legislature has power to make laws.  Of these some are exclusively 
vested in it, in regard to others it enjoys only concurrent jurisdiction.  Among the former 
are customs and excise, bounties on exports, coinage, and naval and military defence.  
Among the concurrent powers are: banking (other than State banking), bankruptcy, 
census and statistics, copyrights, patents and trade marks, matrimonial causes, 
naturalization, immigration and emigration, insurance (beyond State limits), foreign 
commerce, posts, telegraphs, &c., weights and measures. 
 
On the other hand the residual jurisdiction of the States includes authority over all such 
matters as: agriculture, education, charities, factories, forests and fisheries, health, 
friendly societies, liquor control, police, prisons, and State railways.  Above all the State 
Legislatures possess, subject only to the veto of the Crown, the right to amend, 
maintain, and execute their own Constitutions.  The dignity of the States is further 
consulted by the provision that the State Governors (unlike the Lieutenant-Governors 
[begin page 241] of the Canadian Provinces) shall continue to be appointed by the 
Crown and have the privilege of direct communication with the Colonial Office. 
 
In regard to the administration of justice the Commonwealth stands midway between 
Canada and the United States.  In Canada there is only one set of courts, the judges of 
which are appointed by the Dominion Government and are removable only by the 
Governor-General on an address from the Senate and the House of Commons.  In the 
United States there is complete reduplication of courts: a complete system of Federal 
Courts - from the Courts of First Instance up to the Supreme Court - existing throughout 
the Union side by side with, and entirely independent, of the State Courts.  Nor is there 
any appeal from the State Courts to the Federal Courts: each system is self-contained. 
  
The Australian Judiciary is less completely federal than that of the United States, less 
unitary than that of Canada.  On the one hand there is a Federal Supreme Court known 
as the High Court of Australia; on the other, the State Courts are invested with federal 
jurisdiction.  Further, an appeal lies from the State Courts to the Federal Supreme 
Court.  The appellate jurisdiction of the King-in-Council remains unimpaired.  On this 
point there was considerable discussion when the Draft Constitution was under 
consideration by the Imperial Parliament.  In the Draft it was provided that on any 
question arising as to the interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution, or the State 
Constitutions, the decision of the High Court of Australia should be final, unless' the 
public interests of some part of Her Majesty's dominions other than the Commonwealth 
or a State are involved'.  To that provision and in particular to the ambiguity of the 
phrase 'public interests' strong exception was taken by the Imperial Government.  The 
principle maintained by the Imperial Government was thus defined by Mr. Chamberlain when he moved the second reading of the Bill: Australia was to be left [begin page 242] 
‘absolutely free to take its own course where Australian interests' were' solely and 
exclusively concerned'; but in all cases in which other than Australian interests were 
concerned the right of appeal to the Privy Council was to be fully maintained.  This 
principle is embodied in the section (§ 74) of the Act dealing with the question of appeal 
to the Queen-in-Council.  The section runs as follows:  
 
‘No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the 
High Court upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se of 
the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or 
States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or 
more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one 
which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in Council.  
 
‘The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the 
certificate should be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her 
Majesty in Council. 
 
‘Except as provided in this section this Constitution shall not impair any 
right which the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal 
Prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her 
Majesty in Council.  The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in 
which such leave may be asked, but proposed laws containing any such 
limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's 
pleasure.'  
 
This section is plainly concerned with a matter of high constitutional as well as practical 
significance, and before it assumed its final form it underwent many modifications.   
Even in its final form it was not immune from criticism.  High authorities, such as Lord 
Russell of Killowen, Lord Davey, and Mr. (now Viscount) Haldane, held that there was 
at least a possibility of a conflict of authority.  While, in the specified cases, there was 
no appeal from the High Court except by its own leave, an appeal did lie from the 
decision of the State Courts direct to the Privy Council.  Nor did experience weaken the 
strength of the objections foreseen.  The Privy Council [begin page 243] and the High 
Court did actually deliver conflicting judgements on the same subject.  Thus in 
reference to the competence of a State Government to levy income-tax on the salary of 
a federal official the Privy Council decided in the affirmative, the High Court in the 
negative.  In a subsequent case the High Court of the Commonwealth refused to follow 
the ruling of the Privy Council, on the  ground that the Privy Council ought to have held 
itself bound, where a case came before it on direct appeal from  a State Court, to 
accept the judgement of the High Court. 
  
The Impasse was ultimately resolved by an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament 
(1907, No. 8), which abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Courts of the States in 
reference to questions relating to the constitutional rights and powers of the 
Commonwealth and the States inter se.
21  The solution thus reached was consonant at 
once with common sense and with the spirit of the Commonwealth Constitution, and 
redounded to the credit of the Dominion Legislature.  
 
                                                  
21   [243/1]  On the whole question cf. Egerton (op. cit.), p. 212, Who refers to the 
cases of Deakin v. Webb (I C. L. R. 585) and Webb v. Oultrim (L.R.E. 1907. A.C. 
81) and Keith, op. cit., pp. 1157-73. The Legislature 
The Commonwealth Act decreed that the Legislature should consist of two Houses: a 
Senate and a House of Representatives. 
 
The Senate. 
The principle which lies at the root of the Senate  is pointedly suggested by the 
alternative titles which were Senate originally considered for it: the House of the States, 
or the States Assembly.  Like the American Senate it represents the federal principle; it 
stands for the Constituent States and accords to each State equal representation - a 
principle not asserted without strong and intelligible protests from the larger States.  To 
the smaller States, on the other hand, this principle was the condition precedent, the 
'sheet anchor' of their rights and liberties.  And, once asserted, it is fundamental and 
(except in unimaginable conditions) unalterable.  
 
The Senate consists of thirty-six members-six for each [begin page 244] State; but it is 
provided by the Constitution (§ 7) that ‘Parliament may make laws increasing or 
diminishing the number of Senators for each State, but so that equal representation of 
the several Original States shall be maintained and that no Original State shall have 
less than six Senators'.  Further, in the section defining the machinery for constitutional 
amendment (§ 128) it is provided that 'no alteration diminishing the proportionate 
representation of any State in either House of the Parliament. . . shall become law 
unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law'.  The 
Senators are to be 'directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the 
Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate' (§ 7).  The latter stipulation has 
proved to be, perhaps unexpectedly, important.  The voting is by scrutin de lisle: each 
voter has as many votes as there are places to be filled.  This method, as is well 
known, permits, if it does not encourage, a good deal of political manipulation, and 
enables a well-organized majority to sweep the board.  But its significance in relation to 
senatorial elections in Australia can only be appreciated to the full if it is remembered 
that the qualification of a Senator is identical with that of a member of the House of 
Representatives, and that the electors are the same for both Houses.  The power of the 
Senate is thus drawn from precisely the same source as the Lower House, and it is 
drawn 'in the concentrated form of support from large constituencies'.
22  The result is 
that the Australian Senate is the only Upper House in the world which is less 
conservative than the Lower.  It should be added that the Senate is elected for six 
years, while the Lower House is elected for three, and that half the Senators retire 
triennially.  The provision for filling casual vacancies is exceedingly elaborate and 
precise.  If the vacancy is notified while the State Parliament is sitting, the Houses of 
Parliament of the State 'shall, sitting and voting together, choose a person to hold the 
[begin page 245] place until the expiration of the term or until the election of a 
successor. . . whichever shall first happen'.  If the State Parliament is not in session 
 
‘the Governor of the State, with the advice of the Executive Council thereof.  
may appoint a person to hold the place until fourteen days after the 
beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State or until the 
election of a successor, whichever first happens.  At the next election of 
members of the House of Representatives or at the next election of Senators 
for the State, whichever first happens, a successor shall, if the term has not 
then expired, be chosen to hold the place from the date of his election until 
the expiration of the term’  (§ 15). 
 
These minute regulations at any rate testify to the extreme importance which is 
attached by the most democratic community in the world to membership of the Second 
Chamber. 
                                                  
22   [244/1]  B.R. Wise, Making of the Australian Commonwealth, p. 70.  
One or two other points in regard to the composition and procedure of the Senate 
demand attention.  Though federal in constitution, the Senate is ‘unitary in action.’   
Though federal in constitution.  It is expressly provided (§ 11) that ‘the Senate may 
proceed to the dispatch of business notwithstanding the failure of any State to provide 
for its representation in the Senate’, and (§ 22) that the presence of one-third of its 
members (until the Parliament otherwise provides) shall form a quorum.  The voting is 
personal and not according to States.  Each Senator has one vote, and any question 
which may arise is determined by a simple majority. 
 
A noticeable attribute of the Senate, albeit one which it shares with Second Chambers 
in general, is that of ‘perpetual existence.’  Except in the event of a constitutional 
deadlock, it cannot be dissolved.  The Senators are elected for six years, one half of 
them retiring every three years.  Thus the Senate, unlike the Lower House, is never, 
except under the circumstances alluded to, wholly new or wholly old. 
 
The qualification for senatorships is exceptionally easy.  [begin page 246] A Senator 
must be of full age; he must be a natural-born subject of the King, or a subject 
naturalized according to the laws of the United Kingdom or any of the constituent 
States; 'and his' qualification' must be' in each State that which is prescribed by this 
Constitution or by the Parliament, as the qualification for electors of members of the 
House of Representatives' (§ 8), No person may, under heavy penalties, continue to sit, 
in either House, who is convicted of serious crime, or becomes bankrupt, or 'has any 
direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the public service of the 
Commonwealth or' holds any office of profit under the Crown or any pension payable 
during the pleasure of the Crown out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth'.  
But it is provided that this last disqualification shall not exclude Ministers of the 
Commonwealth or the States; and elsewhere (§ 64) it is expressly laid down that 'no 
Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless he is or 
becomes a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives'.  Not even in the 
United Kingdom itself is the correspondence between Legislature and Executive so 
closely and securely guaranteed.  In regard to remuneration Senators and members of 
the Lower House are treated alike - each receiving £1,000 a year.
23  
 
The functions of the Senate, unlike those of the House of Lords and of the American 
Senate, are purely legislative; but, subject to an exception to be noted presently, the 
Senate has 'equal power with the House of Representatives, in respect of all proposed 
laws' (§ 53). 
 
Financial Powers 
As regards finance the provisions of the Constitution are of peculiar interest.  Money 
Bills must originate in the Lower House.  The Senate may reject but may not amend 
them, though it may 'at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed 
law which the Senate may not amend, requesting by message the omission or 
amendment of any items or provisions therein.  [begin page 247]  And the House of 
Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make any of such omissions or amendments, with 
or without modifications.'  Moreover, the precautions against ‘tacking' and against the 
introduction of any alien substance into a finance Bill are exceptionally minute and 
specific.  Thus, under Section 53, a proposed law, shall not be taken to appropriate 
revenue or moneys, or to impose taxation, by reason only of its containing provisions 
for the imposition of fines,' &c.  Under Section 54 it is provided that 'the proposed law 
which appropriates revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual service of the 
Government shall deal only with such appropriation'.  Section 55 enacts that 
 
                                                  
23   [246/1]  Originally £400: raised to £600 in 1907 and to £1,000 in 1920. ‘Laws imposing taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation, and 
any provision therein dealing with any other matter shall be of no effect.  
 
‘Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs or of 
excise, shall deal with one subject of taxation only; but laws imposing 
duties of customs shall deal with duties of customs only, and laws imposing 
duties of excise shall deal with duties of excise only.'  
 
These provisions not only afford guarantees against tacking, but no less effectually 
provide against the device which, following the lead of Mr. Gladstone, the British House 
of Commons has employed since 1861.  There can be no 'omnibus' Budget under the 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth.  Thus, as Mr. Harrison Moore justly 
observes:  
 
‘The Constitution. . . prevents the House of Representatives from taking a 
course which might justify or excuse the Senate in rejecting an 
Appropriation Bill.  In the balance of power in the Commonwealth, it is a 
factor not to be neglected that, while the Senate has a recognized power 
over Money Bills beyond that of any other Second Chamber in the British 
Dominions, it can hardly exercise the extreme power of rejecting the Bill for 
the "ordinary annual services of the Government" upon any other ground 
than that the Ministry owes responsibility to the Upper not less than to the 
Lower [begin page 248] House.  That is a position which in the future the 
Senate, as the House of the States as well as the Second Chamber, may take 
up; but it is a position from which, even in the history of Parliamentary 





In view of the experience gathered in the working of the State Constitutions it was 
natural that the authors of the Commonwealth Act should be at special pains to devise 
effective machinery for the solution of 'deadlocks'.  The originality and ingenuity of the 
Section (§ 57) dealing with this matter justifies quotation in extenso:  
 
‘If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate 
rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House 
of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the 
House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the 
proposed law with or without any amendments which have been made, 
suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass 
it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will 
not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of 
Representatives simultaneously.  But such dissolution shall not take place 
within six months before the date of the expiry of the House of 
Representatives by effluxion of time.  
 
If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again passes the proposed law 
with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by 
the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to 
which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may 
                                                  
24   [247/1]  Commonwealth of Australia, pp. 122-3. convene a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House of 
Representatives. 
 
The members present at such a joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together 
upon the proposed law as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and upon 
amendments, if any, which have been made therein by one House and not agreed to 
by the other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute majority of 
the total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall 
[begin page 249] be taken to have been carried, and if the proposed law, with the 
amendments, if any, so carried, is affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number 
of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, it shall be taken to have 
been duly passed by both Houses of the Parliament, and shall be presented to the 
Governor-General for the Queen's assent.'  
 
The machinery here described was devised, as is well known, after the consideration of 
many alternative solutions.  One party, that of the National Democrats, favoured a 
Referendum, an appeal to the whole body of electors in the Commonwealth.  But this 
solution was naturally distasteful to the smaller States.  Others preferred the remedy of 
dissolution 'to be applied alternatively, simultaneously, or successively to the Senate 
and the House'.  The device ultimately adopted was inspired, partly by the experience 
of South Australia, but, more specifically, as regards the joint sitting, by the Norwegian 
system, 'according to which the two Chambers (or rather the two parts into which the 
House is divided) meet as one for the purpose of composing their differences.'
25  But 
whatever the source of the inspiration, the device is undeniably ingenious, and makes 
effective provision against the weaknesses and dangers which have been all too 
clearly revealed in the Constitutions of the several States. 
 
It is to be observed that on any Bill, whether dealing with finance or not, the Senate can 
'force a dissolution'; that the Lower House cannot override the will of the Senate until 
after an appeal to the electorate, and then only if the will of the electors is declared with 
emphasis.  In this connexion the importance of the stipulation that the numbers of the 
House must always be double those of the Senate becomes apparent.  But for this 
provision
26 the balance contemplated by the authors of the Constitution might be 
seriously disturbed.  As it is, the will of [begin page 250] the people, as measured by 
population, must in the last resort prevail against the will of the States, as revealed in 
the composition and voting strength of the Senate - a further illustration of the 
democratic spirit by which every part of the Constitution is permeated. 
  
Constitutional Revision.  
There remains to be noticed the position of the Senate in the machinery devised for 
constitutional revision.  In the Canadian Dominion there is no such machinery.  The 
source of Canada's Constitution is an Act of the Imperial Legislature, and to the same 
source she must look for the amendment of it.  In the United States the precautions 
against hasty and ill-considered amendments are such as almost to preclude 
amendment altogether.  In the Australian Commonwealth the machinery, though 
elaborate, is decidedly less complicated and less cumbrous.  
 
Every proposed law for the alteration of the Constitution must be passed by an 
absolute majority of each House, and must then, after an interval of not less than two 
and not more than six months, be submitted to the electors in each State.  The 
amendment to become law must be approved by (i) a majority of States, and (ii) a 
                                                  
25   [249/1]  Harrison Moore, op. cit., pp. 124-7. 
26    [249/2]  § 24. 'The House of Representatives shall be composed of members 
directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such 
members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of senators.' majority of electors in the Commonwealth as a whole.  But here as elsewhere State 
rights are rigidly safeguarded, for 'no alteration diminishing the proportionate 
representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number 
of representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or increasing, 
diminishing, or otherwise affecting the limits of the State. . . shall become law unless 
the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law.' 
 
For the event of disagreement on constitutional amendments there is special and 
interesting provision.  Such amendments may, be it noted, originate in either House, 
but should the Houses differ, the originating House may after an interval of three 
months (even in the same session), again pass the amending Bill, and, in the event of 
a second rejection, the Governor-General may submit it to the electors.  Their decision 
is final.  The wording [begin page 251] of the clause - 'the Governor-General may 
submit’ - would appear to leave to the Executive in such cases a discretion as to the 
employment of the Referendum.  But it is obvious that a Ministry, anxious for revision, 
and backed by either House of the Legislature, would never hesitate to submit its 
proposals to the electorate.  
 
Yet the electorate has proved itself far from tamely acquiescent in the wishes of the 
Executive and the Legislature.  On the contrary though projects for revision, in this 
direction and in that, have been, on five occasions, submitted to the electorate, only 
once, in the first twenty years of the life of the Commonwealth, was the requisite 
majority obtained. 
 
In practice the Senate has, by general consent, failed to fulfil the objects with which it 
was designed.  It has done little to protect special State rights; nor indeed has such 
protection been required.  The Senate, as a former Premier of New South Wales has 
pointed out, 'has seldom voted on State lines of cleavage, and such issues have very 
infrequently arisen'.
27  Still less has the Senate exercised a moderating influence in 
ordinary legislation.  Unique among Second Chambers in this as in other respects the 
Australian Senate has proved itself to be, if not the more democratic, certainly the less 
conservative of the two Chambers.  The electorate being co-extensive with the State, 
and the election being by' general ticket', the best disciplined party can, as a rule, 
secure the election of the whole ticket, and thus entirely exclude the minority from any 
representation.  In the election of 1910 the Labour Party carried every seat in every 
State, securing at a single coup half the seats in the Senate.  In 1914, in consequence 
of a deadlock, both Houses were, in accord with the provisions of the Constitution, 
simultaneously dissolved, and the whole of the Senate had to be renewed.  The Labour 
Party secured a majority only of eight in the House of Representatives, but in the 
Senate, though the totality of votes cast was not very [begin page 252] unequally 
divided, the method of election gave them thirty-one seats out of thirty-six.  Such 
results tend to reduce the Constitution to an absurdity, and opinion is steadily gaining 
ground in favour of a drastic alteration.  It can, however, be effected only with the 
unanimous assent of the States, small as well as large, and their consent will not easily 
be obtained.  Parliament has recently adopted a scheme of Proportional 
Representation for senatorial elections, in the hope of securing some representation to 
minorities, but the scheme actually adopted is regarded as only a palliative and has 
not, thus far, given much satisfaction to those who are enamoured of the principle.
28  
Meanwhile the Australian Senate continues to exhibit the unique spectacle of a Second 
Chamber which has displayed many of the characteristic tactics of a Labour 
convention. 'The Chamber’, writes Mr. Brand, 'which is usually supposed to act as a 
                                                  
27   [251/1]  The Hon. Sir Charles G. Wade, Australia, p. 65. 
28   [252/1]  In the election of 1919 the largest of four parties secured seventeen out of 
eighteen seats with an aggregate of 860,060 votes.  One minority seat fell to the 
party which polled 820,000 votes.  Two other parties which together polled 
173,000 votes secured no seat. Bryce, Modern Democracies, ii. 206. drag on revolutionary legislature, has largely occupied itself in passing academic 
resolutions in favour of the nationalization of all means employed in the production and 
distribution of wealth, and other projects of a socialistic character.'
29  
 
The House of Representatives 
The House of Representatives, like the Senate, is directly elected by the people of the 
Commonwealth.  In view of the provision for the solution of deadlocks the Constitution 
ordains that the number of members shall be' as nearly as practicable' twice the 
number of senators.  They number seventy-five and are distributed, mostly in single-
member constituencies, among the several States according to population.  They are 
elected on the basis of adult suffrage for three years, but the House may be dissolved 
sooner by the Governor-General.  A member must be a British subject, have been for 
three years [begin page 253] a resident in the Commonwealth, and qualified to be an 
elector.  The Speaker is elected from among the members at the beginning of each 
Parliament, and is now invariably, like the President of the Senate, a party nominee. 
 
Powers 
The Federal Parliament is endowed with very extensive powers.  Its taxative powers 
are unlimited, So long as it does not discriminate between States or parts of States; but 
they are not exclusive.  The States possess Concurrent powers, except as to the 
imposition of duties of customs and excise.  Its legislative powers, as already observed, 
extend to no fewer than thirty-nine categories, but being enumerated are not unlimited, 
the residue of powers being vested as in the State Legislatures.  The important and 
elaborate provisions in regard to the solution of deadlocks between the two Houses 
have already been noticed in connexion with the Senate. 
  
As compared with the American Congress the Australian Parliament is singularly free 
from restraint.  The American constitutions, alike Federal and State, manifest at every 
turn profound suspicion of the legislative bodies, and contain elaborate precautions for 
the protection of the citizens against the abuse of legislative powers.  No such 
suspicion appears to have animated the authors of the Commonwealth Constitution.  
Parliament, within the wide limits of the Constitution, can, therefore, work its will, 
without fear or restraint. 
 
The Executive 
Like the State Legislatures and like their common English prototype, the Federal 
Legislature controls the Executive.  The formal executive authority is, of course, vested 
in the Crown, but it is exercisable by the Governor-General on the advice of Ministers 
Who must be members of the Federal Executive Council, and must also be, or within 
three months after appointment must become, members of one or other House of the 
Legislature.  This latter is a specific provision (§ 64) of the Constitution, which in that 
respect was unique among the Constitutions of the English-speaking peoples, until the 
section was copied into the South Africa Act, 1909.  The Ministers [begin page 254] are 
the heads of seven Government departments: External Affairs, Home Affairs, Post 
Office, Defence, Trade and Customs, the Treasury, and that of the Attorney-General.  
The Premier holds one of these offices, not infrequently but not necessarily the 
Department of External Affairs.  In addition, there are generally two or three Ministers 
without portfolio. 
 
Finance and Trade 
Embodied in the constitutional frame are no fewer than twenty-five clauses devoted to 
the question of finance and trade.  Nor was the prevision of the authors at fault, for as 
an Australian statesman writes, 'the great lion in the path of the Constitution has been 
                                                  
29   [252/2]   Hon. R.H. Brand, Union of South Africa. p. 67. the problem of finance'.
30  To appreciate the difficulties which were anticipated, and 
have in fact arisen, it is necessary to recall certain outstanding features of the fiscal 
and industrial situation: 
 
(i)    that the States were and are large trading corporations and large 
owners of real property; 
(ii)   that they are consequently large employers of labour; 
(iii)    that the bulk of the State revenues had been raised by customs 
duties, and that the right to raise such duties was henceforth to be 
vested exclusively in the Commonwealth; 
(iv)   that the States are exceedingly tenacious of their 'rights' and anxious 
to maintain their separate and historic identity. 
  
In order to compensate the States for the loss of their customs revenues, and at the 
same time to discourage the Commonwealth from extravagant expenditure, it was 
enacted in the Constitution (§ 87) that for ten years the Commonwealth should return to 
the States 75 percent of the customs revenue they collected.  This provision, known as 
the 'Braddon blot',
31 proved highly unsatisfactory.  The expenditure of the 
Commonwealth rose with unexpected rapidity, the Government was compelled to resort 
to direct taxation, and at the end of the initial period (1911) the assent of the people 
was obtained by Referendum to a drastic reduction in the amount of [begin page 255] 
revenue returned to the States.  Thenceforward it was to be, for a further period of ten 




The constitutional and other rights of the States are, as already observed, specifically 
guaranteed in and by the States Instrument (§§ 106-20).  The States may not coin 
money nor legislate in respect of religion, nor raise or maintain, without the consent of 
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, any naval or military force, and where a State 
law is in conflict with a law of the Commonwealth the latter shall prevail; but while the 
Commonwealth may legislate only on the topics specifically enumerated, the residue of 
powers is vested in the States.  The States continue to be diplomatic entities and are 
still represented in Great Britain by Agents-General, and it was not until 1910 that a 
High Commissioner for the Commonwealth was, in addition, appointed. 
  
The Parliamentary Caucus 
The scope of this book is limited, somewhat strictly, to the machinery of government as 
formally constituted, but no analysis of the Australian Constitution would be otherwise 
than grotesquely incomplete if it failed to take account of an unofficial but most potent 
institution known as the Parliamentary Caucus.  This form of political organization has 
its parallel, as we have already seen, in the United States, but it has thus far played 
little part in English politics.  Half a century ago the advent of the Caucus at 
Birmingham caused a transient tremor among English politicians; but in this country 
party organizations, local and central, while performing functions in regard to the 
selection of candidates, the conduct of elections and so forth, rendered indispensable 
by the extension of the electorate, have hitherto interfered little in the internal work of 
the Legislature.  The members of the parliamentary Labour Party are, it is understood, 
subject to strict discipline, as were the parliamentary followers of Mr. Parnell, but over 
the activities of their members at Westminster the organiza- [begin page 256] tions of 
the two older parties exercise little continuous influence.  A local Party Association may 
occasionally protest against the action or inaction of its parliamentary representative, 
but Members of Parliament in England are still very far from having become mere 
                                                  
30   [254/1]  Sir C.G. Wade, op. cit., p. 67.  
31   [254/2]  It was suggested by Sir Edward Braddon, Premier of Tasmania. delegates of their constituents, or docile instruments in the hands of party 
organizations. 
  
The Labour Party 
In Australia the triumph of the Labour Party has induced a very different state of affairs.  
Party discipline is absolutely strict; members are amenable to the resolutions of a 
parliamentary caucus which is itself the creature of the Trade Councils.  These Trade 
Councils are, therefore, in effect, the real rulers of the country, whenever the Labour 
Party is in power.
32  Whether the other parties will be able to resist a similar 
development, or whether the rapidly improving education of the wage earners will 
conduce to the election of men of more independent character, are questions which 
only time can resolve.  
 
The young Federations of Canada and Australia are alike confronted by problems of 
great complexity and of high significance alike to their own well-being and to that of the 
larger Commonwealth of which they form integral and important parts.  Both Dominions 
have proved their capacity for the solution of problems not less difficult in the past: 
each has produced men apt for constructive statesmanship of the highest calibre.   
There is no reason to apprehend that they will be lacking in the future. 
 
                                                  
32    [256/1]  Lord Bryce attaches so much importance to this relatively recent 
development that he says 'The dominance of the parliamentary caucus has been 
Australia's most distinctive contribution to the art of politics, (Modern 
Democracies, ii. 496). X. - The Union of South Africa  
 
‘In other countries people and States have usually been most loath to part 
with one tittle of their independence or individuality, and constitutions have 
for the most part taken the form of very definite contracts of partnership, 
setting forth in precise language exactly what each partner surrenders and 
what he retains.  The partners have generally been full of suspicion both of 
one another and of the new government which they were creating.  There is 
little of this spirit in the South Africa Act.' - Hon. R.H. Brand. 
 
‘In South Africa more perhaps than in any other portion of the world, there 
are common questions of general interest which can only be decided with 
safety by a general authority expressing the considered judgement of a 
United South Africa.' - H.E. Egerton. 
 
‘The Government of Great Britain has given Constitutions sometimes to 
willing and sometimes to unwilling and suspicious recipients.  But assuredly 
it has never given its sanction to a constitutional experiment which has been 
to so great an extent the product of local conditions or that has so well 
expressed the Colonial will.' - Earl Curzon of Kedleston (1909). 
 
The Problem in South Africa 
Parallel with the centripetal movements in Canada and Australia was that in South 
Africa; but the forces which operated to produce union in South Africa were wholly 
different from those which had made for federalism in Australia, and scarcely less 
remote from those which brought about the Dominion of Canada.  Nor was the final 
result by any means identical.  The Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth is, as 
we have seen, typically federal alike in spirit and in form; the Canadian Constitution, 
though federal in form, bears traces of the unitary ambitions of its more prominent 
architects; South Africa passed at a single stride from separatism to union. 
  
The Native Problem. 
Yet the problems in South Africa were, and are, in many respects even more complex 
than those by which the other Dominions were confronted.  Australia is of all portions of 
the Empire the most homogeneous in racial conditions.  Canada, though containing 
two European races is also pre-eminently a white man's country.  
[begin page 258] 
 
In South Africa it is otherwise; not only are the two European races equally balanced, 
but both in combination are very greatly outnumbered by the coloured races.  Out of 
the total population of just over seven millions, at the Census of 1921, about a million 
and a half are whites.  Nor are the proportions constant in the several South African 
colonies.  In the Orange River colony there are less than three and in the Transvaal 
about four coloured persons to each white inhabitant.  In Cape Colony there is just one 
white inhabitant to four coloured.  In Natal the proportion is roughly one to ten.  The 
small white community in Natal thus finds itself surrounded by a black population which 
is not only ten times as numerous as its own but consists of the most warlike tribes in 
South Africa.  The dominant fact, therefore, in the South African problem is to be found 
in the great preponderance of the coloured races. 
 
Nor is this problem likely to become simpler as time goes on.  On the contrary, the 
improvement of government and the spread of civilization is likely to intensify it.  As Mr. 
Pearson pointed out more than thirty years ago we are 'the blind instruments of fate for multiplying the races which are now our subjects and will one day be our rivals'.  In 
South Africa as in India the rule of the white man has imposed upon turbulent and 
warlike tribes a pax Britannica which has removed the most ancient and the most 
obvious check upon population.  The improvement of sanitary conditions, the partial 
eradication of barbaric customs such as infanticide and executions on charges of 
witchcraft, not to mention the increased regularity and certainty of food supplies - all 
are factors which have operated in the same direction.  No discussion of the political 
problem in South Africa can therefore fail to take account of this dominating and 
differentiating social fact. 
 
The Germans in South Africa 
A third element in the situation differentiating the South African problem from the 
Australian has lost much of its significance since the Great War.  But as one of [begin 
page 259] the most potent of the causes which contributed to union it cannot, in this 
analysis, be ignored.  During the meetings of the National Convention at Cape Town in 
1909 President Steyn used these remarkable words in conversation with Sir Starr 
Jameson and Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. 
 
‘I do not pretend to regard things from the same point of view as you do.  
Nobody with any sense of justice could expect me to feel anything of 
gratitude to the British Government or the British people.  I look only to the 
interests of South Africa, whilst you have your Imperial interests.   
Fortunately in this case the interests of the Empire and South Africa are one.  
Germany is preparing to attack England. . . . This South Africa of ours is 
Naboth's vineyard, and preparations have gone on for years to get 
possession of it, preparations made under our very noses.  German West 
Africa is their jumping off ground.  It has been prepared and arranged for 
that purpose.  It is useless to them for any other purpose.  The population is 
simply a military force.  Their railways are strategic lines laid out for the 
purposes of war in the country.  We must have union to defend ourselves.'
1  
 
The Germans were relatively recent comers.  Before 1884 Germany did not possess a 
single subject in Africa.  Their ambitions, however, were well known.  In 1879 Ernst von 
Weber had strongly advocated the acquisition of Delagoa Bay and the economic 
penetration of the Transvaal and British South Africa.  Sir Donald Currie, speaking with 
knowledge, subsequently stated that: ‘The German Government would have secured 
St. Lucia Bay and the coastline between Natal and the possessions of Portugal had not 
the British Government telegraphed instructions to dispatch a gunboat from Cape Town 
with orders to hoist the British flag at St. Lucia Bay.'  Within a very few years, however, 
Germany had, with the entire assent of the British Government, established [begin page 
260] herself, and at a single bound had leapt into the position of the third European 
power in Africa.  The establishment of the German Protectorate over Damaraland and 
Namaqualand; the annexation of Togoland and the Cameroons; the foundation of 
German East Africa, with its immense significance from the point of view of strategy, of 
man power, and of raw material - all this was the work of less than two years (1884-5). 
 
Delagoa Bay 
Much older than the German Empire in Africa, older than the British, and older even 
than the Dutch, was that of Portugal.  Delagoa Bay, in a strategical sense the most 
                                                  
1    [259/1]  Address by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick to the members of the Empire 
Parliamentary Association on 9th July 1919.  The proceedings were private, but 
Sir Percy emphasized the fact that he had repeated the statement in public many 
times; once at least in his place in the South African Parliament. important portion of the Portuguese possession, could have been acquired by the 
British Government in 1872 for the trifling sum of £12,000.  The Government of the day 
(Gladstone's) grudged the money, and, in the words of a competent writer, 'their ill-
starred economy has proved one of the most unfortunate and costly acts in the whole 
of our South African administration.'
2  The foreign element in South Africa would have 
been far more formidable than it was but for the foresight and enterprise of Cecil 
Rhodes.  In 1888 Rhodes induced the Governor of Cape Colony to conclude a Treaty 
with Lobengula, chief of the Matabeles, affording him protection in return for a promise 
not to alienate any portion of his country without the cognizance of the British 
Government.
3  A year later the British South Africa Company received from the Crown 
a Charter authorizing it to develop the country which lies north of Bechuanaland and of 
the Transvaal and west of Portuguese East Africa.  That territory, together with large 
dominions subsequently acquired in. the north, the Company still rules under the name 
of Rhodesia.' 
 
Cape Colony under the Dutch  
We are, however, anticipating the sequence of events.  'In South Africa', wrote 
Professor Egerton, 'more under the Dutch perhaps than in any other portion of the 
world, there are common questions of general interest which can only be decided with 
safety by a general authority expressing [begin page 261] the considered judgement of 
a united South Africa.'
4  That is true; but events had led to the establishment not of one 
but of four separate and self-governing colonies under the British Crown.  Of these only 
one – Natal - was British in origin.  From the middle of the seventeenth century down to 
the close of the eighteenth the parent Colony - the Cape of Good Hope - was a 
possession of the Dutch East India Company.  Occupied by the Dutch in 1652 Cape 
Colony was regarded by them simply as an outpost of the Dutch East Indies, and as 
such was placed under the Governor-General and Council of India and administered 
from Batavia.  For a century and a half it was little more than a port of call for Dutch 
East Indiamen.  Previous to its establishment the voyages from Europe to the East 
generally meant a mortality of thirty percent among the crews.  The Cape Colony, 
therefore, was utilized as a half-way hospital, and not only did it thus help to cure the 
sick but, by the supply of fresh vegetables, it contributed effectually to ward off the 
attacks of scurvy and similar diseases and to diminish the mortality therefrom.  In 1795 
the United Provinces were conquered by the French, and the Stadtholder, who found 
refuge in England, ordered the Governor of Cape Colony to admit British troops 'who 
come to protect the Colony against the invasion of the French'.  Restored to the 
Batavian Republic by the Treaty of Amiens (1802) the Colony was reoccupied by a 
British force under Sir David Baird in 1806, and was finally retained, on terms 
financially acceptable to the Dutch, by the Treaty of Paris in 1814.  The moral to be 
drawn from the history of the Cape Colony, under the rule of the Dutch East India 
Company, is summarized in a pertinent passage by Sir Charles Lucas:  
 
This story. . . seems to teach three lessons. . . . It is men who make States, 
that is the first lesson.  The Netherlands could never spare men and women 
enough to South Africa.  Had the number of Dutchmen who emigrated to the 
Cape [begin page 262] been multiplied four or fivefold, a strong community 
would have been formed, and the colonists would soon have shaken off the 
mischievous restrictions imposed by the company.  The story is a warning, 
in the second place, that trading companies are meant to trade and not to 
rule.  Companies may with advantage plant a settlement and take charge of 
                                                  
2   [260/1]  The Government of South Africa, p. 31. 
3   [260/1]  See p. 293 (print error in original footnote numbering ed., should have 
been [260/2]) 
4   [261/1]  Op. cit., p. 74. it in its infancy, but after a while company rule is out of place and out of 
time.  This applies to all kinds of dependencies, but most of all to those 
colonial communities where the ruled, or many of them, are of the same 
race as the rulers.  A country where European settlers have made a 
permanent home cannot, after a certain time, be healthily governed on the 
principle of furnishing a regular dividend to shareholders in Europe.  The 
third lesson is that it is impossible to govern aright one part of the world, 
when the governors' eyes and minds are perpetually fixed on another.   
“Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."  The treasure of the 
Netherlands East India Company was in the East.  Their hearts, if they had 
any, their heads, while they had any, were there also.'
5  
 
British Rule in South Africa. 
The Peace of 1814 opened a new era in South Africa, but during the whole period 
between 1814 and 1899 there was constant friction between the British Government 
and the Dutch settlers.  The Dutch farmers, living primitive and isolated lives on their 
huge stock farms, were intensely conservative in temper, and very impatient of 
governmental control-particularly if that control took the form of interference between 
themselves and the natives upon whom they relied for labour.  The zeal of the English 
Government for improved administration, still more the zeal of the British missionaries 
on behalf of the natives, may perhaps have outrun their discretion.  Yet the services 
rendered to South Africa by such men as Moffat, Livingstone, McKenzie, and Maples 
cannot be over-estimated by the impartial historian.  Those services were not, however, 
appreciated by the Dutch farmers whose cup of indignation overflowed when, by the 
Act of 1833, their slaves were emancipated.  That [begin page 263] the administration of 
this Act involved a grievance and some actual hardship to the Boers cannot be denied.  
But the emancipation of the slaves was only the last and most bitter in the long series 
of offences which they alleged against their British rulers.  They resolved therefore to 
quit the land of tyranny and seek freedom in the vast hinterland of South Africa.  The 
great Boer trek (1836-40) is one of the turning-points in South African history; it led to 
the establishment of two Dutch communities, one in the Transvaal, and the other in the 
Orange Free State, and, for many years, still further complicated the relations between 
the two chief European races in South Africa. 
 
Britons and Boers. 
The policy pursued by the British Government towards Britons the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State was, to the last and Boers degree, vacillating.  Two possible 
alternatives presented themselves: either frankly to have acknowledged the 
independence of the Boer Republics; or firmly to have insisted that go where they 
might the Boers must remain subjects of the British Crown.  Neither policy was 
consistently pursued.  In 1848 Sir Harry Smith, the English Governor of Cape Colony, 
issued a proclamation to the effect that 'the whole territory between the Orange and 
Vaal Rivers as far east as the Drakensberg was to be under the sovereignty of the 
Queen'.  The Dutch settlers protested, and in 1852 Great Britain by the Sand River 
Convention conceded to the Dutch settlers beyond the Vaal River 'the right to manage 
their own affairs, and to govern themselves without any interference on the part of Her 
Majesty the Queen's government'.  Two conditions, however, were made: that the 
Transvaal was to be open to all comers on equal terms, and that no slavery was to be 
permitted or practised.  Two years later, by the Bloemfontein Convention, a similar 
concession was made to the Boers of the Orange Free State. 
 
                                                  
5   [262/1]  Historical Geography of the British Colonies, p. 107. Natal 
The policy thus initiated was maintained for the next Natal twenty years.  Meanwhile, a 
good deal had happened.  In 1824 a handful of English colonists had established [begin 
page 264] themselves at Port Natal.  For some years their existence was seriously 
menaced by their Boer neighbours to the north and west of the Drakensberg range.  
But in 1843 the Boers withdrew, and Natal was formally proclaimed to be a British 
Colony.  In 1868 the Boers on the Orange River became involved in a dispute with the 
Basutos, as a result of which the Basutos petitioned for British protection, and, in 1869, 
British sovereignty was proclaimed over Basutoland.  In 1871 Griqualand West was 
similarly annexed.  These annexations possess special significance.  They indicated 
that the policy of inertia pursued for a full generation in South Africa was abandoned.  A 
new temper was stirring at home and was reflected at the circumference of the Empire.  
Especially was it noticeable in Africa.  The motives which inspired the new movement 
were, as usual, mixed.  The acquisition of Griqualand brought into English hands the 
diamond fields of the Kimberley district, and this in turn meant the introduction of a new 
strain into the social life of South Africa.  Henceforward, the digger and the capitalist, 
restless and ambitious, planted themselves alongside the Dutch farmers whose one 
anxiety was to stand in the ancient ways.  Between the new immigrants and the old 
settlers there was no community of outlook, and no sympathy.  Hence the troubles that 
ensued.  
 
Annexation of the Transvaal 
In 1876 the Boers of the Transvaal were threatened with annihilation at the hands of 
their native neighbours.  Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs in 
Natal, was commissioned by Lord Carnarvon, then Secretary of State, to inquire into 
the disturbances, and was authorized at his discretion and provided it were desired by 
the inhabitants 'to annex to the British dominion all or part of the territories which 
formed the scene of his inquiry'.  Armed with this authority and convinced that 
annexation alone could save the Boers from their native enemies, Shepstone in 1877 
took over the administration of the Transvaal in the Queen's name.  The British 
Government now found itself face to face [begin page 265] with the Zulus.  The war 
which ensued (1878) began with a grievous disaster to British arms, but ended in the 
inevitable defeat of the Zulus.  The Boers, relieved of the danger which had threatened 
their existence, now demanded the retrocession of the Transvaal against the 
annexation of which they had from the first protested.  Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent 
out in June 1879 to take over as High Commissioner supreme civil and military 
command in the Transvaal.  Wolseley proclaimed that it was the determination of Her 
Majesty's Government that the Transvaal should remain for ever 'an integral portion of 
Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa’, but conferred upon the Boers a Crown 
Colony constitution.  Encouraged by a change of government in England (1880) the 
Boers responded by a declaration of independence.  War ensued, and a series of 
reverses - at Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba Hill - was followed by the conclusion of 
a convention at Pretoria which acknowledged the right of the Boers to complete self-
government under the suzerainty of the Queen.  Three years later (1884) this 
convention was amended by the Treaty of London, which, while reserving to the Crown 
the control of external relations, deleted all reference to the suzerainty of the Queen, 
and acknowledged the South African Republic. 
 
British Expansion in Africa. 
The set-back to British prestige and supremacy in British South Africa proved to be 
temporary.  In 1884 there began, as we have seen, a scramble for Africa among the 
Africa European Powers.  In 1885 a British Protectorate was established over 
Bechuanaland, partly no doubt with a view of preventing over-close relations between 
the Boer Republics and the recently established German colonies of Namaqualand and 
Damaraland (German South-West Africa).  In the same year a Charter was granted to 
the Royal Niger Company, which established a Protectorate over the Niger territory on the west coast.  But chartered companies and Protectorates alike represent, as a rule, 
somewhat transitory phases of develop- [begin page 266] ment, and in 1900 Nigeria 
was annexed to the Crown.  On the east coast the Chartered Company of East Africa 
(1888) prepared the way in similar fashion for the direct sovereignty of the Crown 
(1896).  In 1889 the Chartered Company of South Africa was, as we have seen, 
incorporated and started on its conquering and civilizing mission, establishing its 
sovereignty in no long time over the vast territory which stretches from the Limpopo in 
the south to Lake Nyassa on the east and Lake Tanganyika on the north. 
 
About the same time (1890) Portugal was induced to renounce all rights over the 
Hinterland which separated its possessions in the west (Angola) from Mozambique and 
Portuguese East Africa. In this way the two Boer Republics were virtually encircled by 
British territory. 
 
The Transvaal Goldfields. 
Meanwhile, in the Transvaal itself an event of first-rate importance had taken place.  
Valuable gold mines were discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand, and the discovery 
attracted a crowd of adventurers who had as little in common with the Boers of the 
Transvaal as had the diamond diggers of Kimberley with the farmers of the Orange 
Free State.  Consequently, the newly founded city of Johannesburg, with its new 
Chamber of Mines, soon found itself in conflict with Pretoria and the Volksraad.  The 
new-comers, or Uitlanders,  demanded political rights commensurate with their 
contribution to the wealth of the community.  The Boer Government, at that time 
dominated by President Kruger, refused to grant them.  In 1895 Cecil Rhodes became 
Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and in December of that same year the Uitlanders 
of the Transvaal attempted to take by force what had been denied to their arguments. 
 
The Jamieson Raid. 
Dr. Jameson, an intimate friend of the Premier of Cape Colony, and himself the 
administrator of the British South Africa Company, foolishly attempted to raid the 
Transvaal territory with an armed force.  The force, commanded by Jameson, was 
surrounded by the Boers at Krugersdorp and forced to surrender.  [begin page 267] 
 
The South African War 
Plainly, things were hastening towards a critical denouement in South Africa.  In 1895 
Mr. Chamberlain accepted office in Lord Salisbury's Ministry as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, and in 1897 Sir Alfred (afterwards Viscount) Milner was appointed 
Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa.  In the same year 
Mr. Chamberlain addressed to the High Commissioner an important dispatch setting 
forth in detail the grievances of the Uitlanders against the Transvaal Government, and 
at the same time instructing him to raise specifically the question of the status of the 
Transvaal under the Convention of 1884.  The terms of that Convention were 
admittedly ambiguous; the renunciation of suzerainty was a sentimental blunder, and 
recent events rendered it imperative, if grave consequences were not to ensue, that the 
situation should be cleared up.  The Transvaal Government attempted, not unnaturally, 
to use Jameson's blunder for the purpose of securing a revision in their favour of the 
terms of the Convention of London, but Mr. Chamberlain was adamant against any 
attempt on the part of the Dutch Republic to assert a status of complete sovereignty 
and independence.  Meanwhile, things could not remain as they were at 
Johannesburg.  In April 1899, Sir Alfred Milner forwarded to the Queen a petition, 
signed by 21,000 British subjects in the Transvaal, praying that the Queen would make 
inquiry into the grievances of which they were victims, and in particular their exclusion 
from all political rights.  A month later Mr. Chamberlain expressed in the House of 
Commons his complete sympathy with the terms of the petition.  Negotiations between 
the two parties ensued, and in June a Conference took place at Bloemfontein between 
President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner at which the latter vainly attempted to persuade the President to make some concession to the Uitlanders.  The situation became so 
menacing that reinforcements were dispatched from England to the Cape, but in 
numbers insufficient to assert the British claims, though more than [begin page 268] 
sufficient to provoke the apprehensions of the Boers.  In October 1899, the two Dutch 
Republics demanded the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and the 
submission of all the questions at issue to arbitration.  To concede the latter claim 
would have been to acknowledge the equality and sovereign status of the Transvaal 
Government.  On the implicit refusal of the demand the two Dutch Republics declared 
war (10th October).  The war followed the usual course of wars waged by this country: 
inadequate preparation; initial reverses; ultimate victory; but with its varying fortunes 
this narrative is not concerned.  In May 1902 peace was concluded at Vereeniging, and 
with the conclusion of peace the long contest for supremacy between the two 
European races in South Africa came to an end.  The Boers frankly accepted defeat; 
the British used their victory not merely with moderation but with generosity.  After the 
annexation of the two Burgher States to the Crown matters began to settle down so 
rapidly that it was deemed possible to confer responsible self-government upon the 
Transvaal in 1906, and upon the Orange River Colony in 1907. 
  
Federation or Union 
In South Africa, however, as in Canada and Australia, the attainment of responsible 
government was but the prelude to a further constitutional development.  Between the 
four self-governing colonies - Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River 
Colony - there was much in common: common interests to promote; common 
difficulties to face; common dangers to avert.  But the four colonies, though the most 
important, were not the only possessions of the Crown in South Africa.  The seven 
others were: Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Swaziland, Nyasaland, and 
Rhodesia, Southern, North-Western, and North-Eastern.  Each of these constituted a 
separate administrative area, and of their several interests and needs any scheme of 
government for South Africa, though designed primarily with reference to the self-
governing colonies, must needs take account.   [begin page 269] 
 
Root problems in South Africa 
Four problems, in particular, confronted British statesmanship in South Africa and 
demanded careful consideration: the position of the native population; the problem 
Africa of labour for the mines, for industry, and for agriculture; the railway system and 
railway rates; and, closely connected with the last, the tariff question. 
  
The glaring disproportion between the European and the aboriginal inhabitants has 
long been the crux of South African politics.  Presenting itself, as we have seen, with 
varying degrees of intensity in the several colonies the problem has naturally not been 
treated on uniform lines.  In Cape Colony, for example, where the proportion of white 
inhabitants to coloured is just about one to four, the treatment of the natives has been 
far more ‘generous’ than in Natal, where the proportion is roughly one to ten.  Cape 
Colony has based its policy on the formula: ‘Equal rights for all civilized men,' It has 
consistently acted on the supposition that ‘the problem will find its solution in narrowing 
the gulf which divides the races'.
6  Natives were admitted to the franchise on precisely 
the same terms as whites, and, in 1903, nearly fifty percent of the revenue raised by 
native taxation was devoted to expenditure on native education.  It was otherwise in 
Natal and the inland colonies.  Natal was at the same time raising 43.05 pence per 
head of the native population and spending 1.9 pence; the Orange River Colony was 
raising 43.6 pence and spending 1.8; the Transvaal was raising no less than 82.03 and 
spending only 1.5.  In none of these colonies were natives admitted to the franchise or 
to any sort of equality in social or political conditions.  The prevalent sentiment in these 
                                                  
6   [269/1]  The Government of South Africa, p, 128 (an anonymous work of great 
value published by the Central News Agency, South Africa, 1908),  colonies is in fact embodied in the blunt declaration of the republican Grondwet that 
‘the people will not tolerate equality between coloured and white inhabitants either in 
Church or State'.
7  Such divergence of temper and policy might [begin page 270] seem 
to have dictated a federal as opposed to a unitary form of constitution, and but for the 
overwhelming force of the argument derived from a consideration of the railway rates 
question and the tariff question, might possibly have been permitted to do so. 
  
Closely connected with the native problem is that of the treatment of Asiatic 
immigrants.  The whole labour problem in South Africa has, ever since the 
emancipation of the slaves, and more particularly since the discovery of diamonds and 
gold, been one of extraordinary complexity.  And it is further complicated by the caste 
system.  That system virtually forbids the white man to undertake unskilled labour, 
however small his capacity for anything higher.  Industry, however, is tending to 
outgrow the local supply of coloured labour, and inevitably, therefore, there has arisen 
a demand for coloured immigration.  The Natal plantations and the Transvaal mines 
alike rely in large measure upon Asiatic labour.  Cape Colony has never resorted, since 
the British occupation, to a similar expedient; yet for obvious reasons it is deeply 
concerned in the policy of its neighbours towards this and similar questions.  The 
interests of white South Africa clearly demand, therefore, if not a uniform treatment, at 
least a common consideration of these persistent problems. 
  
Earlier Schemes of Federation 
Long before they had become so insistent as they now are the disadvantages of 
separation had become apparent to the more far-seeing of English administrators in 
South Africa.  Among these one of the most vigorous and enlightened was Sir George 
Grey.  It was during his administration (1854-61) that Cape Colony was endowed with 
an elected Legislature, but Grey's vision extended far beyond any such constitutional 
expedient.  Looking beyond the vacillating policy hitherto pursued by Great Britain in 
South Africa, he saw that the only possible path of safety lay in some form of 
federation.  The State Paper in which, in 1858, he submitted his views to the Home 
Government is one of the ablest documents in the [begin page 271] history of our 
Colonial Empire.
8  Grey had the Support of the Boers of the Orange River Sovereignty.  
Their Volksraad resolved in 1858 'that a union or alliance with the Cape Colony, either 
on the plan of federation or otherwise, is desirable'.  The only reply of the Colonial 
Office was to recall Grey for exceeding his instructions.  He was restored by the 
personal intervention of the Queen, but he returned to Cape Town with tarnished 
prestige and with gravely impaired authority.  Had the Home Government grasped the 
problem as Sir George Grey grasped it, had they even had the sense to trust ‘the man 
on the spot’, the whole subsequent course of South African history might have been 
different.  Mr. F.W. Reitz, afterwards the Transvaal Secretary of State, wrote to Grey in 
1893: 'Had British Ministers in time past been wise enough to follow your advice, there 
would undoubtedly be today a British dominion extending from Table Bay to Zambesi.'
9  
But in those days the Manchester School was in the ascendant; in that school there 
was no room for statesmen of Grey's vision; the weary Titan was tired of the whole 
'burden’ of colonial establishments, and was looking forward to the happy day when 
'those wretched Colonies would no longer hang like millstones round our necks'. 
 
The Earl of Carnarvon. 
For the time being, therefore, the project was dropped.  It was revived by Lord 
Carnarvon, who, in 1874, became Secretary of State for the Colonies in Disraeli's 
                                                  
7   [269/2]  Ibid., p, 137. 
8    [270/1]  H.C. Papers 216 of 1860. Dispatch from Sir George Grey, dated 
Capetown, 19 November 1858. 
9   [271/2]  Quoted by Egerton, Federations, &c., p. 7I. Ministry.  Carnarvon was the minister who had been officially responsible for the 
enactment of the Federal Constitution for British North America, and was burning with 
the desire, intrinsically commendable, to confer a similar boon upon South Africa.  But 
the moment was inopportune and the means adopted to commend the project to South 
African opinion were singularly unfortunate.  Only in 1872 had Cape Colony been 
advanced to the dignity of [begin page 272] responsible' government; Natal had not yet 
reached it; the Burgher republics were still in enjoyment of the ambiguous 
independence conferred upon them in the early fifties.  The recent annexation of 
Griqualand West (1871) further complicated the situation.  None of the several 
communities - English or Dutch - in South Africa desired union with its neighbours and 
none was prepared to forego any shred of the independence it enjoyed.  The fates 
were not, therefore, favourable to the realization of Lord Carnarvon's far-sighted but 
premature project. 
 
Nevertheless, the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of the Cape in 1875 to 
propose that the several States of South Africa should be invited to a Conference to 
discuss native policy and other points of common interest, and to ventilate 'the all-
important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation'.
10  
The proposal was not welcomed in Cape Colony, and Mr. Froude, the eminent 
historian, who had been sent out to represent the Colonial Office at the proposed 
Conference, found his position highly embarrassing both to himself and to his hosts.
11  
Froude put his finger with great acuteness upon the root difficulty: 'If we can make up 
our minds to allow the colonists to manage the natives their own way we may safely 
confederate the whole country.'  Of federation, however, imposed upon them from 
London, the colonists would hear nothing.  The Conference in South Africa never met. 
  
Lord Carnarvon, not to be foiled, invited various gentlemen interested in South Africa to 
confer with him at the Colonial Office (August 1876).  The Cape Premier, Mr. Molteno, 
happened to be in London but was forbidden by his colleagues to attend; no delegate 
was present from the Transvaal; and Mr. Brand, President of the Orange Free State 
(who greatly impressed Froude), attended under strict injunctions from his Volksraad 
not [begin page 273] to take part in any negotiations respecting federation, by which the 
independence of his own State could be endangered.  Sir Theophilus Shepstone and 
two members of the local Legislature represented Natal.  As regards federation the 
meeting was entirely abortive.
12  
 
Despite this discouragement, Lord Carnarvon sent out to South Africa (in December 
1876) the draft of a permissive Confederation Bill, which in the session of 1877 was 
passed into law by the Imperial Legislature.  This enabling Act contained the outline of 
a complete Federal Constitution.  It was for the South African Colonies to fill it in if they 
would.  Lord Carnarvon, while insisting that the 'action of all parties whether in the 
British Colonies or the Dutch States must be spontaneous and uncontrolled’, informed 
the new Governor of the Cape that he had been selected' to carry my scheme of 
confederation into 'effect'.
13  The man chosen for this high task was one of the most 
trusted and experienced servants of the Crown, one to whose life-work the 
confederation of South Africa might form an appropriate and noble crown.  It was the 
expressed hope of his Chief that within two years he would be 'the first Governor-
General of South Africa'.  The words read ironically, for the reign of Sir Bartle Frere 
(1877-80) coincided, through no fault of his own, with the darkest chapter in the volume 
of South African history. 
                                                  
10   [272/1]  Lucas, op. cit., p. 264.  
11   [272/2]  Cf. Paul, Life of Froude. c. vii. Eight gentlemen invited to meet him at 
dinner at Government House refused. 
12   [273/1]  Lucas, op cit., p. 265. 
13   [273/2]  Egerton, Federations, &c., p. 72.  
With that chapter we have already summarily dealt.  It was not finally closed until the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Vereeniging.  The grant of responsible government to the 
former Boer republics (1906-7) served at once to accentuate the inconveniences and 
even the dangers of isolation and to open out the path to some form of association.  
 
Reasons for Closer Union. 
Of the causes which induced, in each of the colonies concerned, a more favourable 
disposition toward the idea of closer union two have been already analysed.  Even 
more insistent though not more persistent were the [begin page 274] closely related 
questions of tariff policy and railway administration.  There was the problem also of 
common defence, not to mention the grave inconvenience, daily more manifest under 
the new conditions which had obtained since 1902, of a lack of uniformity in law and, 
still more, in the methods of administering it.  A partial attempt to meet the latter 
difficulty was made in 1905 when the question of establishing a South African Court of 
Appeal was referred for consideration to the attorneys-general of the four colonies and 
Rhodesia; but the attempt proved abortive, thus furnishing an additional argument to 
those who had long been convinced of the difficulty of attaining unity in any particular 




The problem of common defence was still more pressing.  The coast colonies were 
wholly dependent for protection upon the Imperial navy: the inland colonies as well as 
those on the coast relied upon the English garrison for the preservation of order 
amongst the native peoples when such a task imposed too great a strain upon local 
resources.  In view of their dependence upon the Royal Navy Cape Colony made an 
annual contribution of £50,000, and Natal of £35,000, towards the expense of 
maintaining it, and each supported a small force of naval volunteers.  The inland 
colonies contributed nothing.  The Imperial garrison was maintained in South Africa, 
less for local reasons than on larger grounds of Imperial policy; consequently no 
contribution towards its upkeep was made or expected.  The cost to the tax-payers of 
the United Kingdom was, in 1907, £2,500,000, in addition to the charge for interest 
upon a capital sum of £6,500,000 spent upon cantonments and other establishments.
15 
With a view to the improvement of the means of internal defence a conference of the 
four colonies and Rhodesia met at Johannesburg in 1907, and an admirable scheme 
was drafted; but the difficulties in the way of its adoption in the several colonies only 
[begin page 275] afforded a further illustration of the inconveniences attendant upon 
constitutional separation.  
 
Immigration 
The necessity for the control of immigration supplied another argument in favour of 
closer union, but nothing non did so much to convince the recalcitrant as the difficulty 
of finding an equitable solution of the tariff problem and the apparently inextricable 
contusion arising from the separate State ownership and management of the railways. 
  
'I can come to no other conclusion’, wrote Mr. I. Conacher, whose Report on 
the prae-union railway system is the locus classicus on the subject, ' than 
that under present conditions no settlement of a permanent character can be 
reached and that any settlement that may now be found practicable would, 
while it lasted, have a tendency to delay further extensions of the railways 
                                                  
14   [274/1]  Government of South Africa. p. 60.  
15   [274/2]  Ibid., p. 100. not of a purely local character through fear of reopening old questions that 
had been settled.'
16   
 
The Railway System. 
All the railways in South Africa were State railways; private enterprise cannot be relied 
upon to provide means of communication in a country of vast extent, sparsely peopled 
and where the supply must necessarily be always somewhat ahead of the demand.  
But South Africa by no means escaped the disadvantages attaching, as the Australian 
Colonies have also learnt to their cost, to State ownership and State management.  Nor 
were those disadvantages diminished by the fact that there were four States and four 
railway systems.  Moreover, in two States - Cape Colony and Natal - the possibility of 
maintaining financial equilibrium depended upon the revenue from railways, and that 
revenue depended mainly upon the traffic between the coast colonies and the 
Witwatersrand.  There is, therefore, little cause to wonder that one of the most 
important and elaborate chapters in the South African Act is that which is devoted to' 
Finance and Railways '. 
 
Customs Duties. 
The two problems were inextricably bound up with Customs each other: and both had 
provided abundant oppor [begin page 276] tunities for friction between State and State.  
For many years the inland States were entirely at the mercy of Cape Colony and Natal.  
These coast colonies controlled the import trade and used their power in a manner 
which Mr. Brand does not hesitate to stigmatize as 'unscrupulous'.
17  The whole of the 
import duties derived from goods consigned to the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal went into the Treasuries of the coast colonies.  In 1884 Cape Colony granted 
a rebate to the inland colonies, in 1886 Natal followed suit, and in 1889 a Customs 
Union was concluded between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State to which 
Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate shortly afterwards adhered. 
 
Attitude of the Boers. 
The iron of injustice had, however, entered into the of the soul of the Boers, and Paul 
Kruger, President of the Transvaal Republic, was determined to get even with the coast 
colonies for the greed they had displayed as long as they were masters of the situation.  
Lord Kimberley's failure to acquire Delagoa Bay gave Kruger his chance, and he used 
it to the full.  Delagoa Bay is forty miles nearer to Johannesburg than is Durban, and 
still nearer than are the Cape Colony ports of East London and Port Elizabeth.  The line 
from the Transvaal to Delagoa Bay was largely controlled by the Netherlands Railway 
Company, in other words by the Transvaal Boers, and Kruger resolved, therefore, to 
divert traffic to the Delagoa Bay route.  He raised the rates on the forty miles of 
Transvaal territory over which the Cape-Free-State railway passed on its way to the 
Rand higher than those on the whole length of the Delagoa Bay railway between 
Johannesburg and the coast.  So successful was this unscrupulous device that by 
1808 the Cape ports which in 1894 had got 80 percent of the traffic, were getting only 
11 percent, that Durban's share was steadily declining, and that Delagoa Bay had 
secured no less than 67 per cent.
18
 
Kruger's animosity was directed, however, not only against the coast colonies, but still 
more against the [begin page 277] mining community of the Rand.  In order to impose 
the greatest inconvenience and damage upon them, the goods traffic was shunted and 
otherwise delayed at Viljoen's Drift, at the Transvaal frontier.  To meet this menace the 
mine owners organized a service of ox-wagons between the Drifts and Johannesburg.  
                                                  
16   [275/1]  Quoted, ibid., p. 208. 
17   [276/1]  Op. cit., p. 15.  
18   [276/2]  Brand, Op. cit., p. 20. Kruger, thereupon, closed the Drifts, and feeling ran so high that in 1895 an outbreak of 
war was barely averted.  It had been better perhaps if the war had not been postponed; 
for on the point then at issue the Dutch both of the Orange Free State and of Cape 
Colony were at one with the oppressed Uitlanders of the Transvaal.  Mr. Schreiner, the 
Dutch Premier of Cape Colony, promised indeed that the Colony would bear half the 
cost of the war, should the Imperial Government find it necessary, in order to enforce 
their claims, to resort to it.  Mr. Chamberlain dispatched an ultimatum to President 
Kruger calling upon him immediately to reopen the Drifts, and Kruger, whose 
preparations for war were not quite complete, obeyed.  The incident is, nevertheless, 
admirably illustrative of the intimate connexion in South Africa between railway 
administration and high policy. 
 
The destruction wrought by the South African War naturally intensified all the fiscal and 
economic problems which had previously confronted the several Colonies.  While the 
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were under Crown Colony Government Lord 
Milner took the opportunity of amalgamating the two railway systems, to the obvious 
advantage of both and in particular of the Orange River Colony which thus obtained a 
share in the increasing prosperity of the Delagoa Bay railway.  Already, in 1901, Lord 
Milner, impelled by the urgent necessity of getting the Rand mines to work again, and, 
faced by the shortage of labour, concluded an agreement with the Portuguese 
Government.  The agreement stipulated for the provision of recruiting facilities for 
native labour in Portuguese territory, and, on the other side, that railway rates should 
not be altered to the [begin page 278] detriment of Delagoa Bay.  The arrangement, 
concluded by the High Commissioner without consultation with the Cape Colony or 
Natal, was little to the liking of those communities.  The competition of Delagoa Bay 
was, as already observed, seriously affecting their traffics and therefore their revenues, 
and the incident consequently supplied yet another to the rapidly accumulating reasons 
in favour of a unification of interests.  
 
Lord Milner’s ‘parting word.’ 
Just before his final departure from South Africa Lord Milner addressed to a conference 
at Johannesburg his ‘parting word' on this question.  Nor did that word lack emphasis.  
A great proconsul whose name will ever be associated with one of the most memorable 
chapters in South African history put on record his 'conviction of the supreme 
importance of trying to get over the conflict of State interests in the matter of railways'. 
 
‘Under the present system,’ he said, ' of four separate administrations the 
benefit to the country generally of any new line is constantly obscured and 
thrown into the background by considerations of its effect upon the 
comparative profits from the railways of the several States. . . . That line 
may be indefinitely blocked because it is going to take money out of the 
pocket of a particular administration.  If there were only one pocket this 
obstacle would never arise. . . .We have got into a rut, and we shall never get 
out of that rut until there is community of interest in all the main railways of 
South Africa.' 
 
The seed sown by Lord Milner fell on prepared ground.  Every responsible statesman 
in South Africa, to whichever of the States he might belong, realized that they were on 
the brink of a crisis hardly inferior to that of 1899.  It was precipitated by the action of 
the Transvaal Government.  After the war, the Customs Union of 1899 was enlarged to 
include the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia, but the severe depression which 
ensued necessitated the raising of a larger revenue from this source.  A conference 
was consequently held at Maritzburg in the spring of 1906 to consider the question.  
Some measure [begin page 279] of agreement was ultimately reached, but with the 
greatest difficulty, for the Transvaal naturally objected to a tariff framed primarily in the 
interests of the coast colonies.  No Sooner, however, did the Transvaal attain to Responsible Government than it notified the other Governments of its intention to 
withdraw from the Customs Union. 
  
This action compelled the immediate consideration of the larger issue.  Was South 
Africa to face the certainty of commercial chaos, the not remote possibility of an inter- 
colonial war?  The interests of the several Colonies were not, on the narrower view, 
identical.  The Transvaal might have prospered in isolation, protecting itself against its 
neighbours by a tariff, and relying upon the non-British port of Delagoa Bay.  It might 
have extended its protection to the Orange River Colony.  What then would have been 
the plight of the Coast colonies already severely depressed by the aftermath of war?  
The question of closer union could no longer be deferred.  
 
Educational Propaganda. 
Opinion had been rapidly maturing.  Lord Milner had called to his aid a brilliant staff of 
young men, mainly Oxford graduates of distinction, Who in the midst of other work, 
administrative and journalistic, set themselves deliberately to prepare the way for the 
federation of the South African Colonies.  A Closer Union Society, with many branches, 
was formed to explore the whole subject in a scientific spirit, and under its auspices 
was published in 1908 a work entitled The Framework of Union which, in addition to an 
historical account of the evolution of federal unity in Canada and Australia, contained 
an analytical comparison of the constitutions of the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, and Switzerland.  Compiled primarily with a view to propaganda in South 
Africa the work makes an exceedingly valuable contribution to the history of Federalism 
in the modern world.  Lord Selborne, Who, in 1905, succeeded Lord Milner as High 
Commissioner, published in 1907 a Review of the Mutual Relations of the British South 
African [begin page 280] Colonies - a masterly State paper comparable in significance 
with Lord Durham's historic Report on Canada.  The case for closer union was there 
stated not only with unique authority but with compelling closeness of argument.   
Lastly, in final preparation for the deliberations of those who were to be actually 
responsible for the framing of a constitution for South Africa, the indefatigable members 
of the Closer Union Society published two portly volumes entitled The Government of 
South Africa.  This invaluable work provides at once a treatise on Political Science, a 
searching analysis of existing conditions in South Africa and a manual of constitutional 
procedure for the Union. 
  
Union or Federalism 
Union had now become the avowed aim of the reformers.  Starting with a preference 
for the federal form of government, already, as we have seen, adopted in the two 
greatest of the British Dominions, the best opinion in South Africa moved with great 
rapidity and remarkable unanimity towards the adoption of an even closer form of 
union.  To this conclusion critics were impelled by considerations the force of which has 
been discussed in preceding paragraphs.  The most superficial acquaintance with 
South Africa will suffice for an appreciation of the basic truth that the territorial divisions 
in that country run on lines which are artificial and accidental, and that the fundamental 
division is between race and race.  'The situation’, wrote Lord Selborne, 'is startling, 
because it is without precedent.  No reasoning man can live in South Africa and doubt 
that the existence there of a white community must, from first to last, depend upon their 
success or failure in finding a right solution of the coloured and native questions.'  The 
solution could be best explored in a united parliament.'  If all South Africa were united 
under one Parliament. . . such a Parliament would beget, what cannot exist without it, 
an informed public opinion on South African affairs.  It would bring into existence a 
class of men throughout the country accustomed to reflect on questions as they [begin 
page 281] affected it in every part.'  Federalism might possibly have availed, though less 
effectively, for this.  The paramount and finally compelling reason for preferring union 
was provided by the interwoven problem of tariffs and railway rates. 
 In May 1908 a conference met at Pretoria to try and find a way out of the tangle.  
Hardly had the delegates got to business before they realized that under the existing 
conditions no way could be found.  They began therefore by passing a unanimous 
resolution pledging their several Governments to summon a National Convention for 
the purpose of drafting a constitution for South Africa.  For the primary problem 
submitted to the Conference no solution could be discovered.  The maritime colonies 
refused to allow the Transvaal to adjust railway rates; the Transvaal would not assent 
to any increase in customs duties beyond the scale of 1906.  The deadlock was 
complete, but all parties agreed to an ad interim continuation of the agreement of 1906.  
If the Constitutional Convention failed, war was plainly in sight. 
 
Constitutional Convention. 
The best men in South Africa were resolved that it should succeed.  On 12 October 
1908 the Convention met at Durban.  It consisted of thirty-three delegates elected by 
the four Parliaments.  The proceedings were wisely conducted behind closed doors, 
but Mr. R.H. Brand who acted as secretary to the Transvaal delegation has, within strict 
limits of discretion, thrown some light upon its procedure and, in particular, has given 
an interesting account of its personnel.  The Federal Convention of America was 
remarkable for the large proportion of university graduates;
19  the Australian 
Convention was particularly rich in constitutional lawyers; the outstanding characteristic 
of the Durban Convention was, according to Mr. Brand, 'the preponderance of the 
farming element'.  About one-third of the delegates were ‘farmers pure and simple', 
several others were largely interested in farming; of the rest there were 'about ten 
[begin page 282] lawyers, two or three men connected with commerce and mining, two 
journalists, and three ex-officials '.  
 
Draft Bill Rapid progress was made during October at Durban, and in December the 
Convention resumed its sittings at Cape Town where, by the end of the first week in 
February (1909), a draft Bill had been completed for submission to the several 
Parliaments.  On the advice of their trusted leaders the Transvaal Parliament agreed to 
the draft without amendment.  There was no such unanimity in the other Parliaments.  
The Boers at Bloemfontein raised the burning question of 'equal rights’ and equal 
values to be attached to votes in urban and rural constituencies.  The Parliament at 
Cape Town could neither abandon its own position as to the political equality of whites 
and natives, nor impose its views upon its neighbours.  Natal, proud and tenacious of 
its 'English’ character, was fearful lest union might involve its absorption into a 'Dutch’ 
South Africa and would have preferred a federal scheme.  Subject, however, to several 
amendments the draft Bill was approved. 
  
After the consideration of the draft Bill by the several Parliaments the Convention 
resumed its sittings - this time at Bloemfontein.  The main stumbling-block was the 
variety of electoral qualifications in the different colonies.  Proving to be insuperable, 
the difficulty was, as will be seen later, evaded by accepting the existing franchise in 
each colony.  The Bill as amended at Bloemfontein was then submitted to the 
Legislatures in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony, and to 
the people by referendum in Natal.  By June 1909 it had been ratified by all the 
constituent colonies; it encountered no serious difficulties in the Imperial Parliament, 
and on 20 September 1909 the Bill' to constitute the Union of South Africa received the 
Royal Assent, and took its place on the British Statute Book as 9 Edw. 71 ch. 9.  
 
The genesis, the progress, and the achievement of the South African Union constitute 
one of the most memorable incidents in the political history of the modern [begin page 
283] world.  Mr. Balfour spoke the thoughts of his countrymen and almost certainly 
anticipated the verdict of history when he said in the House of Commons: ' This Bill, 
soon I hope to become an Act, is the most wonderful issue out of all those divisions, 
                                                  
19   [281/1]  Twenty-nine out of fifty-five. controversies, battles and outbreaks, the devastation and horrors of war, the difficulties 
of peace.  I do not believe the world shows anything like it in its whole history.’  
 
Characteristics of the Constitution  
It remains to examine some of the outstanding characteristics of the Constitution which 
had thus come to the birth. 
 
(a) Sovereign Legislature  
Subject, of course, to the paramount authority of the Crown, the Union Legislature is a 
sovereign body, unfettered by any limitations imposed upon it in the interests of the 
provinces, and free to amend or repeal (subject to certain temporary provisions) any 
clause of the Constitution.  In brief, the South African Parliament has not only 
legislative but constituent authority.  The Constitution itself is consequently not rigid but 
flexible.  This at once and widely differentiates the South African Constitution and its 
Legislature from the Constitutions and Legislatures of the Canadian Dominion and the 
Australian Commonwealth, not to add that of the United States of America.  Flexible 
constitutions and sovereign legislatures are in fact incompatible with Federalism.  In 
both respects South Africa enjoys the advantages (but may also incur the dangers) of 
Unitarianism.  It is proper to add that the powers here ascribed to the Union Legislature 
are subject to two limitations, the one temporary, the other permanent, prescribed in § 
152 as follows: 
 
(b) Amendment 
Parliament may by law repeal or alter any of the provisions of this Act: Provided that no 
provision thereof, for the operation of which a definite period of time is prescribed, shall 
during such period be repealed or altered: And provided further that no repeal or 
alteration of the provisions contained in this section, or in sections thirty-three and 
thirty- four (until the number of members of the House of Assembly
20 [begin page 284] 
has reached the limit therein prescribed, or until a period of ten years has elapsed after 
the establishment of the Union, whichever is the longer period), or in sections thirty-five 
and one hundred and thirty-seven,
21 shall be valid unless the Bill embodying such 
repeal or alteration shall be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and 
at the third reading be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total number of 
members of both Houses.  A Bill so passed at such joint sitting shall be taken to have 
been duly passed by both Houses of Parliament. 
  
(c) Qualifications of voters. 
Section 35 deals with the qualification of electors and the compromise arrived at, as we 
have seen, after infinite trouble.  To have attempted to prescribe a uniform franchise 
throughout the Union would unquestionably have wrecked the whole scheme.  Neither 
in the Cape Colony itself, nor in England, would public opinion have permitted the 
disfranchisement of the coloured voters.  No one of the other three colonies would 
have enfranchised them; nor could Cape Colony, with its colour equality, have adopted 
the manhood suffrage on which the Transvaal relied.  There was nothing for it, 
therefore, but to leave these difficult questions for the future to settle.  Accordingly,  
clause 35, and its corollary, ran as follows: 
  
‘1. Parliament may by law prescribe the qualifications which shall be 
necessary to entitle persons to vote at the election of members of the House 
                                                  
20   [283/1]  These prescribe the number of members to be elected (a) at the first 
election; (b) subsequently. 
21    [284/1]  Section 137 refers to equality in the use of the English and Dutch 
languages. of Assembly, but no such law shall disqualify any person in the province of 
the Cape of Good Hope who, under the laws existing in the Colony of the 
Cape of Good Hope at the establishment of the Union, is or may become 
capable of being registered as a voter from being so registered in the 
province of the Cape of Good Hope by reason of his race or colour only, 
unless the Bill be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and 
at the third reading be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of both Houses.  A Bill so passed at such joint sitting 
shall be taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of Parliament.  
[begin page 285] 
 
‘2. No person who at the passing of any such law is registered as a voter in 
any province shall be removed from the register by reason only of any 
disqualification based on race or colour. 
  
‘Subject to the provisions of the last preceding section, the qualifications of 
parliamentary voters, as existing in the several Colonies at the establishment 
of the Union, shall be the qualifications necessary to entitle persons in the 
corresponding provinces to vote for the election of members of the House of 
Assembly. . .’ 
 
(d) Bicameral Legislature 
Following the precedent set with unanimity by an English-speaking communities, and 
indeed by the civilized world, the Legislature was constituted on the bicameral system; 
and was to consist of a Senate and a House of Assembly. 
 
The Senate  
The Senate was, for the first ten years after the establishment of the Union, to be 
constituted as Senate follows: 
 
(a)    eight Senators to be nominated for a term of ten years, by the 
Governor-General in Council; and 
(b)   eight Senators elected by each of the four original provinces. 
 
Of the eight to be nominated by the Governor-General four were to be selected 'on the 
ground mainly of their thorough acquaintance, by reason of their official experience or 
otherwise, with the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races in South Africa.’  
The eight members representing each province were to be elected, also for ten years, 
in a joint session of the two Houses of the then existing Colonial Legislatures, on the 
principle of proportional representation.  
 
These provisions were to be in force for ten years only; after the expiration of that 
period the South African Parliament might provide for the constitution of the Senate in 
any manner it might see fit, or it might leave things as they are.  In the latter event the 
elected members of the Senate will in future be chosen by the Provincial Council of 
each province acting conjointly with the members of the House of Assembly 
representing that province in the Union Parliament
22 voting by propor- [begin page 286] 
tional representation.  The temporary character of these provisions was due primarily to 
                                                  
22   [285/1]  The Senate was, according to the terms of the Constitution, dissolved in 
1920, but has been reconstituted on the same basis.  The Senatorial Elections took 
place on 23 February 1921, following upon the elections for the House of 
Assembly and resulted as follows: South African Party, 17; Nationalists, 13; 
Labour 2. Most of the eight nominated members belong naturally to the first party.  the desire to emphasize the essentially unitary character of the Constitution.  Further, it 
was hoped by the leaders of South African opinion that after the lapse of a few years, 
when experience had been gained as to the working of the new centripetal institutions, 
and the advantages of union had been more generally recognized, 'provincial feeling 
would have so far given way to national feeling that it might be possible at the end of 
that time to make a nearer approach to the unitary principle'.
23  For this, as we must 
constantly bear in mind, was the goal of the Constitution - not a federal but a united 
South Africa. 
  
The qualifications for Senatorship are five in number, and, with one exception, of the 
usual kind.  A Senator must; 
 
(i)   be not less than thirty years of age; 
(ii)   possess the qualification of a voter for the election of members of the 
House of Assembly in one of the provinces; 
(iii)   have resided for five years within the Union; 
(iv)   in the case of an elected Senator, possess real property of the net 
value of £500; and 
(v)   be a British subject of European descent. 
 
The last-mentioned qualification strikes a note which resounds throughout the 
Instrument, and it was the note which aroused the severest criticism in the Imperial 
Parliament.  It was a tempting opportunity for the leaders of a certain section of British 
opinion.  The protection of the 'native' population in British dominions throughout the 
world, is, in truth, a peculiar and cherished prerogative of the Imperial Parliament.  But 
even in the exercise of prerogative there must be some consistency.  To make an 
immense and far-reaching concession of self-government, to confer upon a distant 
dependency the heaviest responsibilities, and to deny to its citizens the right to deal as 
they will in their [begin page 287] wisdom, or even their unwisdom, with a question of 
vital and overwhelming importance, is surely the part, not of statesmanship, but of 
political ineptitude.  
 
It may be repugnant to the canons of doctrinaire democracy to assent to a clause 
restricting membership of either House to 'men of European descent’, but to have 
insisted on its deletion would have meant the postponement of Union in South Africa to 
the Greek Kalends.  In view of the gravity and complexity of the problems with which 
South Africa was and is confronted, - problems which a divided South Africa could not 
face, and even a united South Africa may fail to solve, - it will surely be held that the 
Imperial Parliament exhibited wisdom in declining to accept the responsibility of such 
postponement.   
 
The President of the Senate is elected from among the Senators and has a casting 
vote.  Otherwise questions are determined by a simple majority.  Twelve members form 
a quorum.  The Governor-General may dissolve the Senate simultaneously with the 
House of Assembly, or may dissolve the latter alone.  But it is provided in the Act (§ 20) 
that the Senate shall not be dissolved within a period of ten years after the 
establishment of the Union, and that the dissolution shall not affect the nominated 
Senators.  All Senators, like members of the House of Assembly, receive £400 a year, 
but forfeit £3 a day for every day of absence during the session.  Each House has 
power to make rules and orders regulating its own procedure.  
 
Money Bills 
The relations of the two Houses were defined with precision.  Money Bills must 
originate in the House of Assembly, but it is provided -  
 
                                                  
23   [286/1]  R.H. Brand, op. cit., p. 68. (1)   That 'A Bill shall not be taken to appropriate revenue or moneys or to 
impose taxation by reason only of its containing provisions for the 
imposition or appropriation of fines or other pecuniary penalties'; and 
 (2)   that 'Any Bill which appropriates revenue or moneys for the ordinary 
annual services shall deal only with such appropriation’. 
[begin page 288] 
 
Deadlocks 
The South African Senate can, like the Australian, reject, but cannot amend, a Money 
Bill.  As regards both Money Bills and ordinary legislation the Senate possesses only a 
suspensive veto.  If a Bill passes the House of locks Assembly in two successive 
sessions, and is twice rejected by the Senate, or receives at the hands of the Senate 
amendments to which the House will not agree, the Governor-General may, during the 
second session, convene a joint sitting, and the Bill, if then passed by a simple majority 
of the members of both Houses, shall be deemed to have been duly passed by 
Parliament, and may be presented for the Royal Assent.  In the case of a Money Bill 
the procedure is even more stringent; for the joint sitting may be convened during the 
same session in which the Senate 'rejects or fails to pass such Bill'.  
 
The solution thus provided for a deadlock is generally similar to that of the Australian 
Commonwealth Act, but with this essential difference: the Australian Act provides for an 
appeal to the electorate: in the South African scheme there is no such provision.  The 
difference between the two schemes may perhaps be connected with the more 
democratic character of the Australian Constitution, and still more directly with the fact 
that the South African Parliament, unlike the Australian, is competent to amend even 
the Constitution itself. 
 
The House of Assembly 
The House of Assembly, as constituted by the Act, was to be directly elected on the 
basis of provinces.  Of the 121 original members, 51 were allotted to the Cape of Good 
Hope, 36 to the Transvaal, and to Natal and the Orange Free State 17 each.  The 
ultimate basis of representation was the number of European male adults in each 
province, periodically readjusted after each census, but with this provision: that while 
the numbers might be increased, they could not, in the case of any Original Province, 
be diminished until the number reaches 150,
24 or until a period of ten years shall have 
elapsed after the establishment of the Union, whichever is the longer [begin page 289] 
period.  Both the Cape Colony and the Transvaal accepted a smaller representation 
than that to which they were on the numerical basis entitled, but the representation of 
the Transvaal has since been increased to fifty.  As soon as the total numbers reach 
650 the seats are to be redistributed on a strictly numerical basis without regard to 
provincial divisions.  In this, as in other provisions of the Act, we perceive the 
centripetal ambitions of its authors, temporarily held in check by the prudent anxiety not 
to wound historical susceptibilities nor to go faster in a unitary direction than public 
opinion would justify. 
 
With the provisions as to the franchise we have already dealt.  The constituencies were 
to return one member each and were to be delimited by a commission, as far as 
possible on a strictly numerical basis.  To this extent sanction was given to the principle 
of 'one vote, one value'.  That principle was, as we have seen, stoutly opposed, more 
particularly by the Boer farmers living in the sparsely populated districts of the Cape 
Colony.  To meet their views the Commissioners were directed, in defining the electoral 
districts, to give due consideration to-  
 
(a)   community or diversity of interests; 
                                                  
24   [288/1]  The number is now (1925) 135. (b)  means of communication; 
(c)   physical features;  
(d)  existing electoral boundaries;  
(e)   sparsity or density of population;  
 
in such manner that, while taking the quota of voters as the basis of division, the 
Commissioners may, whenever they deem it necessary, depart therefrom, but in no 
case to any greater extent than fifteen per centum more or fifteen per centum less than 
the quota. 
  
Even with these qualifications it was found difficult to obtain the assent of the Cape 
Colony Parliament to the acceptance of the principle of one vote one value.  In order to 
save a principle to which the Transvaal inflexibly adhered, it was found necessary to 
sacrifice the idea of [begin page 290] electing the House, like the Senate, on the system 
of proportional representation.  The Boers of the Cape detested this device almost as 
cordially as that of equal electoral districts.  Compromise was, therefore, the only way 
out. 
  
Qualification of members. 
The Instrument contained the usual provisions as to disqualification of membership for 





(a)   be qualified to be registered as a voter for the election of members of 
the House of Assembly in one of the provinces;  
(b)   have resided for five years within the limits of the Union as existing at 
the time when he is elected;  
(c)   be a British subject of European descent. 
 
The qualification as to European descent represented a concession on the part of the 
Cape Colony, where natives had hitherto been eligible for election to Parliament, 
though in fact no native had ever been elected. 
 
The Executive  
The provisions in regard to the Executive demand only brief notice.  The Executive is, 
in the English sense, parliamentary and responsible.  Formally vested in the Crown, it 
is practically exercised by an Executive Council composed of the ‘King's Ministers of 
State for the Union'. 
 
As in Australia, Ministers must, under the Constitution, be members of one or other 
House of the Legislature, and by custom they are allowed to sit and speak but not to 
vote in both Houses: Their number is not to exceed ten, exclusive, in practice, of one or 
two Ministers ‘without portfolio’.
25  
 
By section 18 Pretoria was designated as the seat of Government of the Union.  But by 
‘Government' was understood' Executive Government’, for under section 23 Cape 
Town was to be the seat of the Legislature.  This device, awkward and illogical, is 
another significant [begin page 291] illustration of the spirit of compromise by which the 
whole Constitution is infused.  Similar in origin and in character is the bilingual 
compromise contained in section 137 which runs as follows: 
  
                                                  
25   [290/1]  The delimitation of departmental duties and the allocation of departments 
to Ministers varies with each administration. ‘Both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the 
Union, and shall be treated on a footing of equality, and possess and enjoy 
equal freedom, rights, and privileges; all records, journals, and proceedings 
of parliament shall be kept in both languages, and all Bills, Acts, and notices 
of general public importance or interest issued by the Government of the 
Union shall be in both languages.' 
 
This section is among those which cannot be repealed except by the special machinery 
prescribed in section 152. 
 
Provincial Constitutions.  
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the unitary character of the Constitution than the 
disappearance of the original Colonies and States.  In their place there are four 
Provinces, for the government of which elaborate provision is made in the Act. 
  
The chief executive officer in each Province is an Administrator who is appointed (for 
five years) and paid by the Union Government.  Legislative authority is vested in 
Provincial Councils which are to be elected by the same electors, distributed (as far as 
possible) in the same constituencies, as the Parliament.  The number of provincial 
councillors is to be the same as that of the parliamentary representatives, provided it is 
not less than twenty-five.  The Councils continue for three years and cannot, save by 
effluxion of time, be dissolved.  They have power to make ordinances in relation to any 
matter delegated to them by Parliament, and to a number of enumerated subjects, 
such as: direct taxation, local loans, education (other than higher), agriculture (within 
limits defined by Parliament), roads, markets, and hospitals.  Provincial ordinances 
must receive the assent; of the Governor-General in Council, but the Councils may 
recommend to Parliament the passing of legislation beyond their own competence. 
  
Each Council appoints an Executive Committee of four [begin page 292] persons, who 
mayor may not be members of the Council, to carry on with the Administrator the 
administration of provincial affairs.  As the election of the Executive Committees is 
under proportional representation it was intended that they should not be partisan in 
character, but should approximate rather to the standing committees appointed by local 
councils in this country.  
 
Generally speaking, the Provinces are intended to be, and are, in a position of marked 
inferiority as compared with that of the Canadian Provinces, and still more with that of 
the constituent States of the Australian Commonwealth.  The authority of the Union 
Parliament is paramount; it can legislate concurrently on the same topics as the 
Provincial Councils, and can exercise complete control over the legislation of the latter.  
Absolute too is the control of the Union Government over provincial finance.  No 
appropriation can be made except on the recommendation of the Administrator, and his 
warrant is required for all expenditure (section 89).  Moreover, in every province there 
is one auditor, appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and every warrant issued 
by the Administrator must be countersigned by the auditor who is paid by and 
responsible to the Union Government. 
  
It is noticeable, however, as an acute critic has pointed out that, complete as is the 
power of the Union Government over the provinces, no control over the latter is 
reserved to the Imperial Government.  The power of assent or reservation is vested not 
in the Governor-General, who might in such matters receive his instructions from 
Whitehall, but in the Governor-General in Council, in other words in the Union Ministry.  
In the South African Constitution there is not a trace of federal spirit, though some 
deference is paid to federal forms. 
 New Provinces and Territories  
The Constitution further provides for the admission to the Union of new provinces and 
territories: in particular of Rhodesia.  The King-in-Council is empowered to act on 
addresses from the two Houses of the Union Parliament, [begin page 293] while 
Parliament is authorized to alter the boundaries of any province, divide a province into 
two or more provinces, or form a new province out of provinces within the Union, on the 
petition of the Provincial Council of every province whose boundaries are affected 
thereby.  Thus far (1925) none of the old provinces has been divided, though the 
division of Cape Colony is overdue, and no new territories have been admitted.  The 
native territories, Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland, remain 
under Imperial control which is exercised by Resident Commissioners under the 
direction of the High Commissioner, and it is said that the natives, so far from having 
any desire for admission to the Union, much prefer to remain as they are.  In Rhodesia 
the situation is different.  In Southern Rhodesia there is a white community of some 
33,000 people surrounded by a vast ocean of natives, numbering 860,000 persons.  
Responsible Government was in 1923 conceded to Southern Rhodesia, and 
henceforth the Governor, appointed by the Crown, will act on the advice of a Ministry 
responsible to the Local Legislature. 
 
The Judicature 
No feature of the South African Constitution is more The conclusively indicative of its 
unitarian character than the position assigned therein to the Judiciary.  As in England, it 
is the function of the courts merely to interpret the law, not to act as the guardian of the 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, the Act is exceedingly important as making for simplicity of 
procedure and uniformity of interpretation.  The four independent Supreme Courts, 
none of which was bound by the decisions of the others, were swept away, or rather 
were consolidated into one Supreme Court of South Africa.  This Supreme Court 
consists of two divisions: an appellate division, with its headquarters at Bloemfontein, 
and provincial and local divisions, exercising jurisdiction within their respective areas.  
The Supreme Courts of the several Colonies existing at the time of the Union were thus 
transformed into provincial divisions of the Supreme Court of South [begin page 294] 
Africa.  From any superior court appeals lie direct to the Appellate Division.  From the 
Supreme Court an appeal lies to the Privy Council only in cases in which the Privy 
Council gives leave to appeal.  In this, as in other important respects, the South Africa 
Act is at variance with the precedents afforded by Canada and Australia.  In Canada 
appeals lie by right from every Provincial Court to the Privy Council, and in the case of 
the Commonwealth appeals lie by right and by special leave from all the State 
Supreme Courts, and by special leave from inferior courts.  From the Supreme Courts 
of the Dominion and the Commonwealth appeals lie to the Privy Council only by special 
leave, and in the case of the Commonwealth appeals are in certain instances 
prohibited save by permission of the Court itself.
26
  
That the South African Constitution should. interdict to Provincial Courts rights of 
appeal which are conceded to the Courts of the constituent States of a Federation, is at 
once a natural corollary and a further proof of its essentially unitary character. 
  
Finance and Railways 
It is highly significant of the economic and fiscal situation in South Africa that one of the 
most important chapters of the Constitution - a chapter containing no fewer than 
seventeen sections - should be devoted to the joint subject of 'Finance and Railways’.  
Not less significant is the conjunction of the two subjects, for, as we have already seen, 
the two are really interdependent.  
 
                                                  
26   [294/1]  Keith, op. cit., pp. 980 seq.; The Framework of Union, cc. xi and xii. As regards revenue and expenditure South Africa had no need of the meticulous 
provisions and precautions which, as we have seen, were embodied, after infinite and 
difficult discussion, in the Australian Commonwealth Act.  Here as elsewhere the 
Constitution leaves the largest discretion to the Union Parliament, merely providing 
that, as soon as may be after the establishment of the Union, the Governor-General in 
Council should appoint a commission consisting of one representative from each [begin 
page 295] province, and presided over by an officer from the Imperial Service,
27 to 
inquire into the financial relations which should exist between the Union and the 
provinces.  All property belonging to the several Colonies was transferred to the Union, 
which assumed, on its side, responsibility for all colonial debts and liabilities.   
Compensation, within specified limits, was also to be paid to the municipal councils of 
the provincial capitals for any loss sustained by them, in the form of diminution of 
prosperity or decreased rateable value, by reason of their ceasing to be the seats of 
government of their respective colonies. 
  
Much more elaborate were the provisions as regards railways and harbours.  Section 
125 enacted that all ports, harbours, and railways belonging to the several Colonies at 
the establishment of the Union should from the date thereof vest in the Governor-
General in Council, and that no railway for the conveyance of public traffic, and no port, 
harbour, or similar work, should be constructed without the sanction of Parliament. 
 
There was also to be formed a Railway and Harbour Fund, into which should be paid 
all revenues raised or received by the Governor-General in Council from the 
administration of the railways, ports, and harbours, and the fund was to be 
appropriated by Parliament to the purposes of the railways, ports, and harbours in the 
manner prescribed by the Act.  If, however, the State was to be the owner of the railway 
system, experience proved the absolute necessity of removing the actual 
administration of the property as far as possible from the immediate control of the 
Government of the day.  To this end section 126 enacted as follows: 
  
‘Subject to the authority of the Governor-General in Council, the control 
and management of the railways, ports, and harbours of the Union shall be 
exercised through aboard consisting of not more than three commissioners, 
who shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and a minister 
of State, who shall be chairman.  Each commissioner shall [begin page 296] 
hold office for a period of five years, but may be reappointed.  He shall not 
be removed before the expiration of his period of appointment, except by 
the Governor-General in Council for cause assigned, which shall be 
communicated by message to both Houses of Parliament within one week 
after the removal, if Parliament be then sitting, or, if Parliament be not 
sitting, then within one week after the commencement of the next ensuing 
session.  The salaries of the commissioners shall be fixed by Parliament and 
shall not be reduced during their respective terms of office. 
 
 
A subsequent section somewhat naively insisted that railways and harbours should be 
administered on business principles, due regard being had to agricultural and industrial 
development within the Union, and the promotion, by means of cheap transport, of the 
settlement of an agricultural and industrial population in the inland portions of all 
provinces of the Union.  The section proceeds thus: 'So far as may be, the total 
earnings shall be not more than are sufficient to meet the necessary outlays for 
working, maintenance, betterment, depreciation, and the payment of interest due on 
capital not being capital contributed out of railway or harbour revenue, and not 
including any sums payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.'  The Board was 
                                                  
27   [295/1]  Sir George Murray was selected for this important duty. authorized to establish a fund out of railway and harbour revenue to be used for 
maintaining, as far as may be, uniformity of rates notwithstanding fluctuations in traffic.  
It was also provided that all balances standing to the credit of any fund established in 
any of the Colonies for railway or harbour purposes at the establishment of the Union 
should be under the sole control and management of the Board, and should be 
deemed to have been appropriated by Parliament for the respective purposes for which 
they have been provided.  There then followed some very elaborate precautions, 
originally recommended in Lord Selborne's memorandum, and intended to prevent 
political jobbery in the construction of new railways:  
 
‘Every proposal for the construction of any port or harbour works or of any 
line of railway, before being submitted to [begin page 297] Parliament, 
shall be considered by the Board, which shall report thereon, and shall 
advise whether the proposed works or line of railway should or should not 
be constructed.  If any such works or line shall be constructed contrary to 
the advice of the Board, and if the Board is of opinion that the revenue 
derived from the operation of such works or line will be insufficient to meet 
the costs of working and maintenance, and of interest on the capital invested 
therein, it shall frame an estimate of the annual loss which, in its opinion, 
will result from such operation.  Such estimate shall be examined by the 
Controller and Auditor-General, and when approved by him the amount 
thereof shall be paid over annually from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to 
the Railway and Harbour Fund: Provided that, if in any year the actual loss 
incurred, as calculated by the Board and certified by the Controller and 
Auditor-General, is less than the estimate framed by the Board, the amount 
paid over in respect of that year shall be reduced accordingly so as not to 
exceed the actual loss incurred.' 
 
If, under the directions of the Executive or Parliament, the Railway Board is compelled 
to provide unremunerative services, it is entitled to be repaid from the general revenue 
of the Union. 
 
This safeguard, as Mr. Brand points out, was prompted by 'some discreditable incidents 
in past railway history particularly in Cape Colony'.
28  The authors of the Constitution 
had recent and bitter experience of the financial pressure exercised by the several 
Colonial Governments by means of their railway systems.  Nor were they ignorant of 
the serious evils attendant upon the State ownership and management of railways in 
Australia.  So clearly were these evils recognized in Australia itself, that in every State 
control has now been transferred from the Ministry to Commissioners, though a 
minister for railways is still answerable to Parliament for the general policy pursued. 
 
Finally, as a further guarantee of financial purity, a controller and auditor was to be 
appointed and to be [begin page 298] immovable except on a joint address from both 
Houses of Parliament. 
 
General Reflections on the Constitution   
The foregoing review will have made it clear that the authors of the South Africa Act 
took immense pains to anticipate difficulties and to guard against them.  Yet the 
outstanding feature of the Constitution is the large measure of confidence reposed by 
its authors in the united Parliament which it brought into being.  Detailed provisions 
proper, and indeed indispensable, to a federal instrument, are out of place in a 
                                                  
28   [297/1]  OP. cit., P. 95.  South Africa intends to profit alike by its own experience 
in the past and by that of the Australian Commonwealth. Constitution designed for a unitary State.  A Parliament, virtually sovereign, must 
necessarily be trusted to work out its own constitutional salvation. 
  
Launched on its career only in 1910, the young Dominion found itself confronted, 
almost in infancy, by a world-crisis of unexampled severity.  The reactions of world-
politics were particularly severe upon South Africa.  In no quarter of the world was 
Germany's assault upon the British Empire more elaborately planned or more precisely 
executed than in South Africa.  That the young Commonwealth should, under the 
superb leadership of General Botha and General Smuts, have courageously confronted 
and successfully surmounted the dangers, foreign and domestic, by which it was 
threatened, is not only conclusive testimony to the wisdom and generosity of British 
statesmanship in the past, but of high promise for the future of South Africa. 
 XI - The Organization of The Empire 
The Manchester School.  Imperial Federation. 
The Colonial Conference  
 
‘To speak the plain truth, I have in general no very exalted opinion of the 
value of paper Government. . . my hold of the Colonies is in the close 
affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from 
similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light 
as air, are as strong as links of iron.' - Edmund Burke. 
 
‘If a dominant country understood the true nature of the advantages arising 
from the supremacy and dependence of the related communities, it would 
voluntarily recognize the legal independence of such of its own 
dependencies as were fit for independence; it would, by its political 
arrangements, study to prepare for independence those which were still 
unable to stand alone; and it would seek to promote colonization for the 
purpose of extending its trade rather than its empire, and without intending 
to maintain the dependence of its colonies beyond the time when they need 
its protection.' - Sir George Cornewall Lewis.  
 
‘The other alternative is, that England may prove able to do what the United 
States does so easily, that is, hold together in a federal union countries very 
remote from each other.  In that case England will take rank with Russia and 
the United States in the first rank of states measured by population and area, 
and in a higher rank than the states of the Continent.' - Professor Seeley.  
 
The Government of the Empire. 
We have now traced the steps by which the most important Colonies have been 
admitted to the privileges and duties of Responsible Government.  Three of the 
greatest of the Dominions have, as already indicated, advanced to a further stage in 
constitutional evolution: Canada and Australia have established a Federal system of 
government; the four self-governing colonies in South Africa have merged their 
individual identity in a Union. 
 
Further questions remain to be answered; a more difficult problem has still to be 
solved.  Has the centripetal force, among the peoples of British blood, exhausted itself?  
May not the same principle, which has wrought so great and so rapid a change in the 
political form and [begin page 302] administrative system of three great Dominions, 
operate in the same direction in the British Commonwealth as a whole?  Is territorial 
contiguity and continuity essential to Federalism?  Does the sea necessarily divide a 
sea-empire; may it not unite?  
 
Contrasted Ideals. 
To these questions various answers have been and will be given, according to the 
conception held as to the ideal relation between a Parent State and its offspring.  Ideals 
are sharply contrasted: the one being represented by the άποικίαι of ancient Greece; 
the other by the coloniae of Rome.  The former looks upon a colony as a mere 
swarming of surplus population which carries to distant lands the ideas and traditions, 
the culture and creed, the language and laws of the motherland, but is no longer 
connected with it by any ties of allegiance, constitution, or government.  The latter regards the colonies and the motherland as parts of a common political organism, 
connected the one with the other not only by bonds of kindred, creed, or affection, but 
by the 'forms and machinery of a constitution’.  In the modern world the one school 
looks for inspiration to the teaching of Burke; the other derives much of its 
encouragement from the success with which Alexander Hamilton and other architects 
of the United States of America carried into practical effect the federal principles they 
had preached.  Burke's doctrines were set forth at length in his speeches on American 




Burke, though a sentimentalist, was not a separatist.  He had no wish to see the union 
between the motherland and the dependencies dissolved; on the contrary he was 
supremely anxious that it should be preserved; his main concern was lest the means 
adopted by George Grenville and Charles Townshend should defeat the object at which 
presumably they aimed. 
 
Adam Smith 
The Manchester School, on the other hand, were frankly indifferent as to the 
preservation of political or even of [begin page 301] spiritual ties.  Looking for inspiration 
not to Burke but to Adam Smith, they exaggerated, as is the wont of disciples, and 
even misrepresented the teaching of their master.  No more than Burke was Adam 
Smith a separatist; he may rather be regarded as one of the earliest of the federalists.  
He proposed, indeed, that Great Britain should admit to the Imperial Parliament such a 
number of representatives from each colony 'as suited the proportion of what it 
contributed to the public revenue of the empire'.  'There is’, he wrote in a famous 
passage, ‘not the least probability that the British Constitution would be hurt by the 
union of Great Britain with her colonies.  That Constitution, on the contrary, would be 
completed by it and seems to be imperfect without it.  The assembly which deliberates 
and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly 
informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it.'
1  The case for 
federalism could not be more concisely or more conclusively stated. 
  
Adam Smith's zeal for political representation arose, however, in large measure from 
his condemnation of the commercial relations subsisting between Great Britain and the 
American Colonies.  It is now generally admitted that Adam Smith minimized the merits 
and exaggerated the defects of the mercantile system with all its 'mean and malignant 
expedients'.  Yet his denunciation is hardly consistent.  On the one hand he insists that 
‘under the present system of management Great Britain derives nothing but loss from 
the dominion which she assumes over her colonies'.  On the other he admits that ‘the 
natural good effects of the colony trade more than counterbalance to Great Britain the 
bad effects of the monopoly; so that monopoly and all together, that trade even as it is 
carried on at present is not only advantageous but greatly advantageous'; while in 
regard to the trade of the colonies he insists that although the policy of [begin page 302] 
Great Britain 'has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other nations, it 
has upon the whole been less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of them'.
2
 
The Manchester School 
The prophets of the Manchester School inherited from Adam Smith his detestation of 
commercial restraints and monopolies, without any portion of his Imperialist faith.  Their 
views, purely materialistic as regards the relations between a Parent State and its 
offspring, are faithfully reflected in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's classical work on the 
                                                  
1   [301/1]  Wealth of Nations, Book IV, c, vii. 
2   [302/1]  Ibid.  Government of Dependencies.  The argument of the Essay is summarized in the 
following passage:  
 
‘If a dominant country understood the true nature of the advantages arising 
from the supremacy and dependence of the related communities, it would 
voluntarily recognize the legal independence of such of its own 
dependencies as were fit for independence; it would, by its political 
arrangements, study to prepare for independence those which were still 
unable to stand alone; and it would seek to promote colonization for the 
purpose of extending its trade rather than its empire, and without intending 





Lewis was by no means alone in the views he expressed.  They were re-echoed by the 
whole of the 'Manchester School', then, and for some years longer, dominant in English 
politics.  Thus in 1849 Lord Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Lord 
Elgin:  
 
‘There begins to prevail in the House of Commons, and I am sorry to say in 
the highest quarters, an opinion (which I believe to be utterly erroneous) 
that we have no interest in preserving our colonies and ought, therefore, to 
make no sacrifice for that purpose.  Peel, Graham, and Gladstone, if they do 
not avow this as openly as Cobden and his friends, yet betray very clearly 
that they entertain it, nor do I find some members of the [Lord John 
Russell's] Cabinet free from it.'
4  
 
Cobden himself went even farther when he wrote (1842):  [begin page 303] 
 
‘The Colonial system with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can 
never be got rid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade which will gradually and 
imperceptibly loose the bands which unite our Colonies to us by a mistaken notion of 
self-interest.'
5  Nor did these views, so far as it is possible to ascertain, evoke dissent 
or opposition from any quarter.  Their prevalence may be illustrated by one more 
quotation. 
 
Arthur Mills’s Colonial Constitutions, 1856. 
Mr. Arthur Mills's Colonial Constitutions, published in Arthur 1856, was hardly less 
representative of the prevailing sentiment than Lewis's Essay.  This is his deliberate 
conclusion: 'To ripen these communities [the Colonies] to the earliest possible maturity 
social, political, commercial, to qualify them by all the appliances within the reach of the 
parent state, for present self-government and eventual independence is now the 
universally admitted aim of our Colonial policy.'
6  So late indeed as 1872, Tennyson 
was impelled to repudiate the suggestion, emanating from a responsible quarter, that 




And that true North, whereof we lately heard  
                                                  
3   [302/2]  The Government of Dependencies, p. 324 (ed. 1891). 
4   [302/3]  Quoted ap. Hall, op. cit., p. 48. 
5   [303/1]  Morley, Cobden, i. 230.  
6   [303/2]  p. lxix. 
7   [303/3]  The Times. A strain to shame us, 'keep you to yourselves, 
So loyal is too costly!  Friends, your love 
Is but a burthen: loose the bond and go.' 
Is this the tone of Empire?  
 
The tone of Empire it was not; but that tone had as yet 'hardly been sounded either in 
the homeland or in the Colonies.  So long as the supremacy of the Manchester School 
lasted the Imperial note was hardly heard. 
 
At the same time it must not be assumed that the influence exerted by that school upon 
Colonial policy was devoid of any advantage to the Empire.  To it we owe in the main 
the triumph of the principle of 'Responsible’ Government.  Its influence is seen 
therefore, at its best in Lord Durham's Report and in the policy founded [begin page 304] 
thereon.  Not that Durham himself was a separatist.   
 
The men of his generation for the most part regarded self-government as the goal of 
the constitutional evolution of Colonies under the Crown.  Still more they looked upon it 
as the necessary condition of that period of political apprenticeship which was to be the 
prelude to complete independence. 
  
Contrary views. 
To this general rule there were a few outstanding exceptions: Lord Durham himself was 
one; among others were Sir William Molesworth and Lord Grey, together with Durham's 
colleagues Gibbon Wakefield and Charles Buller.  Molesworth's enlightened views 
entitle him, indeed, to be reckoned one of the forerunners of the Imperial Federal 
movement: as is evidenced by a passage in a speech delivered in the House of 
Commons in 1850:  
 
Sir W. Molesworth 
 
'I maintain that whenever the local circumstances of a colony will admit the 
existence of a Colonial Parliament, the Colonial Parliament ought to possess 
powers corresponding with those of the British Parliament, with the 
necessary exception of Imperial powers.  For if it were to possess Imperial 
powers, it would become an Imperial Parliament; and as there cannot be two 
Imperial Parliaments in one Empire, the British Empire would be dissolved.'  
 
Later in the same speech he said that, as the United States is a system of States 
clustered round a central Republic, so 'our Colonial Empire ought to be a system of 
Colonies clustered round the hereditary monarchy of England.  The hereditary 
monarchy should possess all the powers of Government with the exception of that of 
taxation, which the central Republic possesses.  If it possessed less the Empire would 
cease to be one body politic.'  In this passage there is a clear foreshadowing of that 
division of powers which is a specific characteristic of federal government.  There is no 
hint, however, of separatism, nor is there in Durham's famous Report.  Durham was 
convinced by his own observation that, the predominant feeling of all the English 
population of the North American Colonies is that of devoted attach- [begin page 305] 
ment to the mother country'.  Upon that conviction he founded his argument for the 
grant of Responsible Government.  That the concession would lead to a demand for 
independence he did not believe. 
 
I am well aware that many persons both in the Colonies and at home view the system 
which I recommend with considerable alarm, because they distrust the ulterior views of 
those by whom it was originally proposed and whom they suspect of urging its adoption 
with intent only of enabling them the more easily to subvert monarchical institutions or assert the independence of the Colony.  I believe however that the extent to which 
these ulterior views exist has been greatly overrated. . . the attachment constantly 
exhibited by the people of these provinces towards the British Crown and Empire has 
all the characteristics of a strong national feeling. . . . I do not anticipate that a Colonial 
legislature thus strong and thus self-governing would desire to abandon the connexion 
with Great Britain. . . . I am in truth so far from believing that the increased weight and 
power that would be given to these Colonies by union would endanger their connexion 
with the Empire, that I look to it as the only means of fostering such a national feeling 




Lord Glenelg in South Africa 
If the Manchester School is seen at its best in Lord Durham's Report, it is seen at its 
worst in the policy pursued by Lord Glenelg in South Africa.  Charles Grant, Lord 
Glenelg, was Secretary of State for the Colonies in Lord Melbourne's second 
administration (1835).  A kind-hearted gentleman, a genuine philanthropist, but 
essentially a doctrinaire, Glenelg was deeply imbued with the tenets of the Manchester 
School, and was most anxious to set limits to the boundaries of the Empire.  'The great 
evil of the Cape Colony’, he wrote, ‘consists in its magnitude.'  Unfortunately, the 
boundaries of the Cape Colony had lately been extended up to the Kei River, the 
annexed territory being organized as the new Province of Queen Adelaide.  The 
extension was conceived in the best [begin page 306] interests of humanity and of 
orderly administration Hitherto the frontiers of the Colony had been the scene of 
repeated Kaffir inroads, accompanied by terrible atrocities.  The action of the Governor, 
Sir Benjamin D'Urban, was warmly supported by the Colonists, and above all by the 
missionaries.  Lord Glenelg, however, took the view that all extensions of territory were 
in themselves undesirable, that the natives who had been expelled from the Colony 
were the victims of 'systematic injustice’, that their raids were an attempt to 'extort by 
force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain’, and he recalled the 
Governor and ordered the immediate retrocession of the newly annexed province of 
Queen Adelaide.  Commenting on these events, Sir Charles Lucas justly observes:  
 
‘Few decisions have had more far-reaching results than that which was 
embodied in Lord Glenelg's dispatch.  It would be foolish and unjust not to 
credit the author of the dispatch with courage and high principle, but it is 
impossible, on the other hand, to acquit him of wrong-headed obstinacy.  In 
many ways, direct and indirect, the course of action which he prescribed 
worked mischief not least in the precedent which it furnished for after times. 
It was the beginning of undoing in South Africa.'
9  
 
The Lord Glenelg's policy in South Africa, though peculiarly mischievous in its local 
consequences, was entirely consistent with the views which, during all the middle years 
of the century, prevailed at Whitehall.  The Titan was weary of the burden imposed 
upon him; the triumph of Free Trade would soon reduce to a minimum the economic 
advantages of an extended Empire; the young communities, guarded with parental 
solicitude during the period of adolescence, would one by one reach man's estate and 
endowed with the liberty appropriate to that status would set up for themselves, and 
contribute, in free but friendly competition, to the common good of the family of nations.  
Such was the settled policy, begotten [begin page 307] in part of cynical indolence but 
not wholly lacking in a high idealism, consistently pursued by successive ministries 
from the passing of the first Reform Bill to the passing of the second.  The high 
permanent officials of the Colonial Office shared and perhaps inspired the policy of 
their political chiefs.  Sir James Stephen, permanent Under-Secretary (1836-47), 
                                                  
8   [305/1]  Report, pp. 284, 309-10. 
9   [306/1]  Op. cit., p. 162. Herman Merivale (1847-59),
10 and Sir Frederick Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford) 
(1860-71) were in full accord with each other and with their colleague Sir Henry Taylor, 
alike as to the goal to be aimed at and the best means of attaining it.  ‘I go very far with 
you’, wrote Rogers to Taylor in 1865, ‘in the, desire to shake off all responsibly 
governed colonies, while Taylor went so far, about the same time, as to write to his 
chief the Duke of Newcastle as follows: 
  
‘In my estimation the worst consequence of the late dispute with the United 
States has been that of involving this country and its North American 
provinces in closer relations and a common cause.'
11
 
In a sentence such as this we reach, as Mr. Duncan Hall justly says, 'the lowest depth 
of the separatist movement.
12  But even more characteristic was the satirical 
interrogation of Mr. Goldwin Smith: 'What shall we give to England in place of her 
useless dependencies?  What shall we give to a man in place of his heavy burden or 




Separation – the accepted policy. 
There remains to be noticed evidence of a different and still more conclusive character.  
The above citations represent, it may be objected, the views, however typical they may 
be, only of individuals.  How far official opinion had gone, in the direction indicated, 
may be judged from the draft of a Bill actually prepared by [begin page 308] Lord Thring, 
who was at that time Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury.  This Bill, according to an 
analysis given by Sir George Parkin,
14 embodied 'an attempt to put upon a just basis 
the relations between Britain and her colonies at each period of their growth’ from 
Crown Colony to Responsible Government.  The attainment of the latter stage is made 
dependent not upon pressure from the colony, but upon 'a definite increase of 
European population and other conditions equally applicable to all colonies alike'.   
There was to be a definite distribution of powers between the local and Imperial 
Governments, and a definite distribution of burdens and responsibilities.  Finally, 'as the 
natural termination of a connexion in itself of a temporary character' (to quote from the 
preface to the Bill), provision is made for the formal separation of a colony and its 
erection into an independent State, so soon as its people feel equal to undertaking this 
responsibility.  The last provision is in the present connexion of peculiar significance.  It 
affords the clearest indication of the official view that 'Responsible Government' was 
only a transitory stage, a preliminary apprenticeship for complete and independent 
statehood. 
  
That Responsible Government was not likely to be the final stage in constitutional 
evolution might be conceded by men of all parties and opinions.  The contents of 
preceding chapters have proved the accuracy of the diagnosis.  But was it necessarily 
a preliminary to separation?  Events have negatived this assumption.  It was not, 
however, till 1867 that Canada showed the way to a singularly interesting and at that 
                                                  
10   [307/1]  Merivale was at one time Professor of Political Economy at Oxford and 
published in 1841 two volumes of Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, by no 
means lacking in intrinsic value and of even greater value as typical products of 
that period. 
11   [307/2]  Sir Henry Taylor, Autobiography, vol. ii, pp. 2.34-42, quoted by Duncan 
Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations (1920), pp. 50, 51. 
12   [307/3]  Ibid., p. 51.   
13   [307/4]  The Empire. p. xix, Oxford, 1863. 
14   [308/1]  Imperial Federation, 1892, pp. 10 .Seq. time a unique experiment in the art of Politics: the combination of the Federal principle 
with the Parliamentary under the aegis of a constitutional monarchy. 
 
Decline of the Manchester School 
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century the dreams of the Manchester 
School were dismally dissipated.  Laisser-faire rapidly lost ground in the sphere [begin 
page 309] of social economics.  Prussia, under the masterful domination of Bismarck, 
proved that blood and iron could accomplish that which parliamentary methods, as 
exemplified at Frankfort, had pitiably failed to do.  The conflicts between Prussia and 
Austria, between Germany and France, between Russia and Turkey, between the 
United States and Spain, indicated that war was not yet banished from the earth. 
 
Colonial Ambitions of Germany 
Moreover, hardly had Germany attained, almost at Colonial a single stride, to 
hegemony in Europe before she began to develop colonial ambitions, and to manifest a 
desire, Germany not unnatural, to play her part in world politics.  In 1871 Germany 
possessed not one foot of territory outside Europe.  A single year (1883-4) sufficed to 
bring her to the third place among European Powers in Africa and to establish her in 
the Pacific.  The process of industrialization in Germany, though a century later than in 
England, was, when initiated, extraordinarily rapid.  German manufacturers called out 
for raw materials which only the tropics could supply.  German merchants sought and 
found markets for the surplus products of the German factories in non-European 
countries.  Holding the view that if trade follows the flag the flag must protect trade, 
Germany sought to emulate the example of England.  But one thing she lacked.  She 
could supply goods in large and rapidly increasing quantities, she could provide highly 
trained if not tactful administrators; soldiers she could send in plenty; but she could not 
induce her citizens to face the risks and discomforts of pioneering work on the frontiers 
of Empire.  Her sons were prepared to fight, to trade, to govern, but not to settle-under 
the German flag.  Yet they went readily to other lands.  After 1876 Germans were 
emigrating at the rate of about 200,000 a year, finding a home, or at least a settlement, 
chiefly in the United States and Brazil.  Bismarck was perturbed at the loss of cannon-
fodder: 'A German who can put off his fatherland like an old coat is no longer a German 
for me.'  Hence his somewhat tardy conversion to the [begin page 310] policy of the 
Deutscher Kolonialverein - a society founded at Frankfort in December 1882. 
 
France and Italy 
Germany was not, of course, alone in colonial enterprise, though her activities, so 
tardily aroused, were the most remarkable.  Jules Ferry, who became Prime Minister of 
France in 1880, sought, not wholly without success, to divert the minds of his 
countrymen from the thoughts of ravanche on the Rhine to Northern Africa and the Far 
East.  Italy having, like Germany, achieved unity in 1871, also embarked upon colonial 
enterprises, with indifferent success, in East Africa.  Plainly, a new spirit was moving on 
the face of the waters: and under the impulse of that new spirit the Cobdenite dream 
faded.  Amid the scramble for colonial territory and the struggle for protected markets 
the bases of Free Trade crumbled. 
 
There were not lacking other convergent tendencies.  The successful achievements of 
the Federal principle in Canada and Germany; the attempt to apply it in South Africa; 
the movement towards it in Australia - all helped to turn men's minds to a study of 
federalism as a form of government.  The publication, in 1863, of Mr. Freeman's History 
of Federal Government had supplied an historical background. 
 
British Imperialism 
By the middle of the seventies the separatist force seems to have spent itself in 
England.  The publication of Tennyson's spirited protest, already quoted, evoked a prompt response from Canada, on whose behalf the Governor-General Lord Dufferin 
wrote to thank the Poet-Laureate for the 'spirited denunciation' with which he had 
'branded those who are seeking to dissolve the Empire and to alienate and to disgust 
the inhabitants of this most powerful and prosperous Colony’.  Since arriving here, Lord 
Dufferin went on,  
 
I have had ample opportunity of becoming acquainted with the intimate 
conviction of the Canadians upon this subject, and with scarcely an 
individual exception I find they cling with fanatical tenacity to their 
birthright as Englishmen and to their hereditary association in the past and 
future [begin page 311] glories of the mother-country. . . . They take the 
liveliest interest in her welfare and entertain the strongest personal feeling 
of affection for their Sovereign. . . . Your noble words have struck 
responsive fire through every heart; they have been published in every 
newspaper, and have been completely effectual to heal the wounds 
occasioned by the senseless language of The Times.'
15  
 
The Federal Idea 
Tennyson's protest did but re-echo a sentiment which in the seventies was rapidly 
growing in volume.  Hitherto the expression of Imperial patriotism had been sporadic; 
after 1875, it was, if not fashionable, by no means a mark of eccentricity, and in the 
early eighties the movement towards Imperial Federation began definitely to take 
shape.  The first occasion upon which the idea of Imperial Federation emerges with 
any clearness seems to have been in a lecture delivered by Mr. J.R. Godley in New 
Zealand on 1 December 1852.  Mr. Godley was clearly of opinion that a Federal 
scheme ought to precede the concession of complete self-government. 
 
‘Before the time arrives' he said' when these Colonies  conscious of power, 
shall demand the privilege of standing on equal terms with the Mother-
country in the family of nations, I trust that increased facility of intercourse 
may render it practical to establish an Imperial Congress for the British 
Empire, in which all its members may be fairly represented and which may 
administer the affairs which are common to all.' 
 
Two years later Mr. Joseph Howe, an eminent colonial statesman, spoke in the 
Legislature of Nova Scotia to similar effect. 
 
‘I would not’, he said, ‘cling to England one single hour after I was 
convinced that the friendship of North America was undervalued, and that 
the status to which we may reasonably aspire has been deliberately refused.  
But I will endeavour while asserting the rights of my native land with 
[begin page 312] boldness, to perpetuate our connexion with the British 
Isles . . . the statesmen of England may be assured that if they would hold 
this great Empire together they must give the outlying portions of it some 
interest in the naval, military, and civil services. . . . I have often thought, 
sir, how powerful this Empire might be made; how prosperous in peace, 
how invincible in war, if the statesmen of England would set about its 
organization and draw to a common centre the high intellects which it 
                                                  
15   [311/1]  Memoir of Lord Tennyson, by his son, vol. ii, p. 143.  The Times had in a 
recent article advised the Canadians to ‘take up their freedom’ as the days of their 
apprenticeship were over.  On the date, 8 November 1872, Tennyson writes in his 
diary, ‘Lady Franklin has sent me that Canadian bit of The Times.  Villainous! contains.  If the whole population were united by common interests, no 
power on earth ever wielded means so vast or influence so irresistible.'
16  
 
The Shrinkage of the Globe. 
The facilities of intercourse predicted in 1852 by Mr. Godley were not then, nor for 
some years afterwards, available.  During the next twenty years, however, the progress 
of scientific discovery and of engineering enterprise was extraordinarily rapid.  Two 
achievements are in this connexion particularly relevant.  In 1866 the first Atlantic cable 
was successfully laid; in 1869 the Suez Canal was opened.  The world was rapidly 
passing under the dominion of physical science, and the triumph of science meant the 
shortening of distance and time, and a consequent shrinkage of the globe. 
 
The idea of applying the Federal principle to the British Empire, never wholly 
abandoned, was definitely revived by an article contributed to The Contemporary 
Review  for January 1871 by Mr. Edward Jenkins, who proposed that a Federal 
Parliament for Imperial affairs should be set up, and at the same time indicated the 
questions with which such a parliament ought to deal.  In July 1871 a Conference on 
Colonial questions was held at the Westminster Palace Hotel, and a paper was read by 
Mr. de Labilliere on Imperial and Colonial Federalism in which he advocated an 
Imperial Federal Parliament with an executive responsible thereto.  Thenceforward the 
question was frequently discussed in the Reviews, and at meetings of such bodies as 
the Social Science Congress, and the Royal Colonial Institute which, founded in 1868, 
[begin page 313] has done yeoman service in the cause of Imperial unity.  At a meeting 
of the Institute in 1881 Mr. de Labilliere read an exhaustive paper on the political 
organization of the Empire.
17
 
Seeley’s Expansion of England, 1883. 
By this time the Federal idea was fairly launched, and in 1883 it received an immense.  
impulse from the publication of a remarkable series of lectures delivered before the 
University of Cambridge by Professor Seeley.  In the Expansion of England Seeley 
gave to the political history of England, during the two previous centuries, a new 
interpretation.  The lesson of the American Revolution had in his opinion been 
misconceived.  Not schism but union, was the moral to be drawn from the story.   
England lost its first Empire by the adoption of a false theory of Colonial relations.  The 
second Empire must be preserved by the promulgation of a sound theory 
 
‘If the Colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they 
must be a part of England; and we must adopt this view in earnest. . . . 
When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire 
together and call it all England we shall see that here too is a United States.  
Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion 
and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space. . . . If we are disposed to 
doubt whether any system can be devised capable of holding together 
communities so distant from each other, then is the time to recollect the 
history of the United States of America.  They have solved this problem.
18  
 
Seeley's hope was that we might do likewise.  His book was widely read, and 
immensely influential in moulding educated opinion.  A year after its publication a most 
important practical step was taken.  
                                                  
16   [312/1]  Ap. F.P. de Labilliere, Federal Britain, pp. 9-10. 
17   [313/1]  This paper is printed in extenso in de Labilliere, Federal Britain, pp. 86-
124.  
18   [313/2]  Expansion of England, pp. 158-9.     
The Imperial Federation League 
In 1884 there was founded the Imperial Federation League - an association supported 
by men of all parties, among its founders being statesmen of the homeland like W.E. 
Forster, W.H. Smith, Edward Stanhope, Lord Rosebery, and Professor Bryce, and 
Colonial statesmen [begin page 314] such as Sir Charles Tupper, Sir Henry Parkes, and 
Sir Charles Gavan Duffy.  The object of the League was to secure by Federation the 
permanent unity of the Empire; it insisted that any scheme of Imperial Federation 
should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance 
of common interests, and should adequately provide for an organized defence of 
common rights; but it was expressly laid down that the existing rights of local 
Parliaments as regards local affairs should be strictly reserved and respected.  The 
League was not committed to any cut-and-dried scheme of Federation, but in February 
1885 its chairman, Mr. Forster, contributed to the Nineteenth Century a remarkable 
paper in which he clearly set forth the underlying principles and the immediate aims of 
the association for which he spoke.  ‘What’, he asked, ‘is meant by Imperial 
Federation?’  His reply was: 'Such a union of the Mother Country with her Colonies as 
will keep the realm one state in relation to other states.  Keep not make: for the Empire 
is one Commonwealth already.  Then, " Why not let well alone?" ’   Mr. Forster's answer 
to this question was classical and still stands.  'For this reason: because in giving self-
government to our Colonies we have introduced a principle which must eventually 
shake off from Great Britain greater Britain and dissolve it into separate States; which 
must, in short, dissolve the union unless counteracting measures be taken to preserve 
it.'  To grant to the Dominions domestic autonomy, but at the same time to deny to them 
any official or effective voice in foreign and Imperial policy, is to rely on contradictory 
principles of Government.  They cannot permanently coexist.  On the one side, all" but 
complete autonomy; on the other complete subordination.  Precisely the same point 
was made in the same year (1885) by Sir James Service when he complained of' the 
very anomalous position which these Colonies occupy as regards respectively local 
Government and the exercise of Imperial authority.  In regard to the first the fullest 
measure of [begin page 315] constitutional freedom and parliamentary representation 
has been conceded to the more important colonies, but as regards the second we have 
no representation whatever in the Imperial system.'  This state of things could not be 
expected permanently to endure.  Friction might, with good luck, be avoided for a time, 
but sooner or later some question would be certain to arise which would strain to 
breaking-point the existing constitutional bonds.  Even if that extreme issue were 
avoided, there must be, as Mr. Forster pointed out, 
 
'great inconvenience, not to say real danger, to peace in this legal 
helplessness and powerlessness of the Colonies.  They tried to seize the 
power of which they are deprived.  The attempt, as it were, to right 
themselves by lynch law (as in the then recent cases of New Guinea and the 
Samoan Islands) . . . to enforce the hands of our Foreign and Colonial 
offices may be the only way of obtaining attention for reasonable claims; 
but these dangerous modes of assertion would not be tried if they felt that 
they had an acknowledged voice in the decision of questions deeply 
affecting their interests.'  
 
Mr. Forster accordingly insisted that there must be some organization for common 
defence and a joint foreign policy: 'An official acknowledgement of the right of the 
Colonies to have a voice in the determination of foreign policy especially where such 
policy directly affects their feelings or interests.'  Rejecting, not as intrinsically unsound 
but merely as premature, the suggestion of a Federal Parliament, Forster adopted a 
proposal put forward by Lord Grey in 1879 for a Federal Council.  This Council was to 
deal 'with peace and war and treaties and negotiations and also with all questions 
affecting the defence of the realm, the fortification of its ports and posts, the provision for its Army and Navy, the determination of the strength of each service, and especially 
the respective contributions by each member of the Imperial Commonwealth for such 
defence'.  But although the time was plainly ripe for such a development in 1885, 
progress has not during the intervening years been rapid.  
[begin page 316] 
 
The Colonial Conference 
As regards the constitutional machinery of the Empire the period between 1885 and 
1925 divides into two unequal parts.  The outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 is 
the dividing line.  During the earlier part by far the most significant development was 
found in the initiation and elaboration of the Colonial Conference.  The first of these 
meetings took place in 1887.  The precise moment was perhaps suggested by the 
coincidence of the Jubilee celebrations of that year, but many other things contributed 
to the momentous decision taken by Lord Salisbury's Government.  
 
In proroguing Parliament in 1886 the Queen gave expression to a sentiment which was 
very generally entertained:  
 
‘I am led to the conviction that there is on all sides a growing desire to draw 
closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions 
of the Empire.  I have authorized communications to be entered into with 
the principal Colonial Governments with a view to the fuller consideration 
of matters of common interest.'  
 
The Queen's conviction was doubtless inspired by the wave of Imperial sentiment 
which was at the moment sweeping over the country.  The maladroitness - to use no 
harsher term - displayed by the Gladstone Government in regard to New Guinea and 
Samoa; the enthusiasm evoked by the participation of colonial troops in the recent 
Egyptian campaign; the defeat of Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill and the great 
Unionist victory in 1886; the 'splendid isolation' of Great Britain in European diplomacy; 
the seizure of Penjdeh by Russia and the anticipated attack upon India; and, not least, 
the conscious and devoted labours of the Imperial Federation League, then at the 
zenith of its influence both at home and in the overseas Dominions - all these and other 
things tended to stimulate Imperial patriotism.  The Government wisely seized the 
occasion, thus obviously presented to them, for a step forward in the development of 
Imperial unity.  [begin page 317] 
 
With characteristic caution the subject of Imperial Federation - indeed of constitutional 
relations - was expressly excluded from the agenda of the first Conference.  In their 
letter of invitation the Government had expressed the opinion that 'it might be 
detrimental to a more developed system of united action if a question not yet ripe for 
practical decision were now to be brought to the test of a formal examination'.  The 
same point was taken by Lord Salisbury in his opening address.  
 
Australian Criticism 
Notwithstanding this prudent embargo it was impossible to conceal the dissatisfaction 
felt by some of the greater Colonies with the anomalies and humiliations incidental to 
their existing constitutional position.  Mr. Deakin, in particular, speaking on behalf of the 
Australasian Colonies, gave courteous but caustic expression to this sentiment: 
 
‘We have observed with close interest the discussion that has taken place in 
the Mother Country upon the question of a spirited foreign policy.  There 
are some of us who live in hopes to see it a vital issue in the politics of 
Great Britain as to whether there shall not be a spirited Colonial policy as 
well; because we find that other nations are pursuing a policy which might fairly be described as a spirited Colonial policy.  One has only to turn to the 
dispatches which have passed between this country and the Australian 
Colonies upon the subject of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, and to 
compare them with the dispatches published in the same Blue Book, taken 
from the White Book of the German Empire, and with the extracts of 
dispatches issued by the French Colonial Office, to notice the marked 
difference of tone.  The dispatches  received from England, with reference 
to English activity in these seas, exhibited only the disdain and indifference 
with which English enterprise was treated in the Colonial Office, and by 
contrast one was compelled to notice the eagerness with which the French 
and German statesmen received the smallest details of information as to the 
movements of their traders in those particular seas, and the zeal with which 
they hastened to support them. . . we hope that from this time forward, 
Colonial policy will be considered Imperial policy; and that Colonial 
interests will be considered and felt to be Imperial interests; and that they 
will be carefully [begin page 318] studied, and that when once they are 
understood, they will be most determinedly upheld.'
19  
 
The language is restrained but the sentiment is unmistakable.  Nor was the Conference 
allowed to close without a more specific reference to the constitutional problem.  At the 
concluding session Sir Samuel Griffith, as 'the oldest actual minister present' gave 
expression to a thought which on this historic occasion was in many minds:  
 
‘I consider that this Conference does comprise what may perhaps be called 
the rudimentary elements of a parliament; but it has been a peculiarity of 
our British institutions that those which have been found most durable are 
those which have grown up from institutions which were in the first instance 
of a rudimentary character.  It is impossible to predicate now what form 
future conferences should take, or in what mode some day further effect 
would be given to their conclusions, but I think we may look forward to 
seeing this sort of informal Council of the Empire develop until it becomes a 
legislative body, at any fate a consultative body, and some day, perhaps, a 
legislative body under conditions that we cannot just now foresee.'  
 
Joseph Chamberlain 
Ten years were destined to elapse before the Conference met again in the capital of 
the Empire.  But from the point of view of Imperial solidarity the interval was not wholly 
unfruitful.  In 1894 a conference met at Ottawa where it dealt mainly with questions of 
Imperial communications and commerce.  More important than the Ottawa Conference 
was the fact that on the formation of Lord Salisbury's Conservative-Unionist Ministry, in 
1895, the leader of the Liberal-Unionist wing in the House of Commons selected as his 
post the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies.  Mr. Chamberlain's accession to the 
Colonial Office must be regarded as one of the significant political events in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.  Ever since his rupture with Mr. Gladstone on the Home 
Rule question Mr. Chamberlain's mind had been moving [begin page 319] steadily 
towards the project of Imperial unification.  In this intellectual evolution he was 
avowedly influenced by the example of Germany.  
 
                                                  
19   [318/1]    Report of Conference, pp. 24-5, quoted ap.  Jebb's  The Imperial 
Conference - a valuable work of reference to which I desire to acknowledge my 
obligations. ‘We have’, he said, speaking at the annual dinner of the Canada Club in 
1896, 'a great example before us in the creation of the German Empire.  
How was that brought about?  You all recollect that, in the first instance, it 
commenced with the union of two of the States which now form that great 
empire in a commercial Zollverein.  They attracted the other States 
gradually - were joined by them for commercial purposes.  A council, a 
Reichsrath was formed to deal with those commercial questions.  Gradually 
in their discussions national objects and political interests were introduced, 
and so, from starting as it did on a purely commercial basis and for 
commercial interests, it developed until it became a bond of unity and the 
foundation of the German-Empire.' 
 
On the same text Mr. Chamberlain preached to the Congress of Chambers of 
Commerce of the Empire which met in London in 1896.  
 
‘If we had a commercial union throughout the Empire, of course there 
would have to be a Council of the Empire. . . . Gradually, therefore, by that 
prudent and experimental process by which all our greatest institutions have 
slowly been built up we should, I believe, approach to a result which would 
be little, if at all, distinguished from a real federation of the Empire.'
20  
 
Colonial Conference of 1897 
In 1897, when representatives from every part of the Colonial Empire had come 
together in London for the celebration of Queen Victoria's' Diamond' jubilee, another 
Colonial 1897 Conference assembled under the presidency of the Colonial Secretary.  
Mr. Chamberlain's opening address marked an epoch in the history of imperial co-
partnership.  It was incomparably the boldest and frankest utterance to which colonial 
statesmen had ever listened from a responsible minister of the Crown.  At Ottawa there 
had been no discussion of the constitutional problem, and the Home Government had 
been represented by Lord jersey, [begin page 320] an ex-proconsul who was politically 
opposed to the Liberal Ministry which, in 1894, was in office in England.  The London 
meeting of 1897 was on a totally different plane.  Attended only by Prime Ministers it 
might truly be said to form a 'Cabinet of Cabinets' instead of a conference of 
Governments such as had met in 1887.  But in no respect was its enhanced 
significance more marked than by the position assigned to the constitutional problem 
by the president of the Conference.  
 
‘I feel’, he said, ‘that there is a real necessity for some better machinery of 
consultation between the self-governing Colonies and the Mother Country, 
and it has sometimes struck me - I offer it now merely as a personal 
suggestion - that it might be feasible to create a great council of the Empire 
to which the Colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries - not 
mere delegates who were unable to speak in their name, without further 
reference to their respective governments, but persons who by their position 
in the Colonies, by their representative character, and by their close touch 
with Colonial feeling, would be able upon all subjects submitted to them to 
give really effective and valuable advice.  If such a council were created it 
would at once assume an immense importance, and it is perfectly evident 
that it might develop into something still greater.  It might slowly grow to 
that Federal Council to which we must always look forward as our ultimate 
ideal.'  
                                                  
20   [319/1]  Jebb, op. cit. i, 310-11.  
The immediate outcome of this Conference was hardly answerable to the high hopes 
entertained by its President.  The Report  does indeed testify to the existence of a 
strong feeling among some of the Colonial Premiers that 'the present relations could 
not continue indefinitely’, though the following resolution was adopted, with the dissent 
only of New Zealand and Tasmania: 'The Prime Ministers here assembled are of 
opinion that the present political relations between the United Kingdom and the self-
governing Colonies are generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.'  
No resolution was adopted or even proposed in the sense suggested by Mr. 
Chamberlain.  [begin page 321] 
 
Conference of 1902 
Five years later the Conference again met in London under the same presidency.   
During the interval a great crisis in the history of the Empire had matured and been 
successfully surmounted.  The wonderful loyalty displayed by the Dominions during the 
South African War; the deep chord of sympathy and solidarity touched, in every part of 
the Empire, by the death of Queen Victoria; the crowning of her son, coincident with the 
assembling of the Conference of 1902 - these things might well have inspired a 
statesman less imaginative than Mr. Chamberlain with exceptional hopefulness as to 
the immediate future.  Much of the discussion turned upon the question of preferential 
trade within the Empire - a project to which the Colonial Secretary gave his enthusiastic 
support.  But with that question this work is not concerned.  On the constitutional issue 
Mr. Chamberlain was explicit: he again avowed his own desire for 'a real council of the 
Empire to which all questions of Imperial interest might be referred’, and at the same 
time he threw out a frank suggestion to his Colonial colleagues.  'If you are prepared, at 
any time, to take any share, any proportionate share, in the burdens of the Empire, we 
are prepared to meet you with any proposal for giving to you a corresponding voice in 
the policy of the Empire.' 
 
Of exceptional interest, in this connexion, was the resolution actually adopted by the 
Conference of 1902.  The text of the resolution is as follows:  
 
‘That so far as may be consistent with the confidential negotiations of 
Treaties with Foreign Powers, the views of the Colonies affected should be 
obtained in order that they may be in a better position to give adhesion to 
such Treaties.'  The principle is cautiously affirmed, but its significance is 
enhanced rather than impaired by the delicate consideration shown towards 
the susceptibilities of the Foreign Office, and the Home Government 
generally, and by the obvious apprehension of the difficulties with which 
questions of foreign policy are necessarily surrounded.  None the less is it 
clear that, after the lapse of a quarter [begin page 322] of a century, the self-
governing Dominions were at last coming within sight of the goal discerned, 
in the far-off days, by Sir James Service and Mr. W.E. Forster.  At last they 
were acknowledged to have some interest in the foreign policy of the 
Empire of which they were constituent parts. 
 
Another important step was taken by the Conference of 1902 towards the 
regularization and definition of the constitution of the Conference itself; and the 
periodicity of its meetings.  Future Conferences were to be held as far as practicable, at 
intervals not exceeding four years and questions of common interest were to be 
considered as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers 
of the self-governing Colonies'.  
 
Before the time came for the meeting of the next Conference Mr. Chamberlain had 
ceased to be Colonial Secretary, and it fell to his successor Mr. Alfred Lyttelton to summon it.  In doing so Mr. Lyttelton, himself an ardent disciple of his predecessor, 
made an important suggestion.  In his view the time had come for transforming the 
'Colonial Conference' into an 'Imperial Council' which should possess a continuous 
existence maintained by the creation of a supplementary commission and a permanent 
secretariat.  Tentatively though the suggestion was put forward it excited some 
apprehension in Canada,
21  but before the Conference met in I907 the Unionist 
Government had fallen, and the presidency devolved upon a statesman, experienced, 
courteous, and businesslike but eminently unimaginative, the late Earl of Elgin. .  
 
Conference of 1907 
Nevertheless, the Conference of 1907 marked definite progress.  Undaunted by the 
obvious lowering of the Imperial temperature, and notwithstanding the expressed 
hostility of His Majesty's Government, the Colonial representatives unanimously 
reaffirmed the 'Preference’ resolution of I902.  They also made a determined attempt, 
[begin page 323] on the lines indicated by Mr. Lyttelton's dispatch, to emancipate the 
'Conference' from the control of the Colonial Office.  The bureaucratic instincts of the 
'Office’ were, however, too strong for the young Dominions, and the effective parts of 
the resolution as ultimately adopted ran as follows: 
 
‘That It will be to the advantage of the Empire if a conference, to be called 
the Imperial Conference, is held every four years, at which questions of 
common interest may be discussed and considered as between His Majesty's 
Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond 
the Seas.  The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be ex officio 
President and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions ex 
officio members of the Conference.  That it is desirable to establish a system 
by which the several Governments represented shall be kept informed 
during the periods between the Conferences in regard to matters which have 
been or may be subjects for discussion, by means of a permanent secretarial 
staff, charged, under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
with the duty of obtaining information for the use of the Conference, of 
attending to its resolutions, and of conducting correspondence on matters 
relating to its affairs.' 
 
Three points which I have italicized in the text are worthy of note: 
 
(i)   the term 'Colonial' has been definitely and finally abandoned in favour 
of 'Imperial'; 
(ii)   Dominion Ministries are for the first time referred to as 'His Majesty's'; 
and 
(iii)   the proposed permanent Secretariat was still to be associated with 
the 'Office'. 
 
The third point represented, in one sense, a victory for the British bureaucracy, but at 
the same time it did not preclude an administrative advance.  In 1908 the work of the 
Colonial Office was reorganized: Dominion affairs were separated from those of the 
Crown Colonies and committed to a 'Dominions Division'.  On the second point there 
was an instructive and significant debate, indicative of the desire of the Dominion 
Executives to be regarded as co-ordinate in status with 'His Majesty's Government' at 
home, and as, equally with its members, [begin page 324] ‘Servants of the King'.  The 
wording, as eventually adopted, was a rather clumsy but not insignificant compromise.  
Four years later Sir Wilfrid Laurier was able to claim that the discussions of 1907 'were 
productive of material and even important results’, and it is interesting to note that in his 
                                                  
21   [322/1]  Cf. Cd. 2785 of 1905. opinion the most important of those results was' to substitute for the kind of ephemeral 
Colonial Conferences which had taken place before, a real Imperial system of 
periodical Conferences between the Government of His Majesty the King in the United 
Kingdom and [the precise phrase is noteworthy] the Governments of His Majesty the 
King in the Dominions beyond the Seas.
22 One other point in the proceedings of 1907 
demands notice.  The Australasian delegates were again, as in 1887, gravely perturbed 
by the proceedings of the Foreign Office in regard to the problems of the Pacific.  In 
1906, after years of indecision, the British Government had suddenly, without 
consultation with the Commonwealth or with New Zealand, concluded with France a 
Convention in regard to the New Hebrides.  The whole transaction exhibited a flagrant 
disregard for the susceptibilities and interests of the people most closely concerned, 
and aroused bitter and just indignation amongst them.  To this feeling Mr. Seddon, one 
of the most stout-hearted and whole-minded Imperialists, gave vigorous expression 
only a few hours before his lamented death (June 1906):  
 
‘The Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments are incensed at the 
Imperial Government Conference fixing conditions of dual protectorate in 
the New Hebrides without first consulting the Colonies so deeply interested.  
The Imperial Government calls upon us now for advice upon what is 
already decided, making our difficulties very great.  The entire subject is of 
vital importance to the Commonwealth and New Zealand.  We ought to have 
been represented at the Conference.  If anybody had been there for us who 
knew anything about the subject, the result would have been very different.  
Whoever represented Britain French diplomacy [begin page 325] was too 
much for them.  I cannot honourably say anything further, my hands and 
tongue are tied by the Imperial Government, but I wish I had the power of 
Joshua to make the sun stand still.'  
 
Mr. Seddon's last message to the Empire was re-echoed in the speech of Mr. Deakin at 
the Conference of 1907.  In that speech
23 the Premier of the Commonwealth referred 
to 'the indifferent attitude of statesmen in this country to British interests in the Pacific'; 
to the time now past when 'the anxiety of public men in this country was to avoid under 
any circumstances the assumption of more responsibilities and a great willingness to 
part with any they possessed'; to a feeling - 'an exasperated feeling thus created in 
Australia - that British Imperial interests in that ocean have been mishandled from the 
first'; to the gross bungling of the Home Government in regard to New Guinea and the 
New Hebrides; to the misrepresentation of the Australians as a 'grasping people’, the 
truth being that 'it is not a series of grasping annexations that we have been 
attempting, but a series of aggravated and exasperating losses which we have had to 
sustain'; and finally to the scandalous treatment of the Commonwealth in reference to 
the conclusion of the New Hebrides Convention.  Mr. Deakin revived the memory of 
unfortunate incidents only, as he explained, ‘as warnings for the future and in order to 
explain the feeling that exists'.  To the indictment of the Home Government's procedure 
- their 'take it or leave it' attitude - there was in reality no answer.  Speeches such as 
Mr. Deakin's, so grave in substance, so admirable in restraint, at once reveal in lurid 
light the ineptitude of Whitehall and compel admiration for the forbearance exhibited by 
the Dominions. 
  
The blunder made by the Gladstone Government in 1884 had been, with singular 
fidelity to discredited precedent, repeated by the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry in 
19O6, and the Home Government was within an ace [begin page 326] of again 
repeating it in 1915.  The mere possibility of its repetition gave additional point to the 
                                                  
22   [324/1]  Minutes of Conference of 1911, Cd. 5745, p. 24. 
23   [325/1]  Cf. Minutes of Proceedings, Cd. 3523, pp. 548-60. attempt made by New Zealand, at the Conference of 1911, to put the constitutional 
arrangements of the Empire upon a less unsatisfactory footing. 
 
Subsidiary Conferences, 1907-11  
The Conference of 1907 further resolved that 'upon matters of importance requiring 
consultation between two or more Governments which cannot conveniently be 
postponed until the next Conference, or involving subjects of a minor character or such 
as call for detailed consideration, subsidiary conferences should be held between 
representatives of the Governments concerned specially chosen for the purpose'.   
Under the terms of this resolution a Navigation Conference was held in 1907; 
Education Conferences in 1907 and 1911; a Copyright Conference in 1910, and a 
Surveyor's Conference in 1911.  But of these subsidiary conferences the most 
important was one called to deal in 1909 with the question of naval and military 
defence.  The Conference of 1907 had adopted the principle of the establishment of a 
general staff for the Empire.  The function of the general staff was to study military 
science in all its branches; to collect and disseminate to the several Governments 
military information and intelligence; to prepare schemes of defence on a common 
principle, and, while not interfering with questions of command or administration, to 
advise, at the request of any Government, as to the training, education, and war 
organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.  
 
Opportunity was also taken at the Conference of 1907 to discuss several detailed 
questions as to arms and ammunition (a point on which there was, nevertheless, 
considerable friction between the Canadian and the Home Government after the 
outbreak of war),
24 exchange of officers, cadets, military schools and rifle clubs.  
 
Defence Conference, 1909  
The Defence Conference which met in 1909 fully [begin page 327] justified its existence. 
The functions of the Conference were purely consultative and it deliberated in private, 
but the conclusions which it reached were subsequently communicated to the House of 
Commons by the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).  According to his summary the 
Conference agreed to recommend to their respective Governments a plan 'for so 
organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are that, while preserving the 
complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the 
defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into 
one homogeneous Imperial Army'.  
 
As regards naval defence, Canada decided to establish an auxiliary fleet and 
undertook the maintenance of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimault.  Australia also 
preferred to lay the foundation of her own fleet, purchasing for that purpose three 
cruisers and three destroyers from English firms.  New Zealand on the other hand 
agreed to contribute a subsidy of £100,000 a year, and a cruiser to a squadron of the 
new Pacific fleet.  The latter was to consist of three units, one in the East Indies, one in 
the China Seas, one in Australian Waters.  It was further agreed that the personnel of 
the Australian and Canadian fleets should be trained and disciplined under regulations 
similar to those established in the Royal Navy in order to allow of both interchange and 
union between the British and Dominion Services; and with the same object, that the 
standard of vessels and armaments should be uniform.  
 
The practical result of these decisions, all of which were subsequently confirmed by the 
several Governments concerned, will be disclosed in a subsequent chapter.  
 
                                                  
24   [326/1]  Sir Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia in the Dominion, favoured the 1909 
use of the Ross rifle which had been rejected by the British War Office. The imperial Conference of 1911 
The Conference which met in 1911 was, for more than one reason, memorable.  The 
last of the series of conferences before the outbreak of the Great War, it was the first to 
meet under the new and more dignified appellation 1911 of The Imperial Conference.  
In the development of formal machinery it registered little progress; as a consultative 
assembly it attained unprecedented significance.  [begin page 328] 
 
The Constitutional Resolution 
The constitutional resolution stood in the name of New Zealand and was moved by Sir 
Joseph Ward, the Premier of that Dominion.  The terms of the resolution (as amended 
in the course of the debate) were as follows:  
 
‘That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which 
renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State, with 
Representatives from all the self-governing parts of the Empire, in theory 
and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting 
the interests of His Majesty's Dominions oversea.'  
 
The atmosphere of the 1911 Conference was unquestionably, from an Imperial 
standpoint, ungenial the audience, to which Sir Joseph Ward addressed himself, was 
unsympathetic not to say hostile; the speaker was not proof against the frequent and 
trenchant interruptions of the British Premier (Mr. Asquith) and the speech, with which 
the motion was introduced, failed to do justice to its important theme.  Sir Joseph Ward 
seemed to be constantly shifting his sails to catch any breeze that might be passing, 
and he shifted them with conspicuous ill-success.  The only result was to make the 
course of his argument curiously unsteady.  The motion found no support, even from 
Australia and New Zealand.  Consequently, Sir Joseph Ward was left in splendid 
isolation. Mr. Asquith himself took refuge in a constitutional non possumus:  
 
‘Sir Joseph Ward's proposal . . . would impair if not altogether destroy the 
authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters 
as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration 
and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those 
relations with Foreign Powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, 
which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its 
responsibility to the Imperial Parliament.  That authority cannot be shared, 
and the coexistence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of 
this proposed body - it does not matter by what name you call it for the 
moment - clothed with the functions [begin page 329] and the jurisdiction 
which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgement, 
be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government. . . . We 
cannot, with the traditions and the history of the British Empire behind us, 
either from the point of view of the United Kingdom or from the point of 
view of our self-governing Dominions, assent for a moment to proposals 
which are so fatal to the very fundamental conditions on which our Empire 
has been built up and carried on.'  
 
From a debating point of view Mr. Asquith was able to score an easy victory; but the 
edge of his argument was a good deal blunted by a communication which he made to 
the Conference in the first sentence of his speech.  He had, as he informed them, 
received a memorial from some three hundred members of the Imperial House of 
Commons 'belonging to various parties in the State' in the following terms:  
 ‘We the undersigned Members of Parliament, representing various political 
parties, are of the opinion that the time has arrived to take practical steps to 
associate the oversea Dominions in a more practical manner with the 
conduct of Imperial affairs, if possible, by means of an established 
representative council of an advisory character in touch with public opinion 
throughout the Empire.' 
 
For once the House of Commons was prepared to move faster than the Imperial 
Conference.  It is true and pertinent to add that the memorial of the House of Commons 
was in general terms, while Sir Joseph Ward attempted to descend to particulars.  But 
the blunt truth is that the constitutional resolution did not, in 1911, have a fair chance, 
and under the circumstances it is regrettable that it was moved. 
 
Deplorable as was the issue of the constitutional debate, the Conference of 1911 will 
remain for ever memorable in the history of Imperial unity by reason of the survey of 
the foreign policy of the Empire communicated in private to the members of the 
Conference by Sir Edward Grey (now Viscount Grey of Fallodon).    [begin page 330] 
 
Secret Session, its Significance. 
Sir Edward Grey's communication was rendered the more impressive by the 
circumstances of the hour.  The European atmosphere was highly charged with 
electricity.  The outbreak of war had been hardly averted in 1905 by the resignation of 
M. Delcasse, the Foreign Minister of France - a resignation virtually dictated from 
Berlin.  An even more serious crisis, again provoked by events in Morocco, arose in the 
summer of 1911.  Again Germany sought to impose upon France in the eyes of the 
whole world a diplomatic humiliation, and to drive a wedge into the Triple Entente.  
Could war be a second time averted?  At the moment when Sir Edward Grey was 
laying before the statesmen of the Empire an exhaustive analysis of the diplomatic 
situation no one could have answered that question with an assured affirmative. 
 
What passed in that secret meeting of the Committee of Defence none, save those 
present, can tell.  We can guess only from the impression obviously made upon those 
who were present, and from the speech of Mr Andrew Fisher, Prime Minister of the 
Commonwealth, who evidently expressed the thought of all. 
 
‘Hitherto,' he said, ‘we have been negotiating with the Government of the 
United Kingdom at the portals of the household.  You have thought it wise 
to take the representatives of the Dominions into the inner counsels of the 
nation, and frankly discuss with them the affairs of the Empire as they affect 
each and all of us. . . . I think no greater step has ever been taken or can be 
taken by any responsible advisers of the King.'  
 
Mr. Asquith himself used similar language.  'I do not suppose there is one of us. . . who 
did not feel when that exposition of our foreign relations had been concluded that we 
realized in a much more intimate and comprehensive sense than we had ever done 
before the international position and its bearings upon the problem of government in 
the different parts of the Empire itself.'  Referring also to the confidential discussion on 
defence, and the agreement resulting therefrom in regard to [begin page 331] co-
operation for naval and military purposes, Mr. Asquith said:  
 
‘Our discussions conducted unnecessarily under the same veil of confidence 
in regard to co-operation for naval and military purposes have resulted, I 
think, in the most satisfactory agreement, which, while it recognizes our 
common obligation, at the same time acknowledges with equal clearness 
that those obligations must be performed in the different parts of the Empire in accordance with the requirements of local opinions and local need and 
local circumstances.  Those, gentlemen, are matters as to which we cannot 
take the world into our confidence; we cannot even take our own fellow 
subjects and our own fellow citizens into our confidence in the full sense of 
the term. But we, who have gone into it with the frankness which such 
confidential discussions admit of, will agree that even if the Conference had 
done no more than that it would have been a landmark in the development 
of what I may call our Imperial constitutional history.'
25  
 
In view of these and similar declarations it is not unsafe to surmise that the instant and, 
as it seemed, almost intuitive apprehension, on the part of the Dominions, of the points 
at issue in the European War was due, in no small degree, to the precise and accurate 
grasp of the diplomatic situation which they had obtained, at first hand, during the 
Conference of 1911.  
 
The Empire and International Agreements. 
Of the discussions subsequently made public the most important was that upon 
International Agreements in general, and in particular upon the Declaration of London.  
That Declaration, embodying the new rules in regard to contraband decided upon at 
the Hague Conference of 1907, profoundly affected the position of the dominant Sea-
Power and its Sea-Empire; but, apart from the merits, the Dominions held that, in a 
matter so closely affecting them, they ought to have been consulted.  Consequently, on 
1 June Mr. Fisher moved: 'That it is regretted that the Dominions were not consulted 
prior to the acceptance by the British Delegates of the terms [begin page 332] of the 
Declaration of London. . . .'  Upon that motion Sir Edward Grey spoke,
26 and on 2 June 
the Conference resolved:  
 
‘That this Conference after hearing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
cordially welcomes the proposals of the Imperial Government, viz.: 
 
(a)   that the Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of consultation 
when framing the instructions to be given to British delegates at future 
meetings of the Hague Conference, and that Conventions affecting the 
Dominions provisionally assented to at that Conference shall be 
circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration 
before any such Convention is signed; 
 
(b)   that a similar procedure where time and opportunity and the subject 
matter permit shall, as far as possible, be used when preparing 
instructions for the negotiations of other International Agreements 
affecting the Dominions.'  
 
The discussion was on a high plane, and in the course of it very serious objection was 
taken to the autocratic procedure of the Home Government in reference to Treaties 
which vitally concern the interests of the Dominions.  Even General Botha, who 
throughout the Conference invariably spoke with characteristic modesty and marked 
consideration for the Home Government, was constrained, on this matter, to express 
his 'profound conviction that it is in the highest interest of the Empire that the Imperial 
Government should not definitely bind itself by any promise or agreement with a foreign 
                                                  
25   [331/1]  Minutes of Proceedings, Cd. 5745, p. 440. 
26   [332/1]  This speech, which will be found in Minutes of Proceedings, Cd. 5745, 
pp. 103-15, is quite distinct from the general survey of foreign affairs made in 
camera to the Committee of Defence. country which may affect a particular Dominion, without consulting the Dominion 
concerned'.  The sentiments of General Botha were the sentiments of all the self-
governing Dominions.  Nor did their misgivings lack justification.  Nevertheless there 
can be no question that the broad result of the Conference of 1911 conduced to a 
better understanding between Great Britain and the sister-nations.  The discussions 
were frank almost to the verge of brutality; but confidence begot confidence.  The 
[begin page 333] precise knowledge of the facts which on dispersion the delegates 
carried back with them to their several Dominions necessarily involved a measure of 
responsibility.  The status of dependency was exchanged for that of partnership, and 
when the crisis came they were not taken unawares.  
 
Such was the stage which the Conference had reached in its constitutional evolution 
when the Empire was called to arms.  The results thus far achieved were cautiously 
estimated by one who combined in unique degree historical erudition and experience of 
affairs:  
 
‘Nothing could be more in harmony with the British instinct and British 
methods of construction than the evolution of the Imperial Conference and 
its concomitants.  Twenty- five years have elapsed since the first meeting of 
the kind took place without any system of any kind or any rule as to 
representation, and at the present moment the Imperial Conference is a well 
defined, fully understood, and fully recognized machinery, the meetings 
being held at stated intervals, and each meeting resulting in a step forward 
in the direction of Imperial unity.  The wonder is that it has developed so 
rapidly.  . . any attempt to stimulate its growth by hothouse methods would 
be disastrous.  It is. . . not only inexpedient but absolutely impossible to 
build up the future except by slow degrees if the building is to endure.'
27  
 
A momentous question remained.  Would the machinery, still rudimentary, stand the 
strain of a great crisis; would the ties, still 'light as air’, prove strong enough to hold the 
Commonwealth together through the suffering and sacrifice of a great war?  The years 
1914-18 supplied the answer. 
 
                                                  
27   [333/1]  Sir C.P. Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain (1912), pp. 173-4. XII. - The Machinery of Imperial Co-Operation  
The War and the Empire 
 
The first shot fired in a great European war will be the signal for the 
dissolution of England's loosely compacted Empire.' - General Bernhardi.  
 
The whole course of human affairs has been altered because the British 
Empire has been proved to be a fact and not, what a good many people who 
knew nothing about it imagined, a fiction, . . . There is no doubt at all that 
the events of the last few years have consolidated the Empire in a way 
which probably generations would not have done otherwise.' - D. Lloyd 
George. 18 August 1921,  
 
The realm of paradox. 
England is the realm of eternal paradox.  To every foreigner, even the most sympathetic 
and the best informed, the character of her people is inscrutable, and her political 
institutions are almost unintelligible.  Her success is indeed unquestionable; but what is 
the secret of it?  Has it been due to mere blind chance; to the favour of an over-partial 
Providence, or to profound but carefully veiled calculation?  She disclaims with 
apparent sincerity territorial ambitions; yet every decade she adds to her oversea 
possessions.  She confers upon her dependencies, avowedly with a view to preparing 
them for complete independence, the largest measure of autonomy; but year by year 
the ties between them are strengthened and multiplied.  What wonder that her 
diplomatists should be charged with perfidy and her people be denounced as 
hypocrites?  For her policy is apt to disconcert friends and to disappoint enemies.  
 
The miscalculation of Germany. 
No enemy of England was ever more cruelly disappointed than was Germany in 1914.  
The German plan of attack was based upon two assumptions: first, that England was 
too unprepared and too much distracted by domestic difficulties to go to the assistance 
of France, [begin page 336] and consequently that Germany would be able to march 
into Paris and dictate terms to a vanquished France before she had to tackle the real 
enemy; secondly, that when England's turn came, England would have to fight 
Germany without allies, and above all without assistance from the sister-nations and 
the Dependencies oversea.  
 
The military party at Potsdam had accepted without question Bernhardi's confident 
assurance that the first shot fired in a great European war would be the signal for the 
dissolution of England's 'loosely compacted Empire'.  
 
‘All the Colonies’, he wrote, ' which are directly subject to English rule are 
primarily exploited in the interest of English industries and English capital.  
The work of civilization which England undeniably has carried out among 
them has always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her 
sovereignty by training up a free and independent population and by 
transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent culture of 
their own.  With regard to those Colonies which enjoy self-government and 
are therefore more or less free Republics, as Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, it seems uncertain at the present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in the Empire, to make them serviceable to 
English industries or even to secure that the national character is English.'
1  
 
It is only fair to add that before the war had proceeded very long one of the most 
candid of German publicists, with a clear apprehension of the truth, frankly admitted the 
cruel disillusionment which his countrymen had suffered.  
 
'The unsystematic character of English Imperialism has often been pointed 
to as a deficiency by theoretical critics among the Germans, and people 
believed that the loosely constructed building would break in pieces by 
reason of the superficiality of the link between its many members.  But the 
war has shown, in this case too, that loose threads, when they are properly 
put together, can hold fast.  The Empire geographically so varied spread out 
on every coast has remained a unity "  
[begin page 337] 
 
‘And again’, One of the facts that have become evident in the war is that 
Australia, South Africa, and Canada are English in will and feeling.  They 
have their own provincial pride and their inalienable autonomy, but they 
wish to remain independent parts of greater Britain.'
2  
 
Although the anticipations of Potsdam were destined to disappointment, the war did 
reveal grave defects in the constitutional machinery of the British Empire.  The spirit by 
which the body politic was infused could not have been better; the practical results 
could hardly have been improved; the mechanism could hardly have been worse.  The 
question may possibly obtrude itself: Might not the spirit have been worse had the 
machinery been better?  Given the peculiar genius of Englishmen, might not over-much 
thought for the morrow have defeated its own purpose?  Was not spontaneity of the 
essence of success?  Such questions cannot be lightly brushed aside, but the answer 
must be deferred.  The present chapter is primarily concerned with the development of 
the machinery of Imperial co-operation during the period of the Great War. 
  
The Empire at War 
At midnight on 3 August 1914, the whole Empire was involved in war by the action of 
the Imperial Government.  At one minute after midnight Germany would have been as 
much entitled to bombard Halifax, Vancouver, Cape Town, or Sydney as to bombard 
Chatham or Portsmouth. 
 
Legal position of the Dominions. 
Upon this point it is necessary to lay some emphasis.  The actual participation of the 
Dominions in the war was wholly voluntary; there was no legal obligation resting upon 
them to contribute one man or one shilling; the amount of their contribution in men and 
money was entirely within their own discretion.  But their legal implication in the war 
was involuntary.  New Zealand could no more escape the consequences of Great 
Britain's declaration of war than could Scotland; Canada no more than Ireland.   
Neutrality was legally impossible.  War was declared for the Empire and in one way 
only could [begin page 338] any single unit of the Empire escape responsibility for the 
decision of the Imperial Government; by formal secession.  To remain in the Empire 
and to maintain neutrality was a legal impossibility. 
 
That Germany would have hesitated to push any of the Dominions or Dependencies 
into this dilemma is likely enough; virtual neutrality would have served her purpose; and 
                                                  
1   [336/1]  Germany and the Next War (Eng. trs.), pp. 79-80. 
2   [337/1]  Dr. Friedrich Naumann, Mittel Europa, pp, 184-206. that she counted upon this, if upon no more, is unquestionable.  Nor would the British 
Government have been quick to strain the legal point.  No attempt was made to put any 
pressure upon the Dominions; nor was any request made to them for any form of 
assistance, financial, naval or military.  When the offers of assistance came from the 
Dominions - and they came with the utmost promptitude - they were naturally accepted 
by the Home Government with cordiality and gratitude.  But we must repeat that while 
the offers of aid were spontaneous, the legal implication in war was involuntary.’ 
 
Attitude of the Dominions: South Africa 
In no part of the Empire, except in South Africa, was there any hesitation to come 
forward with offers of assistance, still less to evade the legal responsibility of war; and 
even in South Africa the Union Ministers accepted, as early as 10 August 1914, the 
suggestion of the Imperial Government that they should promptly attack German 
South-West Africa.  Nor was the Legislature slow to support the action of the Executive.  
The House of Assembly, ‘fully recognizing the obligations of the Union as a portion of 
the British Empire’, passed a humble address assuring His Majesty of 'its loyal support 
in bringing to a successful issue the momentous conflict which has been forced upon 
him in defence of the principles of liberty and of international honour, and of its whole-
hearted determination to take all measures necessary for defending the interests of the 
Union and for co-operating with His Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the 
security and integrity of the Empire'; and, further, requesting His Majesty to convey to 
the King of the [begin page 339] Belgians sympathy with the Belgian people in their 
struggle.  To this motion an amendment was proposed by Mr. Hertzog that 'This House 
being fully prepared to support all measures of defence which may be necessary to 
resist any attack on Union territory is of opinion that any act in the nature of an attack 
or which may lead to an attack on German territory in South Africa would be in conflict 
with the interests of the Union and of the Empire'.  The amendment, however, found 
only twelve supporters, of whom nine came from the Orange Free State, as against 
ninety-two who supported the Government.  With subsequent developments in South 
Africa this narrative is not concerned, though it is pertinent to remember that only in 
South Africa and in Ireland was opposition to the policy, which commended itself to the 
general sense of the Empire, carried to the length of armed rebellion.  Before the war 
closed, South Africa had contributed, in addition to 44,000 coloured and native troops 
who were enlisted in labour brigades, no fewer than 76,184 men or 11.12 percent of 
her total male white population. 
 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
The Government of the Australian Commonwealth Australia, informed the Imperial 
Government as early as 3 August of its readiness to dispatch a force of 20,000 men, 
and Canada the first contingent actually left Australia on 1 November.  
 
In the course of the war 331,814 men or a proportion of no less than 13.43 per cent, of 
the male population were raised.  New Zealand was equally prompt and even more 
generous in its contribution.  The Dominion raised 112,223 men, being 19.35 percent, 
of the total male population.  Canada's contribution, though the percentage was greatly 
diminished by the reluctance of the French Canadians to military service, amounted to 
the magnificent total of 458,218 men,
3
 
                                                  
3   [339/1]  For purpose of comparison, it may be mentioned that the total forces of 
the United Kingdom amounted to 5,704,416, or a percentage of serving troops to 
population of 25.36, or 27.28 if Ireland with its disproportionately small 
contribution be omitted. Attitude of Imperial Government. 
One other point requires to be emphasized.  If the Co- [begin page 340] operation of the 
Dominions was as spontaneous as it was superb, if their legal implication in the war 
was inevitable, the Imperial Government were scrupulously careful to respect the 
autonomy of the Dominions.  The legal position required that British subjects 
throughout the Empire should be warned that by contributing to German loans or 
making contracts with the German Government they would render themselves liable to 
the penalties of high treason as abetting the King's enemies.  Similarly, the whole 
Empire was included within the scope of the Proclamations and Orders in Council, 
'dealing with the days of grace allowed for the departure of German merchant vessels 
from British ports throughout the Empire, the carriage of contraband of war by British 
ships between foreign ports, the definition from time to time of contraband goods, and 
the operation with restrictions of the Declaration of London and its final abandonment in 
favour of more rigid rules of war'.
4  Prize courts in the Dominions were also called into 
activity to exercise their jurisdiction under Imperial enactments, and the procedure in 
prize cases was regulated by Acts passed by the Imperial Legislature in 1914 and 
1915. But, as Dr. Keith properly insists, Dominion autonomy was respected in all 
matters where it was possible.  Thus the restrictions imposed on the transfer of ships 
from British ownership by Acts of 1915 and 1916 were not extended to British ships 
registered in the Dominions.  Again, persons who, though resident for a time in Great 
Britain, were ordinarily resident in the Dominions were explicitly excluded from the 
Conscription Acts (1916-18).  Even more remarkable was the abstention on the part of 
the Imperial Government from any interference with the discretion of the Dominions in 
regard to the conduct of their military [begin page 341] expeditions and their occupation 
of enemy territory.  Thus it was General Botha who decided the terms on which the 
German forces in South Africa laid down their arms, and it was Australian and New 
Zealand officers respectively who arranged the terms of the capitulation of German 
New Guinea and Samoa.  There are those who think that in these and similar matters 
the Imperial Government carried the policy of non-interference to unreasonable 
lengths, but at least it cannot be denied that the most scrupulous regard was shown 
alike for the rights and the susceptibilities of the younger communities oversea.  If the 
confidence of the Dominion Governments had been won by the frank disclosure and 
discussion which took place in London in 1911, if their prompt and spontaneous co-
operation in the war was in no small degree attributable to the precise information then 
vouchsafed to them, the most sensitive could hardly fail to be reassured by the policy 
pursued by the Imperial Government throughout the whole course of the war and 
during the peace negotiations. 
  
Defective machinery 
Nevertheless, the machinery of co-operation proved Defective itself, during the war, to 
be lamentably defective.  Nor was there, on this point, any illusion among the leading 
statesmen of the Dominions.  Speaking early in the war at Winnipeg, Sir Robert Borden 
said: 'It is impossible to believe that the existing status, so far as it concerns the control 
of foreign policy and extra-Imperial relations, can remain as it is today.'  These 
pregnant events he said in December 1915, ‘have already given birth to a new order.  It 
is realized that great policies and questions which concern and govern the issues of 
peace and war cannot in future be assumed by the people of the British islands alone.'  
In language not less emphatic and more picturesque, Mr. Doherty, the Minister of 
justice, spoke to similar purpose at Toronto:  
 
                                                  
4   [340/1]  A.B. Keith, War Government of the British Dominions, p. 20. Oxford: at 
the Clarendon Press (1921).  Published on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  In this work Dr. Keith contributes yet another to the series of 
masterly and penetrating studies which in recent years have done so much to 
elucidate the Constitutional relations of the several parts of the Empire. ‘Our recognition of this war as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and 
voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once for all that we have passed 
from the status of the [begin page 342] protected colony to that of the 
participating nation.  The protected colony was rightly voiceless; the 
participating nation cannot continue so.  The hand that wields the sword of 
the Empire justly holds the sceptre of the Empire; while the Mother Country 
alone wielded the one, to her alone belonged the other.  When, as today, the 
nations of the Empire join in wielding that sword, then must they jointly 
sway that sceptre.' 
 
Australia and New Zealand re-echoed the voice of Canada.  'There must be a change 
and it must be radical in its nature’, declared Mr. Hughes.  Mr. Fisher, and Sir Joseph 
Ward spoke with similar emphasis, and the same point was driven home in England by 
Mr. Bonar Law:  
 
‘It is not a possible arrangement that one set of men should contribute the 
lives and treasure of their people and should have no voice in the way in 
which those lives and that treasure are expended.  That cannot continue.  
There must be a change.'  
 
Bluntly put, the warning uttered by the Dominions to the Homeland amounted to this:  
 
‘You have involved us in war without consulting us; we have come into it 
and waged it with all our might; we know that the cause in which we fight is 
righteous; we are prepared to send our last man and to spend our last 
shilling; you can count upon us to the end, but - be it understood - "never 
again”; complete self-government involves something more than the control 
of our own domestic affairs, it means at least a voice in the conduct of the 
foreign policy of the whole Empire.' 
 
The plea was irresistible and the warning was not unheeded.  The pity was that it had 
not been heeded twenty years earlier, and that response was delayed until all the grace 
of it had evaporated.  But it came at last.  
 
The Imperial War Cabinet, 1917. 
The first act of the Government which came into power in England in December 1916 
was to invite the Prime Cabinet, Ministers of the Dominions and representatives of 
India [begin page 343] to visit England in 1917, and to become members, for the time 
being of the War Cabinet. 
 
The invitation was addressed to the Dominions on behalf of His Majesty's Government 
by Mr. Walter (afterwards Viscount) Long, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, and 
in issuing it Mr. Long wrote: 
 
‘I wish to explain that what His Majesty's Government contemplate is not a 
session of the ordinary Imperial Conference but a special War Conference of 
the Empire.  They, therefore, invite your Prime Minister to attend a series of 
special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet, in order to consider 
urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the possible conditions on 
which, in agreement with our Allies, we could assent to its termination and 
the problems which will then immediately arise.  For the purpose of these 
meetings your Prime Minister would be a member of the War Cabinet.' 
 The proposed status to be accorded to the representatives of the Dominions could not 
have been more clearly defined.  The invitation was accepted by all the Dominions as 
well as by India, and on 20 March 1917 - a date destined to be memorable in the 
history of the British Empire - the Imperial War Cabinet met for the first time.  It 
consisted, firstly, of the members of the War Cabinet or Directory: the Right Hon. D. 
Lloyd George, Prime Minister, the Right Hon. Earl Curzon of Kedleston, the Right Hon. 
Viscount Milner, and the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, Ministers without portfolio, and 
the Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of 
Commons.  Canada was represented by the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden, Prime 
Minister, and Sir George Perley, Minister of the Overseas Military Forces, who were 
'accompanied' by the Hon. Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, and the Hon. J.D. 
Hazen, Minister of Marine, but the two last mentioned were not strictly ‘members' of the 
Cabinet.  Australia was at the last minute prevented, by the imminence of a general 
election, from sending any representative, [begin page 344] but New Zealand was 
represented by the Right Hon. W.F. Massey, Prime Minister, and the Right Hon. Sir J.G. 
Ward, Minister of Finance.  General Botha, the Prime Minister, could not leave South 
Africa but the Union was represented by the Right Hon. J.C. Smuts, Minister of 
Defence, and Newfoundland by the Right Hon. Sir E.P. Morris, Prime Minister.  India 
was represented by the Secretary of State for India, the Right Hon. Austen 
Chamberlain, who was 'accompanied' by three assessors: the Hon. Sir J.S. (now Lord) 
Meston, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces; Colonel His Highness 
the Maharajah Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Maharajah of Bikaner; and 
Sir S.P. (now Lord) Sinha, Member Designate of the Executive Council of the Governor 
of Bengal.  The Right Hon. W.H. Long, who had issued the invitations on behalf of the 
Government was, ex officio, a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and spoke on 
behalf of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates.
5  
 
This Imperial War Cabinet was summoned specifically to consider 'urgent questions 
affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible conditions (of peace) and the 
problems which will then immediately arise'.  Its constitutional status and political 
functions were defined with precision by Earl Curzon.  Speaking as leader of the House 
of Lords he said:  
 
‘The representatives are not coming here to endeavour to construct a brand-
new Constitution for the British Empire.  The capacity in which they come, 
however, does constitute a remarkable forward step in the constitutional 
evolution of the Empire.  They are not coming as members of an Imperial 
Conference of the old style.  They are coming as members for the time 
being of the Governing body of the British Empire.  This seems to me the 
greatest step ever taken in recognising the relations of the Dominions and 
ourselves on a basis of equality. . .  The War Cabinet is for a purpose being 
expanded into an Imperial Council.’
6
[begin page 345] 
 
Lord Curzon's language is at once cautious, precise, and hopeful; nor can the 
significance of the experiment thus outlined be denied.  But the question remains: How 
far did the Imperial War Cabinet fulfil the anticipations of those who had the wit to 
summon it?  
 
Reports of the War Cabinet. 
This question is more easily asked than answered.  The Reports of the War Cabinet for 
1917 and 1918 - the publication of which in itself marks a notable innovation in 
                                                  
5   [344/1]  War Cabinet Report for 1917 (Cd. 9005), pp. I, 6-7 
6   [344/2]  House of Lord’s Official Report, 7 February 1917. constitutional practice - reveal more of the arcana of the constitution than has ever 
been revealed before; yet, even so, we can estimate results only from the formal 
utterances of the statesmen actually engaged in the experiment.  The most important of 
these statements was made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons (17 May 
1917):  
 
‘It is’, said Mr. Lloyd George, ‘desirable that Parliament should be officially 
and formally acquainted with an event that will constitute a memorable 
landmark in the constitutional history of the British Empire. . . . The British 
Cabinet became for the time being an Imperial War Cabinet.  While it was in 
session its Overseas members had access to all the information which was at 
the disposal of His Majesty's Government and occupied a status of absolute 
equality with that of the members of the British War Cabinet. . . . So far as 
we are concerned we can say with confidence that the experiment has been a 
complete success. . . . The Imperial War Cabinet were unanimous that the 
new procedure had been of such service not only to all its members, but to 
the Empire that it ought not to be allowed to fall into desuetude.'   
 
Accordingly, it was resolved that an Imperial War Cabinet, consisting of 'the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, and such of his colleagues as deal specially with 
Imperial affairs, of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions or some specially accredited 
alternate possessed of equal authority' and of a representative of India should meet 
annually or more often if occasion demanded.  Mr. Lloyd George concluded with 
expressing the hope, common to his colleagues and himself that 'the holding of an 
annual Imperial Cabinet to discuss foreign affairs [begin page 346] and other aspects of 
Imperial policy will become an accepted convention of the British Constitution'.  
 
The utterances of Dominion representatives entirely corroborated the impression 
conveyed by the Premier's announcement.  Sir Robert Borden, for instance, in an 
address to the Empire Parliamentary Association (3 April 1917) was, if anything, even 
more explicit:  
 
‘We meet there (in the Imperial Cabinet) on terms of equality under the 
presidency of the First Minister of the United Kingdom; we meet there as 
equals; he is primus inter pares.  Ministers from six nations sit around the 
council board, all of them responsible to their respective parliaments and to 
the people of the countries which they represent.  Each nation has its voice 
upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the 
deliberations proceed; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its 
self-government, and the responsibility of its ministers to their own 
electorate.  For many years the thought of statesmen and students in every 
part of the Empire has centred around the question of future constitutional 
relations; it may be that now as in the past the necessity imposed by great 
events has given the answer.'
7  
 
The passage here quoted was rightly deemed sufficiently significant to be reproduced 
in the official Report of the War Cabinet for 1917; but it by no means stood alone.  The 
character of the experiment, the form of procedure, above all, the complete success of 
the new departure in constitutional practice, rest upon irrefutable testimony.  As Sir 
Robert Borden himself well put it: 'With that new Cabinet a new era has dawned and a 
new page of history has been written.'  
 
                                                  
7   [346/1]  Sir Robert Borden, The War and the Future, p. 14 An embryonic Imperial Executive 
Thus, for two months in the spring of 1917, the Empire  did actually possess a real 
Imperial Executive in embryo.  Regarded as a makeshift for the purposes of the war, 
nothing could have been better.  But the question remains: How far did that experiment 
go towards solving the constitutional problem of the Commonwealth?  Plainly, if the 
Empire Cabinet or something on these [begin page 347] lines were to become part of 
the permanent machinery of the Government of the Empire, considerable modifications 
would be found necessary.  In the first place, the composition of the first Imperial War 
Cabinet left much to be desired.  To exclude from such a Cabinet the Secretary of State 
for War, or the First Lord of the Admiralty or a Minister of Imperial Trade and 
Communications would, in ordinary times, and under ordinary circumstances, be 
grotesque.  Under a genuine Federal Constitution the Executive Authority would 
naturally be entrusted, assuming that the principle of Federalism were combined with 
the principle of Parliamentary Government, to seven or eight ministers who would be 
the heads of Imperial departments and who might be drawn indifferently from the 
statesmen of the Homeland or the Dominions.  If, on the other hand, constitutional 
evolution is for the time being to stop short at a Federal Executive it would be in better 
accord, alike with the facts of the situation and with the spirit of the Constitution, that 
the Empire Cabinet should consist mainly, if not exclusively, of ministers without 
portfolio.  The English genius would find it difficult to conceive of heads of 
Administrative Departments who were not responsible to a legislature.  To this point we 
shall return.  
 
Imperial War Cabinet of 1918 
The experiment tried in 1917 was, however, so far Imperial successful that it was 
repeated in 1918; but with important differences.  This second session lasted from 
June 11 of 1918 until July 30, and was attended not only by the Prime Minister and the 
other Members of the War Cabinet, but by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 
for the Colonies, for India, for War, and for the Royal Air Force, and by the First Lord of 
the Admiralty.  Australia, unrepresented in 1917 owing to a general election, was 
represented by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth (Mr. Hughes) and by the 
Minister of the Navy (Sir J. Cooke); Newfoundland, by its Premier (Mr. W.F. Lloyd); 
Canada by Sir Robert Borden and by the President of the Privy Council (Mr. M.W. 
Rowell); New [begin page 348] Zealand by Mr. Massey and Sir J. Ward; the Union of 
South Africa by General Smuts and Mr. H. Burton; and India by the Secretary of State, 
by the Maharajah of Patiala as 'the spokesman of the Princes of India’, and by Sir S.P. 
(now Lord) Sinha, who was 'deputed to this country as the representative of the people 
of India'.  
 
Not only in composition did the Empire Cabinet of 1918 differ from that of 1917.  The 
scope and competence of the Cabinet was also enlarged.  The official record intimates 
that its deliberations were not confined to the all-absorbing military problems, but 
covered the whole field of Imperial policy, including many aspects of foreign policy and 
the war aims for which the British Commonwealth was fighting.  How absorbing the 
military problems were is sufficiently indicated by the dates of the session.  Between 
March and July in that fateful summer the Germans on the Western front launched four 
terrific attacks: the first, opening on 1 March near St. Quentin, pierced the Anglo-French 
line and brought the Germans close to Amiens; the second was launched on 9 April to 
the south of Ypres; the third, opening on 26 May, brought the Germans once more on 
to the Marne; in the fourth, which began on the 15th of July, the German Army was 
permitted by Marshal Foch, now Generalissimo, to cross the Marne.  Three days later 
Foch let loose his reserves, the Germans were driven back with heavy loss, and on 8 
August the British counter offensive, destined to be final and conclusive, began.   
Before the second session of the Empire Cabinet ended, the tide of battle had already 
begun to turn, and the character of the problems to be considered underwent in 
consequence some change.  So also did the status of its members.  'The overseas 
members of the Imperial War Cabinet, not only helped to settle the policy to be adopted by the British Government at the session of the Allied Supreme Council in July, but also 
attended one of the meetings of the Supreme War Council in person.'
8   [begin page 
349] 
 
Not only was the competence of the Cabinet extended, but its machinery was 
elaborated.  Before it adjourned a resolution was adopted, in accordance with the 
suggestion made at the Imperial Conference of 1911, that henceforward the Prime 
Ministers of the Dominions should have the right, as Members of the Empire Cabinet, 
to communicate directly with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and vice versa.  
Such communications were to be confined to questions of Cabinet importance, but it 
was expressly provided that the Prime Ministers themselves were to be the Judges of 
such questions.  
 
Telegraphic communications between the Prime Ministers were as a rule to be 
conducted through the machinery of the Colonial Office; moreover it was laid down that 
this rule was not to exclude, should the circumstances be deemed exceptional, the 
adoption of more direct means of communication.  Another point of great importance  
was also dealt with by formal resolution.  The experience of the period between the 
adjournment of the first session (May 1917), and the meeting of the second (June 
1918), sufficed to demonstrate 'the practical inconvenience resulting from the fact that 
while the Prime Ministers of the Dominions could only attend the Imperial War Cabinet 
for a few weeks in the year, matters of the a greatest importance from the point of view 
of the common interest inevitably arose and had to be decided in the interval between 
the sessions'.  The natural remedy for this defect lay in giving the Imperial War Cabinet 
continuity by the presence in London of Oversea Cabinet Ministers definitely nominated 
to represent the Prime Ministers in their absence.  Consequently, the following 
resolution was adopted: 'In order to secure continuity in the work of the Imperial War 
Cabinet and a permanent means of consultation during the war on the more important 
questions of common interest, the Prime Minister of each Dominion has the right to 
nominate a Cabinet Minister either as a resident or visitor in London to represent him at 
meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet [begin page 350] to be held regularly between the 
Plenary sessions.'  It was also decided that arrangements should be made for the 
representation of India at those meetings.
9  
 
Before this resolution could take effect the military collapse of the Central Powers - 
unexpectedly rapid and complete - precipitated the summoning of the Peace 
Conference in Paris.  That Conference marked the accomplishment of a further stage 
in the evolution of Colonial nationalism, if not of Empire organization.  It may be well, 
therefore, at this point to pause to estimate the results actually achieved during the two 
last years of the war. 
 
As regards the Imperial Executive the results were accurately estimated in a speech 
delivered by Sir Robert Borden to the Empire Parliamentary Association on the 21st of 
June 1918.  The statement then made received a quasi-official imprimatur  by its 
reproduction in the Report of the War Cabinet for 1918.
10  
 
‘A very great step in the constitutional development of the Empire was 
taken last year by the Prime Minister when he summoned the Prime 
Ministers of the Overseas Dominions to the Imperial War Cabinet. . . . We 
meet as Prime Ministers of self-governing nations. . . . But we have always 
lacked the full status of nationhood, because you exercised here a so-called 
trusteeship, under which you undertook to deal with foreign relations on our 
                                                  
8   [348/1]  Report of War Cabinet for 1918, pp. 10. 
9   [350/1]  Report of War Cabinet for 1918. p. 10. 
10   [350/2]  Ibid., PP. 7-8.   behalf, and sometimes without consulting us very much.  Well, that day has 
gone by. . . . It has been said that the term "Imperial War Cabinet" is a 
misnomer.  The word "Cabinet" is unknown to the law.  The meaning of 
"Cabinet" has developed from time to time.  For my part I see no 
incongruity whatever in applying the term "Cabinet" to the association of 
Prime Ministers and other Ministers who meet around a common council 
board to debate and to determine the various needs of the Empire.  If I 
should attempt to describe it, I should say it is a Cabinet of Governments, 
Every Prime Minister who sits around that board is responsible to his own 
Parliament and to his own people; the conclusions of the War Cabinet can 
only be carried out by the Parliaments of the different nations of our [begin 
page 351] Imperial Commonwealth.  Thus, each Dominion, each nation, 
retains its perfect autonomy.  I venture to believe, and I thus expressed 
myself last year, that in this may be found the genesis of a development in 
the constitutional relations of the Empire, which will form the basis of its 
unity in the ears to come.' 
 
Sir Robert Borden's words, and still more the official endorsement of them, are on 
several grounds remarkable.  The assertion of 'perfect equality' as between the 
motherland and the Dominions; the implied claim to the full status of nationhood'; the 
denial of executive competence to the Imperial War 'Cabinet'; above all the suggestion 
that in such a 'Cabinet', endowed neither with executive nor with legislative authority, 
would be found the safest line of' development in the constitutional relations of the 
Empire' - all this seemed to close one door and to open wide another: to repudiate by 
implication the federal solution of the Imperial problem and to put forward as a 
preferable alternative the idea of a confederacy of Free Commonwealths. 
  
The same idea had been expressed, even more explicitly and with even greater 
emphasis, by General Smuts at the Imperial Conference of 1917, and to the work of 
that Conference we must now briefly refer.  
 
The Imperial War Conference, 1917 
Under a resolution adopted at the Conference of 1907 meetings of the Imperial 
Conference were to be held quadrennially.  A conference met accordingly in 1911 and 
another was due in 1915, but in February of that 1917 year Mr. Harcourt, then 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced that in consultation with all the 
Dominions it had been decided that it was undesirable to 'hold the normal meeting of 
the Imperial Conference’ in 1915.  The Dominions acquiesced in this decision, the more 
readily after receiving an assurance that it was the intention of the Imperial 
Government to consult the Dominion Premiers 'most fully and, if possible, personally 
when the time arrives to discuss possible terms of peace'.  That intention was more 
than fulfilled.  [begin page 352] 
 
The special Imperial War Conference sat side by side with the Imperial War Cabinet.  
As regards the representatives of the Dominions and India the personnel of the two 
bodies was identical.  The members of the British War Cabinet did not, however, attend 
the Conference which met at the Colonial Office under the presidency of Mr. Walter 
Long.  As a rule the two bodies met on alternate days, the Conference being concerned 
with ‘non-war problems, or questions connected with the war, but of lesser 
importance'.
11  A great part of the proceedings was of a 'highly confidential character 
and entirely unsuitable for publication at any rate during the war',
12 but extracts from 
the Minutes of Proceedings and some of the resolutions adopted were promptly 
                                                  
11   [352/1]  War Cabinet Report, p. 7. 
12   [352/2]  Minutes, &c. (Cd. 8566), p. 3. published.  Of those resolutions by far the most significant was that on the Constitution 
of the Empire adopted, apparently with unanimity, on 16 April.  After amendment and as 
finally adopted it ran as follows:  
 
Constitutional Resolutions of 16 April 
The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional 
relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject 
to be dealt with during the War, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial 
Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities. 
 
‘They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any 
such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-
government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon 
a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should 
recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in 
foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective 
arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of 
common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, 
founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.'
13  
 
The terms of this historic resolution call for close [begin page 353] scrutiny.   
Contemporary criticism acclaimed it, with satisfaction or chagrin according to the 
temper of the critic, as definitely closing the door upon what is known as the federal 
solution.  Thus Mr. (now Sir) Sidney Low expressed with characteristic lucidity the 
thought that was in many minds:  
 
‘This. . . places the federal solution out of court for the present.  The 
overseas statesmen who have concurred in the establishment of the Empire 
Executive do not expect or intend that their work shall be consummated by 
parliamentary federation.  They are not federalists, but autonomists; and 
they do not regard an Imperial Congress or Parliament as consistent with 
their ideal of national self-expression and self-development . . . and if their 
opinion is shared, as it probably is, by the majority of their fellow-citizens, 
the reorganization of the Empire under a supreme central Parliament must 
be ruled out of consideration for the near future.'
14  
 
Even more important, because more authoritative, General were the words used by 
General Smuts in commending Smuts the resolution to the Imperial Conference.   
General Smuts, though not devoid of the Imperial instinct, is primarily an autonomist or 
nationalist.  The collected edition of the speeches made by him in England, in 1917, to 
go no farther, makes his position perfectly clear.  Those speeches lay stress upon 
several points of outstanding importance.  The first is that an instrument, or written 
constitution, is alien to the spirit of British Constitutional development:  
 
‘While your statesmen may be planning great schemes of union or the future of the 
Empire, my feeling is that the work is already largely done.  The spirit of comradeship 
which has been born in this War and on the battlefields of Europe among men from all 
parts of the Empire will be far more powerful than any instrument of government we 
                                                  
13   [352/3]   Minutes, p. 61. 
14   [353/1]  The Imperial Constitution: the New Phase.  The Nineteenth Century and 
After, August 1917. can erect in the future . . . the instrument of government will not [begin page 354] be a 
thing that matters so much as the spirit which actuates the whole.'
15  
 
A second point was the absolute equality of the constituent States of the 
Commonwealth:  
 
‘The Governments of the Dominions as equal Governments of the King will 
have to be recognized far more fully than that is done to-day.'
16  
 
A third point was their complete autonomy: 
 
‘The young nations are developing on their own lines; the young nations are 
growing into Great Powers; and it will be impossible to attempt to govern 
them in future by one common Legislature and one common Executive. . . . 




Most emphatic of all his points was the supreme importance of maintaining unbroken 
the golden link of the Crown:  
 
‘How’, he asks, ' are you going to keep this commonwealth of nations 
together?  If there is to be this full development towards a more varied and 
richer life among our nations, how are you going to keep them together?  It 
seems to me that there are two potent factors that you must rely upon for the 
future.  The first is your hereditary Kingship, the other is our Conference 
system.  I have seen some speculations recently in the newspapers about the 
position of the Kingship in this country, speculations by people who, I am 
'sure, have not thought of the wider issues that are at stake.  You cannot 
make a republic of the British Commonwealth of nations.'
18  
 
The emphasis laid by General Smuts upon the importance of the Monarchy served, 
however, to give additional significance to the language which he used in regard to the 
constitutional resolution proposed at the Conference:  
 
If this resolution is passed, then one possible solution is negatived, and that 
is the federal solution.  The idea of a future Imperial Parliament and a future 
Imperial Executive [begin page 355] is negatived by implication by the 
terms of this resolution.  The idea on which this resolution is based is rather 
that the Empire will develop on the lines upon which it has developed 
hitherto; that there will be more freedom and equality in all its constituent 
parts; that they will continue to legislate for themselves and continue to 
govern themselves; that whatever executive action has to be taken, even in 
common concerns, would have to be determined, as the last paragraph says, 
‘by the several Governments' of the Empire, and the idea of a federal 
solution is therefore negatived, and, I think, very wisely, because it seems to 
                                                  
15   [354/1]  Cf. The British Commonwealth of Nations, a speech delivered in the 
Royal Gallery at the House of Lords (15 May 1917), War Time Speeches, pp. 28, 
37.  
16   [354/2]  Ibid., p. 15. 
17   [354/3]  Ibid., pp. 17, 31.  
18   [354/4]  Ibid., p. 34. me that the circumstances of the Empire entirely preclude the federal 
solution.'  
 
Sir Robert Borden 
It must of course be recognized that in these utterances Sir General Smuts was 
speaking only for himself, and that in the last-quoted extract he was manifestly anxious 
to put his own gloss upon the resolution about to be adopted by the Conference.  The 
emphasis of his colleagues was in a somewhat different place.  Sir Robert Borden, for 
example, who proposed the resolution, while equally insistent upon the complete 
recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations in the Imperial Commonwealth, 
with a voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, laid stress upon the fact that the 
resolution primarily affirmed that the readjustment of the constitutional relations was a 
question which must be dealt with as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities, 
though it must be dealt with subject to an important reservation.  Mr. Massey, though 
content for the present with the expedient of an Imperial Cabinet, with the possible 
addition of an Imperial Council, still intimated his opinion that the full federal 
constitution would in course of time develop. 
 
Imperial War Conference of 1918 
A second Imperial War Conference met in the summer of 1918, and, as in 1917, its 
meetings alternated as a rule with meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet.  So far as 
appears from the published Minutes the constitutional problem was not even 
approached.  Questions of naturalization, of demobilization, of inter-imperial 
communica- [begin page 356] tions, of emigration, of the treatment of British Indians in 
the Dominions, of the supply of raw materials, and similar topics were dealt with in 
detail, but as hostilities had not yet ceased the problem of constitutional relations was 
avoided.  Properly so, under the terms of the Resolution of 1917. The Conference 
broke up on 26 July; the Imperial War Cabinet held its last meeting on 30 July.  
 
So rapid was the development of events in the various theatres of war during the next 
three months that questions of constitutional procedure were inevitably put on one side.  
It was indeed officially announced on 18 August that each Dominion was to have the 
right to nominate a visiting or resident minister in London to be a member of the 
Imperial War Cabinet, but as a fact no formal nomination was ever made.  Before 
leaving England Sir R. Borden provisionally arranged for the attendance of a Canadian 
representative at any meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet that might take place; 
General Smuts, himself a member of the British War Cabinet, was available to 
represent South Africa, and Mr. Hughes also remained in England during the interval 
between the conclusion of the plenary session of the Imperial War Cabinet and the 
meeting of the Peace Conference in Paris.  During that interval several meetings of the 
Imperial War Cabinet were held;
19 but the conclusion of the Armistice (11 November) 
precipitated the summoning of the Peace Conference; the Dominion representatives 
were immediately recalled to England; and by the 20th of November the Imperial 
Cabinet, though not complete in personnel until the close of the year, was again in 
formal session.  At least twelve meetings were held before the end of the year, two of 
the most interesting being held on the morning and afternoon of 3 December when the 
Imperial War Cabinet met M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch, representatives of 
France, and Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino, repre- [begin page 357] sentatives of 
Italy, who had come to London for an important conference, Important meetings were 
also held before and after Christmas, at the time of President Wilson's visit.
20  
 
                                                  
19   [356/1]  Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Commons, pp. 110, 593. 
20   [357/1]  Report, 1918, p. II. The Peace Conference at Paris, 1919 
On 12 January 1919 the Peace Conference assembled in Paris and thither the centre 
of political gravity necessarily shifted.  The Conference when in plenary session 
consisted of seventy delegates.  This unwieldy body never met except for purely formal 
business
21 such as the signature of peace, the actual treaty being signed by sixty-eight 
out of seventy delegates.
22  The Executive Committee of the Conference was, 
according to the agreed plan, to consist of the 'Council of Twenty-five’ on which each of 
the five great belligerents were to be represented by five delegates.  On this the British 
Empire would act as a unit, and among its delegation a representative of the 
Dominions was to be included.  Too big for executive purposes, the Council of Twenty-
five narrowed itself down to a Council of Ten which was simply a reproduction or 
continuation of the Supreme War Council.  Even this body was too large and its 
methods too cumbrous for the rapid decisions which the situation and an impatient 
world demanded, and in the middle of March 1919, by the dropping out of the two 
Japanese representatives, and of the Foreign Ministers of the other Great Powers, the 
Council of Ten became the 'Big Four': the Prime Ministers of England, France, and Italy, 
and the President of the United States.  At meetings of the Council of Ten, as at those 
of the 'Big Four’, representatives of the smaller Powers, of the Dominions, and of India 
were called in when matters specially affecting their interests were under discussion; 
but the British Oversea Dominions enjoyed, as compared with the smaller Powers, the 
further advantage that on the Council of Ten one of [begin page 358] their 
representatives frequently sat with Mr. Balfour as representing the British Empire, while 
'during the last month of the proceedings in Paris the additional compliment was paid to 
the Prime Minister of Canada of appointing him Chairman of the British Empire 
Delegation in the absence of Mr. Lloyd George'.
23  
 
Separate Representatives of the Dominions. 
Had the Dominions been represented at Paris only in and by the British Empire 
Delegation, it might have made for simplicity of procedure, for the avoidance of friction 
at the moment, and of complications both internal an external in the future.  Had that 
course been adopted the Peace Conference would still have formed, as General Smuts 
claims that it did form, 'one of the most important landmarks in the history of the 
Empire'; but with such a position the Dominions were not content. 
 
‘It was abundantly clear to my colleague and myself that Australia must 
have separate representation at the Peace Conference.  Consider the vastness 
of the Empire and the diversity of interests represented, Look at it 
geographically, industrially, or how you will, and it will be seen that no one 




So spake Mr. Hughes in the Commonwealth House of Representatives.  Other 
Dominion Premiers have spoken - since they were free to speak - to the same effect; 
but perhaps the Dominion's claim, and the ground of it, is most clearly expressed in a 
                                                  
21   [357/2]  It met six times before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, but the 
only meeting of importance was that at which the Covenant of the League of 
Nations was debated.  History of the Peace Conference in Paris, ed. Temperley, i. 
250. 
22   [357/3]  Only China (two delegates) abstained.  
23   [358/1]  Keith, op. cit., p. 150, quoting Canada Sess. Paper, 1919, No. 41.  
24   [358/2]  Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, No. 87, p. 12168.  
The whole of Mr. Hughes's speech on the Peace Treaty will repay the most careful 
perusal. telegram from the Canadian Cabinet to Sir Robert Borden, who was at the time sitting 
in the Imperial War Cabinet:  
 
‘ . . . In view of war efforts of Dominion other nations entitled to 
representation at Conference should recognize unique character of British 
Commonwealth composed of group of free nations under one sovereign and 
that provision should be made for special representation of those nations at 
[begin page 359] Conference, even though it may be necessary that in any 




Sir Robert Borden accordingly claimed separate representation for each of the 
Dominions equal to that of Belgium and other small allied nations.  To Canada the idea 
was intolerable that the United States should have five delegates and Canada none, for 
as General Smuts put it when speaking in the Union Parliament: 'Canada and Australia 
made a greater war effort than any other Powers below the rank of first class. . . 
Australia alone lost more than the United States of America.'  To the reasonableness of 
the claims of the Dominions the British Government were easily persuaded; not so the 
allied representatives. 
 
‘They could not’, as General Smuts subsequently pointed out, ‘realize the 
new situation arising, and that the British Empire, instead of being one 
central Government, consisted of a league of free States, free, equal, and 
working together for the great ideals of human government.'
26  
 
Stated thus bluntly the situation might perhaps have created surprise if not alarm in the 
minds of other people besides the allied representatives.  But the Dominions had their 
w a y .   I n  t h e  Plenary Conference Australia, Canada, and South Africa were each 
represented by two delegates, being treated as small nations on the same level as 
Greece, Portugal, Poland, or Roumania; New Zealand was represented by one.  The 
Dominions in the aggregate were also entitled to be included in the British Empire 
Delegation of five members.  Nor was the part which they played on this Delegation 
insignificant or subordinate.  On the contrary, the leader of the British House of 
Commons emphatically insisted that just as in the Imperial War Cabinet the Dominion 
representatives ‘took in every respect an equal part in all that concerned [begin page 
360] the conduct of the war; so in Paris, in the last few, months, they have, as 
members of the British Empire Delegation, taken a part as great as that of any member 
except perhaps the Prime Minister, in moulding the ‘Treaty of Peace'.
27  
 
Well might General Smuts acclaim the Paris Conference as one of the most important 
landmarks in the history of the Empire.  It is indeed impossible to read the debates on 
the Peace Treaty in the Legislatures of Canada and Australia
28 respectively without 
becoming acutely conscious of the fact that profoundly as were the Dominions 
interested in the actual terms of the Treaty of Versailles, they were even more 
interested in the new, status accorded to their representatives alike in the negotiations 
precedent to the signature of the Treaty, and in the League of Nations.  That status - 
cordially conceded by the Imperial Government but somewhat reluctantly recognized 
by the Allied and Associated Powers - was succinctly and accurately defined by a 
                                                  
25   [359/1]  Quoted by Duncan Hall, op. cit., p. 184. 
26   [359/2]  Duncan Hall, op. cit., pp. 183-4, 185. 
27   [360/1]  Speech by Mr. Bonar Law to the Empire Parliamentary Association, 16 
May 1919; quoted Duncan Hall, op. cit., p 189. 
28    [360/2]  The Debates in the Parliament of the Union of South Africa are not 
officially reported. speaker in the Commonwealth Parliament: 'The Empire’, said Mr. Burchell 'today 
stands in the position of a league of nations within the League of Nations.
29  Towards 
the assertion on the one side and the recognition on the other of the complete 
nationhood of the self-governing Dominions, things had, as already indicated, been 
tending for some time: but, as so often happens in political evolution, the final stage 
was reached with dramatic suddenness.  The outbreak of war, as we have seen, found 
the Imperial Government in a position, as regards international affairs, of unquestioned 
autocracy; the signature of peace found the Dominions almost on a plane of equality 
with the mother-country vis-a-vis the other nations of the world.  Full equality is claimed 
on their behalf.  Thus Mr. Rowell, President of the [begin page 361] Council of Canada, 
speaking in the Dominion Parliament (11 March 1920) said: 
  
‘I venture to think that the position won for Canada by her soldiers on the 
field of battle and maintained for her by her statesmen at the Peace 
Conference, recognized and made certain by the bringing into force and by 
the coming into operation of the Treaty of Peace and the formal 
inauguration of the League, means that Canada is not only an integral 
portion and one of the free nations of the British Empire, but has an 
acknowledged status among the other nations of the world. . . The status is 
one of equality, we are nations within the Empire, all equal in status, though 
not of equal power, under a common Sovereign, and bound together by ties 
of interest and sentiment, by history and by all that united the different 
branches of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the other nations within the 
various portions of the Empire, by ties which though light as air are as 
strong as iron in binding together this great League of Nations which we 
call the British Empire, or the Britannic commonwealth.'  
 
The Dominions and the Peace Treaties. 
Quotations of similar import might be multiplied from the speeches and writings of 
Dominion statesmen; nor can the significance of the language be mistaken. The 
Dominions are at all costs determined on recognition o their equal nationhood within 
the Empire.  The war, which was expected to forge the last link in the chain of 
federalism, has resulted in the making of a Britannic confederation; it has issued, in 
technical language, in a Staatenbund and not a Bundesstaat; a league of nations within 
the larger league, not a 'composite unitary State’ Sir Charles Lucas foresaw the 
development before the war, and expressed it in a sentence: 'We have created nations 
and cannot un-create them.  We can only recognize and welcome existing conditions 
and move forward again.  There is only one sure guide to the future and that is the race 
instinct which represents day to day opportunism.'  It is well and truly said. 
 
With the terms of the settlement arrived at by the Paris Conference this work is not 
concerned, but it would [begin page 362] unfair to the Dominions were the impression to 
be conveyed that their insistence upon separate representation, and upon the 
recognition of the new status  implied in such representation, was due either to 
constitutional pedantry or to political contumacy.  Issues vital to them were at stake, 
and the determination of those issues they were not prepared to entrust to any 
representatives, except such as were directly responsible to the Dominion Legislatures.  
Thus the Union of South Africa was vitally interested in the disposition of the colonies 
which had formerly belonged to Germany upon the African continent, and in particular 
in German South-West Africa.  The conquest of that territory had been the work of 
South African forces; it was no more fitting than just that the Peace Conference should 
have confirmed its possession to the Union of South Africa.  But it was confirmed on 
conditions. 
                                                  
29   [360/3]  Commonwealth of Australia Debates, No. 90, p. 12586.  
Mandate for South-West Africa. 
By Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced in favour of the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions.  
Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations laid down that 'to those colonies 
and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
Sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by 
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization'.  It further suggested 
that the best way of giving effect to this principle is that 'the tutelage of such peoples 
should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their 
experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and 
who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as 
mandatories of the League'.  The character of the mandate must, however, differ' 
according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical [begin page 
363] situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances’. 
 
South-West Africa belongs to the third category of mandates which 'can be best 
administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous 
population'.  The mandate was offered to and accepted by the Union of South Africa on 
behalf of Great Britain, in accordance with terms laid down by the Council of the 
League of Nations.  The terms enjoin upon the mandatory the duty of promoting to the 
utmost, the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants'; 
they prohibit slavery, the sale of intoxicants to natives, the establishment of military or 
naval bases; and provide for complete freedom of conscience, and facilities for 
missionaries and ministers of all creeds.
30  
 
The Pacific Islands 
If the Union of South Africa was vitally interested in the ex-German colony adjoining it, 
not less were Australia and New Zealand interested in the disposition of those islands 
in the Pacific which since 1884 Germany had acquired.  Those islands were swept up 
by the dominant Sea-Power in the first weeks of the Great War.  German Samoa was 
occupied by a force from New Zealand on 29th August 1914; the Bismarck archipelago 
and German New Guinea fell to the Australians in September; while the Japanese took 
the Marshall and Caroline Islands and, with the help of British forces, Kiauchow (7 
November).  
 
To whom were these former possessions of Germany to be assigned at the Peace?  
On this question some difficulty arose between the Imperial authorities and the 
Australasian representatives.  ‘One of the most striking features of the Conference’, 
said Mr. Hughes, the Premier of the Australian Commonwealth, was the appalling 
ignorance of every nation as to the affairs of every other nation, its geographical, racial, 
historical conditions or traditions.'
31  [begin page 364]  
 
The safety of Australia, so her sons maintained, demanded that the great rampart of 
islands stretching around the north-east of Australia should be held by the Australian 
Dominion or by some Power (if there be one?) in whom they have absolute confidence.  
At Paris Mr. Hughes made a great fight to obtain the direct control of them; worsted in 
that by the adherence to Mr. Wilson's formula, Australia was forced to accept the 
principle of the mandate; but her representatives were careful to insist that the mandate 
                                                  
30   [363/1]  Cmd. 1204 (1921). 
31   [363/2]  Commonwealth of Australia I Parliamentary Debates, No. 87. p. 12173. should be in a form consistent not only with their national safety but with their' 
economic, industrial, and general welfare '.  
 
In plain English that meant the maintenance of a ‘White Australia’, and a preferential 
tariff.  On both points Australia found herself in direct conflict with Japan, but, despite 
the formal protest and reservation of the latter, the mandates for the ex-German 
possessions in the Pacific were issued in the form desired by the British Dominions: i.e. 
in the same form as that accepted for South-West Africa. 
 
The islands south of the Equator were, on these conditions, assigned to the British 
Empire or its Dominions: the Bismarck archipelago, German New Guinea, and those of 
the Solomon islands which had formerly belonged to Germany, to Australia; German 
Samoa to New Zealand, and Nauru to the British Empire.  
 
Dissatisfaction of Australia and New Zealand 
With these acquisitions Australia and New Zealand were not satisfied.  They wanted no 
near neighbours in and New the South-Western Pacific - least of all the Japanese.  The 
United States manifested a good deal of sympathy with the attitude of Australasia; and 
would have given them all the former German islands in the Pacific-under mandate.  
Japan, however, was not disposed to relax her hold upon those to the north of the 
Equator.  Mr. Hughes argued that they could be of no value to Japan either for 
purposes of settlement or trade, but they might, on the contrary, be a serious menace 
to the security of Australasia, particularly as affording submarine bases.  But the [begin 
page 365] Imperial Government, bound by its agreement with Japan, felt constrained to 
acquiesce in her wishes, and the Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, and Ladrone Islands were 
accordingly assigned, under mandate, to Japan.  Australia would further have been 
glad to see the condominium in the New Hebrides, which has worked none too well, 
terminated by the withdrawal of France.  But, as France was unwilling, the point plainly 
could not be pressed.  That the final result evoked some disappointment) not to say 
resentment, in the Australasian Dominions cannot be gainsaid; but the question 
naturally obtrudes itself: Could the Dominions have got better terms had they gone to 
Paris as independent States, instead of as units of the British Empire?  'Would their 
position at the Peace Conference have been so good?  
 
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, speaking in the House of Commons on 18 
August 1921, virtually answered this question as follows: 'The Representatives of the 
Dominions and of India constituted part of the British Delegation and sat in almost 
constant session in Paris directing the policy of the British Empire.'  Thus, the Imperial 
War Cabinet was practically continued at Paris.  Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded:  
 
‘My Right Honourable Friend, the President of the Council (Mr. Balfour), 
and I represented the British Empire inside the Conference, but there was no 
action taken by us that had not been submitted beforehand to the British 
Empire Delegation on which the Dominions and India were represented.  
We held constant Conferences or Cabinets in Paris where the whole of the 
Empire was represented, where representatives of all parts of the Empire 
took part in the discussions and where they had exactly the same voice in 
determining British policy as any member of the British Cabinet.'  
 
That the Dominions gained by the status thus conferred upon them will hardly be 
denied by anyone conversant with the facts.  
 
‘Supposing', said Mr. Lloyd George, ‘they had been there as separate independent 
nations, holding no allegiance to the [begin page 366] British Crown.  They would not 
have had one-fifth of the power and dignity they had as representatives of nations 
inside the British Empire.  There was one man sitting on a Commission - the Prime Minister of Canada - deciding questions of the Turkish Empire.  There was another 
sitting on a Commission deciding the fate of Poland and the Eastern frontiers of 
Germany. . . . If they had been independent nations they would not have sat so high in 
the Council Chamber.  It was the fact that they were independent nations inside the 




Nevertheless, when all is said, Australia and New Zealand might reasonably feel - 
though their feelings were, on the whole, kept well under control - that despite the 
superb services they had, in the war, rendered to the common cause, their immediate 
interests were, at the Peace, sacrificed to considerations dictated by the world-policy of 
the British Empire.  Detailed discussion of these questions is, however, beyond the 
scope of the present work.  To return to the more limited problem of machinery.  
 
Significance of the peace Conference 
In the constitutional history of the British Empire and its component parts the Paris 
Conference will for ever stand out as a landmark of immense and perhaps unique 
significance.  For the first time the British Empire was diplomatically recognized as a 
Power; for the first time the Dominions and India were similarly recognized as 
Powers.
33  The status of each was made clear not only by many documents and 
memoranda incidental to the Conference but still more by the attestations to the 
Treaties of Peace.  Thus, the Treaty of Versailles was signed on behalf of' His Majesty 
the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British 
Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India' by five English Ministers, as well as by 
two representatives for the Dominion of Canada, two for the Commonwealth of 
Australia, two for the Union of South Africa, one for the Dominion of New Zealand, and 
two for India.  Similarly; [begin page 367] in the list of the High Contracting Parties the 
British Empire appeared eo nomine as one of the five Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers.  To clinch the position the terms of the Treaties were formally approved by 
each of the Dominion Parliaments, though the legal ratification was the act of the 
Crown, and the ratifying document was deposited on behalf of the British Empire by a 
United Kingdom Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  The Dominions 
were, however, emphatic in asserting that in thus ratifying the Treaty on their behalf the 
Crown was acting on the advice not of his British Ministers, but on that of the Ministers 
Executive of the several Dominions. 
  
The Dominions and the League of Nations 
The new status of the Dominions also received remarkable recognition in the Covenant 
of the League of Nations.  Under the Covenant the Dominions and India are original 
League of Nations members of the League, and each of them has the right of separate 
representation in the Assembly of the League.  Canada and Australia, for example, 
have precisely the same rights as Belgium or Spain.  They have the same voting 
powers, including the right of voting for the elected members of the Council, and the 
right of becoming a candidate for one of the four elective seats.  They have the same 
right also of direct access to the Council (should they choose to exercise it), and the 
right of ad hoc representation on the Council during the discussion of any particular 
question in which they may be interested.  As there are many questions on which the 
decisions of the Council are required to be unanimous it is plain that the Dominions can 
veto any action inimical to their interests or opposed to their wishes. 
 
How far the concession of such powers to nations which are still integral parts of the 
British Empire accorded with the best interests of the Dominions or of the Empire is an 
arguable question, though it cannot be argued here.  Still less is it certain that the 
                                                  
32   [366/1]  Official Report, vol. 46, No. 123, pp. 1704-13.  
33   [366/2]  Keith, op. cit., p. 153. separate representation conceded to the British Overseas Dominions helped to 
commend the League to other Powers, [begin page 368] notably to the United States of 
America.  But again discussion must be declined.  The outstanding fact remains that in 
the League the Dominions are recognized as separate entities, as Nations enjoying 
equal status with all except the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. 
 
The Conferences of 1921 
During the two years after the signature of the Peace Treaties the Dominion statesmen, 
like those of the Homeland, were busily occupied in trying to put their own households 
in order.  But in June 1921 they once more assembled in London.  The precise status 
and even the official designation of that Assembly gave rise to considerable discussion 
not to say controversy.  The Overseas Dominions were invited to take part, in 
accordance with resolutions previously adopted, in an Imperial 'Cabinet'.  Since the 
previous sessions of that Cabinet some suspicion of the term would seem, however, to 
have been engendered in the Dominions.  Were the overseas statesmen then merely 
to take part in a Conference of the pre-war type?  After all that had happened since 
1914 that was plainly unthinkable.  Yet a 'Cabinet’ seemed to imply responsibility for 
executive decision.  To whom, then, were the members of the Cabinet to be 
responsible?  The responsibility of one was to the Imperial Parliament, of another to the 
Canadian, of a third to the Australian Parliament, and so on.  There was, therefore, it 
must be acknowledged, some constitutional force in the objection taken to the term 
'Cabinet'.  The difficulty of terminology seems to have been shelved rather than solved, 
and the official report was given out as 'A Summary of the Proceedings at a 
Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the 
Dominions and India'.  The larger constitutional question was, however, squarely faced, 
with the result that the following Resolution was adopted:  
 
‘The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, having 
carefully considered the recommendation of the Imperial War Conference of 
1917 that a special Imperial Conference should be summoned as soon as 
possible after the [begin page 369] War to consider the constitutional 
relations of the component parts of the Empire have reached the following 
conclusions:  
 
(a)   Continuous consultation, to which the Prime Ministers attach no less 
importance than the Imperial War Conference of 1917, can only be 
secured by a substantial improvement in the communications between 
the component parts of the Empire.  Having regard to the 
constitutional developments since 1917, no advantage is to be gained 
by holding a constitutional Conference. 
(b)   The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and 
the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such 
longer intervals as may prove feasible.  
(c)   The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime 
Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions as well as the 
right of the latter to nominate Cabinet Ministers to represent them in 




Significance of the Resolution 
To ardent Imperialists of the older school this Resolution caused considerable 
disappointment.  Yet it is clear from the published utterances of the leading statesmen 
                                                  
34   [369/1]  Summary of Proceedings and Documents, p. 9. of the Dominions, not less than from the speech delivered by the English Prime 
Minister in the House of Commons on 18 August 1921, not only that the Resolution 
was reached with unanimity, but that its acceptance was in no degree held to have 
impaired the constitutional significance of the recent meeting.  'The general feeling 
was’, said Mr. Lloyd George, ‘that it would be a mistake to lay down any rules or to 
embark upon definitions as to what the British Empire meant. . . . You are defining life 
itself when you are defining the British Empire.  You cannot do it, and therefore. . . we 
came to the conclusion that we would have no constitutional conference.'  Mr. Hughes 
was even more explicit: 'It is now admitted that a Constitutional Conference is not 
necessary, and that any attempt to set out in writing what are or should be the 
constitutional relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country would be 
fraught with very great danger to the Empire'.   [begin page 370] 
 
The question of a Constitutional Conference or any attempt at reduction of the 
Constitution to writing may be therefore regarded as having been finally disposed of.  
'No written Constitution', said Mr. Massey, 'is required.'  Yet Mr. Massey made it clear, 
as have other Premiers, that in his opinion the recent meeting was 'a long way the 
most important which has yet been held'.  It was ‘the first Conference where the 
representatives of the overseas Dominions had been called upon to take part in 
matters connected with the management of the Empire as a whole'.  Nor can it be 
doubted, whatever technical name be given to the meeting, that it did act in effect as an 
Empire Cabinet.  It not merely discussed but decided questions of supreme moment to 
the Empire and to the world, and its decisions, like those of a British Cabinet, were 
invariably reported immediately to the King. 
 
Such is the point which the constitutional evolution of the British Empire had reached at 
the opening of the third decade of the twentieth century.  Is the conclusion 
characteristically inconclusive?  Does it represent an anti-climax?  Or is it merely that 
the eternal paradox persists; that in the political development of the English race the 
kingdom will not come by observation; that he who would save his political soul must 
lose it; that it is only by losing it that it can be saved?  These words are written at a time 
too near to the mighty events of the recent past to permit them to be seen in true 
perspective.  The war whose outbreak was to be the signal for the dissolution of 
Britain's 'loosely compacted Empire’ seemed certain, before it had proceeded many 
months, not merely to bind it together more closely than ever in sentiment, but to 
translate sentiment into concrete institutions.  The Imperial War Cabinet of 1917 
appeared to have brought an Imperial Constitution within the sphere of practical 
politics.  The Conference somewhat chilled the ardour aroused by the Cabinet; yet the 
plea [begin page 371] for delay was reasonable.  One does not, as Lord Rosebery has 
sagely remarked, rebuild a house in the midst of a hurricane.  But the hurricane has 
subsided and the rebuilding, as designed by material architects, seems to be 
indefinitely postponed.  Were the federalists on the wrong tack?  Was Alexander 
Hamilton, whose work for the United States was, a few years ago, held up to us not 
merely for admiration but for imitation, outside the true line of philosophical 
succession?  Is Burke the real interpreter of the political genius of his countrymen?  
Was he right in contemning the 'virtue of paper government’, and in trusting to 'ties 
which though light as air, are as strong as links of iron'?  Are common names, kindred 
blood, and equal privileges more potent than the forms and machinery of a 
constitution'?  Must we abandon the Roman idea of colonial connexion and prefer that 
of the Greeks?  Shall we be content with a Staatenbund in place of a Bundesstaat?  
 
Questions such as these must needs occur to every student of the history of the British 
Empire.  The time for a definite answer is not yet; it may well be that the constitutional 
evolution of the Commonwealth has not reached its term: finis coronet opus. 
 Book IV 
The Structure of Government 
---------- 
XIII. - The Separation of Powers  
 
‘All States have three elements, and the good law-giver has to regard what 
is expedient for each State.  When they are well ordered, the State is well 
ordered, and as they differ from one another, Constitutions differ.' - 
Aristotle, Politics, iv.   
 
‘Unless there is an equitable adjustment in a State, of rights, offices, and 
functions, so that the Executive may have sufficient power, the Senate 
sufficient authority, and the people sufficient liberty, the frame of 
government cannot remain stable and free from violent change.'  - Cicero , 
De Republica,  c. xxxiii.   
 
‘The result of this power of the several estates for mutual help or harm is a 
union sufficiently firm for all emergencies and a constitution than which it is 
impossible to find a better. . . . For when anyone of the three classes 
manifests an inclination to be unduly encroaching, the mutual 
interdependence of all the three and the possibility of the pretensions of 
anyone being checked and thwarted by the others must plainly check this 
tendency; and so the proper equilibrium is maintained. - Polybius on the 
Roman Constitution, Histories, vi. 18. 
 
‘Si la puissance de juger etait jointe a la puissance legislative, le pouvoir sur 
la vie et la liberte des citoyens serait arbitraire.' - Montesquieu, Esprit des 
Lois, xi. vi. 
 
Constitutional Problems. 
Having completed a rapid survey of some typical polities of the modern world, we now 
proceed to inquire what guidance is afforded by the working of those constitutions in 




Problems connected with the Legislature and the Electorate demand the first 
consideration. 
 
I.  What is the best form of Legislative Body: may the function of legislation be 
safely entrusted to a single chamber; if so, how shall that chamber be elected 
and composed; if not, what form shall a second chamber take? 
II.  Shall membership of the second chamber be mainly or partially hereditary as in 
England; shall it, as in Canada, be based upon the principle of nomination; or 
upon direct election, as in Australia; or, as in France, upon indirect election? 
III.  What are the appropriate powers and functions of the Legislature? 
IV.  Shall it be, as in England, legally omni- [begin page 376] potent, with power not 
merely to make laws but to revise the Constitution; or shall it be confined, as in 
the United States, to the making of laws within the rigidly defined limits of an 
Instrument or Frame of Government? V.  If the function of the Legislature be thus limited, what provision should be made 
for the revision of the Constitution itself? 
VI.  Is it desirable to submit constitutional amendments to the direct vote of the 
electorate by means of a Referendum? 
VII.  Ought the electorate to possess the right of initiating such amendments? 
VIII.  Should similar powers be exercised by the electorate in regard to ordinary 
legislation? 
IX.  Are such devices, be they intrinsically sound or unsound, consistent with the 
theory of Representative Democracy? 
X.  How should the electorate itself be composed? 
XI.  Should representation be based upon the principle of locality or upon that of 
occupation? 
XII.  Is a man primarily a citizen or a craftsman? 
XIII.  How shall effect be given, in either case, to his wishes? 
XIV.  How far is it proper to respect the opinions of minorities? 
XV.  By what method can this best be done? 
 
Such are some of the problems which inevitably suggest themselves in connexion with 
the Legislature and the electorate. 
 
The Executive. 
Parallel problems must be considered in reference to the Executive authority. 
 
I.  Shall the headship of the State be vested in an hereditary monarch or an 
elective President? 
II.  Shall the President be the actual repository of executive power or merely the 
official chief of the State? 
III.  In the former case should the Executive be responsible to the Legislature or to 
the electorate? 
IV.  In either case what should be the relation between the Executive and the 
Legislature? 
V.  Should the Executive be co-ordinate in authority with the Legislature or 
subordinate to it? 
VI.  Is the Cabinet system or the Presidential to be preferred? 
VII.  Is there a third alternative? 
VIII.  May the actual control of administration be safely entrusted, as in Switzerland, 
to the Legislative Body? 
IX.  Should executive authority be shared, as in the United States, with the 
Legislature; or ought the functions to be kept rigidly apart? 
[begin page 377] 
 
The Judicature 
I.  What is the true position of the Judicial Body? 
II.  How should the judges stand as regards the Executive and the legislature? 
III.  Ought the judges, as Bacon held, to be 'lions but lions under the throne'; or is it 
essential to purity of administration and to the preservation of liberty that the 
Judiciary should be wholly independent of the Executive? 
IV.  Should the judges themselves be nominated or elected? 
V.  Should they enjoy a permanent tenure of office or be subject to the Recall? 
VI.  What is the proper relation between the Judiciary and the Legislature? 
VII.  Should the judges be merely interpreters of the law, or should they be 
guardians of the Constitution, exercising, in effect, an appellate jurisdiction as 
against the makers of the laws? 
 Central and Local Government 
Another sheaf of problems is raised by a consideration Central of the functions 
appropriate to central and local government respectively.  Under primitive conditions all 
government is local government; in the more advanced societies power tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of the central administration. 
 
I.  Is this tendency sound? 
II.  Does it promote efficiency and economy? 
III.  If it be desirable to vest considerable power in Local Authorities, how should 
those authorities be constituted? 
IV.  Are the principles which determine the distribution of functions among the 
several organs of the central government equally applicable to local 
administration? 
  
Federalism and Devolution 
Questions such as these, if pushed to their logical conclusion, raise a problem even 
more fundamental: should the structure of the State be unitary or federal?  Federalism 
may represent either a centripetal or a centrifugal movement; it may even represent a 
combination of both.  The United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia 
alike illustrate, in their federal constitutions, the triumph of the centripetal idea.  The 
birth of the Federal Dominion of Canada represented, as we have seen, a separatist 
tendency as between Ontario and Quebec, but at the same time it brought these 
provinces into closer association with the Maritime [begin page 378] Provinces, it 
brought the Maritime Provinces into closer association with each other, and it provided 
a framework into which were ultimately fitted units so mutually remote as British 
Columbia, Alberta, and Prince Edward Island.  Federalism as proposed for the British 
Commonwealth might similarly be found to reconcile principles which are theoretically 
opposed, giving to the parts an even larger autonomy than that which they at present 
enjoy, but simultaneously conferring upon the whole powers which are now non-
existent.  On the other hand, federalism may be frankly centrifugal in intention and 
actually in effect.  The Act for the Better Government of Ireland (1920), setting up 
subordinate Legislatures, with Executives responsible thereto in Dublin and Belfast, 
was commended by its authors as federal in principle, though it was in effect admittedly 
centrifugal.  An important question arose in connexion with that ill-fated measure: 
whether the residue of powers should be vested in the Imperial or in the subordinate 
Parliaments; or conversely, whether certain enumerated powers should be delegated to 
the Irish Parliaments, or whether only certain enumerated powers should be reserved 
to the Imperial Parliament?  Subsequent events have, it is true, rendered the 
discussion academic, but that fact does not affect the theoretical validity of the 
arguments advanced.  Those arguments raise issues of vital importance to every 
scheme of government based upon principles professedly federal.  Consideration of 
them must, however, be deferred to a later chapter.  Before the discussion of any of 
these problems can be approached an answer must be given to a fundamental 
question: In an ideal polity, should the several functions of government, legislative, 
executive, and judicial, be rigidly delimited, or is it to the common advantage that they 
should as far as possible be performed in close co-operation if not actually combined? 
 
The Separation of Powers. 
In the science of government as in the art of industry progress is commonly measured 
by the advance in the [begin page 379] principle of differentiation.  Adam Smith builds 
his argument for an advance in the productive capacity of the nations of the world upon 
the principle of the 'division of labour’.  In specialization and co-operation are to be 
found the keys to every advance in the organization of industry.  Free Trade is but the 
application of the same principle to commercial intercourse between nation and nation.  
Politics approaches the same problem from a somewhat different angle.  Eight and 
twenty years before the publication (1776) of The Wealth of Nations Montesquieu had given to the world his Esprit des Lois (1748).  Montesquieu discerned in the theory of 
the separation of powers the most effective guarantee for the preservation of political 
liberty, and it was the philosophy of Montesquieu which, as we have seen, inspired the 
Constitution makers of the United States of America and of revolutionary France. 
 
But the problem is much older than Montesquieu, although it was he who, among the 
moderns, first concentrated attention upon it.  
 
The Greek View. 
Aristotle distinguishes three elements in a well-ordered State as follows: 
 
(i)   The deliberative ( τό Вουλευόμενν περί τών κοινών );  
(ii)   the magisterial ( τό περί τάς άρχάς  ); and 
(iii)   the judicial ( τό όικάζον )  
 
The first is concerned with all the high questions of general interest to the community: 
the making of war; the conclusion of peace treaties and alliances; the infliction of the 
death penalty; exile and confiscation; the auditing of accounts; and the passing of laws.  
The absence of a special legislative organ will be noted; but the Greek philosophers 
presupposed the existence of a code of laws framed by a νομοθέτης or lawgiver, actual 
or mythical - a Solon, an Hippodamus, a Phaleas of Alcaeon - and acquiring by 
tradition an almost Divine authority.  Such laws were not to be lightly changed.  Some 
were disposed to doubt whether they should be changed at all, 'even for the better.  
'Yet' if Politics be an art change must be necessary; for as in other arts, so in making a 
constitution  [begin page 380] it is impossible that all things should be set down in 
writing; for enactments must be universal, while actions are concerned with the 
particular '. Aristotle infers, there- fore, that' sometimes and in certain cases laws may 
be changed' , though the process calls for the utmost caution. ' The habit of changing 
the laws is an evil, and when the advantage is small, some errors, both of lawgivers 
and rulers, had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by the change as he will 
lose by the habit of disobedience. . . . For the law has no power to command 
obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to 
change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law.'  Indispensable legislation 
is, however, entrusted to the deliberative assembly - in Athens the Ecclesia. 
 
The organization of the magistracy; the disposition of offices; the mode of appointment 
to them; the question of tenure; the filling of vacancies; the articulation of functions; all 
these are matters the settlement of which demands, in Aristotle's view, the highest 
circumspection.  The primary problem which presented itself for solution to Lord 
Haldane's Machinery of Government Committee was stated in their Report in the 
following terms: 'Upon what principle are the functions of Departments to be 
determined and allocated?  There appear to be only two alternatives which may be 
briefly described as distribution according to the persons or classes to be dealt with, 
and distribution according to the services to be performed.'
1  The question was 
anticipated in the Politics and stated by Aristotle in almost identical terms: 'Should 
offices be divided according to the subjects with which they deal, or according to the 
persons with whom they deal?'
2  After all, modern England and ancient Greece are not 
so far apart.  
 
On similar lines Aristotle discusses the constitution and functions of the judiciary.  It 
should, however, be [begin page 381] observed that while in theory a clear distinction 
was drawn between the deliberative and legislative, the executive and the judicial 
                                                  
1   [380/1]  Machinery of Government Committee [Cd. 9230) Report. p. 7. 





The Roman Constitution at its best was remarkable Rome less for the differentiation 
than for the balanced equilibrium of powers.  It is upon this feature of the Roman polity 
that both Polybius
4 and Cicero
5 insisted.  
 
‘As for the Roman Constitution,' wrote Polybius, 'it had three elements, each 
of them possessing sovereign powers; and their respective share of power in 
the whole State had been regulated with such scrupulous regard to equality 
and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, 
whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy, a democracy, or 
despotism.  And no wonder: for if we confine our observation to the power 
of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if to that of the 
Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the 
people it would seem a clear case of a democracy.'
6  
 
The Consuls exercised an administrative authority which in war, if not in peace, was 
absolute.  Yet the Senate was supreme in matters of finance, in the settlement of 
disputes between tributaries, as regards foreign and colonial policy, and as a tribunal in 
cases of high treason and other serious crimes.  But the people alone could decide 
matters of life or death, could declare war or make peace, could ratify treaties and act 
as the fountain of honour and of punishment.  So perfect indeed was the equilibrium 
between the several parts - the Consuls depending on the Senate and on the people; 
the Senate controlled by the people; the people dependent on the Senate and on the 
Consuls - that the whole moved as one articulated machine.  Cicero's observations, 
made a century later than those of Polybius, tend to establish [begin page 382] a similar 
conclusion; the monarchical element as represented by the Consuls working in 
harmony with the aristocratic Senate, and both with the people.  
 
Bodin. 
To the subject now under revision the Middle Ages contributed nothing; but, as already 
indicated in another connexion, political speculation was reawakened by the revival of 
learning and the Protestant Reformation.  In his remarkable Treatise on the Republic - 
a work which is ranked by a competent critic
7 above the Discourses of Machiavelli and 
worthy of comparison with the work of Montesquieu - Bodin
8  insists that the Prince 
ought not to administer justice in person, but should delegate this function of 
government to an independent tribunal.  To be at once legislator and judge is to mingle 





It is, however, to Montesquieu we must look for the first scientific exposition, in modern 
times, of the doctrine of the separation of powers.  
                                                  
3   [381/1]  Cf. supra. c. iii.  
4   [381/2]  In the De Republica (54 B.C.).  
5   [381/3]  Polybius went to Rome, 167 B.C. 
6   [381/4]  Histories, vi. 110 
7   [382/1]  Hallam, History of Literature, ii. 68.  
8   [382/2]  1530-96. 
9   [382/3]  Cf. Bluntschli, Theory of the State (Eng. trs., p. 486).  
‘When’, he wrote, 'in the same person or in the same body of magistrates the 
legislative and executive power are combined, no liberty is possible, 
because there is reason to dread that the same King and the same Senate 
may make tyrannical laws with the view of executing them tyrannically.  
Neither is there any liberty if the judicial power be not separated from the 
legislative and the executive.  If it were joined to the legislative power, the 
power of the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary; for the judge 
would be the law- maker.  If it were joined to the executive power, the judge 
would have the force of an oppressor.'
10  
 
Only in England did he in his day find the separation complete, and only in England, 
therefore, was to be found a nation the direct aim of whose constitution is political 
freedom.  Whether the separation of powers was so complete, even in England, as 
Montesquieu imagined is [begin page 383] a question which must not now detain us. 
 
Blackstone. 
Blackstone writing nearly twenty years after Montesquieu, held the stone same view 
and expressed it in words almost identical: 
 
‘In all tyrannical governments the supreme majesty, or the right both of 
making and enforcing laws, is vested in the same man or one and the same 




Not less noteworthy is it that, in adapting English institutions to trans-Atlantic 
conditions, the framers of the American Constitution laid especial stress upon this 
cardinal doctrine of Montesquieu.  'The accumulation of all powers,' wrote Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist, ‘legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective may 




Walter Bagehot, writing a century later than Blackstone, took a view of the English 
Constitution directly contradictory to that of the famous jurist: 'The independence of the 
legislative and executive powers is the specific quality of Presidential Government just 
as their fusion and combination is the precise principle of Cabinet Government.'  
 
It is, however, pertinent to observe that the Constitution of Bagehot's day was very far 
from being the Constitution of Blackstone's.  When George III was 'really King' and 
before the younger Pitt had claimed the place and title which Walpole had disavowed, 
there was a much clearer line of distinction between Executive and Legislature even in 
England than Bagehot, a century afterwards, could discern.  Nor is the line so precise 
in America as some theorists have maintained.  The Federalist indeed insisted that 
'unless these departments [legislative, executive, and judiciary] be so far connected 
and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of 
separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government can never in 
practice be [begin page 384] duly maintained.’
13  Nevertheless it is incontestable that 
                                                  
10   [382/4]  Esprit des Lois, Bk. XI, c. vi, and cf. A. Sorel, Montesquieu. pp. 107, 108. 
11   [383/1]  Commentaries, I. ii. 146.  
12   [383/2]   No. xlvii. 
13   [384/1]  No. xlviii. among the characteristic features and cardinal doctrines of the American Constitution 
the division of powers is one of the most obtrusive. 
 
Revolutionary France. 
The same principle permeated the first of the many constitutional experiments tried by 
France during the revolutionary period at the close of the eighteenth century.  Partly in 
deference to the classical aphorism of Montesquieu, partly from a disposition to follow 
American as against English precedent, and not least by reason of the ineradicable 
suspicion at that time entertained as to the designs of the Court, the Constituent 
Assembly (1789) decreed an absolute separation between the Legislature and the 
Executive.  The King was, indeed, to be allowed a veto upon legislation, but it was to 
be only suspensive, not absolute, and it was strictly laid down that no executive 
minister or holder of any office under the Crown should have a seat or a vote in the 
Legislature. 
 
Regrettable as this decision was, fatal as it proved to the lingering hope that 
constitutional reform might, even at the eleventh hour be effected without recourse to 
violent revolution, the decision was natural if not inevitable.  
 
Of all the points of contrast between the England and the France of the eighteenth 
century, perhaps the most striking was the position occupied in the two countries 
respectively by political writers.  In England the men of letters not merely mingled in 
affairs but not infrequently directed them.  Bolingbroke and Addison were themselves 
Secretaries of State, and Burke was private secretary to a great Whig nobleman who 
was twice first Minister, while he himself sat, for years, in the House of Commons, and 
held, for a time, a minor office.  The political philosophy of such men was necessarily 
tempered; Burke's was suffused by administrative experience and first-hand knowledge 
of practical politics.  In France the divorce between thought and action was absolute.  
Montesquieu,  [begin page 385] Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau were men of letters 
without experience of affairs.  Turgot was, it is true, at once philosopher and statesman, 
but Turgot could not hold his place against Court influence.  
 
Similarly, the men who were returned to the States-General of 1789 were deeply 
influenced by the abstract theories of the philosophers but had themselves, as a rule, 
no experience whatever in practical administration.  ‘I find’, wrote Arthur Young, ‘a 
general ignorance of the principles of government, a strange and unaccountable 
appeal on one side to ideal and visionary rights of nature, and on the other no settled 
plan that shall give security to the people for being in future in a much better situation 
than hitherto.'
14  ‘Among them' Burke found 'some of known rank, some of shining 
talents, but of any practical experience in the State not one man was to be found.  The 
best were only men of theory.'
15  
 
In view of the recent political history of France-the centralization of administration, the 
virtual supersession of the local magnates and officials by the Intendants, the 
concentration of all power in the hands of the Crown and its agents - the results 
deplored by English observers were probably inevitable.  In France the theorists 
pushed principles to their logical conclusion with results destructive of practical 
efficiency; in England efficiency was secured with happy disregard of logic, symmetry, 
or consistency. 
 
The differentiation of political functions was, in England, effected in deference to the 
dictates of practical convenience, slowly and gradually.  Today, in all civilized States, 
                                                  
14   [385/1]  Travels in France. 
15   [385/2]  Reflections. the three functions of government are clearly distinguished, and each function is 
assigned to its appropriate organ: 
 
(i)    the Legislature, or law-making organ, is concerned with the laying 
down of general rules; 
(ii)   the Judiciary, or law-interpreting organ, with the application of general 
rules to particular cases; and [begin page 386]  
(iii)    the Executive, with the enforcing of the orders of the courts, the 
carrying out of the general rules embodied in statutes and with the 
general administration of the business of the State. 
  
In primitive times all three functions were performed by the King.  The King, though 
acting with the counsel and consent of the 'wise', was the supreme legislator.  The 
results of his activities were embodied in Dooms, such as the Dooms of Ethelbert, of 
Ine, of Alfred, of Edward the Elder, of Edgar, and the rest.  But this legislation was 
concerned largely with what we should now regard as Executive business - primarily 
with the preservation of the peace.  The King, again, was the supreme Executive: the 
leader of the host in arms, the guardian of the 'King's Peace'.  The King, finally, was the 
supreme judge.  In theory, indeed, there has been little change in this respect between 
the days of Edward the Elder and those of George V.  Now, as then, the King, with the 
counsel and consent of the wise, makes the laws; the King, through the mouth of his 
judges,  interprets  the law, and the King, with the aid of a vastly complicated 
administrative machine, puts the law into execution.  The King has now transferred his 
several functions to separate bodies.  This transference was, however, a slow process.  
The King's Court (Curia Regis) was, in Norman and early Angevin times, Legislature, 
Executive, and Judiciary in one.  We should now deem it a hardship if in a dispute with 
a tax-collector (Executive) we could not appeal to a judicial tribunal which, though the 
'King's Court’, could be relied upon to decide impartially between the claims of the 
Crown and those of a private citizen.  But in the twelfth century the functions of the 
judges were at least as much fiscal as judicial.  The same thing is true of the King's 
local representative - the shire-reeve.  It is no less true of the Tudor 'man-of-all-work' - 
the Justice of the Peace.  The 'Stacks of Statutes’, under which Lambarde groaned, 
assigned to the county magistrate functions which were [begin page 387] partly judicial, 
partly legislative, partly administrative.  The Justice of the Peace had, for example, to 
try offenders against the law, to relieve the poor, to fix wages, and to ‘set on work' the 
lusty unemployed.  Such a confusion of functions seems to the citizen of the modern 
State, and more particularly to the modern Englishman, to be a serious menace to 
personal liberty.  When judges are makers as well as interpreters of the law, the liberty 
of the individual is gravely imperilled; and to make members of the Executive judges in 
all cases which concern administrative acts seems to the Englishman hardly less 
destructive of liberty than to combine the functions of law-maker and judge.  
 
The principle of the separation of powers being then generally admitted, and the 
differentiation of functions having been largely carried out in practice, it remains to 
consider, in further detail, the problems presented to the student of Political Science in 
connexion respectively with the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. 
 XIV - The Problem of the Legislature  
(i)   Structure: Unicameralism and Bicameralism  
 
‘A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent 
character - when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, 
and always assured of victory in their own House - easily becomes despotic 
and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its 
acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority.  The same reason 
which induced the Romans to have two consuls, makes it desirable there 
should be two chambers: that neither of them may be exposed to the 
corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of a single year.' 
- John Stuart Mill. 
 
‘II y a toujours dans un Etat des gens distingues par la naissance, les 
richesses, ou les honneurs; mais s'ils etoient confondus parrni le peuple, et 
s'ils n'y avoient qu'une voix comme les autres, la liberte commune seroit 
leur esclavage, et ils n'auroient aucun interet a la defendre, parce que la 
plupart des resolutions seroient contre eux.  La part qu'ils ont a la legislation 
doit donc etre proportionnee aux autres avantages qu'ils ont dans l‘Etat; ce 
qui arrivera s'ils forment un corps qui ait droit d'arreter les entreprises du 
peuple, comme le peuple a le droit d'arreter les leurs.  Ainsi la puissance 
legislative sera confiee et au corps des nobles et au corps qui sera choisi 
pour representer le peuple, qui auront chacun leurs assemblees et leurs 
deliberations a part et des interets separes.' - Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, 
I. xi, cvi.  
 
‘What then is expected from a well-constituted Second Chamber is not a 
rival infallibility, but an additional security.  It is hardly too much to say 
that, in this view, almost any Second Chamber is better than none.' - Sir 
Henry Maine.  
 
Of the several organs of government, the first to claim detailed analysis is that which is 
concerned with the making of laws.  Legislation is not indeed either the primary or the 
primitive function of government.  On the contrary the enactment of general rules 
belongs, as we have seen, to a relatively late stage in political development.   
Nevertheless, in the mechanism of the modern State the law-making body must, in 
logical order, take precedence of those which are concerned with the administration or 
the interpretation of the laws.  [begin page 390]  
 
Problems of the Legislature. 
The chief problems which arise in connexion with the legislative body are, as we have 
seen, four; of these the problem of structure is primary, and to a discussion of that 
problem the present chapter is accordingly devoted.  Provisionally at least we may 
assume that the legislative function is entrusted to a representative body and not to the 
citizens as a whole.  But even on this assumption the question will arise whether the 
functions of the elected Legislature may not properly be supplemented, or even, on 
occasion, be superseded, by the direct vote of the electors in a Referendum  or 
Initiative. 
 
Assuming, however, that the constitutional form is not direct but representative, we may 
proceed to ask how the legislative body may be best constructed?   
Universality of Bicameralism.  
The modern world has, with a singular measure of unanimity, decided in favour of two 
legislative chambers.  But we must not therefore assume that the advantages of 
bicameralism have always been self-evident or undisputed.  Most of the Constitutions 
now in existence are the result, as regards the structure of the Legislature, of 
conscious imitation of the English Parliament.  Yet, as we have seen, it was some time 
before the form of that Parliament was defined, and the eventual adoption of the 
bicameral system was, in a measure, due to accidental circumstances.
1  
 
Nor did those circumstances prevail in other countries which like England were, during 
the later Middle Ages, developing a system of representative institutions.  On the 
contrary England was, with the exception of Hungary, in this as in other respects, 
unique. 
 
Not prevalent in Medieval Europe. 
Thus the Aragonese Cortes was organized in four arms or branches: the Clergy, the 
Ricos Hombres or Great Nobles, the Cabaleros or Knights, and the towns.  The 
Swedish Diet included, [begin page 391] in addition to the nobles, the clergy, and the 
towns, 250 representatives of the peasants.  The Castilian Cortes, the States-General 
of France, and the Scottish Parliament were each organized in three Estates; the 
German Diet in three Colleges: the Electors, Princes, and Cities.  It is therefore evident 
that if we may still be permitted to regard Parliament as an 'Assembly of Estates', the 
three-chamber-formation was the natural one; and the general though tardy adoption of 
bicameralism must be regarded as a happy accident. 
 
Alternative Forms. 
Nor, perhaps, would the preference for the bicameral form have become so marked but 
for the exposure, by practical experience; of the inconveniences and dangers attendant 
upon alternative methods.  In countries which have adopted the federal system, such 
as Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, many if not most of the State legislatures 
consist of a single chamber, though in each case the central or federal legislature is 
bicameral. Some of the smaller European States, such as Greece, have made trial of 
the one-chamber system only to abandon it in favour of two.  The position of Norway, 
which perhaps may be regarded as ambiguous, will receive detailed consideration in 
the next chapter. 
  
The System of Estates. 
The triple or quadruple organization of Estates accorded with the medieval conception 
of society, but has in no single case survived into the modern era.  Yet it survived long 
enough to demonstrate its impotence as a check upon autocracy.  If the bicameral 
Parliament of England outlived a Cortes or a States-General, it was, as we have seen, 
mainly due to the fact that, thanks in particular to the link supplied by the knights of the 
shire, the two Houses of Parliament offered a solid opposition to the Crown; while in 
countries where the system of Estates prevailed the Crown was able, by separate 
negotiation with each Estate, to divide its rivals and consequently to crush them in 
detail.  Should the Soviet principle supersede the parliamentary; should the system of 
representation by localities give place to one based upon vocations or [begin page 392] 
                                                  
1   [390/1]  A recent critic has maintained that the separation into two Houses is even 
now by no means complete.  He points out with truth that Parliament still acts as 
one body and not as two Houses in all its solemn functions.  Nor did the House of 
Commons have a separate journal until the year 1547.  Cf. A.F. Pollard, The 
Evolution of Parliament, pp. 122 seq. economic interests, a problem analogous to, though not parallel with, that presented to 
medieval Europe may conceivably emerge once more; but assuming the survival of 
parliamentary democracy, and of a system of representation, based primarily, if not 
exclusively, upon localities, the modern world will have to choose in designing the 
structure of the Legislature, between unicameralism and bicameralism.  
 
Unicameral Experiments. 
From the days of the Puritan Revolution down to our own, the unicameral principle has 
not lacked advocates.  Yet, except at moments of revolutionary fervour, the principle 
has never been adopted by any of the great States of the modern world.  None the less 
are the revolutionary experiments instructive. 
 
The Commonwealth and the Protectorate. 
No sooner had the Rump of the Long Parliament got rid of the Monarchy than the 
House of Commons abolished the Second Chamber.  By an 'Act' passed on 19 March 
1649 it decreed as follows: 
 
‘The Commons of England assembled in Parliament, finding by too long 
experience that the House of Lords is useless and dangerous to the people of 
England to be continued, have though fit to ordain and enact. . . that from 
henceforth the House of Lords in Parliament shall be, and hereby is, wholly 
abolished and taken away; and that the Lords shall not from henceforth meet 
or sit in the said House, called the Lords House, or in any other place 
whatsoever as a House of Lords; nor shall sit, vote, advise, adjudge, or 
determine of any matter or thing whatsoever, as a House of Lords in 
Parliament.' 
 
Further: provision was in the same 'Act' made that, ‘such Lords as have demeaned 
themselves with honour, courage, and fidelity to the Commonwealth' should be capable 
of election to the unicameral Legislature.  It is important to note that the 'Act' of 19 
March 1649, having neither the sanction of the Crown nor of the House of Lords, had 
no more legal force than any other resolution of the House of Commons; as the work of 
a House of Commons from which the majority was [begin page 393] excluded by force 
of arms, it had even less than the usual moral significance. 
  
The Rump of the Long Parliament having thus rid itself of the King and of the Second 
Chamber, proceeded to render itself independent of the electorate and to perpetuate its 
own power; to make itself, in a word, both legally and politically sovereign.  On 4 
January 1649 it had resolved that 'the Commons of England in Parliament assembled, 
being chosen by and representing the people, have the supreme power in this nation'.  
Never, as Professor Firth says, was the House 
 
‘less representative than at the moment when it passed this vote.  By the 
expulsion of royalists and members during the war, and of Presbyterians in 
1645, it had been, as Cromwell said, "winnowed and sifted and brought to a 
handfull."  When the Long Parliament met in November 1640, it consisted 
of about 490 members; in January 1649, those sitting or at liberty to sit were 
not more than ninety.  Whole districts were unrepresented. . . . At no time 




                                                  
2   [393/1]  Cromwell, p. 235. Nevertheless, the position it assumed had in it this element of strength: in the absence 
of a King, a House of Lords, and a written Constitution, there was absolutely no legal 
check upon its unlimited and irresponsible authority. 
 
‘This’, said Cromwell, addressing his second Parliament, ‘was the case of 
the people of England at that time, the Parliament assuming to itself the 
authority of the three Estates that were before.  It had so assumed that 
authority that if any man had come and said, "What rules do you judge by?" 
it would have answered," Why, we have none.  We are supreme in 
legislature and judicature.  
 
Supreme the Rump claimed to be; but it ignored the dominant factor in the situation - 
the new model army and its general; and it chose to forget that its usurped authority 
rested in fact upon the power of the sword.  It was before long uncomfortably reminded 
of this fact.  [begin page 394] 
 
By 1651 there was a clamorous demand for a settlement of the kingdom.  The enemies 
of the Commonwealth were now scattered: Cromwell had subjugated Ireland and 
Scotland; the fleet, organized by Vane and commanded by Blake, had swept Prince 
Rupert and the Royalists from the seas; while Cromwell himself had finally crushed 
their hopes at home by the 'crowning mercy' of Worcester (3 September 1651).  The 
victorious party had now leisure and opportunity to quarrel among themselves.   
Petitions poured in from the army praying for reforms - long delayed - in law and 
justice; for the establishment of a 'gospel ministry’; above all, for a speedy dissolution 
of the existing Parliament.  The officers were ready to employ force to effect the last 
object; but Cromwell was opposed to it and restrained his colleagues.  At last, however, 
even Cromwell's patience was exhausted, and on 20 April 1653 the Rump was 
expelled.  'So far as I could discern when they were dissolved, there was not so much 
as the barking of a dog or any general and visible repining at it.'  So spake Cromwell, 
and in his estimate of the position and policy of the unicameral Rump he was 
undeniably right.  It was in plain truth the 'horridest arbitrariness that ever existed on 
earth'.  The Rump conceived itself to have become a sort of residuary legatee of all the 
powers previously possessed by either House.  ‘Whatsoever authority was in the 
Houses of Lords and Commons the same is united in this Parliament.'  Such was the 
theory held by Lord Chief Justice Glyn.  In particular the judicial power of the House of 
Lords was held to be vested in the Rump, while Major-General Goffe went so far as to 
assure his fellow members 'that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by which the Bishops 
once punished blasphemy had since the abolition of the bishops devolved also upon 
the House'.
3 The union of executive, legislative, and judicial authority more than 
justified Cromwell's famous description.  No man's person or property was safe.  It was 
a repetition of all the arbitrary [begin page 395] tribunals of the regime of Thorough 
rolled into one.  Hence 'the liberties and interests and lives of people not judged by any 
certain known Laws and Power, but by an arbitrary Power. . . by an arbitrary Power I 
say: to make men's estates liable to confiscation, and their persons to imprisonment - 
sometimes by laws made after the fact committed; often by the Parliament's assuming 
to itself to give judgement both in capital and criminal things, which in former times was 
not known to exercise such a judicature'.
4  
 
That Cromwell did not overstate the case against the arbitrary behaviour of a House of 
Commons, acting without a sense of immediate responsibility to the nation, and 
unchecked by any external authority, is no longer questioned by any competent 
historian.  But the story is not yet complete. 
  
                                                  
3   [394/1]  Firth, Last Years of the Protectorate, i. 9. 
4   [395/1]  Cromwell : Speech iii, Carlyle's edition, vol. iv, p. 50. The Instrument of Government. 
To the 'Rump' there succeeded the Puritan Convention, popularly known as the 
'Barebones' Parliament.  This device did not work, and in December 1653 a Committee 
of Officers, assisted by a few civilians, produced the exceedingly interesting draft 
constitution embodied in The Instrument of Government.  This document provided that 
the legislative power should be vested in 'one person and the people represented in 
parliament', i.e. in a single chamber.  The 'single chamber' when once elected showed 
no disposition, however, to accept the ‘fundamentals' of the Instrument.  Despite the 
angry admonitions of the Protector it insisted upon questioning the 'authority by which it 
sat'; regarding itself, in fine, as not merely a legislative but a constituent assembly.  As 
a result the Protector dismissed it at the first legal opportunity (1655).  For the next 
eighteen months England was delivered over to the entirely arbitrary rule of the major-
generals.  But early in the year 1657 a demand arose from many quarters for a revision 
of the Constitution.  Alderman Sir Christopher Pack, one of the members for the City of 
London, was put up to propose [begin page 396] revision - a Second Chamber and 
increased power for the Protector, who was to be 'something like a king'. 
 
The Humble Petition and Advice. 
By the end of March the demand took practical shape in the Humble Petition and 
Advice.  The Protector was to be transformed into a king, with the right to nominate and 
a successor; Parliament was once more to be bicameral; the 'other House' was to 
consist of not more than seventy and not less than forty members, nominated for life by 
'his Highness', and approved by 'this' House.  
 
Cromwell was well pleased with the scheme, and, had his officers permitted, would 
have accepted it in its entirety.  But on one point the leading officers and the ‘honest 
republicans' were alike immovable: they would have no king.  The extremists prevailed, 
and Cromwell refused the offer of the crown. 
 
Revived Second Chamber. 
The proposal for a revived Second Chamber was, on the other hand, carried with an 
unexpected degree of unanimity.  The Protector pressed It strongly upon the officers. 
 
'I tell you’, he said, 'that unless you have some such thing as a balance we 
cannot be safe.  Either you will encroach upon our civil liberties by 
excluding such as are elected to serve in Parliament - next time for aught I 
know you may exclude four hundred - or they will encroach upon our 
religious liberty.  By the proceedings of this Parliament you see they stand 
in need of a check or balancing power, for the case of James Naylor might 
happen to be your case.  By the same law and reason they punished Naylor 
they might punish an Independent or Anabaptist.  By their judicial power 
they fall upon life and member, and doth the Instrument enable me to 
control it?  This Instrument of Government will not do your work.'
5  
 
The case against a unicameral legislature was never put with more telling effect.  'By 
the proceedings of this Parliament you see they stand in need of a check or balancing 
power.'  The appeal to recent experience was irresistible.  More horrid arbitrariness had 
never been [begin page 397] displayed by any government.  The lawyers were 
especially emphatic in their demand for some bulwark against the caprice and tyranny 
of a single elected chamber. 
 
‘The other House’, said Thurloe’, is to be called by writ, in the nature of the 
Lords' House; but is not to consist of the old Lords, but of such as have 
                                                  
5   [396/1]  Ap. Firth, op. cit. i. 137-8; i. 141. never been against the Parliament, but are to be men fearing God and of 
good conversation, and such as his Highness shall be fully satisfied in, both 
as to their interest, affection and integrity to the good cause.  And we judge 
here that this House thus constituted will be a great security and bulwark to 
the honest interest, and to the good people that have been engaged therein; 
and will not be so uncertain as the House of Commons which depends upon 
the election of the people.  Those that sit in the other House are to be for 
life, and as any die his place is to be filled up with the consent of the House 
itself, and not otherwise; so that if that House be but made good at first, it is 
likely to continue so for ever, as far as man can provide.'  
 
The preference of the lawyers for a bicameral legislature was, however, only natural.  
They frankly favoured a return as speedy as possible to the old order, if not to the old 
dynasty.  More remarkable is the acquiescence of the soldiers.  But they too had come 
to realize both the inconvenience - to use no harsher term - caused by the sovereignty 
of a single chamber, and the insufficiency of paper restrictions imposed by the 
Instrument of Government.  A freely elected House of Commons meant the restoration 
of the ‘King of the Scots'.  'On reflection, therefore, they were not sorry’, as Professor 
Firth pertinently remarks, to see a sort of Senate established as a check to the 
popularly elected Lower House, thinking that it would serve to maintain the principles 
for which they had fought against the reactionary tendencies of the nation in general.  
They were so much convinced of this that in 1659 the necessity of “a select Senate" 
became one of the chief planks in the political platform of the army.'
6
[begin page 398] 
 
According to the terms of the Petition the 'other House' was to consist of such persons 
'as shall be nominated by your Highness and approved by this House'.  But after much 
debate the approval of 'this House' was waived and the Protector was authorized to 
summon whom he would.  The task of selection was no easy one, but Cromwell took 
enormous pains to perform it faithfully. 
 
'The difficulty proves great’, wrote Thurloe, 'between  those who are fit, and not willing 
to serve, and those who are willing and expect it, and are not fit.'  At last sixty-three 
names were selected and writs were issued, according to the ancient form, bidding 
them, 'all excuses being set aside,' to be 'personally present at Westminster . . . there 
to treat confer and give your advice with us, and with the great men and nobles'.  Of 
the sixty-three summoned, only forty-two responded; and the second attempt to 
reconstruct the Constitution ended like the first in failure and confusion.  No sooner did 
the reconstructed legislature assemble than it again began to assert its right to 
question 'fundamentals', and to debate the powers, position, and title to be assigned to 
the ‘other' House.  A week of this 'foolery' sufficed to exhaust the Protector's patience, 
and on 4 February he dissolved Parliament with some passion: 'Let God be judge 
between you and me.' 
 
That was the end of constitutional experiments so far as Oliver Cromwell was 
concerned.  After the death of the great Protector, the sword and the robe at once 
came into sharp and open conflict.  Richard Cromwell, powerless either to control or to 
reconcile, was contemptuously pushed aside, and after a short period of confusion the 
people got the opportunity of giving free expression to their true political sentiments.  It 
is not without significance that the Convention Parliament, with its first breath voted 
'The Government is and ought to be, by King, Lords, and Commons'.  From that day to 
this the truth of that proposition, in substance if not in terms, has not in this country 
been seriously disputed.  The [begin page 399] experiment of a unicameral Parliament 
                                                  
6   [397/1]  Op. cit. i. 142, 3. claiming, though not exercising, sovereignty, had been tried and in 1660 it stood 
confessed, a hopeless and irremediable failure. 
 
The French Revolution. 
The French experiments are not less conclusive, if not in favour of  bicameralism, at 
least against unicameralism.  The Comite de Constitution, appointed on 14 July 1789 
to draft a new Constitution for France, reported strongly in favour of a bicameral 
legislature on the English model.  Mounier, the Chairman of the Committee, cordially 
supported its recommendation, but the Constituent Assembly would have none of it.  
Deeply imbued with the doctrinaire and unhistorical philosophy of Rousseau, 
unconvinced even by the recent example afforded by America, and beguiled by the 
eloquence of Mirabeau, who for once was on the side of the doctrinaires, the Assembly 
decided by the overwhelming majority of 849 to 89 in favour of a single Chamber.  The 
unicameral legislature, thus conceived, and consisting of 745 elected members, lived 
only long enough to suspend the monarchy and to convoke a national Convention.  
The  Convention  met on 21 September 1792, and, having formally proclaimed a 
Republic, was presently delivered of the stillborn Constitution of 1793.  This 
Constitution confided the legislative function to a single Chamber, to be annually 
elected by universal suffrage.  One check was, however, imposed upon the power of 
the Legislature.  A right of protest against any proposed law was reserved to the 
people.  If such a protest were raised, the proposed law was to be submitted by 
Referendum to the primary electoral assemblies. 
  
Constitution of the Year III. 
These provisions never became operative, and before it dispersed the Convention had 
so far regained its sanity as to decree the Constitution du 5 fructidor de l'an III, better 
known as the Directorial Constitution.  The new Instrument provided for a Legislature of 
two Houses: the Conseil des Cinq-Cents and the Conseil des Anciens.  Both Councils 
were elected by a process of double or indirect election and one third of each was 
annually  [begin page 400] renewed.  The Cinq-Cents  alone had the right to initiate 
legislation, to the Anciens belonged only a right of veto.  Constitutional amendments 
were excluded from the competence of the Legislature; they had to be promulgated by 
a special constituent assembly (Assemblee de revision) expressly summoned for the 
purpose, and to be subsequently approved by the primary assemblies. 
 
Thus, within five years of its initiation the single-chamber experiment, beloved of the 
doctrinaires, and commended by Sieyes, had been discredited and abandoned, and 
France, gradually restored to normal health after the wild orgies of the Revolution, 
declined to be impaled on either horn of the dilemma, propounded by the most famous 
of her constitutional architects.  'If’, said the Abbe Sieyes, 'a second Chamber dissents 
from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is superfluous.'  Notwithstanding 
this logical dilemma the French people, in all the many and varied experiments which 
were tried between 1795 and 1848, refused to be beguiled again into the path of 
unicameralism; the Directory, the Consulate, the Empire, the Legitimists, and the 
Orleanists, all adopted for their legislature the two-chamber system. 
 
The Republic of 1848. 
The short-lived Republic of 1848 reverted to the model of 1789.  Under the Constitution 
of 1848 the legislature was to consist of a single Chamber containing 750 paid 
members elected by the Departments and the Colonies by universal direct suffrage, 
and to be subject to dissolution every three years.  The initiation of laws was, however, 
shared between the Chamber and the President, who was further endowed with a 
suspensive veto.  A special machinery was also provided for the revision of the 
Constitution, but as the Constitution itself was overthrown by the coup d' etat of 2 
December 1851 the details need not detain us.  Under the new Constitution promulgated by Louis Napoleon in January 1852, the Legislative power was confided 
to the President of the Republic and a bicameral Parliament.  Nor has France either 
[begin page 401] under the second Empire, or under the third Republic; ever been 
deflected from this model.  
 
Political Theory. 
So much for the teachings of recent historical experience.  Nor has Political Theory 
failed to enforce them.  Mill, Bagehot, Henry Sidgwick, Lecky, and Lord Acton, widely 
as they differed in their general political outlook, all concurred in the conclusion that a 
single Chamber Legislature is dangerous to liberty, and does not conduce to efficiency 
of government. 
 
‘A majority in a single assembly,' wrote John Stuart Mill, ‘when it has 
assumed a permanent character - when composed of the same persons 
habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own House 
- easily becomes despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of 
considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted 
authority.  The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls 
make it desirable there should be two Chambers; that neither of them may 
be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the 
space of a single year.
7  
 
Walter Bagehot, more suo, is even more frankly utilitarian in his argument than Mill.  He 
admits that if we had an Ideal House of Commons 'perfectly representing the nation, 
always moderate, never passionate, abounding in men of leisure, never omitting the 
slow and steady forms necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we should 
not need a higher chamber.  The work would be done so well that we should not want 
anyone to look over or revise it.'  But he insists that the House of Commons being what 
it is, it is exceedingly desirable to have a revising body of some sort.  We do not, as Sir 
Henry Maine has pointed out, 'look to a second Chamber for a rival infallibility, but for 
an additional security.  
 
‘It is’, he says, 'hardly too much to say that in this view almost any second Chamber is 
better than none.'  Lecky and Lord Acton, approaching the study of Politics from very 
different angles, are alike in their solicitude [begin page 402] for the maintenance of 
freedom, and both discern in a second Chamber one of the strongest securities for its 
preservation. 
 
‘Of all the forms of government that are possible among mankind, I do not', 
writes Lecky, ‘know any which is likely to be worse than the government of 
a single omnipotent democratic Chamber. . . . The tyranny of majorities is, 
of all forms of tyranny, that which in the conditions of modern life is most 




Lord Acton goes so far as to declare that in every genuine democracy a second 
Chamber is 'the essential security for freedom’.
9  Henry Sidgwick, fearful as were many 
men of his generation lest the Legislature should encroach on the functions of the 
                                                  
7   [401/1]  Representative Government, c. 13. 
8   [402/1]  Democracy and Liberty, vol. i, pp. 299 and 312. 




Functions of a Second Chamber. 
It may be taken, then, as generally agreed by theorists, that the principle of 
bicameralism is essential to that balance of power in the polity which cannot be 
impaired save with evident danger to the efficiency of the governmental machine, if not 
to the maintenance of the Commonwealth.  If majorities must rule, minorities need 
protection, and for the protection of minorities there is no more convenient guarantee 
than a strong Second Chamber.  Moreover, the mere efficiency of legislation demands, 
at the lowest, a revising Committee, if not a second legislative Chamber endowed with 
co-ordinate authority.  
 
The principle that the Lower House should have superior if not exclusive power over 
finance is now generally accepted.  The right to initiate Money Bills is usually confined 
to the Lower House, and in some States even the right of amendment is denied to the 
Upper House, though few Senates are in respect of financial control so completely 
impotent as the House of Lords.  Even the Senate of the Commonwealth of Aus- [begin 
page 403] tralia can reject a Money Bill, and is in practice permitted to suggest 
amendments to the House of Representatives. 
 
In the United States the Senate may and habitually does amend Money Bills, even to 
the extent of increasing the charge upon the people, and indeed is virtually co-ordinate 
in authority with the Lower House. 
 
The French Senate. 
French practice in regard to this important matter is more dubious.  The financial 
powers of the Senate are legally defined by Article 8 of the Constitutional Law of the 
24th February 1875 which states: 'The Senate has equally with the Chamber of 
Deputies the right of proposing and making laws.  But financial measures must, in the 
first instance, be submitted to and voted by the Chamber of Deputies.'  The 
interpretation of this Article gave rise, from the first, to acute conflicts between the two 
Houses, and even now there is not complete unanimity among French publicists either 
as to the constitutional theory, or even the conventional practice.
11  The Senate has, 
however, claimed, and constantly exercises, very wide powers in regard to the 
amendment of Money Bills, and even the right to restore appropriations proposed in a 
Finance Bill by the Ministry but rejected by the Chamber.  But the rights of the Senate, 
in this latter respect, have never been precisely determined.  As a rule the 
disagreements have been ultimately adjusted by a compromise.  In the last resort the 
Senate has generally given way, though without prejudice to its constitutional powers.  
Thus, the question in practice has been settled by 'the system of the last word' which 
admittedly, in matters of finance, rests with the Chamber of Deputies.  The French 
Senate possesses other rights of great constitutional importance.  These will be 
examined later on.  Meanwhile, it is pertinent to observe that in France, as elsewhere, 
the Senate is regarded as the appropriate arena for the discussion of those larger 
questions of policy [begin page 404] and administration for which an overburdened 
Lower House has little leisure.  In this respect the House of Lords is certainly not 
inferior to any legislative Chamber in the world.  But it no longer possesses, except in 
very limited degree, the power, by the exercise of a constitutional right, to suspend 
                                                  
10   [402/3]  Elements of Politics, c. xxiii. 
11   [403/1]  Cf. Reports from His Majesty's Representatives abroad respecting the 
Second Chamber in Foreign States (Cd. 3824), 1907.  I have also made use of a 
memorandum submitted to the Second Chamber Conference (Bryce Committee) 
by certain French publicists in 1917. legislation, until by one means or another it has been ascertained beyond dispute that 
such legislation has the approval of the ultimate political authority in the State.  The 
French Senate enjoys in conjunction with the President the very important power of 
dissolving the Chamber of Deputies before the expiry of its legal term.  This gives to it, 
if not the power of making or unmaking ministries, at least a measure of control over 
the Executive which is inevitably denied to a Second Chamber constituted as the 
House of Lords is constituted to-day. 
 
The Referendal Function. 
Yet, unless the Lower Chamber is to be virtually omnipotent, and liable, therefore, to 
contract the disease of 'horrid arbitrariness' so acutely diagnosed by Cromwell, it would 
seem essential that there should exist in the Constitution a power of reference from the 
legal to the political sovereign.  Such a power was at least latent in the English 
Constitution until 1911.  The late Lord Salisbury was, indeed, wont to contend that the 
referendal function was the primary raison d' etre of the House of Lords.  Its duty, in his 
view, was 'frankly to acknowledge that the nation is our master, though the House of 
Commons is not, and to yield our opinion only when the judgement of the nation has 
been challenged at the polls and decidedly expressed'.  He urged that the House of 
Lords was bound to use its constitutional powers to ascertain beyond a doubt 'whether 
the House of Commons does or does not represent the full, the deliberate, the 
sustained convictions of the body of the nation'.
12  
 
If, however, it is important that there should be in every Constitution some machinery, 
be it legal or con- [begin page 405] ventional, which shall assure to the political 
sovereign an effective measure of control over the policy of its trustees, it is assuredly 
not least important in States which are democratic in spirit If not in form.  In a written 
Constitution there can be no ambiguity on this point.  In a Constitution mainly unwritten 
and pre-eminently flexible, the safeguards against the arbitrary action of the Executive 
or the Legislature must needs be less defined; but they ought not to be on that account 
less real and effective. 
 
That the will of the electorate, constitutionally expressed, must in the last resort prevail 
over all rivals is an accepted maxim of parliamentary democracy.  But the last resort 
may be a comparatively distant one, and the action issuing therefrom is far from 
automatic.  Some intermediate machinery would seem, therefore, to be indispensable.  
The House of Lords in some sort supplied it before 1911, but the, cardinal defect of that 
House, in its referendal capacity, was that its operation was satisfactory only to one 
party in the State.  It was objected, not without reason, that when the Conservative 
Party was in power the referendal function lay dormant.  The soft impeachment could 
not be denied.  Hence the violent reaction resulting in 1911 in the adoption of an 
expedient, professedly provisional, which has given to a Legislature, nominally 
bicameral, a definitely unicameral bias.  That bias, by general admission, now requires 
correction. 
 
Whether foreign examples can afford any help towards the solution of a constitutional 
problem, as obstinate as it is grave, is a question which demands closer examination. 
The next chapter will afford it. 
 
                                                  
12   [404/1]  Lady Gwendalen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, vol. ii, pp. 
26, 24-5. XV. - The Problem of The Legislature  
(ii) - Senates and Second Chambers  
 
‘I tell you that unless you have some such thing as a balance you cannot be 
safe. . . . By the proceedings of this [single-chamber] Parliament, you see 
they stand in need of a check or balancing power.' Oliver Cromwell 
 
‘The reconstitution of our Upper House of Parliament is at once the most 
urgent, the most difficult, and in its consequences the most far-reaching of 
all the reforms of our time. . . . A real and strong Second Chamber is a sine 
qua non of efficient legislation and government.'  Frederic Harrison (1910). 
 
‘Every Second Chamber. . . exists to. . . ensure that great changes shall not 
be made in fundamental institutions except by the deliberate will of the 
nation.' - Viscount Milner (1907). 
 
‘There is good ground for the establishment of a Second Chamber. . . . By 
far the best way of forming a Second Chamber in this country would be the 
Norwegian system.' - Sidney Webb (1917).  
 
Unicameral Exceptions. 
‘There are’, said Lord Rosebery on a famous occasion, ‘two exceptions to the general 
protest of all civilized communities against being governed by a single Chamber.  I will 
name them.  ‘They are Greece and Costa Rica.'  Lord Rosebery's list was not 
exhaustive when he spoke, and Greece has since re-established 'as a substitute for a 
Second Chamber’ a Council of State, and may be deemed therefore to adhere to the 
bicameral principle.  In addition to Costa Rica there are still four Latin-American States-
Panama, San Domingo, Salvador, and Honduras - without a Second Chamber; and in 
Europe, Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia and some of the new Republics which arose upon 
the ruins of the Empires which fell during the Great War are still unicameral.  But to 
none of these has the civilized world yet learned to look as models of constitutional 
propriety, or examples of settled government.  
 
Norway, as already observed, is in respect of its legislative structure in an ambiguous 
position.  Jurists are [begin page 408] not agreed whether it is to be classed among 
unicameral or bicameral constitutions.  Perhaps it is for that reason that an influential 
section of political opinion in England looks to Norway to afford a model for the 
reconstruction of the Second Chamber in this country.
1  Be that as it may, the 
Norwegian system deserves analysis.  Entire legislative power is vested in a body of 
123 Representatives  elected triennially to form the Storthing.  As soon as a newly 
elected Storthing meets it proceeds to elect one-fourth of its members who constitute a 
revising committee known as the Lagthing, the remaining three-quarters constituting 
the Odelsthing.  The Lagthing has no power of initiating legislation, but is entitled to 
suggest amendments in, Bills sent up to it by the Odelsthing.  If the latter refuses to 
accept them, and the Lagthing persists in its objections, a joint session is held and a 
two-thirds majority of the whole Storthing is then required to enable the Bill to become 
law.  The Lagthing constitutes, in conjunction with the Supreme Court of Justice, the 
Rigsret, the tribunal before which members of the Government can be impeached.  All 
Bills involving questions of finance, concessions for works of public utility, the 
                                                  
1    [408/1]  Cf. dictum of Mr, Sidney Webb prefixed to this chapter.  A similar 
Common-view found at least one representative on the Bryce Committee of 1917.  naturalization of foreigners, and motions criticizing the action of the Executive are, by 
rule, brought before the whole Storthing, and are decided by a bare majority of votes.  
That the Lagthing fulfils some of the functions appropriate to a Second Chamber is 
evident; but, on the other hand, the members of it possess no differentiating 
qualifications; they are merely selected from among, and by, the members of the 
Storthing, and do not sit by virtue of any independent right conferred either by the 
electorate, or by official nomination, or by hereditary privilege.  Norway, then must still 
languish in the shade of ambiguity.
2  
 
State Legislatures in Federal Commonwealths. 
The legislatures of the component States, Cantons, or [begin page 409] Provinces of 
Federal Commonwealths are in a class apart, and demand separate consideration.   
Here a Second Chamber is the exception rather than the rule.  Of the eight Provinces 
of British North America two only (Quebec and Nova Scotia) have two-chambered 
legislatures.  In the Helvetic Republic sixteen Cantons have a single Chamber, while 
two Cantons and four half-Cantons still possess the old folk-moots or direct assemblies 
of all the citizens.  Of the German Reich more than half the component States have 
unicameral legislatures; in Australia all the State legislatures, except that of 
Queensland, retain the two-chamber form which they had adopted before the 
establishment of the Commonwealth; and the same is true of the component States of 
the United States of America. 
 
In face of these facts it seems reasonable to conclude that, be the motives what they 
may, whether from force of tradition or simply on considerations of political expediency, 
the modem world has deliberately decided in favour of a bicameral legislature.  Hardly 
less significant, however, is the fact that among the Second Chambers of modem 
States the English House of Lords remains virtually unique.  
 
A Unique Second chamber in a Unique Constitution. 
Not that there is in that fact anything remarkable.  If the House of Lords is unique, so is 
the Constitution of which it forms part.  There are, as we have seen, few modem 
Constitutions which are so predominantly unwritten; there is none which is so 
completely flexible.  The position of the Second Chamber in England cannot be 
profitably discussed without a clear and continuous appreciation of this truth.  If there 
be any Constitution in the world which would, on the face of it, seem to demand every 
imaginable protective device, safeguard, and precaution, it is our own.  Yet there is 
none where they are, on paper, so conspicuous by their absence.  Unprotected by a 
Constitutional Instrument; its law-making confided to a Legislature, legally omnipotent; 
its Executive dependent upon, and responsible to, that [begin page 410] Legislature; its 
Judiciary independent as regards the interpretation of laws, but ultimately subject to the 
will and even the caprice of the Legislature; England and indeed the British Empire 
would seem to be peculiarly defenceless alike against the frontal attacks of those who 
are avowed enemies to the existing order, and against the subtle and insinuating 
operations of those who work under the cover of darkness, and under the forms of a 
Constitution which they are anxious to undermine.  That the English Polity is more 
stable and more secure than appearances might suggest, is due to a combination of 
circumstances which are at once too subtle for rapid analysis and too familiar to 
demand it. 
 
The House of Lords. 
In such a Constitution there would seem to be exceptional need for a strong and 
effective Second Chamber. 
  
                                                  
2   [408/2]  Cd. 3824, pp. 39, 40. Yet the House of Lords is, in law and by convention, exceptionally weak; with the 
exception of the Upper Chamber of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, perhaps the 
weakest in the world.  Nor is its political impotence due exclusively or mainly to the 
passing of the Parliament Act.  Long before 1911 two tendencies were operating to its 
enfeeblement: on the one hand the House of Lords was rapidly increasing in 
membership, and on the other it was becoming more and more predominantly 
hereditary in composition.  Both tendencies were, however, in an historic view, 
relatively recent.  Down to the sixteenth century the House of Lords was comparable in 
size to most of the modern Senates or Second Chambers.  At the accession of the 
Tudors it contained about 75 members, or considerably fewer than that of the American 
Senate and not greatly in excess of the German Reichsrat.  Moreover, of the 75 at least 
45 were Bishops or Abbots and therefore non-hereditary.  The abbots disappeared after 
the dissolution of the monasteries and the Spiritual Peers dwindled to 26.  At this figure 
they have remained constant for three and a half centuries except for the brief period 
(1801-69) when four Irish Bishops reinforced their English brethren.  Meanwhile the 
numbers of the [begin page 411] lay Peers increased very rapidly.  Under Charles II 
they numbered 140; and (including 16 Representative Peers of Scotland, admitted 
under the Act of Union) nearly 200 under George II.  George III during a reign of sixty 
years added 116 members to the hereditary peerage of the United Kingdom; Queen 
Victoria in sixty-four years added about 300.  By 1925 the Temporal Peers entitled to sit 
in the House of Lords numbered no fewer than  670 exclusive of minors.  In addition to 
these there are 28 Representative Peers of Ireland, 16 Representative Peers of 
Scotland and 5 ‘Law Lords' enjoying a seat in the Upper House for life. 
  
Some Foreign Comparisons. 
Thus the House of Lords has become not only predominantly hereditary in 
composition, but utterly unwieldy in bulk.  No other Upper Chamber even approximates 
to it.  The Prussian Herrenhaus contained about 370 members; the Spanish Senate 
360; the Italian 328; the French 314.  But the American Senate has only 96; the 
Canadian 87; the German Reichsrat 66; the Swiss Standerat 44; the South African 40; 
and the Australian 36.  
 
Nor is one of these Chambers exclusively or, with one exception, predominantly 
hereditary in composition.  In this, as in other respects, the Upper House which most 
nearly resembled our own was the former Hungarian Table of Magnates with 227 
hereditary peers out of a total of about 350 members.  In the Prussian Herrenhaus 
there were no fewer than 177 official and ecclesiastical representatives as against 115 
hereditary, and 73 nominated life members.
3  The Hungarian Upper House was the 
only one of any importance whose numbers ever exceeded those of the House of 
Lords.  At one time consisting of some 800 members, it was before the war reduced by 
more than a half. 
 
That modern Republics like France and the United States, and new countries like 
Canada, Australia, and [begin page 412] South Africa should have to rely upon the 
nominative or elective principle or a combination of the two, is intelligible.  But why was 
the hereditary principle so largely discarded in the historic monarchies?  Sir Henry 
Maine suggests a curious and interesting reason:  
 
‘There is (he writes) much reason to believe that the British House of Lords 
would have been exclusively or much more extensively copied in the 
Constitutions of the Continent but for one remarkable difficulty.  This is not 
in the least any dislike or distrust of the hereditary principle, but the extreme 
numerousness of the nobility in most continental societies, and the 
                                                  
3   [411/1]  The Prussian Constitution of 1920 provides for a Staatsrat to be elected 
by the Provincial Assemblies. consequent difficulty of selecting a portion of them to be exclusively 
privileged.' 
 
The Abbe Sieyes insisted that the fatal obstacle to the engrafting of a House of Lords 
on to the Constitution ‘made' for France in 1791 was the ‘number and theoretical 
equality of the nobles'.  Sieyes calculated that at the time of the Revolution France 
contained 110,000  noblemen, and Brittany alone 10,000.  In England there has never 
existed a noble caste.  All the children of Peers are commoners, the characteristic 
differentia  of a ‘Peer' consisting in. the hereditary right to a personal summons to 
Parliament'.
4  This restriction has, as already observed, been of immense significance 
in the development of our parliamentary institutions as a whole, and has imparted a 
distinctive character not only to the Upper but to the Lower House.  Nowhere else could 
the ‘Third Estate' have contained, as did the English House of Commons from the 
fourteenth century onwards, a large infusion of men of noble blood, the sons and 
brothers of the Peers who formed the nucleus of the House of Lords.  Mainly indeed to 
this fact may be ascribed the permanence of parliamentary institutions in this country, 
as contrasted with the evanescence of the States General of France or the Cortes of 
the Spanish Kingdoms.  [begin page 413] 
 
The above summary, rapid it has been, will suffice to establish the fact that while every 
important country in the world has, in the constitution of its Legislature, imitated the 
English bicameral arrangement, not one has been at once willing and able to 
reproduce the features which distinguish the House of Lords.  
 
In attempting a further analysis of existing Second Chambers, one broad and primary 




Of the growth of the federal idea, in modern times, this is not the place to write, but it is 
pertinent to observe that, whatever may be affirmed of unitary States, bicameralism 
would appear to be an essential and inseparable attribute of federalism.  More than 
that.  It is in the Senate or Upper Chamber of Federal Commonwealths that the federal 
idea is enshrined: in that Chamber is to be found the primary and effective guarantee 
for the preservation of this peculiar type of Constitution. 
  
The United States. 
The Senate of the United States of America affords, as we have seen,
5 a conspicuous 
illustration of this truth.  The Senate is composed, and has from the first been 
composed, of two representatives from each State of the Union.  Under a recent 
Amendment (1913) Senators are elected by direct popular vote instead of by the 
legislatures of the component States.  But this involves a change merely in the 
machinery of election.  It does not touch the root principle upon which the Senate is 
based - the absolute equality of the States.  Had this basic principle not from the outset 
been accepted and emphasized, had its permanence not been guaranteed by 
sanctions of peculiar authority, it is safe to say that the Federal Constitution itself would 
never have come into existence.  The jealousy of the smaller States would have been 
too powerful even for the genius and tact and patience of Alexander Hamilton.  It was 
the idea of equal representation in the Senate which reconciled the [begin page 414] 
                                                  
4    [412/1]  Cf. Freeman, Historical Essays, iv. 436; and on the whole of this 
complicated but interesting question, Lords Report on Dignity of the Peerage.  
‘Peers' must be carefully distinguished from 'Lords of Parliament’, some of 
whom, e.g. Bishops and Law Lords, are not technically 'Peers'. 
5   [413/1]  Supra, c.v. smaller States to federal union with the larger, and in the Senate State rights are, and 
from the first have been, enshrined and guaranteed.  Of all the fundamentals of the 
United States Constitution this is held most sacred.  ‘No State’, so the Constitution runs 
(Art. V), 'without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate' - a 
consent which would not, under any imaginable circumstances, be given.  The Senate 
is no longer, owing to the inclusion of new States, the select body of councillors 
contemplated by Hamilton and his colleagues. 
 
It consists not of 26 members but of 96; nevertheless its essential character remains 
unchanged, and the eulogies of Lord Bryce are not undeserved.  'The Senate’, he 
writes, 'has drawn the best talent of the nation, so far as that talent flows into politics, 
into its body, has established an intellectual supremacy, has furnished a vantage 
ground from which men of ability may speak to their fellow countrymen.'
6  Mr. Henry 
Cabot Lodge is not less emphatic than Lord Bryce.  'The Senate’, he writes, 'has 
hitherto been one of the most powerful and, as many believe, one of the most useful 
and effective legislative chambers to be found in the history of the world.'
7  
 
Switzerland and Australia. 
The same principle as that on which the American Senate was based is to be 
discerned in the Standerat of the Federal Republic of Switzerland and in the Senate of 
the Australian Commonwealth.  The Swiss Standerat consists of 44 members, two for 
each of the 22 Cantons; the Australian Senate contains six Senators from each of the 
six States.  The Second Chambers of Germany and the Dominion of Canada present 
interesting varieties.  Neither Germany nor Canada is typically federal to the same 
degree as Australia and the United States.  The former is too largely dominated by one 
of its component States to serve as a model for federalists; the latter possesses a 
Constitution which, as already indicated, was [begin page 415] framed by men with a 
distinct preference for the unitary principle.
8  In neither case, therefore, do we find the 
federal idea completely embodied in the Second Chamber.  
 
The German Reichstat. 
Whether Demombynes was accurate in refusing to include the Constitution of Imperial 
Germany among bicameral constitutions is a question which must not now detain us.  It 
is sufficient for the present purpose that in addition to the Reichstag or popularly 
elected Chamber there is a Second Chamber or Council, known under the Empire as 
the Bundesrat, under the Weimar Constitution as the Reichsrat, and endowed with 
important legislative functions.  The Bundesrat or Reichsrat is one of the most 
interesting legislative bodies in the world.  Descending historically from the Diet of the 
Holy Roman Empire it had under the Empire something of the character of a Council of 
diplomatic plenipotentiaries, and stilt preserves traces of its origin.  Of the fifty-eight 
members or 'voices' of the Bundesrat Prussia claimed no fewer than seventeen; 
Bavaria six; Saxony and Wurttemberg four; Baden, Hesse, and Alsace-Lorraine three; 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick two; and the rest of the States and free cities 
one apiece.  The Constitution of the German Republic (Reich) ratified at Weimar in 
1919 preserved and even accentuated this inequality!  Of the sixty-six members of 
whom the Reichsrat is now composed Prussia contributes twenty-six; Bavaria ten; 
Saxony seven; Wurttemberg four; Baden three; Thuringia, Hesse, and Hamburg two 
each; and the ten other units one apiece.  The Delegates were and are appointed by 
the several State Executives and are bound to vote as instructed by them.  The vote 
                                                  
6   [414/1]  American Commonwealth, i and iii. 
7   [414/2]   The Political Quarterly, No. I, p. 59. 
8   [415/1]  Notably Sir John A. Macdonald. therefore is a State vote; and can be given by one delegate, but is multiplied to the 
power of the State representation.
9  [begin page 416] 
  
Under the Weimar Constitution the Reichsrat still represents the States (lands), as 
opposed to the people, both in legislation and administration.  Each land has at least 
one vote and an additional vote for each million of population; but no land may have 
more than two-fifths of the total, nor have more than one vote on any committee of the 
Reichsrat. 
 
Relations with Executive. 
The relation of the Reichsrat to the Executive is precisely defined.  Ministers may claim 
to be heard in the Reichsrat and if summoned must attend the House or any 
Committee thereof.  It is their constitutional duty to keep the Reichsrat officially 
informed as to Government policy, and to consult the appropriate committees of the 
Reichsrat on any question of importance. 
  
Powers. 
The assent of the Reichsrat must be sought for Government Bills before they are 
introduced into the Reichstag; if the Reichsrat refuses assent the Bill may still be sent 
to the' lower' Chamber, but the Government is bound to state officially its reasons for 
insistence.  If the Reichsrat passes a Bill against the advice of the Government the 
latter must nevertheless introduce it into the Reichstag with a statement of its reasons 
for opposing the Bill. 
 
If the Reichsrat rejects a Bill passed by the Reichstag, and the Government still 
presses the Bill, the Reichsrat may, with the consent of the President, demand a 
Referendum.  If the President refuses his consent to the latter course the Bill lapses.  
For the initiation of constitutional amendments a two-thirds majority in both Houses is 
requisite; but the veto of the Reichsrat is now only suspensive instead of absolute as 
formerly.  It is manifest, therefore, that the place of the Reichsrat under the Weimar 
Constitution, though far from insignificant, is markedly less important than it was under 
the Empire.  [begin page 417] 
 
Canada. 
The power of the Canadian Senate, on the contrary, is almost negligible.  It now 
consists of 87 members nominated for life by the Crown, that is by the responsible 
advisers of the Governor-General.  The Senators must, however, be apportioned to the 
several Provinces of the Dominion in accordance with a scale prescribed by Statute.  
Originally the idea of federal equality was observed; 24 Senators being assigned to 
Quebec, to Ontario, and to the Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) 
respectively: 72 in all.  But in subsequent amendments the principle has not been 
maintained, and the Canadian Senate affords little encouragement to the advocate of 
bicameralism, from the point of view of composition, procedure, or powers. 
  
                                                  
9   [415/2]  The Prussian representatives in the Reichsrat are appointed as to one half 
by the Government (in Prussia the Staatsministerium); but the other half are 
elected by the Prussian Provinces, one by each.  The votes of the Government 
delegates are, as in the old Bundesrat, instructed, but the provincial delegates vote 
freely.  Moreover, the provision that no State may have more than two-fifths of the 
membership of the Reichsrat works against Prussia, as she still has about three-
fifths of the whole population of Germany.  Thus, the authority of Prussia in the 
present Rat is markedly and designedly inferior to what it was under the Imperial 
Constitution. Intrinsically interesting, however, as are the Second Chambers of Federal States, they 
are at present less pregnant with meaning and instruction for the English publicist than 
are those of unitary States.  Should the British Constitution ever be federalized, either 
in respect of the United Kingdom or of the Empire, the appropriate status and 
composition and powers of the Second Chamber would demand close re-examination.  
It has indeed been suggested that the House of Lords might be transformed into an 
Imperial Senate.  But the transformation would not seem to be imminent, and, things 
being as they are, the unitary, Second Chambers are of more immediate interest for 
purposes of comparison if not of imitation. 
 
Unitary Second Chambers. 
The Second Chambers of Unitary, like those of Federal States, may be classified in 
respect of composition and of powers.  We start with the British self-governing 
Colonies.  Nor will it escape observation that, notwithstanding the robustness of their 
democratic sentiments, not one of them has adopted the unicameral model.  For these 
young communities a House of Lords, with hereditary members was, of course, out of 
the question; but nevertheless they have, without exception (save for some of the 
provincial legislatures in the Canadian Dominion), adhered to the bicameral principle.  
Not that there is any [begin page 418] drab uniformity in the composition of their Second 
Chamber.  Thus, the Union of South Africa combines the nominative and elective 
principles.  Of the 40 members of the Senate 8 are nominated by the Governor-
General; and 32 are elected by a process of indirect election, in each case for a term of 
ten years.  The Upper Chamber of New Zealand, until 1920 nominated by the 
Governor, now consists of 3 nominated Maori members and 40 members elected 
directly, but in large electoral divisions and under a system of proportional 
representation.  The members of the Upper Chambers of New South Wales, 
Queensland
10, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec are nominated by the 
Governor for life; in Victoria, Tasmania, South and Western Australia the Legislative 
Councils are elected, but on a special and restricted franchise. 
  
Continental Practice. 
That the British Colonies should have followed the example of the motherland in 
adherence to bicameralism practice is perhaps not altogether unnatural.  It is more 
remarkable that the unitary States of Europe should in remodelling their constitutions 
have shown similar preference.  But these also exhibit a great variety of forms.  France, 
Holland, and Sweden have adopted the principle of indirect election.  In Denmark 18 
members are elected by the members of the outgoing House, and the other 54 by 
direct election, in both cases on the proportional system.  Belgium combines the 
principles of direct and indirect election.
11  The Italian Senators - apart from the Royal 
Princes - are nominated by the Crown for life out of a large number of complicated 
categories.  Austria and Prussia combined (before 1918) the nominative and hereditary 
principles.  The Spanish Upper Chamber includes an official, an hereditary, a 
nominated, and an indirectly elected element: Japan includes all except the first. 
 
The French Senate. 
To examine the composition of these chambers in [begin page 419] further detail is 
unnecessary: but the French Senate seems to call for more minute analysis.  Not only 
is France unique among modern States in the number and variety of her constitutional 
exponents, but she has now evolved a Second Chamber which, among those which 
are the result not of historic tradition but of conscious ‘manufacture’, is one of the most 
satisfactory and most efficient. 
 
                                                  
10   [418/1]  Queensland, as stated above, has now abolished the Second Chamber. 
11   [418/2]  Princes of the Blood Royal also have seats. The existence and rights of the French Senate rest upon a Constitutional Law of 1875 
which is unalterable save by a special process.  Its constitution, on the other hand, was 
regulated by an ordinary statute, which like any English statute can be amended or 
repealed in the ordinary way of legislation and without recourse to special machinery.  
The Senate consists of 314 members who are elected for the term of nine years, one 
third of the number retiring every three years.  The election is indirect, being vested in 
an electoral college in each Department and Colony, and conducted by scrutin de liste.  
The college is composed of; 
 
(1)   the Deputies for the Department; 
 
(2)   the Conseil General of the Department; 
 
(3)   the Arrondissement Councillors; and 
 
(4)   Delegates elected from among the voters of the Commune by the 
Municipal Councils. 
 
The Senators are distributed among the Departments on a population basis; the 
Department of the Seine returning ten; the Nord eight; others five, four, three, two, or 
one apiece.  Senators receive the same salary (15,000 francs) as Deputies.  Conjointly 
with the Chamber the Senate elects the President who may be impeached, but only on 
a charge of high treason, before the Senate by the Chamber.  The Senate shares with 
the Chamber of Deputies the treaty-making power, and with the President the right of 
dissolving the Lower House before its legal term has expired.  This latter prerogative is 
plainly one of great importance.  In England the Executive can appeal to the electorate 
against the Legislature, and the House of Commons has the power, subject to that 
appeal, to dismiss the Executive.  In France [begin page 420] neither the Executive nor 
the Chamber of Deputies can appeal to the electorate.  The Ministry of the day has this 
weapon at its command only if it possesses the confidence of the Senate.  In a sense, 
therefore, the Executive is at the mercy of the Senate, and some of the most 
distinguished of French publicists have argued, with plausibility, that no Cabinet can 
continue to govern in opposition to the will of the Senate.  In 1890 the Tirard Cabinet 
resigned on account of a hostile vote in the Senate, and on at least five comparatively 
recent occasions the Ministry of the day has appealed to the Senate for a vote of 
confidence. 
 
The Senate has the right, as already observed, to reject money Bills, and except in 
regard to the initiation of such Bills has concurrent and equal rights with those of the 
lower House. 
 
Among the Second Chambers of unitary States the French Senate is of peculiar 
interest alike to scientific students of Political Institutions and to practical reformers.  
None of the existing Second Chambers would be likely to provide a model for slavish 
imitation were the task of reconstructing a Second Chamber in England ever seriously 
undertaken.  Nevertheless, the French Senate does undeniably possess certain 
characteristics which, in such an event, would deserve careful consideration. 
 
Before proceeding to examine some of the schemes which have actually been 
suggested as a basis for a remodelled House of Lords, it may be well to ask whether 
the survey, undertaken in preceding paragraphs, appears to suggest any essential 
attributes which a Second Chamber, if it is to fulfil its appropriate functions, should 
possess. 
 
Essential Attributes Intelligibility. 
The first essential attribute evidently is intelligibility.  Every Second Chamber ought to 
rest upon an intelligible basis.  There must be some clear and definite principle at the root of it.  The House of Lords does at least possess this advantage.  The hereditary 
principle may be antiquated and unpopular; but it is at any rate intelligi- [begin page 421] 
ble.  The custom of primogeniture may not commend itself, on scientific grounds, to the 
Professors of Eugenics, but it is understood, even if it is mistrusted by the people. 
 
Distinctiveness. 
Secondly, the principle upon which a Second Chamber is based ought to be 
differentiating.  Apart from the general agreement in favour of a bicameral system, the 
plain man ought to be able to explain at once why an Upper Chamber is superimposed 
upon the Lower.  Federal Second Chambers are pre-eminently distinctive.  In every 
case-so far as they are genuinely federal-they represent not the people in the 
aggregate but the several States of which the Federation is compounded.  Thus, the 
American and Australian Senates are at once historic memorials of the original federal 
compact and practical guarantees for the preservation of the independence of the 
component States.  The German Bundesrat was at once the organ and the symbol of 
those 'Princes' of the Empire who joined in the solemn act in the Hall of Mirrors in the 
Palace of Versailles when the Imperial Crown of the German Folk was placed upon the 
brows of the Hohenzollern King of Prussia.  Nor is the place and purpose of its 
successor the Reichrat less distinctive and intelligible. 
 
A Second Chamber ought, in the third place, to be independent without being 
irresponsible.  The House of Lords, perhaps because it is technically irresponsible, 
dare not assert its independence.  The French Senate, on the contrary, has courage to 
assert its independence, because it makes no claim to irresponsibility.  A Senator no 
less than a Deputy is elected, but the process of election is clearly differentiated; the 
legal term of service is three times as long, and the Senate - apart from the Senators - 
has a continuous existence; above all, as we have seen, it has, with the assent of the 
President, the power of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and of compelling the latter 
to take the opinion of their constituents.  [begin page 422] 
 
Representation. 
Plainly, however, a Second Chamber if it is to be entrusted with a function so delicate 
and so important as that of dissolution must be thoroughly representative in 
composition.  This is not to say that it must needs be elective.  There are in the House 
of Lords nearly all the elements of an assembly ideally representative of the varied 
interests of which the nation is composed.  Industry, agriculture, science, literature, 
education - all are represented there; spiritual forces no less than material and 
intellectual find a reflex in that Chamber; great jurists are there, and great soldiers and 
sailors; experienced proconsuls and successful administrators; except that of manual 
labour there is scarcely a national interest which cannot find a spokesman.  And yet it 
would be difficult to claim for the House of Lords, in the aggregate, that it is a truly 
representative assembly.  Nor is the reason far to seek.  Side by side with a large body 
of men who could under no circumstances be excluded from any assembly which was 
genuinely representative of national interests, there is a considerable if not actually a 
larger body of men to whom admission would indubitably be denied.  The weakness of 
the House of Lords consists, then, not in the absence of competent legislators, but in 
the possibility that the wisdom and experience of the select few who ordinarily conduct 
its business may be overborne on critical occasions by the votes of the many who are 
not so specially qualified. 
 
That any assembly charged with the task of legislative or administrative revision must 
be efficient for the purpose goes without saying.  But to be really efficient it is almost 
essential that the revising Chamber should be, in relation to the Lower Chamber, 
manageably small.  The House of Lords is bigger than the House of Commons, and is 
by far the largest Second Chamber in the world at the present moment; it is, as already 
observed, also among the least powerful.  That its practical impotence is either proportioned to, or the result of, its unwieldy bulk would be a proposition hardly 
susceptible of proof.  [begin page 423]  But it is undeniable that it has diminished in 
effectiveness as it has increased in size.  Perhaps the two most powerful Second 
Chambers are the American Senate and the French Senate.  The former contains less 
than a hundred members.  If federal comparisons must be excluded we may still 
remind ourselves that the French Senate with fewer than half the numbers of the 
House of Lords is at least twice as powerful. 
 
Attempts to Reform the House of Lords. 
It remains to examine the bearing of these conclusions upon the practical problem of 
constitutional reconstruction in this country.  Of schemes for the reform of the House of 
Lords there have been, during the last half century, not a few.  
 
Earl Russell and Earl Grey. 
In 1869 Earl Russell, who a generation earlier had been mainly instrumental in 
reforming the House of Commons, tried his hand on the House of Lords.  He 
introduced a Life Peerage Bill, to empower the Crown to create twenty-eight Life Peers, 
not more than four of whom were to be created in any one year; but the Bill was 
rejected on the third reading by 106 to 76 votes.  An attempt on the part of Lord Grey, 
also in 1869, to amend the laws relating to the election of representative peers for 
Scotland and for Ireland, was for the time being shelved by reference to a Select 
Committee.  
 
Earl of Roseberry. 
In 1874 a Select Committee under the chairmanship of Earl of Lord Rosebery 
recommended various changes in regard Rosebery to the Scotch and Irish Peerages; 
but no legislative action was taken, and for the next ten years no further attempt at 
reform was made.  In 1884, however, Lord Rosebery moved for a Select Committee 'to 
consider the best means for promoting the efficiency of the House'.  To this end he 
advocated; 
 
(1)   the enlargement of the quorum in the Upper House; 
(2)   the introduction of a system of joint Committees of the two Houses of 
Parliament for the consideration of both public and private Bills; 
(3)    the representation in the House of Lords of the Churches, of the 
professional, commercial, and labouring classes, of Science, Art, and 
Literature, and of [begin page 424] the Colonies; and 
(4)   the extension of the system of life Peerages.  
 
He also suggested the possibility of establishing the principle of summoning to the 
House of Lords consultative and temporary representatives or assessors, to deliberate 
and advise.  The motion was rejected, but four years later he returned to the attack.  In 
moving in 1888 for the appointment of a Select Committee Lord Rosebery laid down 
certain definite lines upon which reform might be carried into effect.  He recommended: 
 
(1)   That any reform should respect the name and ancient traditions of the 
House; 
(2)    That the whole body of Peers, including Scottish and Irish Peers 
without seats in the House, should delegate a certain number of 
members to sit for a limited period as representative Peers; a minority 
vote necessary; 
(3)    That a reconstructed House of Lords should also contain a large 
number of elected Peers, 'elected either by the future County Boards 
or by the larger Municipalities, or even by the House of Commons, or 
by all three.’; (4)   That life and official Peerages should form a valuable element in a 
reformed House; 
(5)   That the proportions of these various elements should be definitely 
fixed; 
(6)   That the great self-governing Colonies should be invited to send their 
Agent-General, or representatives delegated for the purpose, to sit, 
under certain conditions, in the House of Lords; 
(7)   That any person should be free to accept or refuse a writ of summons 
to the House of Lords; and 
(8)    That any Peer who had refused or had not received a writ of 
summons to the House of Lords should be capable of being elected 
to the House of Commons.
12  
 
In cases of dispute between the two Houses the Lords and Commons were to meet 
together, and then by certain fixed majorities carry or reject any measure which was in 
dispute between them.  
 
Marquis of Salisbury. 
Once again the Lords rejected Lord Rosebery's suggestions, but in the same session 
Lord Salisbury carried [begin page 425] to a second reading a Bill empowering the 
Crown to appoint as a life Peer any person who had been; 
 
(a)   for not less than two years a Judge of the High Court; 
(b)   a Rear-Admiral or Major-General or of some higher naval or military 
rank; 
(c)   an Ambassador; 
(d)   in the Civil Service and a member of the Privy Council; or 
(e)   for not less than five years a Governor-General or Governor in the 
Oversea Dominions, or a Lieutenant-Governor in India. 
 
Not more than three such persons were to be appointed in anyone year, but the Crown 
was to be empowered to appoint two other Life Peers on account of any special 
qualification other than the fore-mentioned.  In no case was the total number of Life 
Peers created under the Act to exceed fifty at any time.  In the same session Lord 
Salisbury introduced a Bill empowering the Crown, on an Address from the House of 
Lords itself, either temporarily or permanently to cancel writs of summons to Peers. 
 
It is a matter for regret that Lord Salisbury did not persevere in his efforts to reform the 
Constitution of the House of Lords.  His qualifications for the task and his opportunity 
were alike unique.  His failure to carry out structural repairs may well tempt less 
experienced architects to undertake the work of demolition.  The strength of a chain 
depends on its weakest link; the reputation of the House of Lords depends on the 
character of its least competent members.  Hence the paradox that while the individual 
opinions of the leading members of that House command respect, its collective opinion 
counts for little.  Had Lord Salisbury brought his views to legislative fruition, the House 
of Lords would have been both purged and reinvigorated.  That the abandoned Bills of 
1888 would have done all that is required is not contended; but they would have done 
something, and have opened the way for more. 
 
During the next twenty years the Unionist Party was almost continuously in power, and 
it is not without significance that during that period the question of re- [begin page 426] 
forming the Second Chamber ceased to engage attention, In 1907, however, when the 
Liberals had regained power, Lord Newton once more tackled the problem.  The Bill 
which he introduced was withdrawn, but a Select Committee was appointed to consider 
                                                  
12   [424/1]  Report of Rosebery Committee, Appendix A. the suggestions which had from time to time been made for increasing the efficiency of 
the House of Lords in matters affecting legislation.
13  
 
The Report of this Committee, published in December 1908, forms an epoch in the 
history of the question.  For the first time the leading members of the Upper House 
showed themselves to be unanimously of opinion that a radical reform of its 
constitution was urgently required, and to be agreed as' to the main lines on which 
such reform should proceed,  
 
Report of Rosebery Committee, 1908.  
The Committee explicitly disavowed the intention 'of designing a new and symmetrical 
Senate', but they resolved that, except in the case of Peers of the Blood Royal, it was 
undesirable that the possession of a Peerage should of itself give the right to sit and 
vote in the House of Lords, and their main recommendation was that the future Second 
Chamber should consist of six distinct elements: 
 
(1)   Peers of the Royal Blood; 
(2)   Lords of Appeal in Ordinary; 
(3)    A considerable body (200) of representatives elected by the 
hereditary Peers; 
(4)   Hereditary Peers possessing certain specified qualifications; 
(5)   Spiritual 'Lords of Parliament'; and 
(6)   Life Peers. 
 
To discuss in detail the recommendations of the Rosebery Committee would now be 
futile.  Events refused to wait upon the dilatory times and deferred seasons of the 
House of Lords.  The 'People's Budget' was introduced in 1909, and on the decision of 
the House of Lords to refer it to the judgement of the people an acute crisis 
supervened.  Events have completely vindicated the financial wisdom of the Lords, but 
their bold act proved their political undoing.   [begin page 427] 
 
The parliament Act, 1911.  
The Parliament Act deprived the House of Lords of all power over any Bill certified by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons to be a Money Bill, and put an end to their co-
ordinate authority in matters of ordinary legislation.  Thenceforward the Lords were to 
retain only a two-years' suspensive veto.  Any Bill still rejected after passing through 
the House of Commons in three successive sessions might be laid before the King for 
the Royal Assent, and with that assent become law without the concurrence of the 
House of Lords. 
  
Lord Lansdowne’s Bill. 
While this measure was under consideration, but before Lord it became law, the Peers, 
at the instance of Lord Lansdowne, offered to the country an alternative - a reformed 
Bill and reconstituted Second Chamber.  Already in the autumn of 1910 the Lords had 
affirmed two important propositions: first, that henceforward no Lord of parliament 
should be allowed to sit and vote in the House of Lords merely in virtue of hereditary 
right; and, secondly, that it was desirable that the House should be strengthened and 
reinforced by the addition of new elements from the outside. 
  
In 1911 Lord Lansdowne introduced a Bill framed in the spirit of these resolutions.  The 
new Second Chamber was to be only about half as large as the existing House of 
Lords and was to be composed of three distinct elements; one hundred Lords of 
                                                  
13   [426/1]  Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords.  Appendix A 
(234), December 1908. Parliament elected, as Scotch and Irish representative Peers are elected today, by the 
peers from among the peers, only those peers being eligible for election who were 
qualified by public service; one hundred and twenty Lords of Parliament chosen by 
some method of indirect election and with regard to the principle of proportional 
representation; and one hundred Lords nominated by the Prime Minister of the day.  In 
addition, Princes of the Blood Royal, the two Archbishops, and five Bishops, and the 
Law Lords were to find places in a Second Chamber which would number less than 
350 in all.  
 
That a Chamber so constituted should possess powers [begin page 428] co-ordinate 
with those of the House of Commons was not proposed.  
 
‘We desire’, said Lord Lansdowne, 'to have a Second Chamber so composed 
that it will command the confidence of the country by its ability, its 
experience, its authority, and above all by its independence.  We desire that 
it should be in close touch with public opinion, but not that it should be at 
the mercy of popular caprice.  We desire that it should not be strong enough 
to resist the House of Commons when the House of Commons represents 
the deliberate judgement of the country, but that it should be strong enough 
to make a stand when there is reason to believe that the country has not had 
an opportunity of expressing its will clearly and deliberately.  Such a house 
we have endeavoured to construct - not upon a site from which every shred 
and vestige of the old structure has been removed, but preserving the 
soundest materials which we can find on that site, strengthened and 
rearranged so that the new chamber, while faithfully serving the democracy, 
will be strong enough to resist the gusts of passion and prejudice with which 
all democracies are necessarily familiar.’ 
 
Lord Lansdowne's admirable alternative was not, however, accepted; the Parliament 
Bill became law, and, consequently, since 1911, the Imperial Parliament - a Parliament 
legislatively responsible for England, Wales, and Scotland severally, for Great Britain, 
and in a supreme sense for the whole British Empire - has virtually, though not 
technically, approximated to a unicameral form. 
 
The Second Chamber Conference, 1917-18. 
The That the torso of 1911 was never designed to be anything more than a temporary 
makeshift is proved by the terms of the Preamble to the Parliament Act.  With all the 
solemnity which can attach to a Preamble the Legislature declared that 'it is intended to 
substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted 
on a popular instead of hereditary basis'.  That pledge remains
14 unfulfilled.  With a 
view to redeeming it, the Government in 1917 appointed a Committee, drawn in equal 
proportions from the two Houses, [begin page 429] to inquire and report: as to the 
nature and limitations of the legislative powers to be exercised by a reformed Second 
Chamber; as to the best mode of adjusting differences between the two Houses of 
Parliament and as to the changes which are desirable in order that the Second 
Chamber may in future be so constituted as to exercise fairly the functions appropriate 
to a Second Chamber.  The Committee sat, under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce, for 
more than six months, and held nearly fifty prolonged sittings.  The whole subject was 
exhaustively explored, but the scheme recommended by the Committee lacked both 
the simplicity and symmetry of the French Senate and the boldness of conception 
which distinguished the work of Hamilton and his colleagues in America.  
 
                                                  
14   [428/1]  Written in 1923. Its Report. 
The numbers of the new Chamber were not to exceed 350-400.  Excluding Peers of 
the Blood Royal and Law Lords who were to remain as at present, the new House was 
to consist of two sections; 
 
(i)   about 273 members elected by panels of members of the House of 
Commons distributed in 14 or 15 geographical groups; and 
(ii)    not more than 91 members chosen by a Joint Committee of both 
Houses. 
 
The latter were in the first instance to be selected from among the hereditary or 
spiritual Peers; ultimately the choice was to be unrestricted provided that the number of 
Peers and Diocesan Bishops never fell below thirty.  The Second Chamber was to have 
no power of amending or rejecting or initiating Financial Bills, but otherwise was to 
have concurrent rights of legislation.  Differences between the two Houses were to be 
adjusted by the method of 'Free Conference' - the Conference to consist of a Joint 
Standing Committee of forty members appointed sessionally in equal proportions by 
the Committee of Selection in each House, with the addition of ten members from each 
House appointed ad hoc in respect of each Bill in dispute. 
 
Such is the latest and most elaborate of the many attempts which have been made to 
adapt an historic [begin page 430] institution to the needs and conditions of a 
democratic age.  From the Report of the Bryce Committee any reconsideration of the 
question must take its start; though it is unlikely that the practical scheme 
recommended by that Committee will be accepted in its entirety.  Still, it covers the 
ground of Second Chamber reform more thoroughly than any of the schemes which 
preceded it.  It deals, as every scheme must, with the composition of the proposed 
Chamber; it carefully defines its powers, and suggests a method of adjusting 
differences between the two Houses. 
 
Structure, Powers, and Procedure - these are of the essence of the problem of the 
Legislature.  The Second Chamber problem is not the least important factor in the 
wider problem, nor the least difficult.  To devise and construct a satisfactory Upper 
House; to discover for it a basis at once intelligible and distinctive; to confer upon it the 
power of effective revision, without the power of control; to render it amenable to the 
more permanent sentiments of the people, and yet independent of transient phases of 
opinion; to erect a bulwark against revolution, without interposing barriers to reform; 
this is a task which may test the ingenuity and baffle the patience of the most skilful 




                                                  
15    [430/1]  It is noteworthy that among the post-war States, the following have 
adopted the bicameral principle in their Legislatures: Poland, Czechoslavakia, the 
Austrian Republic, and the Southern Irish Free State.  The following are 
unicameral: Jugo-Slavia, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (cf. Select Constitutions 
of the World. Dublin, 1922.) XVI. The Problem of The Legislature  
(iii) - Powers: Constitutional Revision  
 
‘The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more or less than 
this, namely, that Parliament has, under the English Constitution, the right to 
make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside 
the legislation of Parliament.' - Dicey.  
 
‘The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so 
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or 
persons, within any bounds.  And of this high court, he adds, it may be fairly 
said, "Si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est 
honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.'  It hath sovereign and 
uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, 
abrogating, repeating, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters 
of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, 
maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic 
power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the 
constitution of these kingdoms.' - Blackstone's Commentaries.  
 
‘No one can have greater respect for the independence of the legislative 
power than I: but legislation does not mean finance, criticism of the 
administration, or ninety-nine out of the hundred things with which in 
England the Parliament occupies itself.  The legislature should legislate, i.e. 
construct grand laws on scientific principles of jurisprudence, but it must 
respect the independence of the Executive, as it desires its own 
independence to be respected.  It must not criticize the Government.' - 
Napoleon I to the Abbe Sieyes.  
 
The Powers of the Legislature. 
‘Six hundred talking asses, set to make laws, and to administer the concerns of the 
greatest Empire the world had ever seen.'  Thus did Thomas Carlyle, in petulant mood, 
characterize the composition, and summarize the functions, of the British House of 
Commons.  Yet, by common consent, the powers and functions entrusted to a 
Legislature, their nature, extent, and limits, are matters of supreme concern to the well-
being of the modern Commonwealth, and they call for more detached and less choleric 
consideration.   [begin page 432] 
 
Omnipotent or limited? 
The primary question to be determined is whether the Legislature shall be entrusted 
with powers legally omnipotent, or whether its power shall be circumscribed; and, in the 
latter alternative, how the limitations shall be imposed and enforced.  The British 
Parliament - the King in Parliament - affords the classical example of an omnipotent 
Legislature.  Legally, as we have already indicated,
1 there are no limits to its 
competence: there is no tax which it cannot impose; no law which it cannot enact, 
repeal, or amend; no act of the administration which it cannot investigate, and, if need 
be, censure.  Its functions are therefore at once constituent and legislative, and it is 
                                                  
1   [432/1]  Cf. chapters vi and vii, supra. charged with the duty of criticism and control of the Executive.  Not only can it make 
laws without reference to the electorate, whence in apolitical sense it derives its 
powers, but can profoundly modify and indeed revolutionize the Constitution itself.   
Among the great States of the modern world there is none which has entrusted the 
Legislature with powers so vast. Some limit, general or precise as the case may be, 
has invariably been imposed upon the legal competence and activity of the Legislature. 
 
Limitations upon the Powers of the Legislature. 
Such limitations are in some cases imposed by an Instrument or Constitutional Code, 
in others by Organic upon Laws (as in France); in some by a rigid adherence to the 
doctrine of Separation of Powers, by assigning precise functions to the Executive or the 
Judiciary; in others by reserving certain powers or functions to the electorate.  
 
In particular, as we have seen, modern Constitutions have generally been careful to 
provide, with more or less precision, against any alteration of the Constitution itself by 
the ordinary operation of the legislative machinery. 
 
Federal Legislatures. 
Exceptionally precise are the precautions of Federal Constitutions.  Such precautions 
are indeed of the essence of Federalism; for Federalism implies a covenant between a 
number of independent political communities, each possessed within its sphere of 
quasi-sovereign authority.   [begin page 433] 
 
The United States. 
This is conspicuously true of Federal Republics, like the United States of America and 
the Swiss Confederation, and the truth is reflected in their respective Constitutions.  For 
the amendment of the Federal Constitution of the United States elaborate machinery 
has, as already indicated, been provided.  Amendments may be initiated at the 
instance of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or by two-thirds of the State 
Legislatures, but they cannot become law until they have been ratified either by at least 
three-fourths of the State Legislatures, or by an equal number of Conventions specially 
summoned for the pur pose in each State.  
 
Switzerland 
Even more elaborate are the laws which govern the process of constitutional 
amendment in the Helvetic Republic.  
 
Total revision must be proposed if a resolution in favour of it passes either House of the 
Federal Assembly, or on a demand made by 50,000 duly qualified Swiss voters.  The 
question whether the Federal Constitution shall be totally revised must then be 
submitted in general terms to a referendum.  If a majority of those voting pronounce in 
the affirmative there must be a general election of both Councils for the purpose of 
undertaking the revision.  Partial revision must be initiated either by a vote of both 
Houses or on the demand of 50,000 voters.  In the latter case the 'initiative’ may be 
either 'general' or' formulated'.  If the initiative petition is presented in general terms and 
the Federal Assembly concurs, the latter drafts an amendment and presents it for 
acceptance or rejection to the people and the Cantons.  If the Legislature does not 
agree, it must submit the question of revision ‘aye' or 'no' to the people, and if the result 
of the referendum is affirmative the Legislature must do its best to carry out the popular 
will, even against its own better judgement. 
 
But in the. formulated initiative' the Swiss democracy possesses, as we have seen, an 
even more powerful weapon.  Any 50,000 voters may not merely demand [begin page 
434] revision, but may actually draft a specific amendment, hurl it at the head of the 
Legislature, and compel the latter, whether it approve or disapprove, to submit the amendment unaltered for acceptance or rejection by the people and the Cantons.  If 
the Federal Assembly disapprove the amendment it may submit a counter-project of its 
own as an alternative to that formulated by the petitioners, but more it cannot do to 
guide or control public opinion.  In no event can revision, total or partial, take place, 
until the new Constitution, or the amendments to the old, have been approved by a 
majority of those voting thereon, and also by a majority of the Cantons.  
 
Australia. 
The Commonwealth of Australia is not far behind Switzerland and the United States in 
the precautions it has taken in regard to constitutional innovations.  Under the 
Australian Commonwealth Act every proposed amendment of the Constitution must in 
the first instance pass both Houses of the Federal Legislature, or that failing must pass 
one of the two Houses twice, with an interval of not less than three months between the 
two deliberations.  It must then be submitted to the electorate by means of a 
referendum, and in order to become law must be approved: 
 
(i)   by a majority of votes in the Commonwealth as a whole; and 
(ii)   by a majority of votes in each State - a concession to the feelings of 
the smaller and weaker States; and it is further provided that the 
representation of no State can be altered without its own assent. 
 
Had it not been for these provisions, added to that which secures equal representation 
in the Senate - for all States (an imitation of the American system), there would have 
been slight possibility of inducing the smaller States to come into the federal union, 
though in Australia, as elsewhere, there is a pronounced tendency to increase the 




The Dominion of Canada presents a much less perfect type of federalism than the 
Commonwealth of Australia, or the Republics already mentioned, being made up not 
[begin page 435] of States but of ‘Provinces' which possess such powers only as are 
specifically assigned to them by the Constitution.  Moreover, that Constitution being 
embodied in an ‘ordinary' statute of the Imperial Legislature can, in the absence of 
express provisions to the contrary, be repealed and amended like any other Act of the 
Imperial Parliament, and by that method only.  The absence of any local machinery for 
amending the frame of government supplied one of the many elements of friction which 
impaired the working of Pitt's Constitution of 1791.  The Assembly of Lower Canada 
presented petitions for constitutional amendment to the Imperial Government, and 
when Great Britain failed to respond the Assembly boldly claimed the right of 
constitutional amendment for itself.  But that right has never been conceded.  The 
British North America Act, unlike the subsequent Acts for Australia and South Africa, 
provided no machinery for its own amendment, and indeed made no reference to the 
matter, tacitly assuming the unimpaired and undivided sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament.  And while the Dominion has thus far acquiesced, the Provinces, or some 
of them, are insistent upon the maintenance of this principle.  Consequently all 
amendments in the Constitution of 1867 have, with the exception of some trifling 
changes, been effected by the Imperial Parliament. This constitutes, as a recent 
commentator has pointed out, an undoubted and serious curtailment of Canadian 
autonomy,'
2 and in some quarters it is on that ground resented.  But it is important to 
observe that the Act of 1867 embodied an arrangement virtually amounting to a 
covenant, locally concluded, between the Federal Dominion on the one hand and the 
Constituent Provinces on the other.  The terms of that covenant can plainly be varied 
only with the assent of both or all parties.  The Provinces, on their side, are not likely to 
                                                  
2   [435/1]  W.P.M. Kennedy, (Milford, 1922), P.451. agree to any amendment which would tend to circum- [begin page 436] scribe their 
legislative sphere, nor to confer upon the Federal Government powers which would 
enable them to do so.  Moreover, as Mr. Kennedy has forcibly pointed out, the situation 
is complicated by 'the peculiar religious and racial groupings in Canadian federalism'.
3  
Consequently, the likelihood of an official demand from the Dominion for such a 
variation of the Principal Act as would confer upon Canada powers similar to those 
possessed by the Commonwealth of Australia is greatly diminished if not rendered 
altogether remote.  
 
South Africa 
The Union of South Africa occupies, in regard to Africa constitutional revision, a 
position which seems to be unique.  Not only is its Constitution, with very small 
exceptions, flexible, but it is definitely declared to be so in the Act.  It is true that certain 
clauses of the Act - those which refer to the composition and election of the House of 
Assembly and that which decrees the equality of the English and Dutch languages - 
cannot be amended or repealed except by a two - thirds majority in a joint sitting of the 
two Chambers; but the general competence of the Dominion Parliament to amend the 
Constitution itself is asserted in express terms.  Section 152 declares: 'Parliament may 
by law repeal or alter any of the provisions of this Act, provided that no provision 
thereof for the operation of which a definite period of time is prescribed, shall during 
such period be repealed or altered.'  In other Constitutions flexibility may perhaps be 
presumed by silence in respect to constitutional amendments, but there is no other 
Instrument known to me which deliberately and explicitly confers constituent authority 
upon the ordinary Legislature and confides the task of constitutional revision, with a few 
reasonable exceptions, to the ordinary processes of legislation. 
 
The Constitution of United South Africa, as already indicated, is technically unitary; had 
it assumed the federal form it could not have afforded the luxury of flexibility.  But 
though a unitary State is not under the [begin page 437] obligation of rigidity, yet few 
unitary States have deemed it prudent to dispense altogether with safeguards against 
rash and hasty innovations in the framework of the Constitution.  
 
Italy and Spain 
Among European Constitutions the two most closely Italy and resembling our own in 
respect of flexibility are those Spain of Italy and Spain.  Both are written, but neither is 
rigid.  Neither contains any special provision for constitutional as distinct from ordinary 
legislation.  It is, however, worthy of note that the eminent jurist, M. Brusa, has affirmed 
that the fundamental bases of the Italian Constitution, as established by the plebiscites, 
are outside the range of ordinary Parliamentary action.
4  Nevertheless amendments to 
the Statuto have, in fact, been effected by ordinary legislative process, while M. Brusa's 
assertion rests on nothing better than opinion.  The earlier experiments of Spain in 
Constitution-making (e.g. those of 1812, 1857, and 1869) contained special provisions 
for constitutional revision.  In the latest attempt - that of 1876 - they are omitted, and it 





The Constitution of France is not technically flexible, France but revision can be 
effected by a relatively simple process.  Article 8 of the Constitutional Law on the 
organization of the Public Powers (25 February 1875) runs as follows: 
 
                                                  
3   [436/1]  W P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada (Milford, 1922), P.451. 
4   [437/1]  Ap. Marquardsen, Handbuch des Offentlichen Rechts. 
5   [437/2]  Or, as we have since learnt; by a totally different method. ‘The Chambers shall have the right by separate resolutions, taken in each 
case by an absolute majority of votes, either upon their own initiative or 
upon the request of the President of the Republic to declare a revision of the 
constitutional laws necessary.  
 
‘After each of the two Chambers shall have come to this decision, they shall 
meet together in National Assembly to proceed with the revision.  
 
‘The Acts effecting revision of the constitutional laws, in whole or in part, 
shall be passed by an absolute majority of the members composing the 
National Assembly.'  
[begin page 438] 
 
By an amendment of 1879 the seat of the Executive and Legislative power was 
transferred from Versailles, where it was fixed in 1875, to Paris; but it was at the same 
time provided that joint sessions of the two chambers, meeting as the 'National 
Assembly' for the purpose of revision, should continue to take place at Versailles.  By a 
further amendment of 1884 it was ordained that ‘the republican form of government 
shall not be made the subject of a proposed revision' and that 'members of families that 
have reigned in France are ineligible for the presidency of the Republic'.  
 
The Organic Laws of 1875 and 1884. 
The Organic Law of 1875 was in several respects a notable departure from French 
tradition.  Hitherto, as Mr. Lowell has pointed out, ‘it had been the habit in France to 
make a sharp distinction between the constituent and legislative powers, the former 
being withdrawn to a greater or less extent from the control of the Parliament'.  The 
new Republican Constitution still retained some distinction, but revision was rendered 
relatively easy.  Nor was the reason obscure.  Both parties - all parties - regarded the 
settlement of 1875 as purely provisional.  Monarchists still looked for a restoration of 
one of the royal Houses; republicans hoped to establish the Republic on a basis far 
more permanent and effective than any which was available or permissible in 1875.  
Each party wished, in order to facilitate the realization of its own ambition, to leave the 
Constitution as flexible as might be.  By 1884 things had changed; the Republic had 
weathered several storms; the Prince Imperial had fallen in South Africa; the Bourbons 
were divided among themselves and had alienated much sympathy in France; the 
republicans, therefore, felt strong enough to insist that the republican form of 
government should be excluded from the competence alike of the ordinary Legislature 
and the National Assembly.  In one sense France may be thought to have drifted away 
from the democratic principles to which under all her varied forms of government she 
had paid continuous [begin page 439] homage since the great eruption of 1789.  The 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, the theory of the 'general will’, seems to find 
faint reflection in the existing Constitution of France.  
 
The Sovereignty of the People. 
The explanation is not far to seek.  The principle of direct democracy had suffered a 
rude shock from the sinister use which had recently been made of the plebiscites.  But 
behind the 'organic laws' there is a dominating fact which no mere study of 
constitutional texts can reveal.  In the mind of every French republican the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man of 1789 is a fundamental presupposition, anterior and superior to 
any and every Constitution.  'Sovereignty resides in the nation.  No individual or body of 
individuals can exercise authority which does not proceed directly from it.'  So ran the 
third clause of that famous document.  The seventh proceeds ‘Law is the expression of 
the general will.  All citizens have the right to participate in its formation either 
personally or through representatives.'  The plebiscites were, therefore, as regards 
machinery, in complete harmony with French tradition and ideas.  That they were prostituted to subserve the ambition of individuals has undoubtedly inspired Frenchmen 
with some suspicion; but they were essentially akin to the principle of direct, as 
opposed to representative, democracy which has never since 1789 ceased to fascinate 
the French mind. M. Borgeaud lays especial emphasis upon the continued and 
permeating influence of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.  'Its principles’, he writes, 
'permeate French legislation, dominate French public life. . . . It is invoked in the courts.  
It is no longer part of the written law of France. . . but it is none the less the law of 
France.'
6  In any attempt to interpret the existing Constitution of France this is a truth 
which we shall ignore at our peril.  
 
Scandinavia 
The minor European States are even less confiding than France in the prudence of the 
Legislature.  As a rule [begin page 440] their Constitutions rest upon a deliberate 
compact between Prince and people.  It is logical, therefore, that amendments should 
require the assent of both parties.  To this rule an exception is to be found in Norway, 
where the King forms no part of the Constituent Legislature.  The Constitution of 
Norway is, however, peculiarly rigid.  The 112th Article runs as follows: 
  
‘If experience should show that any part of the Constitution of the kingdom 
of Norway ought to be altered the proposed amendment shall be presented 
in one of the regular sessions of the Storthing and published in the Press.  
But it is only within the power of the Storthing at one of its regular sessions 
after the next election to decide whether the proposed change shall or shall 
not be made.  However, such an amendment shall never contravene the 
principles of this Constitution, but shall only relate to such modifications in 
particular provisions as will not change the spirit of this Constitution, and in 
the alteration two-thirds of the Storthing must concur.'  
 
The words which I have italicized are very remarkable.  They represent an attempt to 
establish an Instrument which in essentials shall be not merely fundamental but 
unalterable.  The principle of rigidity could hardly be carried farther.  Strictly interpreted, 
it must mean that a fundamental change in the Constitution can be effected only by 
revolution.  Even for minor changes there must be a double deliberation with a General 
Election intervening.  The same principle obtains in Sweden: double deliberation and 
an appeal to the electorate.  But the Swedish Constitution is, in form at any rate, far 
more respectful to the prerogative of the King who possesses not merely, as in Norway, 
a suspensive, but an absolute veto upon proposed legislation, whether ordinary or 
organic. 
  
Very similar is the procedure in Denmark.  If an amendment to the Constitution is 
passed by both Houses, and the Crown approves, the Rigsdag must be dissolved and 
a General Election held both for the Folketing and for the Landsthing.  If the newly 
elected Rigsdag adopts [begin page 441] the proposed amendment without change and 
the King approves it, it becomes forthwith part of the Constitution.  Iceland follows 
exactly the rule in Denmark.  In the Netherlands also both Houses must be dissolved, 
and the newly elected States-General must adopt the amendment by a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast.  In Belgium, as soon as the Legislature has declared for 
revision, both Houses are ipso facto dissolved.  In the new Parliament there must in 
each House be a quorum of two-thirds, and no amendment can become law unless in 
each House it is supported by a two-thirds majority.  Greece, like Norway, sets aside 
                                                  
6   [439/1]  Etablissement et revision des Constitutions (American translation, pp. 
198, 199). the Royal Prerogative in cases of revision, but, also like Norway, permits no alteration 
of fundamentals, and allows only the amendment of relatively unimportant details.
7  
 
To push our investigations farther into the machinery of constitutional amendment in 
the minor European States would yield little variety of custom.  The general principle 
which underlies all these constitutions is sufficiently summarized by M. Borgeaud as 
follows:  
 
‘The Latin and Scandinavian group have. . . accepted from the modern 
theory the principle of consultation of the people.  They confide the revision 
of the Constitution to the established authorities but the final decision is 
reached only after the complete renewal of the popular chamber by general 
elections, or by the temporary substitution of a special assembly invested 
with full powers in the place of the ordinary legislature.'
8  
 
The German Reich. 
The provision for constitutional revision, in the successive Constitutions of 1867, 1871, 
and 1919, affords an admirable illustration of the half-hearted federalism of modern 
Germany.  Less rigid than that of unitarian France, all those Constitutions have been 
much more flexible than those of genuine Federal States such as Switzerland and the 
Australian Commonwealth. 
  
The North German Confederation of 1867 ordained that [begin page 442] constitutional 
amendments must obtain the assent of two-thirds of the Bundesrat,  and the same 
principle, though differently applied, reappeared in the Imperial Constitution of 1871. 
 
Under the terms of that document the Federal Constitution could be amended by the 
Reichstag, by the ordinary process of legislation, subject only to two limiting provisions: 
first, any amendment could be defeated by fourteen negative votes in the Bundesrat; 
and, secondly, no State could be deprived of any rights guaranteed to it by the 
Constitution without its own consent.  The significance of the first provision will be 
appreciated only if it be remembered that Prussia in its own right possessed seventeen 
out of fifty-eight votes in the Bundesrat.  Prussia alone, therefore, could veto any 
amendment.  Similarly any amendment could be defeated by a coalition of the small or 
single-member States, or by concert among the middle States.  The second proviso 
afforded on paper a considerable measure of security to the smaller States, but jurists 
were divided in opinion as to the real extent of the privilege.  The rights specifically 
guaranteed to the States by the Constitution were few in number, and the States 
retained their general rights only by sufferance of the Empire.  Nor was this practical 
flexibility out of harmony either with the spirit of the German polity, or with the historical 
origins of the Hohenzollern Empire.  The rigidity of the Constitutions of Australia and 
Switzerland, the necessity for obtaining the assent of the States and Cantons 
respectively to constitutional changes, accurately reflects the circumstances to which 
these two Federations owed their birth.  The national Constitutions are, in both cases, 
the result of a pact between the Constituent States.  In Germany, on the contrary, the 
Empire was the creation of the Hohenzollern, and it was therefore natural that Prussia 
should dominate the Bund,  and that the Constitution should consequently retain 
considerable, though far from complete, flexibility.  
 
The present Constitution. adopted by the National [begin page 443] Assembly at Weimar 
on 31 July 1919, is based upon that of 1871, just as the Imperial Constitution of 1871 
represented an adaptation of the North German Confederation of 1867.  It declares, 
indeed, that the German Realm (Reich) is a Republic, but when the French draftsmen 
                                                  
7   [441/1]  Written before the abolition of the Monarchy in Greece. 
8   [441/2]  op. cit., p. 334. at Versailles translated Deutsches Reich by Republique allemande objection was taken 
by Herr Muller, then Foreign Secretary of Germany; and L'Empire allemand was 
substituted.
9 On the point of constitutional revision the Instrument ordains (Art. 76) that 
the Constitution may be 'legislatively' amended; that is, presumably by the ordinary 
legislative procedure.  Such amendments, initiated by the Reichstag, are valid only if 
two-thirds of the accredited members are present, and at least two-thirds of those 
present record their votes.  In the Reichsrat (which like the old Bundesrat represents 
the States or Lands) a majority of two-thirds of the recorded votes is required.  The 
Reichsrat possesses a suspensive veto.  If, however, the Reichstag insists upon the 
proposed amendment, the Reichsrat  may within two weeks of the passing of the 
measure demand that it shall be submitted to a plebiscite; but it cannot be negatived 
unless a majority of the voters record their votes.  In this, as in other matters, the 
balance of power has, under the Weimar Constitution, decisively shifted from the 
Reichsrat, the representative of the States, to the Reichstag, which directly represents 
the people, but as in the old Bundesrat representation is unequal, being based on one 
vote for each million of inhabitants.  Like the old Bundesrat, again, its members must 
be members of the several State Governments.
10  
 
Even more significant of changed conditions is the inclusion of the referendum and the 
Popular Initiative.  Any law passed by the Reichstag must, if the President of the Reich 
so decides, within a month be submitted to [begin page 444] popular plebiscite. If the 
proclamation of the law has been deferred on request of one-third of the members of 
the Reichstag, a popular plebiscite must take place if it be demanded by one-twentieth 
of the voters. 
  
Nor have the primary electors merely a negative voice. One-tenth of the voters may 
demand the submission of any project of law to a popular plebiscite, provided the 
project is embodied in a Bill which has been completely drafted. In this case the 
National Government must inform the Reichstag of the request, and must submit a 
statement of its own views.  If the Reichstag is prepared to accept the proposed Bill, 
without amendment, no plebiscite need take place.  In other words ten per cent. of the 
electorate can propose to the Legislature a Bill in complete form and can demand 
either its enactment, in unamended form, or its submission to a vote of the people (Art. 
73).  
 
Conclusions and Queries. 
To what conclusions then, if any, does the foregoing survey appear to point?  One at 
least seems clear: that among the Legislatures of the modern world the British 
Legislature is, save for those which are directly modelled upon it, unique: none equals 
it in the range of its legal powers; few approach it.  Among those which lack its legal 
omnipotence, some are circumscribed by the Instrument under which they operate; 
some by the existence of competing and co-ordinate authorities; some by the provision 
of devices such as the Referendum and the Initiative, which vest in the electorate an 
appellate jurisdiction, and even constitute a rival legislative organ. 
  
Can any Legislature be safely entrusted with such unlimited power?  Is parliamentary 
omnipotence compatible with democratic principles?  Is it prudent to vest in a single 
body, employing for both purposes identical machinery, the function of ordinary 
legislation and also that of constitutional revision?  Is the British electorate over-
confiding' in the wisdom of its representatives, or have the makers of foreign 
Constitutions  [begin page 445] shown themselves unduly suspicious?  Federal 
Constitutions are, plainly, in a class apart: they represent, as we have seen, a compact 
                                                  
9   [443/1]  The precise rendering of Reich remains, however, a diplomatic obscurity 
as a subsequent treaty contains the expression republique allemande. 
10   [443/2]  See note, p. 415, supra.  or covenant between States, formerly in a position of virtual if not complete 
independence, and, under such circumstances, there could be no question of 
entrusting to a federal legislature unlimited powers.  Are the circumstances of unitary 
States so entirely different as to justify a contrary policy?  
 
Parliamentary Omnipotence and party Government. 
Half a century ago the student of English political institutions would probably have 
answered this question with an unhesitating affirmative.  Today, though the final 
judgement might coincide, it would be less quickly reached and less confidently 
affirmed.  Nor is the reason far to seek.  The smooth working of Parliamentary 
Government has, in England, been greatly facilitated by, if it is not actually dependent 
upon, the maintenance of the two-party organization.  Nor were the two parties - Whigs 
and Tories, Liberals and Conservatives - really divided on fundamental principles of 
government.  The Whigs, it is true, relied for support more particularly upon the monied 
interest, the manufacturing and trading towns, and the Nonconformists, and may have 
regarded political offices, as their hereditary preserve of a small knot of 'revolution 
families; the Tories were somewhat more regardful of the Royal Prerogative and 
perhaps more deferential to the personal wishes of the monarch; they relied for support 
primarily upon the landed interest and the Established Church; but on fundamentals 
both parties were agreed: upon the maintenance of a limited monarchy, of a 
responsible ministry, a bicameral legislature, and a Church which though tolerant of 
Dissent was in close connexion with the State.  Nor did any question of economic 
organization or even trade policy seriously divide them.  Moreover, the representatives 
of both parties in Parliament were men belonging in the main to the same class, who 
had been educated at the same schools and colleges, had served in the same 
regiments, and had common tastes and pursuits.  After 1832 there [begin page 446] was 
an increasing infusion of manufacturers and merchants, but unless, like Peel and 
Gladstone, they belonged to the aristocracy of commerce and had been educated at 
Eton or Harrow, at Oxford or Cambridge, they rarely reached Cabinet rank.  John 
Bright's inclusion in the Cabinet of 1868 was regarded as a portent. 
 
After 1885 the supremacy of the two-party system was rudely shaken by the intrusion 
of a third party, whose members were not only drawn from a different social class, but 
were sharply divided from both the historic parties on a fundamental question of policy. 
  
During the Parliament of 1880 the Irish Separatists, under the skilful leadership of 
Parnell, deliberately attempted to bring parliamentary government into contempt by 
their obstructive and disorderly tactics.  The extension of the Suffrage Act of 1884 to 
Ireland gave Parnell an opportunity which he was quick to utilize, and to the Parliament 
of 1885 the Parnellites returned in numbers sufficient to hold the balance between the 
Conservatives and Liberals.  The Home Rule Bill of 1886 registered the recognition of 
this fact.  From 1886 to 1906, however, the Unionist preponderance was so great that 
the Gladstonian Liberals, even with Parnellite support, were powerless.  From 1906 to 
1910 the Radicals were in a similarly fortunate position; but from 1910 until the 
outbreak of the war, Mr. Asquith's tenure of office depended upon the complaisance of 
Mr. Redmond's Irish followers.  The price of complaisance was an undertaking that a 
Home Rule Act should be placed upon the Statute Book at the cost of a complete 
readjustment in the balance of the British Constitution. 
 
The Parliament Act and Parliamentary Omnipotence 
The passing of the Parliament Act (1911) rendered it impossible for the House of Lords 
to delay for more than two years the enactment of a Home Rule Bill, or any other Bill 
sent up to it in three successive sessions by the House of Commons, while depriving it 
of all control over taxation and finance.  Thenceforward, the Second Chamber was 
reduced to legislative impotence, and the [begin page 447] British Legislature became in 
all but name unicameral.   
Yet the King in Parliament retains legislative sovereignty.  Once elected, the House of 
Commons can work its will unhindered in legislation, and can sustain in power an 
Executive which has received no mandate from the electorate.  The Second Chamber 
lost the power, which it formerly enjoyed, and not infrequently exercised, of compelling 
an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign; the electors gained the right of 
exercising their authority at intervals of five instead of seven years; but how slight a 
barrier that right interposed to the autocracy of Parliament was proved during the Great 
War when Parliament, by successive Acts, prolonged its own existence for three years, 
and might legally have prolonged it for thirty. 
 
Thus not only is the British Parliament unique in its freedom from all legal restraints 
upon its competence; it is almost unique, also, in the extent to which its legal powers 
have been concentrated in a single Chamber.  
 
Undiscriminated Legislature. 
Nor can the significance of another element in the situation be ignored.  So rapid has 
been the development in the legislative activity of Parliament, so numerous and varied 
are the problems with which, in the course of a single session, it is called upon to deal, 
that there is serious danger, lest in the process of legislation the fundamentals of the 
Constitution should be, perhaps inadvertently, or it may be designedly, impaired. 
Between 'ordinary’ laws and 'constitutional' laws there is, as we have seen, no 
distinction in this country.  The process of enactment is the same, whether Parliament 
has in hand a Bill for the legitimization of children born out of wedlock or a Bill for 
conferring a Constitution upon a great Dominion, or for curtailing the powers of one of 
the two branches of the Legislature.  Nor does the judiciary differentiate in any way 
whatsoever between them: an Act of Parliament is an Act of Parliament, whether its 
effect be to protect the funds of Trade Unions, [begin page 448] to destroy the legislative 
union between England and Ireland, or to disendow and disestablish the Church in 
Wales.  
 
Conventions v. Charters 
Does the situation, thus analysed, justify apprehension in the minds of those who have 
a jealous regard for political liberty; or is it one in which, relying upon the innate political 
sagacity, the traditional aversion to extremes, the love of fair play and the instinct for 
compromise generally attributed to the British people, we may safely continue to 
acquiesce?  To this question contrasted temperaments will dictate contradictory 
answers.  Men who are temperamentally inclined to acceptance of the political 
philosophy of Burke will not merely acquiesce in the existing situation, but will resent 
the suggestion that liberties are rendered the more secure by the guarantee of charter 
or scrip.  In their view no external safeguards will avail to preserve free institutions if the 
spirit of a people be atrophied.  Men of less buoyant temper and less robust faith tend, 
on the contrary, to the view maintained by Alexander Hamilton, and by those Puritan 
lawyers of the seventeenth century from whom, much more than from Burke or 
Chatham, the fathers of the American Constitution descended. 
 
If, however, we may no longer venture to rely upon the conventions of a Constitution, 
which is for the most part unwritten, in what directions shall we look for those additional 
safeguards which, while calculated to give free play to the fulfilment of democratic 
aspirations, shall curb the omnipotence of a sovereign legislature? 
 XVII. - Safeguards, Checks, And Limitations  
The Referendum and the Initiative  
 
Every Government in Europe or America which has conceded the principle 
of universal or nearly universal suffrage has at once set about finding 
indirect methods of nullifying its generosity. The polity of the United States 
is a perfect network of checks, cunningly devised against that old bogey, the 
violent and thoughtless caprice of the people.'- F.W. Bussell. 
 
‘The laws reach but a very little way.  Constitute Government how you 
please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of 
powers, which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of Ministers 
of State.  Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them.  
Without them your Commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper 
and not a living active effective organization.' - Edmund Burke.  
 
‘Des qu'on ecrit une constitution elle est morte.' - Joseph De Maistre.  
 
‘There must somewhere in every Government be a power which can say the 
last word, can deliver a decision from which there is no appeal.  In a 
democracy it is only the People who can thus put an end to controversy.' - 
Viscount Bryce.  
 
‘Every Referendum is an attack on the representative principle.' - Lord 
Loreburn (1911).  
 
‘It may well be doubted whether the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
in any form that means much can long survive the triumph of democracy.  . . 
. When the Referendum really comes, the Sovereign Parliament must go.' -
McIlwain, High Court of Parliament. 
  
Sovereignty. 
For many generations Englishmen have been taught to believe that the highest type of 
democracy, attainable under the conditions of the modern State, is that which 
expresses itself in representative government.  English publicists have analysed the 
preconceptions which underlie the theory of Parliamentary Democracy; English 
statesmen have laboured to bring it, in practice, to perfection.  The theory involves, as 
we have seen, the acceptance of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and by 
consequence the negation of the doctrine of the [begin page 450] sovereignty of the 
people.  In practice, the conflicting sovereignties have been, in large measure, 
reconciled, by that spirit of forbearance and compromise - the refusal to push theories 
to their logical conclusion - which Englishmen believe to be peculiarly characteristic of 
English politics, alike in the sphere of action and of thought.  
 
Referendal Democracy. 
Yet in neither sphere has the English type of Democracy commanded unquestioned 
allegiance.  Rousseau, himself the citizen of a City Republic, contemned the English 
people as little better than slaves, since, in the intervals between parliamentary 
elections, they alienated that sovereignty which is in its nature inalienable.  The 
principle of Direct Democracy, most perfectly exemplified in the City States of ancient Greece, has never been abandoned by the Swiss people, and still permeates their 
political institutions, alike in the Cantons and in the Federal Commonwealth.  The 
influence of the same principle may be detected, though in an attenuated degree, in all 
those Constitutions which, as indicated in the preceding chapter, reserve certain 
powers to the electors or impose certain restrictions upon the elected legislatures.  
 
The legal competence of legislative bodies may be limited either by a written 
Instrument or Constitutional Code, or by the superior or co-ordinate authority of the 
Executive or Judicial organ, or by the reservation of powers to the Electorate; or in 
more than one of these several ways.  
 
The Commonwealth and the Protectorate. 
Even in England there was at one period an attempt, as already indicated, to limit the 
legal competence of Parliament.  The Puritan lawyers and soldiers of the 
Commonwealth having abolished the Monarchy and the House of Lords were in no 
mood to confer unlimited authority; upon a single legislative Chamber.
1  The principle 
of a 'paramount law' had already appeared in The Agreement of the People, a 
document drafted by some of the Extremists in October 1647.  Under that proposed 
Constitution the power of the 'Representatives' (or elected legislature) was to extend to 
'the enacting, altering, repealing, and [begin page 451] declaring of laws, and the 
highest and final judgement concerning all natural and civil things'.  But even in regard 
to things natural and civil six matters were specifically 'excepted and reserved' from the 
'Representatives'.  In particular it was laid down that 'no Representative may in any 
wise render up, or give or take away, any of the foundations of common right, liberty, 
and safety, contained in this Agreement. . .'  In other words, the agreement constituted 
a 'paramount law’ which the Legislature was not competent to alter or amend; in fact, 
its function was to be legislative, not constituent.  Not even the extreme democrats of 
Cromwell's army were willing to commit unlimited power to a single legislative 
Chamber.  It may be objected that The Agreement of the People was never accepted 
and never came into force.  That is true.  But many of its principles reappear in the two 
written Constitutions of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. 
 
Under the Instrument of Government, which was drawn up 16 December 1653, the 
legislative power was vested in ‘the Protector, and the people assembled in Parliament’ 
(§ I).  The twenty-fourth clause specifically provides:  
 
‘That all Bills agreed unto by the Parliament shall be presented to the Lord 
Protector for his consent; and in case he shall not give his consent thereto 
within twenty days after they shall be presented to him, or give satisfaction 
to the Parliament within the time limited, that then, upon declaration of the 
Parliament that the Lord Protector hath not consented nor given satisfaction, 
such Bills shall pass into and become law although he shall not give his 
consent thereunto; provided such Bills contain nothing in them contrary to 
the matters contained in these presents.'  
 
What is the precise meaning of this clause and, in particular, of its concluding words?  
On this point there is some conflict of opinion between the Constitutional historian and 
the Constitutional lawyer.  Dr. Gardiner contends that the intention was to devise a rigid 
Constitution, and to limit the authority of Protector and Parliament [begin page 452] by 
the terms of the Constitution as defined by the Instrument.  The Protector was, 
according to this view, invested with a short suspensive veto on ordinary legislation, but 
neither he nor Parliament, nor both combined, could alter or amend the Constitution 
itself.  It is noticeable that this is not the interpretation placed upon the clause by a 
contemporary - Colonel Ludlow.  His summary of the clause runs as follows: 'That 
                                                  
1   [450/1]  See supra, Book III, c. vi. whatsoever they (Parliament) would have enacted should be presented to the Protector 
for his consent; and that if he did not confirm it within twenty days after it was first 
tendered to him it should have the force and obligation of a Law; provided that it 
extended not to lessen the number or pay of the army, to punish any man on account of 
his conscience, or to make any alteration in the Instrument of Government; in all which 
a negative was reserved to the single Person, (i.e. the Protector).
2 Ludlow obviously 
regarded the Protector and Parliament as being conjointly competent to alter even the 
terms of the Constitution itself, and that was the opinion of Mr .Dicey, than whom there 
was no higher authority on the legal aspect of the question.
3 It would seem, moreover, 
to be confirmed by the draft of The Constitutional Bill of the first Parliament of the 
Protectorate, clause 2 of which runs as follows: 'That if any Bill be tendered at any time 
henceforth to alter the foundation and government of this Commonwealth from a single 
Person and a Parliament as aforesaid that to such Bills the single Person is hereby 
declared shall have a negative.'  Clearly, if the single Person did not veto the 
Constitutional amendment, it was to become law.  This 'Constitutional Bill' never 
passed into law, and can be cited, therefore, only in illustration.  But so far as it goes it 
would seem to support the contention of the lawyers that in a legal sense the 
Instrument of Government was not a' rigid' but a' flexible' Constitution.  On the other 
hand, the Instrument does not provide any machinery for Constitutional [begin page 453] 
amendment, and we know from external sources that Cromwell's own intention was 
that the Parliament should exercise merely legislative, and not constituent functions;
4 
and, further, that in consequence of its determination to debate constitutional questions 
- 'fundamentals' - it was summarily dissolved by the Protector.  The point is one of great 
constitutional significance, but we are here concerned with it only to show that, at one 
critical period in English history, there was a strong disposition, if not a clear intention, 
to withdraw from the jurisdiction of an elected legislature, certain matters which were 
deemed to be of fundamental importance; and, moreover, that the limitation was to be 
rendered effective by embodying these fundamentals in an Instrument of Government.  
 
The United States of America. 
The fathers of the American Constitution bettered the example of their Puritan 
ancestors.  They were not only careful, as we have seen, to confide to the Legislature 
America strictly limited powers, but they set up a tribunal, competent to decide, in any 
given case, whether those powers had been exceeded.  The legislative power of 
Congress is therefore very effectively held in check by the Supreme Court, which may, 
in this sense; be regarded as the ‘Guardian of the Constitution'.  
 
Other States have, as indicated in the preceding chapter, adopted various devices to 
effect the same object though none have taken greater precautions in this matter than 
the United States of America, and many have been content with much less elaborate 
safeguards against constitutional innovation.  
 
Among these States some are Federal, and for these, as I have insisted, a written 
Instrument and a limited legislature are essential; others have been habituated to a 
written Constitution from infancy.  It remains an open question whether it can ever be 
expedient for a unitary State, which for generations, or it may be centuries, has been 
accustomed to rely in the conduct of its affairs upon conventions and understandings - 
unless, of course, it [begin page 454] proposes to adopt a federal system of government 
- to place itself under the restraints of a written Constitution. 
 
                                                  
2   [452/1]  Ludlow, Memoirs, p. 478. 
3   [452/2]  Mr. Dicey was kind enough to discuss these points with the author and 
gave him permission to record the opinion. 
4   [453/1]  See speech cited supra, p. 128. Joseph de Maistre. 
The great Roman Catholic publicist, Joseph de Maistre, would have answered this 
question with an emphatic negative: ‘Des qu'on ecrit une Constitution elle est morte.'  
He held that a Constitution was a divine work, not to be touched with profane hands, 
The roots of political constitutions exist before laws are reduced to writing a 
constitutional law is only and can only be the development or the sanction of a pre-
existing unwritten law; that which is most essential, most intrinsically constitutional and 
really fundamental is never written, nor can it be; the weakness an fragility of a written 
constitution vary directly as the number of its articles.  Such is in brief the basis of his 
political philosophy.  That there is a large substratum of truth contained in these 
propositions is evident.  Even the American Constitution represented, as we have seen, 
a process of evolution, the origins of which are to be sought in the unwritten 
Conventions of the English Constitution.  Even more conspicuously is this true of the 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth.  Moreover, it is true that some of the 
most fragile of written Constitutions are exceptional in length and in meticulous 
elaboration.  The American Constitution, on the contrary, is a relatively brief and 
meagre document, conspicuous for its avoidance of detail; and few Constitutions have 
stood, more triumphantly, the test of experience; On the other hand, De Maistre is 
evidently in error in his sweeping assertion that the flavour of fundamentals necessarily 
evaporates in the process of reducing them to writing, though the exceeding difficulty of 
the task is well exemplified by the case, already cited, of the act for the Reunion of the 
Canadas in 184O.  One of the principal objects of the British legislation was, as we 
saw, to confer upon the united Canadas ‘responsible' government in the English sense, 
to import into the Canadian Constitution the Cabinet system.  But before the task of 
reducing to the terms of a written Constitution a device so peculiar and [begin page 455] 
so elusive, the draftsmen of the day evidently quailed; for not a trace of it appears in 
the Act.  
 
The jurists who were responsible for the Australian Commonwealth Act were, as we 
have seen, somewhat more courageous and more successful; yet it would be a 
hopeless task to derive from the terms of that Act, taken by themselves and apart from 
any knowledge of the working of the Cabinet system in England, an adequate or even 
an intelligible notion of that fundamental feature of parliamentary democracy as evolved 
in England.  To this extent De Maistre would seem to be justified in his cardinal 
contention. 
 
The Referendum.  
We must pass, however, to the consideration of a totally different species of safeguard 
against the unrestricted exercise of power by the Legislative body.  I refer to the 
Referendum or Poll of the People, and to the Popular Initiative.  
 
It is important, at the outset, to distinguish clearly between the Referendum and the 
Initiative, and to note the several forms which both or either of these devices may 
assume, and the different purposes for which they may be severally employed.  
 
The Referendum may, as we have seen in the case of Switzerland, be either obligatory 
or optional; it may in either case be employed in the case of all legislation or only in 
reference to proposals to alter the Constitution itself; or it may be invocable only in the 
event of a deadlock between two legislative Chambers.  Similarly the Initiative may 
apply only to constitutional laws, or to all laws, and may take the form either of a 
general instruction to the ordinary Legislature to prepare, and to submit to a Poll of the 
People, a Bill, or of a completely drafted Bill.  
 
The Popular Initiative. 
Many publicists who strongly favour the acceptance of the principle of a popular veto 
are not ess strongly opposed to the device of the Initiative.  Mr, St, Loe Strachey, for example, a lifelong advocate of a Referendum for England, is irreconcilably opposed to 
the Initiative.  ‘The Initiative', he writes, 'is an encouragement to crude [begin page 456] 
legislative schemes. ... Though it may very well suit a small community like, say, the 
smallest Canton of Switzerland or one of the least populous American States (it) does 
not suit a great and complicated modern community with a vast number of laws already 
on the Statute Book which will have to be brought into harmony with the views of new 
proposal. 
 
Views of Mr. St. Loe Strachey and Lord Selbourne. 
In any case the Initiative is not the Referendum.  Therefore, advocates of the 
Referendum are not called upon in any way to defend the Initiative or to meet 
arguments which are applicable only to that institution.  In my own case the Initiative is 
anathema, while I regard the Referendum as the most valuable piece of political 
machinery, and I absolutely refuse to be saddled with one because I want the other.'
5  
Similarly, Lord Selborne, another ardent advocate of the Popular Veto, insists that there 
is no necessary connexion between the Referendum and the Initiative.  If there were, 
he frankly admits that it would constitute a 'new and very serious objection to the 
adoption of the former'.  
 
Theoretically, Lord Selborne and Mr. Strachey are unquestionably right.  In abstract 
logic there is no connexion between a Veto upon legislation and the initiation of 
projects of law.  It is, moreover, true that some States - the Australian Commonwealth is 
a conspicuous example - have adopted the one device without the other, and that in 
other States which have adopted both, recourse to the Referendum is common and the 
employment of the Initiative is rare.  Nevertheless, if the matter be regarded from the 
standpoint of practical politics in England it would seem to be doubtful whether there is 
any likelihood of the adoption of the one device without the other.  
 
N or is the reason far to seek.  The Referendum and the Initiative are thus far akin: 
both are in harmony with the principle of Direct Democracy; neither is theoretically 
appropriate to the mechanism of Representative Government.  Moreover, it will be 
found in practice that it is the men who are temperamentally if not politically Conserva- 
[begin page 457] tive who advocate the Referendum and resist the Initiative; while the 
men of an opposite temper bitterly oppose the former and generally incline to the latter.  
It is true that socialists and radicals might find it convenient to have recourse to an 
appeal to the people against legislation carried by a Conservative majority in both 
Houses of Parliament; but evidently it is as a drag or brake upon rash legislative 
financial proposals that the Referendum is desired by publicists like Mr. Lecky and Mr. 
Strachey, and statesmen like Lord Selborne; it is as a goad to stimulate into activity an 
apathetic or recalcitrant legislature that the Initiative would be and is employed.  In this 
connexion it is significant to note that when the late Lord Balfour introduced into the 
House of Lords his Bill to provide for the 'Taking of a Poll of the Parliamentary Electors 
of the United Kingdom with respect to certain Bills in Parliament', it was strongly 
opposed by Radicals of the type of Lord Loreburn, Lord Sheffield, and Lord 
Beauchamp, though not exclusively by Radicals.  Lord Morley of Blackburn, whose 
temper was in some respects essentially anti-democratic, vehemently attacked it.  'To 
set up', he said, ' as the great cardinal and organic standard of Parliamentary life the 
standard of always consulting and being guided by and thinking of nothing else but 
what the people desire is to my mind a thoroughly wrong standard.'  Men of 
pro-consular experience, like Lord Cromer, Lord Northcote, a former Governor-General 
of Australia, and Lord Selborne, sometime High Commissioner of South Africa, warmly 
supported Lord Balfour's Bill, while Lord Lansdowne favoured the principle of a 
Referendum, simply as an exceptional expedient 'for the purpose of putting an end to a 
persistent difference of opinion between the two Houses, and a persistent difference of 
opinion with regard to important subjects.' 
                                                  
5   [456/1]  The Referendum, pp, 29, 30.  
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. 
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the first Socialist Prime Minister in England, is definitely 
opposed both to the Referendum and the Initiative.  'Democracy', he writes, ‘can only 
work by representation.  Either in the form [begin page 458] of the mass meeting, or of 
the Referendum and Initiative’ (the conjunction of these is, I submit, significant), 
'modem democracy would come to a deadlock. . . . These direct forms of democracy 
cannot function in such a way as to impose upon the electors responsibility for their 
decisions.'
6  Mr. Macdonald's repugnance to the Referendum would probably be 
endorsed by the majority of his followers.   But be that as it may, is it not certain that if 
conservatively-minded politicians were to succeed in engrafting upon the English 
Constitution the principle of a Referendum there would immediately arise a counter-
demand for the Initiative from men of contrary disposition? 
 
Nevertheless, since the Referendum is advocated by a highly responsible body of 
opinion in this country, while there is as yet no articulate demand, so far as I know, for 
the Initiative, it is permissible, and in a formal treatise like the present, it is appropriate 
to consider the Referendum as an accepted device of modern state mechanism, 
without complicating the discussion by considerations of political expediency or party 
prepossessions. 
 
The Argument for the Referendum. 
The main argument advanced in favour of the Referendum is that it isolates a particular 
issue; that it serves to discriminate between legislative projects which involve an 
amendment of the Constitution and ordinary Bills, and gives to the electorate the 
opportunity of giving a definite answer 'yes’ or 'no' to each specific question.  That is 
true; it is also true that there have been cases where a complication of issues has 
prevented a straightforward decision on a question of great importance.  It may be, for 
example, that the issue between Free Trade and Protection would have been decided, 
at least for a generation, in 1906, but for the intrusion in that election of the disturbing 
and (as regards fiscal policy) the wholly irrelevant controversy about 'Chinese slavery' 
in South Africa.  If, however, this advantage is to be secured, it is essential, as the 
wisest advocates of the Referendum insist, that the decision should be sought on a 
specific [begin page 459] legislative project which has been already submitted to critical 
examination and discussion at the hands of the Legislature, and should not take the 
form of an abstract proposition.  To ask the electors to express themselves for or 
against Tariff Reform, for example, or a reform of the Second Chamber, or the 
Referendum itself, would be both mischievous and futile.  
 
It may, indeed, be objected that that is precisely what happens under the existing 
Constitutional system at present operative in England.  Some recent elections have 
undoubtedly tended to turn on a single issue, very generally stated, as in 1906 and 
again in 1923.  More often, however, they have taken the form of an ex-post facto 
approval or disapproval of the general policy of a particular Minister or a particular 
Government.  The General Election of 1874, for example, was a clear condemnation of 
the policy and perhaps the personal statesmanship of Mr. Gladstone; the election of 
1880 was quite as plainly a condemnation of Disraeli, and in particular of the policy of 
his Government in the two preceding years.  The Khaki Election of 1900 was a vote of 
confidence in Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Lord Milner; that of 1918 a still 
more distinct vote of confidence in Mr. Lloyd George and his conduct of the war; that of 
1922 a condemnation of the Coalition and its works. 
 
                                                  
6   [458/1]  Socialism; Critical and Constructive (1924), p. 219. Reference to the people Bill (1911). 
The Bill introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Reference Balfour of Burleigh in 1911 
was specifically devised to ‘Provide for the Taking of a Poll of the Parliamentary 
Electors of the United Kingdom with Respect to certain Bills in Parliament'.  It provided 
that a Poll of the parliamentary electors should be taken: 
 
(a)   on the demand of either House of Parliament, in the case of any Bill 
passed by the House of Commons, but rejected or not passed by the 
House of Lords within forty days after it was sent up to that House; or 
(b)   on the demand of not less than two hundred members of the House 
of Commons in the case of a Bill passed by both Houses. 
 
In either case the Bill was to be presented for the Royal assent if the [begin page 460] 
total affirmative vote exceeded the negative vote by not less than two votes per centum 
of the total negative vote.  Failing such a majority the Bill was to lapse.  The Ballot was 
to be taken in precisely the same manner as at an election, the only difference being 
that the elector was to put his cross against 'yes' or 'no' instead of against ‘John Jones' 
or 'William Smith'.  
 
The Bill bears some marks of the troubled constitutional atmosphere in which it was 
conceived, being mainly, though not exclusively, designed to decide disputes between 
the two Houses.  But it also gave a power of appeal against the decision of both 
Houses to a strong minority in the House of Commons.  Nor was it confined to 
Constitutional' amendments.  Therein Lord Balfour of Burleigh and his friends exhibited 
their prudence, wisely declining the attempt to decide what in England can or cannot be 
regarded as a 'Constitutional' Bill.  
 
Lord Balfour's Bill, though powerfully supported from the Conservative benches by men 
of leading like Lord Lansdowne and Lord Selborne, as well as by Lord Cromer, was not 
accorded a second reading.
7  
 
The Doctrine of the Mandate. 
A second argument advanced in favour of the Referendum is that it would minimize if 
not avert the danger of a Government returned to power on one issue using its majority 
to pass a Bill of great importance, and perhaps highly controversial, on which the 
electorate had not been consulted.  Much of the bitterness exhibited by the ‘Passive 
resistance' movement against the Education Act of 1902 was unquestionably due to 
this cause.  The Non-conformists complained that a majority obtained by an appeal to 
Khaki sentiment was employed to pass an Education Act conceived primarily in the 
interests of the Established Church.  To enter into the merits of the controversy would 
be irrelevant; the incident is cited simply to illustrate the particular argument advanced 
for  [begin page 461] the Referendum.  It will not, however, escape notice that its 
acceptance is an implicit admission of the doctrine of the 'mandate’, and indicates a 
decided step towards ‘direct' as opposed to representative or parliamentary democracy.  
But that is a responsibility which must be assumed by all who would introduce the 
Referendum into the English Constitution.  
 
It is further contended that the device of the Referendum would enable the electorate to 
give its decision on a particular legislative project without involving a change of Ministry, 
and would thus tend to 'place the nation above parties or factions’, and so would 
'greatly diminish the importance of merely personal questions'.  The force of the latter 
part of this plea cannot be denied.  The judgement of the Electorate would be more 
                                                  
7   [460/1]  The debate on this Bill, Official Report (Lords), Fifth Series, vol. vii; pp. 
253 seq., and 657-759, contains the best summary known to me of the arguments 
for and against a Referendum. 'detached’ and impersonal, though it is impossible to suppose that the personality of 
the advocates or opponents of the particular Bill could fail to exercise a powerful 
influence upon the decision. 
 
The Position of a Parliamentary Executive Under a Referendum. 
More disputable, however, is the proposition that the decision could be obtained 
without affecting the position of the Ministry in power.  Theoretically that is true; and the 
theory is supported by the experience of Switzerland and of the States of the American 
Union.  But the analogy of those countries is wholly false, and the force of the 
argument derived therefrom is proportionately weakened.  It appears to be entirely 
forgotten by advocates of the Referendum, and to a large extent by their opponents, 
that neither in Switzerland nor in the United States is Democracy of the parliamentary 
type; that in neither is the Executive responsible, in the English sense, to the 
Legislature.  The English Parliament is not exclusively, nor perhaps primarily, a 
legislative machine.  The House of Commons is elected not only to pass into law 
certain legislative projects, but to sustain an Executive which is understood to favour a 
certain line of administrative policy.  To quote once more Seeley's clumsy but 
impressive phrase: the English Parliament is a Government- [begin page 462] making 
organ.  Unless there should occur a complete break with English political tradition, it is 
hardly conceivable that a Ministry could with self-respect, or indeed with advantage to 
the country, remain in office after the rejection by the electorate of a Government Bill of 
first-rate importance.  Could Mr. Gladstone, for instance, have retained office in 1886 if 
his first Home Rule Bill had been rejected by Referendum instead of at a General 
Election?  Did not his party suffer in 1895 by his retention of office after the rejection of 
the Second Home Rule Bill not by the electorate, but at the hands of the House of 
Lords?  Could Mr. Baldwin have retained office in 1924 if a scheme of Tariff Reform, 
declared by him to be essential to a solution of the problem of unemployment, had 
been rejected on a Referendum?  
 
The Parliament Act and a Referendum. 
It is true and relevant that the Parliament Act has deprived the House of Lords of its 
referendal function, and has to that extent rendered the House of Commons almost 
omnipotent in a legislative sense.  But this practically applies only to Bills proposed by 
a Ministry in the first or at latest the second session of a newly elected Parliament.  If 
Parliaments, as seems not improbable, became virtually triennial, only Bills introduced 
in the first session could, if rejected by the House of Lords, become law without 
reference to the electorate. 
 
Arguments Against The Referendum. 
That great weight must be attached to the arguments thus summarized is undeniable, 
but the arguments on the other side are far from negligible.  Of these some have been 
already noticed by inference in preceding paragraphs. 
 
Of the rest perhaps the most serious is the contention that the Referendum would tend 
to weaken, if not to paralyse, the sense of responsibility under which Parliament at 
present does its work.  The knowledge that the ultimate responsibility for any given 
measure would rest not upon the elected legislators but upon the electors might 
conceivably have this effect; but on the other it might improve the quality of the 
debates.  The paucity of the space allotted to parliamentary proceedings in the [begin 
page 463] cheaper newspapers today is partly proof, partly perhaps the cause, of the 
lack of interest taken in those proceedings by the electors.  If the electors were 
conscious that the duty of finally deciding the fate of any given Bill might rest upon 
them, the effect might well be to quicken their interest in parliamentary debates, and 
consequently to invest those debates with more importance.  It is not easy to predict 
which of these two contradictory results would ensue. 
 ‘Un-English.’? 
A distinguished writer, English by birth but American by adoption,
8 has been at great 
pains to disprove the assertion commonly made, that the Referendum is un-English 
and consequently alien from the genius of English Institutions.  He attempts to prove 
his point by showing that the principle of the Referendum or submission to the people 
is the 'fundamental basis' of American democracy, that 'after a practice of the principle 
covering a period of more than 130 years it is found deeply embedded in the written 
Constitution of almost all the States of the Union’, and 'with a growing sentiment in 
favour of its extension'.
9  More particularly was the device' native' in New England, 
where it was adopted by Massachusetts in 1780, by New Hampshire in 1783, by 
Connecticut in 1818, and by Rhode Island in 1842.  
 
The device has also, as we have seen, been adopted in the federal Commonwealth of 
Australia and in the German Reich.  
 
But is it necessary again to insist that the American Constitutions represent a reaction 
from, not an imitation of, English Institutions?  It was perfectly natural that having 
thrown off the authority of the British Crown the American colonists should vest 
sovereignty in the people.  Precisely the same tendency was, as already indicated, 
manifest after the execution of the King and the abolition of the House of Lords in the 
homeland.  So far as the [begin page 464] Puritans of New England looked to English 
models in framing Constitutions for themselves, they looked, quite naturally, to the 
period of Puritan ascendancy in England, to the period when the Puritan leaders were 
feeling after a new basis for the Commonwealth which they sought, in vain, to 
establish.  The failure to discover such a basis led first to the autocracy of the 'General' 
and his army, and later to the restoration of the Monarchy and the authority of the King-
in-Parliament.  American Institutions have never been 'parliamentary' any more than 
they have been monarchical.  The form of democracy deliberately adopted by them is, 
as repeatedly argued in these pages, Presidential and Federal, and in genius, 
therefore, wholly unlike our own, which is essentially Parliamentary and Unitarian.  The 
Referendum may be a sound and valuable device; but the argument in its favour 
cannot be sustained on the ground that having been adopted in the New England and 
other States of America, it is therefore essentially English. 
 
The experience of non-sovereign Legislatures, like those of Switzerland and the 
American States, affords little guidance to those who seek to engraft a device which is 
wholly consonant with the principle of direct democracy, and evidently appropriate in a 
federal Constitution, to a polity which is both unitary and parliamentary. That politically, 
if not logically, the Referendum might lead to the adoption of the Initiative is a danger I 
have already emphasized; but it seems doubtful whether - as commonly urged - it 
would substantially contribute to the exaltation of the power of the Executive.  If, as is 
sometimes predicted, Parliament should become a mere debating society, concerned 
only with formulating the arguments to be submitted to the ultimate authority, the 
Executive might conceivably increase its power at the expense of the Legislature.  But 
in this connexion it is necessary once again to insist that, even as things are, the 
primary function of an English Parliament is to sustain or displace the Executive.  The 
vital divisions in [begin page 465] the House of Commons today are not those which 
determine the details of legislation, but those on which depends the fate of the Ministry.  
This part of the work of Parliament would not be affected by the occasional reference of 
Bills to the electorate.  
 
                                                  
8   [463/1]  S.B. Honey, The Referendum among the English (Macmillan, 1912).  Mr. 
Honey is (or was) a Judge of the Supreme Court, and writes therefore, with great 
legal authority. 
9   [463/1]  Ibid., p. 7. When all is said, however, the misgiving persists that while the Referendum is a natural 
product of conditions which differ widely from those which prevail in England; that while 
it has flourished on a soil impregnated with the principles of federalism and direct 
democracy, and among a people few in numbers but keenly and closely interested in 
the art of government; its transplantation to an alien soil might nevertheless be 
attended with results disappointing if not actually dangerous. 
 
One thing, however, is certain.  The adoption of the Referendum would involve, if not a 
diminution of the responsibility and prestige of the Legislature, at any rate an immense 
addition to the responsibility of the electorate, and might consequently necessitate 
important changes in its organization.  We must pass, therefore, without delay, to the 
consideration of various questions connected with that side of the mechanism of the 
State. 
 XVIII - Problem of the Electorate  
Parliamentary Reform. 
  
The first element of good government being the virtue and intelligence of 
the human beings composing the community, the most important point of 
excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the 
virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. . . . The ideally best form 
of government is that in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling 
power, in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; 
every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate 
sovereignty, but being, at least, occasionally called on to take an actual part 
in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local 
or general.’  J.S. Mill.  
 
The best security which human wisdom can devise seems to be the 
distribution of political authority among different individuals and bodies, 
with separate interests and separate characters, corresponding to the variety 
of classes of which civil society is composed - each interested to guard their 
own order from oppression by the rest, each also interested to prevent any of 
the others from seizing an exclusive and therefore despotic power; and all 
having a common interest to co-operate in carrying on the ordinary and 
necessary administration of government.  If there were not an interest to 
resist each other in extraordinary cases, there would not be liberty: if there 
were not an interest to co-operate in the ordinary course of affairs, there 
could be no government.' - Sir James Mackintosh.  
 
Essential Conditions of Representative Democracy. 
Of all forms of government, Parliamentary Democracy, particularly as it is understood 
and worked in the country of its origin, is one of the most delicate and difficult.  It 
depends for success on several conditions.  It implies, first, a Legislature scientifically 
constructed and endowed with adequate powers; secondly, carefully devised methods 
of legislation, and such rules of procedure as may be appropriate to the functions, be 
they wide or limited, assigned to the Legislature; thirdly, an Executive strong enough for 
efficient administration, yet continuously responsible to Parliament, and instinctively 
responsive to the will of the electorate; but, perhaps above all, it implies a body of 
electors, individually alert, intelligent, [begin page 468] and informed, and so organized 
as faithfully to reflect the will of the whole community. 
 
It is with the last of these conditions that the present chapter is concerned.  
 
The Problem of the Electorate. 
In this connexion three questions obtrude themselves: first, what legal or political 
qualifications should be demanded of the individual elector; secondly, on what principle 
the electors so qualified should be grouped in order to express most accurately the 
views of the aggregate of the citizens - in other words, on what basis seats should be 
distributed; and, thirdly, how elections should be conducted and what method of voting 
should be adopted. 
 The Principle of Locality. 
Representative institutions in England were, from the first, as already indicated,
1 based 
primarily upon the principle of locality.  Even in Anglo-Saxon days the reeve and four 
men 'of the better sort' represented the village or township in the courts of the hundred 
and the shire.  The Normans, or rather the Angevins, developed the idea of central 
representation.  The sheriff of each shire was bidden to send to Westminster, or some 
other place of meeting, certain knights to represent the shire and burgesses to 
represent the towns.  The principle of locality, as the basis of popular representation, 
was thus carried on from local to central government. 
 
Traces of the Vocational Principle. 
The principle was not, however, universally applied.  The barons, bishops, and abbots 
were summoned to Parliament as individual landowners.  The lower clergy were 
summoned, on the other hand, primarily as representatives of their order, and with 
them the Soviet or vocational principle so far and so quickly prevailed over the 
parliamentary, that they declined to attend, the national council, and preferred to make 
their fiscal grants to the Crown in their professional assemblies, the Convocations of 
Canterbury and York. 
  
During the greater part of the fourteenth century it still remained uncertain which of the 
two principles - that of locality or that of vocation - would ultimately prevail.  
[begin page 469] 
 
The survival of the sheriff and the shire court decided the matter.  The knights, as we 
have seen, and the burghers were alike elected there, and consequently the knights, 
instead of throwing in their lot with their own m social order, preferred the claims of 
locality to that of class, and united with the burghers to form a Commons House of 
Parliament.  The lawyers and the merchants did, indeed, betray an inclination towards 
the Soviet principle. 
  
But the knights and burgesses, in combination, were too strong for them; the idea of 
local communities prevailed over that of professional privileges and vocational 
interests.  Not primarily as merchants nor as lawyers, nor as landholders, were the 
members of the elected House henceforward to sit at Westminster, but as the local 
representatives of all interests and of every class. 
 
County and Borough Representation. 
Of some 300 members in the Parliament of 1295, 74 represented counties - two 
apiece.  Durham and a Cheshire as palatine counties were not represented, nor was 
Monmouthshire.  The rest represented boroughs; but the borough representation 
varied greatly from reign to reign, and indeed from Parliament to Parliament.  The 
lowest limit was reached in 1445, when only 99 boroughs made returns.  Nor did the 
issue or return of a writ imply the attendance of the members elected.  The attendance 
varied even more than the nominal representation.  Under the Tudors the base of 
parliamentary representation was greatly widened.  When Henry VII ascended the 
throne the number of elected members was 296; when Elizabeth died it was 462.  
 
Creation of New Constituencies Under Tudors and Stuarts. 
The representation of the English counties was completed by the inclusion of 
Monmouth (1536), the Palatine County of Chester (1543), and that of Durham (1673). 
Monmouthshire came in as part of a general scheme for the parliamentary 
representation of Wales.  The Act of 1536, which gave two members to Monmouth, 
                                                  
1   [468/1]  Cf. supra, c. vii. gave one to each of the twelve
2 Welsh counties and one to each [begin page 470] of the 
chief towns.  Henry VIII also gave representation (two members apiece) to the 
following towns: Calais, Berwick-upon-Tweed, Buckingham, Chester, Lancaster, 
Newport (Cornwall), Orford, Preston, and Thetford.  By the end of his reign the county 
representation had been increased from 74 to 90, and that of the boroughs to 253, 
bringing the total membership of the House to 343.  
 
Against this increase of numbers no sinister motive could be alleged.  The concession 
of parliamentary representation to Wales did but carry to a logical conclusion the 
Unionist policy of Edward I; the inclusion of Cheshire and Monmouthshire removed an 
antiquarian anomaly, while the new Parliamentary boroughs were places of 
considerable and growing importance. 
  
Of the creation of new boroughs by Edward VI or his Protectors it is impossible to 
speak with the same confidence.  In his short reign no fewer than twenty new 
constituencies were created.  To some of the towns thus enfranchised, such as 
Westminster, Liverpool, Wigan, Maidstone, Lichfield, and Peterborough, no exception 
could be taken.  But many of the new boroughs were in Cornwall, and although the 
fishing towns in that county were in the sixteenth century rapidly increasing in 
importance, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Cornwall was specially favoured as 
a royal Duchy, and as being on that account particularly amenable to royal influence.  
This suspicion is deepened when we find the Protector Northumberland, in issuing 
letters of instruction to the sheriffs, actually going so far as to indicate the names of the 
persons whom the Crown wished to be returned.  Queen Mary created twenty-one 
constituencies, three of them single-membered, but Calais, of course, ceased to return 
representatives, so that the permanent net increase in the membership of the House 
was nineteen.  She also instructed the Sheriffs to admonish the electors to choose 
'such as being eligible by order of the laws were of a grave, wise, and catholic sort’, but 
no names were mentioned.  Queen Elizabeth exhibited a similar solicitude [begin page 
471] as to the personnel of the House of Commons.  Thus in 1570 she complained that 
'though the greater number of knights, citizens, and burgesses for the most part are 
duly and orderly chosen, yet in many places such consideration is not usually had 
herein, as reason would, that is to choose persons able to give good information and 
advice for the places for which they are nominated, and to treat and consult discreetly 
upon such matters as are propounded to them’.  The Queen, therefore, appointed 
Archbishop Parker and Lord Cobham to confer with the Sheriff in Kent and to take care 
that the persons returned ‘be well qualified with knowledge, discretion, and modesty’, 
Queen Elizabeth also was bounteous in the bestowal of parliamentary privileges, no 
fewer than sixty new members being added during her reign to the House of 
Commons.  
 
Thus during four Tudor reigns 166 members were added to the House of Commons. 
 
James I gave representation to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and added 
twenty-three borough members to the House; Charles I eighteen
3 while Charles II, 
besides bringing in the County Palatine of Durham, gave members to the city of 
Durham and the borough of Newark.  The total Stuart addition was, therefore, fifty-one, 
making for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a grand total of 217.  Apart from the 
Scotch and Irish Unions there was no further addition to the membership of the House 
of Commons until 1832, a period of more than a century and a half.  
 
                                                  
2   [469/1]  Five out of the twelve being at the same time created out of the Marcher 
Lordships. 
3    [471/1]  Many of the boroughs enfranchised under the early Stuarts were, it 
should be noted, revivals, not new creations. With what object did the Stuart, and still more the Tudor, Sovereigns add so largely to 
the House of Commons?  To this question two answers may be, and have been, given.  
The older generation of historians, who could see in the Tudors nothing but wilful and 
overbearing despots, naturally find in this proceeding evidence of an attempt to pack 
the House of Commons and render it [begin page 472] a pliable instrument in the hands 
of the Crown.  That it was an integral part of Tudor policy to rule in and through 
Parliament is undeniable; that sinister motives were altogether absent it would be 
difficult to prove.  The special favour shown to Cornwall, even if account be taken of the 
economic circumstances of the day, is, to say the least, suspicious.  On the other hand 
the Tudors were notoriously anxious both to clip the wings of an overpowerful 
aristocracy and to counterbalance their political power by encouraging the growth of a 
strong middle class.  The wealth of the commercial classes increased rapidly in the 
sixteenth century, and nothing was more natural than that the trading and fishing towns 
from which this wealth was derived should find representation at Westminster.  Nor 
should it escape notice how many of the newly enfranchised towns-Liverpool, Looe, 
Fowey, Yarmouth (I.W.), Newport and Newtown (I.W.), Minehead, Harwich, Seaford, 
Corfe Castle, for example-were on the seaboard.  Others, like Preston, Wigan, 
Thetford, Bury St. Edmunds, Peterborough, Cirencester, were towns of growing 
commercial importance.  On the whole, therefore, it is not less consistent with 
probability and more consistent with charity to assume, with Dr. Prothero, that the main 
reason for the increase is to be found 'in the growing prosperity of the country and in 
the reliance which the Tudors placed on the commercial and industrial classes'.
4
 
Distribution of Seats, 1688-1832. 
The eighteenth century witnessed no similar development.  The union with Scotland 
added to the House of Commons 45 members, of whom 30 represented counties; and 
the union with Ireland added 100, distributed as follows: counties 64, boroughs 35, with 
an additional University member for Trinity College.  The additions raised the total 
numbers of the House from 513 to 658, a figure which remained constant until after the 
Reform Acts of 1884-5.  The only change in distribution between 1801 and 1832 was 
the disfranchisement of Grampound in 1821 and the transference of its two members 
to the [begin page 473] County of York.  Even that insignificant transaction was 
denounced by Lord Eldon as calculated to plunge England into 'the whirlpool of 
democracy'.  
 
Agitation for Parliamentary Reform. 
Yet, apart from Lord Eldon and his like, few people Agitation could deny that reform 
was by that time overdue.  That the efforts of the eighteenth-century reformers should 
Reform have been vain need not, on that account, excite either surprise or resentment.  
Their failure is by some attributed to the general political indifference of a period wholly 
lacking in enthusiasm and idealism.  But the true explanation is that not until the close 
of the century were the anomalies of the existing system revealed.  Only very recently, 
indeed, had the system become really anomalous.  It is true that as far back as 1690 
John Locke had drawn attention to the absurdity of the system from a philosophical 
standpoint.  But philosophy has never exercised much influence upon practical politics 
in England.  In 1745 Sir Francis Dashwood moved an amendment to the address 
advocating the reform of Parliament, but nobody listened to his argument, and in 1745 
there was no immediate reason why they should.  The anomalies in the distribution of 
seats had not become glaring. 
 
The Wilkes Case. 
The real genesis of the reform movement may perhaps be traced to the agitation 
aroused by the treatment accorded to John Wilkes, and still more to his constituents, 
                                                  
4   [472/1]  Statutes and Documents, p. lxvi. by Parliament.  In order to punish a worthless and unprincipled demagogue, the House 
of Commons first denied to one of its own members the protection of ‘privilege’, and 
then denied to the electors of Middlesex the right of electing the representative of their 
choice. 
 
Revolt of the American Colonies. 
This affair raised awkward questions as to the relations Revolt of between the House of 
Commons and the Constituencies.  Even more fundamental were the questions raised 
by the Colonies agitation aroused in the American Colonies by the passing of the 
Stamp Act.  If there was any validity in the contention that without representation 
taxation was tyranny, the application of the principle might have begun nearer home.  
Nevertheless, it is suggestive that [begin page 474] Wilkes's motion for parliamentary 
reform (1776) should have coincided with the declaration of American independence, 
although the motion itself excited little attention and was negatived without a division. 
 
The Society for Promoting Constitutional Information. 
Four years later there was established the Society for Promoting Constitutional 
Information.  The most active promoter of the society was Major John Cartwright, the 
author of many scores of political tracts and for more than formation half a century an 
indefatigable and ardent advocate of parliamentary reform.  Among other members of 
the society were such men as the Duke of Richmond, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, and 
Dr. Price - famous as the provider of the text on which Burke preached his discourse on 
the French Revolution.  The programme of the society, formulated at a meeting held 
under the presidency of Charles James Fox, anticipated by more than half a century 
the Charter of 1838.  The points of the two documents were identical: annual 
Parliaments; universal suffrage; equal electoral districts; the abolition of the property 
qualification for members of Parliament; payment of members; and vote by ballot.  In 
the same year (1780) a Bill embodying these points was introduced into the House of 
Lords by the Duke of Richmond, but his speech was interrupted by the tumult roused 
by the Lord George Gordon riot, and his motion was negatived without a division.  
 
Pitt and Reform. 
Pitt's motion (1782) to consider the state of the representation was, however, rejected 
only by a majority of twenty, and three years later he had the distinction of introducing 
the first ministerial scheme for parliamentary reform.  Thirty-six rotten boroughs were, 
with their own consent, to be disfranchised, and their seventy-two members transferred 
to London and the counties.  Their owners were to be compensated at the rate of 
£7,000 per seat, and the same procedure was to be adopted in the case of other 
boroughs which might voluntarily apply for disfranchisement.  Burke and Fox opposed 
the principle - afterwards applied in the Act of Union with Ireland -- of [begin page 475] 
recognizing the right of property in boroughs, and the motion was rejected by 248 to 
174.  Nearly half a century elapsed before a minister tackled the thorny problem again. 
  
The French Revolution served, indeed, to stimulate political agitation but it postponed 
parliamentary reform.  For twenty years the energies of the nation were concentrated, 
and rightly, on the defeat of Napoleon. 
 
The Situation After 1815. 
After 1815, however, the flood, pent up for twenty-five years, burst all barriers.  It was 
not only the lapse of time after which initiated anew the agitation for reform.  Nor was it 
merely the economic anaemia which invariably follows upon the fever and fret of war.  
Since the rejection of Pitt's motion in I785 a new England had come into being: the 
England of the factory and the forge; of the coal-mine and the iron-field; the centre of 
the world's shipping, its textile manufactures, its credit and finance.  Population which 
down to and beyond the middle of the eighteenth century had been thin, scattered, and almost wholly rural, not only increased with unprecedented activity, but shifted in 
distribution.  The 5,000,000 people
5 of 1700 more than doubled in the succeeding 
century and a quarter.  Even more remarkable was the change in the distribution of the 
population as between south and north of the Trent, and as between country and town.  
To us it is almost incredible that down to the Industrial Revolution the most thickly 
populated counties (excluding Middlesex and Surrey) should have been, in that order, 
Gloucester, Somerset, Wilts., Worcester, Northampton, Herts., and Bucks. Sheep-
breeding and the spinning and weaving of the wool for the sake of which sheep were 
bred was still the staple industry of England - a fact which goes far to explain the 
distribution of parliamentary constituencies. 
  
The change when it came was so rapid as to justify the use of the term 'revolution'.  
Kay, Arkwright, Hargreaves, Compton, Telford, Brindley, Macadam, Watt, [begin page 
476] Stevenson made the new England which necessitated a reform of the 
parliamentary system. Boroughs in southern England which had returned members to 
Parliament for centuries fell into complete decay; mere villages in the north expanded 
into great industrial towns. 
 
Distribution of Seats. 
Electoral changes had not, however, kept pace with economic development.  Of the 
203 parliamentary boroughs in 1831 no fewer than 115 were contained in the ten 
maritime counties between the Wash and the Severn and the county of Wilts., and of 
the 115 no less than 56 were on the tideway.
6  But this distribution, as Mr. Porritt points 
out, presents no paradox when the' social and industrial conditions of England up to the 
reign of Elizabeth are borne in mind'.
7  Any anomalies which had arisen were of 
comparatively recent origin.  But they were sufficiently glaring.  Such places as Old 
Sarum, Newtown (I.W.), Galton, Bramber, Bossiney, Beeralston, Hedon, Brackley, and 
Tregony, some of them hardly distinguishable hamlets, returned two members apiece; 
Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, Wolverhampton, Halifax, Bolton, and 
Bradford returned none. 
 
The Franchise. 
The vagaries of the electoral franchise were not less Franchise bewildering than those 
of the distribution of seats.  The county members were elected on a uniform franchise 
by the 40s. freeholders; but in the boroughs the utmost variety prevailed.  In some, 
known as 'Scot and Lot Boroughs’, all ratepayers were entitled to vote; in others only 
the hereditary ‘freemen'; in others only members of the municipal corporation; in others 
'potwallopers'; while in others the franchise was attached to the ownership or 
occupation of particular houses known as 'ancient tenements'.  But it is noticeable that 
even in boroughs where the franchise was theoretically wide, it was in practice narrow 
and confined.  Thus in Gatton, where it was enjoyed by all freeholders and 'scot and lot' 
inhabitants, there were only seven qualified to exercise it, and in Tavistock only ten.  In 
the whole of England, Wales, [begin page 477] Ireland, and Scotland, out of 16 million 
people there were only 160,000 electors.   
 
It was alleged in 1793 by the Society of the Friends of the People that out of 513 
members for England and Wales 70 were returned by boroughs which had practically 
no electors at all, 90 by boroughs with less than 50, and a further 37 by towns with less 
than 100 voters apiece. 
  
                                                  
5   [475/1]  This is the estimate for England and Wales; but before 1801 estimates of 
population were rough. 
6   [476/1]  Porritt, Unreformed House of Commons, p. 90.  
7   [476/2]  op. cit., p. 85. According to another calculation, 254 members were said to represent an aggregate 
constituency of less than 11,500.  Bad in England, things were even worse in Ireland 
and Scotland.  Out of the 300 members in the Irish House of Commons 216 
represented boroughs or manors, and of these 200 were elected by 100 individuals 
and nearly 50 by 10.  In Scotland the 66 boroughs contained in the aggregate 1,450 
electors; Edinburgh and Glasgow had 33 apiece; while the county of Bute, it out of a 
population of 14,000, possessed 21 electors, of whom only one was resident.  
 
Influence and Corruption. 
The restriction of the franchise threw enormous power Influence into the hands of the 
great territorial magnates, of the new and corruption.  ‘Nabobs’ who employed some of 
the money which they derived from Indian trade in the acquisition of electoral influence, 
and, above all, into those of the Government of the day.  A narrow franchise contributed 
also to the almost universal corruption which prevailed in borough constituencies.  A 
vote was a possession too valuable to be parted with except for a high consideration, 
and it has been estimated
8 that prior to 1832 not more than one- third of the members 
of the House of Commons represented the free choice even of the limited bodies of 
electors then entrusted with the franchise'.  Sydney Smith, writing in 1821, declared 
that ‘the country belongs to the Duke of Rutland, Lord Lonsdale, the Duke of 
Newcastle, and about twenty other holders of boroughs.  They are our masters.'  The 
statement was doubtless exaggerated, but it had in it more than a semblance of truth.  
The Duke of Norfolk did in fact return eleven [begin page 478] members, Lord Lonsdale 
nine, Lord Darlington seven, and the Duke of Rutland, the Marquis of Buckingham, and 
Lord Carrington six apiece.  In 1780 the Duke of Richmond declared that not more than 
6,000 men returned a clear majority of the House of Commons.  A petition presented in 
1793 on behalf of the Friends of the People by Lord Grey declared that 357 members 
were returned by 154 patrons, of whom 40 were peers.  According to the detailed 
analysis of Oldfield, no less than 487 out of the 658 members of the House of 
Commons were in 1816 nominees.  Of the English members 218 were returned by the 
nomination or influence of 87 peers; 137 by 90 powerful commoners; and 16 by the 
Government itself.  Of the 45 Scottish members 31 were returned by 21 peers, the 
remainder by 14 commoners.  In Ireland 51 were returned by 36 peers and 20 by 19 
Commoners.  However much of exaggeration there may be in these various estimates, 
it is impossible in face of them to maintain that the pre-Reform system was 
representative in anything but the crudest sense.  
 
Gross corruption alike in the constituencies and among the elected or nominated 
representatives was the inevitable corollary of such a system.  To the sale or purchase 
of seats the term cannot in fairness be applied.  A seat was as much a marketable 
commodity in the eighteenth century as an advowson in the nineteenth, and the 
legitimacy of the transaction was, as we have seen, recognized alike in Pitt's Reform 
Bill of 1785 and in the Act of Union of 1800.  In each case the value of a seat was 
estimated at over £7,000.  Nor was this excessive, for sums far m excess of this 
amount were frequently spent on a parliamentary contest.  Thus in 1768 the Bentincks 
and Lowthers spent £40,000 apiece in contesting the counties of Cumberland and 
Westmorland; while at York in 1807 the joint expenses of Lord Milton and Mr. Lascelles 
are said to have amounted to the astounding sum of £200,000.  
 
Such was the electoral system of Great Britain in the [begin page 479] opening years of 
the nineteenth century. 
 
Economic Distress after 1815. 
Anachronistic and anomalous it unquestionably was; but the recognition of anomalies 
and anachronisms is not in itself sufficient, in England, to stimulate reform.  The 
                                                  
8   [477/1]  By Erskine May (Const. Hist. i. 362). immediate stimulus was supplied by industrial and agricultural depression, and by the 
suffering thereby involved to all classes, and particularly to the poor.  For the period of 
transition, designated by historians the 'Industrial Revolution’, was accompanied, as 
such periods invariably are, by terrible distress among the weaker economic classes.  
The war had diffused, as in uninvaded countries war is apt to diffuse, an air of 
prosperity, which was partial and temporary if not actually artificial.  But the advent of 
peace brought ruin impartially upon all classes; landlords, farmers and labourers, 
bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and artisans - none escaped the common fate.  
'Trade’, wrote the Master of the Mint, 'is gone, contracts are gone, and there is nothing 
but stoppage, retrenchments and bankruptcies.'  Wellesley-Pole did not exaggerate the 
gravity of the situation. 
 
In the soil of industrial depression the political seed sown broadcast quickly produced a 
rich harvest of agitation.  To the philosophical radicalism of the utilitarians; to the 
democratic liberalism of Francis Place; to the communistic teaching of Robert Owen, 
was added the stimulus of economic distress.  Reformers like Lord Grey and Sir 
Francis Burdett had kept the reform question before the attention of Parliament, but the 
motions which between 1793 and 1819 they periodically made were invariably rejected.  
In 1820, however, Lord John Russell won a significant success by carrying through the 
House of Commons a Bill for the disfranchisement of Grampound, Penrhyn, Camelford, 
and Barnstaple.  The Lords rejected It, but Grampound was disfranchised in 1821 and 
its members given to Yorkshire.  From that time until 1831 the agitation for reform was 
practically continuous.  The general election of 1830 brought to an end sixty years of 
continuous Tory rule; the formation of [begin page 480] a Whig Government, pledged to 
parliamentary reform, was appropriately entrusted to the veteran reformer Lord Grey, 
and on 1 March 1831 the Great Reform Bill was introduced - not less appropriately - by 
Lord John Russell. 
  
Parliamentary Reform. 
The vicissitudes of the parliamentary struggle over this Bill and its immediate 
successors must not detain us.
9
  
It must suffice to say that after escaping defeat on the second reading only by a 
majority of one, the Ministry were defeated on going into Committee and immediately 
appealed to the country.  The Reformers were returned in a large majority; the Bill was 
reintroduced, almost unaltered, and after prolonged discussions in Committee passed 
the Commons by a majority of over 100, but was rejected in the Lords.  The autumn 
recess was marked by serious rioting at Bristol, Nottingham, and other towns, and in 
December a third edition of the Bill, this time with considerable alterations, was 
introduced, passed quickly through the House of Commons, and was given a second 
reading by the Lords.  But a hostile amendment being carried in Committee, the 
Ministry requested the King's permission to create new peers.  William IV demurred 
and the Ministry resigned.  Neither Lord Lyndhurst, Manners Sutton, nor the Duke of 
Wellington could form a Government; Grey and his colleagues were reinstated;   
Wellington induced the Peers, in order to avert the swamping of their House and their 
order, to withdraw their opposition, and the Bill passed into law. 
 
                                                  
9   [480/1]  Full details will be found, e. g. in J.R.M. Butler's The Passing of the 
Great Reform Bill; in G.M. Trevelyan's Lord Grey of the Reform Bill; in Spencer 
Walpole's History of England since 1815; and in many other works. I have myself 
told the story in my England since Waterloo.  Methuen, seventh edition, 1925, and 
have here borrowed a few paragraphs from that work. The Act of 1832. 
The changes thus effected may now be briefly summarized.  First, as regards 
disfranchisement: 56 boroughs with less than 2,000 inhabitants were totally 
disfranchised; of these 55 had two members each, one, Higham Ferrers, had one; 
Weymouth and Melcombe Regis lost two of their four members; and thirty boroughs 
with less [begin page 481] than 4,000 inhabitants lost one of their two members.  Thus 
143 seats were surrendered.  These were redistributed as follows: 65 to English and 
Welsh counties; 44 to 22 English boroughs (2 each); 21 to single-member boroughs; 8 
to Scotland; and 5 to Ireland.  The total numbers therefore remained unchanged at 
658.  Not less drastic were the changes in the franchise.  In the boroughs all the 
bewildering varieties of qualification were swept away and for them was substituted a 
uniform £10 household franchise, with the reservation of the rights of resident freemen 
in corporate towns.
10  In the counties the old 40s.  freeholders were reinforced by 
copyholders and long-leaseholders, and by tenants-at-will paying a rent of £50 a year. 
In Scotland the county franchise was given to all owners of property of £10 a year, and 
certain lease-holders; in Ireland to owners as in England, and to £20 occupiers. The 
final and total result was the addition of some 455,000 electors to the roll-an addition 
which more than tripled the electorate. In addition to the clauses governing the 
franchise and the distribution of seats the Act of 1832 provided for the formation of a 
Register of voters; for the division of constituencies into convenient polling districts, and 
for the restriction of the polling to two successive days. 
  
On the face of it the Act of 1832 seems, as compared with the subsequent instalments 
of Reform, almost insignificant.  Yet it is proverbially le premier pas qui coute; the Act of 
1832 was the first great inroad upon the Constitution as it had been worked since the 
seventeenth century, and it profoundly altered the centre of political gravity.  Since 
1688 political supremacy had rested with the territorial oligarchy; the great magnates 
had dominated not only the House of Lords but the House of Commons.  Their power 
was now broken; it passed into the hands of the urban middle classes - the merchants, 
manufacturers, and shopkeepers.  Yet the authors of the Act of 1832 were far from 
apprehending its real implications.   [begin page 482] 
 
Lord Grey himself represented his proposals as 'aristocratic’; his colleagues hoped that 
an 'effectual check would be opposed to the restless spirit of innovation;
11  the Whigs 
generally believed that the Bill was at once ‘conservative' and final in its terms.  Nothing 
would have amazed them more than to learn that they were opening the floodgates to 
the tide of democracy.  'Neither the Whig aristocracy who introduced the first Reform 
Bill,' says a philosophic writer, nor the middle class whose agitation forced it through, 
conceived it to be even implicitly a revolutionary measure.  The power of the Crown 
and of the House of Lords were to be maintained intact; the House of Commons was to 
be more representative, but not more democratic than before.  The change was 
regarded as one of detail, not of principle; in no sense a subversion of the Constitution, 
but merely its adaptation to new conditions.'
12  The Duke of Wellington judged it far 
more shrewdly: 'There is no man who considers what the Government of King, Lords, 
and Commons is, and the details of the manner in which it is carried on,  who must not 
see that government will become Impracticable when the three branches shall be 
separate, each independent of the other, and uncontrolled in its action by any of the 
existing influences.'  It is true that the full force of the shock administered in 1832 was 
not felt for at least two generations.  Despite organic change, the Government of 
England continued to be aristocratic in personnel, at least until 1867.  Nevertheless, it 
is a sound instinct which assigns to 1832 the real point of transition from Aristocracy to 
                                                  
10   [481/1]  If existing prior to 1831. 
11   [482/1]  Report of Cabinet Committee. 
12   [482/2]  Dickinson, The Development of Parliament, p. 39; the whole essay is 
eminently worthy of attention. Democracy.  The changes of 1867 and 1884 were implicit in the earlier revolution.  That 
those changes were neither foreseen nor intended by Lord Grey and his colleagues is 
true, but is nothing to the point.  They opened the gates; the capture of the citadel was 
merely a question of time.  
[begin page 483]  
 
Defects of the Reform Act. 
That an 'extensive measure’ could have been much longer deferred few people on 
either side believed, and events have more than justified the general belief.  Reform 
was inevitable, yet the Act by which it was accomplished was open to grave criticism.  
That it cruelly disappointed the hopes of the working classes was conclusively proved, 
firstly, by the Chartist agitation, and secondly by the refusal of the manual workers to 
support Cobden and Bright in their crusade against the Corn Laws.  Their attitude 
exasperated the middle-class radicals.  The Whigs never had any intention of satisfying 
Chartist aspirations.  By declaring the Reform Act to be a 'final' settlement, Lord John 
Russell not only earned the soubriquet of 'Finality Jack’, but estranged the artisans and 
exhibited his own lack of political foresight.  Nor did the Act satisfy the philosophical 
radicals.  It was based not on principle, but on expediency; it patched and darned; it 
abolished some flagrant abuses, but left innumerable anomalies; it broke the principle 
of aristocracy without admitting that of democracy; representation was based neither 
on numbers, nor wealth, nor education; worst of all, in view of the utilitarian 
philosophers, it made no effort to secure the representation of minorities.  None the 
less the Whigs had a great achievement to their credit, and if in 1848 the avenging 
angel of revolution passed us by, we must thank the legislation of 1832 not less than 
that of 1846. 
 XIX. - The Advent of Democracy (1867-1918) 
The Representation of Minorities  
Soviet v. Parliament  
 
‘How to transmit the force of individual opinion and preference into public 
action.  This is the crux of popular institutions.' – Albert B. Hart. 
 
‘I always thought any of the simple unbalanced Governments bad; simple 
monarchy, simple aristocracy, simple democracy; I hold them all imperfect 
or vicious, all are bad by themselves; the composition alone is good.' - C.J. 
Fox (1790).  
 
The Soviet scheme of government embodies a principle differing 
fundamentally from the parliamentary system which it has been our habit to 
regard both as complete and ideal from the constitutional standpoint.  So 
much dissatisfaction is, however, now being manifested towards Parliament 
that it is not surprising to find even serious-minded people wondering 
whether some merits are not latent in the Soviet system which might permit 
of its transfusion - gradual and partial, if not total - into a truly democratic 
body.  Would the Soviet system enable us to reform, if necessary, a 
representative system which has been outstripped by the requirements of the 
nation, as well as to correct an obsolescent balance between the 
centralisation and decentralisation of the administrative functions.' - 
Edinburgh Review (July 1920).  
 
The floodgates of Democracy, opened in 1832, did not close upon the Act of that year.  
Grote, the banker-historian, Joseph Hume, Locke-King, and other radicals kept the 
question of further reform constantly to the fore in the House of Commons.  Attempts 
were made at frequent intervals to introduce voting by ballot, to assimilate the county to 
the borough franchise, to shorten the duration of parliaments, and to meet in 
substantial measure other demands of the Chartists.  Between 1852 and 1860 no 
fewer than three Bills for the lowering of the franchise were introduced by Lord John 
Russell himself, and in 1859 the Derby-Disraeli Government tried its hand at reform; 
but without success. 
 
Reform Act of 1867. 
It had, however, become abundantly clear that the settlement of 1832 was not going to 
be a final' one, and [begin page 486] in 1867 Disraeli astonished opponents and 
supporters alike by the boldness of his attempt to 'dish the Whigs'.  On the question of 
Parliamentary Reform they were supposed to have established a monopoly.  Disraeli 
determined to dispute it.  
 
With the personal and parliamentary aspects of the struggle over the Reform Bill of 
1867 this chapter cannot concern itself.  Only the final result can be registered.  As 
regards the franchise, the Act was a bold and far-reaching measure; as regards 
redistribution it was relatively insignificant.  Taken in conjunction with the Reform Acts 
for Scotland and Ireland (1868), the net result was that six boroughs returning two 
members each, and five returning one, were totally disfranchised, and thirty-five other 
boroughs lost one member each.  Thus fifty-two seats were available for redistribution.  
They were utilized to enfranchise twelve new boroughs, Chelsea and Hackney obtaining two members each, and ten other boroughs one apiece; to give additional 
members to eight large towns; twenty-seven additional members to counties; two 
members to the Scottish Universities and one to London University.  The total number 
of the House remained at 658.  As for the franchise, household suffrage was 
established in the boroughs, with the addition of a lodger franchise of £10; the basis of 
the county franchise was a £12 occupation.  This extension of the franchise brought on 
to the register an addition of 1,080,000 voters, mostly manual workers in the towns.  
Perhaps the most interesting feature of Disraeli's Reform Act was an innovation in the 
method of voting.  Mr. Hare, J.S. Mill, and others had lately forced to the front the 
problem of the representation of minorities.  The first draft of Disraeli's Bill contained a 
number of 'fancy franchises'; one of these was based upon proved educational 
attainments; a second upon the possession of funded property; a third on a savings 
bank deposit.  But these 'checks and counterpoises' did not long survive in the rough 
and tumble of debate.  At the last moment, [begin page 487] however, the House of 
Lords introduced a device for the protection of minorities.  In three-member 
constituencies electors were to be allowed to give only two votes.  The House of 
Commons, despite the strong opposition of Mr. John Bright, preferred the Lords' 
amendment to the loss of the Bill.  The experiment of the restricted vote, though well 
worthy of a trial, failed to commend itself to the country.  It might have fared better had 
it been tried on a more extended scale.  Only thirteen constituencies - seven counties 
and six boroughs-were immediately affected by it, and in them it did not prove popular.  
In the seven three-member county constituencies a Liberal invariably obtained the 
minority seat; and it was the same in Liverpool; the Conservatives, as a rule, won the 
third seat in Manchester, and occasionally in Leeds and Glasgow.  Birmingham, thanks 
to the organizing genius of Mr. Schnadhorst and Mr. Chamberlain, managed on each 
occasion to return three Liberals.  The ‘restricted vote' gave birth to the caucus; but the 
child survived its parent. 
 
Such were the main features of Disraeli's bold measure.  Thomas Carlyle bewailed the 
‘shooting of Niagara’, and denounced the antics of the superlative Hebrew conjuror, 
spell-binding all the great Lords, great parties, great interests of England to his hand, 
and leading them by the nose like helpless, mesmerized somnambulant cattle to such 
issue'.  Even Lord Derby, Disraeli's own chief, admitted that the Act was ‘a leap in the 
dark’, while Mr. Robert Lowe, the leader of the Liberal ‘Adullamites’, predicted that ‘the 
bag which holds the winds will be untied and we shall be surrounded by a perpetual 
whirl of change, alteration, innovation, and revolution'.  Disraeli himself was quite 
unmoved by denunciation and by predictions of evil.  The Act gave precise expression 
to his lifelong convictions, and the peroration of his third-reading speech in 1867 
echoed the language and reasserted the principles of Coningsby.  Of an oligarchy, 
whether of landlords or of merchants, Disraeli had a pro- [begin page 488] found 
mistrust; like Bolingbroke he desired to see an effective monarchy 'broad based upon 
the people's will.'  His desire and anticipation have been fulfilled.  
 
The Acts of 1884 and 1885. 
If the Act of 1832 did not secure 'finality’, still less did that of 1867.  Within five years of 
its passing an agitation was started for the assimilation of the county to the new 
borough franchise.  A motion in this sense, generally fathered by Sir George Trevelyan, 
was one of ‘hardy annuals' of the 'seventies.  Not, however, until 1884 was the principle 
embodied in a Government Bill.  In February of that year Mr. Gladstone introduced a 
Bill based upon a uniform household and lodger franchise in counties and boroughs.  It 
passed without serious opposition through the House of Commons; but, on the motion 
of Lord Cairns, the House of Lords declined to assent to 'a fundamental change in the 
electoral body' until they had before them the details of the promised scheme for the 
redistribution of seats.  The action of the Lords had logic behind it; but the country 
resented delay, and a fierce agitation was aroused against the Second Chamber.  Still, 
the House of Lords stood firm, and a dead-lock between the two Houses was averted 
only by the direct and tactful intervention of the Sovereign.  A comprehensive scheme of redistribution was presented to Parliament in a specially convened autumn session; 
and, satisfied as to its general outlines, the Conservative leaders allowed the Franchise 
Bill to become law in December.  Under its terms over 2,000,000 electors - mostly 
agricultural labourers - were added to the register.  The Redistribution Bill itself, the 
outcome of an agreement between the party leaders on both sides, passed into law in 
1885. 
  
In relation to the distribution and organization of constituencies, the Act of 1885 was of 
considerable significance.  It went a long way towards establishing the principle of 
equal electoral areas.  All boroughs with less than 15,000 inhabitants, eighty-one in 
number, lost their separate representation, and all boroughs with less than [begin page 
489] 50,000 inhabitants lost one member.  For the rest, with the exception of twenty-
two boroughs which retained two members apiece, and certain Universities, the whole 
country, counties and boroughs alike, was divided into single-member constituencies.  
In order to carry out this scheme it was unfortunately found necessary to increase by 
twelve the aggregate numbers of the House.  The precedent thus set was followed with 
even more untoward results in 1918.  The Act of 1885 set another and a more 
auspicious precedent: it was virtually an 'agreed’ measure; that agreement was 
reached, as we have seen, through the mediation of the Crown, and Mr. Gladstone had 
good reason to 'tender his grateful thanks' to the Queen, 'for the wise, gracious and 
steady influence on her Majesty's part,' which had 'so powerfully contributed to bring 
about this accommodation and to avert a serious crisis of affairs'.  
 
Minority Representation. 
It was contended and anticipated that the adoption, on a scale almost universal, of the 
principle of single-member constituencies would, among other advantages, secure 
adequate representation to minorities.  Mr. Gladstone, while declining to introduce the 
'novel and artificial system' of Proportional Representation, admitted that a 'large 
diversity of representation is a capital object in a good electoral system’, and he 
contended that by means of one-member districts the representation of minorities 
would be adequately secured.  This anticipation was not fulfilled.  On the contrary, the 
new system has tended to the exaggeration of majorities.  The electoral results prior to 
and subsequent to the Act of 1885 establish this conclusion.  The General Election of 
1859 gave the Liberals a majority of 43; that of 1866 a majority of 67; that of 1868 a 
majority of 128.  In 1874 the Conservatives had a majority of 48 over Liberals and 
Home Rulers combined; in 1880 the Liberals outnumbered Conservatives and Home 
Rulers by 46. 
 
These figures offer a remarkable and significant contrast to the results obtained since 
1886 under the single- [begin page 490] member system.  Leaving Ireland out of 
account, the Unionist majority in 1886 was 183; in 1895 it was 213; in 1900 it was 195; 
while in 1906 the Radical majority was 289.  Did those majorities, so much larger than 
those which were commonly obtained in the elections immediately preceding the 
change of system in 1885, accurately reflect the political opinions of the electorate? 
  
The Essence of Liberty. 
Such a conclusion is stoutly resisted by those who are concerned about the adequate 
representation of minorities.  That concern is shared by political philosophers who have 
little else in common.  Thus Lord Acton, answering his own question as to the real 
meaning of 'liberty', said: I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in 
doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, 
custom and opinion.'
1  And elsewhere: ' The most certain test by which we can judge 
whether a nation is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities. . . . It is 
bad to be oppressed by a minority, but it is worse to be oppressed by a majority.'  There 
                                                  
1   [490/1]  History of Freedom, p. 3. is a touch of paradox in the last sentence, if divorced from its context.  Lord Acton's 
meaning, evidently, is that there are summary methods of dealing with tyrannical 
autocrats and oppressive oligarchies which are denied to the victims of overbearing 
majorities.  In his general conclusion Acton was not far from the apostles of a 
philosophy with which he had little in common - that of the Utilitarians.  J.S. Mill himself 
said: ‘Protection against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs 
protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling.'  In Mill's view, 
therefore, as in Acton's, the protection of minorities would seem to be an inseparable 
adjunct, if not the essence of 'liberty'.  Mill, indeed, goes so far as to affirm that' it is an 
essential part of democracy that minorities should be represented.  No real democracy, 
nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.'  
[begin page 491] 
 
‘Fancy Franchises’ 
How is that representation to be secured?  Various expedients have been suggested, 
and more than one method has been experimentally adopted.  Mill strongly favoured 
the device of plural voting.  He would, provisionally at any rate, have given two votes to 
employers of labour, foremen, highly skilled labourers, bankers, merchants, and 
manufacturers.  Even more cordially did he commend the principle of increased 
electoral weight to education.  'In any future Reform Bill’, he wrote in 1861,  which 
lowers greatly the pecuniary conditions of the suffrage, it might be a wise provision to 
allow all graduates of Universities, all persons who have passed creditably through the 
higher schools, all members of the liberal professions, and perhaps some others to be 
registered specifically in those characters and to give them votes as such in any 
constituency in which they choose to register; retaining, in addition, their votes as 
simple citizens in the localities in which they reside.'
2  Disraeli, - as we have seen, 
attempted, in the first draft of his Reform Bill of 1867 to give practical effect to Mill's 
over-ingenious suggestions, but the 'fancy franchises' were laughed out of court, and 
Disraeli did not persist in the attempt.  The device of plural voting found a place, 
however, in the Belgian Constitution of 1893.  
 
The Cumulative Vote 
Another device for securing some representation to minorities is that of the cumulative 
vote, by which, in constituencies returning three or more members, each elector has a 
right to as many votes as there are members, and may, at his discretion, either give all 
his votes to one candidate or may distribute them.  The power of accumulation enables 
a numerically weak party, by the concentration of its voting power on its own candidate, 
to secure at least one seat against far more powerful opponents.  Mr. Lowe advocated 
the adoption of this device in 1867.  His proposal shared the fate of Disraeli's 'fancy 
franchises'; but the principle was adopted in school-board elections under the Act of 
1870, and still remains operative [begin page 492] in Scotland, though in England it 
disappeared with the school-boards themselves in 1902. 
 
In parliamentary elections, however, Great Britain has, thus far, steadily adhered to the 
‘relative majority' system; a system, that is, under which, in order to secure election, it 
is not necessary for a candidate to secure more than half the valid votes cast, but only 
more votes than any other candidate.  This method, as was pointed out by the Royal 
Commission on Electoral Systems,
3 is ‘practically confined to English-speaking 
countries'.  All the great European States and most of the smaller ones have rejected or 
abandoned a system which to them seems ‘unscientific’, and have adopted one or 
other of the several expedients designed to soften its asperities and correct its 
crudities. 
 
                                                  
2   [491/1]  Representative Government, c. viii. 
3   [492/1]  1910. Cd. 5163. The Second Ballot. 
Of these the most generally favoured is The Second Ballot.  Though experience has 
shown that the interval between the two elections not only ‘involves a prolongation of 
electoral turmoil and disturbance’, but ‘greatly increases the expense of candidates' 
and 'offers undesirable temptations to bargaining and intrigue'. 
  
Under this system a candidate can be returned at the first election only if he has 
obtained an absolute majority of the valid votes cast.  If no candidate obtains such a 
majority, a second election is held to decide between the two candidates who in the 
first election obtained most votes.  This method effectively averts the possibility of the 
election of the least popular of three or more candidates; but it is claimed that the 
advantages of this system can be obtained more simply and more cheaply by The 
Alternative or Contingent Vote. 
 
The Alternative Vote. 
 Where this method prevails voters are invited to indicate the order of their choice by 
placing the figures 1, 2, 3, &c., against the candidates' names.  At the first count only 
first choices are reckoned.  If, on that count, no candidate is found to have obtained an 
absolute majority, the candidate who is lowest on the poll is eliminated, and his voting 
[begin page 493] papers are distributed according to the names, if any, marked 2 on 
them.  If no second choice is indicated, the papers are regarded as exhausted, and the 
number of exhausted papers is deducted from the total for the purpose of the second 
count.  If there are more than three candidates, and none receives, on the second 
count, an absolute majority, the process is repeated as often as necessary. 
  
The Royal Commission of 1910 set forth the merits and defects of this system in great 
detail.  Of its defects perhaps the most serious is that while it prevents the election of 
the worst candidate, it does not necessarily secure the election of the best.  Assume a 
three-cornered contest between A, B, and  C in which A  receives 3,500 first 
preferences, B 3,250, and C 3,000.  C being cut out his second choices are distributed 
to A and B, but if the second choices of A and B had been similarly scrutinized C might 
have been found to have received more first and second choices together than either A 
or  B.  The method is also said to multiply opportunities for party intrigue and the 
gratification of personal ill-feeling.  Nevertheless the Commissioners, after giving all 
due weight to the objections urged against the system of the Alternative Vote, came to 
the conclusion that it supplies the simplest means of removing the most serious defect 
inherent in the single-member system, and accordingly recommended its adoption in 
single-member constituencies.  
 
The Conference on Electoral Reform presided over in 1916-17 by Mr. Speaker Lowther 
(afterwards Viscount Ullswater) endorsed this recommendation.  
 
Proportional Representation 
The failure of the 'restricted vote' and the single-member constituencies to correct the 
crudities of the ‘relative majority' system has led the advocates of minority 
representation, in recent times, to concentrate upon the device known as' Proportional 
Representation'.  
 
It was Mr. Thomas Hare who first focussed public attention upon this question; and in 
his book on The Machinery of Representation (1859) he propounded an [begin page 
494] ingenious solution of the difficulty.  Two years later J.S. Mill published his 
Representative Government (1861), and from that time.  Proportional Representation' 
has been kept continuously before the attention of political reformers.  Mill was a 
logical and consistent democrat, and his logic compelled to face the problem of the 
representation not of majorities only, but of minorities. 
  ‘The pure idea of democracy’, according to his definition, is the government 
of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented.  Democracy 
as commonly conceived and hitherto practised is the government of the 
whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented.  
The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter, 
strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favour of the 
numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State. .. .  
In a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, not 
disproportionately, but proportionately.  A majority of the electors would 
always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors 
would always have a minority of the representatives.’ 
  
His reasoning, as we have seen, had some influence upon the authors of the Reform 
Bill of 1867, and even the authors of the Bill of 1884 paid lip service to the principle, 
though they rejected the solution preferred by Mill.  Lord Eversley, the last survivor of 
the Cabinet Committee responsible for the details of the Bill of 1884, has put on record 
the reasons which led them to reject the scheme of the transferable vote, and to favour 
the division of the country, almost exhaustively, into single-member constituencies.   
They frankly admitted that the effect of the single-member system would be to 
exaggerate majorities in excess of the aggregate votes obtained; but contended that 
this result would strengthen parliamentary government as worked in England.  For this 
reason.  Since the Government is dependent from day to day on its majority in the 
House of Commons, no Government can be ‘vigorous and stable' if the representation 
of the two main parties are divided in mathematical proportion to [begin page 495] the 
aggregate votes cast for them respectively in the country.  Proportional Representation 
would necessarily lead to small majorities in the House of Commons, and, therefore, to 
feeble Executives which would be powerless to develop a strong line of policy either in 
domestic or in foreign affairs.  Such a condition of affairs, if recurrent or prolonged, 
might not improbably lead to a demand for a drastic change in our constitutional 
machinery, and, in particular, to a divorce of the Executive from the Legislature, and to 
the direct election of the former for a fixed term of years - in short for the Americanizing 
of the English Constitution.  A further reason against Proportional Representation was 
found in the excessive expense and labour which the large constituencies, 
contemplated under that system, would impose upon candidates and members.   
Finally, it was contended that single-member districts, especially in London, would 
secure a great variety of members, and an adequate representation of the minority.
4  
 
Large Electoral Areas. 
The scheme of Proportional Representation involves, it will be observed, not only an 
alteration in the method of voting, but also a drastic change in the arrangement of 
constituencies.  The advocates of Proportional Representation contend that the present 
arrangement of single-member constituencies is to a large extent arbitrary and artificial.  
This system 'turns the body of electors into a disorganized crowd and breaks the unity 
between local governing groups and Parliament'.  Thus wrote Mr. Ramsay Macdonald.
5  
Lord Bryce, speaking in the House of Lords on the Representation of the People Bill, in 
1918, vigorously attacked the existing system.  
 
‘Is it not true’, he asked, ‘that all communities prosper most and are strongest which are 
based upon nature and upon history? . . .  That was the old system of this country.  Our 
representative system, coming down from the thirteenth century, was based upon 
taking the natural aggregations of [begin page 496] men.  Boroughs returned members, 
counties returned members.  Those were the natural areas which had grown up and 
                                                  
4   [495/1]  Proportional Representation, 1867-1917, by Lord Eversley (formerly Mr. 
Shaw-Lefevre), revised edition, Dec. 1917. 
5   [495/2]  Socialism, Critical and Constructive, p. 253. which represented the associations of the people for social and economic and 
municipal purposes, and that was the basis of representation.  One of the best features 
of our system was that there was local life in all these places which expressed itself in 
the choice of representatives in Parliament.  Compare that with the system of artificial 
divisions to which we have resorted.  We have taken a large town and cut it up by 
perfectly artificial boundary lines and created aggregations . . . where I submit it was 
not necessary, for the purposes of parliamentary representation.  Anyone who knows 
Manchester will feel how much better Manchester was when it was one city returning a 
number of Members, and all of them Members for the one city, and the city interested 
in those Members, and the city desiring to choose eminent men who were 
representative of Manchester in one way or another, rather than when it was cut up into 
divisions.' 
 
That there is considerable force in this contention is undeniable; but it will not escape 
notice that the historic areas for which Lord Bryce expressed a strong preference 
contained under the former franchise very few electors.  Today, a city like Manchester 
has an electorate approaching 350,000 with no fewer than ten representatives.  The 
West Riding of Yorkshire with nineteen constituencies has over 665,000 voters.  Would 
the restoration of these historic constituencies make for more intimate personal 
relations between the 350,000 electors of Manchester and their ten representatives in 
Parliament?  It is not possible to answer that question with a positive affirmative.  In 
smaller boroughs and counties, returning from three to five members apiece, such 
contact would no doubt be easier. 
  
The Single Transferable Vote 
Not less important, however, is the proposed method of voting.  Under the proposals of 
the advocates of Proportional Representation each elector is to have one vote which 
may be given preferentially, and may be transferred by the returning officer according 
to the priority of choice indicated by each elector, who would [begin page 497] further be 
entitled (if he chose) to express as many preferences as there were candidates.   
Assuming a three-member constituency with nine candidates, each elector might vote 
only for the man of his choice, or might indicate a priority of choice to the ninth degree.  
Assuming the votes recorded to be 90,000, every candidate who received a' quota' of 




+ ) would be elected.  If on the first count it happened that 
one candidate received 32,501 votes, 10,000 of his second choices would be available 
for redistribution among the second preferences indicated by his supporters.  The 
system demands the most scrupulous accuracy and some intelligence on the part of 
the counters, but on the part of the voters no more of either quality than is involved in 
'picking up' a cricket eleven: save that the 'picking’ must be all in one process and on 
paper instead of viva voce.  
 
Proportional Representation in one form or another has been adopted in Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Holland, and other European States, 
in New South Wales and Tasmania, in the Union of South Africa (for the Senate), and 
for local government purposes in some American and Canadian cities.  It was 
prescribed both to Northern and to Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland 
Act (1920), and for local government elections under the Local Government (Ireland) 
Act  of 1919, and was adopted by Scotland for education authorities in 1918.  A 
determined attempt was made to introduce it into the Representation of the People Act, 
England and Wales, in 1918. But before dealing with that attempt something must be 
said of other aspects of the Act.  
 
The ‘Speaker’s Conference.’ 
The first point to remark is that the genesis of the Act was peculiar not to say unique.  
Its provisions represented not the triumph of a party, but the result of an agreement reached at a moment when party conflicts were in abeyance and party lines were 
blurred.  In August 1916 Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, threw out the suggestion 
[begin page 498] that the party truce should be utilized 'to see if we cannot work out by 
general agreement some scheme under which, both as regards the electorate and the 
distribution of electoral power, a Parliament can be created at the end of the war 
capable of and adequate for discharging’ the task of reconstruction.  The late Mr. 
Walter Long (afterwards Viscount Long of Wraxall), representing the Conservative 
section of the Coalition Ministry, warmly seconded the Prime Minister's proposal, and 
suggested the setting up of a Conference representative 'not only of parties, but of 
groups’, to work out an agreed scheme.  The Speaker of the House of Commons was 
accordingly invited to call such a conference; he agreed to do so, and he himself 
presided over it.  Some thirty members of both Houses, ‘eminently representative of the 
various shades of political opinion in Parliament and in the country,' were selected by 
him, and after some months of discussion and deliberation they drafted a scheme of 
reform which, with singularly few modifications, received the assent of both Houses of 
Parliament, and was embodied in the Reform Act of 1918. 
 
Franchise Reform Bill. 
The Bill, as first presented to the House, dealt not only with the qualification and 
registration of electors, and with the distribution of seats, but also with the method of 
voting.  Of the proposals under this latter head, one - the Alternative Vote - was, after 
prolonged discussions, finally rejected; to the fate of the other - Proportional 
Representation - further reference must presently be made. 
 
As regards the qualification of electors, the provisions of the Act are far more drastic 
than those of any of its predecessors.  Instead of the seven alternative franchises 
which previously existed, three only are now valid: of these by far the most important is 
residence; a second is the occupation of business premises; the third is the possession 
of a degree (or, in the case of women, its equivalent) at a University.  The ownership 
vote disappeared, and with it, except in severely restricted form, [begin page 499] plural 
voting.  Thenceforward a man might have at most two votes - one for his residence, 
and a second either for a constituency in which he carries on his business or for a 
University.  The University franchise was widely extended, virtually to all who have 
taken the first degree. 
 
By far the most striking innovation in the Bill remains to be noticed.  For the first time 
the franchise was extended to women as well as men; but the basis of qualification for 
the two sexes differs.  A woman is entitled to vote only if she is thirty years of age and 
is qualified as a 'local government elector'; in other words, is a ratepayer or the 
occupant of unfurnished lodgings; or is the wife of a man so qualified.  Provision was 
also made for the registration of 'absent voters’ and for the casting of their votes either 
by post or by proxy.  Cordially welcomed under the circumstances of the hour, these 
clauses enabled soldiers, sailors, airmen, and others engaged on work of national 
importance abroad to record their votes.  It was estimated that in all 8,000,000 electors 
would be added to the registered; in other words that the register would be doubled.  
This estimate proved to be much below the mark: the total electorate having been 
increased to about 21,000,000.  The enfranchisement was, therefore, on a scale more 
than four times as large as that of 1884, eight times that of 1867, and more than 
sixteen times that of 1832.  It should be added that one disqualification, that arising 
from the receipt of poor relief, was partially removed by the Bill, and one disqualification 
was imposed.  There was a general - though not a universal -consensus of opinion that 
the men who declined on grounds of conscience to take part in the defence of the 
country should not then, nor in the immediate future, be allowed to have any share in 
the control of its government.  As ultimately adopted, the provision for the exclusion of 
conscientious objectors was, however, rigidly curtailed both as regards scope and 
duration.  In effect it applied only to the unworthy or the contumacious.  [begin page 500] 
 The period of qualification was reduced to six months the register has, therefore, to be 
made up twice instead of once a year, and half the expenses are now paid by the 
State, half out of local rates.
6  The returning officers' expenses are also defrayed by the 
State, and all polls are, at a General Election, held on the same day.  
 
It was not, however, around these matters, important as they were, it was not even 
around the clauses dealing with the franchises, colossal as were the changes involved, 
that discussion raged most fiercely.  It was round the method of voting and the 
redistribution of seats. 
 
Redistribution of Seats. 
The principle which was to govern any scheme of redistribution was set forth explicitly 
in the report of the Speaker's Conference as follows: 'That each vote recorded shall, as 
far as possible, command an equal share of representation in the House of Commons.'  
The standard unit of population for each member was, accordingly, taken at 70,000 in 
Great Britain, though in Ireland it was to be 43,000.  Forty-four old boroughs, including 
historic cities like Canterbury, Winchester, and Chester, were extinguished, but 
boroughs with 50,000 or more inhabitants retained their separate representation, and 
the boroughs as a whole gained, on the balance, 36 members; the Universities, thanks 
to the enfranchisement of the new Universities, gained 6; and the counties lost 5.  Thus 
the membership of the House was, unfortunately, increased by no fewer than 37 
members, bringing up the total number to 707: a serious addition to a House already 
unduly large.  This total included, however, 105 Irish members.  Owing to the refusal of 
the Sinn Fein representatives to sit in the Imperial Parliament, and the curtailment of 
Ulster's representation, under the Act of 1920, to thirteen, the last provision never 
became operative.  The subsequent concession (1922) of Dominion status to Southern 
Ireland, and the consequent exclusion of Southern Irish representatives from the 
Imperial Parliament, reduced the membership of that Parliament [begin page 501] to 
615.  The old two-membered constituencies remained undivided, but elsewhere the 
single-member principle adopted as the basis of the Act of 1885 was carried out in its 
entirety. 
 
Proportional Representation Rejected. 
During the later stages of the Bill in the House of Commons, and, still more persistently, 
in the House of Lords, repeated efforts were made to get the principle of Proportional 
Representation embodied in the Bill.  The House of Lords, indeed, went so far as 
seriously to endanger the passage of the Bill rather than permit its enactment without 
such a provision.  Ultimately, however, the Commons agreed, in deference to an 
amendment of the Lords; to delete from the Bill the alternative vote; while on the 
question of Proportional Representation the Lords covered their retreat by inserting 
provisions for the appointment of commissioners to frame a scheme for the election of 
about one hundred members, in accordance with that method, such scheme to take 
effect only if adopted by resolution of both Houses.  As there was no chance whatever 
that the House of Commons would assent to, still less initiate, such a resolution, the 
provisions remained inoperative.  Thus Proportional Representation found no place in 
the Act except in the case of Universities returning two or more members.  To apply the 
method to a two-member constituency is not easy, and the attempt has already been 
attended with inconvenience.  The smallest constituency to which the principle can be 
satisfactorily applied is admittedly a constituency returning not less than three 
members. 
  
By the passing of the Act of 1918 in the form described in preceding paragraphs, the 
principle of minority representation suffered a severe rebuff.  Despite the unanimous 
recommendation of the Speaker's Conference, despite the insistence of the House of 
                                                  
6   [500/1]  The Economy Act (1926) abolished the second registration. Lords, the House of Commons refused, by majorities which increased with each trial of 
strength, to admit the principle of Proportional Representation except in the most 
narrowly limited degree.  Three reasons contributed most powerfully to [begin page 502] 
this result: the loss of touch between members and constituents involved in the 
creation of the very large constituencies necessitated by this method of election; the 
great expense to which candidates would be put; and above all perhaps the difficulty 
attaching to the conduct of by-elections.  Various ingenious devices for meeting the 
latter difficulties were suggested; but admittedly none was wholly satisfactory. 
  
The advocates of the principle may derive what comfort they can from its application to 
a large number of local government elections in Europe and America, but thus 3 far 
Germany is the only great State which has adopted it for the election of a national or 
federal Legislature.
7  That it is theoretically attractive for the election of a legislative 
body is undeniable.  But the English Parliament, as preceding chapters of this book 
have, it is hoped, made clear, is much more than a mere Legislature.  Its composition 
determines the complexion of the Executive, if not its personnel; Parliament, 
throughout its term, sustains the Executive and controls it.  This peculiar feature of the 
parliamentary type of Democracy cannot safely be ignored in considering the relative 
merits of various electoral systems. 
  
Any electoral method which seems likely to emphasize the tendency to the formation of 
groups, to endanger the two-party system, will always be regarded with misgiving, if not 
positive hostility, by those who accept the English type of democracy as sacrosanct. 
 
Democracy Representative and Direct. 
Is that type, however, destined to endure?  Or has representative government reached 
its zenith?  Was the Reform Act of 1918 the last expiring effort to maintain a system 
hallowed in this country by long tradition - a system which has been periodically 
adjusted, without serious difficulty or friction, to the ever-changing conditions of modern 
civilization?  
 
Two questions are, in reality, involved: first, whether the principle of representation can 
hold its own; and, [begin page 503] secondly, whether, if so, representation will continue 
to be based upon localities, or whether it will take primary account of economic 
interests and vocational affinities?  
 
The larger issue thus raised between direct and representative Democracy lies outside 
the scope of the present chapter.  The issue between the claims of locality and 
vocation as the basis of representation is, on the contrary, strictly pertinent to the 
argument of the preceding paragraphs.  More than once indeed it has incidentally 
intruded itself upon our notice.  A few words must therefore be added on this question. 
  
Vocation v. Lovcality 
The two principles have, as already indicated, been contending for supremacy ever 
since the development of central representation.  In France and in the Spanish 
kingdoms the vocational, or as we may term it, the ‘Soviet' principle triumphed.  The 
States-General and the Cortes of Castille or Aragon were in fact Soviets in excelesis.  
Down to 1832 the House of Lords was a Soviet of landowners.  The Convocations of 
Canterbury and York enshrine the same principle.  In the House of Commons of today 
the only formal recognition of the vocational basis is found in University representation.  
But the idea, though not formally recognized, has already begun to obtrude itself 
elsewhere.  It would be pedantic to suggest that the official of a trade organization, of 
an employers' association, or a trade union, speaks or votes in the House of Commons 
primarily as the representative of the locality which he nominally represents.  Local 
                                                  
7   [502/1]  Italy adopted it (1919), but has abandoned it. areas may, and not infrequently do, coincide with certain dominant industries: a great 
railway centre, or a mining district, may appropriately be represented by an official of 
the National Union of Railwaymen, or of the Miners' Federation: but, in fact, such 
officials are usually selected primarily as representatives of their respective trade 
unions, and only incidentally assigned as candidates to particular localities.  In practice, 
therefore, the vocational principle is not, even now, unknown in the working of 
parliamentary institutions in this country.  [begin page 504] 
 
Is it advisable to extend its formal application? 
 
To this question affirmative answers have lately been given by two representative 
writers between whose opinions there is, in general, little in common.  Mr. Harold Cox 
writes:  
 
‘Our present territorial constituencies have no communal interest of their 
own in the vast number of problems now coming before Parliament. . . . We 
have to evolve new forms of government to deal with new problems.  If our 
plans are to be successful they must be based upon the principle of a direct 
and logical connexion between the purpose aimed at and the character of 
the agency framed for achieving that purpose.  The most urgent of modern-
day problems are industrial or commercial; therefore the basis of the 
agency or agencies for dealing with them must be industrial or commercial 




The second is from the pen of Mr. G.D.H. Cole:  
 
‘Misrepresentation is seen at its worst to-day in that professedly 
omnicompetent “representative” body Parliament. . . . Parliament professes 
to represent all the citizens in all things and therefore, as a rule, represents 
none of them in anything.  It is chosen to deal with everything that may turn 
up quite irrespective of the fact that the different things that do turn up 
require different types of persons to deal with them. . . . There can be only 
one escape from the futility of our present methods of parliamentary 
government, and that is to find an association and method of representation 
for each function, and a function for each association and body of 
representatives.  In other words, real democracy is to be found not in a 
single omnicompetent representative assembly but in a system of co-
ordinated functional representative bodies.'
9  
 
To these quotations may be added a third from the pen of an anonymous writer:  
 
‘The Soviet scheme of government embodies a principle differing 
fundamentally from the parliamentary system which [begin page 505] it has 
been our habit to regard both as complete and ideal from the constitutional 
standpoint.  So much dissatisfaction is, however, now being manifested 
towards Parliament that it is not surprising to find even serious-minded 
people wondering whether some merits are not latent in the Soviet system 
which might permit of its transfusion - gradual and partial if not total - into a 
truly democratic body.  Would the Soviet system enable us to reform, if 
necessary, a representative system which has been outstripped by the 
requirements of the nation as well as to correct an obsolescent balance 
                                                  
8   [504/1]  Economic Liberty, pp. 186-7.  




Whatever degree of importance may be thought to attach to these opinions, it will 
hardly be denied that they do, to some extent, reflect contemporary thought, and that 
they closely correspond with a development discernible in other spheres of national 
activity.  Unquestionably there are, in several quarters, indications of a feeling, it may 
be merely transitory, that the House of Commons despite, or perhaps by reason of, the 
extension of the electorate, no longer adequately represents the varied interests which 
go to make up the nation as a whole; that the House of Commons, instead of being the 
mirror of the nation, is only one of several mirrors.  Popular language, however loose 
and inaccurate, reflects the change.  So we read of the 'Parliament of Industry’, the 
'Parliament of Labour’, the 'Parliament of Science’, and so forth.  That these sectional 
'Parliaments' should continue to develop each along its own line and each within its 
appropriate sphere is eminently desirable.  Mischief arises only if and when the organ 
appropriate to one sphere of activity obtrudes upon the sphere of another. 
 
In the political sphere Parliament is and must be supreme; it cannot afford to admit any 
competing authority or jurisdiction.  If the governing bodies of the Colleges of 
Physicians and Surgeons were to threaten to call out all the doctors because the 
Government refused to propose to Parliament a measure of total prohibition, [begin 
page 506] much more if they declined to evacuate the Sudan, there would be a general 
outcry against the political use of a professional weapon. 
 
To condemn such an intrusion as impertinent is not, however, to resolve the issue now 
under consideration It may be that the Imperial Parliament is attempting too much; that 
some of its legislative duties might well be devolved upon subordinate law-making 
bodies; that, in an age of the differentiation of functions, some of the more specialized 
work now done at Westminster might with advantage be transferred to more 
specialized organizations all this is fair matter for argument.  Nor is it unreasonable to 
inquire whether, under the centripetal impulse derived from the development of the 
means of transport and communication, locality still remains the most logical and most 
satisfactory basis for representation. 
  
The doubt may obtrude itself whether under a system of universal suffrage it is even 
the safest basis.  An acute Belgian philosopher answered this question in the negative 
a quarter of a century ago. 
 
‘Il est incontestable que le suffrage universel sans cadres, sans 
organisation, sans groupement est un systeme factice; ne donne que 
l’ombre de la vie politique.  Il n'atteint pas le seul but vraiment politique que 
l’on doit avoir en vue, et qui est non de faire voter tout le monde, mais 
d"arriver à représenter le mieux les intérêts du plus grand nombre, . . . Le 
suffrage universel moderne c'est surtout le suffrage des passions, des 
courants irréfléchis, des partis extrêmes.  Il ne laisse aucune place aux 
idées modérées et il écrase les partis modérés.  La victoire est aux exalté.  
La représentation des intéréts, qui contient les passions par les idées qui 




Whether M. Pring would have welcomed the advent of the Soviet When he saw it at 
closer quarters is a question which may be asked, but cannot be answered. 
  
                                                  
10   [505/1]  Edinburgh Review, No. 473, p. 66. 
11   [506/1]  Adolphe Prins, L'Organisation de la Liberté, pp. 186, 201. This, however, must be said: the change from a local to a vocational basis for 
parliamentary representation [begin page 507] must come, if it comes at all, as a result 
of the deliberate decision of the nation.  It cannot be accepted at the dictation of any 
one section of the community, however well organized or influential that section may 
be.  The Soviet principle, properly understood, should not be identified with 
'Bolshevism', nor with the 'direct action' which has from time to time been threatened by 
organized labour.  Nor is it inconsistent with the root idea of Representative 
Democracy.  It is an alternative method of representation, which might be combined, as 
indeed it is in a small degree at present, with the principle of the representation of 
localities. 
 
Before the present system is abandoned due weight should, however, be given to one 
consideration.  Is it well to accentuate the lines of division between one economic 
interest and another?  Are they not already sufficiently marked?  Is it not rather the part 
of wisdom to insist upon the claims of neighbourhood, upon the fact of common 
citizenship, as paramount over the interests of social classes or economic groups?  If 
Aristotle was right in maintaining that 'the State is prior to the individual', evidently the 
citizen is more important than the physician or the lawyer, the grocer or the steelworker.  
Weaver, miner, baker, teacher - each has his part to play in the Commonwealth, each 
his contribution to make to the well-being of the community.  But it would seem on the 
whole advisable that all these several economic interests should combine to send to 
the Imperial Parliament a representative of the locality to which in common they 
belong, rather than by vocational representation to emphasize their class interests and 
exaggerate their economic antagonisms. 
 
That 'interests', classes, and vocations will find it increasingly desirable to organize 
themselves, for sectional purposes, may be assumed as certain.  None the less would 
it be disastrous that the common interest of all, as citizens of the State, should fail to 
find adequate representation in a Commons House of Parliament. 
 XX. Parliamentary Procedure 
The Process of Legislation 
 
'Parliamentary Procedure is often a better index of the true balance of power 
than the written Constitution.'- J.H. Morgan. 
 
'This House will receive no petition for any sum relating to public service, 
or proceed upon any motion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue, 
whether payable out of the consolidated fund, or out of money to be 
provided by Parliament, unless recommended from the Crown.' - House of 
Commons, Standing Order No. 66. 
 
'This House cannot be the effectual guardian of the Revenues of the State 
unless the whole amount of the taxes and of various other sources of income 
received for the Public Account be either paid in or accounted for to the 
Exchequer.' - Resolution of House of Commons, 30th May 1848. 
 




Hardly less important than the structure and the powers of the Legislature are the 
questions relating to its procedure.  The problems are indeed interdependent since it is 
evident that procedure ought to be appropriate to the functions assigned to the 
Legislature and that methods of conducting public business must needs vary according 
to the business which has to be done.  We shall, therefore, expect to find considerable 
varieties of procedure between, for example, the Congress of the United States and the 
Imperial Parliament: the one being a subordinate body and strictly limited in its legis-
lative and taxative functions; the other being a Sovereign body, unlimited in its 
legislative powers, and entrusted with functions for transcending in importance those 
which are performed by a merely legislative assembly.  Nor shall we be disappointed. 
 
English Procedure Largely Customary. 
Procedure in the Imperial Parliament naturally differs also, though less markedly, from 
that which has been largely adopted by or dictated to Legislative Bodies, created by 
custom or under a written constitution.  'Napoleon, when framing a Constitution for 
France, saw and expressed clearly the difference between a legislature as [begin page 
510] he conceived it should be and the British Parliament as actually was.  He 
professed the greatest reverence for the legislative power, but legislation, in his view, 
did not mean finance, criticism of the administration, or ninety-nine out of the hundred 
things with which in England the Parliament occupies itself.  The legislature, according 
to him, should legislate, should construct grand laws on scientific principles of 
jurisprudence, but it must respect the independence of the Executive as it desires its 
own independence to be respected.  It must not criticize the Government.’
1
 
The first and most striking feature of the procedure followed in the English Parliament 
is that it is in large measure customary the result not of specific enactment or 
regulation, but of a long process of historical evolution.  Consequently, as Sir 
Courtenay Ilbert has pointed out, 'the rules of procedure have never been codified.  
                                                  
1   [510/1]  Ilbert, ap. Redlich, vol. i, pp. vi, vii. The standing orders do not constitute and were never intended to constitute a code.  
They merely supplement, explain and alter, in a few particulars, the customary law of 
the house.'
2  Of the existing standing orders only three date from a period prior to 
1832, although the present procedure would seem to have been established in its main 
principles before the middle of the sixteenth century, if not at an earlier date. 
 
'As late, as 1844 there were only fourteen standing orders, and although 
the number has now (1924) increased to one hundred and three they are 
largely restrictive in their character or deal with particular matters.   
Consequently they would afford little help in an attempt to construct a code 
of procedure.  Recourse must, therefore, be had to the precedents to be 
found in the journals, the decisions of Speakers and Chairmen, sometimes 
recorded in the journals, but more usually to be found in the parliamentary 
debates, tradition, and the opinions of people experienced in parliamentary 
proceedings.
3
[begin page 511] 
 
From very early days the House of Commons regulated its business with great 
precision.  Thus, there is an, order of the 9th of May 157I that for the rest of the session 
special afternoon sittings should be held every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday from 3 
to 5, the time to be employed only in taking first readings of private Bills.  Towards the 
close of the same reign (1601) there was a formal procedure debate on the important 
question whether it was for the Speaker or for the House to determine the order in 
which business should be taken.  One member, Mr. Carey, argued that it was the 
function of the Speaker and if he err or do not his duty fitting to his place we may 
remove him.'  To which Mr. Wisconan, though professing great reverence for Mr. 
Speaker 'in his place', retorted: 'we know our own grievances better than Mr. Speaker: 
and therefore every man, alternis vicibus, should have those acts called for he 
conceives most necessary.'  Whereupon, according to D'Ewes: 'All said "I, I, I,” and Mr. 
Secretary Cecil urged that, despite the inconvenience thereby caused to the 
Government, the House should have its way.’
4
 
Privileges of the House of Commons. 
This debate afforded only one of many illustrations of Privileges the growing 
self-confidence of the House of Commons and of the House of its individual members.  
Before the close of the sixteenth Commons century the Speaker was accustomed to 
demand from the Crown the confirmation of privileges which were already ancient and 
accustomed rights'.  These were: the right of access to the Crown, freedom of speech, 
freedom from arrest, and that ‘all their proceedings shall receive from His Majesty the 
most favourable construction.’  Down to 1515 the Speaker asked for freedom of speech 
and access only on his own behalf.  In 1542, however, Speaker Moyle, for the first time, 
requested freedom of speech for members of the House in general, and in 1554 a 
demand for the three privileges which have since become customary was made.  On 
the question of freedom of [begin page 512] speech there were frequent debates in the 
latter part of the sixteenth century; but despite the increasing boldness and 
independence of the Commons the Queen's concession was grudging and strictly 
limited: 
 
                                                  
2   [510/2]  Parliament, pp. 131-2, by Sir Courtenay llbert, Clerk of the House of 
Commons 1902-2 1 and one of the foremost authorities on parliamentary 
procedure. 
3   [510/3]  Parliamentary Procedure and Oversea Assemblies, reprinted from The 
Empire Review, PP. 3, 4, by Sir T. Lonsdale Webster, Clerk of the House of 
Commons, 1921.   
4   [511/1]  D'Ewes, pp. 676-7, ap. Redlich. 'Privilege of speech', so ran the Queen's message of the 19th of February 
1593, 'is granted, but you must know what privilege you have; not to speak 
everyone what he listeth, or what cometh in his brain, to utter that; but your 
privilege is aye or no.  Wherefore, Mr. Speaker, Her Majesty's pleasure is, 
that if you perceive any idle heads, which will not stick to hazard their own 
estates, which will meddle with reforming the Church and transforming the 
Commonwealth, and do exhibit any bills to such purpose, that you receive 
them not, until they be viewed and considered by those who it is fitter 
should consider of such things and can better judge of them.'
5
 
Farther than this Queen Elizabeth refused to go.  So great, however, was the 
importance attached by the House to questions of privilege that in 1589 a Standing 
Committee for privileges was appointed.  A similar committee was set up in 1593, in 
1597, and in 1601, and thereafter the practice became a regular one. 
 
The Stuarts and Parliament. 
James I was reminded at the very outset of his reign that the privileges of the House of 
Commons were 'of and Parliament right and not of grace only'; and the reminder was, 
at intervals, repeated.  Yet as late as 1621 the King challenged the contention, and 
when the Commons protested that 'the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions 
of Parliament' were 'the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the 




Charles  I was as stubborn as his father, but the proceedings in the King's Bench 
against Sir John Eliot, Hollis, and Valentine in 1629 constituted the last attempt on the 
part of the Crown to impugn, in a formal manner, the right of free speech in Parliament. 
 
The Parliaments of 1640. 
In matters of Privilege and Procedure special interest [begin page 513] attaches to the 
proceedings of the fourth and fifth Parliaments of Charles I - the Parliaments commonly 
known respectively as the Short and the Long Parliament.  The long interval - eleven 
years - which had elapsed since the dissolution of the third Parliament together with the 
incidents connected with the rule of 'Thorough' had naturally tended to exacerbate the 
temper of the newly elected members.  The King, or his servants, started badly; the 
Commons were summoned to the House of Lords to hear the King's speech not, as 
was usual and proper, by the Gentleman Usher of the Lords House but by a person 
who 'was said to be a Quarter Waiter upon His Majesty': a discourtesy which 'was very 
ill taken, as an undervaluing and dishonouring of the House'.  Nevertheless, rather than 
'by any disturbance make the King wait, the Speaker, accompanied with the House, 
went upon this summons'; evidently, however, with a sense of wounded pride. 
 
On the following Monday (20 April 1640) there was a 'long and various debate' upon 
the circumstances attending the adjournment of the House on the last day of the 
session of 1629.  Ultimately it was resolved that 'the Speaker's refusing to put 
Questions, after a verbal command by his Majesty, signified to this House by the 
Speaker, to adjourn, and no adjournment made by this House, is a Breach of Privilege 
of this House'.  Moreover, a Select Committee was appointed to prepare a 
representation to the King, and a petition 'that the like Violation may not hereafter be 
brought into Practice to his Prejudice or ours'.  Among the members named of that 
committee were Mr. Pimme, Mr. Hampden, Sir Jo. Hotham, and others destined to play 
a conspicuous part in the days to come. 
                                                  
5   [512/1]  D’Ewes, Journal, p. 460. 
6   [512/2]  C.J. I., p. 668.    
The Journals of the Short Parliament and of the early days of the Long Parliament 
abound with resolutions passed for the purpose of determining their procedure and 
asserting their independence.  Thus, on 21 April, the Commons resolved to 'prefer 
grievances to the supply'.  [begin page 514] 
 
On the 25th the Clerk Assistant was ordered 'not to take any notes here without the 
precedent order of the House'.  On 11 November rules were made in regard to 
witnesses called before the House or the Committee.  In the former case the 'bar ought 
to be down'; in the latter, otherwise.  A few days later Mr. Watkins, a member of the 
House, having several times disobeyed an order to withdraw was called to the Bar, and 
'upon his knees submitted himself to the censure of the House', and was commanded 
to' forbear the House'.  On 26 November it was ordered that 'neither Book nor Glove 
shall give any man title to any Place if himself be absent at Prayers', and on the 4th of 
December that 'whoever does not take his Place, or moves out of it, to the disturbance 
of the House, shall pay 12d. to be divided between the Serjeant and the Poor, and 
whoever speaks loud &c. the like'.
7
  
These may seem trivial matters.  Nothing, if properly understood, is really trivial which 
touches Parliamentary procedure, or affects the position and privileges of its individual 
members.  Not less important, however, is the right of the House to provide for its 
proper constitution by the issue of writs to fill such vacancies as may occur during the 
lifetime of a Parliament; by enforcing disqualifications for sitting in Parliament; by the 
expulsion of members and by determining disputed returns.  The first three of these 
rights are still exercised by the House, but the fourth, which was claimed under 
Elizabeth, and continuously exercised, not without inconvenience and embarrassment, 
from 1604 onwards, was, in 1868 transferred to the Courts of Law.  The House also 
claims and exercises the right to the exclusive cognizance of matters arising within the 
House, and the consequential power of punishing those who infringe its privileges. 
 
Calling of Parliament. 
Before any of these rights can become operative there is, however, a condition 
precedent: the House itself must be called into being.  This can be done only by the 
King who, on the advice of the Privy Council, issues [begin page 515] a Royal 
Proclamation under the Great Seal.  In order to preserve the continuity of Parliament it 
has become customary for the King to issue one Proclamation 'for Dissolving the 
present Parliament and Declaring the calling of another’, discharging as from a 
specified day 'the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Knights, Citizens and 
Burgesses, and the Commissioners for shires and burghs of the House of Commons 
from their meeting and attendance' and calling a new Parliament.  On the same day an 
Order-in-Council is issued to the Lord Chancellor requiring him to issue writs for the 
calling of a new Parliament. 
 
These writs are issued in varying forms to Temporal and Spiritual Peers, to the judges 
and Law Officers in person, and to the Sheriff or Returning Officer of counties and 
boroughs.  Hereditary Peers are required, before taking their seats in the House of 
Lords, to present their writs in person at the table of the House; the returns to the writs 
addressed to Returning Officers are made to the Clerk of the Crown, who furnishes a 
list of members duly returned to the Clerk of the House of Commons.  In the case of 
by-elections - the elected member himself presents a certificate to the Clerk of the 
House, notifying that the Crown Office's certificate has been duly deposited in the 
Public Bill Office. 
 
                                                  
7   [514/1]  C.J., vol. ii. Meeting of Parliament. 
Each new Parliament and every session of Parliament Meeting is opened and 
prorogued by the King in person or by a Commission under the Great Seal.  In the case 
of a new Parliament the opening takes place, in actual practice, in two stages: the 
formal opening at which the King is invariably represented by Commissioners, and a 
ceremonial opening at which it is customary for the King and Queen to attend in state.  
The former is held to enable the House of Commons to choose their Speaker and take 
the oath of allegiance.  At the latter the main business is the reading of the King's 
Speech.  After the first session the earlier stage is naturally omitted. 
 
The Speaker. 
The office of Speaker is generally held to date from the [begin page 516] election of Sir 
Thomas Hungerford in 1376-7.  He was the first member to whom that title was given, 
although, as Bishop Stubbs points out, 'some such officer must have been necessary 
from the first.'  From 1377 onwards the succession has been continuous.  The Speaker 
has always been chosen by the Commons, but their choice must be confirmed by the 
Crown.  Originally the medium of communication between the Commons and the 
Crown, the Speaker has from the first been the pivot of the parliamentary machine: the 
principal officer of the House, its representative on all ceremonial occasions, the 
regulator of its procedure, the guardian of its dignity, the president over its debates.  It 
is therefore a matter of high consequence that the choice should fall upon a fit person.  
In earlier days it was of special importance to the Crown that the Speaker should be a 
man well affected to the King and competent to make the Commons walk in the ways 
desired by him.  The Tudors saw to it that he should be such a man, and if we may 
trust Sir Thomas Smith
8 the customary practice was in their day reversed and the 
Speaker was 'appointed' by the Crown 'though accepted by the assent of the House'.  
The actual course of the debates as reported by D'Ewes confirms this view.  Clarendon 
attributes much of the 'growing mischief' of the Long Parliament to the fact that Sir 
Thomas Gardiner, who had been designated by King Charles for the office of Speaker, 
failed to secure election owing to the machinations of the Puritans: 'so great a fear 
there was that a man of entire affections to the King, and of prudence enough to 
manage those affections, and to regulate the contrary, should be put into the chair.'  
The exclusion of the King's intended nominee was, says Clarendon, an untoward, and 
in truth an unheard-of accident, which broke many of the King's measures, and 
infinitely disordered his service beyond a capacity of reparation.
9  In default of Gardiner 
the choice fell on William [begin page 517] Lenthall, who played a conspicuous part in 
the history of the years that followed, and a part which went far to justify Clarendon's 
view. 
 
From the seventeenth century onward the Speaker has been at once the servant and 
the master of the House of Commons. 
 
Election of the Speaker. 
The manner of his election is on this wise.  The Commissioners 'desire’ (whereas the 
King himself 'demands') Speaker the attendance of the Commons, and the Commons 
having obeyed, formally open Parliament in the King's name and bid the Commons 
choose a Speaker. 
 
The Speaker-less Commons having returned to their own House, the Clerk of the 
House points to a particular member, who thereupon rises and proposes as Speaker 
another member of the House.  The motion having been seconded and the House 
                                                  
8   [516/1]  Sir Thomas Smith, The Commonwealth of England, ed. 1589.  
9   [516/2]  History of the Rebellion, Bk. III, init. having assented to it,
10 the person so designated submits himself to the pleasure of the 
House, and, with a display of modest reluctance is half dragged, half conducted, to the 
chair by his proposer and seconder.  Standing on the upper step he then expresses his 
deep sense of the great honour which the House has been pleased to confer upon him, 
and having seated himself in the chair receives the congratulations of the spokesmen 
of various sections of the House. 
 
On the following day the Speaker-elect presents himself at the Bar of the Lords, and 
submits 'himself with all humility to His Majesty's gracious approbation'.  The Lord 
Chancellor thereupon expresses His Majesty's ‘ready approval and confirmation of the 
choice of his faithful Commons', and the Speaker, having submitted himself with all 
humility and gratitude to His Majesty's gracious commands, proceeds at once to lay 
claim to all the rights and privileges of the Commons; and adds: [begin page 518] ‘With 
regard to myself I humbly pray that if in the discharge of my duties I shall inadvertently 
fall into any error the blame may be imputed to myself alone, and not to His Majesty's 
faithful Commons.'  The Lord Chancellor thereupon declares that the Commissioners 
'have it further in command to inform [Mr. Speaker] that His Majesty doth most readily 
confirm all the rights and privileges which have ever been granted or conferred upon 
the Commons by His Majesty or any of His Royal Predecessors' and adds: ‘With 
respect to yourself, sir, although His Majesty is sensible that you stand in no need of 
such assurance, His Majesty will ever put the most favourable construction upon your 
words and actions.' 
 
The Speaker then reports these proceedings to the Commons, repeats his thanks, and 
takes the oath of allegiance.  His example is followed by other members, and at last the 
House is formally constituted. 
 
State Opening of Parliament. 
After some days' interval the Parliament is opened for the dispatch of business, either 
by Royal Commissioners or by the Sovereign in person.  In the latter case the opening 
is made the occasion of a great State ceremonial carried out amid scenes of medieval 
pomp and splendour.  The stately procession of the King and Queen from their 
residential Palace to the more ancient Palace of Westminster; the gilded chamber now 
brilliantly illuminated and thronged with Peers fully robed and Peeresses in court dress; 
the Bishops in lawn; the judges in scarlet and ermine; all the high officials of the Court 
in resplendent costume; the King and Queen in their robes, wearing their crowns and 
sitting on their thrones; the Commons crowding at the bar - the scene is one which, 
though it may call forth the mockery of the low-minded, brings to the seeing eye and 
understanding heart not only a reminiscence of medieval pageantry, but an epitome of 
seven hundred years of crowded political history. 
 
The King’s Speech. 
The King, having reviewed the state of international relations, requests the Commons 
to grant the necessary [begin page 519] supplies, and lays before both Houses what is, 
in effect, the ministerial programme.  The recital ended, the Court withdraws; and each 
House proceeds separately to consider the speech and to vote an address in reply to it. 
 
                                                  
10   [517/1]  More than one person may, of course, be proposed and seconded, and a 
division, thereupon, ensue.  The last contest for the speakership took place in 
1895, when Mr. William Court Gully, a dark horse 'who knows nothing and whom 
nobody knows' (as Sir William.  Harcourt wrote to Lord Rosebery) was elected 
against Sir M. White Ridley, by 285 votes to 274.  Gully made an excellent 
Speaker.  For a graphic account of the incident see Gardiner, Life of Sir William 
Harcourt, ii. 354 seq. Adjournment and Prorogation. 
Before doing so, each House, in formal assertion of an ancient privilege, reads a Bill, 
which never goes farther a first time.  Each House is free to adjourn when and for so 
long as it pleases: but the prorogation of Parliament requires the presence of the 
Sovereign or his Commissioners.  As a fact the King never attends a prorogation; nor, 
does he personally give his assent to Bills.  That also is done, in formal manner, by 
Commissioners, the King's assent being announced, in medieval French, by the Clerk 
of the Parliaments. 
 
The Clerk of the Parliaments. 
The title of this high official recalls the fact that Parliament is still in theory unicameral.  
All the solemn and formal proceedings take place 'in Parliament', and as a fact in the 
Upper House, whose principal official is not the Clerk of the House of Lords but 'Clerk 
of Parliament'.  The King does, indeed, formally recognize the separate existence of 
the House of Commons, and its supremacy in the sphere of finance, by addressing to 
its members exclusively his request for a grant of supply, but otherwise formal 
procedure assumes the presence of the Commons in the Parliament Chamber where 
the Peers habitually sit.  To that Chamber the Commons are invariably summoned 
when formal business - the opening or proroguing of Parliament or the Royal assent to 
Bills has to be done.
11
 
The preliminaries accomplished, and the address in reply to the King's Speech voted, 
both Houses can get to business, though, in fact, the business of the House of Lords 
has to await the completion of certain stages of business in the Commons.  With 
procedure in the House of Commons we may therefore chiefly concern ourselves. 
 
The work of the House resolves itself into three main [begin page 520]  divisions 
 
(1)   Deliberation: the discussion of matters of public importance; 
(2)   Critical: the imposition of a check upon the Executive Government, by 
interpellation and criticism; and 
(3)   Legislation: the making of new and the amending of existing statutes. 
 
The last is commonly regarded as the main business of  Parliament, and as a fact the 
performance of the deliberative and critical functions (apart from the regular 
interpellation of Ministers) is largely incidental to financial  legislation. 
 
Legislation. 
The Legislative work of Parliament is threefold: 
 
(1)  Ordinary Legislation or Public Bills; 
(2) Financial  Bills; 
(3)  Private Bills; - Bills affecting particular localities or interests. 
 
Any member may, if he gets the chance, initiate legislation.  Every Session a large 
number of Bills are introduced by 'private' members, i.e. by members who hold no 
ministerial office.  It is increasingly rare for Bills thus initiated to come to legislative 
fruition, but the discussion of such projects is far from being invariably wasted. 
  
 Occasionally the Government adopts as its own the project formulated by a private 
member; sometimes it grants him exceptional facilities for passing it into law; still more 
often a private member's Bill stifled in infancy in one session, perhaps in many 
sessions, ultimately finds an honoured place in the Ministerial programme.  It would 
probably be within the mark to say, that of the important legislative enactments of the 
                                                  
11   [519/1]  This is well brought out in A. F. Pollard's Evolution of Parliament, c. vi. nineteenth century half made their debut in the House of Commons under the aegis of 
a private member.  But the tendency is for the Government more and more to absorb 
the time of the House, and to demand priority for their own legislative proposals.  With 
the increasing complexity of public business, the ever-widening responsibilities of the 
House of Commons, and the growing demand for legislation on every conceivable 
topic, this tendency is irresistible; but no one can doubt that the extinction of the 
legislative activity of the private member would result in a deteriora [begin page 521] tion 
in the quality, if not the quantity, of Parliamentary enactments.  People who hold that 
the efficiency of the Parliamentary machine is to be judged by the number of 'first-class' 
measures placed upon the statute-book are naturally impatient of the 'waste of time' 
involved in the discussion of projects which can rarely hope to ripen into immediate 
fruition.  But this view is in reality short-sighted and erroneous.  Of a given Session or 
even a given Parliament it may be true; the chance of the ballot may operate in favour 
of the impracticable crank; but a longer view reveals the fact that much of the best 
legislative work of successive Parliaments had its origin in the 'fads' of private 
members.  From the earlier Factory Acts down to Imperial Penny Postage the annals of 
Parliament teem with illustrations of this truth. 
 
As regards procedure there is no distinction between a Government Bill and a Private 
Member's Bill.  But sharply to be distinguished from both are Private Bills, and to avoid 




A Private Bill is one which is promoted in the interest Private of some particular locality, 
persons, or collection of persons.  Bills to permit the construction of railways, harbours, 
tramways, for drainage schemes or the supply of water, gas, or electricity, afford the 
commonest illustrations.  Such Bills originate in Petitions, which must be sent in before 
a given date (about two months before the commencement of a normal Session), and 
are then submitted to a quasi-judicial examination at the hands of officials of the House 
known as Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.  These examiners report that the 
Standing Orders, of a very stringent character, applicable to such Bills, have or have 
not been complied with.  If everything is in order
12 the Bill is introduced into one or 
other House-Private Bills being distributed, to facilitate business, fairly evenly between 
the Houses.  The ' pre- [begin page 522] sentation' of a Private Bill is equivalent to the 
first reading of a Public Bill.  On second reading a debate on the general principle may 
take place, in the relatively few cases where, at this stage, a Private Bill is opposed.  If 
the Bill survives second reading it is referred to a Private Bill Committee, consisting of 
four members not, locally or otherwise, interested in the Bill.  The Committee stage of a 
Private Bill is in reality a judicial proceeding conducted with the aid of Counsel and 
sworn witnesses.  If the Committee decides that the case has been made for the Bill, or 
in technical language if the preamble of the Bill is 'proved', the Committee proceeds to 
examine its clauses in detail, and these having been approved, the Bill is reported to 
the House, and goes on its further way like an ordinary Public Bill.  It should be added 
that the expense of obtaining a Private Bill is heavy, and that the Exchequer makes a 
considerable profit out of the fees charged in connexion therewith. 
 
Provisional Orders. 
Partly to avoid this expense, and partly to secure the goodwill of the Department 
concerned - generally the Ministry of Health
13 or the Board of Trade - it has become 
increasingly common for the promoters of the various undertakings which require 
Parliamentary sanction to proceed by means of Provisional Order.   A Provisional Order 
                                                  
12   [521/1]  The House has power to condone the omission to comply with Standing 
Orders if it sees fit. 
13   [522/1]  Formerly the Local Government Board. is, in effect, an Order issued in pursuance of a statute after searching investigation by a 
Government Department.  These Orders have to be embodied in Provisional Order 
Confirmation Bills and sanctioned by Parliament, before which they are formally laid by 
the Department which issues them; but they are rarely opposed and still more rarely 
rejected.  Of the 2,520 Provisional Orders issued by the Local Government Board from 
1872 to 1902 only 23 were rejected by Parliament;
14 of 1,206 issued between 19022 
and 1924 14 were rejected by Parliament and 12 were withdrawn.  This is at once a 
proof of the confidence reposed by [begin page 523] Parliament in the great 
administrative departments, and also an illustration of the increasingly marked 
tendency to legislate by delegation.  The whole machinery of Private Bill legislation has 
been subject to much criticism.  That it is both clumsy and expensive
15 is undeniable, 
but on the other hand it has earned the warm encomium of a publicist who is at once 
exceptionally impartial and exceptionally well informed. 
 
‘The curse of most representative bodies at the present day', writes Mr. 
Lowell, 'is the tendency of the members to urge the interests of their 
localities or their constituents.  It is this more than anything else which has 
brought legislatures into discredit and has made them appear to be 
concerned with a tangled skein of private interests rather than with the 
public welfare. . . . Now the very essence of the English system lies in the 
fact that it tends to remove private and local, Bills from the general field of 
political discussion and thus helps to rivet the attention of Parliament upon 
public matters.  A Ministry stands or falls upon its general legislative and 
administrative record, and not because it has offended one member by 
opposing the demands of a powerful company and another by ignoring the 
desires of a borough council.  Such a condition would not be possible 
unless Parliament was willing to leave private legislation, in the main, to 




We may now pass on to explain the procedure of Public Parliament in the case of 
Public Bills.  These may again be subdivided into; 
 
(1)   ordinary legislation, and 
(2)   Bills of Supply. 
 
Generally speaking, every Public Bill, whether originating in the Upper or Lower House, 
must in each House pass through five stages: first reading, second reading, 
Committee, Report, and third reading. 
 
Except in Bills of first-rate importance, the first stage is as a rule purely formal and in 
certain cases it is omitted altogether.  A member, official or private, moves for leave to 
bring in a Bill; leave is given, and the Bill is then [begin page 524] brought in and printed.  
The real debate on the principle of the measure takes place on the motion for the 
second reading.  On a measure of the first magnitude, this stage may be prolonged for 
days, or even for weeks.  If the Bill survives this stage it is 'committed'. 
 
                                                  
14   [522/2]  Select Committee on Private Business (Sess. Papers, 1902, vol. vii, P. 
321). 
15   [523/1]  It was estimated before the war that between £600,000 and £700,000 a 
year was spent on Private Bill Committees. 
16   [523/2]  op. cit. i. 391-2. Standing Committees. 
Under a Standing Order of 1907 every Bill, other than a Bill for imposing taxes or a 
Consolidated Fund or appropriation Bill, or a Bill for confirming provisional orders, 
stands committed to a Standing Committee, unless the House should, on a definite 
motion, order it to be committed either to a select committee or to a committee of the 
whole House.  The Standing Committees were originally two in number, but under the 
Standing Orders Of 1907 were increased to four and in 1919 to six.  They are 
nominated by the Committee of Selection, which consists of eleven members, 
representing all parties, of considerable parliamentary experience.  The Committee of 
Selection is nominated by the House at the commencement of every Session.  Each 
Standing Committee consists normally of from forty to sixty members, but the 
Committee of Selection may add ten to fifteen members in respect of each Bill 
committed.  One of the committees is appointed for the consideration of all public Bills 
relating exclusively to Scotland, and consists of all members representing Scottish 
constituencies with the addition of ten or fifteen members specially nominated ad hoc 
for the consideration of each Bill.  In the case of any Bill dealing exclusively with Wales 
and Monmouth, all members representing those constituencies are entitled to form part 
of the committee to which the Bill may be committed.  The composition of the Standing 
Committees reflects accurately the composition of the House as a whole; but 
notwithstanding this fact divisions and discussions in such committees are apt to follow 
party lines less strictly than in the House. 
 
Committee State. 
The Committee stage, whether the Committee be a Committee of the whole House, or 
a Standing or a Select Committee, affords the appropriate opportunity for dis- [begin 
page 525] cussion of the clauses in detail, and for amendments thereon.  If the Bill is 
amended at this stage, further detailed discussion and amendment may ensue when it 
has been reported by the Committee to the House and is considered 'as amended’.  
After 'Report' comes the third reading, which is a final discussion on principle, and on 
principle illustrated by details which may or may not have formed part of the Bill when 
submitted for second reading.  When no amendments have been made in Committee 
of the whole House, the Report stage is omitted, but never when the Bill has been 'sent 
upstairs’, i.e. to a Standing Committee.  In certain cases there is a further intermediate 
stage when a Bill, having passed a second reading, is, before submission to a Standing 
Committee or Committee of the whole House, sent to a Select Committee.
17
 
The Bill having safely passed through all its stages in the originating House has to go 
through precisely the same stages in the other House.  Should the other House amend 
it,
18 the amendments have to be reconsidered in the originating House.  If they are 
agreed to, the Bill is sent up for the Royal assent; if not, negotiations
19 ensue and one 
or other House has to give way.  If both stand firm the Bill must be dropped. 
 
Financial Procedure. 
It remains to notice the procedure in regard to Finance.  The granting of supplies to the 
Crown and the control of Procedure expenditure are the primary functions of the House 
of Commons, and it is important to understand exactly how they are performed. 
 
                                                  
17    [525/1]  A Select Committee is really a Committee of Inquiry, and may take 
evidence. 
18   [525/2]  Procedure in the Lords is much more elastic than in the Commons: e.g. 
amendments may be introduced at any stage. 
19   [525/3]  For precise methods of procedure, whether by 'message' or 'conference', 
see Erskine May, op. cit., PP. 428 seq. (thirteenth edition, edited by Sir T. 
Lonsdale Webster, 1924).  Committee of Supply. 
During the autumn the several Departments of Government - the War Office, the 
Admiralty, the Board of Education, and the rest - calculate how much money they will 
want for the ensuing year, or, in technical language, [begin page 526] 'frame their 
estimates.'  These estimates are submitted to and criticized in detail by the Treasury, 
and having been passed by the Treasury are then approved by the Cabinet.  Before 31 
March, when the financial year ends, they must be submitted by the responsible 
Ministers to the House of Commons.  For the purpose of considering these estimates 
the House resolves itself into Committee of Supply - a Committee of the whole House 
which is differentiated from ordinary sessions only by greater elasticity in the rules of 
debate, and by the fact that the Chairman of Committees presides in place of the 
Speaker. 
 
Before the House can go into Committee of Supply the Speaker has to be 'got out of 
the chair' - a practice founded on the ancient doctrine that the redress of grievances 
must precede the grant of supplies.  Until 1882 it was the rule that whenever Supply 
was an Order of the Day, and the question was put that 'Mr. Speaker do now leave the 
chair', any member was at liberty to move any amendment, whether relevant or not, to 
the particular vote put down for discussion.  Since 1882 the motion is made only on the 
first day on which the House goes into Committee of Supply on the Army, Navy, Air, or 
Civil Service Estimates, or on a Vote of Credit.  On these occasions one amendment 
may be moved by the member who has secured that privilege by ballot, but it must be 
relevant to the estimates about to be considered.  On other occasions the Speaker 
leaves the chair without question put.  The opportunities for criticism of the Executive 
are thus seriously curtailed.  Not only are the opportunities reduced in number, but 
criticism may no longer range from China to Peru. 
 
‘This system was established in the days of recurring conflict between Parliament and 
the Crown as a device to secure freedom of discussion on matters of finance.  The 
debates in the House itself were recorded in the journal which was sometimes sent for 
and examined by the King; and they were conducted in the presence of the Speaker, 
who in those days was often the nominee and regarded as the [begin page 527] 
representative of the Sovereign.  By going into Committee under the Chairmanship of a 




Another rule, much more ancient and of far wider significance, must here be 
mentioned.  Only the Crown through its Ministers can propose expenditure.  Unofficial 
members may move to reduce a vote, but not to increase one, least of all to initiate 
one.  This rule, originally and still technically nothing more than a Standing Order of the 
House of Commons, has now been accepted as a constitutional maxim of almost 
sacred validity.  It is generally regarded as the last effective barrier that remains against 
the indulgence of philanthropic benevolence at other people's expense.  It also relieves 
pressure upon individual members at the hands of individual constituents.  It is always 
easier for a representative body to spend than to resist expenditure.  This salutary rule 
minimizes, though of course it does not remove, the danger in the case of the greatest 
of representative assemblies.  A Minister must as a rule be convinced of the need for 
expenditure, not in the heated atmosphere of the House, but in the cool and critical 
seclusion of his Department.  A Minister of the Crown may indeed be induced by the 
indirect pressure of debate to promise a supplementary Estimate: but it must be 
proposed on his sole responsibility.  A particular group may desire, for example, to 
double the grant to the unemployed; the parliamentary method for doing this would be 
to move a reduction in the salary of the responsible Minister.  The protest might 
eventually prove effective; but the Standing Order at least provides a guarantee against 
impulsive generosity due to gusts of collective philanthropy. 
                                                  
20   [527/1]  Report of Select Committee on National Expenditure (121 of 1918).  
The constitutional theory which really underlies the whole of this procedure is thus 
stated by Erskine May: 
 
'The Crown demands money, the Commons grant it, and the Lords assent 
to the grant; but the Commons do not [begin page 528] vote money unless it 
be required by the Crown; nor impose or augment taxes unless they be 
necessary for meeting supplies which they have voted or are about to vote, 
and: supplying general deficiencies in the revenue.  The Crown has no 
concern in the nature or distribution of the taxes: but the foundation of all 
Parliamentary taxation is its necessity for the public service as declared by 
the Crown through its constitutional advisers.' 
 
To resume the chronological order.  Resolutions of Supply, having been carried in 
Committee and having been translated into 'Ways and Means' resolutions, are then 
reported to the House and embodied in a Consolidated Fund Bill or Bills authorizing 
payment out of the Consolidated Fund.  For reasons of financial convenience these 
Consolidated Fund Bills are passed at intervals during the Session, but the final 
Consolidated Fund Bill also appropriates the expenditure, previously authorized by 
resolutions in Committee of Supply, exclusively to the particular objects approved by 
those resolutions; it is therefore known as the Appropriation Act.
21  This procedure, it 
must be observed, applies only to what are technically known as the 'supply' services - 
the Army, Navy, and Civil Service.  Something less than half the expenditure of the 
Crown is regulated not by annual but by, permanent Acts of Parliament.  The Civil List 
of the Crown itself, the salaries of the judges, pensions, the payment of interest on the 
National Debt, &c., are charged by permanent Acts upon the Consolidated Fund (of 
which more hereafter) and do not, therefore, come under the annual review of 
Parliament. 
 
The same is true of the sources of revenue.  Much the greater part of the revenue is 
raised under the sanction of permanent Acts.  Such Acts may, of course, like other Acts, 
be repealed or amended at the discretion of Parliament; and frequently are.  But they 
do not call for annual re-enactment.  Every year, however, the whole financial system 
does in effect pass under the review of the [begin page 529] House of Commons, when 
it proceeds to discuss how the supply voted to the Crown is to be 'made good' - in other 
words, how the money is to be found to meet the authorized expenditure. 
 
Committee of Ways and Means. 
For the performance of this important function the committee of House resolves itself 
into a Committee of Ways and Means.  It is to this Committee that the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer presents his Budget or statement on the national accounts.  This statement, 
which is due as soon as may be after the close of the financial year (31 March), falls 
into three parts: a review of revenue and expenditure during the year that is ended; a 
provisional balance sheet for the year to come; and proposals for remission of existing 
taxes or imposition of new ones.  Although part of the revenue and part of the 
expenditure is 'permanent’, a very large balance of both depends on annual votes, and 
each financial year is absolutely self-contained.  It is the business of the guardian of the 
national purse to look twelve months ahead, but (in a technical sense) no farther.  The 
national accounts are in fact 'cash' accounts; there is, in the strict commercial sense, 
no balance-sheet little, if any, account is taken of assets or of capital investments.  The 
Budget, therefore, though nowadays largely concerned with the payment of interest on 
debt, does not take account of the credit side of the account, and to that extent 
presents an inadequate, if not misleading, picture of the financial position of the 
country. 
 
                                                  
21   [528/1]  Cf. Appendices D and E. The rule that each financial year must be self-contained is enforced by the provision 
that money voted to a Department but unspent during the current year cannot legally 
be 'carried forward'.  All such casual balances go automatically to the reduction of debt.  
This rule may, despite the vigilance of the Treasury, occasionally operate in the 
direction of petty extravagance in the closing weeks of a financial year.  No Department 
likes to confess that it has asked for more than it needs.  But appropriation is 
exceedingly minute; money voted under one [begin page 530] sub-head cannot as a 
rule be transferred to another, though by the practice of what is technically known as 
virement a certain limited amount of interchange is legally permitted, more particularly 
in the votes for the fighting services.
22  Petty extravagance is, therefore, more than 
counterbalanced by large economy, and still more by the supreme advantage of 
knowing each year precisely how we stand financially.  There are critics who maintain 
that the safeguards are illusory; and it is not given to every layman to be able to 
unravel the national accounts; but at least it may be said that, thanks to the co-
operation of amateur and expert, the national accounts are more intelligible than most.  
Moreover, though it is true that in all criticism of administrative acts the permanent 
official is at an immense advantage, it must be remembered that the parliamentary 
chief of the Treasury is no more permanent than his critics, and that though he can 
command sources of information denied to them, he enjoys in this respect only a 
temporary advantage.  Tomorrow the tables may be turned; the critic may preside at 
the Treasury Board, the Chancellor of the Exchequer may be playing the role of critic. 
 
To return to the explanation of Procedure. 
 
In Committee of Supply the House determines the amount to be spent on each 
particular object; in Committee of Ways and Means it decides how the money is to be 
raised.  In both cases the 'resolutions' arrived at in Committee have to be 'reported' to 
the Houses and to be embodied in Bills which, with or without the assent of the Lords, 




How can the House of Commons be sure that its orders have been strictly carried out?  
This question carries us [begin page 531] from the region of the Legislature to that of the 
Executive; but it may be briefly answered here in order to complete our review of the 
subject. 
 
The principle of 'appropriation' was successfully asserted by the Commons under 
Charles II, but the machinery was inadequate.  It was improved at the Revolution, 
when the produce of specific taxes was assigned to meet specific charges.  But this 
method has obvious disadvantages.  The modern system dates from the time of one of 
the greatest of our financiers - the younger Pitt.  In 1787 Pitt established the 
Consolidated Fund.  Into this vast financial reservoir flows 'every stream of the public 
revenue', and from it issues 'the supply for every public service'.
24
 
                                                  
22   [530/1]  On the conditions of virement, see Durell, Parliamentary Grants, pp. 284 
seq. 
23    [530/2]  The Parliament Act of 1911 secured to the House of Commons 
‘undivided authority’ in regard to Finance.  It provided that if the Lords withheld 
for more than one month their assent to a Money Bill as defined by the Act it 
might be presented to the King, and on his assent become law.  To the Speaker is 
assigned the duty of deciding whether a Bill is, or is not, a Money Bill. 
24   [531/1]  13th Report of Commissioners of Public Accounts, p. 6o. Exchequer and Audit Act, 1866. 
The pivot upon which the whole working of the financial machinery now depends is a 
functionary known as the Comptroller and Auditor-General.  'He is a non-political official 
created by the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866; his independence is secured by the 
fact that his salary is charged upon the Consolidated Fund, and that he is not permitted 
to sit in Parliament.  The importance attached to the complete detachment and 
independence of this officer is well illustrated by an incident which occurred in the 
House of Commons in August 1921.  The Government of the day had, in March 1920, 
raised the salary of the Comptroller and Auditor-General from £2,000 to £3,000 a year, 
in addition to granting him the 'war bonus' at that time customary in the case of civil 
servants.  The additional payment thus made was admittedly irregular and illegal.  Not, 
however, until August 1921 did the Government introduce legislation to legalize 
retrospectively the irregularity.  The House of Commons took grave exception to the 
procedure, and only sanctioned the additional expenditure after an ample admission of 
error on the part of the Government, and from a generous desire not to penalize a 
public servant who, having rendered distinguished service to the State, was about to 
retire on a well [begin page 532] earned pension.
25  All money collected by the fiscal 
officials - the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, Post Office, and Commissioners of 
Crown Lands - is paid into the Exchequer account at the Bank of England.  Not a 
penny can be withdrawn from that account without the sanction of this potent individual, 
the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who presents annually to Parliament an audited 
account, together with a Report in which it is shown that the sums voted by the House 
of Commons to the several enumerated purposes have been expended strictly upon 
them and not otherwise.  Before he can do so he must of course satisfy himself that the 
payments which he has authorized were in accord with the intentions of Parliament, 
and that they have actually been spent upon the objects to which they were 
appropriated. 
 
The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General is then examined by a Select 
Committee, known as the Public Accounts Committee, who in due course make their 
Report to the House of Commons.  With the presentation of that Report the circuit of 
financial procedure is completed.  That procedure is necessarily protracted; not until 
two years after the money has been voted does the House learn that it has been 
expended in accord with their 'appropriations'; but though protracted, it is, as regards 
financial purity, entirely- effective.  How far the procedure is in other respects efficient is 
a question which must be deferred to another chapter.
26
 
                                                  
25   [532/1]  House of Commons Official Report (5 and 15 August 1921). 
26   [532/2]  Cf. also Appendices D and E, where the financial procedure is described 
in further detail and is illustrated by documents. XXI.  Parliamentary Procedure 
The Power of the Purse: Parliament and Finance 
Comparison of English and Foreign Methods 
 
‘It is ultimately to the power of the purse, to its power to bring the whole 
executive machinery of the country to a standstill, that the House of 
Commons owes its control over the Executive.  That is the fountain and 
origin of its historical victories over the other organs of the State.' - Erskine 
May. 
 
'Finance is not mere arithmetic: finance is a great policy.  Without sound 
finance no sound government is possible without sound government no 
sound finance is possible.' - Wilson. 
 
Justice and Finance. 
The origin of Parliament must doubtless be sought in a High Court of justice.  But the 
administration of justice was, in early days, inextricably intertwined with the collection of 
revenue - Iustitia est magnum emolumentum.  The ancient adage enshrined a political 
truth.  Medieval kings would never have summoned to the High Court of Parliament 
unlearned and unwarlike burgesses had they not needed their financial assistance.   
Representative institutions owe their origin, therefore, to financial necessities, and the 
granting of taxes and the control of expenditure is still the primary function of 
Parliament. 
 
Is Existing Control Adequate. 
How far does the existing procedure ensure the efficient performance of this function?  
Does it enable the House of Commons to exercise a real control over public 
expenditure?  Can the taxpayers feel a reasonable assurance that the money taken, by 
the authority of their representatives in Parliament, out of their pockets, is the minimum 
amount compatible with the efficient maintenance of the public services, that it is 
expended with scrupulous honesty and exactness upon the objects to [begin page 534] 
which it has been appropriated by Parliament, and that the taxpayers get the fullest 
value for their money?  If these questions evoke a negative or even an ambiguous 
answer, the further question arises whether it is possible to improve our own methods 
by the adoption of expedients which have commended themselves to the Parliaments 
of foreign States? 
 
Audit of Accounts. 
The financial procedure of the British Parliament, as it exists today, was outlined in the 
preceding chapter, and of the questions propounded above one can be answered at 
once.  Regarded as a system of audit, as a means of ascertaining that the money 
voted by Parliament, and appropriated by it in minute detail, has been actually 
expended upon the objects designated by Parliament, the existing procedure could 
hardly be improved.  The methods employed may to outsiders appear unduly 
procrastinating; the final report of the Committee on Public Accounts makes admittedly 
a somewhat tardy appearance; but the circle of control is complete; the House of 
Commons has the satisfaction of knowing that every farthing of public expenditure is 
duly accounted for, and that its intentions, as regards the destination of the money 
which it may have voted to the Crown, have been meticulously fulfilled. 
 As regards purity of administration, in the narrower sense, tile system is above 
suspicion.  Does it, however, enable the House of Commons to restrain wasteful or 
undesirable expenditure?  To this exceedingly important question an answer must now 
be attempted.  An elaborate and relatively recent answer, emanating from a highly 
expert Committee of the House of Commons, will be found in the Seventh and Ninth 
Reports of the Select Committee on National Expenditure (1918).
1  Two matters [begin 
page 535] evidently demand attention: 
 
(i)   the form of public accounts and estimates, and 
(ii)   the question of the financial procedure of Parliament. 
 
The Form of Public Accounts. 
The form of public accounts is, in truth, a highly technical matter: but technical though it 
be there is not a business man in the country who would not acknowledge and even 
insist that a sound method of book-keeping is a primary essential of commercial 
success.  Scientific accountancy is at last coming to its own.  'Costings' are a vital 
element in modem business procedure, and the Public Departments can no more 
afford to neglect the precautions which this method of accountancy provides than can 
any commercial firm.  Nor can the House of Commons - and this is the point of 
immediate importance - begin to enforce economy unless and until the accounts are 
presented to it in such a form that members can at a glance detect where the wastage, 
if wastage there be, is taking place. 
 
Estimates. 
The existing form of the Estimates as presented to the House of Commons leaves, by 
general admission, much to be desired.  The Select Committee reported in 1918 that 
Estimates and Accounts prepared on the present basis are of little value for purposes 
of control either by Departments, the Treasury, or Parliament, and this conclusion was 
supported by the highest expert opinion.  'I do not think', said Mr. Dannrouther, 
Accounting Officer of the Ministry of Munitions, 'that Estimates as furnished in the past 
to Parliament are worth the paper they are written on from the point of view of 
parliamentary control.'  Sir Charles Harris, Assistant Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, was not less emphatic and was more precise.  'You cannot', he said, 'get any 
real control of expenditure by cash issues or cash payments, excluding such factors as 
liabilities, consumption of stores from stock and things of that sort.  You cannot control 
administration by controlling expenses on subjects.  If you want to control 
administration by appropriation you must appropriate to objects.'  The evidence given 
to the [begin page 536] Committee by the Comptroller and Auditor-General (Sir H.J. 
Gibson) confirmed that of Sir Charles Harris.  
 
‘If’, he said, 'you wish to establish financial control it can be better effected 
by the objective rather than the subjective scheme.  I have always felt that 
the subjective classification, though very simple and convenient, did not 
lend itself to establishing a unit of cost by which you could control and 
compare the cost of one service with another.'  
 
Testimony so emphatic in tone and so concurrent in effect, above all so authoritative in 
source, must be regarded as virtually conclusive; but Sir John Bradbury, at that time 
                                                  
1   [534/1]  H.C. 95 and 121 of 1918.  With these may be usefully compared similar 
Reports, H.C. 387 Of 1902; Report from Select Committee on House of Commons 
Procedure, H.C. 378 Of 1914; Report Of Select Committee on Estimates 
Procedure, H.C. 281, 1888; Report on Public Income and Expenditure, H.C. 366 
1, 1868-9, and Memorandum by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, Cd. 8337 
(1916). Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, supplied in his Memorandum a pertinent 
reminder.  'In criticizing’, he wrote, 'the existing scheme of appropriation of 
Parliamentary Grants, it must be borne in mind that the control of expenditure in the 
sense, of securing that the various public services 'are efficiently administered at a 
reasonable cost, was no part of the object which the framers had in view.'  Precisely.  
All that the House of Commons sought to secure was an effective audit: to make 
certain that the money voted by Parliament for a particular service had been spent 
upon that service and upon no other.  That object, as we have seen, is already 
adequately secured. 
 
Growth of Expenditure. 
Is this enough?  So long as the Public Departments were few and the expenditure 
modest; so long as the functions of Government did not go much beyond the securing 
of the safety of the realm against external enemies and the maintenance of order at 
home, an effective audit was all that was required.  But times have changed.  New 
ministries, with colossal staffs, have sprung up like mushrooms.  Moreover, much of the 
expenditure of the new Departments is of a commercial or semi-commercial rather than 
an administrative character.  If the House of Commons is, as guardian of the public-
purse, to exercise any efficient control over national expenditure, new methods of 
accountancy, more nearly in accord with the best commercial practice, are essential.  
[begin page 537] 
 
In a Memorandum prepared for the Select Committee by Sir Gilbert Garnsey and Mr. 
J.H. Guy, it was stated that 
 
'in ordinary commercial practice the accounts are considered as of vital 
importance to the business as an index of economical administration and 
sound management, and a very great deal of attention is given to the 
system of accounts in use and to the periodical statements submitted to the 
Directors and to those in charge of various departments of the business 
affected by the results shown.  It is doubtful whether there is any instrument 
of administration which receives greater consideration in a well-organized 
business.' 
 
It may indeed be urged that Departments of State ought not to undertake commercial 
functions and that commercial methods are therefore inappropriate to the public 
service.  Be it so; but the fact, however regrettable, remains that the State appears to 
be increasingly anxious to undertake duties which according to the older view had 
better be left to private enterprise and private management.  That being so, Parliament, 
as the Directorial Board responsible to the shareholders, must adopt methods 
appropriate to the discharge of its new duties. 
 
The House of Commons has not yet done so.  'The Committee found that no vote on 
account includes the total cost of the service to which it relates.'  This sentence points 
to the root of much of the existing confusion.  Appended to the Navy and Army 
Estimates, and to each vote of the Civil Service and Revenue Departments Estimates, 
are notes showing that 'provision is made as follows in other Estimates for expenditure 
in connexion with this service'.  For instance: in the votes for the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office (1918), while the sums estimated are £65,547 and £58,626 
respectively, the notes above referred to show that for the Foreign Office a further 
£40,982, and for the Colonial Office a further £20,925, are provided under other votes 
for expenses of Buildings, Furniture, Fuel and Light, Rates, Stationery and Printing, 
Pensions, Postal Telegraph and Telephone Services, &c.  Again, in the relatively small 
[begin page 538] vote for the Registrar-General's Office (Scotland) no less than 70 
percent of what professes to be the vote for the expenses of that office is provided for 
and accounted for in other votes. 
 Criticism of Present Form of Accounts. 
Does this - system conduce either to departmental economy or to intelligent criticism 
and supervision on the accounts part of the House of Commons?  Be it admitted that 
the existing practice does not lack official apologists.  It is urged that Parliament 
already possesses in the notes to the Estimates and in the statements appended to the 
Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General all the information it needs; that inter-
departmental payments are objectionable in themselves and involve greater expense; 
and that by the separation of financial from administrative responsibility control would 
be loosened.  These arguments have considerable weight, but on the whole the 
rejoinder contained in the Report of the Select Committee seems to be conclusive.  
Firstly: the 'notes' to the Accounts are purely statistical and in no sense audited 
accounts; they are not compared with the ‘notes' in the Estimates and they are not 
made by the Departments on whose behalf the expenditure is incurred.  
 
‘If (says the Report) the obligation were placed on Departments to take up 
in their Estimates and Accounts their total expenditure as a matter of 
accurate accounting, an audit based on this obligation would follow and no 
account could be certified as correct, which excluded from its expenditure 
any stores supplied or services rendered for the period it covered.  Except 
in the few cases where Departments compile manufacturing or commercial 
accounts no department can render an account of its expenditure because 
no department fully knows it.  Its buildings, stationery, rates, pensions, 
postal, telegraph and telephone expenses are all finally recorded as 
matters of account in the accounts of the departments administering these 
services.' 
 
Secondly: the objection to inter-departmental payments, valid though it may have been 
some years ago, ceases to apply now that receipts arising out of the [begin page 539] 
working of Departments are to so large an extent appropriated in aid of the votes.  In 
passing, it may be observed that the whole system of appropriations-in-aid is 
essentially a vicious one, and tends to encourage carelessness and obscure 
extravagance.  So long, however, as it prevails, it vitiates the argument against inter-
departmental payments.  Finally: why should control be loosened if, apart from the 
normal control exercised by the Treasury, the supplying Departments continue to obtain 
repayment of the cost of the services they render from the Departments which are 
supplied? 
 
Control of Expenditure. 
At present control is, or ought to be, applied at four Control of points: 
 
(1)   by the head of the Spending Department, 
(2)   by the Financial Secretary or Accounting Officer, 
(3)   by the Treasury, 
(4)   by Parliament. 
 
The best expert opinion would seem, at the moment, to tend towards the conclusion 
that this control can be most effectually applied within the Department, and by a 
departmental rather than by a Treasury official.  On this point, the evidence given to the 
Committee by Mr. Bonar Law,
2 Mr. Austen Chamberlain,
3 and Mr. McKenna
4 was 
concurrent and emphatic.  'The actual control', said the last, 'must always lie with the 
Departments and all that Parliament can do is to inquire whether the Departments have 
done their work properly.'  'The real control', wrote Mr. Chamberlain, ' is exercised first 
                                                  
2   [539/1]  Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1916-19. 
3   [539/2]  Ibid. 1903-6 and 1919-21. 
4   [539/3]  Ibid. 1915-16. within each Department by its own officers; secondly by the Treasury, and lastly in case 
of serious difference of opinion by the Cabinet.'  Of the efficiency of Parliament as a 
check upon expenditure, Mr. Chamberlain has always expressed himself as highly 
sceptical. 
 
Proposals for Revised Form of Public Accounts. 
The first thing needful is, however, a revised form of public accounts, such a form as 
will 'bring to light for revised extravagance and inefficiency and enable criticism to be 
form of Public usefully applied'.  With a view to attaining this object Accounts the Select 
Committee made certain specific and detailed [begin page 540] recommendations.  Inter 
alia they recommended that the estimated expenditure of the year, as shown in the 
Estimates, and the actual expenditure, as disclosed in the Accounts, should be on a 
basis of income and expenditure representing the cost of services rendered and of 
stores &c., supplied for the service of the year; that the accounts of all Departments 
should comprise their total expenditure, including the services rendered by other Public 
Departments, the rental value of Government-owned buildings occupied, pensions paid 
and pension liability; that the Estimates and Accounts should be grouped to show the 
objects rather than the subjects of expenditure, and with carefully chosen units of cost; 
that as far as possible there should be one comprehensive series of accounts only for 
each service of the State; that the accounts presented to Parliament should be 
responsive to the Parliamentary Estimates of true annual expenditure, and that they 
should be prepared in such a manner as to provide in all their stages a control, by 
means of units of cost, of which effective use should be made by comparison of similar 
units under like conditions both inside the Department concerned and with other 
Departments of the State. 
 
These recommendations have as yet been adopted only to a very limited extent.  The 
Army Estimates were remodelled in 1919, and it was understood that other 
Departments, notably the Admiralty, were to follow suit.  But reform has so far tarried.
5  
Nevertheless the whole question has been explored by a competent Committee; the 
House of Commons has, for the first time perhaps, been made aware of the dangers to 
national economy lurking behind the existing forms of Estimates and Accounts, and if it 
prefers to stand in this matter in the ancient ways - ways not inappropriate when 
accounts [begin page 541] were relatively simple and expenditure was relatively small - 
the blame will rest upon itself. 
 
Financial Procedure. 
We may now turn from a more or less technical subject to a cognate though distinct 
aspect of the same problem.  So long as the system of departmental accountancy 
remains as defective as it is at present, departmental economy if effected at all can 
only be haphazard.  But the larger question remains untouched.  That question largely 
turns upon the rules and conventions governing financial procedure in the House of 
Commons. 
 
The main outlines of the system have been already described; it only remains, 
therefore, to indicate its shortcomings and to consider certain remedies which have 
been put forward for its improvement. 
 
                                                  
5    [540/1]  And even the War Office has now (1925) reverted, despite much 
criticism, to the earlier method.  But the Government has (1926) agreed to the 
important recommendations of the Select Committee on Estimates, as to the 
reclassification of the Estimates.  The object of this reclassification is ‘to show, as 
far as possible, the complete functions and expenditure of each Department'.  H.C. 
59 of 1926. Time Restrictions: ‘Allotted Days’. 
The first and most glaring defect is that the so-called Committee of Supply possesses 
none of the attributes of allotted an effective committee.  The rules of debate are, it is 
days' true, somewhat more elastic than those which govern procedure in the House 
itself, but a 'Committee' of 615 members is a contradiction in terms, and even were the 
time allotted to 'supply' not severely restricted the detailed examination of financial 
estimates would be impossible.  Under the present rules, not more than twenty days, 
being, days before the 5th of August, are allotted for the consideration of the annual 
estimates for the army, navy, and civil services, including votes on account, to which 
additional time, not exceeding three days, before or after the 5th of August, may be 
allotted by order of the House.  At ten o'clock on the last day but one of the allotted 
days the 'guillotine' falls. 
 
The Guillotine. 
Chairman puts forthwith every question to dispose of the vote then under 
consideration, and then, with respect to each class of the Civil Service Estimates, puts 
the question that the total amount of the votes outstanding in that class be granted for 
the services defined in the class.  He then deals in like manner with the votes 
outstanding in the estimates for the army, navy, air force, and revenue departments. 
 
It is hardly necessary to add that under this procedure [begin page 542] a large 
proportion of the votes in any given year receive no examination or criticism at the 
hands of the House of Commons, though it does not follow that a vote on which the 
'guillotine' summarily falls may not have been previously discussed. 
 
Committee of Supply. 
The 'Committee' lacks, however, not only opportunity and time for criticism, but the 
information on which to base it.  It can neither call for papers nor examine witnesses - 
sources of information which, as will be seen presently, are freely at the disposal of 
Budget Committees in foreign Legislatures.  There is indeed no pretence of close or 
effective criticism of details in 'Committee of Supply', with the result that this stage of 
procedure has come to be commonly utilized for a totally different purpose: the 
exposure of grievances, and general criticism of the administrative policy of the 
Government of the day.  For this purpose Committee of Supply affords an admirable 
opportunity, and to this purpose it is mainly devoted. 
 
Treatment of Votes in Committee as Questions of ‘confidence.’ 
Another formidable obstacle to the detailed discussion of financial estimates demands, 
at this point, some consideration. 
 
The convention is that if in Committee of Supply a vote is challenged or a reduction 
moved, such a motion may be treated as one of 'confidence’, involving the fate of the 
Government.  Independent action, if not independent criticism, is thereby rendered 
difficult, and criticism, if not followed by parliamentary action, is apt to degenerate into 
triviality and to issue in futility.  Under these circumstances it is, as the Select 
Committee pointed out, 
 
‘not surprising that there has not been a single instance in the last twenty-five years 
when the House of Commons by its own direct action has reduced, on financial 
grounds, any estimate submitted to it. . . . The debates in Committee of Supply are 
indispensable for the discussion of policy and administration.  But so far as the direct 
effective control of proposals for expenditure is concerned, it would be true to say that if 
the estimates were never presented and the Com- [begin page 543] mittee of Supply 
never set up, there would be no noticeable difference.'  
 The validity of this criticism can be admitted only if special emphasis be laid on the 
word ‘direct’.  The indirect influence of the House of Commons is even now 
considerable, though it might be greatly and advantageously increased.  The estimates 
are framed in the Departments with the knowledge that any item, however detailed, 
may be challenged in Committee of Supply, and that the responsible Minister must be 
in a position to defend it.  Even more effective in a prophylactic sense is the influence 
of the Committee on Estimates (to be presently described); every departmental officer 
in asking for money knows that his demands must run the gauntlet first of departmental 
scrutiny, then of Treasury scrutiny, and that they may afterwards be challenged in the 
Cabinet, and even, under exceptional circumstances, in the House itself. 
 
The point as to motions in Committee of Supply being treated as questions of 
confidence cannot, however, be lightly dismissed. Mr. Lowther (now Viscount Ullswater, 
then Speaker) expressed doubts whether ‘His Majesty's Government have ever 
considered a reduction made in an estimate as a matter of confidence, unless they 
sought the opportunity for resigning'; though he had admitted, on an earlier occasion, 
that governments tend to attach a great deal more importance to defeats on minor 
points of detail than they were wont to do.
6  Mr. Bonar Law, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, expressed the somewhat cynical view that nothing but the fact that 
Ministers do regard motions for reduction as questions of confidence prevents the 
House of Commons from doubling the estimates under the guise of such motions.  
 
That the House of Commons has become in Mr. Lowther's words ‘one of the chief 
spending departments of the State' is a truth which cannot, unfortunately, be [begin page 
544] gainsaid.  All those who are familiar with its recent history are agreed that, instead 
of criticizing the details of the estimates on the ground of excess, it is now more apt to 
advocate increases of expenditure.  But the imputation, however well justified in itself 
and effective as a retort, in no sense invalidates the original criticism.  Even though the 
House be predisposed to extravagance it nevertheless remains true that it lacks the 
power to enforce economy. 
 
Suggested Reforms 
The question, then, remains: is it possible, by a reform of procedure, to make the 
control of the House of Commons over public expenditure more of a reality?  Basing 
their conclusions upon the answers to a questionnaire, addressed to the Speaker, to 
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and three of his immediate predecessors, to a 
selected number of members well versed in procedure, and to various officials of the 




The most fundamental was that there should be appointed two, or if need be three, 
Standing Committees on Estimates.  Each Committee was to consist of fifteen 
members and was to be set up, by the customary procedure, at the beginning of each 
session.  It was to be the duty of these Committees to examine the annual Estimates 
and such Supplementary Estimates as the conditions allowed, and to suggest to the 
House any economies, at once possible and desirable, while strictly excluding any 
question of policy.  Decisions on policy must, in a Parliamentary Democracy, be left 
entirely to the Executive and the Legislature; they are not for a Standing Committee 
however competent.  On this cardinal point there has been pretty general agreement, 
among English politicians and theorists.  To permit a Standing Committee to modify, or 
even suggest the modification of policy, would, it has been commonly supposed, 
impinge upon the responsibility alike of the Treasury and of the Cabinet.  Nor indeed 
                                                  
6   [543/1]  Select Committee on House of Commons Procedure (1914), H.C. 378 
(194). Q. 3061. were the decisions or recommendations of the Committee to have [begin page 545] any 
binding effect; its functions were to be limited to inquiry and report; in all matters of 
finance the House of Commons was to remain solely and finally responsible. 
 
It was proposed that the Committee should have the assistance of a permanent officer, 
whose functions in relation to the Estimates should be parallel with those of the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General in relation to the Accounts.  Such expert assistance 
was held to be essential to the success of the scheme.  For lack of it the Estimates 
Committees which were set up in the Sessions of 1912, 1913, and 1914 had found 
themselves greatly hampered in their work, and were in fact able to achieve little.  The 
Committees were to be set up at the earliest practicable date after the beginning of 
each session, and it was to be their duty, at an early stage of their proceedings, to 
indicate to the Chairman of Ways and Means the votes or classes, if any, on which they 
did not intend to report during the current session.  The remaining Estimates were to be 
considered in the order most likely to meet the convenience of the House, and to fit in 
with the probable course of public business, and Reports were to be made as soon as 
the consideration of the Estimates for any given Department had been completed.  The 
hope was that the vote put down for consideration on successive supply days would be 
regulated according to the procedure of the Committees.  Those votes would naturally 
be taken first on which a Committee had already reported, or had intimated its intention 
not to report during the current session.  It would still, of course, remain open to the 
House to vary the procedure, and to take such votes as would give an opportunity, if 
desired, to debate some matter of grave and immediate importance.  As regards the 
discussion of grievances and general criticism of administrative policy the House would 
remain as untrammelled as ever, but in the examination and discussion of financial 
details there would be a system and order and regularity of procedure which are at 
present conspicuous by their absence. 
[begin page 546] 
 
How Far Adopted 
These recommendations have been adopted only in a very emasculated form.   
Successive Governments and indeed the House itself have, thus far, shown 
themselves reluctant to share any substantial portion of their respective responsibilities 
even with a creature of their own.  An Estimates Committee has indeed been set up but 
only with the following limited terms of reference: 'To examine such of the Estimates as 
may seem fit to the Committee, and to suggest the form in which the Estimates shall be 
presented for examination, and to report what, if any, economies, consistent with the 
policy implied in the Estimates, may be effected therein.'  The Committee has, 
moreover, been set up, as a rule, too late to enable it to do any serious work before 
Easter; the services of a regular officer, on the lines suggested above, have been 
denied to it; nor has there been any such coordination between the work of the Select, 
Committee and that of the House in Committee of Supply as would focus the 
discussion in Committee of Supply upon financial details and thus afford a substantial 
hope of effecting economies in the public services.  The hopes aroused in some 
sanguine minds by the Report of the Committee on National Expenditure have not, 
therefore, materialized.
7  They have been frustrated partly in the manner indicated 
above, but most of all perhaps because the Opposition or Oppositions, whose privilege 
it is to determine the particular votes to be taken on Supply Days, have invariably been 
influenced in their choice not by considerations of finance, but by the opportunities 
afforded by the circumstances of the hour for an attack upon the Government. 
 
Were there rumours of disaffection in the Police Force or a threatened strike among 
post office employees, then a vote must be taken involving the salary of the Home 
                                                  
7   [546/1]  The decision indicated above may, however, mark an important step in 
advance (see note supra, P. 540) Secretary or the Postmaster-General.  Is the public mind exercised about a naval base 
in the Far East?  A Naval Vote must be taken - and so forth.  The need of exercising 
[begin page 547] strict control over national expenditure is the last consideration likely to 
be urged in Committee of Supply. 
 
That consideration is naturally paramount in the Estimates Committee.  It is, however, a 
moot point whether, under the restricted terms of reference, and without the expert 
assistance for which the Committee has repeatedly but vainly
8 asked, it is worthwhile 
to set up that Committee.  The work is arduous and detailed, and earns for those who 
undertake it little gratitude from the House or the constituencies.  Yet it has two 
beneficial effects which should not be underrated.  The Committee has the ordinary 
power to ‘send for persons, papers and records’, and freely exercises it, calling as 
witnesses not only the chief permanent officials of the Departments, but, as, occasion 
demands, the Chancellor of the Exchequer or other Cabinet Ministers.  Its mere 
existence, therefore, supplies an additional incentive to economy in the framing of 
Estimates; its Reports are, as a rule, discussed on the floor of the House, and Ministers 
are called upon to defend any carelessness or extravagance on the part of 
subordinates.  This is to the good, as far as it goes; but it does not go far enough, and, 
as things are, the chief value of the Committee is probably educational.  It affords to 
unofficial members of the House an opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with 
the methods of the administrative Departments and the minutiae of public finance.
9
 
Procedure in Committee of Supply 
So much for Committees on Estimates.  That they might, if provided with appropriate 
assistance, prove valuable adjuncts to the financial procedure of the House is hardly 
open to question.  But whether it would consort with the genius and traditions of our 
parliamentary system to invest them with the position and powers [begin page 548] 
accorded to the Budget Committees of certain foreign Parliaments is a point for 
discussion in subsequent paragraphs.  Meanwhile, many of those best qualified to 
judge hold that an Estimates Committee or Budget Committee must necessarily fail of 
full effectiveness unless a further change of fundamental importance in the 
conventional procedure of the House of Commons were simultaneously adopted.  Of 
the convention under which a motion for the reduction of a Vote is treated as a question 
of confidence, something has been said already.  To the detached observer of the 
working of English institutions it has always appeared paradoxically disproportionate 
that the fate of Governments should depend upon the result of a division on some 
minor economy in a departmental estimate.  To interpret an adverse verdict on such a 
point as a censure upon the Government is surely to strain to the breaking-point the 
theory of a Parliamentary Executive.  So long, however, as the existing convention is 
held sacrosanct, so long as private members are unable to enforce in the division lobby 
their views on a question of departmental economy, without risking the fall of the 
Government which they habitually support, and so plunging the country (and 
themselves) into the turmoil of a General Election, it is plainly inevitable that the smaller 
issue should be cancelled by the larger, and a decision on the real merits of the 
question cannot possibly be reached.  On this point it is difficult to dissent from the 
emphatic opinion expressed by the Select Committee of 1918. 
 
                                                  
8   [547/2]  Until 1926.  (not numbered sequentially in original. Ed.) 
9   [547/1]  On this point the present writer has received much interesting testimony 
from colleagues on the Estimates Committee. Wis perhaps proper to add that he 
was himself a member of the Select Committee on National Expenditure (19 17- 
18) . that he has been (except in one session) a member of all the Committees on 
Estimates set up since the war, was Chairman of the Committee 1924 and 192 5, 
and has also served on the Committee on Public Accounts. 'Only when the House of Commons is free not merely in theory and under 
the terms of the Constitution, but in fact and in custom to vote, when the 
occasion requires, upon the strict merits of proposed economies 
uncomplicated by any wider issue, will its control over the national 
expenditure become a reality.' 
 
The Committee accordingly recommended that 
 
‘it should be established as the practice of Parliament that members should 
vote freely upon motions for reductions made [begin page 549] in pursuance 
of recommendations of the Estimates Committees, and that the carrying of 
such a motion against the Government of the day should not be taken to 
imply that it no longer possessed the confidence of the House.' 
 
This recommendation was cordially endorsed by high authorities, both departmental 
and parliamentary, but opinion on its merits is not, as we have seen, unanimous; it 
would plainly involve a sharp break with constitutional conventions, and it is not, 
therefore, likely to be adopted save under the pressure of public opinion steadily and 
insistently applied. 
 
Money Resolutions for Bills 
A more technical point, but one hardly less important, is raised in the recommendations 
of the Select Committee in regard to 'Money Resolutions for Bills'.  There is, perhaps, 
no part of the procedure of the House which calls for more careful revision.  Important 
as is a close scrutiny of the Estimates, no student of recent legislation will deny that 
scrutiny at least equally close ought to be made of the financial side of ordinary Bills.  
Take any of the larger items in the programme of social 'reconstruction' and it will be at 
once apparent that in all these problems the crucial factor is finance.  But how much 
consideration does the House of Commons necessarily give, under the existing system 
of procedure, to this vital aspect of social legislation?  Standing Order 71 runs as 
follows: 
 
‘If any motion be made in the House for any aid, grant, or charge upon the 
public revenue, whether payable out of the consolidated fund or out of 
money to be provided by Parliament, or for any charge upon the people, 
the consideration and debate thereof shall not be presently entered upon, 
but shall be adjourned to such further day as the House shall think fit to 
appoint, and then it shall be referred to a Committee of the whole House 
before any resolution or vote of the House do pass therein.' 
 
The Order is, in terms, sufficiently impressive and would seem to secure due 
consideration for any motion involving a charge upon public funds.  And the rules of 
procedure implement the Order.  If the main object of [begin page 550] a Bill is to 
impose a charge upon the people, its introduction must be preceded and authorized by 
a Resolution of a Committee of the whole House, which Resolution must be 
recommended by the Crown.  Such Resolutions are not likely to escape notice, nor to 
pass without full consideration.  Far more insidious is the procedure in relation to Bills 
in which the creation of a charge upon public funds is, in form, only a subsidiary 
feature.  Such a Bill may be introduced in the ordinary way, and it is sufficient if the 
requisite Resolution is agreed to by the House before the clause to which it relates, is 
reached by the Committee on the Bill.  Clauses requiring such Resolutions are 'printed 
in italics, and are not supposed to form part of the Bill as introduced.  It may sometimes 
be a moot point whether the charge upon public funds is the main object of a Bill or 
merely a subsidiary feature of it.  The point was in fact raised in 1919 in connexion with 
the Imports and Exports Regulation ('Anti-Dumping') Bill.  Mr. Speaker Lowther was 
asked to rule the Bill out of order on the ground that being a Bill to impose taxes it 
ought to have originated in Committee of Ways and Means.  He declined, however, to do so because, in his view, 'the main purpose of the Bill was to exclude dumped goods 
and goods competing with key industries and the imposition of charges in the nature of 
Import Duties’ was merely incidental to the adoption of such a policy.  Nevertheless, 
since the Bill would impose fines upon importation, Resolutions would be required in 
Committee of Ways and Means before the financial clauses could be taken in 
Committee of the House.  The point is a subtle one, and difference of opinion may 
legitimately exist as to the accuracy of the ruling.  Be that as it may, the incident 
pertinently illustrates the existing rules of procedure. 
 
A more substantial question remains: does the existing procedure afford adequate 
safeguards against extravagant and ill-considered expenditure?  No one who is 
acquainted with the conduct of business in the House of Commons [begin page 551] 
can answer this question in the affirmative.  Money Resolutions on Bills of the widest 
scope, and calculated to involve huge expenditure, are taken after eleven o'clock, or at 
other odd moments after the close of the main business of the sitting; they pass often 
without explanation and commonly without discussion.  Unless private members 
happen to be unusually alert they may be passed quite unnoticed, and the country may 
wake up any morning to find itself committed to large expenditure, while the guardians 
of the public purse were absent or asleep. 
 
Thanks to the recommendations made by the Select Committee of 1918 some 
improvement has in this matter been already effected.  The Committee expressed a 
decided opinion that the terms of the money Resolution should invariably be placed 
upon the Notice Paper of the House; that in the case of Bills not originating in 
Committee this should be done before Second Reading; that wherever possible the 
Resolution should comprise a statement of the probable expenditure whether annual or 
capital; or, alternatively, should be accompanied by a White Paper furnishing such a 
statement.  Evidently there are and must be cases in which precise forecasts are 
impossible; but the Committee recommended that in such cases a White Paper should 
nevertheless be issued giving a full explanation of the reasons why no forecast could 
be furnished.  They further recommended that the statements of probable expenditure 
should be submitted to one of the proposed Estimates Committees for examination and 
report, unless on account of urgency or of the smallness of the sum involved the House 
should by Resolution dispense with this procedure in a particular case.  It would then 
become the duty of the Estimates Committee to elucidate the facts, and to examine the 
basis of any estimate that may have been furnished or the reasons for not furnishing it.  
It must, however, be understood that the purpose in view would not be the insertion of 
a definite figure in a Bill in every case.  That would often be impracticable, and 
sometimes, as the [begin page 552] Committee justly add, 'injurious to good 
administration`.  The real object of these precautions would be to ensure that 
Parliament should not pass legislation involving financial commitments without a clear 
idea based on the inquiries of one of its own Committees of the nature and extent of 
those commitments, so far of course, as they can be foreseen or ascertained'. 
 
Estimates Committees having been set up only in a truncated form the scheme 
adumbrated by the Select Committee could not be, in its entirety, adopted.  Yet the 
suggestions have not been altogether without effect.  On the contrary, the procedure in 
regard to the Money Resolution of Bills has, thanks to the awakened vigilance of 
private members, become more of a reality than it formerly was.  White Papers are now 
furnished to the House; debates, brief as a rule but not quite perfunctory, have 
frequently been initiated; legitimate delays have been interposed when the information 
vouchsafed by Ministers appeared to be inadequate, and in some cases strict 
limitations of expenditure have been imposed. 
 
Two other points of considerable significance deserve brief notice. 
 The Treasury Watch Dog 
Both ultimately raise the question as to the position of the Treasury in the 
administrative hierarchy.  The Treasury is in many respects, alike on historical and 
practical grounds, the most important Department of the central government.  It 
exercises or ought to exercise a strict control over the expenditure of all other 
Departments.  Not a penny of the sums apportioned by Parliament to the several 
services can legally be spent without a warrant signed by two Lords of the Treasury; 
and, since it is the Treasury which has ultimately to find the money, all Estimates must, 
as we have seen, be approved by the Treasury before they are submitted to the House 
of Commons by the Minister more immediately concerned.  Two tendencies have, 
however, manifested themselves in recent years.  On the one hand the Treasury, once 
the vigilant watch dog of the State, has itself become a great [begin page 553] spending 
Department; on the other hand the principle of Cabinet solidarity or collective 
ministerial responsibility has sensibly weakened, with results detrimental to the 
Treasury. 
 
On the former point Mr. Austen Chamberlain (with a large experience of the Treasury) 
expressed himself, in answer to the questions of the Select Committee of 1918, with 
great emphasis and explicitness. 
 
'Such Bills', he wrote, 'as the Old Age Pensions Bill or the Insurance Bill 
should never be in the charge of the Chancellor of the Exchequer during 
their passage through the House, nor, I think, should their administration 
after they have passed into law.  The effect of placing them in the hands of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer is to turn the Treasury into a spending 
Department.  All control is abolished.  There is no entrenchment behind 
which the Minister can take shelter, as is the case when a Bill is in charge 
of another Minister who must obtain the Chancellor's consent before he 
makes any considerable financial concession.' 
 
The Committee so far concurred in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion as to recommend that 
the Treasury 'should cease itself to be a spending Department'. 
 
As regards the relation between a Chancellor of the Exchequer and his ministerial 
colleagues, the Committee showed less acquiescence.  The question raises a large 
issue, nothing less indeed than that of Cabinet solidarity.  During the later years of the 
Great War all the time-honoured principles of Cabinet Government were necessarily 
jettisoned.  Administration was frankly departmental, as it has always been in the 
United States.  With a return to peace conditions the inconveniences attending the 
Presidential system became so glaring that the old Cabinet system was restored.  How 
far the restoration will arrest the tendency towards departmental detachment remains to 
be seen, but in relation to financial control the Committee expressed themselves 
without ambiguity. 
 
'We consider that the Ministry as a whole should be responsible both £or 
making and for declining to make pro- [begin page 554] posals to Parliament 
for increased expenditure.  There have been departures in recent years 
from the practice by which an individual minister was not considered at 
liberty to dissociate himself publicly from his colleagues, and, while himself 
retaining office, to throw, upon the Treasury the onus of refusing a particular 
grant affecting his own Department.  We deprecate 'these departures, 
which if they became the rule would make the position of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer almost untenable.  We recommend that the former practice 
should be rigidly observed.' 
 Most people competent to judge will probably assent to the propositions here laid 
down, and will agree that it is almost hopeless to look for any effective Cabinet control 
over public expenditure if the Departments are permitted to work in splendid isolation. 
 
Foreign Parliaments 
In England, then, there is a prescribed circle of financial responsibility: the Department, 
the Treasury, the Cabinet, the House of Commons.  Control can be rendered effective 
only on two conditions: first, if each link in the chain is sound; secondly, if the chain 
itself is unbroken.  Foreign Parliaments secure co-ordination and control by other 
methods.  From an investigation into those methods two points plainly emerge: 
 
I.  that, in the judgement of most competent critics abroad, debates on the floor of 
the Chamber are useless from the point of view of controlling finance and, 
consequently,  
II.  that experience has proved the necessity of setting up a committee, selected 
from the Legislature, to act as intermediary between the Legislature and the 
Executive. 
 
The United States 
This device is naturally most fully developed in those Constitutions where the Executive 
is most completely detached from the Legislature.  Among such Constitutions, that of 
the United States is the most conspicuous.  Financial control is, to all intents and 
purposes, entirely vested in the committees of Congress.  There is no single Budget or 
Finance Committee; both the Senate and the House of Representatives work through a 
series of committees, each concerned with a different aspect or depart- [begin page 
555] ment of expenditure or of revenue.  There is indeed no Budget or single 
comprehensive statement of the financial position of the country.  The Secretary for the 
Treasury submits a written report of the financial operations of the Federal Government 
for the past fiscal year, with estimates of revenues for the ensuing year.  The 
secretaries of the several Executive Departments submit to the appropriate committees 
estimates of the expenditure required by their respective Departments during the 
ensuing year, and the committees' present them to Congress, by whom the particular 
items may, as far as time permits, be scrutinized.  Of the finance committees the most 
important is the Committee of Ways and Means which has jurisdiction over Revenue 
Bills, and the chairman of that committee' comes nearer than any one else to the 
position of leader of the House',
10 although, as already emphasized, there is and can 
be no 'leader' in the English sense. 
 
Committee of Ways and Means. 
Until 1885 the Appropriations Committee had control over general Appropriation Bills; 
but of late years there has been a marked tendency to substitute for a centralized 
financial control a special control exercised by various expert committees.  The 
Appropriations Committee now possesses jurisdiction only over appropriations which 
are not specifically allotted to other Standing Committees.  Nine of these remaining 
committees have power to report appropriations connected with the Departments with 
which they are specially concerned, among them being the Committees on Naval, 
Military, and Foreign Affairs.
11
 
These committees possess enormous power.  It is true that not a dollar can be 
expended without appropriation by Congress, and that every item of an Appropriation 
Bill is subject to the approval or disapproval of both Houses; but the effective life of 
each Congress is so short, the Bills which it has to consider are so numerous, and the 
                                                  
10   [555/1]  Bryce, American Commonwealth, i. 151.  
11   [555/2]  H.C. 378 (1914), P. 236. time allotted for their discussion is so scanty, that control over revenue and expenditure 
is necessarily [begin page 556] concentrated in the committees.  The chairmen of 
committees become 'practically a second set of ministers before whom the 
departments tremble and who, though they can neither appoint nor dismiss a post-
master or a tide-waiter, can by legislation determine the policy of the administration 
which they oversee'.  Ministers and permanent officials may be summoned before the 
committees and interrogated in regard to any item of expenditure or revenue.  The 
President has, indeed, the legal power to refuse to allow his Ministers or officials to 
obey the summons of a Congress committee; to the President alone they are 
responsible, and even if they do attend they can plead that responsibility, can refuse to 
answer questions or produce documents, or, despite any views expressed by Congress 
or its committees, can, within the limits of law, persist in any line of Executive conduct 
on which they and their master have decided.  In practice, however, such refusal is 
rare.  The Executive Departments and their officials have the best of reasons for 
keeping on good terms with the Legislature, and in particular with the chairmen of 
committees, and generally contrive to do so. 
 
Procedure in Congress  
As the Executive officials are not bound to appear before committees of the 
Legislature, so the latter are not bound to accept the advice tendered to them by the 
former.  The committees may refuse appropriations desired by the Departments, and, 
what to English ideas is much more strange, they can, and do, grant appropriations 
which are not wanted.  Lord Bryce, writing before the Great War, observed that America 
is the only country in the world whose difficulty has mostly been not to raise money but 
to spend it.  Consequently little check existed on the tendency of members of Congress 
to 'deplete the public treasury by securing grants for their friends or constituents or by 
putting through financial jobs for which they (were) to receive some private 
consideration'.
12  Should Congress force upon [begin page 557] a too modest or even 
reluctant Executive revenue for which it has not asked, and which it is unwilling to 
spend, what, it may be asked, becomes of unexpended balances?  In England, as we 
have seen, they are applied automatically to the extinction of debt.  In America 
unexpended balances in the hands of disbursing officers at the end of the fiscal year 
are credited to the revenue of the ensuing year.  After the expiration of two years they 
are carried to the surplus fund and are then subject to appropriation by Congress.
13  
Any member of either House may propose amendments involving additional 
expenditure, but such amendments are in order only when 'authorized by existing law' 
or in continuation of a project or work already begun.  But the part played by Congress 
in regulating and controlling national expenditure is in truth little more than perfunctory, 
apart, of course, from the work of the committees already described. 
 
Criticism of American System 
Under the actual conditions imposed by the American Constitution, the system of 
Standing Committees is indispensable to the reasonably efficient conduct of public 
affairs.  But such measure of efficiency as results is secured at the cost of 
emasculating Congress and destroying its sense of corporate responsibility.  The 
Standing Committees do their work for the most part in secret - a method which 
evidently facilitates if it does not encourage jobbery.  Moreover, the fundamental 
weakness of the committee system is further exaggerated by the multiplication of 
committees and the extreme subdivision of their functions.  In particular it is hopeless 
to look for economy so long as the duty of devising ways and means for the raising of 
revenue is divorced from that of regulating expenditure.  In the House of Commons 
members who assent to votes in departmental estimates are aware that it is they who 
will have to find the money.  In America one set of men working in isolation and in 
                                                  
12   [556/1]  American Commonwealth, i. 182-3. 
13   [557/1]  H.C. 378 (1914), PP. 302, 304. secret vote an appropriation, to another set working under the same conditions it falls 
to devise ways and means, and to [begin page 558] do it, curiously enough, without 
reference to the amount or objects of expenditure.  Both sets of men are, moreover, out 
of touch with the Executive officials who will have the actual spending of the money 
voted by Congress.  Lord Bryce has on this matter delivered a judgement from which 
few people on either side of the Atlantic will be disposed to dissent: 
 
‘The administration instead of proposing and supervising, instead of 
securing that each department gets the money that it needs, that no money 
goes where it is not needed, that revenue is procured in the least 
troublesome and expensive way, that an exact yearly balance is struck, that 
the policy of expenditure is self consistent and reasonably permanent from 
year to year, is by its exclusion from Congress deprived of influence on the 
one hand, of responsibility on the other.  The office of Finance Minister is 
put into Commission, and divided between the chairmen of several 
unconnected committees of both Houses.  A mass of business which 
specially needs the knowledge, skill, and economical conscience of a 
responsible ministry, is left to committees which are powerful but not 
responsible, and to Houses whose nominal responsibility is in practice 
sadly weakened by their want of appropriate methods and organization.’
14
 
A foreign critic may well wonder how the system works at all.  The only possible 
explanation is that it works because America is America; because in finance, as in 
foreign affairs, the conditions of the American polity are peculiar, not to say unique; 
because, in both spheres, the problems are relatively simple; and because the 
American people have enough of political genius to educe order out of conditions 
which to most other peoples would involve chaos. 
 
The rigid application of the principle of the separation of powers, to which repeated 
reference has been made in previous chapters, prohibits the possibility of adapting the 
apparatus of English finance to American institutions.  A parliamentary Chancellor of 
the Exchequer would be wholly inconsistent with the fundamentals of the Constitu- 
[begin page 559] tion.  Yet an English critic finds it, nevertheless, difficult to understand 
the reason, even in the absence of a parliamentary Ministry and a regular Budget, for 
the excessive subdivision of financial functions.  He is apt to conclude, perhaps too 
hastily, that the system exhibits a reductio ad absurdum of a philosophic formula, and, 
in special degree, illustrates the possibility that obstinate adherence to the principle of 
equality may easily endanger the equally democratic principle of liberty. 
 
Financial Procedure in France 
France stands in respect of financial procedure, if not precisely midway between 
England and the United States, at some distance from both, though much nearer to 
England than to America. 
 
Budget Commissions 
Each Chamber has its Budget Commission, but the functions of the two are so closely 
parallel that the following description will deal only with that of the Chamber of 
Deputies.  The Budget Commission consists of 44 members who are appointed by the 
Bureaux for the duration of the Session, though in certain cases its powers may be 
prolonged from one year to another by a special resolution of the Chamber.  The 
Budget itself is submitted, on the responsibility of the Ministry, to the Chamber, but is 
referred for detailed examination to the Budget Commission.  The Commission sits 
daily throughout the greater part of the session, and for the consideration of the annual 
Budget it divides itself into a number of special sub-committees, each of which 
                                                  
14   [558/1]  American Commonwealth, i. 213. considers a special part of the Estimates, and presents a detailed report upon it.  The 
Commission has the right to send for papers and to require Ministers and permanent 
officials to attend and give evidence.  No Minister has the right to attend, but, if he 
expresses a desire to do so, he is generally invited, but only to give information.  Nor 
may any Deputy, other than members of the Commission, attend, save for a similar 
purpose.  The proceedings are secret, and the minutes, though deposited in the 
Chamber, can be consulted only after the final passage of the Finance Bill.  The items 
of the Budget can be cut down by the Commission or [begin page 560] increased, with 
or without the assent of the Finance Minister.  The special reports of the 
subcommittees are co-ordinated in the General Report of the full Commission which is 
presented to the Chamber by the rapporteur gėnėral.  The position of this functionary is 
very influential and in some senses superior to that of the Finance Minister himself, 
since the Ministry are precluded from moving amendments in the Chamber, and 
consequently from inviting it to reverse the decisions of the Commission.  The latter is, 
therefore, supreme in its control over the annual finances.  Ministers are practically at 
its mercy, and accord between them and the Commission is secured, as M. Dupriez 
observes, only when the Ministry submits to the dictation of the Commission.
15
 
A similar procedure is followed by the Senate which also has its Commission du 
Budget, but the Senate has no power of initiating financial legislation, and though its 
right of rejection is unquestioned its right of amendment is not.  Gambetta attempted in 
1882 to revise the powers of the Senate in respect to finance; but he was 
unsuccessful, and consequently the powers of the Senate in this sphere have 
remained somewhat dubious.  In practice, the tactics of the Chamber have tended to 
reduce the power actually entrusted to the Senate by the Organic Laws.  By deferring 
the passage of the Budget to the latest possible moment the Chamber compels the 
Senate to choose between the alternative of rejecting the Budget, and 'driving the 
Ministry to a provisional levy of taxation needing to be subsequently confirmed'.  Lord 
Bryce deprecated this practice on the ground that finance is a subject, which the 
Senate understands.  'The reports of its Commission on the Budget', he adds, 'are 
always careful and usually sound, but they have little effect in checking either the 
extravagance or the fiscal errors of the deputies.'
16  [begin page 561] 
 
To both defects the system of Budget Commissions would unquestionably appear to 
contribute.  The operation of the system is much less deleterious than in America, as 
the system itself is less elaborately articulated.  Moreover, France possesses what the 
United States does not, a parliamentary Executive.  But any advantage which the 
Cabinet principle may be held to confer is to a large extent neutralized, notably in the 
sphere of finance, by the traditional suspicion of the, Executive still entertained by the 
Legislature - a suspicion which is constitutionally manifested in the rules under which 
the Budget Commission operates.  In finance, the authority of the Commission 
overshadows that of the Cabinet, and the position of its rapporteur gėnėral rivals that of 
the Finance Minister. 
 
Audit of Accounts 
The arrangements for the audit of the public accounts in France are similar to those 
which obtain in England, and are understood to be not less effective.  The rules which 
govern the examination of the Budget are, as we have indicated, widely different, and 
doubtless the grave inconveniences attaching, in English eyes, to the French system 
have led experienced statesmen and officials, in England, to question the wisdom of 
conferring enlarged powers upon the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons. 
 
                                                  
15   [560/1]  Lėon Dupriez, Les Ministres dans les Principaux pays d' Europe et d' 
Amėrique. Paris: 3 vols. (3rd ed., 1892-3). 
16   [560/2]  Modern Democracies, i. 265. Comparisons 
The inconveniences are evident; but the English system, while avoiding the reckless 
extravagance of the French, can hardly be said to achieve economy, or to secure to the 
House of Commons any effective control over national expenditure.  Cabinet 
responsibility is, and must remain, a cardinal principle of English Government; the rule 
which confers upon the Crown only, and its Ministers, the right to propose expenditure 
is one of the most salutary of our constitutional safeguards, and should be inflexibly 
maintained; but short of the French Commission du Budget, and very much farther 
short of the multitudinous Committees of the American Congress, there would seem to 
be room in the procedure of the English Parliament for one or more Committees on 
[begin page ] Estimates which might secure to us some of the advantages, without 




                                                  
17    [562/1]  Budget Committees, more or less on the model of the French 
Commissions, existed in the Legislatures of Italy, the German Empire, Austria, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland, and possibly elsewhere, Neither Holland nor 
Belgium possessed permanent Budget Committees. (H.C. 378 Of 1914) XXII - Parliamentary Procedure 
The House of Lords.  Legislature and Executive.   
Foreign Legislatures and International Affairs 
 
'No one who is not blind to the political development of our time can have 
failed to perceive that parliamentary government has . . . become the chief 
problem in the science of public law - in the theory and practice of politics.  
Nor can there be any doubt that the central element of the problem, as it 
now presents itself, is the manner in which a parliament is to discharge the 
function of enabling the State to perform its regular work.'- Dr. Joseph 
Redlich. 
 
'The main problems of Parliamentary procedure under existing conditions 
are two: on the one hand, how to find time within limited Parliamentary 
hours for disposing of the growing mass of business which devolves on the 
Government, and on the other hand, how to reconcile the legitimate 
demands of the Government with the legitimate rights of the minority - the 
dispatch of business with the duties of Parliament as the great inquest of the 
nation at which all public questions of real importance find opportunity for 
adequate discussion.' - Sir C.P. Ilbert, Clerk of the House of Commons. 
 
'There is no more striking illustration of the immobility of British 
Institutions than the House of Commons.' - Lord Oxford. 
 
The adjustment of relations between Executive and Legislature in the 
conduct of foreign affairs has been in many free countries one of the most 
difficult and indeed insoluble problems of practical politics.' - Lord Bryce. 
 
Procedure in House of Lords. 
The procedure of the House of Lords, though more elastic than that of the Commons, 
is, as regards ordinary legislation, virtually identical with it.  But over Money Bills the 
Lords have, since 1911, had no control.  The term 'Money Bill' had for a long period 
been regularly used without precise definition, and there still remains some uncertainty 
of interpretation.  But under the Parliament Act, 1911, the term has now received 
statutory definition.  A 'Money Bill' is a Public Bill which in the opinion of the Speaker of 
the House of Commons, 
 
‘contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the following subjects, 
namely, the imposition, repeal, remission, alteration, or regulation of 
taxation the imposition for the payment [begin page 564] of debt or other 
financial purposes of charges on the Consolidated Fund, or on money 
provided by Parliament, or the variation or repeal of any such charges; 
supply; the appropriation, receipt, custody, issue, or audit of accounts of 
public money the raising or guarantee of any loan or the repayment thereof 
or subordinate matters incidental to those subjects or any of them.' 
 
A Money Bill, when it is sent up to the House of Lords, must be endorsed with the 
Speaker's certificate, but that endorsement is conclusive and cannot be questioned in any court of law; though discussion has, inevitably, arisen as to whether, in given 
cases, such a certificate ought to be given or withheld.
1
 
Apart from Money Bills the procedure in the House of Lords differs so little from that of 
the House of Commons that it calls only for a brief description.  Like the Commons the 
Lords have complete control over their own proceedings, but the pressure of business 
being less, their rules are less stringent.  Thus in asking and answering questions 
debate is permitted, without any formal motion being proposed to the House.  Debates 
are altogether less formal in the Upper House, as evidenced by the rule that peers may 
now be alluded to by name, whereas in the Commons each member must, in debate, 
be distinguished by the office he holds, by the Constituence he represents, or by some 
other designation.  Courtesy in treatment of colleagues is rigidly insisted upon in both 
Houses.  [begin page 565] 
 
Standing Order No. 28 of the House of Lords directs 
 
'that all personal, sharp, or taxing speeches be forborne’, and that if offence 
be given the House 'will sharply censure the offender'. 
 
Nor is the Lower House less insistent upon good manners.  The Upper House is in one 
sense more democratic than the Lower: all members, official and unofficial, are on an 
equal footing; the Government enjoys no special privileges in debate.  Nor is there any 
closure or 'guillotine’. 
 
The Lord Speaker 
Much the most significant difference consists in the position of the Speaker.  Ordinarily, 
and by prescription, the Lord Chancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, 
is Prolocutor of the Upper House, and by Standing Order No. 5 he is required to attend 
the House in that capacity; but if he be absent, or if there be none authorized under the 
Great Seal to supply his place, the peers may, during the vacancy, choose their own 
Speaker.  The Prolocutor, singularly enough, need not necessarily be a peer.  Lord 
Brougham, for example, presided as Lord Chancellor before he was raised to the 
peerage, and when the Great Seal has been in Commission the Crown has appointed 
the Master of the Rolls, or the Chief Baron of the Exchequer (an office now extinct), or 
even a Vice Chancellor to function as Lord Speakers.  Sir Robert Henley presided over 
the House of Lords as Lord Keeper for three years (1757-60) as a commoner, though 
he was subsequently raised to the peerage and held office as Lord Chancellor through 
three successive administrations.
2
                                                  
1   [564/1]  For example: in reference to the Housing (Financial Provisions) Bill, 
1924), the question was raised whether it would be certified as a Money Bill.  
Neither the fact that it involved a large expenditure of public money, nor that it 
originated in Committee of Ways and Means (on a financial resolution) would, I 
submit, have sufficed to bring it within the category.  If such reasons were held to 
bring Bills within the definition, few Bills involving social reforms would be 
excluded.  The definition or description contained in the Parliament Act is, 
however, far from satisfactory; it is at once curiously inclusive and curiously 
restrictive.  On the one hand, Bills have been certified as Money Bills although 
they did not grant money to the Crown for supply services (as, e.g., the Public 
Buildings Expenses Bill of 1913); while, on the other hand, the Finance Bills of 
Sessions 1911, 1916, 1917-18, 1918, 1921, and 1923 failed to secure the 
Speaker's certificate as 'Money Bills'.  On the whole of this intricate question cf. 
May, Parliamentary Practice (ed. Webster), PP. 435 seq. 
2    [565/1]  May, op. cit., P. 175, and Lord Henley, Memoir of Lord Chancellor 
Northington.  
The House itself appoints the Chairman of Committees who presides in all committees 
of the whole House, and, unless it shall have been otherwise directed by the House, in 
all committees upon Private Bills.  The House may also elect a Speaker Pro tempore, 
when the Lord Chancellor and all the Deputy Speakers (nominated by the Crown) are 
absent. 
 
The position of the Lord Speaker is in several respects [begin page 566] anomalous.  As 
a member of the Government he is in no sense raised above parties; he frequently acts 
as spokesman of the Government and may even act as leader of the House.
3  On the 
other hand his authority over his fellow peers is strictly limited.  If more than one peer 
rises at the same time, it is for the House, not for the President, to decide which shall 
be heard, though if the President himself be one of them precedence is by custom 
accorded to him.  Speeches are addressed, consequently, not to him but ‘to the rest of 
the lords in general'.  Another result of his limited powers is 'that a peer who is 
disorderly is called to order by another peer . . . ; and that an irregular argument is apt 
to ensue in which . . . recrimination takes the place of orderly debate.  There is no 
impartial authority to whom an appeal can be made, and the debate upon a question of 
order generally ends with satisfaction to neither party, and without any decision upon 
the matter to which exception had been taken.’
4
 
It remains to ask three questions: 
 
(i)    How far the procedure of the English Parliament is effective in 
enabling it to perform the functions imposed upon it 
(ii)   whether and, if so, in what directions it could be improved; and 
(iii)   whether the procedure adopted in foreign Parliaments furnishes any 
hints for such improvement. 
 
Select Committees on Public Business 
That the House of Commons is anxious to improve its methods of conducting public 
business may be inferred from the fact that since 1832 it has appointed no fewer than 
seventeen Select Committees to inquire into and report on procedure.  Of these no 
fewer than six have sat since 1906, a sufficient indication of the increasing 
dissatisfaction with existing methods. 
 
Sittings of Parliament 
The latest inquiry (1923-4)
5 was concerned with the desirability of altering the 
customary period of the Parliamentary Session - a matter which was also discussed 
[begin page 567] by the Select Committee of 1914.
6  For nearly two decades Parliament 
has sat throughout the greater part of the year.  Out of the last nineteen years autumn 
sessions or sittings have been held in no fewer than sixteen, and it is the view of the 
latest committee that it must be assumed that, except under very special 
circumstances, an autumn session will be of normal occurrence.  At present the 
session is habitually opened on the assumption that the work of the session will be 
completed by sitting into the late summer.  The expectation is hardly ever fulfilled, with 
the result that Parliament, having sat far into August, is again summoned in the 
autumn.  There would seem to be general agreement on two points: 
                                                  
3   [566/1]  As in the case of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Lord Chancellor in the 
Macdonald Ministry of 1924. 
4   [566/2]  May, op. cit., pp. 3009-10. 
5   [566/3]  House of Commons Papers 112 (of 1924). 
6   [567/1]  House of Commons Procedure (378 of 1914).  See especially evidence of 
Mr. Speaker Lowther, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Balfour.  
(i)   that the present normal sittings of Parliament are sufficiently if not 
unduly prolonged; and 
 (ii)   that it is undesirable for Parliament under any circumstances to sit 
beyond the end of July. 
 
Mr. Asquith was convinced, even in 1914, that the session was already too long, and 
that its prolongation was having a serious effect not only on the health of members and 
the efficiency of Ministers and Departments, but also on the attractiveness of 
Parliament to the kind of men it is desirable to attract.  Perhaps post-war experience 
may to some extent have dissipated the latter apprehension.  'Business' is, however, a 
serious competitor to Parliament, and it is increasingly difficult to induce the captains of 
industry and finance to exchange the city, or the cities, for Westminster, though many 
of them ultimately find a place, to the great advantage of Parliament as a whole, in the 
Second Chamber.  A yet older type of members - the cadets of good family and the 
leisured inheritors of commercial wealth - is still largely represented in the House of 
Commons.  Nevertheless, it must be admitted that it would be a grave disaster if Mr. 
Asquith's fears were realized and the House were to be composed of men to whom a 
salary of £400 was a consideration.   [begin page 568] 
 
Parliamentary Counsel’s Office 
The real objection, however, to a prolongation of Parliamentary Sessions concerns the 
work, not of the Legislature, but of the Executive, and in particular that part of the 
Executive to which pertains the pro-bouleutic function, and the preparation of the 
annual estimates.  In 1869 there was established an official department, under a 
Parliamentary Counsel of great experience, to which all the Government Departments 
have a right to resort for the drafting of Bills.  The staff of the office now consists of the 
Parliamentary Counsel and two assistants, with clerks, &c.  Since the establishment of 
this office the custom formerly prevailing of having Bills prepared by the legal officers 
attached to the several departments has been gradually discontinued, and the work of 
preparing legislation for all departments is now, to the general advantage of the public 
service, concentrated in a single office which commands the services of highly skilled 
and specialized officers. 
 
Drafting of Bills. 
That the drafting of Bills still leaves much to be desired is a common complaint among 
unofficial Members of Parliament, still more among the public; but how difficult and 
highly technical a task it is can be appreciated perhaps only by those who, as 
amateurs, have attempted it.  Above all, it is a task which takes time.  Instructions for 
the preparation of Bills are not, in the, normal course of business, received before 
November, and an important Bill often involves fifteen or twenty amended drafts, most 
of which have to be referred by the Parliamentary Counsel to the Cabinet or a Cabinet 
Committee.  It is, therefore, not surprising to learn that experienced draftsmen estimate 
that the drafting of an important Government Bill involves two and very often three 
months for completion. 
 
Autumn Sessions 
Drafting is, however, a relatively late stage in the process of legislation.  Departmental 
and Cabinet work, often prolonged, must precede the transmission of instructions to 
the Parliamentary Counsel, and even if Parliament rises at the end of July such work 
can hardly [begin page 569] begin, if Ministers and their secretaries are to have a 
reasonable holiday, before October.  Regular autumn sessions can hardly fail to result 
in scamped and hurried preparatory work, involving the expenditure of additional time 
in Parliament, not to add unsatisfactory legislation. 
 With these considerations in mind it is hardly surprising that the joint Committee 
unanimously rejected the proposal that Parliament should be opened about the 
beginning of November and sit until just before Christmas; and again from the third-
week of January until the end of July.  It was suggested that during the Autumn Sitting 
Parliament should dispose of the address in Reply to the Gracious Speech from the 
Throne; and that in the House of Commons the Committees of Supply and of Ways and 
Means should be set up, the Supplementary Estimates passed, and the Second 
Readings of the main Bills of the Session should be taken.
7  That the existing 
arrangement involves great pressure of financial business in February and March 
cannot be denied; but to require the Departments to prepare in October their 
Supplementary Estimates covering expenditure up to 31 March would almost certainly 
result in over-estimating, while the time for the preparation of Bills would be, 
disastrously curtailed.  As an alternative, the joint Committee suggested that Parliament 
should continue to meet after the turn of the year, and sit until near the end of July; with 
the under standing that if the business of the session could not be concluded by or 
about that date it should be adjourned until October or November.  Autumn Sittings 
might, under favourable circumstances, sometimes be avoided, and where they were 
inevitable the length of them would depend on the amount of work which, so far as 
could be estimated in July, would have to be accomplished before Christmas. 
 
Foreign Examples. 
The law and custom of Foreign Parliaments in this respect greatly vary.  In France, 
Belgium, and the United [begin page 570] States the sittings of the Legislature are 
regulated by Constitutional Law.  In France the statutory term is from the second 
Tuesday in January to 14 July, at earliest, with an additional session from the end of 
October or early in November until 3o December.  The United States Congress sits 
from the first Monday in December to 3 March, or Midsummer (in alternate years), and 
the Belgian Parliament from the second Tuesday in November to May or the end of 
July (in alternate years).  In democratic Switzerland the Federal Legislature does not as 
a rule sit for more than fifty days in the year: for three or four weeks in June; from the 
first Monday in December to Christmas, and occasionally for a fortnight or three weeks 
in Spring and Autumn.  The Swiss peasants cannot afford to be absent for protracted 
periods from their ordinary avocations.  Other Parliaments, like our own, regulate their 
sittings not by law, but by custom.  No foreign Parliament, except the French, excels 
our own in assiduity of attendance.
8  The average number of days in a session on 
which the Swiss Parliament sits is 50; the Swedish 70-75; the Belgian 120-130; the 
French 200; while the English Parliament has in the last six years (1919-24) sat on an 
average 142 days, though its sittings were interrupted by no fewer than three General 
Elections.  The English Parliament cannot, then, be accused of sloth.  But is it efficient?  
Are its methods well adapted to its functions?  Could they be improved?  To these 
questions some answer, however summary, must be attempted, before we complete 
the survey of this portion of the subject. 
 
Functions of Parliament 
Efficiency must be judged in relation to functions.  The functions of the English 
Parliament, be it recalled, are not confined to legislation, either ordinary or financial.  
They are also deliberative and critical.  Above all, it is the business of Parliament, and 
particularly of the House of Commons, to maintain and sustain, and within limits to 
control, the Executive Government.  This latter function [begin page 571] is performed 
partly by means of constant interpellations, by debates on policy, and, most important 
of all, by vigilant control over public expenditure. 
 
                                                  
7   [569/1] By Sir Leslie Wilson, Patronage Secretary to the Treasury, 1921-3. 
8   [570/1]  See Appendix to Report of Select Committee of 1914. Deliberation and Criticism 
Of the process of legislation enough has been said already, some words must be 
added on the functions of criticism and control.  Debates on matters of general policy 
can be initiated in the House of Lords almost at any moment and by any individual 
peer, and such debates are usually maintained, in the Upper House, on a high level of 
excellence and with great advantage to the political education of the country at large.  
In the House of Commons opportunities are afforded by the debate on the address in 
reply to the speech from the Throne; on 'days' allocated for the purpose by the 
Government, generally on the demand of the Opposition leaders; on motions for the 
adjournment of the House, and, in particular, in Committee of Supply.  The exercise of 
this important function gives rise frequently to what are colloquially known as ‘full-dress 
debates' - occasions on which party is arrayed against party, when the leaders cross 
swords in dialectical conflict, and the House, and even the country, is roused to a high 
pitch of excitement.  But for these occasional gladiatorial displays the days of the 
Parliamentarian would, however fruitful in results, be mostly rather dreary and drab. 
 
‘Questions’ 
To this somewhat deterrent generalization the Question may, perhaps, be regarded as 
forming an exception.  Questions now occupy the first hour of public business on the 
first four days of the week, and may be put down on Fridays, though it is understood 
that Ministers need not, on Fridays, be present to answer them.  The Question hour is, 
with private members, the most popular part of the day's proceedings; indeed, save on 
the occasion of a 'full-dress' debate, it is the only hour of the day when the Chamber is 
crowded.  This is not unintelligible.  'Questions' afford to the private member, under 
modern conditions, almost his only opportunity.  In ordinary debates he may sit for 
hours and even for days without [begin page 572] being 'called'.  But with some little 
knowledge of procedure, and some ingenuity in the framing of questions, he can be 
reasonably certain of 'getting in’, not only with his original questions, but with one, or 
more supplementary questions 'arising out of the original answer'. 
 
As a rule some 80-100 questions, in addition to 'supplementaries', are daily disposed 
of.  Questions may be either oral or written.  The former are marked with an asterisk on 
the Order Paper, and give the inquirer, and indeed other members, the chance of 
putting supplementary questions to the Minister.  Supplementary questions afford to the 
questioner - the chance of displaying parliamentary ingenuity, and to the Minister the 
chance of proving his knowledge of his particular job, and still more his dialectical 
adroitness.  Questions of merely local or personal interest, touching, for instance, the 
claims of individual constituents, should be, and often are, relegated to the written 
category, in which case the member receives the desired information by letter from the 
Department. 
 
Origin of ‘Questions’ 
That the privilege of interpellation may be abused is obvious; it is, indeed, one of the 
most important and, be it added, one of the most delicate functions of the Speaker to 
check the abuse of it; but any attempt to curtail it is rightly regarded with extreme 
jealousy by members of Parliament, and to abolish it would be to alter the whole 
character of Parliamentary Democracy as evolved in this country. 
 
The practice of permitting the interrogation of Ministers is, indeed, coeval with the dawn 
of Cabinet Government.  The earliest recorded instance of a parliamentary question 
occurred on 9 February 1721, when, in the House of Lords, Lord Cowper called 
attention to a report that a certain offender, named Knight, against whom the House of 
Lords wished to institute proceedings, and who had absconded, had been arrested in 
Brussels, which being a matter in which the public was highly concerned, he desired 
those in the administration to acquaint the 'House whether there was any ground for 
that report'.  Where- [begin page 573] upon Lord Sunderland, First Lord of the Treasury, stated that the Report was true, and informed the House in what manner Mr. Knight 
had been apprehended and secured taking credit to the Government for the 
promptitude and energy they had exhibited.
9  Only, however, within a recent period has 
the practice been formally recognized.  On 29 April 1830 the Speaker of the House of 
Commons ruled that 'there is nothing in the orders of this House to preclude any 
member from putting a question and receiving an answer to it', and that the proceeding 
'though not strictly regular affords great convenience to individuals'.  On the following 
day, after some objections and explanations, a question was, by courtesy, allowed 
precedence over an item which had been fixed as the first order of the day. 
 
Questions appeared on the Paper for the first time in 1849,
10 and in 1854 the time and 
method of putting and answering questions was actually regulated.  In that year Mr. 
(afterwards Sir Thomas) Erskine May prepared, under the direction of the Speaker, a 
Manual of the Rules and Orders of the House of Commons; and Rule 52 provided that, 
'before the public business is entered upon, questions are permitted to, be-put to 
Ministers of the Crown relating to public affairs; and to other members, relating to any 
Bill, motion, or other public matter connected with the business of the House, in which 
such members may be concerned.
11
 
This cherished privilege is strictly limited, though in Limits the opinion of Mr. Balfour the 




Questions must relate to the public affairs with which the Minister to whom they are 
addressed is officially concerned, to any matter of administration for which he is 
responsible, and to proceedings pending in Parliament.  [begin page 574] 
 
They should not be put if the information sought can be obtained from ordinary 
sources, and they must not concern the internal affairs of a friendly State or a 
Dominion; nor must they contain reflections upon the Sovereign nor upon the conduct 
of the heir to the throne, the Viceroy of India, the Governors-General of the Dominions, 
the judges, the Speaker or the Chairman of Ways and Means, or members of either 
House of Parliament.  Questions must seek and not convey information may not 
contain statements of fact, nor arguments, inferences, or imputations.  Epithets are not 
allowed, nor quotations nor controversial or ironical expressions.
13  Any question may 
be disallowed by the Speaker, who exercises the closest scrutiny over them before 
allowing them to appear on the 'Paper'; and a Minister may refuse to answer them 
without giving further reason than that it is, in his judgement, against the public interest 
to do so. 
 
Questions may be debated in the House of Lords but not in the House of Commons, 
though a member, if dissatisfied, may give notice that he will raise the matter on the 
motion for the adjournment of the House, in which case, if he can keep a quorum, he 
may get a debate of about twenty minutes.  Formerly it was within the power of any two 
members to move and second a motion for the adjournment of the House either during 
Questions or at any moment before the commencement of public business, and to 
raise thereon a general debate.  But this right led to grave abuse of the time of the 
House, and, since 1882, such a motion can only be made immediately after Questions, 
with the assent of not fewer than forty members, and after the Speaker has decided 
                                                  
9   [573/1]  Parliamentary History, vii. 709; Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, iv. 
398. 
10   [573/2]  Select Committee of 1914, Q. (Mr. Swift MacNeill), 1233. 
11   [573/3]  Todd, Parliamentary Government, ii. 341. 
12   [573/4]   Q. 1240. 
13   [574/1]  May, Parliamentary Practice, pp. 221 seq. that the question raises 'a definite matter of urgent public importance'.  Urgency and 
definiteness are of the essence of the matter.  The Speaker frequently refuses on one 
or other or both of these grounds to put the question to the House, and even when put, 
the House not infrequently declines to assent.  [begin page 575] 
 
Foreign Practice. 
Questions have no place, of course, in Legislative Bodies to which, as in the Congress 
of the United States, Practice the Executive is not responsible, but they are an 
essential part of the procedure in those Parliaments which have modelled themselves 
on that of Great Britain, though there is no Legislature in the world where the Executive 
is subjected to an equally severe bombardment.
14  The Federal Legislature of the 
Swiss Confederation is, as already indicated, pre-eminently native born, but although 
the Executive Council occupies in Switzerland a peculiar position in face of the 
Legislature, the rules of both Chambers provide for questions and permit the 
questioner to declare whether he is satisfied with the answer.  No debate may, 
however, take place.  In striking contrast to the procedure of the French Parliament 
which presupposes on the part of Senators and Deputies a spirit of sleepless vigilance, 
not to say perpetual hostility towards the Executive, Swiss procedure presupposes 
mutual confidence and benevolent goodwill, and knows nothing of the contrivances 
which are designed to harass and entrap Ministers. 
 
Germany 
The German Constitution of 1871 was in several respects Germany anomalous, and in 
none more than in its definition of the relations of the Legislature and the Executive.  
The Chancellor was the sole Imperial Minister and was responsible not to the 
Legislature but to the Emperor.  As Minister he had no place in the Reichstag; but as a 
member of the Bundesrat he could, like other members, attend the sittings of the 
Reichstag, and in that capacity he answered the interpellations addressed by the 
Reichstag to the Bundesrat.  Debates on interpellations were permitted if demanded by 
fifty members, but no order of the day followed, nor did the Chancellor resign in 
consequence of an adverse vote. 
 
The new German Constitution (1919) provides that the Chancellor, the National 
Ministers (the Cabinet), and their deputies may attend the sittings of the Reichstag and 
the Reichsrat and their Committees, and are bound [begin page 576] to do so, if 
summoned.  They are entitled to be heard, at their request, and to propose resolutions.  
The Chancellor lays down general policy and bears the responsibility thereafter in the 
Reichstag, but individual Ministers are severally responsible for their own Departments.  
Ministers are obliged to keep the Reichsrat informed of the course of current business, 
and to consult the competent committees of the Reichsrat in their deliberations on 
subjects of importance.  Should the Reichstag withdraw its confidence from the 
Chancellor or any other National Minister, the Minister so censured must resign.  The 
new Constitution marks, therefore, a considerable, advance in the direction of 
Parliamentary Democracy, though the Departmental principle, as opposed to that of 
complete Cabinet solidarity, is still maintained. 
 
Italy 
The Italian Constitution approximates more nearly, perhaps, to that of England than 
does that of any other continental State, but in regard to the particular point of 
Parliamentary procedure now under discussion, Italy stands midway between England 
and France.  The Italian Cabinet is slightly less dependent upon the caprice of the 
Legislature and less restrained by the Committee system than that of France, but 
Ministers are exposed not only to 'Questions' in the English sense, but to 
                                                  
14   [575/1]  Mr. Balfour's evidence before Select Committee of 1914, Q. 1156. 'Interpellations' according to, the usage of France.  Yet with a difference.  Ministers are 
exposed to 'Questions' as in England, but the Standing Orders provide that the answer 
of the Minister must not be made use of either in order to initiate a debate or to enable 
the deputy to make a declaration.  As in France, however, a formal 'Interpellation' may 
be followed by a debate and a vote on the order of the day.  But the debate and vote 
must take place, not as in France immediately after the answer of the Minister, but on a 
subsequent day.  This precaution not only allows time for members to cool down and 
for excitement to evaporate, but also for calm calculation as to whether it is or is not 
desirable to displace the Cabinet.
15   [begin page 577] 
 
France. 
For the widest latitude in the use both of simple ‘Questions’ and elaborate 
'Interpellations’, we must turn to France.  The Napoleonic Empires, First and Second, 
to say nothing of the Ancien Regime, have bequeathed to the modern Frenchman a 
tradition, curiously blended, of reliance upon bureaucracy and mistrust of the political 
Executive.  Adherence to the principle of Administrative Law does not prevent the 
constitutional jurist in France from placing every possible obstacle in the path of the 
Parliamentary Executive.  Of the most powerful of the checks exercised by the 
Legislature over the Executive, that of the Committee system, something must be said 
presently.  Even more harassing in the conduct of Parliamentary business are 
'Interpellations'.  'Questions' in the English sense do not play any great part in French 
procedure.  Oral questions are permitted only if the consent of the Minister has been 
previously obtained.  They can be put at the beginning and end of any sitting, but in the 
four years (May 1910-July 1913) only 47 questions were thus put - less than half the 
number ordinarily answered in a single sitting of the English Parliament.  In the same 
period there were, however, 3,147 written-questions.  A Minister's previous consent is 
not, in this case, required, but he may refuse to reply in the interests of the public 
service, or may ask for time to prepare his reply.  Replies must, however, be printed 
and circulated within eight days. 
 
The 'Interpellation' is a much more serious matter.  It is, indeed, the ordinary means of 
bringing about a ministerial crisis.  Any member is entitled to interpellate a Minister, 
who is bound to reply, and on the reply a debate may arise.  The Chamber itself fixes 
the time of the discussion which for questions of domestic politics must not be more 
than a month ahead.  Questions touching foreign affairs may be indefinitely postponed.  
During the period May 1910 to July 1913, no fewer than 481 interpellations were 
deposited, of which 167 were discussed, 29 were withdrawn, and 285 failed to secure a 
day.  [begin page 578] 
 
Ordres du jour 
The method of interpellation was first introduced into the French Chamber during the 
reign of Louis Philippe (1830-48), but at that time no motion was made on the subject-
matter of the interpellation.  In order, however, to dispose of the interpellation, it was 
necessary to move to proceed to the Order of the Day.  This procedure is still in use 
under the name of The Order of the Day pure and simple.  It is equivalent to the 
'previous question’, and, if carried, involves neither acquittal nor condemnation.  Hostile 
critics may, however, move an ordre du jour motivi, in which case an expression of 
opinion with regard to the conduct of the Ministry may be tacked on to the motion for 
the Order of the Day.  These ordres du jour motivis may reflect all shades of approval 
or condemnation.  Several may be, and usually are, proposed on each interpellation, 
but, many or few, they can be discussed concurrently, while the Chamber itself decides 
the order in which they shall be put to the vote.  If the motion preferred by the 
                                                  
15   [576/1]  Lowell, Governments, i. 211. Government is rejected, or if a hostile motion is carried, provided the matter is deemed 




Questions and 'Interpellations' afford the most obvious means, open to a Legislature, of 
criticizing and controlling an Executive.  But much more effective, as a method of 
exercising continuous control over the Ministry, is the system of Standing Committees.  
Such Committees play a far more important role in most foreign Legislatures than in 
our own.  Moreover, these Committees are, in most cases, much more independent of 
the control of the Chamber, and much more powerful in face of the Executive.  Their 
functions may be conveniently considered in reference to general legislation, to 
finance, and to international affairs. 
 
The general mode of procedure in foreign legislatures centres round the Committee 
system.  The English [begin page 579] system of Three Readings, in addition to 
Committee stage and Report, is virtually unique.  Elsewhere
17 the general rule is to 
refer all Bills immediately, and without preliminary discussion, to a Committee - either a 
special or ad hoc Committee; or more commonly a Standing or permanent Committee.  
After consideration in Committee, a Bill is reported to the Chamber or Senate, as the 
case may be, by the member of the Committee chosen to act as rapporteur.  This 
appointment is eagerly sought after; it brings the member into the parliamentary 
limelight and confers upon him special rights in debate.  The Committee, through its 
reporter, recommends the Chamber to accept, amend, or reject the Bill.  Committees of 
the Chamber are bound to report within four months of the date of the reference; 
Senatorial Committees within six, or within three, in the case of a Bill originating in the 
Senate but amended in the Chamber.  Both Chambers leave at least one day a week 
free for the work of the Committees.  Discussions in Committee are private, but 
minutes are kept in summary form and are deposited in the archives of the Chamber 
concerned, where they are open to confidential inspection by members.  Ministers are 
entitled to attend Committees, as auditors only, and may be required to attend as 
witnesses.  Committees may also, with the Ministers' consent, summon as witnesses 
the competent departmental officials.  If, however, the Minister is sure of support in the 
Chamber, he can refuse to attend or to allow his officials to attend.  The Committee 
having reported on a Bill, one discussion in the Chamber is generally held to suffice.  In 
France and many other continental States there is, in the Chamber, only one 
discussion, but taken in three stages: 
 
(i)   a general discussion followed immediately by 
 (ii)   discussion of articles, and 
(iii)   a final vote on the whole Bill. 
 
Committee System in France. 
In the Senate there are two examinations with a five days' interval between them.  The 
countries where the Committee system has been [begin page 580] worked out with the 
greatest elaboration are France and the United States.  Of the former M. Joseph 
Barthelemy writes.  Theoretically no question comes before either House before it has 
been studied by a Committee whose findings are set down in a brief report.’
18  The 
French Chamber, at the beginning of each Parliament, nominates twenty Grandes 
Commissions permanentes, corresponding roughly to the Chief Departments of State.  
                                                  
16   [578/1]  Report of Select Committee (378 Of 1915), pp. 241-3. Cf. Cmd. 2282 of 
1924. 
17    [579/1]  The description that follows applies more particularly to France. Cf. 
Cmd. 22.82 Of 1924. 
18   [580/1]  The Government of France, P. 49. The members are appointed for the lifetime of the Parliament, and each consists of 44 
members.  In addition to these there are an indefinite number of Grandes Commissions 
diverses, similarly, appointed for the lifetime of the Parliament. 
 
Each contains 44 or 22 members.  The Senate similarly sets up annually twelve 
Grandes Commissions, each of 36 members.  In both Houses the members are 
nominated by the groups, in proportion to their numbers.  All Senators and Deputies 
are asked to attach themselves to a group.  Of these groups (with more or less 
differentiated political tenets), there are at present (1924) nine, while the ‘unattached' or 
independent members form for certain purposes a tenth group.  The nominations of 
Committeemen by the groups has to be approved by the Chambers, but this approval 
is a mere matter of form.  In the event of objection, the Committees are nominated by 
scrutin de liste, each Deputy or Senator having a number of votes corresponding to the 
number of Committee-men to be nominated. 
 
Besides the Standing Committees there are certain monthly Commissions, each 
consisting of 11 to 22 members, and each House has its Budget Committee, consisting 
Of 33.  These are nominated by the sections or Bureaux into which all members of both 
Chambers are redistributed monthly by lot.  There are 11 Bureaux in the Chamber and 
9 in the Senate, and each nominates according to the size of the Committee, one, two, 
three, or four Committee-men.  
 
This curious system is one of the few relics of the ancien regime still to be found in the 
parliamentary procedure of [begin page 581] modern France.  It was a common device 
alike in the ecclesiastical assemblies, and to a less degree in the Etats géneraux of the 
old monarchy; it reappeared in 1789, and still forms a characteristic and curious feature 
in the working of political institutions under the third Republic. 
 
It is noticeable that as regards the process of legislation Continental Europe has been 
prone to follow the French rather than the English model.  Whether this is due to a 
desire to attain greater scientific precision in legislature, or to a failure to apprehend the 
niceties of the English Cabinet system and the consequential relations between the 
Executive and the Legislature, cannot be summarily determined.  The fact remains that 
foreign Parliaments have almost without exception adopted a procedure which, while it 
may conduce to more precise legislation, seems to English eyes to savour of undue 
encroachment upon the sphere of the Executive. 
 
More particularly is this true of the control exercised by the Parliaments of Foreign 
States over international relations and over finance. 
 
Control of Foreign Policy 
Hardly one of those Parliaments has so little direct Control over, international affairs as 
our own.  Perhaps the most striking illustration of recent developments in this respect is 
furnished by the new German Constitution.  Under the Imperial Constitution the 
conduct of foreign affairs was the strictly guarded and exclusive prerogative of the 
Kaiser, though the consent of the Bundesrat was required to a declaration of war 
except in the case of an attack upon the federal territory or its coasts.  It must be 
remembered, however, that through the Prussian delegation the Kaiser had an all but 
dominating influence over the Bundesrat. 
 
Germany 
All this has, of course, been altered.  The Reichstag is now supreme alike in the 
domain of foreign and of domestic policy.  The declaration of war and the conclusion of 
peace require legislation in the Reichstag, as do certain treaties.  Apart from the right of 
questioning Ministers and bringing forward motions on foreign policy [begin page 582] 
the co-operation of the Reichstag in international affairs is further secured by the appointment of a special Committee for this purpose.  It is the duty of this Committee to 
keep the foreign policy of the Ministry under permanent observation, to remain in 
constant touch with the Foreign Office, and to exercise control over it.  To enable it to 
do this effectually it continues to sit even during the adjournments of the Reichstag, 
and in the interval between the dissolution of one Reichstag and the meeting of 
another.  The Committee has, moreover, the right to inspect all official documents alike 
of the Reich and of the Federal States, and to summon and examine all officials, or 
other witnesses whom they may desire to interrogate.  The Federal Governments as 
such enjoy no rights in the domain of foreign policy, but the Reichsrat has its own 
Committee for Foreign Affairs, as well as other Committees corresponding with the 
different Departments of State, and the Ministry is obliged to keep these Committees, 
and through them the Reichsrat, informed as to the conduct and course of national 
affairs.  The Committee for Foreign Affairs can be summoned at the request of any 
representative of a Federal State, its chief function being to keep the Federal 
Governments informed about Foreign Affairs.  It possesses, however, no formal right to 
interfere, in this matter, with the Government of the Reich. 
 
Sweden 
That Germany should have gone so far in democratizing the machinery for the control 
of foreign policy is perhaps the most striking illustration of recent tendencies.  But few 
States have altogether escaped them.  All the Scandinavian States have recently 
democratized their machinery in this respect.  In Sweden important constitutional 
amendments came into force in 1921.  Of these one provided for the setting up of a 
permanent Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs 'to confer with the King on 
matters affecting Sweden's relations to foreign Powers'.  This Committee is composed 
of sixteen members, eight from each Chamber.  The members are elected annually at 
the opening of each session in proportion to the strength [begin page 583] of parties in 
the Chamber.  The Committee may be summoned to meet not only on the initiative of 
the Executive but on the request of any six members.  The King usually presides in 
person, and he may require the attendance of Cabinet Ministers or any experts with 
special knowledge of the subject in hand.  The Foreign Minister is required to lay 
before the Committee, at the opening of each session, or whenever the occasion 
demands, a report on the diplomatic situation.  The Committee, whose members are 
under a strict pledge of secrecy, must be consulted before any important decision is 
taken in foreign policy; but the decision rests with the Cabinet.  The Cabinet must, 
however, communicate their decision to the Committee at the first opportunity, and the 
latter are entitled to see all documents.  Under the Constitutional Amendments Of 1921 
it is further provided that all agreements with foreign Powers must, save in exceptional 
cases, be made subject to ratification by the Riksdag.  In such cases as are excluded 




In Norway, too, the need for more precise information on Foreign Affairs was 
accentuated by the War.  A Parliamentary-Committee was accordingly set up in 1917, 
but the members of the Storthing resented their exclusion from the discussion of 
foreign policy.  Accordingly, the Committee was, in 1923, reconstituted more or less on 
the German model and is now reported to be working satisfactorily.  Denmark in the 
same year set up a similar Committee. 
 
Poland 
Austria, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom are among 
the European States whose Parliaments have no Standing Committee for Foreign 
Affairs; Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Poland, and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands are among those which have.  The Polish Diet conducts a large part of its 
business by means of Standing Committees, the most important of them being, perhaps, the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  This Committee consists of thirty-one 
[begin page 584] members, nominated afresh in proportionate numbers, by the 
Caucuses of their respective parties, after each General Election.  The members retain 
their seats for the life of the Parliament, i.e. a maximum period of five years.  The  
Committees of the Senate are similar to those of the Diet, but the Senate Foreign 
Affairs Committee, of seventeen members, deals also with military matters.  The 
powers of the Foreign Affairs Committee are not strictly defined, and, indeed, there is at 
present (1924) a difference of opinion as to the status of the Committee.  One party 
maintains that its functions are purely advisory, and that the Committee is responsible 
to the Diet as a whole; another party holds that if the Committee expresses its 
disapproval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs he is constitutionally bound to place his 
resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister, without awaiting a vote of the Diet.  All 
treaties and agreements are referred in the first instance to the Committee, and its 
Report is generally accepted, without demur, by the Diet.  The Committee meets in 
public, unless order is otherwise taken.  Generally speaking, however, the procedure 
and powers of the Committee follow the French model. 
 
The Netherlands 
A Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs has existed in the Dutch Legislature only 
since 1919.  Its nine members lands are appointed each, session by the President of 
the Second (or Lower) Chamber, who himself acts as Chairman of the Committee with 
the Recorder of the Chamber as Secretary.  Under the revised Constitution of 1922 the 
Sovereign may no longer declare war without the previous consent of the States-
General, whose sanction is also essential, as a rule, to the ratification of Treaties. 
 
Italy 
The Italian Chamber of Deputies set up, in 1920, a series of permanent Commissions, 
one of them being a 'Commission for Political Relations with Foreign Countries and for 
the Colonies'.  But most of them were swept away by the new electoral law of 1923, 
which has reverted to the earlier system of ad hoc Committees.  Only one permanent 
Commission - that on the Budget ('la Giunta Generale del [begin page 585] Bilancio’) - 
has survived.  It consists of thirty-six Deputies, appointed for the duration of the 
Session, and they divide themselves into Sub-Commissions for the examination of the 
Departmental budgets.  Among these, the 'Sub-Commission for Foreign Affairs', writes 
Sir Ronald Graham, 'is an organ whose functions are not restricted to merely financial 
questions, but which amounts to a commission of great political importance.'
19
 
The Italian Senate has a standing 'Commission for Foreign Policy', consisting of eleven 
Senators, who are nominated each session by the Senators.  This Commission is 
specially charged, in accordance with Article 39 of the Senate regulations, with the duty 
of 'receiving from the Government information about foreign policy and international 
negotiations and of asking for information on the subject'.  It is also the function of this 
Commission to examine international treaties submitted for the approval of the Senate, 
with the exception of treaties of commerce and treaties of private law ('diritto privato’), 
which are examined by a special Commission in accordance with ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
 
The negotiation and conclusion of International Treaties comes within the prerogative 
of the Crown; but the Constitution (§ 5) prescribes that notice of them must be given to 
the Chamber ‘as soon as the interests and security of the State permit, and the 
appropriate Communications on the subject must be made to the Chamber'.  Moreover, 
the approval of Parliament is required, not only for treaties involving a financial burden 
upon the State, but also for those involving territorial changes, and, by gradually 
established usage, for treaties of commerce and navigation, which may indirectly affect 
                                                  
19   [585/1]  Cmd. 2282, P. 32. the finances of the State.  Even such Treaties as are not subject to the approval of 
Parliament are communicated textually to it, as soon as the interests of the State 
permit, but of those interests the Crown is judge. 
 
From the foregoing summary, rough and rapid though [begin page 586] it be, two 
conclusions seem to emerge: on the one hand, that in few Parliaments is there so little 
of formal machinery for consideration and control of Foreign Policy as in our own; on 
the other, that in foreign legislatures the machinery for this purpose has been in some 
cases actually devised, in others materially strengthened, since the Great War. 
 
The changes in procedure are relatively least important, as indeed was to be 
anticipated, in the two great States which, differing from each other so fundamentally in 
constitutional type, have this in common: that they initiated the system of Parliamentary 
Committees much sooner than other countries, and that they have gone farther than 
others in the articulation and elaboration of the system. 
 
United States 
The peculiar functions in regard to Treaties attributed by the American Constitution to 
the Senate gives to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations special importance.  It 
now consists of seventeen members (formerly of fifteen), ten being members of the 
majority, and seven of the minority party.  The Lower House has a Committee oil 
Foreign Affairs, consisting of twenty-one members, twelve being of the majority and 
nine of the minority party.  Both Committees, and their respective chairmen, are now 
appointed by the Committee on Committees in each House, which in effect means the 
Legislative Caucuses of the respective parties.  In the Senate Committee the senior 
member of the dominant party acts as Chairman; in that of the Lower House he is 
nominated by the House itself.  The two Committees are entirely independent of each 
other; even more so than the two Houses, and they never meet together.
20
 
The Committees have the power to summon witnesses and to compel their attendance; 
but they have no absolute right to inspect State documents, or to demand information 
from the President or his officers.  A request for information or documents addressed 
by the Chairman [begin page 587] to the President or Secretary of State would, 
however, in practice, be complied with as a matter of course.  Except when evidence is 
being taken or when an interested party requests to be heard by the Committee, the 
deliberations of the Committees are, at least nominally, secret.
21  Reports made by the 
Committees to Congress are, however, printed as public documents, and are frequently 
inserted in the Congressional Record. 
 
There are no formal rules governing the relations between the Executive and the 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, nor, as a rule, is there any formal or official 
communication between them.  In August 1919, however, President Wilson summoned 
a Committee to the White House, in connexion with the Peace Treaties, and answered 
questions put to him by various members of the Committee.  The proceedings were, on 
this occasion, printed in, the report of the Committee. 
 
Sir Esme Howard, now British Ambassador at Washington, points out that the exclusive 
right of the President and Senate to make peace has, in fact, been modified by the 
procedure adopted on the conclusion of peace between the United States and 
Germany and Austria respectively after the Great War.  In both cases peace was 
declared by the President approving a joint Resolution of both Houses of Congress. 
 
                                                  
20   [586/1]  Cd. 6102, P. 32. 
21   [587/1]  It can debate with closed doors, but this does not ensure secrecy.'  Bryce, 
Democracies, ii, 409.  Lord Bryce's considered judgement on the senatorial participation in Foreign Affairs is 
not altogether favourable.  The Senate Committee usually, he says, contains a few able 
men among others who know little of anything outside their own country, and may 
regard the interests of their own State rather than those of the Union.  Jealous of its 
own powers, and often impelled by party motives, the Senate has frequently checked 
the President's action, sometimes with unfortunate results.'
22  These words, it should 
be noted, were written before the conclusion of the Peace Treaties. 
[begin page 588] 
 
No State, federal or unitary, presidential, or parliamentary, has gone so far as the 
United States in the attempt to apply in practice Montesquieu's central doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers.  The divorce between the Executive, the Legislature, and the 
judiciary is under the American Constitution carried about as far as it can be without 
inducing paralysis in the Governmental organs.  Perhaps in consequence of this 
characteristic feature of American institutions, perhaps in spite of it, Congress has 
developed the Committee system more fully than any other Legislature, with the 
possible exception of France. 
 
France 
The French 'Organic Laws' of 1875 confide to the President the right to 'negotiate and 
to ratify treaties', but require him to 'communicate them to the Chambers as soon as 
the interests and the safety of the State allow'.  Negotiation is, therefore, exclusively the 
function of the Executive.  So strictly is this principle enforced that when in April 1919 a 
Resolution was brought forward in the Chamber of Deputies requesting the 
Government 'to maintain and carry through at the Peace Conference the principle that 
Germany must keep neither army nor military organization nor armaments of any kind', 
the President of the Chamber refused to allow it to be proposed.  He held that the 
proposed Resolution implied interference with the exclusive right of the Executive to 
negotiate treaties, and, according to the memorandum forwarded by the British 
Ambassador
23 in Paris, the President's 'ruling on the point was accepted without 
demur'. 
 
Ratification is also technically the function of the Executive: though the limits of its 
discretion are narrow, since 'Treaties of peace, of commerce, Treaties which affect the 
finances of the States, Treaties relative to the status of persons and to the property 
rights of Frenchmen abroad are only binding after having been voted by the two 
Chambers'.  Moreover, 'no cession, no exchange, no [begin page 589] adjudication of 
territory can take place save under a law.  The President of the Republic cannot 
declare war without the prior consent of the two Chambers.' 
 
It might be supposed that all treaties would be covered by these wide exceptions, and 
that the Constitutional rights of the Executive would thereby be reduced to nullity.   
Indeed, such a claim has actually been put forward by some judicial authorities.  But, 
as Lord Crewe's memorandum points out, the contention is refuted by the facts.  A 
study of the parliamentary annals of the Third Republic shows that there are a number 
of matters of the first importance on which treaties have been in fact concluded and 
ratified without a vote in either Chamber.  It shows also that there are a number of 
matters in regard to which the Executive is under no obligation to inform the Chamber 
of the tenor of treaties arrived at with foreign Powers or even of the existence of such 
treaties.  Instances may be quoted.  The Treaty of Berlin of July 1878 to which the 
French Government was a party, and by which an important stage in the history of the 
Near Eastern Question was marked, was not submitted to either of the French 
Chambers.  M. Pierre, the recognized authority in French Constitutional procedure, 
                                                  
22   [587/2]  Democracies, ii. 409. Cf. Thayer, Life of John Hay. 
23   [588/1]  Cmd. 2282. apparently holds that such submission was unnecessary, since the Treaty of Berlin was 
not a treaty of peace, but a 'Convention designed to prevent war'.  The Franco-German 
Convention of November 1911 relative to the political status of Morocco was not 
submitted to the Chambers, because, M. Pierre states, 'it dealt only with measures 
preliminary to the establishment of the French protectorate.'  The Franco-Czechoslovak 
Treaty of 1924 was not submitted to the two Chambers, because, apparently, it was not 
a treaty of peace nor a treaty immediately engaging the finances of the State.  There is 
no trace in the debates of either Chamber of the approval by them of the Franco-
Belgian Military Convention, which, according to newspaper reports, was concluded 
between the French and Belgian Governments in Septem- [begin page 590] ber 1920.  
Neither is there anything to show that the Chambers are privy to its terms. 
 
As a further proof of the incorrectness of the contention that full parliamentary control of 
the ratification of treaties is directly afforded by the 'Organic Laws', there may be 
quoted a statement made by M. Poincare in the Chamber of Deputies during his 1912 
Presidency of the Council.  This statement, which was accepted by the Chamber, read 
as follows: 
 
'The Government is ready to submit to the Chambers before any ratification 
whatever all treaties which may affect, even indirectly, the various matters 
envisaged by the constitutional law.  But it claims for the President of the 
Republic the right to negotiate in the name of France, and communicate 
treaties to the Chambers only when the safety and interests of the State 
allow.  As regards secret treaties they cannot, of course, be concluded in 
violation of the constitutional law, and if they affect matters reserved by that 
law they can only become definitive after having been published, approved 
by the Chambers, and officially ratified.'
24
 
It is then clear that the French Constitution does contemplate the possibility of the 
conclusion of treaties without the consent, and, in exceptional circumstance, without 
the knowledge of Parliament, and that in the exercise of this power by the Executive 
the Legislature has acquiesced.  On the other hand it is equally clear, as the 
memorandum points out, that 'in the field of foreign affairs, as in that of all legislation 
and administration, the “organic laws" have provided the Chambers with the 
opportunity to create vis-à-vis the Government a vigorous extended and working 
system of control'. 
 
Conclusions 
What conclusion, if any, emerges from this survey of the procedure of foreign 
parliaments?  How are the modern democracies shaping in regard to the conduct of 
their international affairs?  In the foregoing summary one omission will be noted - that 
of Switzerland.  But Switzerland one of the most conservative of democracies - has 
made no change since the War, though we learn from Mr. Sper- [begin page 591] ling's 
dispatch to Mr. Ramsay Macdonald that in 1920 ‘several members of the National 
Council signed a motion requesting the Federal Council to draft a Bill to create a 
permanent commission for foreign affairs'.  Nothing, however, has yet been done.  The 
truth is, of course, that Switzerland has in large measure been relieved, if not from the 
burden of self-defence, at least from the obligation to maintain an elaborate diplomatic 
system by the peculiarity of its international status. 
 
The United States has been similarly relieved partly by its geographical position, partly 
by rigid adherence to a tradition which, initiated by Washington himself, has defined the 
foreign policy of his country from that day to this. 
 
                                                  
24   [590/1]  Cmd. 2282, pp. 16, 17. ‘Europe', said Washington in his farewell speech, has a set of primary 
interests which to us have none or a very remote is relation.  Hence she 
must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are 
essentially foreign to our concerns. . . . Our detached and distant situation 
invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forgo the 
advantages of so peculiar a situation?  Why quit our own to stand upon 
foreign ground?  Why, by interweaving our destiny with any part of Europe, 
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, 
rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice? 
 
Jefferson, on his accession to office in 1801, reaffirmed, in phrase even more 
trenchant, the maxims first enunciated by George Washington.  'Peace, commerce, 
and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'  Two and twenty 
years later (December 1823) President Monroe sent that famous message to Congress 
which for a full century has supplied the sheet anchor of American diplomacy.  
 
Neither Switzerland nor the United States has, then, been seriously troubled by 
problems of international policy.  Consequently, we cannot rely upon the example of 
these two democracies either to dispel or to confirm the suspicions of that form of polity 
entertained by the apostles of the old diplomacy.  [begin page 592] 
 
Democracy and Diplomacy. 
The suspicions are in fact mutual.  If democracy is suspicious of diplomacy, diplomacy 
is proverbially shy of democracy.  How, it is asked, can the governing masses of the 
new democracies find the leisure necessary to acquire that knowledge of foreign 
countries and foreign peoples, of the personalities of the rulers and statesmen of 
foreign States, of the difficult problems of international politics, for lack of which the 
democratic control of foreign policy can only flounder in a morass of ignorance?  And 
what is more likely than ignorance to breed suspicion between peoples?  Moreover, 
what dependence can be placed by foreign Governments on the consistence or 
continuity of a foreign policy controlled by a popular electorate?  What is more likely to 
lead to misunderstandings and even to war than inconstancy in the conduct of 
international affairs?  How often is a difficult crisis been averted by promptitude and 
courage?  Are not popular assemblies notorious for procrastination, neutralized, if not 
atoned for, by precipitancy of action when prudence demands cautious handling and 
delay?  Is democracy likely to select its instruments, and even democracy cannot 
dispense with agents, more wisely than autocracy or oligarchy? 
 
Such questions, though crudely stated, cannot be brushed aside either as impertinent 
or irrelevant.  The political philosopher must needs give heed not only to the 
accusations brought by the new democracy against the old diplomacy, but also to the 
apprehensions which diplomacy, rightly or wrongly, entertains as to the characteristic 
frailties of democracy. 
 
One plea is plainly unanswerable.  Increased popular control over foreign policy cannot 
safely be conceded to an uneducated democracy.  If 'democracy' is intent upon 
exercising control it must patiently equip itself for the unaccustomed role; and only 
education in the true sense can equip it. 
 
Much more remote, if not actually groundless, is the apprehension, frequently 
expressed, that the democratization of foreign policy will lead to inconstancy and 
discon- [begin page 593] tinuity.  As a fact there has been a larger measure of continuity 
in English foreign policy since 1885 than in the period immediately preceding it.  That 
may be ascribed to the wisdom of a remarkable succession of Foreign Secretaries - 
Lord Rosebery, Lord Salisbury, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Grey of Fallodon; - to name 
only those who were responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs during the period of 
the 'armed peace'.  But be that as it may, the fact remains, and it, is a fact which must be put to the credit of a democracy, in many respects highly self-conscious, that it 
should have been content to leave delicate questions in competent hands without 
undue interference by the Legislature. 
 
Les mœurs politiques 
There is another and a stronger reason for discounting the fear of discontinuity.  It is 
this.  Among all great nations the main lines of foreign policy are to an extraordinary 
degree traditional.  What the French felicitously call les mœurs Politiques represent 
something much more substantial than the caprice or even the conviction of a ruling 
caste.  They are bred in the bone of the common folk.  The interpretation of the 
tradition, the method of applying the principle, may vary in some degree from 
generation to generation, from ministry to ministry.  Not so the broad tradition. 
 
Take the problem of the eastern frontier of France.  The Bourbon Monarchy, the first 
Republic, the Napoleonic Empire, first and second, the third Republic - wherein has 
one differed from another in its attitude towards this problem?  Take Italy.  Could any 
Italian minister Liberal, Socialist, Fascist - eradicate from the mind of the Italian people 
the tradition of friendship for England, or their passionate desire to regain Italia 
Irredenta?  Most striking of all is England.  English inconstancy in its continental 
affinities is an accepted aphorism among foreign diplomatists.  In truth nothing could be 
more remarkable than her adherence to tradition.  The one thing which for the last four 
hundred years could be counted on infallibly to rouse the English people to wrath, 
[begin page 594] and even to war, has been an attack upon the independence of the 
Low Countries.  Philip II discovered it to his cost in the sixteenth century; Louis XIV, at 
the end of the seventeenth century, played into the hands of the Dutch Stadtholder by 
ignoring it; the French Republic defied it; Napoleon I might have retained his crown and 
established his dynasty had he in 1814 been willing to respect it, the ex-Kaiser of 
Germany must often have rued the day when he preferred strategy to policy, and 
compelled England in August 1914 to draw the sword in defence of Belgium. 
 
Would any change in the machinery of government suffice to defeat the policy of a 
people inspired by les mœurs Politiques?  Such a change might indeed materially 
affect methods and cause modification in detail.  But changes in methods, the reversal 
of alliances, are not unknown to autocrats and oligarchs.  Bismarck was the autocratic 
chief of the Prussian oligarchy.  Yet Bismarck's policy underwent profound modification 
in 1878 when the tangle of Balkan affairs compelled him to choose between Russia 
and Austria as the ally of Germany.  His encouragement of Austria's aspirations in the 
Balkans virtually dissolved the Dreikaiserbund  and prepared the way for the Triple 
Alliance.  Similarly, Louis XV of France abandoned a Prussian in favour of an Austrian 
alliance in 1756, thus sacrificing the carefully garnered harvest of more than a century's 
diplomacy. 
 
This work is, however, concerned with international relations only so far as the conduct 
of them reacts upon the internal mechanism of the State. 
 
Preceding paragraphs have shown that the extension of the principle of Popular 
Government, and the increasingly strict control exercised by popularly elected 
Legislatures over the Executive Department of the State, has not been wholly confined 
to domestic administration.  They have shown that in many of the continental States an 
attempt has been made to democratize the conduct of foreign affairs, either by a 
demand that all treaties between State and State shall be subject to ratification at [begin 
page 595] the hands of their respective Legislatures, or by setting up a Standing 
Committee of the Legislature to act, in the sphere of Foreign Policy, as a check upon 
the Executive, or by both methods. 
 Neither method has in fact proved wholly effectual.  Both, it is true, have been applied 
tentatively and with reservations.  The truth is that some element of secrecy is 
inseparable alike from negotiation and from completed international covenants.  Even 
the League of Nations has decided that Article 18, of the Covenant, which prescribes 
the registration of treaties and international engagements, does not compel the 
registration of all international instruments, nor exclude the reservation in secrecy of 
certain portions of the instruments actually submitted for registration.  Nevertheless the 
assertion of the principle of 'open' diplomacy has made undeniable progress.  Down to 
the end of 1925 no fewer than 364 treaties have been already registered.
25
 
As to the device of Standing Committees on Foreign Policy, much has been written in 
preceding paragraphs.  The effectiveness of such machinery varies greatly in different 
countries.  In the United States such a device is in complete harmony, alike with the 
genius of the Constitution and with the traditions of the people.  But although its 
effectiveness cannot be denied, the beneficence of its operations has, not without 
reason, been hotly disputed.  Apart from the United States it cannot be said that the 
attempts to democratize the control of foreign policy have thus far been attended with 
conspicuous success.  It is, however, fair to add that the experiment has hardly had a 
fair chance: only in a few States has Democracy, even now, got a firm seat in the 
saddle; it is, as yet, lacking in experience of administration, particularly in the sphere of 
international politics; above all, the conditions for political experiments have not, of late, 
been favourable. 
 
Much scorn has been heaped upon the attempt to [begin page 596] substitute 
diplomacy by conference for the older methods of negotiation.  Direct intercourse 
between Ministers responsible to their respective Legislatures is doubtless more 
consonant with democratic principles than the system of permanent residential 
embassies.  Yet the fruits gathered by diplomacy by conference have not as yet been 
so luscious as to commend the new mode for universal acceptance.  It is all to the 
good that the parliamentary Ministers of different countries should be personally 
acquainted, but it is a pure assumption that direct negotiation between men who are 
answerable to their respective Legislatures will necessarily tend to the avoidance of 
international friction, or the speedy and permanently satisfactory solution of diplomatic 
problems. 
 
Nevertheless the persistent effort on the part of popularly elected Legislatures - by 
questions and interpellations, by public debate in the Chamber, and by the 
development of the system of Standing Committees - to exercise increased control 
over the Executive, has already effected important modifications in the machinery of 
government, and may not improbably contribute in the near future to changes even 
more fundamental.  Such changes cannot fail to react powerfully upon parliamentary 
procedure, and may even modify profoundly the whole conception and operation of 
Parliamentary Democracy. 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, and indeed throughout a great part of this and preceding 
chapters, an analysis of the machinery by which the Legislature works has involved 
reference to the appropriate functions of the Executive, and of the relations of the one 
to the other.  To a consideration of the problems connected with the executive side of 
government we shall, therefore, forthwith proceed. 
 
                                                  
25   [595/1]  A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, ed. Temperley, vol. vi, P. 
562. (Begin Volume 2) 
XXIII. - The Problem of the Executive (1) 
Personal Monarchy 
 
'Nec regibus infinita ant libera potestas.' - Tacitus, Germania. 
  
'Rex autem habet superiorem, Deum scilicet; item legem per quam factus est 
rex; item curiam suam, videlicet comites, barones, quia comites dicuntur 
quasi socil regis, et qui habet socium habet magistrum et ideo si rex fuerit 
sine fraeno, id est, sine lege, debent ei fraenum ponere, nisi ipsimet fuerint 
cum rege sine fraeno.' - Bracton (13th century). 
 
'A King of England cannot at his pleasure make any alterations in the laws 
of the land, for the nature of his government is not only regal but political.' – 
Sir John Fortescue.  De Laudibus Legum Angliae (15th century). 
 
'Lex facit regem; the King's grant of any favour made contrary to the law is 
void; what power the King hath he hath it by law, the bounds and limits of it 
are known.' - Hooker (16th century). 
 
'The government by a single person and a Parliament is a Fundamental.  It is 
the esse, it is Constitution.' - Cromwell (17th century). 
 
'The executive part of Government . . . is wisely placed in a single hand by 
the British Constitution for the sake of unanimity, strength and despatch.  
The King of England is therefore, not only the chief but, properly the sole 
magistrate of the nation; all others acting by commission from and in due 
subordination to him.' - Blackstone (18th century). 
 
Legislature and Executive. 
The business of the Legislature is to enact general rules and for the conduct of citizens 
and to impose taxes.  It is the function of the Executive to carry out those rules and to 
collect and expend the taxes authorized by the Legislature: 
 
. . . ‘the governmental business classed as executive', writes Mr. Henry 
Sidgwick, 'should include all the measures required for the due protection 
of the interests of the community and its members in their relation with 
foreigners, especially the organization and direction of the military forces of 
the State; all the actions not strictly judicial required to prevent members of 
the community from causing injury to each other or to the public interests 
and to secure their co-operation for common ends, so far as this is not 
better left to voluntary association; and finally all the industry required for 
utilizing such part of the wealth and resources of the [begin page 4] 
community as it is expedient to keep in public ownership, and for providing 
all commodities needed by the State or its members that are not better 
provided by private industry and free exchange.
1
 
                                                  
1   [4/1]  Elements of Politics, P. 385. In brief, the Executive is concerned with the defence of the realm against external or 
internal enemies, with the maintenance of law and order, and with the performance of 
such other functions as may be claimed for the State by the Legislature. 
 
Problems of the Executive. 
The problems which naturally present themselves in connexion with this branch of 
government are: 
 
(i)   Shall the Executive be distinct from the Legislature and the judiciary, 
or shall the same men act in more than one capacity? 
 
(ii)   In either case, how shall members of the Executive be selected? 
 
(iii)   Shall their tenure be fixed or variable; and if variable, on what shall it 
depend? 
 
The first of these questions has given rise to prolonged discussion, and has been, and 
probably will be, answered differently, according to circumstances.  To the second and 
third the answer, suggested by the experience of most of the States of the modem 
world, would generally be that the Executive ought to consist partly of permanent, partly 
of temporary officials, and that no single method of appointment is appropriate to the 
two different classes. 
 
The modem State largely relies, for its efficient administration, upon a large supply of 
professional and permanent officials, who in the aggregate form the Civil Service or 
Administration, or Bureaucracy.  The best method of selecting these permanent 
officials is a matter of high moment, and will demand consideration in a later chapter.  It 
is the members of this service and their employees who, strictly speaking, form the 
executive branch of government.  The Ministers of State are not, strictly regarded, the 
Executive.  Neither the King nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer personally collects 
the taxes: that function is performed by subordinate officials of the Board of Customs 
and Board of Inland Revenue.  Neither the [begin page 5] Secretary of State for War nor 
the First Lord of the Admiralty ever fires a gun or commands forces in the field or at 
sea.  The King or President or Ministers do, however, supply the motive power to the 
Executive.  Their orders bring into action the departments of government concerned.
2
 
The present and following chapters will, then, be concerned with the higher officials of 
the State, with what, in common parlance, we speak of as the Government, or with 
greater though not complete precision, as the Executive. 
 
The Central Problem 
The central problem to be solved in this connexion has been clearly propounded by an 
old-fashioned writer: 'The great problem of Government is to make the Executive power 
sufficiently strong to procure the peace and order of society and yet not to leave it 
sufficiently strong to disregard the wishes and happiness of the community.
3  Briefly it 
may be said that the Executive should be at once strong and responsible.  On the 
indispensability of strength in an Executive the prudent architects of the American 
Constitution were under no illusion.  Alexander Hamilton exposed the vulgar error that 
a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. 
 
'Energy in the Executive', he wrote, 'is a leading character in the definition 
of good government.  It is essential to the protection of the community 
                                                  
2   [5/1]  Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, ii. 142.  
3   [5/2]  William Smyth, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge 1807-
49).  against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration 
of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-
handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of 
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of 
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.’
4
 
The same great publicist found the ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive 
to consist of, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its 
support; fourthly, competent powers. 
 
Monarchy 
For many centuries the world looked for these ingre- [begin page 6] dients in hereditary 
kingship.  Monarchy supplies an intelligible and not infrequently highly efficient 
Executive; and one which is not necessarily less responsible because it does not 
depend upon popular election.  Monarchy has sometimes represented the patriarchal, 
sometimes the military principle: the head of a ruling family, or, as among the Teutonic 
peoples, the successful leader in war (the dux) becomes a king, and may develop 
either into the Great Leviathan of Hobbes, or into the constitutional ruler preferred by 
Locke. 
 
Parliamentary Executive or Presidential. 
For the modern world the choice of a supreme Executive would seem to lie between 
the Parliamentary Executive typified by England or France, and the Presidential 
Executive of which the United States of America affords the most conspicuous 
illustration.  Until 1918 it might have been necessary to add a third alternative, the 
absolute but administrative monarchy of the Hohenzollern type, and it may still be 
proper to notice a type of Executive which is neither strictly Parliamentary nor strictly 
Presidential - that which obtains in the Helvetic Republic.  The Swiss model may, 
however, be regarded as an exotic, the peculiarities of which have already received 
consideration.  For practical purposes we may confine the discussion to the, 
Presidential and the Parliamentary types. 
 
Both, it will be observed, are compatible with either a Monarchical or a Republican 
Constitution.  As regards the position of the Executive, Republican America had much 
more in common with Imperial Germany than with Republican France; Monarchical 
England has more in common with Republican France than it had with Imperial 
Germany.  In England a Parliamentary Executive has been evolved under the aegis of 
an hereditary monarchy; in the King all Executive authority is still legally vested; in the 
King's name all Executive acts are done. 
 
The Crown 
With the position of the Crown, therefore, the analysis of the Executive authority must 
begin. 
 
Half a century ago Walter Bagehot startled his contem- [begin page 7] poraries of the 
mid-Victorian era by an enumeration of some of the legal powers of the Crown. 
 
'The Queen', he wrote, 'could disband the army (by law she cannot engage 
more than a certain number of men); she could dismiss all the officers, from 
the General Commanding-in-Chief downwards; she could dismiss all the 
sailors too; she could sell off all our ships of war and all our naval stores; 
she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Cornwall, and begin a war for 
the conquest of Brittany.  She could make every citizen in the United 
                                                  
4   [5/3]  The Federalist, No. LXX. Kingdom, male or female, a peer; she could make every parish in the 
United Kingdom a "university"; she could dismiss most of the civil servants; 
she could pardon all offenders.  In a word, the Queen could by prerogative 
upset all the action of civil government within the Government, could 
disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could, by disbanding our 
forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against foreign nations.
5
 
Bagehot's rhetorical statement startled the unlearned and even to the pundits appeared 
a trifle paradoxical.  But it pointed to a fact, apt to be ignored - the immense reserve 
power vested by the English Constitution in the Crown.  Six hundred years of unbroken 
constitutional development, the evolution of new constitutional devices, the growth and 
decay of institutions, had affected but little the legal position of the Crown.  The legal 
powers of Queen Victoria differed infinitesimally from those of Queen Elizabeth; those 
which she was to hand on to Edward VII were substantially the same as those which 
Edward VI inherited from Henry VIII. 
 
The Revolution of 1688. 
It is rarely safe in English Constitutional History to assign to a precise date a 
constitutional change of outstanding significance, yet the popular verdict which 1688 
indicates the year 1688 as that which marked the birth of the modern phase of the 
English monarchy is not grossly at fault.  More precise historians prefer the year of the 
accession of the first Hanoverian King (1714) as the birthday of 'Constitutional 
Monarchy', and designate George I - for reasons to be hereafter set forth - as the 
[begin page 8] first Constitutional' King of England.  It is sufficiently accurate to say that 
down to the 'Revolution', inaugurated by the 'abdication' of James II in 1688, and 
consummated by the accession of George I in 1714, or perhaps by the Ministry of 
Walpole (1721-42), England was ruled by Kings.  Thereafter the King, according to the 
classic aphorism of M. Thiers, reigned but did not rule.  Down to the 'Revolution' the 
Crown was the essential and effective factor in the Constitution.  On the personal 
character and ability of the King depended the government of the State and the 
wellbeing of the people.  Other factors - economic, intellectual, and political - naturally 
contributed to the prosperity of one epoch, to the adversity of another.  But as was the 
King, so, broadly speaking, were the people.  An Edward III could not avert a 
catastrophe like the great pestilence of 1349 nor greatly mitigate its effects.  The 
shrewdness of an Elizabeth could not ward off from her people the suffering caused to 
them by the flooding of the European markets with the product of the silver mines of 
America.  Nevertheless it was true that a good king meant a prosperous people, and 
that the reign of a bad king was marked by individual suffering and national humiliation.  
Since the 'Revolution' that has been less true, though George III, a man of weak 
intellect, albeit strong will, contributed not a little, at one period of his reign, to the 
humiliation of his country. 
 
Such changes, however, as that from personal rule to Constitutional monarchy are not, 
as a rule, catastrophic in this country.  They are almost invariably the result of gradual 
evolution.  Notably was this so in regard to the change under discussion.  Yet the crisis 
was, in fact, reached in the seventeenth century. 
 
When James I ascended the English throne he found Parliament in a critical, not to say 
a truculent, temper.  It was ready and anxious to assert those prerogatives which, if not 
allowed altogether to lapse during the dictatorial rule of the Tudors, had been 
maintained with rare discretion. 
 
                                                  
5   [7/1]  English Constitution, 2nd edition (1872), P. lxxi. The ‘Lancastrian Experiment.’ 
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the growth [begin page 9] of Parliamentary 
privileges had been too rapid; Parliament had claimed rights and exercised functions to 
which neither Parliament itself nor the nation was equal.  The ‘revolution' which brought 
the House of Lancaster to the throne was essentially a parliamentary revolution.  The 
Lancastrians 'stood', if we may anticipate the phraseology of modem democracy, upon 
a constitutional programme.  Henry IV could not, 'without discarding all the principles 
he had ever possessed, even attempt to rule as Richard II and Edward Ill had ruled.
6  
Archbishop Arundel promised on his behalf that he would 'be counselled and governed 
by the honourable, wise, and discreet persons of his kingdom and by their common 
counsel and consent', would do his best for the governance of himself and his 
kingdom, not wishing to be governed of his own will nor of his own' voluntary purpose 
or singular opinion', but 'by common advice, counsel, and consent'.  The Lancastrians 
did their best to fulfil the promises of their ecclesiastical sponsor.  They even attempted 
a constitutional experiment which, in some sense, anticipated that solution of the 
problem which, three centuries later, found expression in the Cabinet.  From 1404 to 
1437 the King's Council was not merely dependent upon Parliament, but was actually 
nominated in it: the subordination of Executive to Legislature was never so complete.  
But the result was a dismal failure.  And it is pertinent and instructive to inquire why a 
political device which justified itself so completely at a later period so signally failed in 
the earlier? 
 
The plain truth is that 'Responsible Government' is no simple or easy thing.  It demands 
for its success conditions - social and political - which are never found except in highly 
developed societies.  In the England of the fifteenth century some of the conditions 
were notably absent.  'Constitutional progress', to quote a pregnant aphorism of Bishop 
Stubbs, 'had outrun administrative order.'  Politically advanced, the nation was socially 
backward.  The development of the parliamentary machinery had [begin page 10] been 
too rapid for the intelligence of the nation at large.  The result was that while Parliament 
was busy in establishing its rights against the Crown, the nation was sinking deeper 
and deeper into social anarchy. 
 
Feudal Bastardism 
A small knot of powerful barons were reproducing some Feudalism of the worst 
features of feudalism without its redeeming advantages.  Private wars became more 
common than they had ever been since the miserable days of Stephen.  Baron was at 
war with baron, county with county, town with town.  Disbanded soldiers coming home 
from the French wars took service with rival chieftains, accepted their liveries, and 
fought their battles.  The great lord, in turn, protected or, to use the technical term, 
'maintained' his liveried followers and shielded them from the punishment due to their 
crimes of violence.  Thus law was paralysed; justice became a mockery; and the whole 
nation, outside the charmed circle of the great lords and their retainers, groaned under 
the 'lack of governance' which quickly became the byword of Lancastrian 
administration.  Plainly the nation 'was not yet ready for the efficient use of the liberties 
it had won; the time for a parliamentary Executive had not come and the people, 
reduced to social confusion by the weak and nerveless rule of the Lancastrians, 
involved in aristocratic faction fights to which the quarrels of York and Lancaster gave a 
deceptively dynastic colour, at length emerged from these 'Wars of the Roses' anxious 
for the repose and discipline secured to them by the New Monarchy. 
 
The Tudor Dictatorship. 
For a century the Tudors continued to administer the tonic which they had prescribed to 
a patient suffering from social disorder and economic anaemia.  The evolution of the 
parliamentary machinery was temporarily arrested; but, meanwhile, the people throve 
                                                  
6   [9/1]  Stubbs, Constitutional History, iii. 6. socially and commercially.  Aristocratic turbulence was sternly repressed; extraordinary 
tribunals were erected to deal with powerful offenders vagrancy was severely 
punished; work was found for the unemployed; trade was encouraged; the navy was 
organized on a permanent footing scientific [begin page 11] training in seamanship was 
provided; excellent secondary schools were established - in these and in many other 
ways the New Monarchy, despotic and paternal though it was, brought order out of 
chaos and created a new England.  The maintenance of law; the growth of a strong 
middle class; the diffusion of wealth and education; above all, the critical temper of 
Protestantism, reacted in their turn upon political development.  The result was that by 
the close of the sixteenth century the nation was ready, as it had not been ready at the 
beginning of the fifteenth, for the efficient use of the liberties it had won.  The Tudor 
'dictatorship' had done its work, and in no direction were its results more clearly marked 
than in the broadening and strengthening of parliamentary institutions.  The experiment 
of making Parliament the direct instrument of Government had broken down in the 
fifteenth century because it was premature; because the political intelligence and the 
social development of the people at large lagged hopelessly behind the structural 
evolution of the parliamentary machine.  Thanks in part to the strong and bracing rule 
of the Tudors and in part to a many-sided economic revolution, social had now caught 
up political development.  Consequently, the Stuarts from the moment of their 
accession found themselves confronted by a people not merely ready but anxious to 
take upon their own shoulders the high responsibilities of self-government. 
 
The Stuart Monarchy. 
The 'Apology' drawn up by Parliament in 1604 sufficiently attests the new temper of the 
nation.  In that famous document the Commons made it abundantly clear that the era 
of the Tudor dictatorship was definitely closed, and that they were no longer disposed 
to acquiesce in the virtual suspension of their privileges and authority.  The King, they 
avowed, had been grossly misinformed alike as to the 'estate of his subjects of 
England', as to 'matter of religion', and as to 'the privileges of the House of Commons', 
and it was their bounden duty to set him right. 
 
'We stand not in place to speak or do things pleasing.  Our care is, and must be, to 
confirm the love and tie the hearts of [begin page 12] your subjects, the Commons, most 
firmly to your Majesty.  Herein lieth the means of our well deserving of both: there was 
never prince entered with greater love, with greater joy and applause of all his people.  
This joy, this love, let it flourish in their hearts forever.  Let no suspicion have access to 
their fearful thoughts, that their privileges, which they think by your Majesty should be 
protected, should now by sinister informations or counsel be violated or impaired; or 
that those, which with dutiful respects to your Majesty, speak freely for the right and 
good of their country, shall be oppressed or disgraced.  Let your Majesty be pleased to 
receive public information from your Commons in Parliament as to the civil estate and 
government; for private informations pass often by practice: the voice of the people, in 
the things of their knowledge, is said to be as the voice of God.  And if your Majesty 
shall vouchsafe, at your best pleasure and leisure, to enter into your gracious 
consideration of our petition for the ease of these burthens, under which your whole 
people have of long time mourned, hoping for relief by your Majesty; then may you be 




Consideration for the old Queen combined with anxiety as to the succession had 
conduced to a conscious postponement of the constitutional issue.  'In regard of her 
[Queen Elizabeth's] sex and age, which we had great cause to tender and, much more, 
upon care to avoid all trouble, which by wicked practice might have been drawn to 
impeach the quiet of your majesty's right in the Succession, those actions were then 
                                                  
7   [12/1]  State Papers (Dom.), James I, viii. 70. passed over, which we hoped in succeeding time of freer access to your highness of 
renowned grace and justice, to redress, restore, and rectify.'
8
 
The Contest of the Seventeenth Century 
Thus, in the very first year of the new reign was the key-note of the impending struggle 
struck.  To follow the incidents of that struggle is no part of my purpose.  It must suffice 
to recall one or two of the more important landmarks.  For five-and-twenty years James 
I, and his son after him, attempted the impossible task of reconciling [begin page 13] the 
Stuart theory of kingship with the advancing claims of Parliament and particularly of the 
House of Commons. 
  
The first act of the drama closes with the concession of the Petition of Right (1628), 
with the dissolution of Charles's third Parliament (1629), and the death in the Tower of 
the ‘proto-martyr of Parliamentary independence', Sir John Eliot (1633).  The Petition of 
Right determined no general principles, but, after our English manner, provided certain 
remedies for the more flagrant of the practical grievances which had been disclosed by 
the experience of the last three years.  Then followed a period of personal government, 
during which the Crown was unfettered either by the opposition of Parliament or by the 
decisions of an independent judiciary.  For eleven years (1629-40) no Parliament met; 
the ordinary administration of justice was set aside by the Star Chamber and other 
extraordinary tribunals; money was raised for the necessities of the Crown by all 
manner of peculiar expedients; Wentworth was let loose upon Ireland (in the main to its 
advantage) Laud was let loose upon England and even upon Scotland, with results 
which proved fatal to the Stuart Monarchy.  The first signal of overt resistance was 
given by Scotland.  To require Scotland to accept Arminianism at the hands of Laud 
was like asking England to accept Roman Catholicism at the hands of Philip II.  
Intensely national and intensely Calvinistic, Scotland 'bristled into resistance', and 
Charles I was consequently compelled to meet his Parliament again. 
 
The Long Parliament and the Grand Remonstrance. 
The Long Parliament spent the first few months of its existence in breaking into 
fragments the machinery of 'Thorough' and in wreaking vengeance upon the leading 
the Grand agents of that system.  Strafford and Laud paid on the scaffold the penalty 
for the failure of personal rule. 
 
The fact that it was necessary, in order to obtain for Parliament a control over the 
Executive, to have recourse to these 'judicial murders' affords conclusive proof that a 
critical turning-point in the evolution of our Constitution had been reached. 
Ecclesiastical issues of high significance [begin page 14] hung in the balance; but, on 
the political side, the core of the contest of the seventeenth century centred in the 
struggle for the control of the Executive.  As to the existence of a parliamentary 
Legislature there was no real question.  Bacon and Strafford were at one with Eliot and 
Pym as to the advantages derived by the Monarchy from the periodical meetings of an 
elected Legislature. 
 
‘Look on a Parliament as a certain necessity, but not only as a necessity; as 
also a unique and most precious means for uniting the Crown with the 
Nation, and proving to the world outside how Englishmen love and honour 
their King, and their King trusts his subjects.  Deal with it frankly and nobly 
as becomes a king, not suspiciously like a huckster in a bargain.  Do not be 
afraid of Parliament.  Be skilful in calling it; but do not attempt to 'pack' it.  
Use all due adroitness and knowledge of human nature, and necessary 
firmness and majesty, in managing it; keep unruly and mischievous people 
in their place; but do not be too anxious to meddle, "let nature work"; and 
                                                  
8   [12/2]  Ibid. above all, though of course you want money from it, do not let that appear 
as the chief or real cause of calling it.  Take the lead in legislation.  Be 
ready with some interesting or imposing points of reform or policy, about 
which you ask your Parliament to take counsel with you.  Take care to 
"frame and have ready some commonwealth bills, that may add respect to 
the King's government, and acknowledgement of his care; not wooing bills 
to make the King and his graces cheap; but good matters to set the 
Parliament on work, that an empty stomach do not feed on humour”.’  
 
Such was, in substance, the sagacious advice tendered by Bacon to James I. Between 
Crown and Parliament there could in his view be no essential antagonism.  And 
Bacon's language is echoed in that of Sir John Eliot : 
 
'For the King's Prerogative no man may dispute against it; it being an 
inseparable adjunct to regality. . . . For the privilege of Parliament they have 
been such and so esteemed as neither to detract from the honour of the 
King, nor to lessen his authority. . . . This methinks should endear the credit 
of our Parliaments that they intrench not upon but extend the honour and 
power of the King . . . Parliament is the body: the [begin page 15] King is the 
spirit; the author of the being of Parliament.  What prejudice or injury the 
King shall suffer, we must feel.' 
 
While, however, there was little difference of opinion as to the existence of a Parliament 
there was much as to its functions.  Bacon would have had it vote taxes, help to make 
laws, and keep the King well informed as to the state of public feeling.  The functions of 
Parliament were, in a word, to be legislative, taxative, and informative.  To these Pym 
and his party desired to add a fourth and to give to Parliament an effective control over 
the Executive.  To this extension of functions the older fashioned constitutionalists, 
Bacon, Strafford, Hyde, and the like, strongly demurred.  That Parliament should be 
permitted to meddle in the 'mysteries of State’, that it should interfere in the intricacies 
of foreign policy, that it should presume to exercise a continuous control over the 
Executive, that it should hold the servants of the Crown responsible to itself, was 
unthinkable.  This was, however, the point on which from the outset of the contest Eliot, 
and after him Pym, laid most stress.  'That His Majesty be humbly petitioned by both 
Houses to employ such counsellors, ambassadors, and other ministers, in managing 
his business at home and abroad as the Parliament may have cause to confide in 
without which we cannot give His Majesty such supplies for support of his own estate, 
nor such assistance to the Protestant party beyond the sea, as is desired.
9  'So ran the 
most significant clause in the Grand Remonstrance of 1641. 
 
The Civil War ensued.  The King paid the penalty for the failure of his appeal to arms 
(1649), and his death was quickly followed by the abolition of the Monarchy. 
 
On 17 March 1649 the Rump of the Long Parliament employed such remnant of legal 
authority as it still retained to pass an ' Act ' abolishing the office of king. 
 
'Whereas', so the 'Act' ran, 'Charles Stuart, late King of England, Ireland, 
and the territories and dominions thereunto longing, hath by authority 
derived from Parliament been [begin page 16] and is hereby declared to be 
justly condemned, adjudged to die, and put to death for many treasons, 
murders, and other heinous offences committed by him. . . . And whereas it 
is and hath been found by experience that the office of a king . . . is 
unnecessary, burdensome and dangerous to the liberty, safety and public 
interest of the people, and that for the most part use hath been made of the 
regal power and. prerogative to oppress and impoverish and enslave the 
                                                  
9   [15/1]  Grand Remonstrance, § 197. subject . . . be it, therefore, enacted and ordained . . . that the office of king 
shall not henceforth reside in or be exercised by any one single person, 
and that no one person whatsoever shall or may have or hold the office, 
style, dignity or authority of King of the said kingdoms or dominions.' 
 
The Cromwellian Protectorate. 
It was comparatively easy to get rid of the Monarch; it was much more difficult to get rid 
of the Monarchy.  The Protectorate 'Rump' made a bold bid for Sovereignty, perpetual, 
unrestrained, and undivided; but Cromwell and the army intervened to prevent this 
usurpation; and Cromwell, little to his liking, found himself invested with an authority 
limited only by the necessity for retaining the loyalty of his Ironsides.  To devolve upon 
a representative Assembly some portion of his heavy responsibility was the immediate 
and constant anxiety of Cromwell.  Hence the summoning of the convention of Puritan 
nobles commonly known as Barebone's Parliament.  A few months sufficed to 
demonstrate the failure of this experiment, but Cromwell nevertheless persevered.  The 
Instrument of Government provided for the election of a single-chambered Legislature.  
Its brief but stormy existence proved that, though the Stuart monarchy was overthrown, 
the problem which had divided the Stuart monarchs and their parliaments was still 
unsolved.  Cromwell was no more disposed than Strafford or Charles I to subordinate 
the Executive to the Legislature.  Nay; he was not even willing to concede to 
Parliament constituent powers. Legislate they might, and freely, but it must be within 
the four corners of the Instrument'; circumstantials only were within their competence; 
'Fundamentals' they must not touch.  This subordinate position Parliament was 
unwilling to [begin page 17] accept, and at the first legal opportunity it was dissolved the 
Protector.  Cromwell and many of his wisest counsellors believed that the breakdown of 
the experiment was due to the unicameral structure of the Parliament. 
 
Consequently a second attempt was made with a renovated ‘Upper House'; but with no 
better results.  The old difficulties reappeared.  Cromwell had summoned Parliament to 
make laws; they claimed the right to revise the Constitution and to criticize the 
Executive.  They forgot that, disguise it, how he might, the monarchy of Cromwell 
rested upon the sword.  Had Strafford been master of Cromwell's legions the proud 
Lieutenant would have made short work of the Long Parliament.  That Cromwell was to 
assign to an elected parliament a place in the Constitution can be denied by no 
unprejudiced person; but it was a strictly subordinate place.  On their refusal to accept 
it, they had to go. 
 
But Cromwell left no successor.  His son Richard, though installed as Protector, was a 
poor creature and quite unequal to the task of reconciling the military and civil powers.  
Army and Parliament were once more at loggerheads; all classes, particularly the 
merchants and the lawyers, cried loudly for a 'settlement' and the weakness of Oliver's 
successor soon drove home a perception of the truth that without a restoration of the 
hereditary monarchy there could be no permanent settlement.  
 
The Restoration 
The Restoration had, therefore, a threefold significance: it marked, primarily indeed, the 
triumph of the monarchical principle; it marked not less clearly the triumph of the 
parliamentary principle; but, above all perhaps, it marked an emphatic repudiation of 
government by the sword.  `No, Bishop, no King' was the formula which the alliance 
between the Crown and the Church. 
 
“No King no Parliament' might, with equal significance, have been adopted as the 
motto of the Restoration of 1660.  It soon, however, became manifest that the Stuarts 
had their lesson very imperfectly.  The native shrewdness and the extraordinary 
political adroitness of [begin page 18] Charles II enabled him to outmanoeuvre the 
Whigs, who were almost as blind as the Stuart kings to the moral of recent events.  If the Long Parliament and the Civil War proved that England had outgrown the idea of 
personal monarchy, the experience of the Commonwealth and Protectorate proved that 
England could not afford the dispense with the principle of hereditary kingship. Dryden 
sang: 
Our temperate isle will no extremes sustain 
Of popular sway, or arbitrary reign 
But slides between them both into the best, 
Secure in freedom, in a monarch blest.
10
 
Was freedom secure under the later Stuarts?  The folly of the Whigs, in pressing for 
exclusion, permitted Charles II, despite accumulating unpopularity, to retain the throne 
until his death.  James II had more conscience but less dexterity.  With perverted 
ingenuity he contrived simultaneously to alienate Anglicans and Nonconformists, Tories 
and Whigs, the country gentlemen and the trader of the towns.  The crisis of 1688 
found him, therefore and a relatively small and essentially, almost friendless, 
oligarchical party was able to effect a transference of the Crown with a minimum of 
friction and virtually without opposition. 
 
The Revolution of 1688 
Burke, in his anxiety to confound the error of those who desired to establish a parallel 
between the English Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789, unduly 
accentuated the conservative character of the former.  Did we, then, assert the right to 
‘choose our own governors to cashier them for misconduct, or to frame a Government 
for ourselves'?  Far from it.  There was, it is true ‘a small and temporary deviation from 
the strict order of a regular hereditary succession', but in the Declaration of Right all 
possible ingenuity is employed to keep from the eye' this temporary solution of 
continuity; . . . whilst all, that could be found in this act of necessity to countenance the 
idea of an hereditary succession is brought [begin page 19] forward and fostered and 
made the most of . . .’  So far from thanking God 'that they had found a fair opportunity 
to assert a right to choose their own governors', or make an election the only lawful title 
to the Crown, Parliament 'threw a politic, well-wrought veil over every instance tending 
to weaken the rights, which, in the rated order of succession they meant to perpetuate; 
which might furnish a precedent for any future departure 'from what they had then 
settled for ever'.  Had the nation or its leaders wished to 'abolish their monarchy' that 
was the obvious opportunity.  They definitely renounced it, and reasserted the ancient 
and prescriptive monarchical succession.  A slight deviation was necessary; but the 
utmost care was taken that it should be the slightest possible. 
 
‘A State without the means of some change is without the means of its 
conservation.  Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of 
the Constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve.  The two 
principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two 
critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found 
itself without a King.'
11
 
The nation had, at both those periods, 'lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice'.  
Did they, therefore, ‘dissolve the whole fabric.'  On the contrary, they ‘regenerated the 
deficient part of the old Constitution through the parts which were not impaired’. 
 
Some allowance must be made for the circumstances under which the Reflections on 
the Revolution in France Burke's point of view had perhaps been somewhat modified 
since the time, twenty years earlier, when he indited the Thoughts on the Causes of the 
Present Discontents.  Yet the constitutional theory expounded in 1790 was undeniably 
                                                  
10   [18/1]  The Medal. 
11   [19/1]  French Revolution, P. 49. sound.  The Revolution of 1688 was essentially a Conservative movement.  The legal 
and technical  prerogatives were not thereby materially affected. 
 
Effect of the Revolution 
Nevertheless this epoch is commonly, and, in one sense, [begin page 20] rightly, 
selected as the dividing line between the old system and the new; as the real beginning 
of constitutional as opposed to personal monarchy; the subordination of the Executive 
to the Legislature; the responsibility of the Crown and its Ministers to Parliament. 
 
This paradox can be fully resolved only when we proceed to deal with the evolution of 
the Cabinet.  Meanwhile we may summarily indicate the combination of circumstances 
by which the change was indirectly brought about. 
 
Considerable importance must no doubt be attached to the change in the person of the 
Monarch.  'It was', writes Macaulay, 'even more necessary to England at that time that 
her King should be a usurper than that he should be a hero.  There could be no 
security for good government without a change of dynasty. . . . It had become 
indispensable to have a sovereign whose title to the throne was bound up with the title 
of the nation to its liberties.'  The point is put with characteristic exaggeration: William 
III was not a 'usurper'; he did not represent a new 'dynasty', still less did his wife.  
Nevertheless, the ‘deviation' was sufficient, as in the parallel case of Henry IV, to mark 
a real change in the relation of the Crown to the nation, and to register an important 
stage in the evolution of the supremacy of Parliament. 
 
Regular Meetings of Parliament. 
To the same result the increased regularity in the meeting of Parliament itself materially 
contributed.  It was impossible that the Executive should be really responsible to the 
Legislature so long as the meeting of the latter was irregular, capricious, and uncertain.  
The impossibility of dispensing with a standing army, the jealousy with which its recent 
establishment was regarded and the necessity for the annual renewal of the Act upon 
which its discipline depended, secured, by a device characteristically devious, the 
annual meeting of the Legislature 
 
The Civil List 
The change in the mode of granting supplies to Crown, and the institution of a Civil List 
supplied further contribution to the same result.  Hitherto the King had borne the whole 
charge of government [begin page 21] between the royal revenue and the national 
revenue there had been no distinction.  Under Charles II, indeed, the Commons had 
successfully maintained their exclusive right to determine 'as to the matter, measure, 
and time of every tax’, and the principle of the appropriation of subsidies to particular 
purposes was definitely established.  But it is with the Revolution that the effective 
control of House of Commons over national expenditure really begins.  To William III 
Parliament voted a revenue of £1,200,000 a year, of which £700,000 was appropriated 
to the support of the Royal Household, the personal expenses, the  payment of civil 
officers, &c.; the rest being appropriated to the more general expenses of 
administration.  George III, in return for a fixed Civil List, surrendered his interest in the 
hereditary revenues of the Crown.  William IV went farther, and surrendered not only 
the hereditary revenues but also certain miscellaneous and casual sources of revenue 
in return for a Civil List of £510,000 a year divided into five departments.  To each of 
these a specific annual sum was assigned, and at the same time the Civil List was 
further relieved of certain extraneous charges which were properly national or 
parliamentary.  The process was completed at the accession of Queen Victoria when 
the Civil List was fixed at £385,000, distributed as follows: (1) Privy Purse, £60,000; (2) 
Household Salaries, &c., £131,260; (3) Royal journeys, &c., £172,500; (4) Royal 
Bounty, £13,200; (5) Unappropriated £8,040.  At the same time opportunity was taken to transfer to Parliament all charges properly incident to the maintenance of the State
12 
as distinct from the personal expenses of the Sovereign.  Thus, as Erskine remarks, 
 
‘while the Civil List has been diminished in amount its relief from charges 
with which it had formerly been encumbered has [begin page 22] placed it 
beyond the reach of misconstruction. The Crown repudiates the indirect 
influence exercised in former reigns and is free from imputations of 
corruptions.  And the continual increase of the civil charges of the 
Government, which was formerly a reproach to the Crown, is now a matter 
for which the House of Commons is alone responsible.  In this, as in other 
examples of constitutional progress, apparent encroachments upon the 
Crown have but added to its true dignity, and conciliated more than ever the 




The sum voted to Queen Victoria proved in the later years of the reign quite 
inadequate, despite the economical administration of the Household, to the 
maintenance of the royal state.  The Civil List of King Edward VII was accordingly 
fixed, after a careful scrutiny at the hands of a Select Committee, at £470,000, to which 
were added grants of £20,000 for the Duke of Cornwall and York (now King George V), 
£10,000 for the Duchess, and an annuity of £18,000 for the joint line of the King's three 
daughters.  Pensions of £25,000 a year were at the same time voted to the servants of 
the late Queen Victoria; and two grants of a contingent nature were provided for an 
annuity of £70,000 to Queen Alexandra in the event of her surviving the King and of 
£30,000 to the Duchess of York in a similar contingency. 
 
The Crown Lands 
This provision, as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach who was responsible for proposing it justly 
observed, was lands a moderate one.  The nation may indeed be said to have made a 
very advantageous bargain with the Crown in view of the fact that the value of the 
hereditary revenue: surrendered by the Crown increased during the reign of Queen 
Victoria from £245,000 to £452,000 a year.  When George Ill came to the throne in 
1760 the net revenue was only about £11,000. 
 
The 'hereditary revenues' are derived mainly from Crown lands, including mines, and 
are managed by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests,
14 under the ex-officio 
[begin page 23] presidency of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.  Technically, they 
also include the hereditary Excise Duties granted to Charles II, but long in abeyance, 
the compensation for wine licence revenue, and the hereditary post office revenue.  For 
the year ended 31 March 1924 the net sum paid over by the Commissioners to the 
Exchequer amounted to no less than £920,000 - a sum vastly in excess of the cost to 
the nation of the Monarchy and all its appurtenances. 
 
Civil List of King George V. 
On the death of King Edward VII a Select Committee Civil was again appointed to 
consider the new Civil List.  They satisfied themselves that 'the provision made in 1901 
                                                  
12    [21/1]  The Crown still enjoys the revenues of the Duchies of Lancaster and 
Cornwall, the latter being part of the appanage of the Prince of Wales.  The former 
now yields to the Crown a net revenue of £60,000 a year; the latter paid over to 
the Prince of Wales (for the year 1921) £33,736; the gross revenue for the same 
year amounting to £194,020. 
13   [22/1]  Constitutional History, i. 247. 
14   [22/2]  Now 'Crown Lands'.     was adequate but not more than adequate for the proper of the dignity of the Crown'.  
The Civil List was accordingly fixed at £470,000 as before; in addition to which 
provision was made for other members of the Royal family – including the annuity of 
£70,000 to the Queen Mother – amounting to £146,000 a year; £18,000 for.  Pensions 
to the servants of the late King, and contingent grants as follows: to the Queen, should 
she survive the King, £70,000; to a possible Princess of Wales, £10,000, and £30,000 
in the event of widowhood; for the King's younger sons, £10,000 a year each at 
majority and an a £15,000 on marriage, and for the King's daughters £6,000 a year 
each at majority or marriage.  It was understood that Parliament should not be asked to 
provide for the children of the younger members of the Royal family. 
 
Allowing, then, for every possible contingency the State, it will be seen, is amply 
secured against any deficit on the balance sheet of the monarchical establishment.  It 
was argued, in 1910, that the revenues of the two Duchies ought to be surrendered to 
the State.  Mr. Balfour, however, had no difficulty in proving that the Duchies were in a 
different category both from ordinary Crown lands and from the private property of the 
Sovereign, and it was generally agreed that the successful management of both 
Estates had completely cut the ground from [begin page 24] under the feet of those who 
desired a change in the historic manner of dealing with them. 
 
The alteration in the mode of granting supplies to the Crown, the institution of a Civil 
'List, was, however, only one of several indications of a profound change in the position 
of the Crown and the conception of Monarchy.  With other indications and implications 
of that change the next chapter will deal. 
 XXIV. - The Problem of the Executive (2) 
Constitutional Monarchy 
 
A Constitutional Monarchy, according to the classic aphorism of M. Thiers, 
is one in which the King reigns but does not govern.  This highly artificial 
arrangement is commonly taken to be coeval with the Monarchy of 
England.  It came into existence a century and a half ago.  The first 
Constitutional king was George I. -Goldwin Smith. 
 
'The direct power of the King of England is very considerable.  His indirect 
and far more certain power is great indeed.' - Burke. 
 
'The acts, the wishes, the example of the Sovereign in this country are a real 
power.  An immense reverence and tender affection await upon the person 
of the one permanent and ever faithful guardian of the fundamental 
conditions of the Constitution.' - W.E. Gladstone (19th century). 
 
'You cannot make a republic of the British Commonwealth of Nations.' -
General J.E. Smuts (20th century). 
 
Constitutional Monarchy 
Constitutional Monarchy is one of those curious yet characteristic contradictions which 
are almost unintelligible save to the native born.  The device is pre-eminently a product 
of political conditions which were for a long time peculiar to England.  A Roman 
commentator upon the Teutonic polity was naturally struck by the limited authority of 
the 'Kings' of the German tribes.
1  We have long been taught to believe that the Saxon 
kingship, when it re-emerged on English soil, was similarly limited.  A great English 
jurist of the thirteenth century - a period of advanced, not to say precocious, political 
theories - laid particular emphasis upon 'the limitations imposed upon the royal 
authority by the 'curia’.
2
 
Another great jurist, writing under the Lancastrian regime, taught his royal pupil, Henry 
VI, that a 'King of England cannot at his pleasure make any alterations in the laws of 
the land, for the nature of his Government is not only regal but political'.
3  What is more 
remarkable is that the judicious Hooker, writing at the apogee of the Tudor [begin page 
26] dictatorship, dared to remind his contemporaries that ‘what power the King hath he 
hath it by law, the bounds and limits of it are known'. 
 
The Stuarts, imbued with the Gallican rather than the Anglican doctrine of kingship, 
would have none of this illogical compromise.  'As for the absolute prerogative of the 
Crown, that is no subject for the tongue of a lawyer nor is it lawful to be disputed.  It is 
atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do; good Christians content 
themselves with his will revealed in his word, so it is presumption and high contempt in 
a subject to dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this or that; but 
rest in that which is the King's revealed will in his law.'  In this manner did James I 
address his Privy Council in 1616.  Similarly he wrote in his True Law of Free 
                                                  
1   [25/1]  Tacitus, Germania.   
2   [25/2]  Bracton (d. 1286). 
3   [25/3]  Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae. Fortescue's reference is 
to the analysis of Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, cf. supra, c. ii. Monarchies: 'A good King will frame all his actions according to the law, yet is he not 
bound thereto but of his own goodwill.'  Unfortunately for his people and unfortunately 
for his House, James I brought to the task of ruling Puritan England the mind of a 
Scotch metaphysician and the traditions of French absolutism.  The harvest was 
reaped in the Great Rebellion, and in the 'Revolution Settlement' of 1688. 
 
To that settlement the advent of 'Constitutional Monarchy' is commonly ascribed.  Yet 
the transition from personal to parliamentary government was, in fact, very far from 
complete under William III, or even under Queen Anne.  The policy of England from 
1689 to 1702 was the policy not of any Minister but of the King himself.  King William 
undoubtedly found himself hampered, if not frustrated, by Parliament in some of his 
continental designs; but despite opposition he carried them through.  Even Queen 
Anne, though not endowed with high capacity or strong character, imparted a distinct 
personal bias to the politics of her reign. 
 
The Hanoverian Dynasty. 
A Constitutional monarch was defined by M. Thiers as one who reigns but does not 
govern.  If we are to accept the aphorism as accurate we must date the transition from 
[begin page 27] personal to Constitutional rule from the next reign, - that of George I. 
 
The accession of a King who, despite English blood, was in all essentials a foreigner, 
the prolonged ascendancy of a great Minister under whom the Cabinet for the first time 
assumed its modern form, and the development of Party organization in Parliament 
itself - all these contributed to the process. 
 
Recent historical research has considerably modified the previously accepted view that 
the effective power of the Crown was entirely eclipsed during the reigns of George I 
and George II, but such influence as the Crown exercised was felt more decisively in 
European than in domestic politics. 
 
George III 
With the accession of George III there was, however, a real revival of the monarchical 
idea.  The young King came to the throne saturated with the principles of Bolingbroke's 
Patriot King, and determined, in his own person, to put them to the test of practical 
experiment.  His own personality and the political circumstances of the hour were alike 
favourable to its success.  In almost every way the young King stood in marked 
contrast to his immediate predecessors.  The first of his dynasty who could be 
regarded as English, he rather overplayed the part; but he was simple, manly, and 
unaffected; his private life was above reproach, and his courage, both moral and 
physical, was magnificent.  Intellectually he was below the average, with all the 
obstinacy of a rather stupid man, but his prejudices, which were numerous, fortunately 
coincided with those of the great mass of his subjects.  And he had this further 
advantage.  The political forces which during the last half-century had rivalled and even 
eclipsed that of the Crown were palpably weakening.  Parliament was becoming every 
year more oligarchical both in temper and in composition.  'You have taught me', said 
George II to Pitt, 'to look elsewhere than to the House of Commons for the opinion of 
my people.'  The lesson was not lost upon his grandson.  Increasingly [begin page 28] 
oligarchical, Parliament was also increasingly disorganized.  Since the fall of Walpole 
the great Whig party had rapidly disintegrated; it was broken up into factions and 
groups, and could offer little effective resistance to concentrated and sustained attacks.  
The King pressed home his advantage with unremitting industry and unflagging ardour.  
He worked like an election-agent, and dined on boiled mutton and turnips, in order that 
he might spend his enormous income in the purchase of the House of Commons.   
Burke probably exaggerated the cohesion of the' King's friends',
4 but as to the reality 
                                                  
4   [28/1]  Cf. Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, passim.  and extent of the King's personal influence upon politics there can be no question.  
‘Everyone', wrote Horace Walpole, 'ran to Court and voted for whatever the Court 
desired.'  The personal influence of the King reached its zenith during the ministry of 
Lord North (1770-82).  But even before the fall of his favourite Minister it was on the 
wane.  The disasters of the American War, disasters laid, not wholly without 
justification, at the King's door; the acceptance of Mr. Dunning's historic resolutions 
(1780)
5 above all, the ferment created by the King's personal interposition to defeat 
Fox's India Bill, seriously damaged the prestige of the Crown.  Pitt came to the King's 
rescue in 1783, and five years later the hatred of opponents was changed to pity by the 
oncoming of insanity, which, fitful at first, became permanent in 1810. 
 
George IV and William IV 
Under the Regency (1810-20) and the reign of George IV the popularity if not the 
power of the Crown markedly declined.  George IV had more brains than his father, but 
much less conscience, and there can be no question that the scandals of his private 
life, combined with his obstinate resistance to all reform, seriously imperilled the 
existence of the Monarchy.  On the Continent the restored Monarchies were on trial; 
even in England there were plenty of critics hostile to the institution.  'Oh, that the free 
would stamp the impious name of King into the dust’  [begin page 29] was an aspiration 
which if infrequently uttered was widely entertained.  Nothing but the unpopularity of 
the King could have conferred so much popularity upon his unhappy but undeserving 
Queen.  Nevertheless it would be a mistake to underrate the practical influence of 
George IV upon politics.  His alienation from the Whig friends of his youth kept the 
Tories in power in 1812, and throughout the whole of his regency and reign.  Brougham 
asked the House of Commons to declare that the influence of the Crown was 
'unnecessary for maintaining its constitutional prerogatives, destructive of the 
independence of Parliament and inconsistent with the well-governing of the realm'.  It is 
significant that, unlike Dunning's resolutions of 1780, Brougham's was negatived by a 
large majority.  But that the country would have tolerated a succession of George IV’s 
is unlikely. 
 
To George IV there succeeded in 1830 his brother, William IV, a sailor, bluff, genial, 
and kind-hearted, but entirely lacking in dignity, not to say in decorum.  Under him the 
popularity of the Crown was restored, but its dignity was still further endangered. 
 
Queen Victoria 
Such was the situation which confronted the young Princess, called to the throne, as 
Queen Victoria, by her uncle's death in 1837.  'Since the century began', as one of her 
biographers pungently puts it, 'there had been three Kings of England. . . of whom the 
first was long an imbecile, the second won the reputation of a profligate, and the third 
was regarded as little better than a buffoon.'
6  'It was, therefore, the young Queen's first 
task to re-establish the Monarchy in the respect and affection of the people.  More 
particularly was it her function to win the confidence of the middle classes who had 
lately, by the revolution of 1832, become supreme in English politics.  For this task she 
was exceptionally qualified.  'It was', says Mr. Benson, 
  
‘supremely fortunate that the Queen by a providential gift of temperament 
thoroughly understood the middle plass point of view.
7 How well she 
succeeded in conciliat- [begin page 30] ing to the Crown the affectionate 
regard of her people the history of her long reign eloquently tells. But it 
                                                  
5   [28/2]  The first of them ran: 'That the influence of the Crown has increased, is 
increasing, and ought to be diminished.' 
6   [29/1]  Lee, Queen Victoria, P. 53,  
7   [29/2]  Queen Victoria's Letters, i. 28. would be misleading to suppose that her success was immediate, or, until 
the last two decades of her reign, complete.  The cartoons of Punch reflect 
with singular accuracy the public sentiment.  In the earlier half of the reign 
they are far from complimentary to the Queen, and to the Prince Consort 
they are something less than respectful.  In later years the tone changes.  
The change is clearly due to something more than length of days.  The first 
impulse to it came perhaps from acknowledged misjudgement as to the 
Prince Consort: 
 
We know him now: all narrow jealousies 
Are silent; and we see him as he moved, 
How modest, kindly, all accomplish'd, wise, 
With what sublime repression of himself, 
And in what limits, and how tenderly; 
Not swaying to this faction, or to that; 
Not making his high place the lawless perch 
Of wing'd ambitions, nor a vantage ground 
For pleasure; but through all this tract of years 
Wearing the white flower of a blameless life. 
 
It was shortly after the death of the Prince Consort that Mr. Walter Bagehot published 
his remarkable study on The English Constitution.  His chapter on the Monarchy opens 
with the following words: 
 
The Mid-Victorian Monarchy 
‘The use of the Queen in a dignified capacity is incalculable.  Without her in England 
the present English Government would fail and pass away.  Most people, when they 
read that the Queen walked on the slopes of Windsor - that the Prince of Wales went to 
the Derby, have imagined that too much thought and prominence were given to little 
things.  But they have been in error; and it is nice to trace how the actions of a retired 
widow and an unemployed youth become of such importance.' 
 
The passage is noticeable for several reasons.  Bagehot was a genuine believer in the 
Monarchy as an institution and a sincere admirer of the Monarch but his tone is 
obviously half-contemptuous and would now be generally [begin page 31] resented as 
barely decorous.  For reasons which will be disclosed presently, the political position of 
the Crown is far better understood and more highly appreciated than was the case half 
a century ago.  On the other hand Bagehot’s analysis of the non-political functions of 
the Monarchy could even now hardly be improved upon.  He describes the Crown as 
the pivot of the 'dignified part of the constitution’.  It is an 'intelligible' headpiece and 
consequently calls forth feelings towards the Government which no form of republican 
institutions can evoke. 
 
‘royalty is a Government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one 
person doing interesting actions.  A Republic is a Government in which that attention is 
divided between many who are all doing uninteresting actions’.  Again: ‘the Monarchy 
strengthens out Government with the strength of religion’; it appeals to sentiments 
which are not the less real and not the less real.  It is valuable, also, as excluding 
competition for the headship of society; and above all as the guardian of the 'mystery' 
of the Constitution.  It ‘acts as a disguise'; 'it enables our real rulers to change without 
heedless people knowing it.' 
 
Political Functions of the Crown. 
Passing to the political functions of the Crown, Bagehot, like most other commentators, 
confessed his inability to pierce the veil of mystery in which the political action of the 
Sovereign is wisely enwrapped.  'We shall never know but when history is written our children may know what we owe to the Queen and Prince Albert.'  Something of the 
debt is known.  A portion of the veil has been already withdrawn.  Materials for an 
historical judgement are rapidly accumulating.  The Lives and Letters of leading 
statesmen of the Victorian era have disclosed much; the throwing open of archives has 
revealed much; the Letters of Queen Victoria herself, though edited with care and 
reticence, have perhaps done more than any other single publication to draw aside the 
veil.  To what extent has the withdrawal rendered necessary a modification of 
Constitutional theory?  [begin page 32] 
 
Under a Constitution so flexible as our own much must evidently depend upon the 
personal equation.  The character even of a strictly Constitutional Sovereign 
necessarily counts for a great deal.  Year by year the character of Queen Victoria 
stands more clearly revealed as that of an exceptionally capable woman, strong of will 
and passionately devoted to duty.  Such a character combined with an experience 
which, as the days of her long reign lengthened, far surpassed that of any Minister, 
must needs have left a profound impress upon the day-by-day working of the 
Constitution. 
 
Apart from this somewhat elusive influence the English Sovereign possesses certain 
formal prerogatives which may be convenient, at this point, to indicate. 
 
Right of Dissolution 
The King has, firstly, the right of appeal from Parliament to the masters of Parliament, 
from his own advisers to the political Sovereign before the expression of whose 
deliberate will the legal Sovereign must bow.  For, as Mr. Dicey justly observed, 'the 
whole current of modern constitutional custom involves the admission that the final 
decision of every grave political question now belong, not to the House of Commons, 
but to the electors as the representatives of the nation.'
8  This right of dissolution the 
King would be compelled to exercise if he were unable to find a Ministry willing at once 
to accept responsibility for his acts and at the same time able to secure and retain the 
confidence of the House of Commons.  But it evidently a weapon which he would 
hesitate except in the last resort to employ.  And for an obvious reason.  An adverse 
verdict would create a situation almost intolerable.  The position of the King would be 
that of a master who has given notice to servants and has been compelled by 
circumstances to retain them on their own terms.  The older books taught that William 
IV ventured to employ this weapon against the Whigs in 1834, when, having dismissed 
the Melbourne Ministry, he dissolved Parliament in the hope of securing a majority for 
Sir Robert Peel.  [begin page 33] 
 
The incident is capable of other explanations and the Melbourne Papers make it clear 
that the Prime Minister was, to say the least, a consenting party.  Peel, however, when 
he took office, was under the impression, erroneously, as we now know, that 
Melbourne had been dismissed by the King, and he recognized that by taking office he 
had made himself responsible for the dismissal.  ‘I should’, he said, ‘by my acceptance 
of the office of First Minister become technically if not morally responsible for the 
dissolution of the preceding Government though I had not the remotest concern in it.
9
 
The Crisis of 1913. 
That the Sovereign exercised this prerogative in 1784, 1801, 1807, 1832, and 1839 is 
undeniable.  He was, in no dubious accents, invited to exercise it again in the autumn 
of 1913.  The crisis of the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912, and the operation of the 
Parliament Act (1911), had at that time become acute.  Mr. George (now Viscount) 
Cave expressed the hope that, if Mr. Asquith’s Ministry should prove obdurate in their 
                                                  
8   [32/1]  Letter to The Times, 15 Sept. 1913. 
9   [33/1]  Peel, Memoirs, ii. 31. refusal to lay the claims of Ulster before the electorate, the Sovereign would exercise 
his undoubted right and dissolve Parliament before the commencement of the next 
Session’.
10  Mr. Balfour appealed to the Government spontaneously to advise the 
course recommended by Mr. Cave.
11  They declined to do so.  The Crown could not, 
while retaining the Asquith Ministry, by an exercise of the prerogative have appealed 
over their heads to the electorate.  That the Ministry would have tamely accepted such 
an affront, or the Crown have offered it, is unthinkable.  It would, however, have been 
within the undoubted right of the Sovereign to have sought the advice of an alternative 
Ministry, and in the event, certain under the circumstances, of their immediate defeat in 
the House of Commons, to have dissolved Parliament.  ‘The discretionary power of the 
Crown', writes Dicey, ‘occasionally may be, and according to constitutional precedents 




But there is no disguising the fact that if the electorate had refused support to the 
alternative Ministry, the King would have found himself in a position of some 
embarrassment.  He would, as already stated, have been compelled by the electors to 
take back a body of servants whom proprio motu he had dismissed.  Thus, as so 
frequently happens under our unwritten Constitution, the matter was, in practice, 
reduced from one of constitutional Convention, to one of political expediency.  A course 
sanctioned by law and precedent may well be injudicious.  Of its wisdom the alternative 
Ministry must, in the last resort, judge. 
 
Refusal of Dissolution 
Another constitutional right, similar to but quite distinct from the former; belongs 
unquestionably to the King.  He is entitled to appeal from his Ministers to Parliament.  
This is in effect to refuse to an existing Ministry a dissolution.  Such cases have 
frequently arisen in the self governing Dominions, though the action of the governor 
refusing, and sometimes indeed in granting, a dissolution has not escaped criticism.  In 
Australia there were no fewer than three refusals by Colonial governors in one year.
13
 
The question of the exercise of this prerogative at home was raised acutely in 
December 1923, when, as a result of the General Election, no one of the three parties 
found itself in an absolute majority in the House of Commons.  Had Mr. Baldwin, before 
resigning office, or Mr. Macdonald after accepting it, been so ill advised as to ask for a 
dissolution of Parliament, the King might certainly have declined to assent to it.  The 
constitutional doctrine this point was stated at the time by Mr. Asquith in terms as lucid 
as they are unequivocal: 
 
'The dissolution of Parliament', he said, 'is in this country one of the 
prerogatives of the Crown.  It is not a mere feudal [begin page 35] survival, 
but it is part, and I think a useful part, of our constitutional system for which 
there is no counterpart in any other country, such, for instance, as the 
United States of America.  It does not mean that the Crown should act 
arbitrarily and without the advice of responsible Ministers, but it does mean 
that the Crown is not bound to take the advice of a particular Minister to put 
its subjects to the tumult and turmoil of a series of General Elections so 
long as it can find other Ministers who are prepared to give it a trial.  The 
                                                  
10   [33/2]  The Times, 8 Sept. 1913  
11   [33/3]  The Times, 10 Sept. 1913.   
12   [34/1]  Law of the Constitution, P. 360. 
13    [34/2] For a full discussion of this question see A.B. Keith, Responsible 
Government in the Dominions, i. 180 seq.  The point has again (July 1926) been 
raised, in an acute form, by the action of Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General 
of Canada, whose attitude seems to have been entirely correct'. notion that a Minister who cannot command a majority in the House of 
Commons. . . in those circumstances is invested with the right to demand a 
dissolution is as subversive of constitutional usage as it would, in my 




It will not escape notice that Mr. Asquith made the exercise of this prerogative 
dependant upon the advice of responsible Ministers; but in seeking that advice the 
King has the right to act on his own initiative, and in the case under notice he might 
well have thought it proper to do so.  In the particular case Mr. Asquith, after 
enunciating the constitutional doctrine in terms of unimpeachable accuracy, himself 
rendered the exercise of the prerogative unnecessary by helping the Socialist leader to 
defeat the Conservative Ministry in the House of Commons, and by sustaining him for a 
few months in office, if not in power. 
 
Selection of Prime Minister 
There is yet another right incontestably appertaining to the Crown closely connected 
with the above.  It is the right of selecting his chief adviser, the Minister who is now 
officially, as well as popularly, styled Prime Minister.  The King’s choice is, as a rule 
very narrowly limited in practice, but it is not denied, by any authority entitled to 
respect, that, within such limits, the discretion permitted to the Crown is a real one. 
 
George III and the Younger Pitt. 
The appointment of the young William Pitt to the George premiership in 1783 was the 
act of the King, and of the King alone.  So also was the dismissal of the Fox-North 
Coalition Ministry.  Nothing, indeed, was omitted which could add to the ignominy of 
their dismissal or could [begin page 36] emphasize the personal responsibility of the 
King.  Lord North and Mr. Fox were commanded to return their seals, by their under-
secretaries as a personal interview would be disagreeable to his Majesty.  Earl Temple, 
who had acted as intermediary between the King and the House of Lords, and had 
been the chief instrument of the Crown in effecting the defeat of the Ministry, was 
entrusted with the seals for the purpose of formally dismissing the outgoing Ministers. 
 
The King's right to select his own Minister was hotly challenged at the time.  The House 
of Commons accepted without a division a resolution moved by Mr. Coke of Norfolk: 
'That the continuance of the present Ministers in their offices is an obstacle to the 
formation of such a administration as may enjoy the confidence of this House.’  Pitt, 
however, stoutly stood his ground.  He refused to resign; he refused to advise a 
dissolution of Parliament; he denied that the appointment or removal of Ministers 
rested with the House of Commons, and boldly claimed that Ministers appointed by the 
Crown were entitled a fair trial.  The young Minister’s Minister's patience and tenacity 
gradually wore down the Opposition, and when, after three months of guerrilla warfare 
in the House of Commons (December 1783 to March 1784) he at last dissolved 
Parliament, the electorate emphatically endorsed his contention and approved the 
tactics by which he had maintained it.  Of Pitt's opponents upwards of one hundred and 
sixty lost their seats and the young Minister was carried back to power at the head of a 
triumphant majority. 
 
The Royal Prerogative 
This result was, however, a triumph for the King not less than for the Minister.  George 
III had, indeed, staked far more upon the issue of the election than had Pitt.  Had it 
gone against him the position of the Crown would certainly have been humiliating and 
might easily have become precarious.  Many things contributed to success of the 
                                                  
14   [35/1]  The Times, 19 Dec. 1923. venture: dislike of the Coalition; loyalty to the memory of Chatham and admiration for 
the spirit [begin page 37] displayed by his son; apprehensions of an attack on ‘property’ 
suggested by the proposals of Fox's India Bill; Pitt’s magnanimity in regard to the 
Clerkship of the Pells; his disinterested zeal for public economy; the stupid tactics of 
the Opposition; their oligarchical temper, so sharply contrasted with the popular 
instincts of Pitt; their apparent mistrust even of the limited electorate of the eighteenth 
century; above all, a genuine enthusiasm for the King and his gallant champion.  But 
the completeness of the king’s triumph should not blind us to the serious risks involved 
in the course on which he had chosen to embark.  Failure would plainly have 
weakened, perhaps beyond the possibility of repair, the position of the Crown; it might 
even have precipitated a crisis parallel with that which occurred five years later in 
France. 
 
As things were, the outbreak of the Revolution in France served to emphasize the 
victory won by George III and Pitt.  The Napoleonic wars firmly consolidated it.  So 
firmly, indeed, that in the midst of those wars George III felt strong enough, if not to 
dismiss his ally, at least to dispense with services which he could retain only by 
assenting to the removal of the last remnants of the disabilities under which the Roman 
Catholics still laboured. 
 
Rather than break faith with the Irish Roman Catholics Pitt resigned in 1801; but so 
strong was the position of the Crown that when renewal of the war compelled his return 
to office, he was constrained to abandon the Catholic cause.  The refusal of Grenville 
and his colleagues in the Ministry of ‘All the Talents’ to do likewise led to their fall in 
1807.  That George Ill and his eldest son reflected on this question the opinions of the 
great mass of their people is probably true; but it is indicative of the power of the Crown 
that two such kings should have been able successfully to withstand such Ministers as 
Pitt, Castlereagh and Canning. 
 
The long premiership of Lord Liverpool relieved George IV of any difficulties with his 
Ministers or with [begin page 38] Parliament during the greater part of his regency and 
nearly the whole of his reign.  None could be apprehended with the Duke of Wellington 
in office.  William IV was credited with 'popular' sympathies, and the Whig Ministers 
publicly announced that in promoting the cause of parliamentary reform they enjoyed 
not merely the confidence but the support of the new King.  By 1834, however, the King 
had become mistrustful of the intentions of Lord Grey's Ministry in regard to the Irish 
Church. 
 
William IV and Lord Melbourne 
The resignation of Lord Stanley, Sir James Graham, the Duke of Richmond, and Lord 
Ripon intensified his apprehensions (May); the resignation of Lord Grey and the 
succession of Lord Melbourne (July) did nothing to remove them, and on 15 November 
the King suddenly dismissed the Ministry and sent for Sir Robert Peel.  To this incident 
and its interpretation reference has already been made That Lord Melbourne was 
himself at least a consenting party is now clear; yet Erskine May is right in saying that 
'all the usual grounds for dismissing a Ministry were wanting', and that 'the act of the 
King bore too much the impress of his personal will, and too little of those reasons of 
State policy by which it should have bee prompted'.
15
 
Sir Robert Peel did indeed assume, in due constitutional form, entire responsibility for 
the action of the King.
16  But neither this avowal nor the immediate dissolution, 
Parliament which the new Minister was constrained advise availed to extricate the King 
from the embarrassment into which he was plunged by his precipitate action.  Peel 
                                                  
15   [38/1]  Op. cit. i. 121, 122. 
16   [38/2]  Hansard, 3rd Ser., xxvi. 216, 223. materially improved his parliamentary position, but the Whigs were still in a large 
majority, and in April 18 Lord Melbourne returned to office. 
 
Queen Victoria and her Ministers. 
Could Queen Victoria have had her way she would have retained him permanently.  
Nothing could have exceeded the cordiality of the relations which from the first 
subsisted between the young Queen and the man whom she treated as a political 
godfather.  His resignation in 1839 caused [begin page 39] her deep pain, which she 
was at no trouble to conceal either from Lord Melbourne or from the 'cold odd man' 
called to succeed him.  The Queen announced her intention ‘to prove her great fairness 
to her new Government’; but when Peel insisted, with perfect constitutional propriety, 
that the highest household offices, female no less than male must change with the 
Government, the Queen flatly declined to part with her ladies.  Peel would not give way, 
and Melbourne, to the Queen's delight, came back.  Sixty years later the Queen 
confessed to Sir Arthur Bigge (afterwards Lord Stamfordham) that she had doubts as to 
the propriety of her conduct in regard to the Bedchamber Question: ‘I was very young 
then, and perhaps I should have acted differently if it was all to be done again.’   
Melbourne finally resigned in 1841 having, in the words of Wellington, taught the 
Queen ‘to preside over the destinies of this great country’.  Peel was not only forgiven, 
but was admitted to the fullest confidence and friendship of the Queen and the Prince 
Consort. 
 
Thus, when he in turn was compelled to resign in 1846, the queen wrote ‘expressing 
her deep concern at losing his service, which she regrets as much for the country as 
for herself and the Prince.  In whatever position', she continued.  ‘Sir Robert  Peel may 
be, we shall ever look on him as a true friend, and ever have the greatest esteem and 
regard for him as a Minister and as a private individual. 
 
The Position of the Crown in the Victorian Era. 
Such letters - and they abound in the collection edited bey lord Esher and Mr. A.C. 
Benson - suffice to prove not only the warmth of the Queen’s feelings, but the close 
and continuous interest she took in the Government of her kingdom.  Do they afford 
proof of anything more?  Is it possible to draw from those or other sources any 
inference as to the actual political power of the Crown during Queen Victoria’s reign?  
Was it, on the whole, impaired or increased between 1837 and 1901?  A recent critic, 
while admitting that by the end of the reign the prestige of the Sovereign had 
enormously grown, maintains that 'the [begin page 40] power of the Sovereign had 
appreciably diminished and, indeed, goes so far as to assert that 'the Crown was 
weaker than at any other time in English history'.
17  Will this proposition command 
assent?  The extreme flexibility of the English Constitution, still more its 'unreality’, 
render it difficult to answer this question with complete assurance.  This much, 
however, is indisputable: that the English Constitution still affords to the Sovereign 
frequent opportunities for exerting an influence upon the course political events. 
 
Kings are mortal, but they are not ordinary mortals; a glamour attaches to their position 
and person which even the stoutest and most self-assured democrats find irresistible.  
The sentiment thus inspired may be unworthy or the reverse; but it is idle to deny that it 
exists, or that it gives the Sovereign an initial advantage in dealing with any Minister, 
however powerful. 
 
Queen Victoria and Lord Palmerston 
Bagehot enumerated three rights possessed by the King: ‘the right to be consulted, the 
right to encourage, the right to warn.'  ' A King of great sense and sagacity would want', 
                                                  
17   [40/1]  Strachey, Queen Victoria, pp. 301, 303. he adds, 'no other.'  The Letters of Queen Victoria afford innumerable illustrations of 
her insistence upon these rights.  It was the violation of her right to be consulted which 
brought Lord Palmerston into trouble in 1851, though his indiscretion in regard to the 
coup d'etat would hardly have led to dismissal had he not already forfeited the 
confidence of the Queen. 
 
'The Queen', so ran the famous memorandum of 1850 requires, first, that 
Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in 
order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal 
sanction.  Secondly, having once given her sanction to such a measure that 
it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister.  Such an act must 
consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by 
the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that Minister.  She 
expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and foreign 
ministers before important [begin page 41] decisions are taken based upon 
that intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to 
have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself 
acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off.' 
 
The demand, though explicit, was entirely reasonable, and Lord Palmerston justly 
suffered a temporary humiliation for the lack of consideration he displayed towards the 
Sovereign.  That he had a strong personal regard for the Queen, and a high respect for 
her intellect, we have his own testimony to prove: but he was inclined to treat her as an 
elderly family solicitor occasionally treats a young lady client: ‘of course, my dear young 
lady, you can read these documents if you like, but you won't understand them if you 
do, and you will save yourself trouble and me time if you sign at once.’  The Queen, as 
is clear from her correspondence, strongly resented this attitude on the part of her 
Minister; and properly.  She enforced her claim to be consulted. 
 
Queen Victoria and Peel 
He right to encourage, was perpetually exercised.  Her letters to Peel in the midst of 
the struggle for the repeal of the Corn Laws afford one of many illustrations.  Thus in 
January 1846 the Queen wrote to express her 'great satisfaction’ at peel’s success in 
persuading his colleagues to accept the principle of his policy ' feeling certain that what 
was so just and wise must succeed'.  On 4 February she wrote again saying 'she is 
sure that Sir Robert will be rewarded in the end by the gratitude of the country.  This 
will make up for the abuse he has to endure from so many of his party.’  On the 17th 
Prince Albert writes to Peel ‘allow me to tell you with how much delight I have read your 
long speech of yesterday.  It cannot fail to produce a great effect, even upon a party 
which is determined not to listen to the voice of reason.'  This is followed on the next 
day by a note from the Queen herself, enclosing an equally flattering one from the 
Queen Dowager to her daughter: ‘The Queen must write a line to Sir Robert Peel to 
say how much she admired his speech.'  Such letters and many like them, attest the 
meticulous attention [begin page 42] bestowed by the Queen upon passing events in the 
sphere of domestic policy.  Not less close and continuous is her interest in foreign 
policy; and not less marked is the encouragement given to her Ministers during periods 
of national stress, such as the Crimean War.  No detail is too small or unimportant to 
engage the personal attention of the Sovereign: the supply of ammunition or transport 
accessories, the exact disposition of the armaments, hospital comforts for the sick or 
wounded, and so forth.  On these points and such as these she inquires of the 
Secretary for War.  To the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, she writes to express 'her 
sense of the imperative importance of the Cabinet being united, of one mind, at this 
moment, and not to let it appear that there are differences of opinion within it.' 
 Queen and Lord Derby  
But if she was generally ready to encourage, she did not hesitate to reproach.  Thus in 
1858 she wrote to Lord Derby a letter which by itself would suffice to prove how justly 
tenacious she was of the royal prerogative:  ‘The Queen', she writes, 'was shocked to 
find that in several important points her Government have surrendered the prerogative 
of the Crown. . . . The Queen must remind Lord Derby that it is to him, as the head of 
the Government, that she looks for the protection of those prerogatives which form an 
integral part of the Constitution.'  With Lord Palmerston she was even more seriously 
angry in the midst of the Mutiny crisis.  In her opinion - and she was undeniably right - 
Palmerston underrated the gravity of the situation and to the Queen, far more than to 
the Minister, the nation owed the timely dispatch of adequate reinforcements. 
 
The Prince Consort and the Trent Affair. 
The Illustrations of the judicious and opportune intervention of the Sovereign might be 
multiplied almost indefinitely.  That on some occasions the Queen's action was inspired 
by the Prince Consort is an indubitable fact, but, in this connexion, is nothing to the 
point.  One notable instance the Prince's diplomatic tact may, however, be mentioned.  
When the Prince was on his death-bed in 1861, England and America came within 
measurable distance of war over [begin page 43] the Trent affair.  0pinion in England 
was seriously aroused about the detention of Slidell and Mason, and Lord John 
Russell, accurately interpreting that opinion, is depicted by Punch as squaring up to 
President Lincoln with the words ‘give them up or fight'.  Lord John Russell's dispatch 
sent down for the approval of the Queen is said to have been conceived somewhat in 
this tone.  The Prince's emendations, without in the least diminishing its firmness, 
afforded Lincoln a golden bridge for retreat from an indefensible position.  Lincoln had 
the sense and courage to cross it; the situation was saved, and war was averted, no 
one can doubt, by the fact that the Minister's draft dispatch had to undergo the scrutiny 
of a royal diplomatist whose tact and judgement were ripened by a continuous 
experience of affairs, such as no Minister can possibly, under our party system, hope to 
enjoy.  The Sovereign is in fact, as regards foreign affairs, a permanent Civil Servant 
with opportunities for acquiring a knowledge of things, and more particularly of men, 
such as no Civil Servant, immersed in the routine of a great office, and no diplomatist, 
touching affairs only at a single point, ever has or can acquire. 
 
King Edward VII 
No English Sovereign ever exemplified this truth better than King Edward VII.  As 
Prince of Wales he had been jealously excluded by Queen Victoria from all official 
knowledge of affairs of State.  Not until 1895 was he even entrusted with the 'Cabinet 
Key' which gives access to the boxes which are circulated among Cabinet Ministers 
and contain the latest information on current affairs.  Nevertheless he made the most of 
all the opportunities given to him by his position, and still more by a singularly affable 
and attractive personality.  He sedulously cultivated the acquaintance of every ruler in 
Europe, and of statesmen and publicists belonging to all parties.  He was no student in 
the narrower sense, but he made a systematic habit of picking every brain worth 
picking, and consequently was cognizant of every current and cross current of opinion 
in Europe.   [begin page 44] 
 
Both before and after his accession to the throne King Edward took his holidays on the 
Continent.  Connected by ties of blood and friendship with most of the continental 
dynasties, the appellation of L'Oncle de l’Murope at once expressed a literal truth and 
indicated a political fact of considerable significance.  Lisbon, Rome, Paris, Athens 
Madrid, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Christiania were visited in turn.  His first ceremonial 
visit as King to Paris in 1903 was epoch-making.  Anglo-French relations had not for 
many years been cordial, and at times had been seven strained, and the King's 
reception in Paris, though correct was chilly.  But in a memorable speech he gave 
public expression to his affection for the beautiful capital France and stated his conviction that 'the days of hostility between the two countries are happily at an end’.  
Before the close of his brief visit he had completely captivated the heart of the citizens 
of Paris, and indeed of France. 
 
To ascribe to King Edward the origin of the Anglo French Entente is not, of course, 
accurate; M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, M. Delcasse, and Lord 
Lansdowne must share with him the credit; though, in truth, the part played by 
individuals was secondary.  The compelling factor in the evolution of 'Triple Entente' 
was the pre-existing 'Triple Alliance.  Yet the influence of King Edward was by no 
means negligible. 
 
If, however, we deny to him the whole credit for the Anglo-French Entente, we must not 
ascribe to him responsibility for the 'encirclement' of Germany.  If indeed, Germany was 
'encircled', the circle was drawn by her own diplomacy.  In July 1904 Great Britain 
concluded with Germany an Arbitration Treaty, parallel in terms with that concluded with 
France in the previous year, and in the same summer King Edward, accompanied by 
First Lord of the Admiralty, visited the Kaiser at Kiel.  Thereafter, scarcely a year 
passed without an interchange of visits between the English and German Courts, and 
[begin page 45] thrice during his short reign did King Edward visit the aged Austrian 
Emperor, Francis Joseph.  Thus did King Edward labour in the cause of international 
peace. 
 
Nevertheless he discerned - none more clearly - the clouds on the horizon.  Lord 
Redesdale and Lord Morley of Blackburn alike testify to the anxiety manifested by the 
King on receipt of the news that Austria had annexed the Provinces of Bosnia and the 
Herzegovina (1908).
18  His intimate knowledge of continental politics enabled him to 
perceive, more clearly than some of his Ministers, the sinister implications of the events 
of that most fateful year.  Yet he strove, during the brief remainder of his reign, though 
with dwindling hopes of success, to preserve the peace of Europe and the world. 
 
The time has not yet come for a full disclosure of the part King Edward played as a 
peacemaker, nor for a precise analysis of his influence upon the policy of his reign.  But 
there is no question that in the domain of foreign affairs it was at once considerable 
and beneficent. 
 
Queen Victoria and the Iris Church Question 
Not only, however, in foreign affairs is there room for the exercise of diplomatic tact on 
the part of the Sovereign.  On two notable occasions in the latter part of her reign 
Queen Victoria is known to have intervened with success to avert a conflict between 
the two Houses of the Legislature on questions of eminent importance.  The first was in 
regard to the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church in 1869.  The 
Queen's personal sentiments in this matter were opposed to those of her Ministers; but 
never for an instant did she deflect her course from that prescribed to the most rigid of 
'constitutional' Sovereigns.  Loyalty to her Ministers; perfect appreciation of the 
bearings of the political situation; realization of the fact that the House of Commons in 
passing the Bill by large majorities reflected the sentiments of the Constituencies; 
above all, perhaps, anxiety to avert a conflict à outrance between the two Houses; all 
these things combined to [begin page 46] induce the Queen to mediate between the 
Government and their opponents in the House of Lords.  With this object General Grey, 
the Queen's secretary, addressed the following letter to Archbishop Tait and sent a 
copy to the Prime Minister. 
 
                                                  
18   [45/1]  Cf. Lord Redesdale, Memories, i. 178, and The Recollections of John, 
Viscount Morley, ii. 277. Mr. Gladstone is not ignorant (indeed the Queen has never concealed her 
feeling on the subject), how deeply her Majesty deplores the necessity, 
under which he conceived himself to lie, of raising the question as he has 
done; or of the apprehensions of which she cannot divest herself, as to the 
possible consequences of the measure which he has introduced.  The 
apprehensions, her Majesty is bound to say, still exist in full force; but 
considering the circumstances under which the measure has come to the 
House of Lords, the Queen cannot regard without the greatest alarm the 
probable effect of its absolute rejection in that house.  Carried, as it has 
been, an overwhelming and steady majority through a House Commons, 
chosen expressly to speak the feeling of the country on the question, there 
seems no reason to believe that any fresh appeal to the people would lead 
to a different result.  The rejection serves to bring the two Houses into 
collision, and prolong a dangerous agitation on the subject.' 
 
The Peers passed the second reading by a majority of thirty-three, and Mr. Gladstone 
gratefully acknowledged, as well he might, the efficacy of her Majesty's 'wise counsels’.  
His own feelings are vividly depicted in a letter to the Queen.: 
 
‘Mr. Gladstone would in vain strive to express to your Majesty the relief, 
thankfulness, and satisfaction with which he contemplates not only the 
probable passing of what many believe to be a beneficent and necessary 




Queen Victoria and the Parliamentary Reform Bolls of 1884 and 1885 
Not less memorable and not less effective was the Queen's intervention in regard to 
another threatened conflict between Lords and Commons in 1884.  The circumstances 
are relatively recent and need no elaborate [begin page 47] rehearsal.  Of all the Reform 
Bills of the nineteenth century that of 1884 was the largest in its scope.  The Lords 
were determined, and most properly, to refuse their assent to so wide an extension of 
the electoral franchise, unless they were previously reassured as to the lines of the 
coming Bill for the redistribution of Seats.  The case was eminently one for 
compromise; but an impartial arbitrator was needed to bring the parties together.  The 
invaluable intermediary was found through the good offices of the Crown; both sides 
were exhorted to moderation; and in the event Mr. Gladstone had every reason 'to 
tender his grateful thanks to your Majesty for the wise, gracious, and steady influence 
on your Majesty's part, which has so powerfully contributed to bring about this 
accommodation, and to avert a serious crisis of affairs'.  The delicate tact demanded 
from a conciliator in matters of such high moment it requires little imagination to 
conceive.  But it can be fully appreciated only on perusal of the story in detail.
20
 
It is not likely that we shall ever be able to define with precision the sphere within which 
the personal will of the Sovereign operates; but the 'materials' now rapidly 
accumulating do enable us to perceive that a 'Constitutional King' is not synonymous 
with  un roi fainiant; that despite the evolution of the Cabinet system, despite the 
responsibility of Ministers and the irresponsibility of the Sovereign, despite the 
dominance of Party and the rigid non-partisanship of the Crown, there does remain to 
the latter a sphere of political action which, if wisely left undefined, nevertheless has 
been and may be of incomparable value to the nation as a whole.  On this point the 
testimony of Mr. Gladstone is at once eloquent, emphatic, and conclusive, and justifies 
quotation in full: 
                                                  
19   [46/1]  Morley, Life, ii. 278. 
20   [47/1]  For which cf. Morley's Gladstone, vol. iii, pp. 129-39; and Lang, Life of 
Lord Iddesleigh (Popular edition), P. 352.  
'Although the admirable arrangements of the Constitution have now 
completely shielded the Sovereign from personal responsibility they have 
left ample scope for the exercise of [begin page 48] a direct and personal 
influence in the whole work of government.  The amount of that influence 
must vary greatly according to character, to capacity, to experience in 
affairs, to tact in the application of a pressure which never is to be carried to 
extremes, to patience in keeping up the continuity of a multitudinous 
supervision, and, lastly, to close presence at the seat of government; for, in 
many of its necessary operations, time is the most essential of all elements 
and the most scarce.  Subject to the range of these variations, the 
Sovereign, as compared with her Ministers, has, because she is the 
Sovereign, the advantages of long experience, wide survey, elevated 
position, and entire disconnexion from the bias of party.  Further, personal 
and domestic relations with the ruling families abroad give openings, in 
delicate cases for saying more, and saying it at once more gently and more 
efficaciously than could be ventured in the more formal correspondence 
and ruder contacts, of Governments. . . . there is not a doubt that the 
aggregate of direct influence normally exercised by the Sovereign upon the 
counsels and proceedings of her Ministers is considerable in amount, tends 
to permanence and solidity of action, and confers much benefit on the 
country without in the smallest degree relieving the advisers of the Crown 
from their undivided responsibility. . . .  The acts, the wishes, the example of 
the Sovereign in this country are a real power.  An immense reverence and 
a tender affection await upon the person of one permanent and ever faithful 
guardian of the fundamental conditions of the Constitution.  She is the 
symbol of law, she is by law, and setting apart the metaphysics, and the 
abnormal incidents of revolution, the source of power.  Parliaments and 
Ministers pass, but she abides in lifelong duty; and she is to them as the 
oak in the forest is to the annual harvest in field.’
21
 
This testimony is the more remarkable as coming from one who was generally 
accounted to be no courtier.  It lacks, therefore, neither authority nor impartiality. 
 
Formal Powers of the Crown. 
Two further points demand in this connexion brief notice.  Whatever the actual power of 
the Crown in politics there can be no question that its formal executive powers have in 
these last years enormously increased.  [begin page 49] 
 
This has been due to several causes: partly, to the abnormal legislative activity of 
Parliament, partly to multiplication of the functions and responsibilities of the State, and 
partly to the increasing tendency to legislation by delegation.  Acts of Parliament are 
now frequently mere cadres, which are vivified, by the consent and intention of 
Parliament, by the several administrative departments.  This, as an acute American 
critic of English Institutions has pointed out, has very largely increased the formal 
executive powers of the Crown.
22
 
The Crown and the Empire 
Equally indisputable and much more significant is the increased importance of the 
Crown as the centre and symbol of Imperial unity.  If to the term 'political' we give the 
circumscribed connotation common to the publicists of the last generation, we might be 
disposed to agree with President Lowell that 'as a political organ it [the Crown] has 
                                                  
21   [48/1]  Gleanings, i. 41-3. 
22   [49/1]  Lowell, Government of England. receded into the background'.
23  Queen Victoria came to the throne at a time when the 
weary Titan groaned beneath the weight of Imperial responsibilities which were light 
compared to those of today; when men asked querulously how long 'those wretched 
Colonies' were 'to hang like a millstone round our necks’ while as yet the imagination of 
the English people was wholly untouched by the idea of Imperial solidarity.  To them, 
therefore, 'political' activity could signify nothing but pre-occupation with the 
permutations of party government at home. 
 
In the last eighty years, however, ideas have changed in this matter with amazing 
rapidity.  Our conception of the 'political' sphere has broadened.  The political activities 
and influence of a British ruler are now bounded only by the globe.  The Empire 
inherited by King George V is a totally different thing from that which William IV handed 
on to Queen Victoria.  The actual centre of political gravity is shifting; the domestic 
politics of Great Britain, even her European relations, are shrinking into true 
perspective and, as a result, a new [begin page 50] sphere of influence and activity is 
opening out before the occupant of the Throne: 
 
The loyal to their Crown 
Are loyal to their own fair sons who love 
Our ocean Empire with her boundless home, 
For ever broadening England, and her throne 
In one vast orient, and one isle, one isle 
That knows not her own Greatness. 
 
The obverse is equally true.  The loyalty of the oversea Dominions is evoked not by an 
institution but by a person
24; not by a Parliament, imperial only in name, by an 
Emperor-King.  In a word, the Crown has become, in an especial sense, the guardian 
and embodiment of a new idea - the sentiment of Imperial Unity. 
 
To this development the Great War contributed not a little. 
 
The Great War 
The deep reality of the sentiment which on 11 November 1918 brought the surging 
multitudes, as though drawn by a common and irresistible impulse, to the gates of 
Buckingham Palace, cannot be missed by the least reflective commentator on 
contemporary events.  From August 11 to November 1918 the King was in an especial 
sense and to an extraordinary degree the embodiment of the spirit of the nation and of 
the Empire.  If the hosts which went forth, not from Great Britain only but from every 
land where the British flag flies, were in truth embarking on a crusade for humanity, 
they also fought for King and Country.  Nor did King George ever fail, during those 
anxious years to rise to the height of a great opportunity, with the result that, despite 
the fact that in Central and Eastern Europe many thrones were overturned, the British 
Crown emerged from the ordeal established more firmly than ever as the symbol of 
national unity. 
 
And not less as the symbol of Imperial unity.  The war did more than many years of 
peace to intensify and solidify [begin page 51] this sentiment.  General Smuts, speaking 
in London in 1917, specially emphasized it.  Belonging himself to the autonomist or 
nationalist school of colonial statesmen, he, nevertheless, recognized the supreme 
importance of the ‘golden link' of the Crown. 
                                                  
23   [49/2]  Ibid., vol. i, P, 40. 
24   [50/1]  Cf. The Times, Dec. 28, 1910.  'The settled attitude of politicians in all the 
Great Dominions nowadays is to profess complete indifference to the fortunes of 
parties in England, and on the other hand to redouble their professions of devotion 
to the Crown.'  
'How', he pertinently asked, 'are you going to keep this Commonwealth of 
nations together? If there is to be this full development towards a more 
varied and richer life among our nations, how are you going to keep them 
together?  It seems to me that there are two potent factors that you must 
rely upon for the future.  The first is your hereditary Kingship, the other is 
our Conference system.  I have seen some speculations recently in the 
newspapers about the position of the Kingship in this country, speculations 
by people who, I am sure, have not thought of the wider issues that are at 
stake.  You cannot make a republic of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.' 
 
Arguing that the election of a President for the Empire would present an insoluble 
problem, General Smuts continued: 'The theory of the Constitution is that the King is 
not your King, but the King of all of us, ruling over every part of the whole 
Commonwealth of nations; and if his place should be taken by anybody else, that 
somebody will have to be elected under a process which it will pass the wit of man to 
devise.'
25  This is the language not of sentiment but of common sense.  The abolition of 
the Monarchy would mean the dissolution of the Empire.  It is arguable that in each 
component State of the Commonwealth an elected President might perform efficiently 
many of the functions now assigned to the Crown, but a President of the whole 
Commonwealth, still more of the vast and varied Empire, of which the Commonwealth 
forms only a part, is unimaginable.  In this connexion no small significance attaches to 
the repeated tours made by the Heir Apparent to the great Dominions, to India and to 
other portions of the Empire.  The Prince of Wales has proved himself to be a 
particularly efficient 'ambassador of Empire', acquiring knowledge, at first hand, of the 
problems which await [begin page 52] solution in the several parts of the King's 
dominions making personal acquaintance with many thousands of his father's subjects. 
 
If, then, there has been during the last half-century some contraction in the influence of 
the Crown upon domestic politics, the contraction in one direction has been more than 
compensated by expansion in another, a wider and an even more important sphere. 
 
                                                  
25   [51/1]  War Time Speeches, p. 34. XXV. - The Problem of the Executive (3) 
The Parliamentary Executive: Cabinet Government; 
The Evolution of the Prime Minister 
 
'The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the 
close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative 
powers.  No doubt by the traditional theory, as it exists in all the books, the 
goodness of our constitution consists in the entire separation of the 
legislative and executive authorities; but in truth its merit consists in their 
singular approximation.  The connecting link is the Cabinet.  By that new 
word we mean a committee of the legislative body selected to be the 
executive body.' - Bagehot (1863). 
 
'While every act of state is done in the name of the Crown, the real 
executive Government of England is the Cabinet. . . . No one really 
supposes that there is not a sphere, though a vaguely defined sphere, in 
which the personal will of the Queen has under the Constitution very 
considerable influence.' - A.V. Dicey (1885). 
 
'No Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three months 
unless he is or becomes a Senator or a member of the House of 
Representatives.' – Australian Commonwealth Act, Sect. 64. 
 
'No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of 
either house during his continuance in office.' - Constitution of the United 
States 1, Sect. 6. 
 
Alternative Forms of Executive Government 
For the ancient world the choice of an Executive lay between a Monarch, more or less 
autocratic, an Oligarchy, of aristocratic or commercial, and a Democracy, in which the 
citizens filled in turns the executive offices.  In the modern State choice must virtually 
be made between an Executive of the parliamentary type, first evolved in England, and 
one of the Presidential type as exemplified in the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
 
A Parliamentary Executive is compatible either with a Monarchy, provided the latter be 
'Constitutional' or with a unitary Republic such as that established in France since 
1875.  Whether the Cabinet system is consistent with a Federal Republic, or indeed 
with Federalism at all, is a question which will demand consideration later on.  Similarly, 
the Presidential type may coexist either with [begin page 54] Royal autocracy, as in the 
German Empire of 1871, with a democratic republic. 
 
The present chapter is concerned with the characteristics and implications of a 
Parliamentary Executive, and particularly with that type of it which coexists with 
'Constitutional' Monarchy.  Of that curious but characteristic compromise the Cabinet 
system is the natural if not necessary complement. 
 
We have already followed the process by which the King who was for many centuries 
the pivot of the constitutional machine and the real ruler of the realm, has been brought 
into political dependence upon Parliament, and more particularly upon the House of 
Commons; or, to use more technical language, the process by which the Executive has been subordinated to the Legislature.  But of all devices employed to effect this virtual 
transference of supreme political authority the most important remain be analysed.  It is 
found in the evolution of a Cabinet Council under the presidency of a Prime Minister. 
 
Cabinet Government 
The Cabinet and the Prime Minister are of all English political institutions the most 
characteristic.  Taken together they are the pivot round which the whole political 
machine practically revolves; yet neither is in terms known to the law. 
 
It was shown in the last chapter that the legal powers of the Crown were not seriously 
curtailed by the Revolution Settlement of 1688-1701.  We might have gone farther and 
shown that those powers have on the contrary been enormously extended by the rapid 
increase in the functions of government and by the delegation of subordinate law-
making powers to various administrative bodies (such as the Home Office, the Ministry 
of Health, and the Board of Trade) which act in the name of the Crown.  But while the 
powers of the Crown have been increased, the power of Crown has been rigorously 
curtailed.  And the apparent paradox is to be explained by the development of an 
administrative system, the chief officials of which, while nominally the servants of the 
King, are in reality politically [begin page 55] responsible to Parliament.  Of these 
officials the most important have come to form what is popularly known as the Cabinet 
Council or the Cabinet. 
 
What is the Cabinet?  It is sometimes described as a Committee of the Legislature (e.g. 
by Bagehot), sometimes as a Committee of the Privy Council (e.g. by Hearn).  Neither 
description is strictly accurate; but it is sufficiently true to say that all Cabinet Ministers 
must be members of one or other House of the Legislature, and must be members of 
His Majesty's Privy Council.
1  It is further true that to the ancient Privy Council we must 
look for the origin of the modern Cabinet. 
 
The King’s Council 
The King's Council has, under various names,
2 a continuous history from Norman days 
to our own.  In the early fifteenth century it was, as we have seen, subjected, with 
disastrous results, to Parliament.  In the sixteenth century it became the all-powerful 
instrument of Tudor government.  Under the Stuarts this Privy Council became utterly 
unwieldy in size, and consequently useless for administrative purposes.  The King, 
therefore, began to select a few members of the Council with whom to consult on 
affairs of State. 
 
Impeachment 
Meanwhile, as we have seen, a strenuous attempt had been made by the leaders of 
the progressive party under the early Stuarts to enforce the legal and political 
responsibility of the King's Ministers to Parliament.  Notably was this seen in the case 
of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, when Sir John Eliot was the most conspicuous 
of his accusers; still more notably in the case of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 
pursued to his death by John Pym.  Eliot had been the friend of Buckingham, Pym the 
friend of Wentworth, but both had fastened upon the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility as the keystone of the arch of Constitutional government, and both were 
resolved to assert that doctrine at all costs.  The revival of the  practice of political 
impeachments went far to establish it, [begin page 56] and it was clinched by the 
famous impeachment of Danby (1679).  Danby was notoriously the mere agent of the 
King in the execution of a policy of which he personally disapproved.  Yet he was 
accused of having 'traitorously’ encroached to himself Regal Power by treating of 
                                                  
1   [55/1]  For more detailed and exact discussion of these points cf. post. 
2   [55/2]  Curia Regis, Concilium Ordinarium, Concilium Secretum or Privatum. matters of Peace and War with Foreign Princes and Ambassadors’; of having 
traitorously endeavoured . . . to introduce a, tyrannical and arbitrary way of 
Government'; of being popishly affected'; of having 'wasted the King’s treasure'; and of 
having misappropriated money voted by Parliament for the disbandment of the army.  
Preferred against the King these charges were notoriously true; preferred against 
Danby they were notoriously false.  Danby pleaded in excuse the order of the King 
expressed in writing, and pleaded also, in bar of an impeachment the King's pardon 
granted under the Great Seal.  Both were set aside, and thus Danby's impeachment is 
generally and rightly regarded as having gone far towards establishing the principle 
that 'no minister can shelter himself behind the throne by pleading obedience to the 
orders of his sovereign.  He is . . . answerable for the justice, honesty, the utility of all 
measures emanating from Crown as well as for their legality.'
3
 
Impeachment is, however, at best a clumsy weapon.  Both in the case of Strafford and 
in that of Danby it broke in the hands of those who attempted to work it for more than it 
was worth.  It could properly apply only to offences against the law, and in neither of 
the crucial cases cited could the Commons secure a conviction.  Strafford was 
enmeshed, but not in the toils of an impeachment. 
 
His relentless enemies, in order to catch him, were compelled to have recourse to an 
Act of Attainder.  In Danby's case proceedings were dropped.  Pym clearly realized the 
difficulty, which is stated with admirable explicitness in the Grand Remonstrance.  'It 
may often fall out that the Commons may have just cause to take exception at some 
men for being Councillors, and yet not charge those men  [begin page 57] with crimes 
for there be grounds of diffidence which lie not in proof.  There are others, which 
though they may be proved, yet are not legally criminal.
4  The only effectual means of 
meeting the difficulty was, as the same document points out, for the King to employ 
such counsellors  . . . as the Parliament may have cause to confide in'.  In a word, the 
King's Ministers must become the servants of Parliament.  But the time for working out 
the scheme adumbrated with remarkable prescience by Pym in 1641 had not yet come.  
Nor was it advanced by the personal ascendancy obtained by Cromwell after the Civil 
War.  The revival of parliamentary authority after the Restoration brought it a stage 




At this point it is essential to insist upon a fact which is frequently ignored and still more 
commonly obscured.  Ministerial responsibility is not the same thing as Cabinet 
responsibility.  In one sense the two principles are actually opposed.  Parliament might 
well have succeeded in substantiating the principle of the legal, and perhaps even the 
political, responsibility of individual Ministers without ever evolving the Cabinet system.  
In America, for example, the President's ministers are responsible and liable to 
impeachment for offences committed in the discharge of their duties. Whether they are 
also impeachable ' for bad advice given to the head of the State' is a question which, as 
Lord Bryce points out, has never arisen.  But, according to the same authority, 'upon 
the general theory of the Constitution' it would rather seem that they are not.
5  I n  
England the Ministers of State are, as will be shown, both legally responsible for their 
individual acts, and politically responsible for their collective advice.  But the two 
responsibilities are separable and distinct. 
 
                                                  
3   [56/1]  Hallam, ii. 411. 
4   [57/1]  Grand Remonstrance, §§ 198, 199. 
5   [57/2]  American Commonwealth, i. 86. Towards the theory of ministerial responsibility the seventeenth century made a large 
and important contribu- [begin page 58] tion towards the doctrine of collective Cabinet 
responsibility it made, in outward form and seeming, none. 
 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the evolution of the Cabinet system was, throughout 
the whole of the century between 1640 and 1740, steadily progressing, and when in 
1742 Sir Robert Walpole, having been defeated on the question of the Chippenham 
election, resigned office, it was in outline complete.  That process has been already 
described. 
 
It still, however, remains to examine the essential features of this peculiar and entirely 
original political device, and to analyse the presuppositions upon which its successful 
working depends.  No part of our governmental machinery is at once more subtle and 
more characteristic of the eccentric genius of English Institutions, nor has it ever been 
more accurately or more picturesquely described than by one who himself contributed 
not a little to the success of one of the most delicate experiments ever attempted in a 
political laboratory. 
 
‘The Cabinet', wrote Mr. Gladstone, 'is the threefold hinge that connects 
together for action the British Constitution of King or Queen, Lords and 
Commons. . . . Like a stout buffer-spring, it receives all shocks, and within it 
their opposing elements neutralize one another.  It is perhaps the most 
curious formation in the political world of modern times, not for its dignity, 
but for its subtlety, its elasticity, and its many sided diversity of power. . . . It 
lives and acts simply by understanding, without a single line of written law 
or constitution to determine its relations to the Monarch, or to the 
Parliament or to the nation; or the relations of its members to one another 
or to their head.'
6
 
The Essentials of Cabinet Government 
The Cabinet system as hitherto worked in England has involved the acceptance of five 
principles: close correspondence between the Legislature and the Executive; the 
political homogeneity of the Executive; the collective responsibility of the members of 
the Cabinet; the exclusion of the Sovereign from its meetings, and the common [begin 
page 59] subordination of its members to the leadership of a 'First Minister'. 
 
Dependence on the Legislature 
Of these principles none is more vital than the close correspondence between the 
Cabinet and the parliamentary majority for the time being.  Such correspondence could 
not be established, still less could it be regularly maintained, until the definition of the 
Party system in Parliament.  Upon the recognition of that system Sunderland's 
suggestion of a Ministry composed entirely of Whigs - the Whig junto of 1697 - was 
based.  It was in deference to the same principle, then rapidly gaining ground, that 
Queen Anne was compelled, much against her inclinations, to admit to her Councils 
Whig Ministers.  Not until the Country returned a Tory majority to the House of 
Commons in 1710 did the Queen venture to dismiss the Whigs and replace them in 
office by the Tories.  Walpole remained in office so long as he retained the confidence 
of the House of Commons; but no longer.  When he was defeated in 1747 on the 
question of the Chippenham election he resigned office, and this cardinal principle may 
be said to have been definitely established.  Even George III so far recognized its 
validity as to lend all his energies to securing a subservient House of Commons, in 
order that he might retain a Ministry after his own heart. 
 
                                                  
6   [58/1]  Gleanings from Past Years, i, pp. 224 seq. The principle is now maintained in two ways: first, as we have seen, by requiring that 
the Cabinet shall reflect the political colour of the majority in Parliament; and, secondly, 
by the rule that all members of the Cabinet shall be members of the Legislature.  There 
is, indeed, no statute or legal usage to this effect, and, as we have already noted, the 
Legislature was, in the initial stages of Cabinet Government, exceedingly jealous of the 
intrusion of the Ministers of the Crown, in Parliament.  The tradition of this jealousy so 
far survives that even now the law does not allow more than five Secretaries of State 
and five Under Secretaries of State to sit in the House of Commons.
7  Yet [begin page 
60] the Convention is one which, in Mr. Gladstone's words lies near the seat of life and 
is closely connected with the equipoise and unity of the social forces'.  The rule, 
however is not absolute.  In 1880 Sir William Harcourt, when Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, found himself temporarily without a seat in Parliament.  The same 
fate befell Mr. Goschen when appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1887.  And 
there have been other and more recent instances of the temporary exclusion of 
Cabinet Ministers from Parliament.  More striking because more deliberate was the 
refusal of Mr. Gladstone to seek re-election at Newark when appointed by Sir Robert 
Peel to the Colonial Secretaryship in December 1845.  As a result he was, though a 
leading member of the Cabinet, out of Parliament during the difficult and momentous 
Session of 1846.  But these are exceptions which prove a rule, now firmly established.
8
 
Cabinet Government in the Dominions 
It is noticeable that under the written Constitutions of some of the self-governing 
Colonies this rule, implicit in the Constitution of the Motherland, is explicitly laid down.  
Under the Natal Constitution of 1893, Ministers had to become Members of Parliament 
within four months.  Section 64 of the Australian Commonwealth Act of 1900 provides 
that: ‘After the first general election no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer 
period than three months unless he is or becomes a Senator or a member of the 
House of Representatives.'  The South Africa Act of 1909
9 reproduces the provision 
contained in the Commonwealth Act.  In striking contrast to the law and practice of the 
young Communities which inherit British traditions is the provision (Section 6) of the 
Constitution of [begin page 61] United States: 'No person holding any office under the 
United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.'   
Here as elsewhere the United States has preferred the theory of Montesquieu to the 
practice of England. 
 
Political homogeneity 
Closely connected with the principle that the Executive shall reflect the Parliamentary 
majority is a second principle: that of political homogeneity.  It is obvious, indeed, that if 
the members of the Cabinet are to reflect the  political colour of the parliamentary 
majority, they must  themselves be drawn from a party itself homogeneous. 
 
                                                  
7   [59/1]  The number was only raised to five by the Air Force Constitution Act, 
1917 (7 and 8 George V, c. 51).  The limit on the number of Parliamentary Under-
Secretaries of State was temporarily suspended during the war and for six months 
afterwards by the New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916 (6 and 7 George V, c. 
68).  By an Act of 1926 (16 and 17 George V, c. 18) the number of Principal and 
Under-Secretaries of State capable of sitting and voting in the House of Commons 
has been raised to six in consequence of the elevation of the Secretary for 
Scotland to the status of a Secretary of State. 
8   [60/1]  I do not refer to, though I do not ignore, many exceptions which occurred 
between December 1916 and October 1919, when the Cabinet system was 
virtually in abeyance. 
9   [60/2]  9 Edw. 7, C. 9, III. 14. Parties were, however, less clearly defined, party discipline was less strict, party 
allegiance less absolute in the eighteenth than in the nineteenth century.  The 
homogeneity of the Cabinet only followed, therefore, the comparatively slow process of 
the evolution and consolidation of parties.  The earlier Ministries of Queen Anne were 
essentially composite, though the Whigs gained exclusive control of the Executive in 
1708 the Tories in 1710. 
 
Under the first two Georges the Whigs were firmly in the saddle, but George III was 
determined, for his own purposes, to break the solidarity of the Party system, and was 
in a large measure successful, though the indignation evoked by the 'Coalition ' of Fox 
and North in 1783 is significant of the increasing definition of Parties. 
 
The younger Pitt, though he started political life as Whig, moved steadily towards 
Toryism, and in 1794 the Duke of Portland and some of the 'Old Whigs' joined his 
Ministry.  On his death (January 1806) Grenville and Fox united to form the Ministry of 
'All the Talents', but after Fox's death in the autumn of the same year successive 
Ministries were all predominantly Tory in composition.  An attempt was indeed made by 
Spencer Perceval in 1812 to strengthen his Ministry by the inclusion of Lord Grenville 
and Lord Grey, but it failed, and until the formation of Lord Grey's 'Reform' Ministry in 
1830 the Tory supremacy was unbroken. 
 
Collective Responsibility. 
The political homogeneity of Ministries was, however, [begin page 62] a principle of slow 
growth.  It is, indeed, often difficult to determine the political adhesion of the names 
which figure in successive Ministries during the eighteenth century.  After 1784, and 
even more markedly after 1830, the lines of party, allegiance were more strictly defined.  
So long as Ministries were heterogeneous in composition, a third principle, now 
regarded as essential to the Cabinet system must necessarily have remained 
embryonic: that of collective responsibility.  For many years the responsibility of 
members of the Cabinet was individual and departmental.  The idea that Cabinet 
Ministers must all vote together and support the measures of the Government was not 
accepted until long after the time of Walpole.  During the first ten years of George III's 
reign there were, as Sir William, Harcourt pointed out, repeated examples members of 
the Government opposing the measures of the administration both by speech and vote 
- notably Camden and Thurlow.
10  So late as 1806 Lord Temple maintained similar 
views: 'The Cabinet was not responsible as a Cabinet, but the Ministers were 
responsible as the officers of the Crown.'
11  Walpole had strongly favoured the opposite 
view, and did his best to enforce it upon his colleagues.  He dismissed various 
colleagues who opposed his Excise Bill, but even he found it necessary to repudiate 
the suspicion that they were dismissed on that account: 'Certain persons', he declared, 
'had been removed because his Majesty did not think best to continue them longer in 
his Service.  His Majesty has a right so to do, and I know of no one who has a right to 
ask him, What doest thou?  On another occasion the King sent for the Duke of 
Newcastle and reproached him for opposition to the policy of the Cabinet to which he 
belonged.  'As to business in Parliament,' he said, 'I do not value the opposition, if all 
my servants act together and are united; but if they thwart [begin page 63] one another, 




                                                  
10   [62/1]  A.G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, ii. 610. 
11   [62/2]  Quoted by Anson (op. cit., p. 119), who shows that the responsibility here 
referred to was legal responsibility sanctioned by the process of impeachment: not 
moral responsibility sanctioned by public opinion. 
12   [63/1]  Blauvelt, Cabinet Government in England, PP. 237, 238. But thwart each other they not infrequently did.  The doctrine of departmental 
responsibility died hard; that of Cabinet responsibility evolved slowly.  At what precise 
point in our history it can be said to have been definitely established, it is difficult to say. 
Professor Hearn - an authority entitled to high respect - is inclined to regard the second 
Rockingham Ministry - that of 1782 - as 'the first of modern ministries', from the point of 
view of collective responsibility and corporate unity.  For the first time the new ministry 
came in as a body 'on the distinct understanding that measures were to be changed as 
well as men, and that the measures for which the new Ministry required the royal 
consent were the measures which they, while in opposition, had advocated.’  So lately 
as 1763 the elder Pitt had been baulked in a similar attempt.  When negotiations were 
opened with him for the formation of a Ministry he demanded the removal of all the 
Ministers who had supported the Peace of 1763, and insisted that he and his friends 
must 'come in as a party'.  No demand could have been more distasteful to George III; 
and Pitt's terms, which at the time were regarded as wholly extravagant, were 
unequivocally declined.  Rockingham effected unprecedented changes in the 
personnel of the administration when he formed his first Ministry in 1765.  'I do not 
remember in my times', writes Lord Chesterfield, 'to have seen so much at once as an 
entire new Board of Treasury and two New Secretaries of State cum multis aliis.'
13  It is 
clear, therefore, that the principle of Cabinet solidarity was gaining ground rapidly in the 
eighteenth century.  Whether Professor Hearn is strictly accurate in assigning to a 
specific date the final and complete establishment of the principle is more open to 
doubt.  This at least must be said, that if we accept 1782 as a definite date we must 
continue to admit exceptions as proving a rule.  Perhaps the most [begin page 64] 
flagrant instance is that of Lord Loughborough who, as Lord Chancellor, advised the 
King to resist Pitt's views on the Catholic Question in 1801, and so virtually upset the 
Ministry of which he was a prominent member.  But despite such exceptions, the theory 
of the Constitution is accurately interpreted in a 'classical passage by Lord Morley of 
Blackburn. 
 
'As a general rule,' he wrote, 'every important piece of departmental policy 
is taken to commit the entire Cabinet, and its members stand or fall 
together.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer may be driven from office by a 
bad dispatch from the Foreign Office, and an excellent Home Secretary 
may suffer for the blunders of a stupid minister of war.  The Cabinet is a unit 
- a unit as regards the Sovereign, and a unit as regards the Legislature.  Its 
views are laid before the Sovereign and before Parliament, as if they were 
the views of one man.  It gives its advice as a single whole, both in the 
royal closet, and in the hereditary or representative chamber. . . .  The first 




The Crown and the Cabinet 
With this famous and authoritative passage from the pen of Lord Morley we may 
compare the even more authoritative utterance of his former chief.  'As the Queen’, 
said Mr. Gladstone, 'deals with the Cabinet, just so the Cabinet deals with the Queen.  
The Sovereign is to know no more of any differing views of different ministers than they 
are to know of any collateral representation of the monarchical office; they are a unity 
before the Sovereign and the Sovereign is a unity before them.'  And again: While each 
Minister is an adviser of the Crown, Cabinet is a unity, and none of its members can 




                                                  
13   [63/2]  Hearn, Government of England, PP. 212, 213. 
14   [64/1]  Life, of Walpole, pp. 155. 156. 
15   [64/2]  Gleanings, i. 74, 242. Queen Victoria and Her Ministers. 
That this rule is a sound one will be questioned by no, who has grasped the essential 
principles upon which the delicate mechanism of Cabinet government is held 
equipoise.  Yet it is not without exceptions.  No Sovereign [begin page 65] was ever 
more scrupulous in regard to Constitutional procedure than Queen Victoria, but in 1859 
the Queen took the unusual step of writing to Lord Granville, then President of the 
Council, to ask whether her letter to Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, in 
regard to his proposal to lend 'the moral support of England to the Emperor Napoleon 
at Verona' had been read to the Cabinet?  Lord of Granville's answer to this query was 
a model of tact.  Protesting that Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell might well 
resent his interference in a matter which concerned primarily the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Secretary, he yet gave the Queen all the information she wanted.  He made 
it clear that Lord John 'from a loose way of doing business' frequently overrode the 
decisions of the Cabinet, and that the Cabinet itself was, on the Italian question, 
divided; but having done all that the Queen desired he concluded his letter with a broad 
hint: 'It is very desirable as regards Lords Palmerston and John Russell that the Queen 
should show as much kindness as possible to the latter, and appear to communicate 
frankly with the former.'  Rarely have the graces of the diplomatist and the courtier 
been more happily combined than in the man whom the Queen would, if she could, 
have made Prime Minister in 1859. 
 
Another incident, similar to the one recorded above, occurred in 1864.  The Queen, 
who had by now lost her invaluable adviser, the Prince Consort, was very anxious to 
prevent the intervention of England, on behalf of Denmark, in the intricate question of 
the Danish Duchies.  The Queen definitely appealed to the Cabinet, through Lord 
Granville, 'to be firm and support her'.  She acknowledged Russell's fairness: 'but Lord 
Palmerston alarms and overrules him.'  Lord Granville, in his communications with the 
Queen, was scrupulously careful to avoid even the appearance of trenching upon the 
rights of the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary; but the Queen got her way and 
the paragraph to which she objected was expunged from the Queen's speech. 
[begin page 66]  
 
Once again, in 1885, the Queen found herself at issue with the Prime Minister.  This 
time the offender was Mr. Gladstone; and the Queen appealed to Lord Granville who 
was Foreign Secretary and leader of the House of Lords.  Lord Granville replied to the 
Queen's remonstrance, tactfully as ever: ' Your Majesty will readily understand what an 
extremely delicate, matter it is for Lord Granville to enter into any question as to the 
relations between your Majesty and Mr. Gladstone.  Your Majesty may rely on perfect 
frankness from Lord Granville in any matter which concerns himself.’
16
 
Sir William Harcourt on Cabinet Solidarity 
Sir William Harcourt in a considered memorandum on the Cabinet system explicitly 
confirmed Queen Victoria’s theory and practice in this matter.  In criticism of Lord 
Morley’s classical chapter, Harcourt insisted on the right of the Sovereign to demand 
the opinion of the Cabinet as a Court of Appeal against the Prime Minister or any other 
Minister in his general or departmental action.  As a general rule the foreign dispatches 
are settled between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and are submitted to 
the Queen, but if she dissents she has the practical right to demand the opinion of the 
                                                  
16   [66/1]  Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, i. 349, 456-9.  Sir William Harcourt 
has confirmed these facts in general terms: 'We had several instances in the 1880 
Government where the Queen especially required that the Cabinet should be 
consulted as distinguished from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary 
upon views stated by herself.’ Op. cit, ii. 611. Cabinet on the dispatch.  'This', he adds, 'is really a very practical power in the hands 
of the Crown, especially where there is a strong Cabinet.
17
 
The Rosebery Cabinet 
It is evident, however, that in this matter of Cabinet solidarity, as in many others 
connected with the practical working of Cabinet Government, much depends upon 
personalities.  The rule of solidarity is apt to be most rigidly observed under a Prime 
Minister of dominating personality like Peel or Gladstone.  Sir William Harcourt was, 
indeed, the colleague of Gladstone, but he was also [begin page 67] leader of the 
House of Commons during the Premiership of Lord Rosebery.  The words quoted 
above were, however, written in 1889, before the differences between Harcourt and his 
leader had arisen.  Those differences have now been revealed to the world in the 
authoritative biography of Sir William Harcourt.  They were accentuated not only by the 
personal antipathy of the two men, but by the fact that while the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary were both in the House of Lords, the Foreign Office was represented 
in the House of Commons by an Under-Secretary (Sir Edward Grey) who was more in 
sympathy with his chiefs in the House of Lords than with his leader in the House of 
Commons.  It was not, therefore, unnatural that Harcourt should have insisted that he 
was entitled to see all answers on important questions of Foreign Policy before they 
were given in the House of Commons, and that he should make, on behalf of the 
Cabinet, all important statements in debate on foreign affairs.  It is plain that in this 
manner alone Cabinet solidarity could, under the circumstances, be maintained.
18
 
That the circumstances were peculiar is unquestionable; but it is also open to question 
whether they were quite so exceptional as to leave the convention of solidarity 
unaffected.  This much may with safety be said: that there have been few 
administrations in the course of which critics were unable to point to a breach of the 
rule.  None the less the Convention is a salutary one, and is well worth preserving, 
even if breaches of it should continue to be not infrequent. 
 
Exclusion of the Sovereign 
A fourth principle of Cabinet Government is the irresponsibility of the Sovereign and his 
exclusion from the deliberations of the Cabinet. 
 
Long before the King's irresponsibility was politically established it had become a 
maxim of the Constitution that 'the King can do no wrong'.  The execution of Charles I 
and the ‘abdication’
19 of James II proved other- [begin page 68] wise; and so long as 
executive authority was vested in the Crown, irresponsibility could be nothing but a 
Constitutional figment.  So long as the Sovereign presided over meetings of the 
Cabinet some share of responsibility for decisions taken thereat must necessarily have 
attached to his person.  The last English Sovereign who regularly followed this practice 
was, as we have seen, Queen Anne. 
 
George I is said to have attended two Cabinet meetings: once when evidence was laid 
before the Cabinet implicating Sir William Wyndham in a Jacobite plot, and secondly, 
after the landing of the Pretender in Scotland in 1715, in reference to which Townshend 
writes to Stanthorpe: 'the Lords of the Council, his Majesty being present, did . . .’
20  Sir 
William Anson
21  points out that of three instances of occasions on which the King was 
                                                  
17   [66/2]  Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, vol. ii, Appendix 1 in 1889. 
18   [67/1]  Op. Cit. ii. 337.  
19   [67/2]  See Resolution of the House of Commons, 28 January 1689. 
20    [68/1]  Blauvelt, Cabinet Government in England, c. vi, appendix a; Coxe, 
Walpole, i. 71. 
21   [68/2]  Law and Custom of the Constitution (vol. ii, The Crown). Part I, p. 40. present since 1714, recorded by Alphaeus Todd,
22 two were formal meetings to lay 
before the King the draft of his speech to be made at the opening of Parliament; the 
third (shortly after the accession of George III) rests on very doubtful authority.  Todd 
himself states that from the accession of George I, whose knowledge of the English 
language was limited, it became customary for Ministers to hold Cabinet meetings by 
themselves, and that, by the end of George II’s reign, it had become 'unusual' for the 
Sovereign to be present at consultations of the Cabinet, and that from the time of 
George  III the absence of the Sovereign ‘may be considered as having been 
permanently engrafted on our Constitution'.  Todd's statement errs on the side of 
caution.  It may be taken as an established convention of the Constitution that the King 
shall take no part in the deliberations of the Cabinet: though he does attend the Privy 
Council for the transaction of formal business.  Such instances as can be quoted to the 
contrary are, so far as they relate to the period since 1714, few and quite unimportant.  
Thereafter the King ceased, but without loss of [begin page 69] the personal dignity, to 
rule; he continued, with great advantage to his people, to reign. 
 
Subordination to a Common Head 
As the King gradually surrendered the actual task of government, there appeared on 
the political arena a new functionary of State to whom was eventually assigned, though 
not until after the lapse of nearly two centuries, the official designation of Prime 
Minister. 
 
Until the emergence of a First Minister the Cabinet structure could not be completed, 
for the Premier is, in Lord Morley's words, 'the keystone of the Cabinet arch.'  The 
phrase is as precise as it is picturesque.  The keystone holds the arch together; yet the 
arch maintains the key stone in position.  The subordination of the members of the 
Cabinet to a common head may therefore be regarded as the fifth and last of the 
essential principles implied in the Cabinet system. 
 
Evolution of the Prime Minister. 
Nevertheless the position of this high functionary was for a long period, and still 
continues, in some measure, to be extraordinarily anomalous.  From the days of Sir 
Robert Walpole onwards the Prime Minister has been the political ruler of England, but 
not until 1878 was an English Minister ever officially designated as Prime Minister;
23 
and it is still doubtful whether there is technically an 'office' of Prime Minister.  The point 
is amusingly illustrated by an incident in the life of Lord Palmerston.  The latter when 
visiting the Clyde in 1863 was received with great enthusiasm.  'The captain of the 
guardship, anxious to do honour to the occasion, was hindered by the fact that a Prime 
Minister was not recognized in the code of naval salutes; but he found an escape from 
his dilemma in the discovery that Lord Palmerston was not only first Lord of the 
Treasury, but also Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, for which great officer a salute 
[begin page 70] of nineteen guns was prescribed - an apt instance’, as Mr. Ashley adds, 
'of the minor anomalies of the Constitution under which we live.’
24
 
An incident which took place in the House of Commons so lately as 3 May 1906 is in 
this connexion not without significance. Mr. Paul, member for Northampton, had given 
                                                  
22   [68/3]  Government of England, ii. 115. 
23    [69/1]  In the opening clause of the Treaty of Berlin, Lord Beaconsfield was 
described as 'First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury, Prime Minister of England'.  
But this was, no doubt, a concession, as Sir Sidney Low (op cit., p. 154) suggests, 
'to the ignorance of foreigners, who might not have understood the real position of 
the British plenipotentiary, if he had been merely given his official title.’ 
24   [70/1]  Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston, ii. 233. notice of a question to be addressed to the First Lord of the Treasury.  On his rising to 
put the question the following instructive dialogue took place: 
 
Mr. Paul.  'Before putting this question, Mr. Speaker, may I ask for your ruling?   
Whenever I put down a question addressed to the Prime Minister that name is struck 
out at the table and the words "First Lord of the Treasury substituted.  I understood that 
the King had been pleased to confer the style and title of Prime Minister, with 
appropriate precedence, on the head of his Government, and that that was now the 
proper official designation of the right hon. gentleman.  I have observed that you 
yourself, sir, have made use of it.  Perhaps you will be good enough to say for the 
information of the House and the table whether I rightly apprehend the significance of 
his Majesty's most gracious act? 
 
The Speaker.  'If I am asked to decide on the spur of the moment I should say that 
Prime Minister was the proper designation.' 
 
Mr. Paul.  'I beg most respectfully to thank you for your reply and to ask the Prime 
Minister the question of which I have given notice.' 
 
Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.  'I hope my hon. friend will find that the rose by either 
name will give the same answer.’ 
 
Two years before (1904), Mr. Balfour was asked in the House of Commons 'whether he 
was aware of any such official recognized by law as the Prime Minister?’  He had 
already answered the question by anticipation in a speech at Haddington:
25 The Prime 
Minister has no salary as Prime Minister.  He has no statutory duties as Prime Minister, 
his name occurs in no Acts of Parliament, and though holding the most important place 
in the Constitu- [begin page 71] tional hierarchy, he has no place which is recognized by 
the laws of his country.  That is a strange paradox.'  Some part of the paradox has been 
removed by the assignment to the Prime Minister of a precedence between the 
Archbishop of York and the premier Duke, and the title now frequently appears in 
official documents.
26  This settled the social position of the Prime Minister; is it certain 
that even now he holds an 'office' under the Crown?  This at any rate may be said 
without fear of contradiction.  It is still so far true that there is no 'office' of Prime 
Minister, that no one could, by usage, be Prime Minister, or sit as such in his own 
Cabinet, unless he held simultaneously some recognized office.  This office is 
commonly that of First Lord of the Treasury.  To this Mr. Gladstone, following the 
precedent of Pitt and Canning, added on two occasions that of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  Lord Salisbury, when Prime Minister, was for several years also Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, and later was Lord Privy Seal.
27  Lord Rosebery took the 
office of Lord President of the Council.  The precise office assumed by the Prime 
Minister, in addition to his own, matters not; but without such an office he would receive 
no salary.  'Nowhere in the wide world', says Mr. Gladstone, 'does so great a substance 
cast so small a shadow; nowhere is there a man who has so much power, with so little 
to show for it in the way of formal title or prerogative.
28
 
                                                  
25   [70/2]  Quoted by Sidney Low, Governance of England, p. 153. 
26   [71/1]  Thus in the London Gazette: at the Council Chamber, Whitehall, the 10th 
day of May, 1910.  By the Lords of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council. 
Present: Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop of York, Prime Minister, Lord 
Privy Seal, Mr. Secretary Churchill. It is this day ordered, &c. 
27   [71/2]  Mr. Ramsay Macdonald when Prime Minister (1924) also held the Seals of 
the Foreign Office. 
28   [71/3]  Gleanings, i. 244. Embryonic Prime Minister. 
Where are we to look for the protoplasm of this vigorous germ?  At most periods of 
English history there has been a person who had many of the attributes of a Prime 
Minister of the Crown.  Ralph Flambard under William II; William Longchamp under 
Richard  I; Hubert Walter under King John; William of Wykeham who resigned in 
consequence of an adverse vote in Parliament in 1371; [begin page 72] Wolsey and 
Thomas Cromwell under Henry VIII; William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, under his imperious 
daughter; Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, in the years immediately succeeding the 
Restoration - all these had some of the attributes of a modem Prime Minister, but they 
lacked, still more noticeably, the essential characteristics.  They had no necessary or 
continuous connexion with Parliament, and they had none with a Cabinet or Council or 
Ministers.  They were servants of the King; holding office solely at his pleasure, and 
responsible to him.  Clarendon it is true, was impeached by the Commons; but his fall 
was due primarily to the fact that he had lost the favour of the Crown; and we must 
recall the warning already given against the confusion between the legal responsibility 
of an individual Minister, and the moral responsibility of a collective Cabinet.   
Nevertheless, Clarendon's career marks the beginning of the period of transition.   
Danby was even more like a modern Prime Minister; but he was not the head of the 
Cabinet.  In Somers we find a closer resemblance, but William III was still in every 
sense of the word master in his own Cabinet.  So long as that lasted there could be no 
Premier in the modern sense.  Queen Anne strove gallantly to maintain the position of 
the Crown; but Godolphin's ascendancy brings us a step nearer the modern system: 
still, no man as yet had been Prime Minister of England. 
 
Sir Robert Walppole 
Sir Robert Walpole clearly was Prime Minister, and with him the earlier stages in the 
evolution of the official may be said to be complete.  Walpole is the master of the 
Cabinet; his colleagues are his subordinates and nominees.  He is also leader of the 
House of Commons, and when the house withdraws its confidence he ceases to be 
Prime Minister.  At last we are obviously in a modern atmosphere.  But there is much 
characteristic jealousy of the new departure.  Clarendon undoubtedly interpreted aright 
the prevalent sentiment when in 1661 he refused the suggestion of the Duke of 
Ormond that he should, resign the Chancellorship and be content to advise the King on 
questions of general [begin page 73] policy.  'He could not consent', he replied, 'to enjoy 
a pension out of the Exchequer under no other title or pretence but being First Minister, 
a title so newly translated out of French into English that it was not enough understood 
to be liked, and every one would detest it for the burden it was attended with.'  Roger 
North says that Jefferies was at one time 'commonly reputed a favourite and next door 
to premier minister'.
29  Swift frequently describes Harley as Prime Minister, and in the 
preface to the Last Four Years of Queen Anne refers to 'those who are now commonly 
called Prime Ministers among us'.  But the new title, perhaps by reason of its Gallic 
origin, made slow way towards general acceptance in England.  It was one of the most 
serious accusations against Walpole that he made himself 'sole minister' and 'Prime 
Vizier'.  A Protest of dissentient Peers, outvoted on the motion to remove Walpole, 
declared in 1741 that 'a sole or even a first minister is an officer unknown to the law of 
Britain, inconsistent with the constitution of this country, and destructive of liberty in any 
Government whatever'.  Sandys declared in the House of Commons: 'We can have no 
sole and Prime Minister.  We ought always to have several Prime Ministers and officers 
of State.'  But more remarkable than the accusation is the defence.  So far from 
justifying the usage Walpole repudiated the title and the office.  'I unequivocally deny 
that I am sole and Prime Minister and that to my influence and direction all the affairs of 
Government must be attributed. . . . I do not pretend to be a great master of foreign 
affairs.  In that post it is not my business to meddle, and as one of His Majesty's 
Council I have but one voice.'  From a real Prime Minister such a declaration would be 
                                                  
29   [73/1]  Lives of the Norths, p. 354, ap. Blauvelt. amazing; it affirms not the modern English doctrine, not the idea of Cabinet 
responsibility, but that of American departmentalism. 
 
The Pelhams. 
The truth is, of course, that the office was not as yet clearly defined, nor is it always 
quite easy to decide who, in a given administration, was actually Prime Minister. 
[begin page 74] 
 
After Walpole's resignation in 1742, Lord Wilmington (Sir Spencer Compton) is said to 
have become 'nominal’ Prime Minister, but how far Carteret, who was a Secretary of 
State, or Pulteney, who was in the Cabinet without office, in practice acknowledged his 
primacy is doubtful.  On Wilmington's death (1743) Henry Pelham became indisputably 
Prime Minister and himself assume the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.  The Duke of Newcastle succeeded his brother as 
Premier in 1754, but resigned after the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756), being 
succeeded in the nominal Premiership by the Duke of Devonshire, while the real 
leadership fell to Pitt as Secretary of State and leader of the House of Commons.  But 
the Newcastle influence was still unbroken, and in 1757 Pitt had 'to borrow Newcastle's 
majority to carry on the Government', conceding to him the First Lordship of the 
Treasury and the titular Premiership. 
 
Lord Chatham 
Was Pitt himself ever Prime Minister?  The matter is not free from ambiguity, though the 
balance of authority inclines to an affirmative answer.  If so, it can only have been 
during the short period from July 1766 to February 1767.  On the dismissal of the 
Rockingham, Ministry (July 1766) Pitt accepted a Peerage as Earl of Chatham and 
became Lord Privy Seal.  The Duke of Grafton became First Lord of the Treasury.  Was 
he also nominally Prime Minister?  Thus far the Premiership, so far as it can be 
recognized at all, had invariably been associated with the office of First Lord of the 
Treasury.  Since 1766 the conjunction has occasionally been severed, and no 
conclusive argument can, therefore, be founded on the fact that Chatham, who was 
already in failing health, preferred another office.  Moreover, it is clear that the Ministry 
was formed by Chatham, and that the offices, including that assigned to Grafton 
himself, were allocated by him.
30  No [begin page 75] subordinate Minister would have 
declined, as Chatham did in February 1767, to acquaint his colleagues with his views 
on an important question of policy.  Nor would Grafton, if Prime Minister, have 
acquiesced in the refusal.
31  By February, however, Grafton was evidently 'acting' 
Prime Minister, and when Chatham retired into private life, Grafton became the real as 
well as the effective head of the Ministry.
32
 
Lord North and George III 
Lord North, who in 1770 succeeded the Duke of Grafton, combined the Chancellorship 
of the Exchequer with the First Lordship of the Treasury, but during North's long tenure 
of the nominal premiership, King George III realized his mother's ambition and was 
'really King'. 
 
                                                  
30   [74/1]  Cf. Autobiography of Augustus Henry, Third Duke of Grafton, (ed. Anson).  
Grafton says (p. 90) Mr. Pitt 'added that His Majesty had given him full powers 
thus to form a Ministry'.  Cf. also Chatham Correspondence, iii, pp. 22-33, 
Grenville Correspondence, iii. 308. 
31   [75/1]  Grafton Autobiography, p. 116. 
32   [75/2]  Op. cit., e.g. p. 118. On North's resignation (1782) Lord Rockingham formed a Ministry, which by reason of 
its political homogeneity is, as we have seen, commonly regarded as marking a distinct 
stage in the evolution of the Cabinet.  Shelburne succeeded to the premiership on 
Rockingham's death, after a few months of office, and like all his predecessors except 
Lord Chatham assumed the office of First Lord of the Treasury.  So did the Duke of 
Portland, who was nominal Prime Minister during the Ministry commonly known as the 
'Coalition of Fox and North', who were the Secretaries of State. 
 
The Younger Pitt 
No ambiguity attaches to the position of the younger Pitt, who definitely claimed both 
the place and title repudiated by Walpole.  In conversation with Melville in 1803 he 
dwelt 'pointedly and decidedly upon the absolute necessity there is in this country that 
there should be an avowed and real minister, possessing the chief weight in the 
Council and the principal place in the confidence of the King.  In that respect (he 
contended) there can be no rivalry or division of power.  That power must rest in the 
person generally called the First Minister.' 
 
Peel 
The office, perhaps, reached its zenith in the person of Sir Robert Peel.  He was, says 
Lord Rosebery, 'the model of all Prime Ministers.  It is more than doubtful, indeed, if it 
be possible in this generation, when the burdens of [begin page 76] Empire and of office 
have so incalculably grown, for any Prime Minister to discharge the duties of his high 
post with the same thoroughness or in the same spirit as Peel . . . Peel kept a strict 
supervision over every department: he seems to have be master of the business of 
each and all of them . . . it is probable that no Prime Minister ever fulfilled so completely 




Mr. Gladstone's testimony is to the same effect: Nothing of great importance is matured 
or would even be projected in any department without his personal cogizance.'  But 
Peel himself was clearly becoming conscious that his own conception of his great office 
was 'becoming impossible of realization, except by sending all Prime Ministers to the 
House of Lords'
34 - a solution to which he personally refused to assent.  Mr. Gladstone 
declared that ‘the Head of the British Government is not a Grand Vizier'.  Lord 
Rosebery hints that Mr. Gladstone, in his first Ministry of 1868, may have occupied a 
position equal to Peel's, but he declares with emphasis - and not without knowledge - 
that the position of a modern Prime Minister is very different.  He is merely 'the 
influential foreman of an executive jury'; he has 'only the influence with the Cabinet 
which is given him by his personal arguments, his personal qualities, and his personal 
weight'.
35  Lord Rosebery writes, of course, with great authority, but it would not be 
wise to lay too much stress upon a constitutional dictum obviously coloured by recent 
personal experience obtained under circumstances which were perhaps exceptional. 
 
Position of the Prime Minister 
Whatever be the position of a Prime Minister in relation of the to his Cabinet 
colleagues, there is no ambiguity in his relation to the general machinery of the State.  
Backed a stable and substantial majority in Parliament, his power, [begin page 77] as Sir 
Sidney Low truly has observed, is greater than that of the German Emperor or the 
                                                  
33   [76/1]  Rosebery, Sir Robert Peel, pp. 27-9. 
34   [76/2]  'I defy the Minister of this country to perform properly the duties of his 
office ... and also sit in the House of Commons eight hours a for 118 days.'  Peel, 
Papers (ed. Parker), iii. 219. 
35   [76/3]  Rosebery, Peel, PP. 32, 33.  The whole passage is one of extraordinary 
interest, but the warning in the text should not be neglected. American President, 'for he can alter the laws, he can impose taxation and repeal it, 
and he can direct all the forces of the State.  The one condition is that he must keep his 
majority, the outward and concrete expression of the fact that the nation is not willing to 
revoke the plenary commission with which it has clothed him.'
36  The Prime Minister 
occupies in fact a four fold position: he is (to put it at the lowest) the chairman of the 
Executive Council; he is the leader of the Legislature; he is indirectly the nominee of 
the political sovereign or electorate, and finally he is, in a special degree, the 
confidential adviser of the Crown and the ordinary channel of communication between 
the Crown and the Cabinet. 
 
'He reports to the Sovereign', says Mr. Gladstone, 'its proceedings, and he 
also has many audiences of the august occupant of the Throne.  He is 
bound, in these reports and audiences, not to counterwork the Cabinet; not 
to divide it; not to undermine the position of any of his colleagues in the 
Royal favour.  If he departs in any degree from strict adherence to these 
rules, and uses his great opportunities to increase his own influence, or 
pursue aims not shared by his colleagues, then unless he is prepared to 
advise their dismissal he not only departs from rule, but commits an act of 
treachery and baseness.  As the Cabinet stands between the Sovereign 
and the Parliament, and is bound to be loyal to both, so he stands between 
his colleagues and the Sovereign and is bound to be loyal to both.'
37
 
Such is the position of an English Prime Minister, and such the structure to which he 
supplies the cement.  From 1714 to 1914 the Cabinet system developed steadily, and, 
save for George III's attempt to revive personal monarchy, without interruption.  The 
Great War proved that there were grave limitations to its utility as a war-machine.  Were 
the defects revealed by war-conditions inherent in the mechanism?  Was the 
mainspring of the Constitution [begin page 78] showing signs of obsolescence even 
before the exceptional strain put upon it by the war? 
 
Is the Cabinet System Obsolescent? 
Since 1911 the English Constitution had admittedly been in a condition of suspense.  
'There is no party in England at this moment which regards our present Constitutional 
arrangements as anything but temporary and provisional.  We are plodding along 
under an ever-accumulating load of unfulfilled promises and unrealized Preambles.   
The Constitutional fabric is confessedly incomplete: to the artist a mere torso; to the 
grammarian a protasis without and apodasis.'
38  These words were written in 
December 1913.  They were inspired by contemporary conditions: by the unfulfilled 
promise contained in the Preamble to the Parliament Act of 1911, and by the large 
expectations held out in connexion with the Home Rule Bill of 1912, which was 
avowedly proposed as an instalment of Federalism for the United Kingdom.  Nothing 
could have been, from that standpoint, less adroitly drafted; no indication was given of 
the lines on which the rest of the building was to be reconstructed.  But the relevant 
point is that the structure of 1913 confessedly lacked a coping-stone; the Constitution, 
to vary the metaphor, had been cast into the cauldron, and had not emerged. 
 
Machinery of Government Committee, 1917. 
If the whole machinery of the State was beginning to creak ominously, the creaking was 
more clearly perceptible in that section which kept the Executive in operation.  A 
                                                  
36   [77/1]  Op. cit., P. 47. 
37   [77/2]  Gleanings, i. 243. 
38    [78/1]  They appeared in an article by the present writer in The Nineteenth 
Century and After for January 1914.  They are quoted here with all due apologies 
merely as evidence of contemporary pre-war opinion. Committee appointed in July 1917, under the chairmanship of Viscount Haldane of 
Cloan, reported that ‘a rearrangement of the supreme direction of the Executive 
organization as it formerly existed has been rendered necessary, not merely by the war 
itself but by the prospect after the war.
39
 
Lord Lansdowne on the Cabinet. 
Experienced administrators had arrived at similar conclusions.  Thus Lord Lansdowne, 
speaking in the House of [begin page 79] Lords, in June 1918, of the old Cabinet 
system, attributed the breakdown of the system to the increase in the number of 
Cabinet Ministers. 
 
'I think', he said, ' the trouble really arose from the rapid increase in the 
number of the members of the Cabinet.  It became an unwieldy body.  .  .  . 
If only a few of them took part, the Cabinet ceased to be representative.  If 
many of them took part, the proceedings tended to become prolix and 
interminable, and it is a matter of common knowledge that reasons of that 
kind led to the practice of transacting a good deal of the more important 
work of the Government through the agency of an informal inner Cabinet.'
40
 
The development of an 'inner Cabinet' was indeed as notorious as it was inevitable.  
The old system was breaking down under the sheer weight of numbers.  Pitt's Cabinet, 
responsible for the conduct of the French War, 1793-1801, contained ten members; his 
second twelve; Grenville's 'All the Talents' Ministry fourteen; Spencer Perceval's only 
ten.  During the nineteenth century Cabinets ranged as a rule from fourteen to 
seventeen members, though Disraeli's second administration (1874-80) consisted of 
only thirteen.  Lord Salisbury included sixteen members in his Cabinet of 1886 and 




Lord Curzon’s Views. 
Increase of numbers would seem to have involved a decrease of collective efficiency.  
Methods of transacting business appropriate to a Cabinet of twelve or fourteen persons 
could not yield satisfactory results when the Cabinet numbered over a score, and 
when, moreover, many of that number represented departments whose administrative 
responsibilities were extending with appalling rapidity.  No board of directors, working in 
the old informal way, could keep abreast of the work.  Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 
speaking, like Lord Lansdowne, with [begin page 80] experience of more than one type 
of Executive Government, cast a lurid light upon the confusion of Cabinet procedure.  ‘I 
do not think', he said, 'anybody will deny that the old Cabinet system had irretrievably 
broken down both as a war machine and as a peace machine.' 
 
The meetings of the Cabinet were most irregular; there was no order of business, no 
agenda, no record of decisions arrived at: 
 
‘The Cabinet often had the very haziest notion as to what its decisions 
were; and I appeal not only to my own experience but to the experience of 
every Cabinet Minister who sits in this House, and to the records contained 
in the Memoirs of half a dozen Prime Ministers in the past, that cases 
frequently arose when the matter was left so much in doubt that a Minister 
went away and acted upon what he thought was a decision which 
                                                  
39   [78/2]  Report of Committee on the machinery of Government (Cd. 9230, p. 5. 
40   [79/1]  House of Lords Official Report, 20 June 1918. 
41    [79/2]  Reduced to twenty by Colonel Seely's resignation and Mr. Asquith's 
assumption of the War Secretaryship. subsequently turned out to be no decision at all, or was repudiated by his 
colleagues. . . . Ministers found the utmost difficulty in securing decisions 
because the Cabinet was always congested with business.' 
 
Critical of the system, or lack of system, in the past Lord Curzon ventured upon a 
prediction as to the future: 
  
'I think', he said, 'you will find the Cabinets in the future will all be subject to 
a great reduction of numbers from the old and ever-swollen total to which 
reference has been made.  I do not think we shall ever have a Cabinet of 
twenty-two or twenty-three Ministers again.  Secondly, I think the presence 
of other Ministers than Cabinet Ministers at the discussion will also become 
an inevitable feature of future Cabinet procedure.  Thirdly, the preparation 
of an agenda in order that we may know in advance what we are going to 
discuss is an inevitable and essential feature of business-like procedure in 
any Assembly in the world.  Fourthly, I doubt whether it will be possible to 
dispense with the assistance of a Secretary in future.  Fifthly, I think that a 
record and minutes of the proceedings will have to be kept; and, lastly, I 
hope for, a very considerable development of the system of devolution and 
decentralization of Government work which I have described.
42
 
Lord Curzon's confident forecast was based upon [begin page 81] eighteen months' 
experience of the striking constitutional experiment initiated by Mr. Lloyd George on his 
accession to the Premiership in December 1916. 
 
The War Cabinet. 
Mr. Lloyd George himself explained the reason for the change with blunt common 
sense. 
  
‘The kind of craft you have for river or canal traffic is not exactly the kind of 
vessel to construct for the high seas.  I have no doubt that the old Cabinets 
were better adapted to navigate the Parliamentary river with its shoals and 
shifting sands, and perhaps for a cruise in home waters - but a Cabinet of 
twenty-three was top-heavy for a gale. . .  It is true that in half a multitude of 
counsellors there is wisdom.  That was written for Oriental countries in 
peace times.  You cannot run a war  with a Sanhedrin.'
43
 
Accordingly a War, Cabinet or Directory was appointed by the new Prime Minister to 
supervise the conduct of the war.  It consisted of five members, the Prime Minister, 
Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Arthur Henderson.  Of these, one 
was a Liberal, three were Conservatives, and one a Socialist.  One only, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (Mr. Bonar Law), was a Departmental Chief, and he also led the 
House of Commons, a triple burden which undoubtedly contributed to his premature 
death in 1922.  The intention was that the rest of the Directory - ultimately increased to 
seven members - should be entirely free to devote themselves, uninterrupted by 
Departmental or Parliamentary duties, to the conduct of the war. 
 
How far the older Cabinet was superseded by its younger rival is a question which still 
rests wrapped in an ambiguity characteristic of the English Constitution.  Questioned 
on the subject in the House of Commons by the present writer, Mr. Law denied that 
there was in being any Cabinet other than the War Cabinet; and further denied that 
                                                  
42   [80/1]  House of Lords. Official Report, 19 June 1919. 4 
43   [81/1]  The Times, 20 December 1916. there were any Cabinet Ministers other than the five who, in July 1919, constituted the 
'War Cabinet.’
44  [begin page 82] 
 
Yet there were as a fact other Ministers - Heads of the principal Departments - who 
conceived themselves members of a Cabinet, if not the Cabinet, who received, in the 
usual form, a summons to meetings of 'His Majesty’s Servants', who attended a weekly 
breakfast at No. 10 Downing Street, and, under the chairmanship of the Home 
Secretary, maintained a semblance of collective responsibility  Yet technically Mr. Bonar 
Law was correct: the only Cabinet existing between 1917 and 1919 was the 'War 
Cabinet'. 
 
The War Cabinet 
The War Cabinet itself met almost daily, sometimes twice or thrice in one day - 300 
times in all during the year 1917 - and received at every meeting reports from the 
Foreign Secretary, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff.
45  The heads of Departments attended only when the affairs of their 
several Departments were under discussion.  The administration of domestic affairs 
thus became virtually departmental.  The clash of arms is apt not only to silence laws, 
but to set aside many constitutional conventions; above all it led to the rapid 
multiplication of ministries and therefore Ministers and the line between Cabinet and 
non-Cabinet Ministers was not, in fact, rigidly defined.  Moreover, the War Cabinet itself 
developed in a direction not originally contemplated.  Designed as a War Directory, it 
developed into a species of Super-Cabinet, to which Departmental Ministers were 
summoned as occasion required, and at which their differences were adjusted.  In 
addition to this, the War Cabinet was responsible for assigning an immense amount of 
business to individual Ministers or to ad hoc Committees, and for setting up Standing 
Committees to deal with matters of more continuous importance. 
 
The War Cabinet system did not long survive the conclusion of Peace.  The Haldane 
Report contemplated that the Cabinet of the future should approximate to that of the 
War Cabinet; that it should consist of ten or twelve members who were not, as a rule, to 
act as Heads of [begin page 83] the Departments, but to exercise functions supervisory 
and co-ordinating rather than directly administrative.  The Peace was hardly signed, 
however, before Parliament began to manifest curiosity, if not impatience, as to the 
prolongation of an experiment ostensibly due only to the special circumstances of the 
war.  Accordingly in October 1919 it was quietly announced that a Cabinet, of the pre-
war type of twenty members, had been appointed.  Nor have subsequent Cabinets 
deviated, in outward appearance, from the traditional pattern. 
 
The Cabinet Secretariat 
Outward appearances are, however, rarely to be trusted where the mechanism of the 
English Constitution is concerned.  In formal shape the pre-war Cabinet has been 
restored; but has the war left no traces upon this the most delicate part of the machine?  
As to the character and the value of the legacy bequeathed to the post-war Cabinet, 
there may be, and are, differences of opinion: but there can be no question that the 
survival of a Cabinet Secretariat does represent a constitutional innovation of 
considerable significance. 
 
That the old machinery had shown signs of obsolescence is proved on the 
unimpeachable testimony, already quoted, of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Curzon of 
Kedleston.  Yet before the war the Cabinet did not as a rule meet more than once a 
week - if so often - during forty weeks in the year.  Post-war statistics tell a very 
different tale.  The old Cabinet system, as we have seen, was revived only in the 
                                                  
44   [81/2]  Official Report, 31 July 1919, p. 2277. 
45   [82/1]  Cf. Reports of the War Cabinet for 1917 and 1918. autumn of 1919.  In 1920 there were 82 Cabinet meetings, and in 1921 there were 93.  
'In addition to that there are the Conferences of Ministers, in effect Cabinet 
Committees, the Home Affairs Committee, which is now (1922) a Standing Committee 
of the Cabinet, to which a large amount of business is relegated, a Finance Committee, 
and various sub-committees of the Cabinet.'  Including all of these Committees there 
were in 1920 no fewer than 332 meetings and 339 in 1921.  The pace has now slowed 
down, but in the year ended 31 March 1925 there were 62 meetings of the full Cabinet 
and 159 meetings of [begin page 84] Cabinet Committees, in addition to 154 meetings 
of Committee of Imperial Defence and its Sub-Committees.  In face of such figures one 
may well ask with a Cabinet Minister of great experience, 'How are you to co-ordinate 
the work of these Committees?  How is the Cabinet itself to keep any control over them 
unless a record be taken of the work of the Committees and unless that record be 
available with the decisions of the Committees for consideration of the Cabinet?
46
 
Those questions explain, and in the opinion of many justify, the continuance of an 
important wartime experiment, the Cabinet Secretariat. 
 
The Committee of Imperial Defence 
In its origin the Cabinet Secretariat was a development of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, an organization which was initiated to co-ordinate the work of the Army and 
the Navy, and to envisage and discuss as a whole problem of defence, not merely for 
the United Kingdom but for the Empire.  For the first ten years of its existence the 
Committee was a somewhat nebulous body, but in 1904, mainly through the efforts of 
Mr. (now the Earl of) Balfour, who was then Prime Minister, it was reorganized with a 
small but permanent secretariat and staff.
47  Of this Committee the Prime Minister is 
chairman, and the ordinary members are the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 
the Colonies and Dominions, India, War, and Air, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
First Lord of Admiralty, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the 
Chief of the Air Staff, and Directors of the Intelligence Departments of the War Office 
and. Admiralty.  The Prime Minister is expressly empowered to call for the attendance 
of any military or naval officer or of other persons with administrative experience 
whether they are in official positions or not.  In particular the advice is sought of the 
representatives of the Dominions.  Records of its proceedings are kept, and available 
for reference by successive Committees.  In the [begin page 85] first months of the 
Great War a War Council was set up (25 November 1914), with Sir Maurice Hankey, 
the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee as its Secretary.  This was replaced 
(June 1915) by the Dardanelles Committee, 'so called because that was the campaign 
which was at the moment occupying the greater part of the attentions of the 
Government',
48 and this Committee expanded into the, War Committee until the latter 
was in turn superseded (December 1916) by the War Cabinet already described. 
 
Distinct from the Cabinet Secretariat which has its offices in Whitehall Gardens, and 
not to be confused with it, is the personal Secretariat of the Prime Minister.  In 1913 this 
amounted only to four persons, and the cost of it was £1,017 a year.  The personal staff 
was necessarily augmented during the war and had to be accommodated in temporary 
offices in the garden of 10 Downing Street, and was consequently nicknamed the 
Kindergarten or the Garden Suburb.  So rapidly did it grow during the war and the first 
                                                  
46   [84/1]  Mr. Austen Chamberlain in House of Commons.  Official Report for 13 
June 1922. 
47   [84/2]  The estimate for the Committee for the year 1904-5 was £2,960. 
48   [85/1]  On the work of the Cabinet Secretariat during the war, cf. two informative 
papers by Mr. Clement Jones, one of the Assistant Secretaries ap. Empire Review 
for December 1923 and January 1924. The staff has increased (1926) to 42, and 
the estimated cost to £17,77I. years of peace that in 1922 the staff numbered twenty and cost the Exchequer £9,318 
a year.  Since that time it has again been reduced to reasonable proportions. 
 
To return to the Cabinet Secretariat.  Including the Committee of Imperial Defence, with 
which it constitutes for staff purposes a single unit, the staff numbered, in 1918, 98, and 
the cost of it was £19,600.  By 1922 the staff had unaccountably swollen to 137, and 
the cost still more unaccountably to £36,800.  These facts evoked strong comment in 
Parliament, and the staff has now (1924) been reduced to 38, costing £15,500 a year.'  
The Secretariat itself must, however, now be regarded as a permanent part of the 
constitutional machinery.  Its precise character and functions are nevertheless 
somewhat obscure.  Its critics represent it as virtually a new Department thrust in [begin 
page 86] between the Cabinet and the administrative Departments, and in particular 
between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office, an appropriate adjunct of a new system of 
'presidential' as opposed to 'Cabinet' government.  Its apologists deride these fears, 
maintaining that its functions are merely secretarial, that it only prepares the agenda for 
Cabinet, keeps the minutes, records decisions, and transmits those decisions to the 
Departments which have to carry them out.  The Prime Minister mainly responsible for 
the development of the Cabinet Secretariat said of it: 
 
'They are a recording Department; they are a communicating Department; 
they are a means of transmitting to Departments the decisions not merely 
of the Cabinet, but of the very considerable number of Cabinet Committees 
that have always been set up in every administration, but which of course, 
have been multiplied considerably since the War.’
49
 
Does this authoritative passage exhaust the functions of the new Secretariat?  If it 
does, the machinery provided for functions so modest would seem to be unnecessarily 
costly and elaborate.  A mere conduit pipe might surely have been provided at less 
expense.  But it is almost inevitable that a mechanism so obviously convenient should 
rapidly develop.  A medium of communication is apt to become part of the machinery of 
control.  Has the Cabinet Secretariat escaped that tendency?  Lord Robert Cecil, not 
without some experience of Cabinet office expressed the fear lest the Cabinet 
Secretariat might lead to a diminution of departmental responsibility, more particularly 
in the case of the Foreign Office.  In this the control of the House of Commons was 
necessarily relaxed and the power of the Prime Minister inevitably exalted.  As it was 
put in the debate to which reference has already been made: 
 
'The position of the Prime Minister . . . in foreign affairs least, closely 
resembles the position of the President of the United States, much more 
closely than it resembles the position of the Prime Minister under the British 
Constitution before [begin page 87] the War.  The chief engine in this 
revolution has undoubtedly been the Cabinet Secretariat.'
50
 
For this development there were, however, other reasons, personal and temporary.   
The resignation of Mr. Asquith opened the way for a Prime Minister endowed with 
omnivorous energy and faced by a unique emergency.  It is small wonder that, cut off 
by the necessities of the hour from continuous contact with the House of Commons, 
and Chief of a War Directory, the Prime Minister should have allowed his office to 
approximate to that of an American President.  But that tendency was arrested, partially 
by the restoration of a normal Cabinet in the autumn of 1919, and completely by the 
dissolution of the Coalition and the return to Party Government in 1922. 
 
Nevertheless, the experiment has left its mark on the administrative system in the 
institution of the permanent Cabinet Secretariat, and in those modifications of Cabinet 
                                                  
49   [86/1]  Official Report, 13 June 1922. 
50   [87/1]  The Hon. Walter Guinness ap. Official Report, 13 June 1922, p. 252. procedure to which reference has already been made.  The proverbial flexibility of the 
English Constitutions forbids more scientific analysis or more precise measurement of 
the changes wrought by recent events in the fabric of the English Polity. 
 XXVI. The Problem of the Executive (4) 
Presidential Government 
 
We ought not to consider a Minister of the English type, conducting 
legislation and administration at once, and rising and falling at the pleasure 
of Parliament, to be necessarily the normal, and only proper, result of 
political development.' - Sir John Seeley. 
 
'Under the existing regime it is from the Sovereign alone that emanates the 
directing idea in every transaction.' - French Official Communiqué, 22 
September 1863. 
 
'The President of the Republic shall be responsible only in case of high 
treason.' - Organic Law of France (25 February 1875). 
 
'The President presides but does not govern; he can form no decision save in 
agreement with his Ministers; and the responsibility is theirs. . . . The 
President, therefore, exercises no power alone.' – Raymond Poincara (1913). 
 
'With us the King himself governs.' - Bismarck (1882). 
 
'No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of 
either House during his continuance in office.’ The Constitution of the 
United States, Vi. 2. 
 
'Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government. . . . The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive 
are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its 
support; fourthly, competent powers. . . . Those politicians and statesmen 
who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and 
for the justice of their views have declared in favour of a Single Executive.' 
- Hamilton, The Federalist, No. LXX. 
 
Parliamentary Executive or Presidential. 
Responsible Government is, in the sphere of Politics, the most characteristic 
achievement of the English genius for affairs.  Is it also the most commendable?  It 
would be rash to assume that the answer to this question will necessarily be, 
affirmative, or that, even for Great Britain and the other nations of the British 
Commonwealth, the Cabinet system is the last word in Political Science.  Sir John 
Seeley has pointed out that Responsible Government as evolved in England was 
'much more casual and accidental, much less necessary than is commonly supposed', 
and that so far from being a 'necessary result of the growth [begin page 90] of the spirit 
of liberty” ’, it was 'a very peculiar result of very special circumstances'.
1
 
In England, however, the Parliamentary type of Executive, in short the Cabinet system, 
has approved itself by the experience of two hundred years.  Moreover, the system has 
been extensively imitated, though not with unqualified or universal success.  It was not 
                                                  
1   [90/1]  Introduction to Political Science. copied by the architects of the Constitution of the United States, where the Executive, 
as we have seen, is not Parliamentary but Presidential. 
 
The Choice of the Executive in the Modern State. 
Between these two types the choice for the modern State would seem to lie.  Let it be 
observed, however, that it by no means follows that Republics must be 'Presidential’, 
still less that Monarchies must be 'Parliamentary'.  On the contrary, a Parliamentary 
Executive is compatible equally with a Republic and an Hereditary Monarchy, provided 
that in each case the Head of the State is a 'constitutional' and not an autocratic ruler.  
Conversely a 'President' may be either crowned or uncrowned.  The Monarch under the 
Hohenzollern Empire in Germany conformed clearly to the 'Presidential' type.   
Executive authority was vested not in Ministers responsible to the Legislature, but in 
the Emperor.  The Imperial Chancellor was as much the servant of the Emperor William 
I or II as was Wolsey or Thomas Cromwell the servant of Henry VIII. Wolsey had 
sometimes to explain the Royal policy to Parliament as Bismarck had to defend himself 
and his master in the Reichstag.  The Emperor, however was the real ruler of Germany; 
he not only reigned but governed. 
 
The French President 
In modern France, on the contrary, the President is a constitutional Head of the State.  
His position was somewhat sardonically analysed by Sir Henry Maine in the following 
passage: 
 
‘. . . there is no living functionary who occupies a more pitiable position than 
a French President.  The old Kings of France reigned and governed.  The 
Constitutional King, according to M. Thiers, reigns, but does not govern.  
The [begin page 91] President of the United States governs, but he does not 
reign.  It has been reserved for the President of the French Republic neither 
to reign nor yet to govern.' 
 
How far does this description, written some forty years ago, still correspond to the 
facts?  The formal position of the French President can be very briefly stated.  The 
President is the supreme Representative of the State.  He is elected by an absolute 
majority of the suffrages of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, acting in joint 
session as the National Assembly.  The procedure at the election which takes place at 
Versailles, is graphically described by M. Raymond Poincare, himself President of the 
Republic during the critical years 1913-20. 
 
'When the Assembly is convoked for a Presidential election the members 
vote without discussion.  The urn is then placed in the tribune and as an 
usher with a silver chain calls their names in a sonorous voice the members 
of the Assembly pass in a file in order to deposit their ballot papers.  The 
procession of voters lasts a long time; there are nearly nine hundred votes 
to be cast.  When the voting is completed the scrutators, drawn by lot from 
among the members of the Assembly, count the votes in an adjoining hall.  
If no candidate has obtained an absolute majority of votes, the President 




The President is elected for seven years but is re-eligible for any number of terms.  In 
fact, only one President, Jules Grévy, has been re-elected, and in consequence of a 
financial scandal, in which his son-in-law was involved, Grévy resigned early in his 
second term.  From 1871 to 1875 the President had been responsible to the 
Legislature, but the inconvenience and even the danger of this principle soon became 
                                                  
2   [91/1]  How France is Governed (Eng. trans.), pp. 168-9. apparent, and since 1875 the President has been irresponsible save in the event of 
high treason.  If accused of high treason the President may be impeached by the 
Chamber of Deputies and tried by the Senate.  The Senate has the power to proclaim 
his dismissal and to impose the appropriate penalties.  Otherwise, the Presi- [begin 
page 92] dent is, for the duration of his legal term, irremovable, although, as was seen 
in the case of M. Millerand, the Chambers can render the position of the President 
untenable.
3  For the rest the whole responsibility is assumed, as in England, by his 
Ministers, by one of whom all his proclamations must be countersigned. 
 
In a social and ceremonial sense the position of the President is one of high dignity.  
He is lodged at the Palais d’Elysée, and the castles of Rambouillet and Fontainebleau 
are assigned to him as country houses.  He receives a salary of 1,200,000 francs a 
year, and an equal amount for expenses; but the salary is subject to annual review of 
the Legislature - a system which is hardly consonant with the dignity of the Head of the 
State, and one, moreover, which might conceivably result in undesirable bargaining. 
 
The President is the Grand Master of the Legion of Honour; he represents the State in 
national solemnities, and vis-à-vis foreign Powers; foreign ambassadors are accredited 
to him and from him ambassadors receive their letters of credence.  The majesty of his 
person is secured by a special libel law enacted as a protection against attacks in the 
press, and he has the right of immunity or ‘grace'.  He is constitutionally the head of the 
fighting forces of the Republic, and conveys to them the encouragement and gratitude 
of the nation. 
 
The President and the Legislature 
The President shares with both Chambers the right of initiating laws, but he has no 
veto on legislation.  He can however, refuse to promulgate a law, and, by means of a 
reasoned message, may require the Legislature to further deliberation to the projected 
law.  His power of retardation lasts only a month, and should the Legislature insist, the 
law must be promulgated in its original form. 
 
It is the President's duty to convoke and prorogue the [begin page 93] Legislature, but 
the Chambers, if not convoked earlier, must meet at latest on the second Tuesday in 
January and must sit for at least five months.  The President may adjourn the 
Chambers, but not for a period exceeding one month and, not for more than twice in 
one session.  Extraordinary sessions may be, and are, almost annually, summoned at 
the discretion of the President.  The President also enjoys the prerogative, with the 
assent of the Senate, of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, before the expiration of 
its legal term.  This prerogative is, as already indicated, of real constitutional 
importance, though the prerogative has only once been exercised.
4
 
The President and His Ministers. 
The most important function assigned to the President is that of selecting a Prime 
Minister.  Owing to the multiplication of groups in the French Chamber, the choice of a 
successor to an outgoing Premier is much less clearly indicated to the President than 
to an English Sovereign, and, consequently, the performance of this political function 
calls for no little tact and experience on the part of the President.  He usually consults 
                                                  
3   [92/1]  In June 1924 President Millerand commissioned M. Francois Marsal to 
form a stop-gap ministry, for the purpose of conveying to the Chambers a message 
from the President.  Thereupon the National Assembly declined to receive a 
message from the Government and M. Millerand resigned. 
4   [93/1]  By President MacMahon, who in 1877 hoped to get a Chamber in accord 
with his personal views.  His failure has discouraged a repetition of the 
experiment.  the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, whose knowledge of the 
parliamentary situation is even more intimate than his own.  As to the selection of the 
other Ministers, the President may proffer advice to the Premier, or President of the 
Council, to give him his official title, but the latter need not take it.  Nevertheless, as a 
distinguished French publicist has said, the Head of the State is 'something more than 
a great elector of ministers.  The constitutional irresponsibility of the President of the 
Republic does not prevent his bearing a heavy moral responsibility towards the nation 
in the nomination of his ministers.’
5
 
That responsibility must needs be enhanced by the regular attendance of the President 
of the Republic at the Councils of Ministers. A French Cabinet meets in two capacities: 
(i) as a Conseil des Ministres; (ii) as a Conseil [begin page 94] de Cabinet.  The former 
is something between an English Privy Council and a Cabinet Council.  Its meetings 
are prescribed by law, and are held at the Elysée, presence of the President of the 
Republic, though the latter cannot vote.  Formal business is there transacted; but not 
formal business only.  As a rule there are two meetings a week and the main lines of 
State policy, especially in relation to foreign affairs, are there laid down.  The Conseil de 
Cabinet meets, as a rule, once a week, under the chairmanship of the President of the 
Council, and is largely concerned with the details of parliamentary business, a topic 
which occupies perhaps a disproportionate part of the time of an English Cabinet.  It 
cannot be easy or even possible always to keep the two topics apart, but there is 
evidently some advantage in such a variation of procedure as necessitates the attempt 
to do so.  No minutes are kept at either Council. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
In the conduct of international relations the President of the French Republic plays an 
important and, in certain circumstances, may play a decisive part.  He not only 
represents the State in all formal relations, but has the right to negotiate and ratify 
treaties, though not to declare war without the assent of both Chambers. 
 
On his election in 1920 M. Millerand is understood to have insisted that the Constitution 
imposed upon the President the duty of active participation in foreign policy.  How far 
he succeeded in upholding his contention is a secret hid in the breasts of himself and 
the Ministers who served him.  During at least half of the time of his Presidency he 
found himself vis-à-vis a Minister of very masterful personality, whose will was not likely 
to have been deflected, had they clashed, by that of the President of the Republic. 
 
In a Parliamentary Democracy, whether it be monarchical or Republican in form, much 
must evidently depend on the personal equation, but the foregoing sketch should make 
it plain that the French President is not a mere roi fainéant.  The Constitution, as has 
been truly observed meant to invest him with a real and dominating [begin page 95] 
authority ',
6 doubtless with a view to the easier restoration of a Monarchy. MacMahon, 
the first President, favoured a restoration, though the effect of his autocratic methods 
was to weaken the presidential office.  His successor, Grévy, weakened it of set 
purpose; and from his time onwards it was the deliberate policy of successive National 
Assemblies to prefer the weaker to the stronger candidate.  Casimir Périer, elected 
after the assassination of Carnot (1893), was a notable exception to this rule; but, after 
a few months of office Périer resigned in despair. 
 
'The Presidency of the Republic [so ran his resignation message of 15 January 1894] is 
deprived of means of action and of control.  I cannot reconcile myself to the weight of 
moral responsibilities laid upon me and the impotence to which I am condemned.'   
Perhaps Périer was oversensitive, or overstrained.  Be that as it may, it is certain that a 
                                                  
5   [93/2]  Joseph-Barthélemy, The Government of France (Eng. trans.), p, 91. 
6   [95/1]  Joseph-Barthélemy, op. cit., p. 81. President of powerful personality can and does exercise a real influence upon affairs, 
partly in virtue of the duration of his office, glaringly contrasted with the brevity of 
ministerial tenure, partly in virtue of his regular presence at Conseils des Ministres.  
The latter custom evidently enables him to exercise more continuous influence upon 
public affairs than an English Sovereign.  He does not indeed reign: yet the second part 
of Sir Henry Maine's aphorism clearly demands some modification. 
 
The German President. 
The German Constitution of 1919 provides for an elected President who is plainly 
intended by the terms of the Constitution to play the part of a 'Constitutional Ruler'.  It 
was a matter of considerable dispute in the Constituent Assembly whether it was 
desirable to have a President at all, and if so what his constitutional position and 
powers should be.  Some members of the Weimar Assembly were opposed to the 
creation of a President, on the ground that, however circumscribed his powers, he 
would tend to prepare the ground for a monarchical restoration.  Others argued in 
favour of a President of the American type who should be a real chief of the State and 
independent of the [begin page 96] Legislature.  The situation was like that of France in 
1875 when the Monarchists elected Marshal MacMahon as a warming-pan for the 
Monarchy.  But the German Monarchists have had to content themselves with a strictly 
Constitutional President, whose powers are even strictly circumscribed than those 
exercised by the Head of the State in France or England. 
 
Election and Powers 
The President of the Reich is elected not like the French President by the Legislature 
but by the popular vote of the whole German people.  By an amendment of 1920 the 
President must receive on the first ballot an absolute majority of the votes cast, though 
on a second ballot a mere plurality suffices.  On the death of the first President (Ebert) 
in 1925, the candidate of the Right, Dr. Jarres did in fact fail to secure an absolute 
majority.  A second ballot was consequently required, at which Field-Marshal von 
Hindenburg (who had replaced Jarres as the candidate of the Right) received 
14,655,766 votes as against 13,751,615 cast for Dr. Marx, while 1,944,567 were to 
other candidates.  The President is Command-in-Chief of the army and navy, and 
represents the Reich foreign affairs, but a declaration of war can be made only by the 
Legislature, while alliances and treaties require its assent.  If public safety is disturbed, 
the President may temporarily suspend the constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
speech, &c., but all his decrees and orders must be countersigned by a Minister, who 
thereby accepts responsibility for them.  Moreover, any suspension of constitutional 
guarantees must be promptly communicated to the Reichstag which may require their 
abrogation. 
 
The President or any of his Ministers may be impeached by a two-thirds vote of the 
Reichstag, the trial being held in the Staatsgtrichhof.  He may also be removed from 
office by a referendum demanded by a similar major the Reichstag.  If the popular vote 
is in favour of the President, he resumes office for a further term of seven years and 
the Reichstag is automatically dissolved.  The latter provision will obviously make the 
Reichstag cautious [begin page 97] in the exercise of a power which may result in 
extending the term of a President and abruptly terminating its own. 
 
If, however, the Reichstag can appeal to the electorate against the President, the 
President can equally appeal against the Reichstag.  As already indicated, he can 
resolve a deadlock between the two Houses in this method and can also order a 
referendum on laws relating to the budget, taxes, or salaries.  But in every case the 
President must act on the advice of a Minister, representing the parliamentary majority.  
His position, therefore, is, so far as the Weimar Constitution can secure it, strictly 
parliamentary; not, in the American sense, presidential. 
 The Helvetic Republic 
There is, indeed, a third alternative which must be briefly noticed. The Constitution of 
the Swiss Republic, as we have seen, confides the Executive authority neither to a 
President nor to a Premier; neither to a Cabinet nor to an autocrat.  The Ministers who 
compose the Bundesrat or Federal Council are in effect, though not in form, the 
permanent heads of certain State departments, and they exist to do the will of the 
sovereign people whether expressed to them directly by an 'instructed' initiative, or 
through the intermediation of the elected representatives in the Legislature.  In this, as 
in other respects, Swiss Democracy is direct, but whether such a form of Democracy 
can exist elsewhere than in a small State, itself the federal aggregate of still smaller 
States, peculiarly situated alike as regards geography and international relations, is a 
question which must not detain us. 
 
For the great States of the modem world the choice, let it be repeated, lies between 
Democracy of the presidential, and Democracy of the parliamentary type. 
 
Of these two types England and the United States present the predominant examples.  
There is something to be said in favour of each, and one thing to be said equally in 
favour of both: both are native, both are racy of the soil in which the culture was 
developed, both, therefore, may be presumed to correspond with the political 
necessities of the States which gave them birth.  [begin page 98] 
 
With the former this work has dealt in some detail.  It remains to analyse the latter. 
 
The American President  
Reference was made in an earlier chapter to the formal powers of the President of the 
United States, and to the method by which he is elected to his high office.  From thart 
elaborate machinery the fathers of the Constitution and anticipated results almost 
impeccable.  ‘This process of election’, wrote Hamilton, 'affords a moral certainty that 
the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent 
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.'  How far has this anticipation been 
realized?  That men of the highest eminence have been elected to the Presidency goes 
without saying; that many men, quite unknown even to their own countrymen before 
their selection as candidates, have, after election, filled their great office with dignity, 
capacity, and even with distinction, proves nothing as to the felicity of this prescribed 
method of election.  It says much, on the other hand, for the wealth of capable citizens 
produced in the soil of American democracy, and still more perhaps for the prevailing 
spirit of moderation and good sense - a word, for the genius for self-government which 
is common heritage of the English race.  Nevertheless, success in a lottery is, as 
Bagehot wittily observed, no argument for lotteries, and the Presidential election is 
essentially a lottery.  M. Boutmy ascribes the relative success of the system entirely to 
the exceptional geographical position of the United States, the simplicity of their 
international relations, and their happy immunity from the dangers of militarism.  But be 
the results good or bad, they cannot be ascribed to the prescience of the Philadelphia 
Convention.  No part of the system they devised has been more conspicuously 
modified by events. 
 
The Constitution contemplated a process of indirect election, both stages of which 
should be conducted with every safeguard for a wise, decorous, and sagacious choice.  
No anticipations could have been more entirely falsified.  In fact, the whole process of 
selecting presidential candi- [begin page 99] dates and of electing the President is 
controlled by a: series of party conventions, which, starting with the ‘primaries' of the 
smallest electoral units, culminate in the two great national conventions.  From the first 
stage to the last, the election is in the hands, not of representatives appointed to vote 
according to their unfettered discretion for the candidate who on scrutiny appeared to 
them fittest for the office, but of carefully instructed and closely controlled delegates 
sent up from convention to convention to do the bidding of their parties.  
Genesis of the Office. 
Historically the office of President descends in part from the old Governor of colonial 
days, in part from the British Crown.  English publicists are apt to lay stress, perhaps 
unduly, upon the latter model. 
 
‘It is tolerably clear', writes Sir Henry Maine, 'that the mental operation 
through which the framers of the American Constitution passed was this: 
they took the King of Great Britain, went through his powers and restrained 
them whenever they appeared to be excessive, or unsuited to, the 
circumstances of the United States.'
7
 
Lord Bryce is in substantial agreement with Maine: 
 
'the President', he writes, 'is George III, shorn of a part of his prerogative 
by the intervention of his Senate, in treaties and appointments, of another 
part by the restriction of his action to Federal affairs, while his dignity as 
well as his influence are diminished by his holding office for four years 
instead of for life. . . . Subject to these precautions he was meant . . . to 
resemble the State Governor and the British King, not only in being the 
Head of the Executive, but in standing apart from and above political 
parties.  He was to represent the nation as a whole, as the Governor 
represented the State Commonwealth.  The independence of his position, 
with nothing either to gain or fear from Congress, would, it was hoped, 
leave him free to think only of the welfare of the, people.'
8
 
Lord Bryce, it will be observed, more cautious and better informed than Maine, refers to 
the dual parentage [begin page 100] of the President.  But he does not go far enough to 
satisfy some of the more exclusive of American critics.  They deny the admixture of 
royal blood.  'If', says one of them, 'the framers of our Constitution took the Presidential 
powers from the powers of the British Crown as described, in Blackstone they were 
great bunglers and could hardly have been able to read the English language.`
9  Mr. 
Fisher would seem to be too eager to disclaim the British origin of the President, but it 
is undeniably true that for most of the powers conferred upon the President there are 
ample precedents to be found in 'native' American sources.  Similar powers were 




Confirmatory of Mr. Fisher's contention is the significant fact that the American 
Constitution makes no provision for the formation of a Cabinet.  It is true, of course, 
that in 1787 the Cabinet system was by no means fully developed in England: George 
III was still 'King', though Pitt was rapidly attaining to the position of Premier.   
Nevertheless the omission of all reference to a Cabinet Council is significant.  It would 
be even more significant were it not that a similar omission is noticeable in the Union 
Act of 1840 - an Act expressly intended to establish the Cabinet system in Canada.  In 
the case of America the omission is, however, plainly deliberate.  It was not intended to 
establish the Cabinet system, and as a fact it never has been established.  The 
American Constitution is consequently not parliamentary but presidential.  Its framers 
preferred the practice of Cromwell to the precepts of Pym: the theory of Montesquieu to 
the practical expedients Walpole. 
                                                  
7   [99/1]  Popular Government, P. 212. 
8   [99/2]  American Commonwealth, i. 39. 
9   [100/1]  Fisher, op. cit., p. 95.  
‘Those politicians and statesmen', wrote Hamilton, 'who have been the most celebrated 
for the soundness of their principles and the justice of their views have declared in 
favour of a single Executive and a numerous legislature.  They have, with great 
propriety, considered energy as the [begin page 101] most necessary qualification of the 
former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand.'
10
 
Accordingly the Executive was vested in the President.  Between him and Congress 
there was no necessary correspondence, nor was he politically responsible to it.  On 
the contrary such responsibility is expressly repudiated by Hamilton.  'However inclined 
we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to, the 
inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to 
the humour of the legislature. . .  The same rule which teaches the propriety of a 
partition between the various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition 
ought to be so contrived as to render one independent of the other.'  It naturally 
followed that the Constitution did not provide for anything in the nature of a Cabinet.  
Under Section 2 of Article II the President 'may require the opinion, in writing, of the 
principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the 
duties of their respective offices'.  These principal departmental officers have in course 
of time developed into something which is now commonly known as the 'Cabinet’; but 
between the American Cabinet and the English Cabinet there is as little resemblance 
as between a British Consul and a Roman Consul.  The American Cabinet is a mere 
fortuitous aggregation of the heads of the principal State departments (now ten in 
number); it is entirely lacking in solidarity and cohesion; it has no vestige of mutual 
responsibility.  Each of the ten Ministers is personally responsible for the work of his 
department, but not to Congress nor to his colleagues.  'Colleagues', indeed, in the 
English sense, an American Minister has none; the administration is technically 
departmental.  Yet if there was one quality more than another which the Constitution 
hoped to achieve in the Executive, it was unity.  Nor has the desire of its architects 
been thwarted.  It has been [begin page 102] secured by vesting the Executive (apart 
from the rights inhering in the Senate) in a single person, who, on English analogy, may 
be said to stand not only for the Crown, but for the Prime Minister, and not least for the 
Cabinet.  To him the several Ministers are individually, not collectively, responsible, and 
it is he, not his Cabinet, who is responsible to the legal Sovereign, the people of the 
United States. 
 
Between the American and the English Cabinet there are other differences on which it 
is unnecessary here to dwell.  American Ministers, for example, may not and do not sit 
in Congress; they have no responsibility for initiating Bills or for superintending their 
passage through the Legislature; they have no oral interpellation to answer and no 
general policy to defend in parliamentary debate.  Each secretary is, however, required 
to make annually to Congress a detailed report upon the work his department, even the 
details of which the Standing Committees of Congress are apt to supervise. 
 
As a rule, the heads of departments are selected by the President from one of the two 
parties, but that is not due to a desire to secure homogeneity of administration but 
because the President himself is a partisan and desires to reward his party associates.  
Consequently, American Ministers do not resemble civil servants so closely as do the 
members of the Swiss Council.  Technically and legally they are the servants, not of 
Congress, but of the President.  Actually, according to Mr. Wilson, they tend to become 
‘rather the President's colleagues’.
11  ‘The early Congresses', writes the same 
authority, 'seem to have regarded the Attorney General and the four Secretaries (State, 
Treasury, War, Navy) who constituted the first Cabinet as something more than the 
                                                  
10   [101/1]  The Federalist, No. LXX. 
11   [102/1]  Congressional Government, P. 46. President's lieutenants. . . . Their wills counted as independent wills.'
12  Of such 
independent volition, the Constitution, we must repeat, knows nothing.  It recognizes 
only the President.  How far, in any given administration, ministers are his colleagues, 
how far his servants, evidently depends neither [begin page 103] upon law nor upon 
convention, but upon the respective personalities of President and Secretaries. 
 
The President and Congress. 
The Constitution enjoins that 'the President shall from time to time give to the Congress 
information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such 
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient'.  This provision has now 
developed into the Presidential Message, which is regularly sent, or on occasions 
personally delivered, to Congress at its opening Session, something after the manner 
of the King's Speech.  Between a Presidential Message and a King's Speech there is, 
however, one essential difference.  The President may recommend legislative 
measures, but he has no power to compel attention to his recommendations.  If 
Congress chooses to ignore them, nothing happens.  The King's Speech, on the other 
hand, is framed by Ministers who are themselves responsible for the initiation and the 
conduct of the legislation which they recommend to Parliament. 
 
If, however, the President cannot initiate legislation, the Constitution arms him with a 
very important negative control.  The Presidential veto was borrowed from the 
Constitution of the State of Massachusetts.  It is not an absolute, nor even suspensive, 
but is liable to be overborne by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress.  None 
the less the veto does constitute a powerful weapon in the hands of a strong President.  
In the course of a century and a quarter the prerogative has been exercised nearly six 
hundred times, and, except in the case of Andrew Johnson, with rare discrimination.
13  
Only on thirty-two occasions has Congress passed a Bill over the head of the 




Thus the President checks Congress, and the authority [begin page 104] of Congress 
balances that of the President.  As a modern writer of high authority has summarized 
the situation: 'A mere majority of Congress cannot make any law if the President 
disapproves, and the President cannot obstruct legislation if it be favoured by two-
thirds of the branches of Congress.'
15  These provisions are in complete harmony with 
that principle of balance and equipoise which runs all through the American 
Constitution.  The President, being the centre of the Executive machine cannot 
legislate; he cannot even initiate legislation; but he may suggest it.  He cannot veto 
legislation, but he can postpone it.  Postponement is a most valuable weapon.   
Democracies are apt to be in a hurry; but if they are compelled to reflect, the result is 
not infrequently negative.  Whether postponement is effected by the suspensive veto of 
a President, by the authority of a Second Chamber, or by a direct reference to the 
electorate, matters little.  Second thoughts are apt to defer if not to discourage 
legislation. 
 
                                                  
12   [102/2]  Ibid., p., 257. 
13   [103/1]  Grover Cleveland holds the record for the exercise of the veto.  J.A. 
Spender (The Public Life, i. 199) mentions the fact that during the ninety-six years 
1788-1884 the entire number of veto messages was 132.  In four years Cleveland 
sent in 301 veto messages, and in addition practically vetoed 189 Bills by 
inaction, i.e. withholding his consent. 
14   [103/2]  Kimball, op. cit., p. 205. 
15   [104/1]  J.M. Beck, The. Constitution of the United States (1924), P. 233. The President and Foreign Policy. 
A similar balance operates in reference to the executive side of Government.   
Congress can do nothing, under ordinary circumstances, to control the action of the 
President.  Yet the President, as we have seen, can make no treaty without the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, nor can he declare war.  The latter function 
belongs to Congress, though Congress can exercise no influence over the policy, still 
less over the conduct of negotiations, which may render war inevitable.  So much has 
been written in preceding chapters about the treaty-making power and the conduct of 
foreign relations that a brief reference may here suffice. 
 
The Presidential system, like the Cabinet system, has during the last twenty years 
been put to a severe test.  Which system has reacted the more successfully?  The 
question is obviously delicate, but it is inevitable, and no publicist can shirk it. 
 
To those who observed the working of the two systems, [begin page 105] fifty or sixty 
years ago, their respective merits did not appear doubtful.  The late Marquis of 
Salisbury, then Lord Robert Cecil, and a Tory of Tories, was at one with a philosophical 
radical like Walter Bagehot in commending the superiority of the Cabinet system.   
Writing in the Quarterly Review for July 1864, Lord Robert Cecil commented as follows 
upon the control exercised by the House of Commons over the Executive: 
 
'The control which it possesses, if it pleases to exert it, is quite absolute.  
By a simple vote it can paralyse a single department or all departments of 
the civil service.  The possession of such a power confers inestimable 
advantages re upon us.  It brings the nation and the Government into so 
close a connexion, that any policy which is approved by the to mass of the 
nation is certain to be promptly adopted by its rulers.  Other countries have 
tried to produce the same result by providing that the ruler shall be 
periodically elected by the people.  The contrivance fails in two ways.  It 
makes no provision for changes of opinion which may take place between 
the intervals of election; and it takes no note of any public opinion except 
such as can make itself heard over the din of artificial cries which it is the 
professional duty of an organized body of electioneerers to raise.  No one 
can at present say whether the genuine public opinion of the Northern 
States of America is for war or peace.  In England, the machinery which 
carries the will of the nation into the policy of the Government is far more 
sensitive.  No Government could exist in England for three months that was 
acting in the face of a decided national conviction.' 
 
Eighteen months later (January 1866) Lord Robert Cecil reaffirmed his conviction in a 
not less striking passage 
 
'Our system is constructed to carry out in the policy of the Government the 
actual opinion, at the moment, of the million and a quarter of electors by 
whom the nation is ruled.  It is a machine of the most exquisite delicacy.  
The conduction from the electors, who are the source of power, to the 
Ministers, is so perfect that while Parliament is sitting they cannot govern 
for ten days in opposition to the public will.'  [begin page 106] 
 
Walter Bagehot. 
Bagehot, also writing in the Palmerstonian era, was not less emphatic than Lord Robert 
Cecil in his preference for the Cabinet system, and in particular for what he conceived 
to be its specific quality - the fusion and combination of the executive and legislative 
powers.  The Cabinet system manifested its superiority alike in quiet times and in days 
of crisis and stress.  If you divorce the Executive from the Legislature you injure both. 
 ‘The executive is crippled by not getting the laws it needs, and the 
legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive 
becomes unfit for its name, since cannot execute what it decides on; the 
legislature is demonized by liberty, by taking decisions of which others, and 
not itself, will suffer the effects.'
16
 
Even if disputes should temporarily emerge, harmony is likely to be restored by the fact 
that 'on a vital occasion the executive can compel legislation by the threat of 
resignation and the threat of dissolution'.  The Presidential system provides no such 
safety-valve.  Then consider the educational influence of Cabinet Government; it 
educates the Legislature, it educates the electorate.  A change of Executive in England 
is usually preceded and effected by prolonged debates in Parliament, debates which 
find their echo in the Press and in the constituencies.  The more important debates in 
the House of Commons issue in action, and are regarded mainly for their possible 
effects upon action.  In the American Congress they are not regarded at all, mainly 
because no action can result from them.'
17
 
Woodrow Wilson’s Opinion. 
Mr. Woodrow Wilson, writing twenty years later than Bagehot, concurred in his estimate 
of the relative merits of Presidential and Cabinet Government.  'The discussions which 
take place in Congress are aimed at random . . .  To attend to such discussions is 
uninteresting; to be instructed by them is impossible.'
18  He detected, however, [begin 
page 107] a steady' concentration of all the substantial powers of government in 
Congress,
19 and he broadly hinted that the distempers of Congress would, before long, 
be remedied, as the distempers of the post-revolution Parliament of England had been 
cured by the evolution of a Cabinet system.
20  Events have not justified his anticipation. 
 
Sir Henry Main 
Meanwhile, by a curious turn in the wheel of criticism the Presidential system was 
beginning to find apologists among English publicists.  Sir Henry Maine published his 
Popular Government in 1885, and no one can fail to be struck by the diminishing 
enthusiasm there displayed for the English as compared with the American type of 
Democracy.  The success of the Federal Constitution has been 'so great and striking' 
as almost to render mankind oblivious of the general failure of republican institutions.
21  
He lauds the sagacity of the authors of the Federalist, a sagacity which ‘may be tracked 
in every page of subsequent American history' and ' may well fill the Englishman who 




Mr. Lecky's Democracy and Liberty (1896) struck a similar note.  It lauded the 'eminent 
wisdom of the Constitution of 1787' and attributed to it much of 'the success of 
American democracy'.  To the safeguards contained in 'an admirable written 
Constitution’ ‘America mainly owes her stability'.  By reason of the absence of such 
                                                  
16   [106/1]  The English Constitution, p. 17. 
17   [106/2]  Exceptions are of course to be found in the Senatorial debates on treaties, 
and in debates preceding a declaration of war. 
18   [106/3]  Congressional Government, pp. 298, 299. 
19   [107/1]  op. cit., p. 56. 
20   [107/2]  op. cit., PP. 314 seq. 
21   [107/3]  p. 202. 
22   [107/4]  p-254. safeguards England is pre-eminently exposed to the dangers of constitutional 
innovation, of fiscal injustice, and confiscatory legislation.
23
 
The change of tone between Lord Salisbury and Bagehot on the one hand, and on the 
other Maine and Lecky, is unmistakable.  The ardent and confident enthusiasm of the 
earlier writers had given place to the tempered pessimism of the later.  To the former 
the superior qualities of the English Constitution, more particularly in reference to the 
position of the Executive and its relation to the Legis- [begin page 108] lature, were 
indisputable; the latter were beginning to discover in the relative stability of the 
American Constitution a virtue of which English Government could no longer boast.  
How are we to account for the transition effected in a short generation?  Must we 
ascribe it to Disraeli’s 'leap in the dark'; to the addition of one million voters to the 
electoral roll under the Act of 1867; to the addition of another two millions, mainly 
agricultural labourers under Gladstone's Act of 1884? 
 
Many good judges have indeed held, as was indicated in a previous chapter, that 
Parliamentary Government reached its meridian during the middle years of Queen 
Victoria's reign, that the equipoise of the forces on which it rests was never so perfect 
as between 1832 and 1867.  Be that as it may, it is plain that the tone even of the 
friendliest critics is less confident, though it is noticeable that those who know the 
Presidential system most intimately are least ready to criticize the only real alternative 
Parliamentary or Cabinet system as it operates in England. 
 
The Administrative Autocracy of Prussia. 
It would be affectation to pretend that the problem of the Executive is easy of solution.  
On the contrary, every form of Executive - autocratic Kingship, the Parliamentary 
Cabinet, the President, monarchical or elected - offers a target for criticism to those 
who have primary, regard for efficiency of administration.  Perhaps, in a technical 
sense, no country was ever better administered than Prussia under its Hohenzollern 
kings.  The Prussia of the eighteenth century showed administrative absolutism at its 
best.  Yet even that system had its weak points.  Jena revealed them.  Civil and military 
administration had alike broken down.  The military disasters at Jena and Auerstadt 
taught Prussia her lesson.  Napoleon’s presence in Berlin enforced it.  The genius of 
Stein, Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, and Humboldt enabled the Hohenzollern Kingdom to 
draw from disaster every possible advantage, and in the subsequent Prussianization of 
Germany the efficiency of a Civil Service, as near perfection [begin page 109] to as 
brains and industry could make it, gave admirable and indispensable support to the 
organizers of war and the commanders in the field. 
 
Autocracy and War. 
In the making of war, still more in the preparation for war, the palm must be conceded 
to the autocracy which can command the service of efficient administrators.  Its merits 
as a form of Executive were brilliantly exemplified by the preparations of the triumvirate 
Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke for the series of wars which transferred the headship of 
Germany from Vienna to Berlin, and the primacy of continental Europe to Berlin from 
Paris.  Even more brilliantly was the efficiency of the Prussian machine exemplified by 
the patient preparations which preceded the Great War of 1914. 
 
Parliamentary Democracy and War - France 
In sheer military capacity the French Staff was probably at least equal to that on which 
the Kaiser could rely.  But, apart from the palpable inferiority of her administration, 
France was handicapped by a parliamentary Executive.  Even in France, where the war 
was regarded as inevitable and where preparation for it was made with hardly less of 
                                                  
23   [107/5]  vol, i, PP. 55, 95, 112. consistent purpose than in Germany, the work of the soldiers was impeded by the 
politicians.  A parliamentary Executive must always have primary regard to Parliament, 
to conciliating the support first of deputies or members, and then of the electorate.  The 
General Staff might work and warn; a War Office might do its best to maintain the 
military machine in readiness and efficiency; but always in the background was the 
Legislative Body, the politicians who were ever critical of the Executive, the politicians 
who held the purse-strings. 
 
England 
If this was so in France, which lived in constant dread of an attack upon her frontiers, 
and where every elector was a trained soldier, much more was it in England, which had 
long since forgotten what it was to be at war with a great military Power, and where the 
politicians were anxious only to persuade themselves and their democratic masters 
that no danger was to be apprehended from the Holienzollern Empire. 
[begin page 110] 
 
We may take it then as indisputable that in the preparation for war an autocracy enjoys 
a manifest advantage over any other form of Executive.  That is true also of the 
conduct of war, particularly in the earlier stages of the contest.  Those advantages 
diminish, however, as the struggle is prolonged.  The reason is obvious.  War compels 
every Government to assume something of the characteristic quality of an autocracy.  
Inter arma silent leges.  We have already seen how, under the stress of war, the 
Cabinet system was transformed in England into a Directory.  Votes of credit were 
passed by the House of Commons virtually without, discussion.  The rapidity with which 
an industrial machine designed for peace times, and a commercial machine based on 
the presupposition of perpetual peace, were adapted to war conditions, evoked the 
wonder and admiration of all who witnessed the transformation.  The transformation 
will, in truth, constitute an abiding monument to the administrative genius of the British 
race.  But the effort was enormously costly, whether computed in terms of men or 
money.  Three out of the six or seven members of the Directory have already,
24 by 
premature death, paid the price demanded by such an effort.  Ten thousand millions of 
money represented the, expenditure in cash.  The brunt of the struggle was borne by 
two parliamentary democracies; in the final round of the contest indispensable help 
was given by the great Democracy which affords the most eminent example of the 
success of Presidential Government. 
 
Thus the respective merits of a Presidential and a Parliamentary Executive in the 
conduct of war cannot be dogmatically determined by the events of recent history.  The 
conduct of war constitutes, however, a relatively unimportant factor in the aggregate of 
the problem of Government; and it is a factor which all men hope may diminish in 
significance.  It is more to the purpose, therefore, to inquire which system responds the 
more successfully to the demands made upon it in ordinary times. 
[begin page 111] 
 
The Treaty of Versailles. 
Few will deny that the American Constitution showed itself in its least dignified and 
efficient aspect in relation to the world-settlement after the Great War.  The 
representatives both of France and of the British Empire – of the Empire in its integrity 
and in its component parts exhibited, on the contrary, one characteristic excellence of 
the Parliamentary System.  They could negotiate without fear that the results of their 
efforts would be repudiated by the peoples in whose names they spoke and signed.  
The initial and perhaps irremediable mistake of President Wilson was in crossing the 
Atlantic: still, it was the mistake of a generous spirit and an over-active brain.  Mr. 
Wilson was essentially a solitary worker he never appreciated the value of team-work.  
                                                  
24   [110/1]  By 1925. There was nothing in the American Constitution to compel, or even to encourage him to 
learn the lesson.  He had come, with only a brief experience of public life, almost 
straight from a college class-room to the White House.  His mind was eminently 
academic, and his habits those of the secluded student.  But the personal 
characteristics of the individual cannot be held responsible for the failure of the system.  
Mr. Lloyd George could speak in the Councils of Europe as the representative of a 
Parliamentary majority which had received a recent and unmistakable mandate from 
the electorate.  His word was the bond of Britain.  Mr. Wilson's word, however weighty, 
carried only the weight of his personal character; his bond was repudiated with out 
hesitation by those with whom the American President shares the treaty-making power.  
That the possibility, nay the probability, of such an issue to the President's European 
mission was foreseen, detracts nothing from the humiliation to which it exposed both 
the President, and the people of the United States.  The Parliamentary Democracies of 
Europe, having paid insufficient regard to the divergences between the American 
Constitution and their own, were taken aback by a result the possibility of which was 
never remote. 
 
Again, however, it may be said that treaty-making is [begin page 112] only an occasional 
incident in the business of State.  That is true, though it may be hoped that it may 
always be a less infrequent incident than war.  But as regards the conduct of 
diplomacy, and particularly of the diplomacy that issues in important international 
treaties, the superior advantages of a Parliamentary Executive would seem to be 
indisputable. 
 
The Executive in Time of Peace 
The respective merits of the two systems are less easily assessable in relation to the 
workaday business imposed upon Governments in times of peace.  Both are in some 
degree obnoxious to the charges commonly urged against the Executives of 
democratic Governments; that they are deficient in courage, in promptitude, in 
continuity, and in efficiency.  From all these points of view administrative absolutism, 
when it reaches the standard of excellence exhibited, for instance, by pre-war 
Germany, has much to recommend it.  To a casual but highly cultivated observer, 
Germany, on the eve of the war, appeared to be more efficiently administered than 
either England or France.
25  A careful and comparative analysis of health, housing, and 
mortality statistics, say in London a Berlin, or in Manchester and Leipsiz, might perhaps 
have corrected the impression derived from Wiesbaden Homburg. 
 
Views of Lord Bryce. 
The choice for the modern world lies, however, as we have repeatedly insisted, not 
between absolutism and democracy, but between different types of democracy.  Lord 
Bryce, writing with intimate personal knowledge of the two most eminent examples of 
the most sharply contrasted types, has summarized his conclusions with characteristic 
felicity and impartiality. 
 
Strength of the Cabinet System. 
The Parliamentary type seems to him to be calculated to secure 'swiftness in decision 
and vigour in action'; it concentrates responsibility; it enables the Cabinet to pass 
through such legislation as it thinks needed, and to conduct both domestic 
administration and foreign policy with a maximum of vigour and promptness; it brings 
Ministers [begin page 113] into constant contact not only with members of their own 
Party but with members of the Opposition, and by the system of parliamentary 
interrogation it ventilates the grievances of electors and their representatives, and 
keeps Ministers and officials up to a high pitch of alertness and efficiency; it enables 
                                                  
25   [112/1]  Owen Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity. the Nominal Executive, be he King or President, to remain outside the range of party 
politics, and to assist the transitory Ministers with advice based upon a longer and 
more continuous experience of public affairs; it renders the transfer of power from one 
Party to another, in accordance with the expressed will of the electorate or even the 
Legislature, simple, rapid, and orderly.  In this latter respect Parliamentary Democracy 
combined with Hereditary Monarchy enjoys conspicuous advantages as compared with 
a Parliamentary Republic. 
 
Its Defects. 
The merits of the Parliamentary system are balanced by its serious defects.  This 
system intensifies the spirit of Party which not only clogs the wheels of legislation but 
hampers administration; if it does not actually engender corruption, it may well dispose 
the Executive to seek popularity at the expense of efficiency; finally, 'the very 
concentration of power and swiftness with which decisions can be reached and carried 




The Presidential System 
The Presidential system, on the other hand, 'was built for safety not for speed', but the 
'Separation of Powers’ on which it is based has proved inconvenient by impeding the 
co-operation of representatives and administrators; it has for some purposes turned out 
to be 'not the keeping apart of things really distinct but the forcible disjunction of things 
naturally connected'.  What is the result?  'Delay, confusion, much working at cross 
purposes' - results particularly noticeable and deplorable in the sphere of finance.   
There is, however, a real gain in efficiency of administration from the fact that Ministers 
are not distracted by the necessity of constant attendance in the [begin page 114] 
Legislature, and in efficiency of legislation by concentrating the minds of legislators 
upon their special function.  A large part of the time of an English Cabinet is taken up 
by the consideration of parliamentary tactics; much of the thought and time of members 
of Parliament is devoted to plans for upsetting one administration installing another. 
 
Moreover, despite the fact that party organizations are even stronger in the United 
States than in England, party discipline is weaker at Washington than at Westminster.  
There is also a greater sense of stability.  Congress elected for a fixed term; the 
President is elected a fixed term; ‘A shifting of the political balance can take place only 
at elections, points fixed by law;' but those fixed points afford a definite opportunity for 
the reconsideration of policy, administrative or legislative.  Consequently, moderation is 
likely to characterize both.  'The country need not fear a sudden new departure: the 
demagogue cannot carry his projects with a run.'  Yet responsibility to the people would 
seem to be better secured under the Parliamentary than under the Presidential system, 
since responsibility is concentrated in a Cabinet which controls both administration and 
legislation; or which, failing to control legislation, can refer the matter to the electorate.  
Should the President or the Congress, in America, flout the will of the people by who 
they are severally elected, the electors must await the end of the legal term before 
responsibility can be brought home. 
 
Conclusion 
The experience hitherto acquired of these competing systems of government is not 
perhaps sufficient to warrant any general conclusion, but subject to this warning, Lord 
Bryce, with characteristic caution, reaches the conclusion that the Swiss system is the 
only one which brings out the popular will in 'an unmistakable and unpervertible form’, 
but that for a large country the cumbrousness and cost the Referendum are 'practically 
prohibitive'.  As between Parliamentary and Presidential Government he holds that 
                                                  
26   [113/1]  Modern Democracies, ii, c. 1xviii. [begin page 115] the former 'has many advantages for countries of moderate size', while 
the latter, 'constructed for safety rather than promptitude in action, and not staking 
large issues on sudden decisions, is to be preferred for States of vast area and 
population, such as are the United States and Germany'. 
 
From a conclusion so cautiously reached and so tactfully stated it is difficult to dissent.  
Yet the Wilson episode has undoubtedly tended to accentuate the apprehensions of 
those, on both sides of the Atlantic, who feared lest the Presidential system, when 
subjected to the test of an external crisis, might fail to react successfully.  It would be 
unsafe to assume that the Parliamentary system might not, if subjected to an equally 
severe test, reveal weakness of a kind totally different and much more fatal to the 
stability of the Commonwealth.  Thus far, Parliamentary Democracy in combination with 
Constitutional Monarchy has wonderfully justified itself in the country of its origin. 
 
Abroad it has emerged successfully from the ordeal by battle; it has not surrendered to 
the forces of disruption and spoliation at home.  Yet it is difficult to regard without 
misgiving the immediate future, so far as that future depends on the perfection of 
constitutional machinery.  Political thinkers who look for inspiration to Burke are apt, in 
proud reliance upon the ethos of a people, to underrate the importance of constitutional 
cheeks and balances. 
 
If the people mean mischief, they will work it; no constitutional safeguards can avail 
against the will to revolution. 
 
The school of Hamilton view the matter differently.  To them a Constitution is as the ark 
of the Covenant.  Storms may beat upon it; they shall not prevail.  Four generations of 
people in the United States of America have been born into this tradition and educated 
in this conviction. 
 
But is it on the conviction or on the Covenant that the guarantee for stability really 
rests?  A prophecy tends to fulfil itself; a political conviction affords the soundest 
anchorage for the ship of State.  Convictions may derive from a Document; but they 
can be sustained in the long [begin page 116] run only by an appeal to reason.  That 
appeal will lie whether the Constitution be embodied in a Covenant, or rests upon 
conventions which are themselves the product of long centuries of compromise, of 
concession, and of continuous readjustment to ever-changing conditions.  The spirit of 
a people is, as a political force, more elusive than the letter of the Constitution.  It has 
yet to be proved that it is less sure a shield in adversity, and less efficacious as a 
barrier against the folly and violence of extremes. 
 XXVII. The Permanent Executive (i) 
The English Civil Service 
 
'Read any history of England in the last century, you will gather the 
impression that the Cabinet and the House of Commons have been the only 
operative instruments of our Government; you will hear nothing about the 
permanent officials, everything about the politicians.'  -Ramsay Mum. 
 
'Of all the existing political traditions in England the least known to the 
public, and yet one of those most deserving attention is that which governs 
the relation between the expert and the layman . . . the relationship between 
the titular holder of a public post, enjoying the honours and assuming the 
responsibility of office, and a subordinate who, without attracting attention, 
supplies the technical knowledge and largely directs the conduct of his 
chief, extends throughout the English Government from the Treasury Bench 
to the Borough Council.' - A.L. Lowell. 
 
'As matters now stand the Government of the country could not be carried 
on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a 
position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly 
responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient 
independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, 
and to some extent influence those who are from time to time set over them.' 
- Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1853). 
 
The Civil Service 
Autocratic Sovereigns, elected Presidents, Parliamentary Cabinets have this in 
common: they all perform their functions, in these modern days, under the glare of 
publicity.  An American President, an English Minister, can only reach his constituents, 
can only influence that public opinion, upon which his own power ultimately rests, 
through the megaphone of the Press.  In each case, however, his success in 
administration depends upon the loyal and skilful co-operation of a body of officials 
whose tenure is virtually permanent, who in their several departments have a technical 
and expert knowledge of the work which the political chiefs of the State must 
necessarily approach as amateurs. 
 
With these expert, permanent, and silent officials, with the men who carry on the daily 
work of Government, and [begin page 118] with the main departments in which their 
work is organized, the present chapter will be concerned. 
 
Its history Unwritten 
It is a significant and illuminating fact that the history of the English Civil Service still 
remains to be written.  Whitehall is indeed a mushroom growth compared with 
Westminster; but while the High Court of Parliament has formed the subject of 
innumerable treatises in many languages, the history of the development of the Civil 
Service must still be sought in Blue Books, in the Reports of Royal Commissions, of 
Departmental and Select Committees, and similar publications, the popularity a 
accessibility of which are by no means commensurate with their intrinsic value.  There 
are, indeed, excellent chapters on this subject in general works on English Government 
but the Civil Service still awaits a chronicler who will treat the subject comprehensively 
and on a scale adequate to its importance.  Meanwhile, no work on the mechanism of the State can ignore one of the most vital portions of the machine, and the organization 
and staffing of the great departments of the Central Government must, therefore now 
claim our attention. 
 
The Political Executive 
The mainspring of the administration is supplied by the Cabinet.  This body, regarded 
as a unit, acts as the Executive political committee which rules the United Kingdom and 
the British Empire.  Apart, however, from membership of this Committee, an English 
Cabinet Minister acts individually, in a threefold capacity: he is an adviser to the Crown; 
he is a Parliamentary and Party leader; and finally he is, with certain exceptions, the 
head of an administrative department. 
 
The Cabinet has, in modern days, generally included the following officials: the Prime 
Minister, the Lord High Chancellor, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy 
Seal, the First Lord of the Treasury, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Secretary for Scotland, the 
First Commissioner of Works, six Secretaries of State - for Home Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs, Colonies, War, [begin page 119] India, and Air; three Presidents of Committees 
of the Council - the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, and Education; the Minister of Health, 
and the Minister of Labour.  The Prime Ministership is, as we have seen, invariably 
combined with another office; generally with the First Lordship of the Treasury.  Other 
offices are sometimes, but more rarely, combined in one person.  Nor do all the above 
offices invariably carry with them the right of admission to the Cabinet.  The First 
Commissioner of Works, the Postmaster-General, and the various Presidents of 
Boards have at times, during the last forty years, been excluded from the Cabinet.  On 
the other hand, the Attorney General, the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of 
Ireland, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the Lord Lieutenant himself have been 
included in one or more recent Cabinets.  In addition to the above, the following are 
also included in the Ministry, although they have never been admitted to the Cabinet: 
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
1 the Patronage Secretary, and three junior 
Lords of the Treasury; the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to the Home, Foreign, War, 
Colonial, India, and Air Offices, to the Boards of Trade, Education, and Admiralty, and 
to the Ministries of Health and Labour; the Civil Lord of the Admiralty; the Paymaster-
General,
2 Assistant Postmaster-General, the Attorney-
3 and Solicitor-Generals  for 
England and Ireland
4 the Scottish Lord-Advocate and the Solicitor-General for 
Scotland, the Financial Secretary of the Army Council, and certain officers of His 
Majesty's Household. The above Ministers may, most of them must, have seats in 
Parliament.  They are Party leaders who go into and out of office, according to the 
mutations of party [begin page 120] majorities in the House of Commons.  It is rare for 
any one Minister to hold any one office continuously for more than four or five years.  
Even if his own party is returned for a second tenure of office the individual Minister is 
not infrequently shifted from one office to another.  The Earl of HaIsbury and Lord 
Ashbourne held the Lord Chancellorships of England and Ireland respectively for a 
continuous period (broken only by one three-years' interval) of twenty years; but such 
instances are rare, and likely to become rarer.  A Minister is, always, a bird of passage 
                                                  
1    [119/1]  The Financial Secretary was admitted exceptionally in 1923 when 
virtually acting as a Deputy Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Chancellor who 
was also Prime Minister. 
2    [119/2]  The Paymaster-General was sometimes in the Cabinet: e.g. Lord J. 
Russell in 1832, Sir E. Knatchbull in 1841, Macaulay in 1846, and Lord Granville 
(1851); but Granville was, it would seem, the last. 
3    [119/3]  Since 1812 the Attorney-General for England has been frequently 
included; but to his inclusion grave exception has been taken.   
4   [119/4]  Until 1922. through the department over which he temporarily presides, and generally of rapid 
passage.  Parliamentary Government, Disraeli was wont to say, would be impossible 
but for the recess.  A parliamentary Executive would be impracticable were it not for the 
existence of a permanent Civil Service. 
 
‘As matters now stand the Government of the country could not be carried 
on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a 
position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly 
responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient 
independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, 




The Civil Service, as we know it to-day, may be said to date from the Report of the 
eminent public servants just quoted.  Many of the individual Departments of State, as 
will be shown presently, were in fact in existence long before 1853, but 'before that date 
the administrative and clerical staffs presented no unity of organization, no regularity of 




The Permanent Officials. 
The Civil Service, in the widest sense of the word, now includes all permanent 
employees of the Government, from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign or Home 
Affairs, with his £3,000 a year, down to a Post Office sorter or [begin page 121] a Home 
Office charwoman.  Throughout this Service there are two dominant principles - 
amounting in some cases to rules: permanence of tenure (during good behaviour), and 
abstention from party politics.  Under an Act of 1705 and many subsequent Acts all 
'placemen’, with the exception of holders of certain high political posts, were excluded 
from Parliament; while partly by Service regulations, partly by convention, civil servants 
are required to abstain from all participation in party politics.  An Act of 1710 rendered 
liable to fine and dismissal any Post Office official who shall' by Word, Message, or 
Writing or in any other manner whatsoever endeavour to persuade any elector to give 
or dissuade any elector from giving his vote for the choice of any person . . . to sit in 
Parliament'.  An Act of 1782 disfranchised Revenue officers.  Out of 160,000 electors 
no fewer than 11,500 were at that time officers of Customs and Excise, and no fewer 
than seventy elections were said to be dependent upon their votes.
7  With a franchise 
largely extended the difficulty has been minimized, and an Act of 1868 removed the 
disqualifications imposed in 1782, while Police officers were for the first time 
enfranchised in 1887.  But the danger, though mitigated, has not been entirely 
removed.  It has indeed in late years been emphasized, partly by the enormous 
extension of Government activities and the consequent multiplication of Government 
employees, and partly by the growth of the principle and habit of trade-association.  
The danger is, so far, most clearly apparent in the dockyard constituencies where high 
political considerations are commonly said to be subordinated to trade questions of 
hours, wages, and conditions of employment.  The members for ‘dockyard' boroughs 
are easily distinguishable in the House of Commons for their zeal on behalf of the 
dockyards-men.  This may be inevitable, but it raises large questions not easily 
dismissed.  The agitation among the employees of the Post Office affords another 
symptom of the same disease.  The Postal and Telegraph Service now [begin page 122] 
employs about 185,00 persons, and as an impartial observer remarks, 'it is not difficult 
                                                  
5    [120/5]  Report by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan on the 
organization of the Permanent Civil Service (1853), P. 3. 
6   [120/2]  Royal Commission on the Civil Service, Fourth Report, p. s [Cd. 73381], 
1914. 
7   [121/1]  Erskine May, Constitutional History, i. 348. to perceive that such a power might be used in directions highly detrimental to the 
State.  There is no reason to expect the pressure to grow less, and mutterings are 
sometimes heard about the necessity of taking away the franchise from Government 
employees.  ‘That', adds President Lowell, 'would be the only effective remedy, and the 
time may not be far distant when it will have to be considered seriously.’
8  When it is, 
the difficulties encountered in the daughter-lands, and the ingenuity with which, in one 
instance, they have been met, will deserve and doubtless will receive attention. 
 
Recruitment for the Service; Patronage. 
Only since 1855 have the appointments to this service been placed on a satisfactory 
footing.  Down to that time the principle of private patronage prevailed, and it was not 
entirely eliminated until 1896.  Thus Lord John Ruskin wrote in 1823: 
 
‘Offices in the Post Office, the Stamp Office and the Customs especially are made part 
of the patronage of Members of Parliament voting in favour of Government. . . .  Even 
patronage of the smaller offices . . . is a powerful means of persuasion with that 
numerous class of men who prefer a favour from Government to any other means of 
earning their bread. . . . The Minister, seeing his advantage, has of late years more 
completely organized and adapted this kind of patronage to the purpose of 
parliamentary influence.  When an office in the Stamp or Post Office is vacant the 
Treasury write to the member for the County or Borough voting with the Government 
and ask for his recommendation.'
9
 
A few years later (1829) the Duke of Wellington wrote to his colleague, Sir Robert Peel, 
to complain that the ‘whole system of the patronage of the Government was 
erroneous'.  But the point of his complaint was that the patronage fell to private 
members who did not always vote with the Government.  The effect of such methods of 
appointment upon the efficiency of the public service was held up to public scorn in 
1849 by Sir Charles Trevelyan, [begin page 123] then Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury.  He condemned the service as overstaffed in numbers, inactive, and 
incompetent, and urged that the first necessary step towards reform was to ensure that 
only properly qualified persons should be appointed. 
 
'There is', he wrote, 'a general tendency to look to the public establishments 
as a means of securing a maintenance for young men who have no chance 
of success in the open competition of the legal, medical, and mercantile 
professions. . . . There being no limitation in regard to the age of admission 
in the great offices of State, the dregs of all other professions are attracted 
towards the public service as a secure asylum, in which, although 
prospects are moderate, failure is impossible, provided the most ordinary 
attention be paid to the rules of the Department.  The prizes of the 
profession have long been habitually taken from those to whom they 
properly belong and have been given to members of the political service.  
We are involved in a vicious circle.  The permanent Civil servants are 
habitually superseded because they are inefficient, and they are inefficient 
because they are habitually superseded.' 
 
To remedy these defects Sir Charles Trevelyan suggested the imposition of an age limit 
on first appointments; the institution of an examination in literary and scientific subjects 
preliminary to appointment; and the enforcement of an effective period of probation 
before the confirmation of the appointment.  Some years were, however, to elapse 
before these suggestions were acted upon. 
 
                                                  
8   [122/1]  Government of England, i. 
9   [122/2]  History of the English Government, pp. 402-3. Open Competition for the Indian Service. 
Meanwhile, the principle of a competitive examination for appointments had been 
tentatively introduced into the service of the East India Company.  The Charter Act of 
1833 provided that four candidates should be nominated by the Board of Directors, or, 
failing them, by the Board of Control, to each vacancy in the Company's College at 
Haileybury, and that nominees should be subjected to competitive examination.  The 
novel principle was thus justified by Lord Macaulay, who was primarily responsible for 
its introduction: 
 
‘It is said, I know, that examinations in Latin, in Greek, and in mathematics 
are no tests of what men will prove to be in life.  [begin page 124] I am 
perfectly aware that they are not infallible tests, but that they are tests I 
confidently maintain.  Look at every walk of life, at this House, at the other 
House, at the Bar, at the Bench, at the Church, and see whether it is not 
true that those who attain high distinction in the world are generally men 
who were distinguished in their academic career.  Indeed, Sir, this objection 
would prove far too much even for those who use it.  It would prove that 
there is no use at all in education. . . . Why should we keep a young man to 
his Thucydides or his Laplace when he would rather be shooting?   
Education would be, a mere useless torture if at two or three and twenty a 
man who has neglected his studies were exactly on a par with a man who 
has applied himself to them, exactly as likely to perform all the offices of 
public life with credit to himself and with advantage to Society.' 
 
The system introduced by Macaulay was, after a few years' trial, suspended, but the 
principle for which he pleaded was accepted in 1853 when open competition for the 
recruitment of the Indian Service was finally and permanently adopted. 
 
The Northcote – Trevelyan Report, 1853. 
The English Civil Service reached the same goal by much more gradual stages.  The 
first stage was marked by the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles 
Trevelyan who in 1853 were commissioned by Mr. Gladstone, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, to inquire into the organization of the permanent Civil Service and to report 
upon the best method of recruiting it.  'The Report of these Commissioners, dated 23 
November 1853, is the foundation upon which the structure of the existing Civil Service 
has been built.’
10  The Commissioners found that 'admission to the Civil Service was 
indeed eagerly sought after, but it was for the incompetent and the indolent or 
incapable that it was chiefly desired'.  No effort was made in the first instance to secure 
fit persons for the public service or to turn to the best account any abilities which the 
persons appointed might happen to possess.  Patronage was evidently the root of the 
evil; and the Commissioners, therefore, recommended that patronage should be 
abolished and that the Service should be recruited by competitive [begin page 125] 
examination open to all candidates, subject only to a test of age, health, and character.  
They further recommended that a clear distinction should be drawn between the 
intellectual and routine work of the Civil Service; that a corresponding division of labour 
in public offices should be insisted upon, and that two types of examination - one for 
the higher and another for the lower appointments in such offices-should be instituted. 
 
The Civil Service Commission. 
The subsequent developments in the organization of the Civil Service have followed 
precisely the lines indicated by Northcote and Trevelyan; but that development was 
slow and irregular.  The first and not the least important step was taken in 1855, when 
by an Order-in-Council of 21 May the Civil Service Commission was created to conduct 
the proposed examinations.  This was followed in 1859 by the Superannuation Act 
                                                  
10   [124/1]  Fourth Report of 1914, P. 7. which made pensionable rights in the permanent Civil Service dependent upon a 
certificate from the Commissioners.  Not, however, until 1870 was the competitive test 
made obligatory by an Order-in-Council, and not until 1876 was the principle of 
differentiation of functions within the several offices, to which the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report had attached the highest importance, generally accepted and applied.  The 
Royal Commission of 1886 found indeed that the application was still partial, and the 
lines of differentiation far from satisfactory.  Certain improvements were accordingly 
adopted. 
 
The Royal Commission of 1912-14. 
A quarter of a century elapsed before yet another of a long series of Commissions was 
appointed under Lord Macdonnell.  The Commissioners reached the conclusion that 
despite 'various defects, some of considerable importance', the fundamental principles 
upon which the Civil Service was based were sound, and its organization was in the 
main efficient.  The action which, over a series of years, had been taken to improve the 
service had resulted, in their judgement, in the creation of a 'competent, zealous, and 
upright body of officers'.  Nor did they doubt that to this result the system of open 
competition had 'most materially contributed'.  [begin page 126] 
 
The detailed recommendations of the Macdonnell Commission, like those of the 
Treasury Committee appointed under the Chairmanship of Lord Gladstone (January 
1918 to review the situation created by the war, are too technical and detailed to justify 
consideration in a work like the present.  It is, however, indicative of the movement of 
opinion in the last twenty years that the Macdonnell Commission should have laid 
particular emphasis on the importance of bringing the several examinations for Civil 
Service appointments of different grades into closer and more logical correspondence 
with the educational system of the country.  Only in this way, it was held, could 'the 
interests of democracy and of the Public Service ' be reconciled, and the best brains of 
the country, in whatever rank of Society they might emerge be made available for the 
service of the State. 
 
That the Civil Service does now open a career to talent cannot be disputed.  The 
educational ladder is now sufficiently substantial to enable boys and girls of 
conspicuous ability to mount by successive rungs to the Universities, and from the 
Universities to qualify for admission to the highest grades of the Civil Service.  There 
are, indeed, sections of opinion to which the idea of competition, even in connexion 
with an examination system, is abhorrent; but those who dislike the competitive 
principle have not yet formulated any alternative which would not reproduce, though 
possibly under different forms, many of the defects inherent in the old system of 
patronage.  The only alternative to competition is selection, and selection must, in one 
form or another, involve patronage.  The doctrinaire opponents of the competitive 
principle will, therefore, be well advised to scrutinize closely the records of the past 
before embarking on a path beset by many unsuspected pitfalls. 
 
Organization of the Civil Service. 
Within the Service itself there are now various grades, the initial recruitment for which 
is from differing intellectual, though not invariably different social, spheres.  The 
classification has been reorganized since 1920 in accordance [begin page 127] with the 
recommendations of the Civil Service National Whitley Council,
11 and the several 
compartments are no longer watertight.  On the contrary the principle is now fully and 
frankly accepted that material hindrances must not be allowed to block merit and ability, 
and that persons recruited to the Service at different ages and by different tests shall 
be placed on an equality as regards opportunity of promotion to higher posts.  A few of 
                                                  
11   [127/1]  Report of the joint Committee on the Organization, &c., of the Civil 
Service, Stationery Office, 1922. the highest posts are still occasionally filled by nomination; for more, there is a 
combination of selection and competitive examination; but the great bulk of the 
appointments are made on the results of open, competitive, written examinations.  The 
service is now open both to men and women. 
 
Grading. 
The administrative and clerical work of the Civil Services falls broadly into two main 
categories.  To one category belongs all such work as is either of a simple mechanical 
kind or consists in the application of well defined regulations, decisions, and practice, 
to particular cases; to the other category, the work which is concerned with the 
formation of policy, with the revision of existing practice or current regulations and 
decisions, and with the organization and direction of the business of Government.   
Acting upon this principle Civil Servants are now graded in four classes: 
 
(i)   a Writing Assistant Class for simple mechanical work; 
(ii)   a Clerical Class for the higher sort of work included in the first main 
category defined above; and, for the work included in the second 
category, 
(iii)   an Executive Class, and 
(iv)   an Administrative Class. 
 
Writing Assistants are employed in large numbers only in those departments in which 
there are large blocks of simple routine work to be performed, as in the Post Office, the 
Health, Labour, and Pensions Ministries.  In offices where there are no such large 
blocks of work of this kind, the duties of the Writing Assistant Class are assigned to the 
Clerical Class in the initial stage of their career.  Writing Assistants are recruited, largely 
among girls, by local [begin page 128] competitive examinations of a simple character 
with age limits of 16 to 17.  The pay of this class ranges from 18s. to 36s. a week 
exclusive of war bonus.
12  Regular machinery exists for the promotion of Writing 
Assistants of proved capacity to the Clerical grade. 
 
The Clerical Class supervises the work of the Writing Assistants and deals with the 
collection of statistical and other materials for the higher grades and with the checking 
of claims, returns, &c., under well-defined instructions.  This class is recruited under 
age limits of 16 to 17 for boys and 16½ to 17½ for girls by open examination based 
upon the standard of the intermediate stage of a Secondary School course.  Entrants 
are subjected to one year's strict probation.  The pay of this class ordinarily ranges 
from £60 to £250 a year, but with further possibility of rising, £400 a year in cases of 
proved capacity. 
 
                                                  
12   [128/1]  The present bonus scheme was framed in 1920 when the cost of living 
figure stood at about 130 percent above pre-war, and this was taken as the basic 
figure from which bonus calculations begin.  For every five full points variation in 




.  The cost living figure on which bonus is at present (1925) based is 80, 
and the bonus has therefore been reduced by 
10
26
 from the 130 point.  Thus at 
present, salaries up to 35s. a week carry a bonus of 80 percent while on salaries 
above 35s. a week the percentage of bonus to salary becomes progressively less 
than the percentage increase in the cost of living over pre-war, until at £2,000 a 
year the bonus disappears completely. The Executive Class is recruited partly from the Clerical Class, and partly by open 
competitive examination based upon the standard reached at the end of a Secondary 
School course.  The pay ranges from £100 to £500 a year. 
 
The Administrative Class is concerned with the formation of policy and with the general 
administration and control of the Departments of the Public Service.  Apart from 
promotion from the lower grades of the Service it is recruited by examination based on 
a high honours standard at a university, with age limits of 22 to 24.  Entrants serve an 
apprenticeship in a 'Cadet Corps', with salaries ranging from £200 to £500 a year, and 
thence pass to the [begin page 129] highest administrative posts with salaries ranging 
for permanent Heads of Departments up to £3,000 a year.
13
 
It should be added that a probationary period of one year (which may be extended to 
two years at the discretion of the Head of the Department) has been prescribed by 
Order-in-Council for all persons recruited to the Civil Service by examination. 
 
Besides the above classes there are employed in the public offices a certain number of 
professional, scientific, and technical advisers, such as lawyers, physicians, 
economists, &c., some of whom enter the Service at a relatively mature age by 
nomination; though as a rule recruitment is by some form of open competition.  There 
is also a large number of typists and shorthand typists who are recruited by 
examination, within age limits of 18 to 28, and receive from 22s. up to 46s. a week, with 
superintendents at £150 to £180 a year, and chief superintendents with a minimum of 
£200 a year.  There are also, duly enumerated in the Parliamentary Estimates, 
charwomen and messengers. 
 
Growth of Bureaucracy 
Entrance to the Service is now almost invariably by open competition and in all but 
relatively few cases by examination.  Under modern conditions it could not be 
otherwise, since the weaknesses incidental to any form of patronage or selection have, 
it is obvious, been immensely exaggerated by the multiplication of Government 
Departments, and the consequent increase in the number of officials.  Tendencies in 
these directions were manifest before the outbreak of the Great War, and were to be 
attributed on the one hand to a declining faith in the philosophic dogma of laisser-faire, 
on the other to the complementary demand that the State should undertake a variety of 
functions which, if performed at all, had hitherto been undertaken by individuals or 
voluntary associations. 
 
Public Social Services 
Nothing, perhaps, illustrates more vividly the growth [begin page 130] of the social 
activities of the State than a return which for some years past has been annually 
presented to Parliament showing the expenditure under certain Acts of Parliament for 
Public Social Services.  The return includes expenditure on the National Insurance 
(Health) Acts, the Unemployment Insurance Acts, the Old Age Pensions Acts, the 
Education Acts, and others of considerable though less importance.  The total 
expenditure on such things England, Wales, and Scotland was in the year 1891 about 
£13,300,000; in 1901 it had risen to £23,000,000; and 1911 to about £46,000,000.   
Neither the Health nor the Unemployment Insurance Acts had in 1911 come into 
operation, and no account has been taken in the above figures of sums expended on 
the relief of the poor.  To the growth of expenditure on such services since 1911, 
particularly since the War, reference will be made another connexion.  The number of 
persons employed in the Public Service tells a similar tale.  In 1797 it was 16,267; by 
                                                  
13   [129/1]  A very few special posts, created for specially imported men, carry the 
same and in one case even higher salary. 1827 it had increased to nearly 23,000;
14 in 1914 it was 279,300.
15  It is now (1925) 
299,120, and has in the interval been much higher.
16
 
Civil Service Estimates. 
Equally  eloquent is the growth in the Civil Service estimates.  No estimates were 
Presented to Parliament for the salaries of the Civil Service until 1848.  Down to the 
end of the eighteenth century the cost of civil government, so far as it was not self-
supporting, was paid out of the Civil List of the Sovereign, as was proper and logical so 
long as the staffs of the Departments of State were regarded as household servants of 
the King.  The office premises were technically regarded as ‘lodgings of court', and the 
staffs were, to a relatively recent date entitled to food from the King's kitchen supplied 
at King's expense.  Thus there is a record as late as 1737 of [begin page 131] a 
payment of £1,269 to two Under-Secretaries and sixteen of their clerks as 'Board 
wages during His Majesty's residence at Hampton Court, July 14-October 29 '-a clear 
indication that while the Court was in London these gentlemen were fed from the royal 
kitchen.  The remuneration of these 'Civil' servants was mainly derived from fees.  The 
Secretary to the Post Office, for example, had a salary of £1,200 a year, and in addition 
derived over £3,000 a year from fees.  Even the Heads of Departments were to a great 
extent remunerated in a similar way.  The fees of the Foreign Secretary were reckoned 
at £2,000 a year; of the Lord President £2,280; while the fees of the Home Secretary 
were so large that it was his practice to return £1,500 a year out of them to increase the 




The drastic reform applied to the Legislature in 1832 was quickly followed by equally 
drastic changes on the administrative side of Government.  So long as the King was 
the personal and, effective ruler of the realm it was natural that the administrative 
officials should be regarded as his personal servants, appointed to do his will, and 
remunerated in part out of his purse, and in larger part out of the fees of suitors and 
clients.  Patronage and nomination are the logical complements of autocracy and even 
of oligarchy.  When supreme power passed to a reformed House of Commons it was 
natural that the servants of the King should become the servants of the State.  The 
change of system, like most other changes in this country, was effected by gradual 
stages.  An indication of the coming change may be found a comparison of the 
Accounts of Public Income and Expenditure for the year ended 5 January 1802, with 
the accounts for the years immediately preceding.  In the year 1802 the Civil List 
payments are for the first time set forth under the eight classes into which the Civil List 
expenditure had been specifically [begin page 132] divided by Lord Rockingham's Act of 
1782.
18  More than that; there now appears for the first time an item, Miscellaneous 
Civil Services out of Supplies, viz. 
 
 £  s.  d. 
Class 1. Public Works and Buildings.  37,121  0  0 
   “      2. Salaries, &c., of Public Departments  42,740  14  0 
   “      3. Law and justice.  32,439  12  3 
                                                  
14   [130/1]  Public Offices Employment Returns, 1828. 
15   [130/2]  Cmd. 2428 (1925). 
16   [130/3]  Cmd. 2448 0925). These figures no longer include (as did those of 1914) 
southern Ireland, nor do they include industrial staffs, Admiralty staffs in foreign 
yards, or some 6,000 employees of the War Office, Air Ministry, and Labour 
Ministry. 
17   [131/]  Gretton, The King's Government, pp. 97, 108; Report of Select Committee 
on Reduction of Salaries (1831); S.C. on Misc. Expenditure, 1847-8. 
18   [132/1]  Geo. III, c. 82.    “      4. Education, Science, and Art.  ----------  --  -- 
   “      5. Colonial Consular and other Foreign Services  165,680  14  9 
   “      6. Superannuations, Charities, &c.  273,262  0  8 
   “      7. Miscellaneous, special and temporary  178,611  2  0 
 
The total sum thus granted ‘out of supplies' (1802) amounted to £729,855 3s. 8d., as 
compared with a total of £997,678 3s. for the Civil List.  ‘Supply’, it must be observed, 
accounted only for the supplementary payments for the carrying on of the Civil 
administration of the State.  The bulk of the charge was still imposed upon the Civil List 
and was not, therefore, subject to the annual scrutiny of the House of Commons.  That 
any portion of the charge for the Civil Service should be contingent upon an annual 
vote and consequently subject to an annual scrutiny marked an immense step forward 
towards the control of Parliament over public expenditure. 
 
The annual charge tended to increase, though not quite constantly.  In 1804 it was just 
over £1,000,000, in 1815 just short of £2,000,000, in 1819 £2,500,000.  For the latter 
year the Civil List charge amounted to £1,319,404 2s. 2d.  All through the reigns of 
George I and George IV there had been constant deficits on the Civil List, due in part 
to the inevitable growth of public expenditure, in part to the efforts of the Crown to 
retain its political influence in the manner cynically commend [begin page 133] by Sir 
Robert Walpole.  These deficits Parliament had to make good.  On the accession of 
William IV a more decisive step was taken.  Upon the recommendation of a select 
Committee all expenditure 'not directly' affecting the dignity and state of the Crown and 
the personal comfort of their Majesties was removed from the Civil List, which was then 
fixed at £510,000.  Meanwhile the payments for Miscellaneous Civil Services out of 
supply grants had mounted (for the year ending 5 January 1832) to £2,850,000.  On 
the accession of Queen Victoria the Civil List was reduced to £385,000, and at the 
same time relieved of the payment for Civil List pensions.  The Supply Grants showed 
thereafter a tendency to rise: they amounted to nearly £2,800,000 for 1838, nearly 
£3,000,000 for 1842, and over £5,000,000 for 1847. 
 
Select Committee of 1848 
The growth of expenditure for Miscellaneous Services led to the appointment, in 
February 1848, of a Select Committee to inquire into this branch of national 
expenditure and to report on the possibility of reductions or of improvements in the 
mode of submitting estimates to Parliament.  The average expenditure for these 
services in the decennial period 1798-1807 had been £1,800,012; in that from 1828 to 
1837, £2,269,668; and in that from 1838 to 1847, £3,016,343. 
 
The Committee expressed their conviction that the ‘only large reduction that could be 
made would be that Parliament should decide on some great measure of relief to the 
Public purse from certain charges, and afterwards urge upon the Executive a minute 
and constant supervision of those that remain'.  Sir F.T. Baring, M.P., expressed to the 
Committee his opinion that 'the Treasury ought to be constantly employed in revising 
this expenditure'.  'These revisions', he said, 'have been periodical; in my opinion they 
ought to be continuous.’
19
 
Growth of Civil Service Expenditure 
How far those revisions were effective in reducing expenditure, or in preventing the 
growth of it, may be seen from the expenditure on Civil Government (with which [begin 
page 134] alone we are at present concerned) during thee next twee years. 
 
   £ 
1848 -------  12,207,973 
                                                  
19   [133/1]  Reports, vol. xviii, Sess. 1847-8.    £ 
1849 -------  11,466,615 
1850 -------  11,150,603 
1851 -------  11,001,648 
1852 -------  10,952,035 
1853 -------  10,688,889 
1854 -------  11,417,812 
1855 -------  11,026,520 
1856 -------  13,212,723
20
1857 -------  13,091,138 
1858 -------  14,505,906 
1859 -------  13,626,098 
1860 -------  14,124,461 
1861 -------  15,215,476
21
1862 -------  15,521,537 
1863 -------  15,434,973 
1864 -------  15,298,923 
1865 -------  14,811,883 
1866 -------  14,853,002 
1867 -------  15,346,976 
1868 -------  16,076,961 
 
These figures include the Consolidated Fund charges, (except that for the Service of 
the Debt), the Civil Administration, and the Revenue Departments.  They reveal an 
almost constant, though not a startling, increase of civil expenditure, and even more 
clearly they reveal the influence exercised upon English politics during the whole of this 
period by the Manchester School.  In some directions that influence may have been far 
from beneficent, in regard to public expenditure it was in the highest degree salutary.  
Economy was the watchword of the school, and, in particular, of Mr. Gladstone, who as 
Chancellor of the [begin page 135] Exchequer, 1852-4, 1859-66, and 188o-2, did more 
than any statesman of his time to exorcize the spirit of public extravagance. 
 
Gladstone’s Influence on the Treasury 
That economy lay at the root of all sound administration was indeed the central article 
in Gladstone's creed.  Influence To him the principle of thrift, public and private, was not 
merely economic but ethical, and he never tired of preaching, and, while he had the 
power, of enforcing it.  'All excess in the public expenditure beyond the legitimate wants 
of the country is not only a pecuniary waste, but a great political and above all a great 
moral evil.'
22  'Economy', he wrote to his brother Robertson, 'is the first and great article 
in my financial creed.'  And economy must have regard to pennies not less than to 
pounds.  Addressing an Edinburgh audience in 1879 be said: 'The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer should boldly uphold economy in detail, and it is the mark of a chicken-
hearted chancellor when he shrinks from upholding economy in detail. . . . He is 
ridiculed no doubt for what is called candle-ends and cheese-parings, but he is not 
worth his salt if he is not ready to save what are meant by candle ends and cheese-
parings in the cause of the country.'
23
 
Mr. Gladstone's practice was consistent with his precepts.  The last Budget for which, 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was responsible (his thirteenth) was that of 1882.  
In that year the estimated total expenditure amounted to £85,429,491; the Civil Service 
                                                  
20   [134/1]  The effect of the Crimean War is apparent in this and the following years. 
21   [134/2]  Post Office Packet Service transferred from Navy to Post Office in this 
year. 
22   [135/1]  Morley, Life, ii. 53. 
23   [135/2]  Ibid., 62-3. expenditure to £16,872,729 - a sum hardly in excess of that under Mr. Gladstone's first 
Ministry of 1868. 
 
Expenditure 1882-1914 
To a post-war generation these figures appear almost insignificant; and in the figures 
for the next twenty years there was little to alarm even the more rigid economists, 
though it is possible to discern the effect of social legislation upon public expenditure.  
In 1887-8 the Civil Service expenditure was £18,210,000,
24 and after a decline in the 
[begin page 136] next four years, gradually mounted again to £20,884, in 1896-7, and to 
£36,200,000 under the influence of the South African War in 1902-3.  Not until 1909-10 
did it again reach that figure, but Mr. Lloyd George's first Budget of that year provided 
for £40,010,000.  Within five years the same Chancellor of the Exchequer had 
increased expenditure, under this head, to £57,066,000 - his original estimate for the 
last pre-war year 1914-15. 
 
How was this money expended?  By far the large, single item until we reach the Great 
War, with its heavy charge for war pensions, was for education.  In the year 1890-1 the 
charge to the exchequer, apart from local rates, was about £6½ millions; in 1900-1 it 
had risen to nearly £13 millions; in 1910-11 to £19 millions, and in 1921 to nearly £56 
millions.  By 1910-11 another considerable item had appeared - over £7¼ millions for 
old-age pensions.  This item increased rapidly to £20¾ millions in 1921, and for the 
year 1925-6 to nearly £27 millions.  The Ministries of Health and Labour, neither in 
existence in 1891 nor indeed in 1911, now claim between them, largely for health and 
unemployment insurance, no less than, £35 millions. 
 
Figures such as these point, more graphically than many words, to the immense 
expansion of the activities of the Civil Service during the last forty years, and more 
particularly in the last fifteen. 
 
The War and the Civil Service. 
The period since the outbreak of the Great War must evidently be treated as 
exceptional, and many of the phenomena connected with that period may, it is hoped, 
be regarded as transitory.  The State was suddenly called upon to assume - apart from 
the actual provision of men and munitions for the conduct of the war - a multitude of 
functions, to which it was unaccustomed, and for which the available machinery was 
neither apt nor adequate.  This expansion of activities is clearly demonstrated by the 
rapid increase of Civil Service expenditure; by the Phenomenal addition to staffs, and 
by the creation of new Ministries and Departments.  [begin page 137] 
 
Civil Service Expenditure 
For the last pre-war year (1914-15) the Civil Service expenditure was estimated, as we 
have seen, at £57,066,000.  The audited expenditure for that year was £130,837,590 
for 1915-16, £728,555,621; for 1916-17, £1,270,197,820 and for 1917-18, 
£1,686,613,670.  The last figure marked the peak of expenditure, and it may be 
interesting to record some of the largest items in this colossal total.  The Ministry of 
Munitions accounted for £715,101,222 (the highest point reached for munitions), loans 




                                                  
24    [135/3]  These and the following figures include only what is now strictly 
regarded as Civil Service and excludes Consolidated Fund charges and Revenue 
Departments - unlike the figures on p. 134. 
25   [137/1]  Cmd. 802 (1920). After the war there was naturally a rapid reduction: to £448,816,000 (audited 
expenditure) in 1920-1, and to £222,609,000 for 1925-6 (original estimates), but even 
the latter figure shows an increase of £165,543,000, or over 300 per cent., as 
compared, with the estimate for the last pre-war year.  From this comparison war 
pensions, amounting for the current year
26 to £66,026,000, must clearly be omitted.  
Education, however, shows an increase of over £30 millions (from £17 to £47 millions); 
Old-age Pensions of £16,683,000 (from £10,000 to nearly £27 millions); Health and 
Unemployment Insurance of £13½ millions (from £6½ to £20 millions); while other large 
items are £2¼ millions for the Board of Agriculture (against £371,000); £3½ millions for 
a variety of Health Services (against £522,000); £6½ millions for Works and Buildings 
(against £3¼); £9,040,000 for Housing (an entirely new item); over £7 millions for 




Criticism of the policy which has involved, and may or may not justify, the expenditure 
detailed in the preceding paragraphs would be out of place in the present work.  The 
figures are quoted simply for the purpose of illustrating the effect of the Great War, and 
of the new sense of [begin page 138] money values induced by war-expenditure, upon 
domestic administration.  Such figures do not, however, stand alone.  Parallel with 
them, and not less illuminating as evidence of the vast extension of State activity, was 
the expansion of the staffs of Government Departments.  In 1914 the total staff, as we 
have seen, was 279,300, of whom the Post Office accounted for 208,900.  At the time 
of the Armistice (11 November 1918) the total was 418,025.  A six-fold increase in the 
War Office staff (excluding Record Office and Pay Office and Ordnance Factory staffs) 
is intelligible; as is the increase in the Admiralty between three and four-fold.  But, save 
for the Post Office, by far the largest staff at the time of the Armistice was that of the 
Surplus Stores Liquidation Department - hitherto the Ministry of Munitions.  This was 
responsible for no fewer than 65,142 persons.  But the Board of Trade had expanded 
from 2,500 employees to 7,036, apart from its subordinate Departments for Food 
Control and Shipping Liquidation which in November 1918 were jointly responsible for 
nearly 12,000 employees. 
 
The Bradbury Committee, 1918. 
The rapid growth of ' Whitehall ' created a considerable measure of alarm in the public 
mind.  The impression began, rightly or wrongly, to prevail that the expansion of 
Government employment was, during the war, on an exaggerated, unnecessary, and 
extravagant scale.  To appease public uneasiness a Treasury Committee under Sir 
John (now Lord) Bradbury was (February 1917) appointed to inquire into the numbers 
and organization of the clerical staffs employed in the new Ministries created, and in 
other Departments enlarged, during the war, the method of recruitment and rates of 
remuneration and to report on possible improvements and economies.  The final 
Report of this Committee was presented in 1910 and showed that the clerical, &c., 
staffs employed in Civil offices (i.e. excluding the entire staffs of the Army local 
establishments, of the Ordnance Factories, and of the Ordnance Survey Department, 
the manipulative staffs of the Post Office and the men in other departments who [begin 
page 139] were absent on military service) amounted, on the dates mentioned, to 
 
 Men.  Women.  Total. 
1. August 1914  45,000 8,500 53,500 
1. April 1917  54,000 51,000 105,000 
1. February 1918  62,000 86,000 148,000 
 
                                                  
26   [137/2]  1925-6 (estimate). In 1920-1 the charge for war pensions was no less than 
£106,367,000. Cmd. 2428 (1925). The Committee formed the opinion that this enormous expansion was due primarily to 
the inevitable extension of Government activities during the war, but that the numbers 
employed were excessive as compared with the numbers which would have been 
required if the standard of organization prevailing in the best-managed permanent 
departments could have been adopted throughout the service.  Under the stress of war 
such an ideal was evidently unattainable.  New departments had to be hurriedly 
created; their staffs had to he collected at short notice; it was impossible to insist on 
any strict test of qualification; such non-commissioned officers (if we adapt the analogy) 
as were not released for military duties were too few in numbers to train the new 
recruits.  There was, moreover, great difficulty in securing suitable office 
accommodation; the sub-division of departments between a number of widely scattered 
buildings led to waste of staffs, duplication of functions, and rendered more difficult the 
task of training and of supervision.  Nevertheless, after making all allowances for these 
and similar difficulties the Bradbury Committee came to the conclusion that there 
remained a proportion, and 'in some departments a very substantial proportion of staff 
which was excessive and whose employment could have been avoided by better 
organization'.  The excess was due, in their opinion, in some degree to overlapping 
between departments, but much more to defects in internal organization, particularly in 
the new departments. 
  
Not content with criticism the Bradbury Committee made a series of detailed 
recommendations as to staffing, the concentration of office accommodation, the 
strengthen- [begin page 140] ing of Treasury control and like matters, a consideration of 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter.  The general purport of the 
recommendations was that there should be a return to normality in Civil Service 
administration at the earliest possible moment permitted by circumstances.  
 
The Return to Normality. 
Circumstances proved, as a fact, unexpectedly obdurate, and the return to normality 
was correspondingly slow.  By 1 April 1929, the staffs showed a reduction of about 25 
per cent. as compared with Armistice Day (317,721 against 418,025), and the Civil 
Service expenditure for the year 1922-3 amounted to £290,6000,000, as compared 
with £932,383,203 for the first year of peace, 1919-20.  Gone was the bread subsidy 
which in 1919-20 had cost £56,500,000; gone was the item 'Loans to Dominions and 
Allies' which in the earlier year had accounted for no less than £147,500,000; the 
payment under the Railway agreements was halved and was soon to be reduced to 
insignificance, while war pensions already showed a diminution of £26,000,000 as 
compared with the 'peak' year.
27  But these were not the items which caused most 
anxiety to those who looked for drastic economies and a contraction of the activities of 
the State.  These items evidently represented the lingering legacy of war-time 
administration.  It was the increased expenditure on peace-time activities which in 
particular inspired alarm. 
 
New departments had, as will presently be seen, necessarily been called into being by 
the war.  Some had already closed down; others had been reduced to skeleton 
proportions and were soon to die the death of the unrighteous; others again, like the 
Ministry of Pensions were bound to tarry for a considerable time; some, like the 
Ministries of Labour and Transport, seemed destined to permanence.  But this aspect 
of the development of the Civil Service will be treated more appropriately in the next 
chapter. 
 
                                                  
27   [140/1]  Cmd. 802 (1920), 2428 (1925). XXVIII. The Permanent Executive (2) 
The Great Offices of State. The Secretariat 
 
'Amongst all particular offices and places of charge in this State there is 
none of more necessary use, nor subject to more cumber and variableness, 
than is the office of principal Secretary.'-Nicholas Faunt (1592). 
 
'All officers and counsellors of provinces have a prescribed authority by 
patent, by custom or by oath, the Secretary only excepted, but to the 
Secretary, out of a confidence and singular affection, there is a liberty to 
negotiate at discretion at home and abroad, with friends and enemies, in all 
matters of speech and intelligence.' - Sir Robert Cecil. 
 
'It is not the business of a Cabinet Minister to work his department.  His 
business is to see that it is properly worked.' - Sir George Cornewall Lewis. 
 
 
Growth of the Administrative System. 
Reference has been repeatedly made in the course of this work to the haphazard 
development of English institutions.  The observation is not least pertinent in regard to 
the administrative system.  The English Constitution has never been 'made'; it is 
organic; it has developed with the development of the people, and strengthened with 
their strength.  The hand of the reformer has been frequently applied to it; or rather the 
process of amendment - a patch added here, a rent mended there has been wellnigh 
continuous.  What is true of the Constitution as a whole is true also of those 
departments of Government which are concerned with the work of practical 
administration.  'The English offices', says Bagehot, 'have never since they were made, 
been arranged with any reference to one another; or rather, they were never made, but 
grown as each could.'  Of the administrative system, in its totality, Bagehot's 
observation is undeniably true; but in regard to particular offices it is less true today 
than it was when Bagehot wrote some sixty years ago.  Not indeed until the 
appointment of the Machinery of Government Committee by the short-lived Ministry of 
Reconstruction [begin page 142] (1917) was there any attempt officially to survey the 
administrative system as a whole or to suggest a scheme for its reorganization on lines 
at once more scientific, more practically efficient, and (it was hoped) more economical.  
To the Report of this Committee, over which Viscount Haldane of Cloan presided, 
further reference will be made later. 
 
The tedious detail of the preceding chapter will at least have served to illustrate the 
obvious truth that administration is largely a matter of money.  In primitive communities 
indeed the Sovereign calls upon his subjects not for money but for service.  The 
substitution of a money economy for a personal economy is one of the earlier 
manifestations of an emergence from primitive conditions of society to those which we 
are pleased to term' civilized'.  The latter term is itself, indeed, indicative of the 
transition.  The institution of Scutage in England, in the twelfth century, marked an 
important stage in the evolution of modern society.  The King found it more convenient 
even for the purposes of waging war, especially if the campaign was on foreign soil, to 
accept from his vassals a composition in money in lieu of personal service.  The 
demand thus made for money produced widespread reactions.  Feudal lords and their 
manorial villeins found it to their mutual advantage to substitute fixed money payments 
for the agricultural services owed by the villeins to the lords. 
 The Treasury 
It is not, therefore, remarkable that the history of the Administrative System, or rather 
the history of the differentiation of Government Departments, should begin with the 
Treasury, the Scaccarium or Exchequer of the Norman and Angevin Kings. 
 
The Exchequer is descended from the Curia Regis, or, to speak more precisely, the 
Norman Scaccarium was the Curia when sitting for financial business.  It consisted of 
two offices: the Upper, which was a Court of Account; and the Lower, a Court of 
Receipt.  The function of the Exchequer of Account was to ascertain what was due to 
the King; of the Exchequer of Receipt to receive it.  The [begin page 143] Exchequer of 
Account gradually developed into one of the three great Courts of Common Law; the 
Exchequer of Receipt was, if not the ancestor, at least the predecessor, of the modem 
Treasury.
1  The Upper Exchequer consisted of the Chancellor, the Treasurer, and a 
board of high officials known as the Barons of the Exchequer.  This Court controlled all 
persons who collected or expended the revenues of the Crown, audited Accounts, and 
determined all legal questions relating to revenue.  The full body met only twice a year 
to receive the sheriffs' accounts, and in the intervals between its sessions the Barons of 
the Exchequer went on circuit throughout the country for the transaction of financial 
and judicial business. 
 
The chief officers of the Exchequer of Receipt were the Treasurer and the 
Chamberlain.  The functions of the latter officer were later subdivided between the Lord 
Great Chamberlain, the King's Chamberlain, and the Chamberlain of the Exchequer.  
Down to 1826 payments into the Exchequer were recorded by means of tallies, one 
half of which served as a receipt to the payer, the other as a record of payment for the 
Exchequer.  Payments out of the Exchequer were authorized by an order under the 
Great or Privy Seal addressed to the Treasurer and Chamberlains.  The association of 
these officials emphasizes the confusion, to which attention has already been drawn, 
between the household and national accounts and the household and State officials. 
 
The growth of business, the centralization of administrative functions, and the legal 
reforms of Henry II led, before the end of the twelfth century, to a differentiation in the 
functions of the Exchequer and a bifurcation of staffs.  A Chief Baron, with three or four 
other Barons, dealt with judicial business: the Treasurer and his clerks did the 
administrative work.  Yet traces of the common origin of the Courts of Law and the 
Treasury may be found in the fact that down to the year 1875 the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was entitled to sit as a judge in the [begin page 144] Court of Exchequer, 
and on the morrow of St. Martin (12 November) he still annually sits in the High Court 
of justice for the purpose of appointing the sheriffs.  To this ceremony the whole 
Cabinet as well as the judges are summoned.  Thus 'the justiciarii and great officers of 
State sit once more on the Exchequer side of the Curia, only the Exchequer and its 
barons have gone and the Chancellor of the Exchequer finds himself presiding in the 
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of justice'.
2
 
Among the great departments of State the Treasury still stands in every sense apart, 
and in some sense pre-eminent, as it has stood for over seven hundred years.  As 
early as 1155 the Pipe Roll makes mention of a payment 'for repairing the house of the 
Exchequer', from which we may infer that as far back as the reign of Henry II the 
Treasury was separately housed, though the 'house' was then, and for long afterwards, 
within the precincts of the Royal Palace of Westminster.  Owing perhaps to the fact that 
the Treasurer had his own office the Exchequer became the place of deposit for State 
archives.  The responsibility for the custody of these documents from the time that they 
are released from the departments to which they severally belong is now vested in a 
great judicial officer, the Master of the Rolls. 
                                                  
1   [143/1]  Cf. Gretton, op. cit., p. i seq. 
2   [144/1]  Anson, The Crown, p. 178.  
The Treasurer 
The Treasurer was, from the Norman Conquest until the Tudors, one of the great 
officers of the King's Court and of the State.  He was originally inferior in dignity to the 
Justiciar, who acted as the first Minister of the King, and, during the latter's frequent 
absences from the realm of the King, as Viceroy.  The Treasurer was inferior also to the 
chief clerk, or Chancellor, who after the abeyance of the Justiciarship (temp. Henry III) 
was in dignity as well as in power and influence second to the King.  Yet the author of 
the Dialogus de Scaccario (temp. Henry II) says of the Treasurer that he could hardly 
explain in words the cares and anxieties of his office, though he had the pen of a ready 
writer.  His solicitous diligence was [begin page 145] necessary in all the transactions of 
both the Upper and Lower Exchequers, so much so that so long as the Exchequer 
remained, his duties could not be separated from it.  He received the accounts of the 
sheriffs, and had the charge of writing the Great Roll, being responsible that there was 
no error in number, cause, or person, and that no one should be discharged who was 
not quit, and no one charged who had acquitted himself.
3  'In a word,' as Madox puts it, 
'his duty was to provide for and take care of the King's profit.' 
 
By the separation of the Chancery from the Exchequer, at the end of the reign of 
Richard I, the Treasurer gained greatly in dignity and independence.  Still more so by 
the disappearance of the Justiciar.  Moreover, the appointment, under Edward I, of a 
Chief Baron of the Exchequer relieved the Treasurer of judicial business and left him 
free to devote himself to his administrative and political duties.  From this time onward 
he was second only in the official hierarchy to the Chancellor until a rival appeared, 
under the Tudors, in the person of the King's Secretary, or until both were surpassed if 
not superseded by the emergence of a Prime Minister. 
 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Meanwhile, the separation of the Chancery from the Exchequer necessitated the 
appointment of a new official to take charge of the Seal (cancellarium) of the 
Exchequer, and perhaps also to keep a cheek upon the Treasurer, who was already 
tending to become overpowerful and independent.  The earliest record of the 
appointment of a Chancellor of the Exchequer is the 18 Henry III.
4 'He was bound 
equally with the Treasurer to see to the correctness of the Great Roll,' and if the 
Treasurer was in error he was 'to rebuke him with modesty and to suggest what ought 
to be done. If, the Treasurer persevered, the matter was to be argued before the 
Barons and left to their decision.'
5   [begin page 146] 
 
A long time was, however, to elapse before the position, of the junior official in any way 
rivalled that of the senior.  From the time of Henry VII the functions of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer would seem to have become steadily more important.  The office of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Under-Treasurer have since then generally been held 
by the same person, though under different patents.  But under Henry VIII Thomas 
Cromwell combined for a time the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer with that of 
Lord Treasurer.  In 1622 a Commission was issued to enable the Lord Treasurer to act 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in 1624 Sir Richard Weston combined the latter 
office with that of Under-Treasurer, besides being a Commissioner to execute the 
office, during a vacancy, of Lord Treasurer.  The growing importance of the 
Chancellorship of the Exchequer is indicated by the fact that under Charles I the office 
                                                  
3   [145/1]  Public Income and Expenditure (1869), p. 335; Dial. de Scacc., p. 13; 
Madox, P 55. 
4   [145/2]  Though in 1217 Robert Passelawe is recorded as being 'Chancellor of the 
Exchequer or deputy treasurer under Peter de Orial'. 
5   [145/3]  Report of 1869 quoting Madox and Dial. de Scacc.  is held by such men as Francis (afterwards Lord) Cottington, by Sir John Colepeper, 
and, in 1642, by no less a man than Sir Edward Hyde, afterwards Earl of Clarendon.  
From the reign of Charles II the Treasurership was, with increasing frequency, put into 
commission, with the result that the Chancellorship of the Exchequer still further 
developed in importance. 
 
After the Revolution of 1688 we get nearer and nearer to the modern practice.  Thus in 
1694 Sidney (afterwards Earl of) Godolphin became Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
first Commissioner of the Treasury.  Sir Robert Walpole is similarly designated in 1715, 
and finally in 1717 James (afterwards Earl) Stanhope became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and first Lord Commissioner.  This was the position and style assigned to 
Walpole in 1721.  By that time, however, the Prime Minister had definitely emerged; the 
Treasurership had been finally put into commission, and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, having got rid of the incubus of a personal Lord High Treasurer, had come 
to occupy one of the most important places under the Crown, though in the official 
hierarchy his place [begin page 147] is inferior to many of his Cabinet colleagues.  The 
last personal holder of the office of Lord Treasurer was Charles, Duke of Shrewsbury, 
who was appointed to the office, which he held with those of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland 
and Lord Chamberlain of the Household, in the last hours of the reign of Queen Anne.  
In 1714 George I nominated Lord Halifax and four other persons to be Lords 
Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer, and in Commission the 
office has remained ever since that time.  The duties are nominally apportioned among 
five persons: the First Lord, who has generally, though not invariably, combined this 
office with the Premiership; three junior Lords, who now act as the Party Whips, but 
have no duties,
6 save purely formal ones, at the Treasury; and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, who is now the working Head of the Department.  The 'Board' was still a 
reality down to the close of the eighteenth century, but like other Boards (e.g. the Board 
of Trade), though regularly constituted, has long since ceased to meet. 
 
The Treasury is still in many respects the most important Department of the Central 
Government, since it exercises or ought to exercise a strict control over the rest.   
Subject, of course, to Parliament, the Treasury is responsible for the regulation of 
taxation and for the collection of revenue, being assisted in the latter function by the 
Revenue Departments.  It also controls expenditure.  Consequently all estimates must 
be passed by the Treasury before they are submitted to the House of Commons by the 
Minister immediately responsible.  Under the Cabinet system, however, the 
responsibility for expenditure, as for everything else, is collective, and, should the 
Cabinet decide that a certain expense must be incurred, the Treasury has no option but 
to find the money.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he deems the expenditure 
unjustifiable, has one means of protest, but one only - that of resignation.  In 1887 Lord 
Randolph Churchill [begin page 148] resolved on this method of protesting against the 
expenditure on armaments; the Prime Minister decided in favour of the Admiralty and 
the War Office, and Lord Randolph Churchill's resignation was consequently accepted.  
But the protests of the guardian of the national purse do not often go so far as this.  
The threat is frequently uttered but rarely carried out.  Lord Palmerston declared that 
his desk was full of Mr. Gladstone's resignations, but, in his case, matters were always 
in the long, run adjusted.  On one occasion when the tone of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was more than ordinarily menacing, Lord Palmerston wrote to Queen 
Victoria: 
 
‘Viscount Palmerston hopes to be able to overcome his [Mr. Gladstone's] 
objections; but if that should prove impossible, however great the loss to 
the Government by the retirement of Mr. Gladstone, it would be better to 
lose Mr. Gladstone than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth.' 
                                                  
6   [147/1]  They occasionally 'represent' a Department, otherwise unrepresented in 
the House of Commons.  
Both the threatened disasters were for the time being averted; but the story illustrates 
vividly, enough the relations which may subsist between a Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and his colleagues of the Cabinet.  Mr. Gladstone was perhaps mindful of his own 
earlier experience, when at a later stage of his career he elected to combine the offices 
of First Lord of the Treasury, Prime Minister, and Chancellor of the Exchequer.  In view 
of the control which the Treasury ought to exercise over the ‘spending Departments’, 
and the intimate knowledge which its Chief ought to possess of their requirements, 
there is much to be said for this arrangement.  But with the rapid expansion and 
growing complexity of the nation's business the experiment is one which is hardly likely 
to be repeated. 
 
Besides its general control both over Revenue and Expenditure, the Treasury has to 
arrange for the provision of the funds required to meet the day-to-day necessities of the 
public service; and for this purpose it is entrusted with extensive borrowing powers.  To 
the.  Treasury it falls also to initiate and carry out all measures affecting- the [begin page 
149] currency and the public debt.  Finally, it prescribes the form in which the public 
accounts shall be kept. 
 
It has other functions of minor though not small importance, such as the audit of the 
Civil List of the Sovereign, the award of Civil Pensions, the financial control of the 
County Courts, the valuation of Government property for rating purposes, and the 
general regulation of the personnel of the Civil Service in such matters as recruitment 




The total staff of the Treasury and the Departments subordinate to it now (1925-6) 
numbers 780 persons, and the net total of the estimate is £315,807.  The subordinate 
offices are the Cabinet Secretariat and Committee of Imperial Defence,
8 the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel, the Exchequer Office Scotland, the Paymaster-General's 
Office, the University Grants Committee, the Trade Facilities Act Advisory Committee, 
and the War Histories Department.  The Exchequer and Audit Department is wholly 
independent of the Treasury, and the head of that Department is independent not 
merely of the Treasury, but, for reasons already stated, of the House of Commons, his 
salary being charged, like that of the judges, on the Consolidated Fund.
9
 
The Revenue Department - the Customs and Excise, the Inland Revenue and the Post 
Office - are in theory still farther removed from the Treasury, and the estimates for 
these departments are not even included in Civil Service Estimates. 
 
Dual Functions of the Treasury. 
The question has indeed been raised whether it can be regarded as a sound principle 
of administration that same department should be responsible both for raising the 
revenue and controlling the expenditure.  The answers are not unanimous.  Those who 
favour a large increase in the activities and therefore in the expenditure of the State 
[begin page 150] chafe at Treasury control.  They contend that it is the business of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to raise the funds demanded by the collective wisdom of 
his colleagues.  This view has never yet obtained general acceptance.  On the contrary 
it has been commonly held that it is essential both to efficiency and economy that the 
Minister responsible for raising the revenue should also have a predominant voice in 
deciding on the amount, and-in some degree - on the character of the expenditure.  
Only in this way can the Chancellor of the Exchequer impose an effective restraint 
                                                  
7   [149/1]  Cd. 9230 of 1918, p. 17. 
8   [149/2]  Supra, ii, p. 83 seq. 
9   [149/3]  Supra, p. 5 3 1 infra, Appendices D and E. upon the demands of his colleagues and appreciate the extent of the liabilities to which 
he is being committed by them.  'If he is to be held responsible for filling the reservoir 




The Secretary of State 
The Treasury, however, is not, or should not be, a spending Secretary department.  Its 
traditional function is to act as a watch dog, to stand sentinel over the other 
Departments.  To the other Departments we may now pass; and first to those over 
which His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State preside.  Of these Secretaries there 
are now six,
11 but although the powers of the Secretary of State are assigned in 
practice to six different persons, there is still, in legal form, only one office, and any one 
of the Secretaries may legally exercise its powers.  Acts of Parliament still confer 
powers on 'a Secretary of State' which by statutory definition means ‘one of His 
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State'.  Thus modern terminology recalls and 
conforms to the facts of history, since all six Secretaries derive from one official who 
wag originally, like other great officers, attached to the King's person in a domestic not 
to say a menial capacity.  The duties of the King's Secretary were originally discharged 
by the Chancellor, who had the custody of the Great Seal.  But the Chancellor, as we 
[begin page 151] have seen, tended to become more and more absorbed in judicial 
duties; the Chancery itself was located at Westminster, and the King found it necessary 
to have a 'lesser seal in the shape of a Private or Secret Seal' which was entrusted to a 
'Keeper' who acted as the King's confidential clerk and was constantly about his 
person. 
 
Before long the Keeper of the Privy Seal, like the custodian of the Great Seal, 
developed into an officer of State so important that the Lords Ordainers, when 
presenting their scheme of reform to Edward III, demanded that they should have the 
nomination of this Minister.  Again, therefore, the King found it necessary to enlist the 
services of a less exalted official; he provided himself with a third seal, the signet, for 
his private use and entrusted his private correspondence to a Secretarius.
12
 
This new official, the King's Secretary, is first mentioned in official documents in the 
reign of Henry III.  In the Commission for negotiating an alliance with Spain in 1253 
one John Maunsell is described as Secretarius Noster; in 1254 he is empowered as 
'Secretary' to give assent to the marriage of Prince Edward with Eleanor of Castille, 
and four years later is mentioned as a member of the King's Council.  His successor, 
Henry de Wengham, was also a member of the Council and was rewarded for his 
secretarial services by the Bishopric of London - an indication that the Secretaryship 
was becoming a post of distinction. 
 
The Three Seals 
There is a marked advance in the importance of the office during the fourteenth 
century. 
 
'The signet was gradually superseding the privy seal as the seal for the 
King's private use, and the clerk of his chamber who kept the signet was 
                                                  
10   [150/1]  Cd. 9230, p. 18. 
11   [150/2]  Increased (1926) to seven by the appointment of a Secretary of State for 
Scotland. 
12   [151/1]  In the revision of this chapter I have had the advantage of Miss F.G. 
Evans's scholarly monograph, The Principal Secretary of State (1924), and Sir E. 
Troup's valuable little book, The Home Office (1925) in addition to Gretton, op. 
cit. gradually employed more and more exclusively on secretarial business until 
the title of Secretary was by Richard II's reign officially applied to him.  . . . 
The fifteenth century opens with the signet firmly established as the third 
and most private of the King's three official seals. 
[begin page 152] 
 
It is used both to authorize the issues under the privy sea an chancery, and 
to seal the personal correspondence of the Sovereign, and its Keeper, a 
subordinate household officer, is officially known as the King's Secretary.'
13
 
The procedure in reference to the Seals is thus described by one who was for many 
years intimately associated with the work of the Home Office:
14  ‘While in the eleventh 
century the King gave verbally to the Chancellor the instructions on which he issued an 
instrument under the Great Seal: and while in the thirteenth century the King gave his 
verbal instructions to the Keeper of the Privy Seal who conveyed these instructions 
under the Privy Seal to the Chancellor who thereupon issued the instrument under the 
Great Seal: in the fifteenth century the King expressed his wishes to his Secretary who 
communicated them under the signet or the sign manual to the Keeper of the Privy 
Seal who passed them on under the Privy Seal to the Chancellor who thereupon 
issued the instrument under the Great Seal.  This last cumbrous procedure,' adds Sir 
Edward Troup, 'a fossilized record of the rise of the several offices, has survived almost 
to the present day.'  The letters patent for the creation of a peer are still sealed with the 
Great Seal on the authority of a royal warrant countersigned by a Secretary of State.  
The intermediate stage involving the intervention of the Privy Seal was cut out only by 
the Great Seal Act of 1884.  The possession of the signet is still the formal evidence of 
the authority of the Secretary of State, who on his appointment receives from the 
Sovereign three seals: the signet, a lesser seal, and the Cachet.  The custody of the 
signet was indeed the primary duty of the King's Secretary long before he became 
head of a department',
15 though it was not until the reign of Richard II that political 
significance attached to the use of the signet.  The Secretary was not, however, at that 
time regarded as at all on the same level as the   Chancellor, the Treasurer, or the Privy 
Seal-those being the officials over whose appointment the opponents of the Crown 
wished to secure control.
16
 
The Fifteenth Century 
The fifteenth century was, as already indicated, essentially a period of constitutional 
definition.  Holding the Crown by a parliamentary title the House of Lancaster was 
constrained to accept the principle of parliamentary control over the Executive.  It is 
not, therefore, surprising that during this period the King's Secretary should begin to 
emerge from his original position as a household officer - 'the beloved clerk who stays 
continually by our side' into that of a Minister of State.  But the evolution was slow.  
When the Lancastrians came to the throne the King's Secretary was still not much 
more than a steward or domestic bursar keeping minute accounts of receipts and 
expenditure in the royal household, and taking rank with the King's Surgeon and the 
Clerk of the Kitchen. 
 
Ordinance of 1443 
In the year 1443 certain rules were made by an Order-in-Council to ensure the 
responsibility of the Council and the officers of the King for the answers given or grants 
                                                  
13   [152/1]  Evans, op. cit., p. 14. 
14   [152/2]  Sir Edward Troup, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
in the Home Office, 1908-22. 
15   [152/3]  Anson, ii. 168. 
16   [153/1]  Gretton, P. 2 7.  made in response to petitions.  This ordinance incidentally throws light upon the 
functions and status of the Secretary.  If the answer involved a grant the Secretary was 
required to prepare letters which, signed with the signet, should authorize the fixing of 
the Privy Seal and ultimately the Great Seal.  Here, as Sir William Anson observes, we 
find the Secretary in a position of recognized responsibility for the expression of the 
King's will.
17  The enhanced status of the King's Secretary is clearly indicated by the 
inclusion of Gervase le Volore with such eminent personages as the Duke of Somerset 
and Alice de la Pole, Duchess of Suffolk, in the list of those who in 1451 were 
impeached by the Commons in a petition to the King for 'misbehavying about your roiall 
persone, by whos undue means your possessions have been gretely amenused, youre 
lawes not executed, and the peas of this youre Reame not observed [begin page 154] 
nother kept'.
18 Thomas Mannyng, another of Henry VI’s Secretaries, was among the 
other adherents of the Lancastrian House who were attainted of high treason after 
accession of Edward IV. 
 
Under Edward IV the establishment of the Secretary doubled in size - an indication of 
increasing importance not lost upon modern Heads of Departments.  He now had, four 
clerks and 'sufficient writers of the King's signet', a 'gentleman to attend on him', and 
'three persons wayters on him for all that office'.  He had his appointed Commons at 
Court - 'three loaves, two messes of great meat, half a pitcher of wine and two gallons 
of ale;' he had ‘one torch, one percher, two candels wax, three candels, paris’, while 




A Second Secretary 
Meanwhile the work of the Secretary was increasing so fast that in 1433 a second 
Secretary had been appointed for the transaction of the King's business in France, 
though as there was as yet but one signet, the second Secretary being appointed by 
patent.  In 1464, however, it was laid down that in the absence of Edward Hatclyffe, 
‘our Secretary and Councillor', one Oliver King, 'the King's first and principal Secretary 
in the French language,' was to have the custody of the signet and was 'to receive all 
kinds of bills and warrants whatsoer addressed to the Chancellor, or to the Privy Seal 




It is perhaps premature to see in the appointment of a second Secretary to deal 
primarily with French affairs the beginning of a bifurcation - not destined to become 
definite and final for more than three centuries - between the Home Office and the 
Foreign Office; nevertheless the appointment at least affords evidence of the growing 
importance of the office.  Further evidence of a similar [begin page 155] tendency is 
afforded in 1476, when for the first time a newly appointed Secretary is described as 
the 'Principal Secretary' - not, as it would seem, to denote a difference in the rank of the 
two Secretaries, but to mark the responsible character of the office as distinct from that 
of a mere clerk or amanuensis.  For some time to come the appointment of a second 
Secretary was fitful; only in the reign of James I was the practice definitely established.  
From 1539, however, there were two signets and two books of warrants in the keeping 
severally of the two Secretaries.  In 1640 a further step was taken.  On the appointment 
of Sir Henry Vane, in that year, the foreign business of the office was formally divided.  
Secretary Windebank was to have charge of the business with Spain, Italy, and 
                                                  
17   [153/2]  Op. cit. ii. 162. 
18   [154/1]  Rolls of Parliament, v, p. 216. Cf. also Gretton, op. cit., p. 29. 
19   [154/2]  A.p. Gretton, p. 30. 
20   [154/3]  Miss Evans, op. cit., pp. 102-4, and Cal. S. P. Dom. 1639-40, pp. 332, 
433, ap. Gretton, op. cit., p. 51. Flanders; Vane himself of that with France, Germany, Holland, and the Baltic.  In fact 
this was only the formal recognition of an arrangement which had in practice been 
adopted since the reign of James I, but it formed the basis of the organization of the 
Northern and Southern Departments which lasted until 1782.  The rationale of the 
arrangement was not, however, geographical, as the titles would seem to suggest, but 
religious and political.  James I aspired to the position of mediator between the warring 
creeds of Europe, and in conformity with that aspiration he selected one Secretary as a 
Persona grata to the Protestant Powers, the other to the Catholics.  The differentiation 
of duties indicated in Secretary Vane's dispatch to Sir Thomas Roe did not, however, 
precisely correspond with lines of ecclesiastical divisions. 
 
The Secretaryship under the Tudors 
Long before this differentiation important developments had taken place in the position 
of the Secretary.  The Tudor Dictatorship marks a significant stage in he evolution of 
the ministerial system as in that of Parliament.  The two are, indeed, closely connected.  
By a Statute of 1539 the attendance of the Secretaries of State in Parliament and their 
precedence therein is minutely regulated.  Moreover, the King's Secretary has by that 
time ceased to [begin page 156] be merely a Household or Court official; he has 
become one of the highest, he is soon to become indisputably the highest among the 
officers of the realm.  This may perhaps be regarded as a natural consequence of the 
personal government of a series of great rulers.  But the Tudor Dictatorship was more 
than personal; Henry VII Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, all made 
Parliament the instrument of their government.  The exaltation of the power of the 
Crown may have exalted the King's servant – ‘the beloved clerk who stays continually 
at our side,' - but in exalting it also tended to transform him.  The King's Secretary, 
though not yet a Parliamentary Minister, must take his place in Parliament, and must 
learn the arts of governing, if not yet of persuading Parliament. 
 
The Secretaries in Parliament. 
The Statute of 1539 ordained that the Secretary, as well, as the Lord Chancellor, the 
Lord President of the King's, Council, and the Lord Privy Seal, should attend 
Parliament.  If any of these great officers of State should be under the degree of a 
Baron of Parliament they should sit ‘at the uppermost part of the sacks in the midst of 
the said Parliament Chamber'.  Later it was ordained that when the King or the Speaker 
was present in the House of Lords - that is, when any formal business was to be 
transacted - both the Secretaries were to be on the woolsacks.
21  Otherwise they were 
to sit alternately, week by week, one in the House of Lords, and one in the House of 
Commons; but if important matters were before the Commons the presence of both 
Secretaries in that House might be required.
22  Edward VI, when making rules for the 
conduct of business in the Council, made his Secretary the medium of communication 
between the King and the Council or its Committees. 
 
The Tudor Secretaries. 
To recall the names of some of the Secretaries of the sixteenth century is sufficient to 
establish the impor- [begin page 157] tance of the office.  Richard Fox, Bishop of 
Winchester, and Thomas Ruthall, Bishop of Durham, held office under Henry VII. Fox's 
pupil, Wolsey, brooked no rival during his ascendancy, and Thomas Cromwell -the first 
layman to hold the office of Secretary - was indisputably the first Minister of the realm.  
                                                  
21   [156/1]  Taries 
Formal business still requires the presence of the King (in person or by Commission) 
and of the Speaker, in the Parliament Chamber, now specifically designated the 
House of Lords. 
22   [156/2]  Gretton, p. 33. Sir William Cecil (afterwards Lord Burleigh) occupied as Secretary (1558-73) almost 
the position of a Prime Minister under Elizabeth.  When in 1573 he accepted the 
formally higher office of Lord High Treasurer he found in Sir Francis Walsingham, who 
succeeded him as Secretary, a dangerous rival, but after Walsingham's death (1590) 
he was able 'to keep the office vacant for six years and then to secure it with 
undiminished powers for his son Robert Cecil'.
23
 
Robert Cecil, afterwards Earl of Salisbury, occupied a place in English politics during 
the last years of Elizabeth and the first years of James I (1590-1612) even more 
dominating than his father's.  But after his death the ear of the King was given to 
favourites rather than to Ministers, and though men of distinction like Coke, Vane, 
Falkland and Thurloe, Sunderland and Godolphin subsequently held the office, the 
Secretaryship never quite regained the pre-eminence given to it by the Tudor 
Secretaries, until a day came when the Secretaryship had to yield pride of power if not 
of place to a Prime Minister, who might or might not be a Secretary of State as well.
24  
In the meantime various Departments and Boards had been set up, the history and 
functions of which will presently demand attention. 
 
The germ of those specialized offices is to be discovered in the two great officers of 
State whose evolution has now been traced.  For that reason, no excuse need be 
offered for exploring in some detail the genesis of the Treasury and of the 
Secretaryship of - State, though it will suffice to indicate in brief outline the subsequent 
history of the latter office. 
 
A third- Secretary of State (for Scotland) was added [begin page 158] after the Union in 
1708, but in 1746 the number was again reduced to two.  A third Secretaryship (this 
time for the Colonies) was established in 1768, only to be abolished after the 
recognition of American independence in 1782.  In that year the work of the office was 
reorganized: the Northern Department was transformed into a Foreign Office; the 
Southern into a Home Office responsible also for Ireland, which in the same year was 
granted legislative independence under the Grattan Constitution, and for the few 
colonies which survived the great disruption of 1782. 
 
New Secretaryships of State. 
The simplicity of this arrangement was soon, however rudely disturbed.  The 
exigencies of the struggle with France brought a third Secretary (for War) into existence 
in 1794, and the Colonies were added to his Department in 1801.  The Crimean War 
led to the assignment responsibility for Military and Colonial Affairs to two separate 
Secretaries in 1854; the transference of the dominions of the East India Company to 
the Crown raised the Secretariat to five in 1858; and the growing importance of aerial 
warfare demonstrated by the Great War led in 1917 to the appointment of a sixth 
Secretary of State for Air. 
 
Work of the Home Office. 
The existing powers of the Home Secretary are partly an emanation from the Royal 
Prerogative, and, in even larger part, are the result of the feverish legislative activity of 
the nineteenth century. 
 
Prerogative Powers 
Many of the Prerogative Powers of the Crown have been ministerially assigned to other 
Departments of State, notably to the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty, 
but the Home Secretary has been aptly described by President Lowell as 'a kind of 
                                                  
23   [157/1]  Troup, op. cit., p. 12  
24   [157/2]  Cf. supra. residuary legatee.’  He is responsible for the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy and 
for the maintenance of the King's Peace.  The responsibility for calling out the troops in 
cases of civil disturbance rests with him, and for the action of the magistrates and 
police.  He is the channel of communication between the Sovereign and his subjects, 
and his formal duties in connexion with the grant of honours, alike [begin page 159] 
individuals and to localities, including such matters as the right of an institution, society, 
or club to use the title Royal.  He is also the proper medium of communication between 
the King as head of the Church of England and the Church.  He submits to the King the 
warrant for the issue of Letters Patent under the Great Seal authorizing the election of 
a Bishop by Cong’e d'élire, and he presents the Bishop elect when he does homage for 
the temporalities of the see.  He issues His Majesty's instructions to Lords Lieutenant, 
magistrates, Governors of Colonies; the warrants for certain appointments under 
Letters Patent pass through his hands, and in particular he is responsible for the 
appointment of Royal Commissions. 
 
Statutory Duties 
The duties imposed upon the Home Secretary by statute are complex and multifarious.  
He is at once Minister of Justice and, to a large extent, Minister of Industry, though of 
some of the functions implied in the latter title he has been recently relieved.  The 
administration of Justice; the control of the Metropolitan Police, of Prisons, 
Probationary and Industrial Schools, Criminal Lunatic Asylums; the control of 
immigration the registration, supervision, and deportation of aliens naturalization; sale 
of intoxicating liquors and dangerous drugs; the safety of the public in theatres and 
picture-houses; their protection against fires, explosives, fire-arms; the guardianship of 
public morals, and the preservation of public amenities; the administration of Factory 
and Shops Acts, of Truck Acts, and of Workmen's Compensation Acts - all these things 
come within the province of the Home secretary.  He has to approve local by-laws and 
is responsible for the conduct of Parliamentary and local elections.  Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands are all, in some measure, under his 
jurisdiction. 
 
The classification of duties assigned to the Home Office thing is anything but scientific, 
and if ever the reorganization of the departments of the Central Government should be 
taken seriously in hand the Home Office would probably [begin page 160] be 
transformed almost out of recognition.  Yet the Home Secretary would still, it must be 
assumed, take that precedence among the Secretaries of State which is historically his.  
He remains, par excellence, the Secretary of State: the special servant of the King; and 
of all Cabinet Ministers, except the Prime Minister, he is still in closest personal contact 
with the Sovereign. 
 
Staff 
The work of the Home Office is now done by a staff of 975 persons, as compared with 
26 at the end of the eighteenth century, and with 30 in 1832.  The net estimate for the 
current year (1925-6) is £418,744.  Of this sum over £150,000 is accounted for by the 
inspection of factories and workshops - a branch of the work which employs a staff of 
293 persons.  167 persons are employed in executing the Aliens' Restriction Acts at a 
cost of £61,000.  On the whole it must be said that, in view of the variety and 
complexity of the functions imposed upon the Department, the staffing and expenditure 
are relatively modest. 
 
 
The Foreign Office 
Less varied but even more responsible is the part played in the economy of the State 
by the Foreign Office, which, as an independent establishment dates only from 1782.  
The total staff of the Office, including King's messengers, but excluding the staff of the 
Diplomatic and Consular, Service, is 880, and the gross estimate is £299,427, but the appropriations in aid (mostly derived from passport fees) (£105,000) reduce this total to 
a net sum of £193,170.  The maintenance of the Diplomatic and Consular Services 
costs in addition £1,094,124. 
 
The Crown and Foreign Affairs 
The work of the Foreign Office, important as it is, calls for no detailed analysis.  Apart 
from the Passport Office, which is financially self-supporting, the staff, in relation to the 
work done and in comparison with more modern Departments, is not a large one.  One 
observation must, however, be made.  The political head of the Foreign Office stands in 
a special relation to the Sovereign, and Queen Victoria manifested special interest in 
the appointment to this office.  Though responsibility rests entirely [begin page 161] with 
the Secretary of State and the Cabinet, the Sovereign has, by tradition, exercised a 
more direct influence over the conduct of foreign than over that of domestic affairs.  To 
what extent that tradition will be maintained after the adoption of the republican form of 
government by so many of the Continental States it is impossible to predict.   
Ambassadors are, however, accredited personally to the Sovereign and all important 
dispatches to foreign Governments are submitted to him.  Nor is the Sovereign's assent 
a mere formality. 
 
Upon the observance of this rule Queen Victoria inflexibly insisted, and the neglect of it 
practically cost Lord Palmerston his place when he was almost at the zenith of his 
popularity in the country (1851).  Nor can it be doubted that the custom has contributed 
both to the continuity and the success of our foreign policy.  The less our diplomacy is 
deflected from its traditional lines by party mutations at home, the better for this country 
and for its neighbours.  Happily there are not wanting signs that Foreign Affairs are 
coming to be regarded, in increasing degree, as outside the domain of party politics.  
This is partly the cause and partly the effect of the continuously exercised intervention 
of the Sovereign.  But one point must be emphasized.  No whit of responsibility 
attaches to him, any more than to the permanent Under-Secretary.  Influence they both 
exercise in full measure; the Secretary of State alone bears responsibility. 
 
Colonial Office 
Next in seniority to the Home and Foreign Secretariats is that for the Colonies.  The 
history of the office is instructive.  On the reorganization of the Privy Council after the 
Restoration Charles II created a Council of Trade and a Council of Foreign Plantations.  
These Councils were combined in 1672, but the combined Council existed only for 
three years.  In 1695 William. III revived it as the 'Board of Trade and Plantations'.  By 
this Board the Colonies or Plantations were administered, so far as the casual control 
exercised down to 1768 could be described as 'administration.’  By that time we were 
already involved in acute [begin page 162] controversy with the American Colonies, and 
it was thought desirable to create a third Secretaryship of State to deal with Colonial 
affairs.  In 1782 the most important part of the Colonial Empire had ceased to be; the 
separate Secretaryship was, therefore, abolished, and the residue o work was 
transferred to the Home Office.  In 1801 Colonial business was transferred once again 
to the new Secretary of State for War, created, as we have seen, in 1794.  The new 
Department henceforward became known as that for War and the Colonies, until in 
1854 a separate Secretaryship for the Colonies was created.  From that time onwards 
the office steadily grew in prestige and importance until, in 1895, it received a fresh 
access of dignity by being selected as the special sphere of his activities by the most 
prominent of the leaders of the Party then in power.
25
 
                                                  
25   [162/1]  In order to reflect more accurately the new status of the Self-governing 
Dominions, the term ‘Dominions' has, since 1925, be substituted for that of 
'Colonies’ in the style of the ‘Colonial’ Office, and its chief, the Secretary of State. The Colonial Office is not responsible for all the oversea territories of the Crown.  India, 
as already indicated, has its separate Secretariat; various Protectorates are controlled 
by the Foreign Office, while the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man are under the 
jurisdiction of the Home Office. 
 
The present cost of the Head-quarter's work of this Colonial Office is £177,473, but to 
this must be added £1,216,207 for sundry colonial services, such as passages of 
Governors and other Colonial officers, salaries of High Commissioners, grants in aid of 
local revenues in such places as Tanganyika, Uganda Railway annuities, &c.  The 
Middle-Eastern Services - expenditure in connexion with the Iraq and Palestine 
Mandates and with Arabia - call for an additional £4,770,000, and the work of Oversea 
Settlement for £497,925, the latter being mainly expended in connexion with the 
Empire Settlement Act of 1922.  Since the war there has been a notable decrease in 
emigration, not least in migration to the British Dominions oversea.  In 1913 the total 
number of emigrants [begin page 163] was 701,691, of whom 331450 went to the 
Dominions.  The outward flow of population ceased during the war, and has been only 
slowly resumed.  In 1923 the total was 463,285, of whom 260,271 went to the 
Dominions.  Partly in order to deal with the settlement of ex-service men and partly for 
other reasons it was deemed desirable for the State to assume more direct 
responsibility for oversea settlement.  Consequently a special committee was set up at 
the Colonial Office originally known as 'The Government Emigration Committee', but 
now more happily renamed as 'The Oversea Settlement Committee'.  The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies is President and the Parliamentary Secretary of the Department 
of Overseas Trade is Chairman of the Committee, while the Parliamentary Under-
Secretaries for the Colonies and of the Ministry of Labour are ex-officio members of it.  
The mere mention of these sub-Departments is significant of the rapid development of 
the work of the Colonial Office.  To the overwhelming importance of that development 
reference has been already made, but this word may be added.  Were that 
development to be arrested or even to slacken in intensity it would be indeed ominous 
for the future of the British Empire. 
 
The War Office 
The history and organization of the War Office must be treated not less summarily, 
partly because a civilian cannot be trusted to apprehend and still less to describe it with 
accuracy; and even more because of all the great offices of State it has known least of 
continuity or of finality.  A system described with reasonable accuracy today may by 
tomorrow be out of date. 
 
The Army has always been in a peculiar sense under the control of the Crown.  The 
command of it was, as a competent writer has observed, 'the last of the royal 
prerogatives to be brought under the principle of ministerial responsibility.'
26  This was 
due partly to the anxiety of the Crown to retain it; still more perhaps to the reluctance of 
Parliament to admit that a standing army was anything [begin page 164] more than a 
disagreeable and temporary expedient, to be dispensed with as soon as circumstances 
permitted.  Circumstances have obstinately forbidden such a consummation; but the 
War Office, which was first organized under Charles II, was, until relatively recent 
times, conspicuous for the confusion which would naturally be expected in an 
organization designed for temporary purposes.  The confusion which characterized this 
Department down to 1855, and did not entirely cease in that year, is thus happily 
summarized by Sir William Anson: 'The soldier was fed by the Treasury and armed by 
the Ordnance Board: the Home Secretary was responsible for his movements in his 
native country: the Colonial Secretary superintended his movements abroad: the 
Secretary at War took care that he was paid, and was responsible for the lawful 
                                                  




The office of Secretary at War dates from the reign of Charles II.  In 1676 a warrant, 
countersigned by one of the Secretaries of State, was issued to the Duke of Monmouth.  
Under this warrant all warrants and orders or military affairs were in future to be issued 
under the sign, manual and countersigned not by a military officer but by the Secretary 
of the Forces 'as by our command'.  In 1683 the Office of Ordnance was reorganized 
on a civil basis, but until the definition of his functions by an Act of 1783 the position of 
the Secretary at War remained ambiguous.  Like a Secretary of State he countersigned 
State documents and thus authenticated the sign-manual of the King; but he was not 
technically a Secretary of State, and in 1717 Pulteney - when fulfilling the office formally 
repudiated his responsibility to Parliament.  He was, he contended, 'a ministerial, not a 
constitutional officer, bound to issue orders according to the King's direction.'  In 1783 
the ambiguity was so far terminate that the Secretary at War was entrusted under 
Statute with - definite functions - largely financial - to be per- [begin page 165] formed 
under parliamentary sanction and responsibility.  In 1793 the King surrendered the 
personal command of the armed forces to a General Commanding-in-Chief, and a year 
later (as already described) a Secretaryship of State for War was established. 
 
From 1794 to 1887 the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State occupied joint 
thrones, located at the Horse Guards and the War Office respectively.  The dual control 
thus established over the Army, and prolonged by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief 
was almost invariably a Royal Prince, was not terminated until 1887, when by Order-in-
Council the whole administration of the Army was confided to the Commander-in-Chief.  
Simultaneously that officer was himself made responsible to the Secretary of State.  In 
1895 the Duke of Cambridge was induced to resign the office which throughout a great 
part of his cousin's reign he had filled, and in 1904, after the Boer War, the office of 
Commander-in-Chief, having subsisted for a little more than a century, was abolished. 
 
Meanwhile the Secretaryship of State for War had emerged as a differentiated and 
substantive, office.  Constituted in 1794, its functions were confused in 1801 by the 
absorption of colonial business, and still more by the continued existence of the 
Secretary at War.  But the War and Colonial Secretaryships were bifurcated in 1854; in 
1855 the Secretary of State for War took over the duties of the Secretary at War, and 
the latter office was finally abolished in 1863.  Meanwhile the control of the 
Commissariat was transferred from the Treasury to the War Office, the Board of 
Ordnance was abolished and its duties similarly transferred, and at the same time 
(1855) the War Office absorbed the Army Medical Department.  Gradually order was 
being evolved out of chaos and the War Office was coming into its own.  Since 1855 
internal reorganizations have been not infrequent, but they have mostly tended in one 
direction.  Control and responsibility have alike been concentrated in the Secretary of 
State, until at last in 1904 his great rival finally disappeared.  The Secretary of State, 
[begin page 166] like the First Lord of the Admiralty, now obtains technical advice from a 
Board of professional experts.  This Army Council now includes, in addition to the 
Secretary of State, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and the Financial Secretary; the 
Chief of the General Staff; the Adjutant-General; the Quartermaster-General; and the 
Master-General of the Ordnance. 
 
India Office 
A fifth Secretariat-Department is the India Office.  In certain respects, to be noticed 
presently, the organization of this office is unique.  Down to 1784 British India was ruled 
by the directors of a commercial company acting under Charter from the Crown and 
(since 1773) controlled to some extent by Parliament.  The India Act passed by Pitt in 
                                                  
27   [164/1]  Op. Cit. ii. 375. 1784 established a dual control: it left the powers of the Company untouched as 
regards commercial affairs, but it transferred political responsibility to a Board of 
Control consisting of six Commissioners, all of whom were to be Privy Councillors, and 
among whom were always to be the Chancellor of the Exchequer and one of the 
Principal Secretaries of State.  The Court of Directors was at the same time given 
power to appoint a Secret Committee of three members, through whom the orders of 
the Board of Control were transmitted to India.  From 1784 onwards the President of 
the Board of Control (almost invariably a Cabinet Minister) was virtually a Secretary of 
State for India, and controlled Indian administration with the assistance of the Secret 
Committee. 
 
The formal change to the modem system was effected after the Mutiny.  By an Act of 
1858 British India was formally transferred to the Crown, and it was provided that 'all 
the powers and duties then exercised or performed by the East India Company ... 
should in future be exercised and performed by one of Her Majesty Principal 
Secretaries of State'.  For this purpose a fifth Secretaryship was, as we have seen, 
created.  But the Secretary is, in theory at any rate, not a complete autocrat at the India 
Office.  And this constitutes the peculiarity of his position.  He appoints, and is assisted 
by, a Council [begin page 167] – the Council of India-which must be carefully 
distinguished from the Viceroy's Council, the latter appertaining to the local government 
of India.  The former consists of fifteen members, of whom nine must have recently 
served or resided for ten years in India.  Members of the Council are ineligible for seats 
in the House of Commons.  They are all paid and meet weekly.  This is no phantom 
Board like that of the Treasury, or the Trade or Education Boards.  Its members are an 
integral part of the Government of India; without their advice the Secretary of State 
cannot, except in matters of secrecy or inquiry, act, and in certain important cases they 
have actually a power of veto.  Apart from this Council the internal organization of the 
India Office, with its permanent secretaries, clerks of the first and second division, and 
so forth, differs only in detail from the rest of the executive Departments of the central 
Government.  Yet in one important respect the India Office stands apart.  Its expenses 
are mainly charged not upon the revenues of Great Britain but upon those of India.  
Parliament is only asked for the comparatively trifling sum of £115,100 'as a 
contribution to the cost of the Department'.  Parliament pays the salary of the Secretary 
of State and of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, but the rest of the vote takes the 
form of a grant-in-aid in respect of the expenditure of the India Office in this country on 
political and administrative services.  This expenditure is not audited in detail by the 
Controller and Auditor-General, nor are unexpended balances surrendered, according 
to the ordinary rule, to the Exchequer. 
 
The Air Force 
The youngest of the Secretaryships of State was established in 1917 to administer the 
business of the Air Force.
28  Only in 1912, indeed, had the Royal Flying Corps come 
into existence.  Provision was then made for a Naval Wing and a Military Wing to be 
maintained and administered by the Admiralty and the War Office respectively.  In order 
to secure co-operation between the two services a joint committee, known as the Air 
Committee, [begin page 168] was formed, but, as was to be anticipated, friction arose 
between the two wings, and in 1914 the Naval Wing was reorganized as the Royal 
Naval Air Service, and by the outbreak of war the bifurcation was practically completed.  
Wartime conditions served, however, to accentuate the competition between the two 
older services for the assistance of the new arm, and in 1916 an Air Board was set up 
to co-ordinate the demands of the Army and Navy and to reorganize the Air Service.
29
  
                                                  
28   [167/1]  Save for the Secretary of State for Scotland. Cf. notes, supra. 
29   [168/1]  Cf. Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Fifth Series). vol. 99. col. 126 
seq., vol. 103. col. 957 seq., vol. 123, col. 127 seq., vol. 126, col. 1579. Out of this Board came the new Air Force Council under a new Secretary of State.  The 
Council was set up by an Order-in-Council dated 21 December 1917, and the transfer 
of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps to the new Ministry was in 
the following year gradually accomplished.  By degrees, a separate, independent, and 
self-contained force was set up.  Thus, soon after the Armistice, the Technical 
Department of the Ministry of Munitions, concerned with the supply of material, was 
transferred to the new Ministry.  The latter also took over the control of meteorological 
research and of civil aviation. 
  
The members of the Air Council are, in addition to the President and Vice-President-the 
Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary-a Chief of the Air Staff, who 
is responsible for the conduct of air operations, for advising the Government on all 
questions of air policy and for the organization and training of the Air Force; an Air 
member of Personnel whose functions correspond generally with those of the Adjutant-
General of the Army; an Air member for Supply and Research; an additional member 
and Deputy Chief of the Air Staff who is Director of Operations, and a Secretary who is 
primarily responsible for finance and contracts. The sub-Departments of the Ministry 
correspond broadly to the functions of the several members of the Council, the 
Directorate of Civil Aviation being in the Department of the Under-Secretary of State.  
[begin page 169]  
 
The estimate of the Ministry for the current year (1925-6) amounts to £15,513,000, and 
the staff, exclusive of Unit and Command Office Staffs (which number over 1,900), 
numbers 1,819.  The Ministry is represented in Parliament by a Secretary, whose right 
to sit and vote in the House of Commons was specially provided for by a section of the 
Air Force (Constitution) Act which raised the number of Principal Secretaries of State 
and Under-Secretaries capable of sitting and voting in the Commons House of 
Parliament from four to five.
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30   [169/1]  § II. XXXIX. The Permanent Executive (3) 
The Departments of State.  Boards.  Ministries 
and Miscellaneous Offices 
 
'The English offices have never since they were made been arranged with 
any reference to each other; or rather they were never made but grew as 
each could.' - Walter Bagehot. 
 
'The laws reach but a very little way.  Constitute Government how you 
please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of 
powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of Ministers 
of State.  Even all the use and potency of the law depends upon them.   
Without them your Commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper 
and not a living active effective organization.' - Edmund Burke. 
 
'Our investigations have made it evident to us that there is much 
overlapping, and consequent obscurity and confusion in the functions of the 
Departments of Executive Government.  This is largely due to the fact that 
many of these Departments have been gradually evolved in compliance with 
current needs, and that the purposes for which they were thus called into 
being have gradually so altered that the later stages of the process have not 
accorded in principle with those that were reached earlier.  In other 
instances Departments appear to have been rapidly established without 
preliminary insistence on definition of function and precise assignment of 
responsibility.' - Report of Haldane Committee on the Machinery of 
Government (1917). 
 
Having dealt in the preceding chapter with these Departments of State which have 
developed from the protoplasm of the King's Secretary we pass to other Departments, 
some of which trace their origin to some high officer of the State, such as the Lord High 
Admiral, some of which derive from the Privy Council and its Committees, while others 
again have been created to meet the circumstances of the hour. 
 
The Admiralty 
The Admiralty is not a Secretariat but a Board representing, like the Treasury, a great 
and historic official whose duties are now and have long been performed by 
commissioners.  The office of Lord High Admiral dates from the fourteenth century, but, 
except in 1827 when the [begin page 172] Duke of Clarence held it, the office has been 
continuously in Commission since the death of the consort of Queen Anne in 1708.  
Under Edward III there was a 'clerk of the ships, galleys, barges, ballingers, and other 
the King's vessels’, but not until a much later date was there a regular standing navy 
any more than there was a standing army. 
  
Until the reign of Henry VIII the official description of the 'navy' was 'the ships in the 
King's Majesty's army on the sea'; but from his reign we trace the gradual organization 
of a Department charged with the control of the Navy.  The King maintained such ships 
as there were and victualled the officers and men, though, by 1546, we discern the 
germ of an Admiralty in the existence of a 'Controller of the Ships with two clerks, a 
Surveyor of the Ships with two clerks, and a Clerk of the Ships' - soon to develop into a 
Treasurer of the Navy.  From Elizabeth's reign these officials were regularly located in 
an office in Crutched Friars in the City.  By Charles II there was, in addition to the Navy Office in the city, a Victualling Department at Deptford and subordinate offices at 
Chatham, Portsmouth, &c.  There was also an Admiralty Office located in the palace of 
Whitehall.  While the Duke of York held the post of Lord High Admiral this office was 
known as 'the Duke of York's Chamber'.  After his resignation in 1673 the office was put 
in Commission and the Lords of the Admiralty appear with a secretary and a staff of 
seven clerks established in the Admiralty Office.  Of the first and second Boards of 
Admiralty both Secretaries of State were members.  By the end of the eighteenth 
century naval business was distributed among five departments - the Navy Office with 
a staff of 160; the Victualling Office, 118; the Navy Pay Office, 73; the Admiralty, 45; 
and the Audit Office, 33.
1  In 1815 the numbers were: Navy Office, 225; Victualling 
Office, 209; the Admiralty, 65; and the Audit Office, 125.  These distinct depart- [begin 
page 173] ments were, under a Statute passed in 1832, concentrated under the single 
Board of the Admiralty with a staff of 723 persons under a Minister responsible to 
Parliament. 
 
The authority of the Board extended to every branch of naval administration save the 
provision of guns.  The charge for this item continued, for many years after the 
absorption of the Ordnance Office by the War Office, to be borne on the estimates of 
the latter; but in this, as in other matters, the Navy is now self-contained. 
 
The staff of the Admiralty is now 8,502, as against 5,800 the last pre-war year, having 
risen in the meantime under the exigencies of war to over 20,000. 
 
The Board of Admiralty, like the Army Council and the Council of India, but unlike the 
Treasury Board, is a reality.  The First Lord is assisted in Parliament by a Civil Lord and 
a Financial Secretary, while his expert advisers on the Board are four naval officers of 
high rank.  The First Sea Lord, who is also Chief of the Naval Staff, is responsible for 
strategy, tactics, and for the discipline of the Fleet; the Second is Chief of Naval 
Personnel and responsible for recruiting and education; the Third is Controller and 
responsible for Naval Construction, while the Fourth is responsible for supplies and 
transport.  The Board also includes a Deputy and an Assistant Chief of the Staff and the 
Permanent Secretary.  Finance is in the hands of Parliamentary and Financial 
Secretary.  The cost of the Navy is at present £60,500,000, as compared with 
£51,350,000 for the last pre-war year. 
 
The Post Office 
Another office generally included among the Executive offices is that which is presided 
over by the Postmaster-General, though, for financial purposes, the office is classed, 
and properly, with the Revenue Departments.  Letter Post was first instituted, as a State 
concern only, in the Reign of James I, and then only for letters to foreign countries 'for 
the benefit of the English merchants'.  The service was extended to inland letters under 
Charles I.
2  [begin page 174] 
 
A proclamation was issued by that monarch in 1635 reciting that up to that time there 
had been no certain communication between England and Scotland 'wherefore he now 
commands his Postmaster for foreign parts to settle a running post or two, to run night 
and day between Edinburgh and London, to go thither and come back again in six 
days, and to take with them all such letters as shall be directed to any post town in or 
near that road'.  Similar posts were promised to Chester and Holyhead, to Exeter and 
Plymouth, for the Oxford and Bristol road and for that leading through Colchester to 
Norwich.  It will not escape notice how closely these lines correspond with the existing 
                                                  
1   [172/1]  Returns on Public Offices Employment. Accounts, Papers, vol. 656, p. 
300 (92 of 1830). 
2   [173/1]  Cf. First Report of the Postmaster-General (1855), which contains an 
excellent historical summary. trunk lines of railways.  In the early days of the experiment the Postmaster was allowed 
to take the profits, in consideration of his bearing the charges; but as the profits rapidly 
increased the office of Postmaster was farmed out, a vicious system which continued, 
& regards the by-posts, until the year 1799. 
 
The first legislative authority (apart from an Ordinance of the Commonwealth) was 
contained in the Statute 12 Car. II, c. 35, and in 1663 the revenue of the Post Office 
which was estimated at £21,000, was settled on James Duke of York, and his heirs 
male in perpetuity.  On the accession of James to the throne in 168 this revenue, then 
valued at £65,000 a year, was vested in the Crown and became part of the Hereditary 
Revenues. 
 
In 1710 an important Statute was enacted which formed the legal basis on which the 
Post Office, until 1837, rested.  Under its provisions a General Post Office for the three 
kingdoms and the Colonies was established under an official known as Her Majesty's 
Postmaster-General.
3  As this office was created after the enactment of the Place Bill 
of 1707 its holder was excluded from a seat in the House of Commons, until he was 
rendered eligible, subject of course to the usual rule as to re-election on acceptance of 
office, by a Statute of 1866.  From the time of Queen Anne onward [begin page 175] the 
office has been one of some importance, and during the reign of George III was almost 
invariably held by a peer.  Not, however, until after the middle of the nineteenth century 
was it regarded as a highly political office.  The first Postmaster-General admitted to 
the Cabinet was the Earl of Hardwicke, who held the office under Lord Derby in 1852.  
Viscount Canning was, as Postmaster, a member of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet in 1853, 
and since that time the Postmaster-General has been invariably included in the Ministry 
and frequently in the Cabinet. 
 
The business and functions of the Post Office have multiplied with amazing rapidity.  A 
money-order office, first established in 1792, became a recognized branch of the 
establishment in 1839; a uniform penny post was established in 1839; a book post was 
established in 1846; a pattern or sample post in 1862; and an inland parcel post in 
1883.  Meanwhile the Post Office had established in 1861 a Savings Bank Department; 
in 1870 it took over the telegraphic service, and in 1911 the telephone service as well.  
Imperial penny postage was gradually introduced from 1898 onwards. 
 
The Post Office has, however, become more than a carrier of mails and a transmitter of 
communications.  It is the banker and the stockbroker of the poor, accepting their 
savings on deposit or investing them in, Government securities; it distributes State 
bounty in the shape of old age pensions; it acts as an insurance agent, and collects 
revenue for the State in return for licences, and by the sale of the appropriate stamps it 
collects contributions under the Health, Unemployment Insurance, and Contributory 
Pensions Acts. 
 
It is little wonder that the staff of the office should have expanded rapidly.  In 1797 it 
numbered 957; in 1827, 1377; and in 1925, 184,766. 
 
The gross revenue of the Post Office now amounts to the gigantic sum of £57,000,000, 
on which the profit to the State is about £4,000,000.  [begin  page 176] 
 
The success of the Post Office is frequently quoted as an argument in favour of the 
extension of the trading activities of the State.  Without entering upon highly 
controversial ground, three things may be said: first, that the success of the Post 
Office, though respectable, is neither phenomenal nor unquestioned; secondly, that so 
far as it is substantial, it is attained under the protection of a rigid monopoly; and, 
                                                  
3   [174/1]  Down to 1823 the office was generally held by two postmasters of equal 
rank and authority. thirdly, that those who desire to found upon it arguments for further experiments must 
prove that private management would not yield better results, as regards public 
convenience, commercial profit initiative, and adaptability.  This would be no easy task. 
 
Board of Trade 
We pass next to two Boards which represent Committees of the Privy Council.  Of 
these the oldest is the Board of Trade which started in the reign of Charles II (1662) as 
a Committee on Trade and Plantations, being designed primarily to assist the work of 
the Great Trading Companies, and in particular their trade with the Oversea 
Settlements.  This joint Committee was abolished in 1675 but in 1695 was revived.  Its 
primary functions were to promote the employment of the poor and to consider the 
removal of impediments to trade.  The establishment of a Secretaryship of State for the 
Colonies in 1768 deprived the joint Committee of some of its most important functions, 
but in 1782 the new Secretaryship of State and the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations were alike among the victims of Burke's consuming zeal for economy in 
public administration, the cost of the Committee or Trade being put, in that year, at 
something over £12,600.  
 
The Committee on Trade could not, however, be spared at a moment when the whole 
industrial position of the country was undergoing a profound transformation, and when 
trade was expanding by leaps and bounds.  Consequently the Committee was, in 1786, 
reconstituted by Order-in-Council, and in 1797 had a staff of nineteen persons.  The 
Board now consists of a President and the following ex-officio members: the First Lord 
of the Treasury, the Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the [begin page 177] 
Exchequer, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Speaker of the House of Commons.  
Its powers, however, can be and are exercised by a President who is almost invariably 
a Cabinet Minister.  The staff of the Board in numbered 5,085, as compared with 2,500 
in 1914 and 26 a century ago (1827).  In the course of the nineteenth-century 
multifarious duties were imposed upon a Board which constantly increased in 
importance: in 1832 it was charged with the duty of collecting and publishing statistical 
information; after 1840 it was called upon to exercise a measure of control over railway 
companies; to it was committed the registration of joint-stock companies; the 
supervision of schemes for provision of and power; weights and measures; navigation, 
astronomy, and insurance; the enforcement of the Acts for the regulation of merchant 
shipping; and the administration of the Bankruptcy Acts.  From its inception in 1662 
down to the outbreak of war the Board of Trade had indeed ‘been the main repository 
of the relations of the Government with private enterprise in material production 
whether in the form of stimulus, information, regulation, or prohibition'.  Of late years 
the specialization in departmental activities has relieved it of nearly all its duties in 
connexion with railways and transport; with development of electrical lighting and 
power; with employment Exchanges and Trade Boards.  Yet its functions are still 
multifarious and miscellaneous: industrial property and patents; trade designs and 
trade-marks; joint-stock companies; foreshores, and Crown property therein; 
lighthouses (shared with Trinity House and other authorities); wrecks and salvage; 
pilotage; coast-guard service; mercantile marine; not to mention various services (such 
as the Food Liquidation Department and the Clearing Office for enemy debts) arising 
out of the war, and the work of the Department of Overseas Trade which is established 
in a semi-independent position.
4
 
Department of Overseas Trade. 
This Department was formed in 1917 as a joint Depart- [begin page 178] ment under the 
Foreign Office and Board of Trade.  It is represented in Parliament by a Parliamentary 
Secretary who holds the position both of an additional Parliamentary Secretary of State 
                                                  
4   [177/1]  Cf. Report of Select Committee on Estimates (96 of 1024). for Foreign Affairs, and also of an additional Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of 
Trade, and it employs a head-quarters staff of 390 persons. 
 
The Department is concerned mainly with the promotion and development of Overseas 
Trade.  In it was incorporated the former Department of Commercial Intelligence of the 
Board of Trade, and the Exhibitions Branch of the Board of Trade; certain duties 
previously performed by the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office were also 
transferred to it.  It has in addition taken over from the Foreign Office were the 
administration of the commercial services in foreign countries, e.g. the Commercial 
Attaché - now Commercial Diplomatic-Service and the Consular Service, of which the 
administrative control has been transferred from the Foreign Office to this Department, 
though the Consular Vote remains part of Class V for which the Foreign Office is 
responsible.  The control of the Export Credits Scheme was in 1921 transferred from 
the Board of Trade to the Department of Overseas Trade.
5
 
The Board of Education 
Parallel with the position of the Board of Trade is that Board of Education.  In 1839 a 
Committee of the Privy Council was set up to supervise the distribution of the 
Parliamentary grants for elementary education, first made in 1833.  Down to the year 
1899 the supervision of education, so far as the Central Government was concerned, 
was vested mainly in this Committee.  The nominal and sometimes the effective head 
of the Committee was the Lord President of the Council, though the effective head was 
more often the Vice-President of the Council of Education, who was sometimes, but by 
no means invariably, a member of the Cabinet.  The Committee of the Council 
controlled what were virtually two distinct Departments - the Education Department and 
the Department of Science and Art - while a third body, the Charity [begin page 179] 
Commissioners, exercised important functions in regard to schools.  An Act passed in 
1899 created a Board of Education, on the model of the Local Government and other 
Boards, under a President, assisted by a Parliamentary Secretary and the usual 
secretarial staff.  The President - except during the war-cabinet period - has invariably 
been a member of the Cabinet. 
 
A reorganization of the Education Department had been recommended by the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Secondary Education (1895), and was necessitated by the 
passing of the Education Act of 1896.  Already there had come into being 'local 
authorities of all kinds and of all dimensions': School Boards under the Education Acts 
of 1871 and 1876; county and borough authorities under the Technical Instruction Act 
(1889); and Committees of Managers under the regulations of the Committee of 
Council.  Some of these authorities were dispensing large sums of money raised 
locally, and all of them were dispensing Parliamentary grants.  It was, therefore, in the 
highest degree anomalous that there should not be a central authority, possessing a 
status, and clothed with authority, at least equal to the Boards which supervised 
agriculture and trade.  Moreover, further reforms in the local organization of education 
were pending, and central reorganization could not, therefore, be deferred.  The new 
Board was accordingly constituted in 1899.
6
 
The Board of Education now employs an administrative staff of over 1400 persons.  
There is, in addition to this, an Inspectorate of about 380 persons and a medical staff of 
18.  The Board is now responsible for the supervision of public elementary education, 
as well as for the inspection of a large number of secondary schools, of technological 
institutions, evening schools, schools of art and art classes, and training colleges.  It 
makes grants to various forms of adult education and provides scholarships and 
                                                  
5   [178/1]  Cf. Report of Select Committee on Estimates (96 of 1924). 
6   [179/1]  Duke of Devonshire in House of Lords, 1 Aug. 1898. Parliamentary 
Debates, 4th Ser., vol. 63, col. 666. maintenance allowances for students at colleges [begin page 180] and universities.  It is 
also responsible to Parliament for the Royal College of Art, the Victoria and Albert 
Museum, the Science and the Bethnal Green Museums.  Even the great public schools 
- or some of them - do not disdain the imprimatur derived from inspection by the Board.  
The Parliamentary vote for the Board is now over £40,000,000, in addition to which 
some £30,000,000 is raised for education out of local rates.  This expenditure, which 
relates to England and Wales only, compares with an expenditure of about 
£10,000,000 (taxes and rates) in 1891, and something less than £30,000,000 in 1911.  
A sevenfold increase in thirty years at least affords evidence of the anxiety of the State 
no longer to neglect the education of its masters.  The Parliamentary vote to the Board 
of Education does not include Scottish education, which claims about £6,000,000 from 
Parliament, nor grants to Universities and colleges in England and Wales and to Welsh 
intermediate education (about £1,5000,000), nor a total of some two and a half million 
pounds distributed among such institutions as the British Museum, the National Gallery, 
the London and Imperial War Museums, nor a certain sum for the encouragement of 
scientific and industrial research. 
 
The Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health represents the latest stage in a long stage of administrative 
evolution.  The first stage was marked by the creation of the Poor Law Board which 
was set up in 1847 to carry on the work entrusted by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 
1834 to a Board of Non-Parliamentary Commissioners, who had rendered, be it 
remarked, an incomparable service to the State in a most critical period of our social 
history.  A second stage witnessed the constitution in 1848 of a General Board of 
Health to superintend the execution of an Act passed in that same year to promote the 
public health by improved water-supply, drainage, cleansing and paving in 'towns and 
populous places'.  This Board lasted only until 1858 and after that year the Home Office 
supervised the provision of labourers' dwellings, drainage schemes, baths and 
washhouses, with other detailed functions of local [begin page 181] government, and 
the registration of births, marriages, and deaths.  The Privy Council remained 
responsible for public health and the administration of the Vaccination Acts. 
  
The Local Government Board was constituted in 1871.  It was to consist of a President 
and certain ex-officio members: the President of the Council, the Secretaries of State, 
the Lord Privy Seal, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  The new Board superseded 
the Poor Law Board and took over its functions.  It also took over from the Home Office 
the powers, vested by a long succession of statutes in the Home Secretary, in respect 
of Registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages; Public Health; Local Government; 
Drainage and Sanitary matters; Baths and Washhouses; Towns Improvements; 
Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings; Local Taxation Returns, &c. From the Privy Council 
the new Board took over the administration of the Vaccination Acts and a number of  
other Acts for the Prevention of Disease. 
  
In 1919 the Local Government Board was in turn superseded by the Ministry of 
Health,
7 which was established to take over, in respect of England and Wales, all  the 
powers and duties of the Local Government Board, of the Insurance Commissioners, of 
the Board of Education with respect to the health of expectant mothers and of young 
children not at school, and the medical inspection and treatment of school children; 
certain powers of the Privy Council in regard to midwives, and of the Home Office in 
regard to infant life protection. 
 
The Ministry of Health is now one of the most important Departments of State.  It is 
represented in Parliament by a Minister of the first rank and by a Parliamentary 
Secretary; the staff of the Ministry now (1925) numbers 3,838, having exceeded 6,000 
in 1921; while the expenditure for which it is responsible is not far short of £20,000,000.  
                                                  
7   [181/1]  9 and 10 Geo. V, c. 21. The main functions of the Department are the supervision, in conjunction with the 
Voluntary Benefit Societies, of Health Insurance; the administration of the Poor Law; of 
the  [begin page 182] Housing Acts; a variety of Public Health functions, such as 
vaccination and tuberculosis treatment; sanatoria; maternity and child welfare; and the 
welfare of the blind.  Within its wide-embracing jurisdiction also come local legislation, 
loans, and local rates, allotments, libraries, recreation grounds, gymnasiums, 
apprenticeships, food adulteration, water undertakings, local charities, markets and 
fairs, milk supply and dairies, and a multitude other cognate matters.
8
 
The Ministry of Agriculture 
The Like the Boards dealt with in the preceding paragraphs the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries owes its parentage to the Privy Council.  Its immediate predecessor the 
Board of Agriculture was constituted in 1889 to take over certain duties from the Privy 
Council and the Land Commissioners.  In 1903 the duties of the Fisheries Department 
of the Board of Trade were transferred to the Board of Agriculture, the designation of 
which was at the same time altered to accord with its extended functions.  Finally, in 
1919, the Board was transformed into Ministry, and on the new Ministry further and 
important duties were imposed. 
 
The Ministry is now entirely responsible for agricultural education and research; it deals 
with the diseases of animals, the improvement of livestock; the breeding of horses; with 
agricultural credits and co-operation and with the investigation and development of 
Fisheries.  It has been entrusted by Parliament with the expenditure of large sums for 
the promotion of land-settlement schemes (especially the settlement of Ex-
Servicemen); with the expenditure of the Beet-sugar subsidy (now amounting to 
£1,000,000), and with the administration of the Acts for the regulation of agricultural 
wages.  For these and other purposes it requires from Parliament a vote of nearly 
£3,500,000, as compared with £414,092 in 1913-14.  It employs a staff of 2,578 and is 
represented in Parliament by a Minister, who has, of late years, invariably been 
included in the Cabinet, and a Parliamentary Secretary.  [begin page 183] 
 
Office of Works. 
H.M. Office of Works is placed under the control of the Commissioners of Works and 
Public Buildings, consisting of a First Commissioner, the Principal Secretaries of State, 
and the President of the Board of Trade.  The First Commissioner is a Parliamentary 
Minister, and not infrequently is included in the Cabinet, but politically the office has 
never been regarded as of sufficient importance to justify the appointment of a 
Parliamentary Under Secretary. 
 
The management of public works and buildings was vested by an Act of 1832 in the 
Commissioners of Woods Forests, a body of persons who were and are primarily 
charged with the duty of administering the landed estates of the Crown and collecting 
the revenues arising therefrom.  Down to 1851 the Commissioners were accustomed to 
use part of the revenue derived from Crown lands to maintain the public parks and 
buildings for which they were responsible.  The expenditure on these objects tended to 
increase, and it was deemed proper to bring it under the direct control of Parliament.  
Accordingly, in 1851, the Board of Public Works and Buildings was set up as a 
separate entity and to take over certain of the duties hitherto vested in the 
Commissioners of Woods and Forests. 
 
The work of the Department has increased very rapidly, and during the war was 
exceedingly onerous and responsible.  It may be classified as follows; 
 
(1)  the erection of any new buildings required for the public services 
                                                  
8   [182/1]  Report of Select Committee on Estimates (127, 142 of 1925). (2)  the maintenance, repair, alteration of existing public buildings, 
including the Palace of Westminster, the Royal Palaces, and the 
Royal Parks; Diplomatic and Consular buildings; Legal buildings; Art 
and Science buildings, and so forth; 
(3)  the administration and maintenance of the Osborne Convalescent 
Home for Naval and Military Officers; and 
(4)  works carried out on repayment or loan terms for other departments, 
such as the Post Office, the Ministries of Labour and Pensions and 
others. 
 
The Parliamentary vote for this Department now amounts to about £7,500,000, as 
compared with a sum just under [begin page 184] £2,500,000 for the last pre-war year.  
The administrative staff now numbers 1,683, as compared with 770 on 1 August 1914. 
 
The land revenues of the Crown are collected, as indicated above, by the 
Commissioners of Woods, Forest and Land Revenues.  When these revenues were 
surrendered by George III (1760) the net return was about £11,000.  In the year ending 
31 March 1924 the gross receipts were no less than £1,493,491, of which over 
£900,000 was paid into the Exchequer as net revenue. 
 
The Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall 
From the arrangement under which the Crown lands were handed over to the State in 
return for a Civil List, the Crown Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall were, as we have 
seen, excluded.  The former is an appanage of the Sovereign, who as Duke of 
Lancaster receives the net revenues of the Duchy.  The affairs of the Duchy are 
managed by a Chancellor, who is a high political official always included in the Ministry 
and not infrequently in the Cabinet.  As the duties of the office are light it is generally 
conferred upon a statesman whose counsel and advice are desired by the Prime 
Minister, but one who does not desire administrative duties or for whom no appropriate 
office is available.  The Chancellor appoints a Vice-Chancellor who must be a lawyer of 
distinction and who presides over the Chancery Court of the Duchy, an Attorney-
General for the Duchy, and the County Court judges and their subordinates.  The 
salaries of the Chancellor and of the other officials are charged upon the revenues of 
the Duchy and not upon the Consolidated Fund.  Strictly speaking, therefore, the 
Chancellor, though a Parliamentary Minister, is not responsible to Parliament, but solely 
to the Crown. 
 
Still more remote from Parliamentary control is the Duchy of Cornwall which, since its 
creation by Edward III, has been the appanage of the eldest son of the Sovereign, and 
has provided a large part of his income.  The Prince of Wales is assisted in the 
administration of the Duchy by a Council which includes a Lord Warden of the 
Stannaries, [begin page 185] who is also Keeper of the Privy Seal, an Attorney-General, 
Receiver-General, and others. 
 
The Scottish Office 
From the time of the Act of Union (1707) down to 1885 connexion between the 
Executive business of England and Scotland was maintained chiefly through the 
Secretary of State, though the Lord-Advocate for Scotland, sitting in the House of 
Commons, acted as an Under-Secretary of State and exercised large administrative 
powers.  In 1885 a Secretary for Scotland
9 was created by Statute and to him were 
transferred the control of Education, of the Poor Law, Lunacy, Public Health, Fishery 
Boards, Police, Prisons, and other matters of a similar kind.  The new Secretary for 
Scotland also became Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland.  In addition he is at once 
Home Secretary, Minister of Education, and Minister of Health.  He is capable of sitting 
                                                  
9   [185/1]  Now (1926) a Secretary of State. in the House of Commons and is a member of the Ministry and usually of the Cabinet.  
In Parliament he is assisted by an Under-Secretary for Health, as well as by the Lord-
Advocate and the Solicitor General for Scotland.  Scotland possesses, however, its 
own Board of Agriculture (though the Board is not separately represented in 
Parliament), its own Fishery Board, and Inland Revenue Office.  Some of the 
administrative offices, particularly the Education Department, have a nucleus of officials 
in London, though the main work of the Departments is transacted at Edinburgh. 
 
Ireland 
From 1800 to 1920 Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom, but as already 
indicated it retained certain symbols of the more independent status it enjoyed before 
the Act of Union.  The Lord-Lieutenant, the Lord Chancellor, and the Chief Secretary to 
the Lord-Lieutenant virtually constituted the Irish Executive.  Ireland also had its own 
Law Officers.  The Lord-Lieutenant resided at the Viceregal Lodge in Dublin; his Chief 
Secretary had an office in the castle and another in London.  At different times the 
Lord-Lieutenant, the Lord Chancellor, and the Chief Secretary have been included in 
the Cabinet; some- [begin page 186] times two out of the three officials have 
simultaneously been in the Cabinet. 
 
The legislation of 1920 and 1922 brought this state of things to an end. 
 
The Act for the Better Government of Ireland (1920), provided for the establishment of 
two Parliaments at Belfast and Dublin respectively and for Executives severally 
responsible thereto.  Each Parliament was to contribute twenty members to an all-
Ireland Council, which was intended to form the nucleus for an all-Ireland Parliament.  
As regards Southern Ireland the Act of 1920 was stillborn.  Northern Ireland reluctantly 
accepted it as at least preferable to subordination to a Dublin Parliament, and has 
worked it loyally and successfully.  Northern Ireland enjoys a restricted representation 
(thirteen members) in the House of Commons, and by that representation retains some 
legislative connexion with Great Britain.  Such Executive connexion as subsists is 
maintained through the Home Secretary. 
 
By the Statute passed in 1922
10 to give the force of law to the agreement for a Treaty 
between Great Britain and Ireland, Southern Ireland was constituted a Free State with 
the same Constitutional status in the British Empire as the other great Dominions.  It 
has its own Parliament and an Executive responsible thereto, with a Governor- General 
appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada.  The Irish Free State 
has, therefore, passed under the control of the Colonial Office. 
 
Wartime Departments. 
During the war, as was indicated in the preceding chapter, there was necessarily an 
immense development of governmental activities, and consequently there came into 
being a large number of new Departments.  Of those which have survived the war 
some description will be given in subsequent paragraphs.  The majority have happily 
ceased to exist and a detailed analysis of their activities is, therefore, uncalled for.  The 
fact of their [begin page 187] temporary existence is of some historical interest, but their 
titles are, in most cases, sufficiently indicative of the purpose for which they were set 
up, and a bare enumeration must suffice.  The largest of the war-time Departments was 
the Ministry of Munitions which, at the date of the Armistice, had a total staff of no fewer 
than 65,142.
11  The Ministry had indeed become, in Dr. Addison's words, ‘not only the 
                                                  
10   [186/1]  12 Geo. V, c. 4. Cf. also Irish Free State (Consequential Provision. Act, 
13 George V, c. 2. 
11    [187/1]  Cf. Reports of Committee on Organization and Staff's (Bradbury 
Committee). Cmd. 9220 (1918), Cmd. 61 (1919), and Cmd. 2428 (1925). biggest purchasing organization in the world, but also the largest selling and 
distributing agency,' not to mention its primary work of production of guns, ammunition, 
'tanks', aircraft, and what not.  Its staff included 'perhaps the most remarkable 
aggregation of men and women of diverse qualifications and attainments’ - business 
and commercial men, scientists, lawyers, literary travellers, soldiers, and sailors - ever 
got together in the world.
12  After the Armistice it was reconstituted as a Ministry of 
Supply, and in that capacity was mainly responsible for the disposal of the immense 
accumulation of surplus stores.  The remarkable success which, in the latter capacity 
the Ministry achieved was due primarily to the unselfish service rendered to the State 
by certain business men of outstanding capacity, and cannot be accepted as an 
argument in favour of the continuation or renewal of the experiment.  The Ministry of 
National Service dealt with the difficult problem of man power and recruiting; the 
Ministry of Food, organized with conspicuous ability and courage by such men as Lord 
Rhondda and Lord Devonport, and backed up in the War Cabinet by Lord Milner, dealt 
with the supply and the rationing food.  Closely connected with the supply of food was 
the supply of shipping.  To deal with the latter problem – a problem which as early as 
1916 threatened to become insoluble - a Ministry of Shipping under a Shipping 
Controller was set up in December 1916, and, under Lord [begin page 188] Maclay, 
rendered invaluable service to the State.  In June 1918 the staff of the Ministry 
numbered 1,723 persons and cost £254,156 per annum.  A Ministry of Blockade was 
formed in connexion with the Foreign Office and was itself responsible for a number of 
new Departments - the Contraband, Statistical, War Trade Intelligence, the Foreign 
Trade and Finance, and the Restriction of Enemy Supplies Departments.  The 
Prisoners of War Department was attached to the Foreign Office itself, and the Trading 
with the Enemy Department to the Treasury. 
  
No fewer than three separate Departments were set up to act as organs of Government 
policy',
13 to disseminate information and to suggest schemes of 'reconstruction’ after 
the war.  The Ministry of Information had a Headquarter's staff of 526, and, in addition 
to much gratuitous service, a salary list amounting to £77,302 per annum.  These 
figures include the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries which, though 
independent of the Ministry of Information, did analogous work.  Other publicity work 
was confided to a War Aims Committee, which consisted in part of members of 
Parliament (unpaid), and in part of somewhat highly paid officials.  The Ministry of 
Reconstruction was set up under the new Ministries Act of 1917, and was charged with 
the duty to 'consider and advise upon the problems which may arise out of the present 
war and may have to be dealt with upon its termination'.  Its functions were, therefore, 
singularly vague, and though it assembled a staff of 112 persons at a cost of £24,935 
per annum, the tangible results of its labours have fallen far short of the enthusiasm 
with which it was inaugurated.  It produced a large number of pamphlets - largely 
popular epitomes of more elaborate Blue-books and Reports - and initiated some 
important investigations.  But the zeal for 'reconstruction' evaporated during the 
transient period of industrial prosperity which followed upon the Armistice and failed to 
react to the stimulus of depression. 
[begin page 189] 
 
A life even more brief was the portion of Departments such as that which was created 
to deal with grants under the Civil Liabilities scheme, or the Dollar Securities Branch of 
the National Debt Office, the Trading with the Enemy Department of the Public Trustee 
Office, the Belgian Refugees Committee (attached to the Local Government Board), 
and the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement which was set up to co-ordinate 
                                                  
12   [187/2]  For an interesting account of the multiform activities of this Department, 
cf. speech by Dr. Addison, then Minister, in Official Report, xcv, pp. 558 seq, and 
Addison, Politics from Within, ii, C. 7. 
13   [188/1]  Cmd. 9219 (1918). the purchases of munitions, equipment, and food supplies on behalf of the allied 
Governments. 
 
Brought into being, some by the stem exigencies of the war, some by the zeal of 
benevolent theorists, screened by votes of credit from a minute investigation of 
expenditure, staffed partly by patriotic volunteers and in even larger proportion by 
highly paid amateurs, these war-time Departments flourished awhile and have been 
gradually dispersed.  Other Departments set up during the war have survived it, and to 
these survivors we now pass. 
 
Ministry of Pensions 
Of these new Ministries the largest is the Ministry of Pensions.  This Department is 
responsible for a larger of expenditure of, public money than any other Department of 
State.  It was established by the Ministry of Pensions Act, 1916, in pursuance of which 
an Order-in-Council was issued transferring to the Minister of Pensions, as from the 
15th February 1917, the powers and duties of the Admiralty, the Chelsea 
Commissioners, and the War Office in regard to the administration of pensions to 
officers, nurses, and men, in respect of disablement, and to their widows, children, and 
other dependants, in respect of death.  The same Act provided that the powers and 
duties of the Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation should be 
exercised under the control of and in accordance with the instructions of the Minister of 
Pensions.  By the Naval and Military War Pensions, &c., (Transfer of Powers) Act, 
1917, this Statutory Committee was dissolved and its powers and duties were 
transferred in part to the Minister of Pensions and in part to a new [begin page 190] 
Committee to be appointed by the Minister of Pensions and to be called the Special 
Grants Committee.  Chief amongst the functions so transferred to the Minister of 
Pensions was the duty of making provision for medical treatment and for training.  In 
1919, however, it was decided to transfer the responsibility for training to the Minister of 
Labour, except in so far as it was deemed necessary to provide training in conjunction 
with treatment under medical supervision.  The powers and duties of the Minister of 
Pensions were further limited by the War Pensions Act of 1920, which provided for the 
transfer or the re-transfer to the Service Departments of matters in connexion with 
compensation for disablement in times of peace. 
 
From that date the two main functions of the Ministry of Pensions have been: (a) the 
award and payment of compensation in respect of disablement or death arising as a 
result of service in the Great War or in any former war; and (b) the provision of medical 
and surgical treatment for disabilities so incurred. 
 
The organization of the Department is threefold: viz. Local, Regional, and 
Headquarters.  The Local Organization consists of Area Offices which afford facilities 
for pensioners, their widows and dependants, and other claimants to obtain advice and 
assistance on all matters relating to Great War pensions.  All claims on pension matters 
are lodged, in the first instance, at the Local Area Offices.  The Local Offices also 
arrange for the medical boarding of pensioners for pension or treatment purposes and 
pay Treatment Allowances. 
 
The area of the United Kingdom and Ireland was formerly divided into eleven Regions, 
each with separate headquarters, but in consequence of the diminution of work some 
of the Regions have been amalgamated, and abolished.  At the present moment there 
are separate Regional Offices for Scotland (Edinburgh), Northern Region (Newcastle-
on-Tyne), North-Western Region (Manchester), Midlands Region (Birmingham), and 
the [begin page 191] Welsh Region (Cardiff).  The whole of the south-cast and south-
west of England (roughly south of a line from the Wash to the Bristol Channel), and 
Ireland, function directly under Head-quarters.  It is probable that in the near future 
other Regions will be abolished.  The functions of a Region are the awarding of 
pension and the control of Area Offices, but cases of exceptional difficulty or of particular types are submitted to Head-quarters in order that proper co-ordination may 
be secured. 
 
The Head-quarters consists of the General Administration Division under the 
Permanent Secretary, the Awards, Accounts, Local Administration, Medical Divisions, 
and Pension Issue Office. 
 
Medical treatment (in-patients and out-patients) is provided at Ministry Hospitals and 
Clinics, and concurrent treatment and training at Ministry Centres under the direct 
control of the Medical Services Division at Headquarters.  Use is also made of Civil 
Hospitals and other Institutions for the treatment of the Ministry's patients. 
 
The General Administration Division initiates and directs policy, and is responsible for 
the financial control of the operations of the Ministry. 
 
The Pension Issue Office, as its name implies, issues pensions to men, their widows 
and dependants, except in Scotland, which has its separate office.  It administers the 
pensions and allowances of lunatic, blind, paraplegic, and other chronic Institutional 
cases; it also administers the estates of deceased pensioners and authorizes the 
payments abroad to pensioners who emigrate.  Payments of pensions are made in 
cash by the Post Office on the authority of an Allowance Book, issued by the Pension 
Issue Office, and on presentation of an Identity Certificate which is issued direct to the 
pensioner. 
 
The Ministry has the assistance of certain consultative and advisory bodies.  The 
Central Advisory Committee was set up in accordance with Section 3 of the War 
Pensions Act, 1921, to consider such matters as may be submitted for its advice.  The 
Committee includes officers [begin page 192] of the Ministry, ex-service men, and 
representatives of War Pensions Committees.  
 
Local Advisory Councils have also been set up which form the channel for the 
consideration of the recommendations of War Pensions Committees on matters of 
policy and administration.  These Councils include representatives of ex-service 
officers or men, widows and dependants, and other suitable persons.  
 
War Pensions Committees, of which there are 170, have been established under 
Section 1 of the War Pensions Act, 1921, and include representatives of disabled men, 
widows, and dependants in receipt of pensions, local authorities within the Committee's 
area, employers and workmen in industry, and voluntary associations.  
 
The functions of Committees, which are advisory and not executive, are: 
 
(1)    to make recommendations upon general matters of policy and 
administration, upon applications made by ex-service men, &c., for 
various grants, and upon complaints made by pensioners or 
claimants; 
(2)    to arrange for the care of motherless or neglected children, the 
distribution of certain grants made by the Special Grants Committee; 
and to make inquiries in cases of forfeiture of widows' pensions.  
 
Finally, a Standing Joint Committee, composed of nine Government representatives 
appointed from the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Labour, 
and the Ministry of Pensions, and fifteen representatives of ex-service organizations, 
was constituted in 1920 with the object of assisting organizations of ex-officers and 
men in their task of securing for their members and ex-service men generally full 
information as to the rights and privileges conferred on them by the Crown and 
Parliament, and the enjoyment of such rights and privileges: and also to provide machinery for consultation between the Government and ex-service officers and men 
upon questions affecting them and their dependants.  The work of the Joint Committee 
is carried on through two panels, one confining its attention to matters affecting  [begin 
page 193] ex-officers and the other to matters affecting other ranks.  Questions affecting 
both sections are dealt with at joint sittings.
14
 
The magnitude of the work entrusted to the Ministry of Pensions may be gauged from 
the fact that it employs a staff of about 18,000 persons and is responsible for an 
expenditure of no less than £66,000,000.
15  Both figures however, may be expected to 
show reasonably rapid diminution.  In 1920-1, which was the peak year, the staff 
numbered 32,045 and the expenditure was over £106,000,000.  The present number of 
beneficiaries is about 2,200,000, and the capital value of War Pensions liabilities is 
about £900,000,000 as compared with about £1,,400,000 in 1921. 
 
Should peace be preserved the work of this Ministry will be subject to contraction at an 
ever accelerated pace, the Ministry itself should, within a generation, be extinguished. 
 
The Ministry of Labour 
A similar fate is not likely to overtake the Ministry of Labour, which represents, though 
less directly than the Ministry of Pensions, a legacy of war-time conditions. The Ministry 
of Labour was constituted as a separate under the New Ministries Act of 1916, primarily 
to take over and carry on the work of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade.  
The Ministry is mainly concerned with unemployment and the administration of the 
Unemployment Insurance Acts.  Consequently the numbers of its staff and the amount 
of its expenditure exhibit extraordinary fluctuations.  The net cost of the Employment 
Department of the Board of Trade in 1913-14 was under £1,000,000,
16 and its staff was 
4,400.  The staff of the new Ministry, which at the time of the Armistice numbered 
8,484, had expanded by 1 April to 25,777.  During the trade boom which followed it was 
reduced to 15,863 (1 October 1920), but six months later was up again to 24,354, and 
on 1 July 1921 was [begin page 194] 31,426. Similarly the expenditure, which in 1916-
17 was under 2½ millions, had increased tenfold in 1918-19, and in the following year 
(1919-20) reached the appalling total of £48,833,235.  The expenditure is now (1925) 
about £18,000,000 and the staff about 15,000.  Of these some 10,000 are employed 
locally in connexion with the Employment (or Labour) Exchanges, and the 
administration of the Unemployment Insurance Acts, while the keeping of the records 
for the same service necessitates a Headquarter's staff of over 3,000.  Apart from 
services connected with unemployment the Ministry supervises the work of the Trade 
Boards, which regulate wages in unorganized industries; it endeavours, through its 
Industrial Relations Department, to avert, and by the machinery of the Industrial Court 
and by arbitration under the Conciliation Act (1896) to settle, Trade Disputes.  It has 
also a variety of duties in connexion with ex-service men.  It has taken over from the 
Pensions Ministry the industrial training of the disabled; it supervises the working of the 
‘Interrupted Apprenticeship' scheme, and administers the grants for their resettlement 
in civil life.  These functions may be regarded as temporary.  A considerable part of the 
work of the Department consists in the collection and dissemination of Labour 
statistics, the value of which is variously estimated.  Finally, the Ministry is responsible 
for the British share (9.40 per cent.) of the cost of maintaining the International Labour 
Organization which has been established in connexion with the League of Nations at 
Geneva. 
  
                                                  
14   [193/1]  Report of Select Committee on Estimates (127, 142 Of 1925).  
15   [193/2]  In 1925. 
16   [193/3]  H. of C., Papers, 70 of 1922, p. 86. The Ministry of Transport 
The Ministry of Transport owes its legal creation to a Statute of 1919,
17 under which His 
Majesty was empowered to appoint a Minister of Transport and to transfer to him 
certain powers in relation to railways; light railways; tramways; canals, waterways, and 
inland navigations; roads, bridges, ferries, and vehicles and traffic thereon; harbours, 
docks, and piers.  The Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary were declared capable 
of [begin page 195] sitting in, the House of Commons, and provision was made, on 
unusually elaborate scale, for an office establishment.  Power was also taken to set up 
various Committees to give advice and assistance to the Minister in connexion with the 
exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties.  The Ministry now (1,925) 
employs a staff of 464 persons and expends something less than £120,000 a year. 
 
The Railways Act. 
Complementary to the Ministry of Transport Act was the Act passed in 1921
18 for the 
reorganization of the railways.  On the outbreak of war the Government had taken the 
over control of the railways, though the actual management was vested in a small 
Committee of general managers, whose performance of a most difficult task afforded a 
model of administrative efficiency.  During the period of control which was prolonged 
until 1921 the Government guaranteed to the Railway Companies their net receipts on 
the basis of the year 1913.  Control being due to terminate on 15 August 1921 many 
difficult questions, financial and administrative, arose – questions which were further 
complicated by a serious strike of railway employees in the autumn of 1919.  On what 
basis, if at all, were the railways to be handed back their proprietors?  In certain 
quarters there was a vociferous demand that the opportunity should be seized to 
acquire the railways for the State: to unify the many existing systems and to nationalize 
the whole transport service.  Others demanded that the State, having compensated the 
proprietors for the damage inflicted upon their property by the requirements of the 
country during the war, should simply hand it back to them.  But, apart all other 
considerations, the attitude of the railway employees rendered that simple course 
impracticable.  By the grant of a series of war bonuses the employees were by 
receiving an additional 33s. per week per man.  The salaries and wages-bill of the 
principal railway companies had risen from about £47,000,000 in 1913 to about 
£150,000,000 (1920); the coal cost had risen, in the same [begin page 196] period, from 
about £9,000,000 to nearly £24,000,000; while the total net receipts had fallen from 
£48,395,198 to £7,500,000 (apart from payments from the State). 
 
The legislation of 1919 and 1921 represented a compromise between the views of the 
State Socialists and those who believed that national interests could be best served by 
a return to the principle of private enterprise and company control.  The Ministry of 
Transport was set up not to provide transport facilities (save in the last resort), but to 
regulate and control those who do.  The railways were to be grouped into four gigantic 
systems by a process of summary amalgamation.  The interests of the proprietors and 
the consumers - the traders and passengers - were to be adjusted by a Railways Rates 
Tribunal - something between a judicial court and a body of arbitrators - which was 
invested with the power to fix rates and fares, but with due regard to the interests not 
only of the public but also of the railway proprietors.  Questions as to wages and hours 
of duty, and other conditions of service, were, in default of direct agreement between 
the railway trade unions and the railway companies, to be referred to a joint Central 
Wages Board consisting of sixteen persons representative in equal proportions of the 
employers and the workmen.  In default of settlement by this Central Wages Board an 
appeal was to lie to a National Wages Board, consisting of six representatives 
appointed by the Companies, six by the Trade Unions, four by the users of the 
railways, with an independent chairman nominated by the Minister of Labour.  Whether 
                                                  
17   [194/1]  9 & 10 Geo. V. c. 50. 
18   [195/1]  11 & 12 Geo. V, c. 55. the provisions of the Acts of 1919 and 1921 will furnish a final and a satisfactory 
solution of the many problems which confronted the State, the railway companies, the 
railway proprietors, and the railway servants, at the conclusion of the war, it is, as yet, 
too soon to say.  One thing may confidently be said: that the machinery set up for the 
adjustment of labour disputes has, in a time of exceptional strain, stood the test with a 
large measure of success.  [begin page 197] 
 
The Mines Department  
Parallel with the problems presented, at the conclusion of the war, by the Transport 
industry were those presented by the coal mines.  Mines and railways had alike been 
virtually nationalized during the war, and in both industries the employees had tasted 
the sweets of serving an employer who possessed a purse temporarily bottomless.  
The end of the war, and the resumption of normal budgeting, after a period of finance 
simplified by votes of credit, brought the State and the taxpayers, the mine-owners and 
the miners, face to face with hard economic facts.  The public purse being, in fact, far 
from bottomless, how were the miners to be paid war-time wages without penalizing 
the consumer and killing the industry? 
 
The work thrown upon the Board of Trade by an attempt to solve these problems 
appeared to necessitate the creation, if not of a new Ministry, at least of a new   
department semi-independently represented in Parliament by a Parliamentary 
Secretary, to be designated 'The Secretary for Mines'.
19  At the same time there was 
transferred to the Board of Trade and through it to the Secretary for Mines 'all the 
powers of a Secretary of State under enactments relating to mines and quarries'.  The 
special object of the new Department, as stated in the Mining Industry Act (1920), was 
to secure 'the most effective development and utilization of the mineral resources of the 
United Kingdom and the safety and welfare of those engaged in the mining industry'.  
The Act authorized the Minister to regulate the export of coal and its pit-head price for 
consumption in the British Isles, and for bunkers; and to regulate both wages and 
profits.  As in the Transport Bill, power was taken to appoint advisory Committees, and 
Committees were to be set up for each pit (where it was desired by the employees), for 
each of twenty-six scheduled districts; and for each of the six chief mining areas, 
Scotland, Ireland, Northumberland, Durham, the Midlands, the Southern and South 
Wales.  This hierarchy of Committees was to be crowned by [begin page 198] a national 
Board.  The Act was plainly a compromise between the mutually exclusive principles of 
Private Enterprise, State Socialism, and Syndicalism, and had, therefore, little chance 
of success. 
 
The rapid fluctuations of fortunes in the coal-mining industry; the alarm justifiably 
inspired in the Government by the liabilities to which the State was committed by ‘the 
policy of control'; the abrupt termination control in March 1921; the grave crisis which 
consequently ensued in April 1921; the prolonged and disastrous strike (1 April-4 
July)
20 - all these things imposed upon the new Department a strain which, though 
severe, has not actually broken it.  Yet those who can regard the legislation of this 
period with detachment, who can penetrate through ‘circumstantials' to the fundamental 
principles which are essentially predicated by the setting up of these post-war 
Ministries and Departments, must needs be apprehensive as to the stability of a 
structure which has been built not upon the eternal rock of principle but upon the 
shifting sands of political expediency.  Of this structure the two main pillars are the 
Ministry of Transport and the Department of Mines.  Called into being to meet the 
emergency of the hour, reflecting in their constitution the confused thinking of a period 
of economic and social confusion, they may well prove, should industry and society 
                                                  
19   [197/1]  10 & 12 Geo. V, C. 50. 
20   [198/1]  The direct cost to the State of this crisis was estimated at £30,000,000, 
and the loss to the country at £250,000,000. ever regain their normal health, to be a hindrance to recovery rather than an incentive 
to progress and development. 
 
Miscellaneous Departments of State 
With a number of Departments, purely administrative and executive, and wholly 
divorced from politics, it seems unnecessary in the present work to deal at length.   
Some of them, however, supply indispensable cogs in the wheel of Executive 
Government, and call therefore for passing notice.  The more important of them are 
closely connected with the Treasury.  Of these the Inland Revenue Department, which 
collects direct taxation, amounting to about [begin page 199] £450,000,000 at a cost of 
about 6½  millions, employs a regular staff of about 19,500 persons.  The Customs and 
Excise Department, which collects about £235,000,000 of indirect taxes at a cost of 
£4,720,000, has a staff of over 11,000.  The function of the Paymaster-General, as his 
name implies, is the converse of those assigned to the Inland Revenue and Customs 
and Excise Departments.  In his name stand all the balances or rather the one 
concentrated balance resulting from the sum paid into the bank by the Exchequer for 
the Public Services.  By him all the payments authorized by the Treasury are actually 
made; the Treasury having in turn been authorized to spend the money by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General, whose duty it is to make sure that the credit 
demanded by the Treasury strictly accords with the Parliamentary vote.  Thus the cog-
wheel of the whole machine is the Comptroller and Auditor-General.  Appointed by 
Letters Patent under the Great Seal his salary is charged on the Consolidated Fund, 
and he is irremovable - like a judge - except on an address from both Houses of 
Parliament.  His position is, therefore, one of great responsibility and complete 
independence.  His staff numbers about 340 and expenses of his office amount to 
about £160,000 a year.
21  Another office of ever-increasing importance is that of the 
Government Actuary, who has a staff of 86 persons maintained at a cost of about 
£40,000 a year.  The Government Chemist has a staff of 174 persons costing £46,000 
a year.  The Civil Service Commission, with a staff of 131, spends £62,000 a year; the 
Forestry Commission, with a staff of 133, spends £300,000; and the Charity 
Commission, established in 1853 for the better administration of Charitable Trusts, but 
now relieved by the Board of Education of its control educational endowments, still 
maintains a staff of 118 persons at a cost of £4,3000 a year.  The Public Works Loan 
Commission has a staff of 66 persons, but its expenses are practically reimbursed by 
the fees it receives.  [begin page 200] 
 
The Officers of the Household 
Had this chapter been primarily historical it would have begun, instead of ending, with 
some reference to the officers of the Household.  Pretending only to, an analysis of the 
mechanism of the State as now existing a few sentences must suffice.  The great 
officers of the Household, as Bishop Stubbs observed, 'furnish the King with the first 
elements of a Ministry of State.
22  The indispensable servants of the Household from 
Teutonic days were the chamberlain, the steward, the marshal or horsthegn, and the 
cup-bearer or butler.  The Norman king, in addition to his quasi-State officials, such as 
the justiciar, the Treasurer, and the Chancellor, had his Lord Great Chamberlain, Lord 
High Steward, his Constable, and his Marshal.  These offices tended to become 
hereditary, but the only one in regard to which the tendency has subsisted is that of the 
Lord Great Chamberlain.  That office has been hereditary since the grant of Henry I to 
the family of the De Veres, Earls of Oxford.  The custody of the Palace of Westminster 
is still in the keeping of this officer, whose duties otherwise are ceremonial. 
 
                                                  
21    [199/1]  For a detailed description of the procedure, and facsimiles of the 
appropriate documents, see Appendix E. 
22   [200/1]  Constitutional History, i. 343. The Lord Chamberlain, the Lord Steward, and the Master of the Horse are Court 
officials pure and simple though they change (as a rule) with the Government.  The 
Treasurer of the Household, the Controller, and the Vice-Chamberlain, though 
Household officers for all ceremonial purposes, are also members of the Government 
and act as ministerial Whips.  Besides these high and dignified officials the King also 
has his working officers: his Treasurer and Keeper of the Privy Purse, his State 
Chamberlain, and his Private Secretary.  The last-named office dates only from 1812, 
when the Prince Regent raised a constitutional storm by appointing a certain Colonel 
M'Mahon as his Private Secretary.  Purists detected in the new appointment not a 
common-sense arrangement for dealing with the Regent's correspondence, but an 
insidious attempt to circumvent the constitutional responsibility of the Ministers of the 
Crown.  Was not the [begin page 201] Secretary of the State the King's Private 
Secretary, and was it not his duty, asked one, to wait upon the King?  Would not the 
new official, asked another, necessarily be brought under parliamentary control?  Lord 
Castlereagh and Mr. Spencer Perceval, on behalf of the Government, attempted to 
allay these apprehensions.  Colonel M'Mahon was Castlereagh pointed out, 'incapable 
of receiving His Royal Highness's commands in the constitutional sense of the words 
or of carrying them into effect’.  Perceval insisted that Colonel M'Mahon was 
'incompetent to communicate the pleasure of the Prince Regent in any way that would 
authorize any subject in the land to attend to it or to act upon it with official 
responsibility'.  The debate, as a modem critic has pointed out, is exceedingly 
instructive, alike as illustrating the suspicions lurking in the minds of Constitutionalists 
against any semblance of 'personal monarchy', and still more, perhaps, as betraying a 
curious misapprehension on the part of the Commons about the historical evolution of 
the Secretariat.
23  Colonel M'Mahon was starting under the Prince Regent precisely 
where Lord Castlereagh's predecessor in title had stared under Henry III.  From the 
point of view of the constitutional purist those were right who foresaw for the new 
official a similar evolution.  Politically, there was little ground for apprehension: the 
doctrine of Constitutional Monarchy and ministerial responsibility was too firmly 
established to permit the interposition of a personal servant between the Sovereign and 
his parliamentary Ministers.  Yet who can say what might have happened William IV 
been succeeded by a saner George III instead of by a Queen instructed in 
Constitutional theory and trained in Constitutional practice by so accomplished a 
mentor as Lord Melbourne?  Who can say what might still happen in the case of an 
inexperienced Sovereign in the hands of a Secretary who was at once competent to 
exert influence and astute enough to conceal it?  In fact, the office has been filled by a 
succession of men who, as far [begin page 202] as the world knows, have played a 
difficult part with exemplary discretion.  Not least confidently may this be affirmed of the 
man who for twenty years was virtually Secretary to Queen Victoria - the Prince 
Consort. 
 
There remain to be noticed three of the most historic and the most dignified officials of 
the central Government: the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Lord 
President of the Council. 
 
The Lord Chancellor 
The Lord Chancellor, who is invariably a member of the Cabinet, occupies a fourfold 
position.  He presides in the House of Lords, and as Speaker of the House of Lords 
receives a salary of £4,000 a year, charged upon the vote for the House of Lords 
Offices.  He is the head of the Judiciary; the head of a Department - the Crown Office in 
Chancery; and the chief legal adviser of the Government.  In the last capacity he is 
assisted by the 'law officers', the Attorney and Solicitor-General.  The Manifold duties of 
the Chancellor, judicial, legislative, and administrative, strikingly exemplify the lack of 
differentiation incidental to the period in which the Chancellor's office had its origin.  Of 
                                                  
23   [201/1]  Gretton, op. cit., pp. 102-3. all the great officers of State, that of the Chancellor is the oldest, dating from the reign 
of Edward the Confessor.  The Chancellor (so named from the cancelli or the screen 
behind which the secretaries sat, to transact business
24) was the chief of the King's 
secretaries and chaplains, the 'keeper of the King's conscience’, and custodian of the 
King's Great Seal.  He was a prominent member of the King's Council, a baron of the 
Exchequer, but primarily the head of a secretarial department, the Chancery.  His chief 
rival, the Norman Justiciar, disappeared at the end of Henry Ill's reign, and 
thenceforward the Chancellor was indisputably the leading Minister of the Crown, the 
‘Secretary of State for all departments', at any rate until the sixteenth century.  Of his 
place in the judicial system I propose to speak later.
25  Down to the reign of Edward III 
the office was invariably and naturally held by an ecclesiastic the first lay Chan- [begin 
page 203] being Robert Bourchier, appointed in 1340.  From the sixteenth century the 
political importance of the office somewhat declined owing to the development of the 
Secretariat; but the Chancellor still takes precedence next after the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and his office remains not merely one of the highest dignity, but of the 
greatest importance.  Apart from his own judicial duties, the Chancellor is responsible 
for the appointment of judges,
26 magistrates, and counsel learned in the law; he is 
patron of many of the King's livings, visitor of the King's Hospitals and Colleges, and 
head of the Crown Office in Chancery whence many important writs still issue, e.g. 
those for the election of Members of Parliament.  It should be added that the 
Chancellorship is one of the few offices still subject to a religious disability.  It cannot be 
held by a Roman Catholic. 
 
The Lord Privy Seal. 
The office of Lord Privy Seal has, since 1884, been merely a sinecure; but it is an 
historic office still held, with appropriate precedence, by a member of the Cabinet, not 
infrequently in commendam with another office, and sometimes without emolument.  
Historically the office is interesting, since it played an important part in the development 
of the principle of ministerial responsibility.  It dates back at least as far as the 
fourteenth century, and may have been intended as a check upon the growing power of 
the Chancellor.  Any way, by the sixteenth century it had become part of the regular 
administrative routine that 'documents signed by the King's own hand, and 
countersigned by the Secretary, are sent to the Keeper of the Privy Seal, as 
instructions for documents to be issued under the Privy Seal; and these again serve as 
instructions the Chancellor to issue documents bearing the Great Seal of the Realm.  
This practice begets a certain Ministerial responsibility for the King's acts.'
27  But all 
legal necessity for the use of the Privy Seal was definitely abolished by Statute in 1884.  
[begin page 204] 
 
The Lord President of the Council 
The Lord President of the Council is another official of the highest dignity, who has 
been deprived of the most important of his administrative functions by comparatively 
recent changes recorded in the preceding pages.  The conversion of the Committee of 
Council into a Board of Education in 1899 was the last and most serious blow.  The 
establishment of the Board of Agriculture was another, less recent and less serious.  
The Lord President is still nominally a member of many phantom Boards, but apart 
from his position as a member of the Cabinet, in which he invariably sits, his functions 
                                                  
24   [202/1]  Stubbs, i. 352. 
25   [202/2]  Cf. chapter xxxi. 
26   [203/1]  The Chancellor appoints judges of the High Court, justices of the Peace 
and County Court judges; but not the Lords Justices of Appeal, the Law Lords nor 
stipendiary magistrates. 
27   [203/2]  Maitland, Constitutional History of England, P. 203. have shrunk with the fortunes of the historic Privy Council of which he is the official 
head.  At meetings of the Council he sits invariably on the right hand of the Sovereign. 
 
The Privy Council 
These meetings are frequent, but only in a formal sense are they important.  Yet the 
business there transacted is indispensable to the efficient working of the administrative 
machine, and the Privy Council Office has a staff of thirty, six persons and spends 
about £15,000 a year.  It is the King-in-Council who issues Proclamations and 
Executive Orders.  It is in the Council that newly appointed Bishops do homage to the 
King for the temporalities of their Sees; that Ministers take the official oath, kiss the 
King's hand, and from him receive the insignia of office; in the Council Sheriffs are still 
'pricked'.  Numberless executive acts still require to be done in Council, and to be 
attested by the signature of the Clerk.  Maitland
28 enumerates six different kinds of 
powers delegated by Parliament to the, Privy Council: the power to lay down general 
rules, e.g. as to the administration of workhouses to issue particular commands, e.g. to 
a recalcitrant local authority; to grant licences; to remit penalties; to order inspection; to 
order inquisitions, e.g. as to a railway accident.  But in the performance of these 
functions, though the parent Council remains the formal authority, the real and 
originating authority is vested in one of the numerous daughter departments to which 
the Council has given birth.  [begin page 205]  
 
The Council now consists of some three hundred and forty persons.  Among them are 
all Cabinet Ministers, present and past; and other officers of State; the two Archbishops 
and the Bishop of London; a large number of Peers, including practically all those who 
have held high administrative posts at home and abroad; a certain number of the 
highest judges and ex-judges; a few colonial statesmen, and a large number of 
persons whom for political, literary, scientific, military, or other services the Sovereign 
(or his Minister) desires to honour.  Except on the demise of the Crown and some 
ceremonial occasions, only a few members of the Council are summoned, the 
customary quorum being three.
29  But the Council has a great history behind it, and, 
should certain imperialist dreams be fulfilled, may have a great future before it. 
 
                                                  
28   [204/1]  Op. Cit., P. 407. 
29   [205/1]  The Council which met on 7 May 1910 to proclaim the accession of King 
George V was attended by over 140 persons, among them, according to precedent, 
being the Lord Mayor and representatives of City of London. XXX. The Machinery of Government 
The Administrative System England, Prussia, 
France, America - Delegated Legislation 
 
'The King bath no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows 
him.' - Sir Edward Coice. 
 
'Everything for the benefit of the King shall be taken largely, as everything 
against the King shall be taken strictly.' – Chief Justice Hobart, in Sir 
Edward Coke's Case. 
 
'The individual citizen is in danger of being ground between two millstones.  
One is the old one of powers and immunities reserved to the Sovereign . . . 
under cover of which public servants may escape liability.  The other is the 
newer and more oppressive one of powers excluding or curtailing ordinary 
private rights of redress which have been conferred by Parliament . . . on the 
officials of various Departments.' - Sir. Frederick Pollock. 
 
'The action of our Acts of Parliament grows more and more dependent upon 
subsidiary legislation.  More than half our modern Acts are to this extent 
incomplete statements of law.' - C.T. Carr. 
 
The Business of Government 
The preceding chapter, though unavoidably catalogic in character, may at least have 
served to Convey some idea of the multifarious and miscellaneous duties assumed by 
or imposed upon the modern State.  Yet it can hardly have failed at the same time to 
suggest certain disquieting questions?  Does the existing arrangement of business 
make for efficiency and economy?  Has not the multiplication of departments tended to 
the overlapping of duties and reduplication of functions?  Is the articulation of work 
between the several departments of Government orderly and scientific?  Does it even 
roughly correspond with a logical delimitation of services?  Or is it completely 
haphazard; the result of piecemeal legislation and uncoordinated administration?  That 
the creation of new Ministries and Departments has of late years afforded opportunity 
for the rearrangement of duties on more [begin  page 208] scientific lines is undeniable, 
and the preceding chapter has shown that the opportunity has been to some extent 
redeemed.  Thus the Education Office, as now constituted, represents the 
concentration of functions previously allocated to the Committee of Council for 
Education, to the Department of Science and Art, and to the Charity Commissioners.  
Yet the concentration is not complete.  The Home Office is still responsible for 
Reformatory and Industrial Schools; the Ministry of Labour deals with the ‘vocational 
training' of ex-service men; the Treasury administers the grant to Universities and 
University Colleges; the Ministry of Agriculture also has close relations with Colleges 
and Universities in regard to a agricultural education; the Home Office and the Ministry 
of Health both touch the life of children of school age, the former under the 
Employment of Children Act, 1903, and the latter in connexion with Orthopaedic 
Hospitals and other health services for children.  In each of the cases cited there are 
good, perhaps conclusive, reasons for the allocation of the particular function to a 
particular Department.  But it is not easy to explain why the Board of Education should 
be responsible for the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Science Museum, and the 
Geological Museum, and not for the National History Museum at South Kensington. 
 The Articulation of Functions 
A question of fundamental importance seems at this point to emerge.  Should the 
articulation of functions according to the persons and classes to be dealt with, or 
according to the services to be performed?  For example': is it better to have one 
Ministry of Education, another of Health, and a third of Labour, or Ministries 
respectively for children, for paupers, and for the unemployed?  The Machinery of 
Government Committee, while observing that neither principle could be applied with 
absolute and exclusive rigidity, pronounced unequivocally in favour of differentiation 
according to services.  'It is impossible that the specialized service which each 
Department has to render to the community can be of as high a standard [begin page 
209] when its work is at the same time limited to a particular class of persons and 
extended to every variety of provision for them, as when the Department concentrates 
itself on the provision of one particular service only, by whomsoever required, and looks 
beyond the interests of comparatively small classes.’
1  As to the soundness of this 
conclusion there would seem to be little doubt.  But even if the principle of 
differentiation by services be generally adopted, some overlapping is inevitable.  Nor 
can the difficulty be overcome save by systematic co-operation between the several 
Departments of State.'  Thus the officials of the Ministry of Health cannot do their work 
efficiently unless, as regards the health of children, they are in constant touch with the 
officials of the Board of Education.  Similarly the Ministry of Labour must be in close 
correspondence with the Ministry of Pensions in reference to the training of disabled 
ex-service men.  The new Department of Overseas Trade may be regarded primarily as 
a liaison between the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office.  The Treasury must be, 
and is, in touch with every Department. 
 
Report of the Machinery of Government (Haldane Committee) 
The Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, to which reference has more 
than once been made, has received less attention than it deserved.  Many of its 
conclusions can indeed be accepted, if at all, only with large reservations, and none of 
its recommendations should be adopted without grave and prolonged consideration.  
Moreover it is important, when considering them, to bear in mind that the Report was 
issued at a moment (1918) when the exigencies of war had necessitated the adoption 
of collectivist methods which were applied under circumstances exceptionally 
favourable to the temporary success of the experiments.  No one doubts that given 
certain conditions collectivism may produce magnificent results.  Under normal 
conditions, and among average men, the mainspring of economic activity is the desire 
for wealth - using the term wealth in its widest connotation.  But under the stress of an 
emotion more potent than that of [begin page 210] personal ambition men will work 
harder for others than they do normally for themselves.  Such an emotion is that of 
patriotism; a danger threatening the Fatherland supplies a stimulus to generous minds 
stronger than the desire for personal gain.  During the war the State was able 
temporarily to command the services of all men of goodwill: in particular the services of 
great captains of industry, whom in ordinary times no pecuniary reward could have 
induced to enlist under the banner of industrial bureaucracy.  Two other advantages the 
State possessed during the years of war: it had unlimited command of labour and a 
command of credit and capital which also temporarily 'unlimited'.  Even so, the results, 
thou superb, were attained at a cost which, though not grudged at the moment, is now 
recognized as having been grossly extravagant, and having imposed upon the nation a 
burden which can be alleviated only by a century of strenuous labour and persistent 
self-sacrifice. 
 
At the moment when the Report of the Machinery Government Committee was 
prepared, these truths were less self-evident than they are today.  Consequently it is 
not remarkable that the Report should be pervaded by a belief in the virtue of State 
                                                  
1   [209/1]  Cd. 9230, PP. 7-8. action and State control much more robust than accords with the prevalent 
disillusionment of today.  Nevertheless the specific recommendations of the Committee 
are entitled to respectful consideration. 
 
Special Committee of Canadian Senate 
With this Report may usefully be compared a Report presented in July 1919 to the 
Senate of Canada by a Special Committee of the Senate appointed ‘to consider and 
report on the possibility of bettering the machinery of Government.'
2  The Canadian 
Committee had before them not only a Report on the Organization of the Public 
Service of Canada specially drafted for the Canadian, Government in 1912 by Sir 
George Murray,
3 but also the [begin page 211] Report of the Haldane Committee and an 
important Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure on the Financial 
Procedure of the House of Commons.
4  On the whole the Canadian Report, though 
less exhaustive, is more workmanlike and direct than that of the Haldane Committee 
and notably less infected by the doctrinaire tone which pervades the latter and detracts 
from its impressiveness.  But the two Reports have naturally much in common. 
 
The outstanding feature of the Haldane Report, as already indicated, is the suggestion 
that the business of the various departments of Government should be distributed as 
far as possible according to the nature of the service with which they are concerned.  
Accordingly, it is proposed that the several Departments should deal with Finance; II 
and  III, National Defence and External Affairs; IV, Research and Information; V, 
Production (including Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries), Transport, and Commerce; 
VI, Employment; VII, Supplies; VIII, Education; IX, Health; and X, justice.  In so far as 
this may be taken to involve a reduction of departments and a simplification of the 
functions of the State, the suggestion will command general approval, but incipient 
satisfaction is discounted both by the caution that some of these branches would 
'undoubtedly require more than one Minister', and by the general tenor of the Report, 
which appears to contemplate the intrusion of the State into every corner and cranny of 
social and industrial activity. 
 
The Cabinet and Departments 
There remains the question as to the relation which should subsist between the 
Cabinet as the Supreme Executive and the Administrative Departments.  The main 
functions of the Cabinet are defined as 
 
(a)   the final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament; 
(b)   the supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the 
policy prescribed by Parliament; and 
(c)   the continuous co-ordination and delimitation of [begin page 212] the 
activities of the several Departments of the State. 
 
From this definition it may be inferred that it is contemplated that the Cabinet of the 
future should approximate more nearly to the War Cabinet
5 than to the older type, that 
its functions should be supervisory and coordinative rather than administrative, and that 
its members (limited to ten or twelve) should not as a rule act as political chiefs of 
Departments. 
 
                                                  
2   [210/1]  Journals of the Senate of Canada (vol. 1v), Ottawa, 1919. 
3   [210/2]  Rt. Hon. Sir G.H. Murray, formerly Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue, and Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (1903-11). 
4   [211/1]  Ninth Report of the Session of 1918. - Presented 22 Oct. 1918. 
5   [212/1]  Supra, ii. 81. That there is something to be said for this bifurcation of functions is undeniable, and in 
particular this: That Parliament would be able to fix responsibility for the details of 
administration upon the individual head of a Department, to drive it home and to visit 
serious blunders with the appropriate punishment, without displacing the Government 
as a whole.  The Select Committee on National Expenditure made an analogous point 
when they insisted that parliamentary control over expenditure will become a reality 
'only when the House of Commons is free, not merely in theory and under the forms of 
the Constitution, but in fact and in custom, to vote, when the occasion requires, upon 
the strict merit of proposed economies uncomplicated by any wider issue.’  Collective 
responsibility for policy is not surely inconsistent with individual responsibility for 
administration.  Yet the idea of a divorce between thought and action, between policy 
and administration, is to the English mind unquestionably repugnant, and the 
repugnance was forcibly expressed by the Marquis of Salisbury in the debate to which 
reference has already been made: 
 
His [Lord Curzon's] idea of an ideal Cabinet is a number o gentlemen who 
are not engaged in Departmental work, who sit as judges before whom the 
various Ministers, or others interested, are called in to plead and to hear 
decisions by them.  That I believe to be a thoroughly bad system.  What 
you want is not to be governed by people who acquire the information they 
ask for at the moment, but by people who have constant experience in the 
administration of affairs.  Those are, and can [begin page 213] only be, the 
Departmental Ministers who are soaked in the work of their Departments.  It 
is not a question of hearing in ten minutes or a quarter of an hour a case 
put forward by one man, and the contrary case put forward by another man, 
and then deciding between them.  That is not the method which has 
prevailed in this country, and which ought to prevail.  Our system has been 
that the Ministers who are actually engaged in the conduct of affairs, who 
have at their command the best talent of any particular subject that the 
world can provide, who live, and move, and have their being every day in 




Nevertheless, it is a question of supreme moment whether the existing machinery of 
government is of the pattern best adapted to secure efficiency and economy.  No 
prudent man will answer that question dogmatically.  Evidently it is a matter for careful 
consideration.  There is nothing sacrosanct in the existing system of Cabinet 
Government, nor in the present articulation of functions in the permanent Civil Service.  
The most impressive argument in favour of both is that they exist, and that their 
existence is the result not of a single act of creation but of a prolonged process of 
evolution.  No one who sat down to devise an administrative system based upon 
adherence to certain a Priori principles of government would produce a scheme in 
precise conformity with that which the English people have gradually evolved.  The 
English system, as already observed, rests fundamentally upon that association of 
amateur and professional which is the most characteristic feature of English 
institutions.  It has worked reasonably well; it has been copied with a greater or less 
measure of success by other peoples; but it is neither logical nor scientific and it 
involves an annual expenditure which can only be described as colossal.  The total 
estimate for the Civil Services for the current year (1925-6) amounts, as already 
mentioned, to no less than £222,609,000, and to this sum must be added £11,450,635 
[begin page 214] for the Revenue Departments in Great Britain (excluding the Post 
Office, which earns a profit for the State).  The question inevitably arises whether the 
nation is getting value for its money, whether equal efficiency could not secured at less 
cost; above all, whether the State has assumed duties which could, with greater 
advantage, the community, be left to private initiative.  But the answers to such 
                                                  
6   [213/1]  H.L. Official Report, 19 June 1918. questions lie outside the scope of a work which is primarily analytical, and would carry 
us into the realm of Politics and Philosophy into which the mere historian may not 
intrude.  It remains, however, in accordance with the plan of this book, to glance briefly 
at the administrative systems of other typical States. 
 
The Ancient World 
For obvious reasons little help can be derived from the ancient world towards the 
solution of the administrative problem in the democratic States of today.  'Ancient 
societies dispensed, for the most part, with a Civil Service, altogether, and only a few 
outstanding communities carried the formation of a permanent governing staff beyond 
its rudimentary stages.' 
7  Among these the most conspicuous were Egypt and Rome.  
The principle o direct democracy as exemplified in the city-states of Greece obviously 
afforded little scope to the development of a permanent and professional Civil Service.  
The maxim ‘rule and be ruled in turns' may embody the ideal of democracy, but it does 
not conduce to continuity of administration, and it is evidently applicable only to small 
communities, based upon an economic substratum of slavery.  In Egypt, on the 
contrary, there existed, alike under the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies, a highly 
developed bureaucracy.  At the head of the hierarch stood the Vizier.  'He was Keeper 
of Somerset House', the central office in which the Egyptians deposited their wills.  As 
Master of the Rolls he was in charge of the immense Public Records Office.  As Lord 
Chief justice he presided over a divisional court of professional judges who [begin page 
215] heard appeals from the County Courts.'  A High Treasurer, who was 'the second 
greatest official in Pharaoh's service', presided over the Treasury, which employed 'a 
large staff, including the bailiffs of the royal estates' and the 'Keepers of the Privy Purse 
(which was already distinct from the public chest)'.  The business of the Department 
was to collect 'a large tribute in kind, partly as rent from the Crown Domains, partly in 
the form of taxes on freeholds'.  There was also a Board of Works which ‘carried out by 
means of forced labour the all-important work of embanking and irrigating and a 
Munitions Ministry for the equipment of the troops.  A regular Police Force maintained 
order in Thebes, the capital, and District Officers acted as governors of the various 
counties.  These officials combined the functions of our Indian district judges and 
collectors, and in addition kept up to date the land register, which in Egypt was almost 
as old as the land itself.'  The Pharaonic system thus outlined underwent little change 
in later ages.  It survived the loss of Egyptian independence and was remodelled in 
turn by each new foreign ruler.  Under the Ptolemies the higher posts in the Civil 
Service were reserved for Greeks, but otherwise the Ptolemies adopted the same 
system which had obtained under the Pharaohs. 
 
The Roman Civil Service 
The Egyptian Bureaucracy, though in itself remarkable, was rudimentary.  As a ruler the 
Roman combined the Roman civil genius of the modern Englishman and the modern 
Prussian.  In his sense of discipline and belief in method he anticipated the Prussian; in 
his adaptability to the demands of a wide-stretching Empire, in his tolerant attitude 
towards subject peoples, and in his readiness to associate them with the governing 
race in the task of government he has had no equal among the peoples of the world 
except ourselves.  Like the British people, the Romans started on their imperial career 
without the help of anything like a professional bureaucracy.  'In the early days of 
Roman expansion,' as Mr. Cary observes, 'the amateur governing aristocracy were so 
successful that its methods became as [begin page 216] it were consecrated.'  But the 
growth of the Empire, ‘the accumulation of people and wealth in the capital, and the 
consequent emergence of a grave social problem,' rendered the creation of a 
professional service inevitable. 
 
                                                  
7    [214/1]  M. Cary, 'The Civil Service in Ancient Civilizations', p. 1, ap.  The 
Development of the Civil Service, London, 1922. The Roman Civil Service was the result of a series of ‘piecemeal and reluctant reforms' 
effected by the Emperor Augustus and his successors, but by the second century A.D. 
the framework was practically complete.  The principal departments correspond very 
closely with those to which the modern State has grown accustomed.  Thus the 
Treasury was elaborately organized, and its principal official drew up a yearly budget 
'like any modern Chancellor of the Exchequer'.  There were two Secretariats, one for 
Greek and another for Latin correspondence.  A Local Government Board audited 
municipal accounts.  A Scholarship Board financed the education of poor children.  The 
Post Office existed only for the convenience of the Emperor.  The Board of Works 
looked after the public buildings of Rome, and a Metropolitan Water Board furnished it 
'with one of the best water supplies in the world'.  The chief function of the Tiber 
Conservancy Board was to maintain the river embankments.  There was also a Road 
Board, a Public Libraries Department, a Corn Purchase Commission and a Corn 
Distribution Board, a Registration Department for taking the census, a Public Record 
Office, and a Board for the management of the gladiatorial games.  Not until the rise of 




The Prussian Bureaucracy 
Between ancient Rome and modern Prussia there was, however, one striking contrast.  
The whole administrative system of Prussia may be said to have centred in the 
Department of Education; that Department, save for the Scholarship Board, was 
conspicuous by its absence in Roman bureaucracy.  In the remaking of Prussia, after 
the debacle at Jena, Fichte and Humboldt played a part not less important and not less 
conspicuous than Stein and [begin page 217] Hardenberg, than Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau. Among the States of the modern world Prussia stands out pre-eminently as 
the organized State, and to the perfection of its organization three classes of her 
citizens have in particular contributed: the drill sergeants, the schoolmasters, and the 
civil servants.  Of Prussia, indeed, it may be said, as Aristotle said of Sparta, 'the 
system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war.'  
Nor can it be denied that it is this unity of principle which has given to the fabric of the 
Prussian State, and through it to the modern German State, its remarkable 
completeness and consistency.  The army system and the educational system are 
parts of one coherent whole, and the whole has been rendered and kept coherent by 
the persistent labours of an incomparably skilled bureaucracy. 
 
On parallel lines with the evolution of the Prussian army we can trace the evolution of a 
civil service (Beamtenthum).  The suppression by the Great Elector (1640-88) of the 
local Estates and the gradual substitution of centralized administration for disorganized 
local autonomy rendered possible, and indeed inevitable, the drastic reforms of 
Frederick William 1 (1713-40). The separated territories of the loosely compacted 
Prussian Kingdom were welded by him into a single domain, and that domain was 
administered by a single central directory under the personal presidency of the King, 
whose orders were executed by a staff of civil servants, carefully graded and co-
ordinated, almost pitilessly efficient, and taught to owe responsibility to the head of the 
State alone.  This system was, in its fundamentals, preserved intact by Frederick the 
Great, though he expanded and perfected it in detail, and in particular linked up the 
purely domestic civil service with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War.  For all 
three the thinking was done by a single brain - his own.  So long as that brain 
functioned the machine was extraordinarily efficient.  Between 1786 and 1806 the 
machine collapsed, and after the evidence of its collapse at Jena, Stein and his 
colleagues were confronted with the [begin page 218] problem of recreating the brain of 
an efficient civil service and making the State, in its civil as in its military capacity 
independent of dynastic accidents and vicissitudes 
 
                                                  
8   [216/1]  Cary, op. cit., pp. 12-16. The problem was solved by the devoted and co-operative efforts of Hardenberg and 
Stein, of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and not least, as has been said, of Fichte and 
Humboldt.  The Civil Service was reorganized, and, in the century that followed, by 
sheer continuity of pressure in the daily task of ordinary administration, it drove home 
the value of technical knowledge and the material benefits of science properly applied.  
The Prussianization of the Rheinland province acquired in 1818, the creation of the 
Zollverein, the economic unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony - all this 
was the work of a wonderfully efficient bureaucracy.  Thanks to the work of the 
Beamtenthum Bismarck could afford to wait until his remorseless diplomacy compelled 
his foes to strike the hour for the final denouement.  There remained after 1871 the 
Prussianization of the new German Empire.  The instrument employed by Bismarck for 
this work was the Prussian Civil Service.  Thanks to its experience and efficiency the 
enlightened work of the new national Legislature was translated into administrative fact.  
The organization and administration of finance, customs, post office, railways, 
insurance against old age, unemployment, and sickness, bringing home to every man, 
woman, and child in Germany the idea of the Empire as a beneficent power, and as an 
omnipresent fact in every aspect of life was a remarkable triumph of Prussian 
efficiency.
9  The existing articulation of Government offices in the German Reich 
corresponds closely with that in other countries.  The Chancellor has now become a 
responsible Parliamentary Minister.  The Vice-Chancellor at present presides over the 
Home Department, and the Minister of justice is also Minister for the Occupied 
Territories.  Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defence, Labour, Posts, Transport, 
Economics and Food and Agriculture [begin page 219] complete the list.  In no other 
country have the civil servants been so admirably trained for the performance of their 
specific duties; nowhere else is so large a proportion of the nation's ability to be found 
in the public service.
10  The sovereignty of the State machinery is the Prussian 
equivalent of the English Reign of Law; of that machinery the driving wheel is the Civil 
Service in Berlin. 
 
The French Civil Service 
The position, functions, and organization of the French Civil Service can be understood 
by an Englishman only if certain fundamental points of contrast between the political 
traditions and the governmental genius of the two countries are borne carefully and 
constantly in mind.  The English Civil Service is in the main the creation of Parliament, 
but Parliament itself marks the final stage in the evolution of representative institutions 
which were local in origin, to which, in Township, Hundred, and Shire, the people had 
become habituated long before a central Legislature came into being.  The Central 
Government in England represents, therefore, a concentration of local activities.  The 
converse is true of modern France.  Local government is the creation of the State; local 
officials are appointed by the central government and take their orders from Paris in a 
way which to an English County Council or Municipal Council would seem intolerable, if 
not incomprehensible. 
 
Centralization in France 
Even before the Revolution of 1789 the centralizing monarchs had made large inroads 
upon the local autonomy of the French Provinces.  Yet there were many survivals 
reminiscent of feudal independence.  All these were swept away by the Constituent 
Assembly: the old provinces were abolished, every excrescence disappeared, and 
France was mapped out into Departments, Arrondissements, Cantons, and 
Communes.  Of Departments there are now 90; of Arrondissements 385; of Cantons 
3,019; of Communes about 37,000.  At the head of each Department is a Prefect 
appointed by the Minister of the Interior, removable by and responsible to him.  He is, in 
M. Poincard's striking [begin   page 220] phrase, 'a national figure in the midst of local 
                                                  
9   [218/1]  Marriott and Robertson, Evolution of Prussia. Oxford, 1915. 
10   [219/1]  Bryce, Modern Democracies, ii. 39. life. . . the organ and emanation of the Government'.
11 He is assisted by a General 
Secretary and a Consultative Committee also appointed by the Government, while the 
democratic element is supplied by a General Council to which each Canton sends one 
representative elected by universal suffrage.  The Prefect is shorn of some of the 
powers which he exercised under Napoleon, but to English eyes his powers are almost 
dictatorial in matters of patronage, police, poor relief, and even education.  The 
teachers of the primary schools are appointed by him and by-laws emanate from him.  
The sub-Prefect stands to the Arrondissement in the same relation as the Prefect to the 
Department, but the Mayor of the Commune, though acting partly as the agent of the 
Central Government, is elected by and from the Council of the Commune, and to that 
extent, though with far less independence, corresponds with an English mayor. 
 
There is, then, far more of centralization and of direct Government control in France 
than in England, or even in Germany, a contrast which necessarily affects the work of 
the members of the central administration. 
 
Departmentalism 
A second point of contrast is the larger measure of Departmentalism in France.  The 
multiplication of Departments has necessarily accentuated a similar tendency in 
England, but Cabinet cohesion is a much stronger force in England than in France, and 
the closer association of the Parliamentary Chiefs is naturally reflected in the work of 
the Departments over which they preside.  A French Minister shoulders a larger share 
of individual responsibility, and even in its internal organization his Department, reflects 
the relative independence of its chief.
12
 
The Offices of the Central Government 
The allocation of business to the chief Departments of Government in France does not 
differ materially from our own, though it is perhaps, as would be expected, somewhat, 
more logical and scientific.  The Ministry of justice is not [begin  page 221] infrequently 
taken by the President of the Council (Prime Minister), though he sometimes combines 
the Presidency of the Council with another office.  If the Prime Minister is not Minister 
of justice, the latter Minister acts as Vice President of the Council.  This Minister is the 
successor of the Chancellor of the ancien régime; he is the President of the Council of 
State (which must be clearly distinguished from the Cabinet Council), the head of the 
Magistracy, and the Keeper of the Seals of France.  He is responsible for the 
administration of justice, for prisons and reformatories. 
 
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for public order, police, hospitals, and 
asylums, and, as we have seen, for the supervision of local government.  Deprived by 
the Ministry of justice of some of the functions performed by the English Home Office, 
the Ministry of the Interior carries on much of the work of the Ministry of Health. 
 
The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Colonies, War, and of Marine perform functions so 




To the Ministry of Instruction and Fine Arts are assigned functions far transcending in 
range and importance those of our own Board of Education.  It is supreme over every 
grade of education in France from the Primary School to the University.  In its main 
outlines the educational system of France still bears the impress of the masterful 
genius of Napoleon.  The Minister is the Grand Master of the University.  He is assisted 
                                                  
11   [220/1]  R. Poincare, How France. is Governed, p. 61. 
12   [220/1]  The Development of the Civil Service, p. 181. by a Council, the majority of its members being elected by the members of the higher 
teaching profession, a few by the primary teachers, and some being nominated.  Eight 
Directors severally supervise Superior Education (including universities and scientific 
and learned societies), Secondary, Technical, and Primary Education, Accounts, 
Records, and Scientific and Industrial Research and Inventions.  For University 
education France is divided into seventeen Academies; at the head of each Academy is 
a Rector, appointed by the Government.  The Rector is the head of [begin page 222] the 
local University and exercises a general supervision over the superior, secondary, and 
higher primary education of the district.  Secondary education is given in State lycles 
and colleges and in private establishments.  Primary instruction is compulsory (from the 
age of six to sixteen), gratuitous and secular.  Religious congregations are excluded 
from all share in education, but private schools are permitted.  For the whole of this 
vast network of education, the Minister of Public Instruction is responsible, as well as, 
for the National Schools of Fine Arts and Decorative Arts, the School of Ceramics at 
Sevres, and the School Gobelins' Manufactures.  But the Minister of Agriculture is 
responsible for the various Agricultural, Horticultural, Dairy, Forestry, and Veterinary 
Colleges, and for the Stud College.  The Minister of Commerce is similarly responsible 
for certain specialized schools and colleges of Art, Crafts, Manufactures, &c.; the 
Minister of Public Works for the National School of Mines and a School of Bridges and 
Highways; the Minister of the Colonies for a Colonial College, and the Ministers of War 
and Marine for various Military and Naval Academies. 
 
The Ministry of Public Works is responsible not only for railways, highways, and canals, 
but for posts and telegraphs, and the Ministry of Labour - a relatively new Department - 
for all that concerns thrift and social insurance as well as for other matters which 
formerly fell within the province of the Ministries of the Interior and of Commerce and 
Industry.  The latter Ministry deals with the development of industry and trade; with 
credit, mutual guarantee associations, and the popular banks; weights and measures, 
commercial attaches, and similar matters now assigned in England to the Department 
of Overseas Trade; customs legislation and tariffs; commercial treaties; industrial and 
commercial combinations; patents, trade marks, registered designs, &c. 
 
Ministry of Finance. 
The Ministry of Finance in a sense combines the functions of the English Treasury, of 
the Revenue Departments, and of the innumerable local bodies which are in [begin 
page 223] England responsible for the imposition and collection of local rates.  The 
Minister of. Finance prepares the budget; he controls the State industries and the 
collection of taxation direct and indirect, and pays the pensions of retired State officials.  
Financial procedure in France differs, as already indicated, from that which obtains in 
England, nor are the functions of the respective Finance Ministries very strictly 
comparable.  The contrast between them arises partly from the fundamental difference 
between the relations which respectively exist between Central and Local 
Administration in the two countries, partly from the greater independence inter se of 
French Departments, and not least from the fact that the primary business of the 
French Treasury is the collection of revenue, while the English Treasury, though 
responsible for the methods proposed for raising revenue, is not less concerned with 
the control of expenditure.  A Chancellor of the Exchequer is engaged in an unceasing 
struggle with his colleagues in regard to their departmental demands upon the public 
purse.  The sole responsibility for the estimate ultimately presented to the House of 
Commons rests with him, since it cannot be so laid without his approval.  In France, on 
the other hand, the responsibility for departmental estimates rests upon the Minister 
concerned, while the responsibility for presenting them to the Chambers rests upon the 
Budget Commissions of those Chambers.  The fight, therefore, rages not between the 
Treasury and the spending Departments, as with us, but between the latter and the 
Budget Commission. 
 The staff of the French Ministry of Finance occupy a special position in the Civil 
Service.  They are appointed by the Minister, half by examination and half by 
patronage, being in both cases nominated from a list of selected persons as a reward 
for special services.  Once appointed they enjoy complete security of tenure, as they 
are not liable to dismissal.
13  [begin page 224] 
 
It results from the severe restriction of the sphere local self-government, and the 
consequent imposition of the detailed duties of administration upon the central 
government, that the Civil Service in France is in proportion to the population larger 
than that of any other country in Europe or America. 
 
Post-war Offices 
In France, as in England, the war has been responsible for the creation of several new 
Departments.  Of these the Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of the Liberated 
Territories perform functions sufficiently described by their respective titles.  There is 
also a Ministry of Labour, Hygiene, Assistance, and Social Prevision, which, in addition 
to the duties imposed upon the Ministry, Labour in England, undertakes many of those 
which with us are assigned to the Ministry of Health. 
 
French and English Ministers 
The position of the Political Heads of Departments in France also differs materially from 
that which they occupy in England.  Ministers, though in fact almost invariably 
members of one or other Legislative Chamber, are not necessarily either Deputies or 
Senators; nor is the idea of Cabinet solidarity quite so fully developed as in England.  
For the general policy of the Government all the members of the Cabinet accept 
responsibility, but for the administration of his own Department each Minister is 
individually responsible.  The distinction is, however, less marked in practice than in 
theory. 
 
The American Civil Service 
When we pass from France to the United States of America a fundamental distinction 
must be observed.  In the case of France, as of England, we are dealing with the 
administrative system of a unitary State.  By reason of the extreme centralization which 
since the Napoleonic regime has characterized her policy, France is even more 'unitary' 
than countries which, like England, possess a vigorous and historic system of Local 
Government.  The Prussian bureaucracy also was devised with reference to a unitary 
State, though it has been adapt to the needs of a federal State.  Germany, however, 
has never afforded - owing to the predominance of Prussia – [begin page 225] so 
perfect an example of federalism as the United States of America.  This outstanding 
and differentiating factor must, then, be taken into account in any attempt to analyse 
Political Institutions in the American Commonwealth.  Equally, however, must it be 
remembered that the federal administration of America is itself highly centralized as 
compared with that of Germany.  In the Reich, though legislation is federal, the 
administration is decentralized, the laws being executed by local officials appointed by 
the State, Governments.  In America it is otherwise, federal law being executed 
throughout the States by federal officials. 
 
Departmentalism. 
Another difference between America and England or France needs, once more, in this 
new connexion, to be emphasized.  The type of Democracy which prevails in the latter 
States is parliamentary; in the former it is presidential.  A Parliamentary Executive 
concentrated in a Cabinet necessarily affects the character of departmental 
                                                  
13   [223/1]  The Development of the Civil Service, pp. 197-202 ; Poincare, op. cit., c. 
xii. organization.  France, with a less tenacious grip upon the Cabinet principle than 
England, has a more departmentalized administrative system than England.  The 
United States which has no Cabinet - properly understood possesses an entirely 
departmentalized administration.  That the heads of the chief Departments of the 
Federal Administration have come together in a Cabinet, and that the Cabinet is 
gradually acquiring more and more cohesion, is true; but, as already observed, the 
American Executive is essentially non-parliamentary; the Ministers are severally 
responsible each for his own Department to the President alone. 
 
Growth of Departments 
The creation of Executive Departments is implied, though not in terms enjoined, in 
more than one article of the Constitution.  Thus, by Article II, Sect. ii, Cl. 1, the 
President is authorized to 'require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each 
of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective 
offices'.  By Article I, Sect. viii, Cl. 18, Congress is empowered 'to make all laws which 
shall be necessary or [begin page 226] proper for carrying into execution the for proper 
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this 
Constitution Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.’ 
 
Accordingly, at its first session in 1789, Congress created three executive departments: 
the Department of Foreign Affairs (soon to be reorganized as the Department of State), 
the Department of War, and the Treasury.  Shortly afterwards it created the office of 
Attorney-General which, in 1870, was organized as the Department of Justice.  The 
Department of State, besides the ordinary duties pertaining to a Foreign Office, also 
has custody of the Great Seal and promulgates all the laws, executive orders, and 
proclamations, as well as treaties.  The Secretary of State occupies by custom a 
premier position in the President's Cabinet, though legally he is precisely on a par with 
his colleagues, and the Department over which he presides is actually the smallest of 
the executive departments.  The ambassadors and all the other diplomatic officials, as 
far down as the Secretaries of Legation, are appointed not by the Secretary of State but 
by the President.  The service is not a professional one, nor in its higher ranges 
permanent.  The higher officials are changed with every change of party and generally 
with every administration, if not oftener. 
 
The War Department stands in a special relation to the President, who is Commander-
in-Chief of the Army, and is therefore authorized to make regulations independent of 
Congress.  In addition to the management of military affairs the War Department is 
responsible for the construction of public works, the improvement of rivers and 
harbours, and also for the administration of the oversea possessions of the Republic.  
Herein it follows the analogy of the English War Office which, until the Crimean War 
was responsible also for the Colonies. 
 
The Treasury is, with the exception of the Post Office, the largest of the Government 
Departments, having a staff of no fewer than 30,000 persons.  Its primary function is 
[begin page 227] the collection of the federal revenue which mainly comes from three 
sources: customs duties, internal revenue taxes (notably excise), and income tax.  It 
also controls the mint and the currency and the banking system, being invested with a 
power of inspection over the national banks quite alien from English usage.  The 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the Mint are officials of the Treasury, 
though the former, if not the latter, occupies a semi-independent position.  The 
Treasury does not prepare a budget, since in America there is no executive budget, but 
it prescribes the form of public accounts.  It supervises the land banks and the 
operation of the Federal Farm Loan Act.  Besides these financial functions the Treasury 
is responsible for the planning, though not the execution, of public works, for the coast 
guard, and, somewhat anomalously, for the Public Health Service. 
 The Department of justice represents an expansion of the office of Attorney-General, 
which was created in 1789.  The Attorney is the legal adviser of the President and of 
the administration; he is also the chief advocate and chief prosecuting officer.  He has 
no official voice in the selection of the judges, but he controls the assistant attorneys 
and district attorneys and the United States marshals, who are the executive officers of 
the Federal Courts.  He also advises the President in the exercise of the prerogative of 
mercy.  The national prisons are under the control of this Department. 
 
The Post Office, as a separate Department, dates from 1829, and now employs no 
fewer than 300,000 persons.  Its functions call for no special enumeration, being 
practically identical with those of the English Post Office, with the important difference 
that it was not, until the world war, regarded as a revenue department.  Rarely, indeed, 
before 1917, did receipts balance expenses.  Like the Secretary of the Treasury, but 
unlike other Ministers, the Postmaster-General reports directly to Congress. 
 
The Department of the Navy is not charged with any extraneous duties, but the 
Department of the Interior [begin page 228] occupies a peculiar position.  Few if any of 
the duties performed by the English Home Office are discharged by it, but it is 
responsible for Patents and Pensions, for educational statistics and information 
(education itself being a State not a federal service), and for the native Indians.  It also 
acts as the Land Office, and looks after the classification survey, the sale of public land, 
and irrigation works. 
 
The Department of Agriculture as an Executive Department of Cabinet rank dates only 
from 1888.  It acts as the meteorological office, carries on investigations into plant life, 
soils, insect pests, diseases of animals &c.; it inspects live stock, meat, and butter, and 
controls animal quarantine; it administers the Food and Drugs Act (1906); it publishes 
crop estimates and agricultural statistics, and information concerning the marketing of 
products; it conducts a Biological Survey and an Office of Farm Management; it looks 
after the Agricultural College and experimental stations; it administers the federal road 
Act, and acts as a Forestry Commission. 
 
The Department of Commerce and Labour was created in 1903, and from it ten years 
later the Department of Labour was separated.  The parent Department remains 
responsible for the encouragement of home and foreign trade, for lighthouses, 
navigation, the mercantile marine, steamboat inspection, for the geodetic survey, and 
fisheries.  The Department of Labour deals with immigration, naturalization, industrial 
disputes, statistics, and child-welfare. 
 
Excluding the military and naval service, the employees of the national Government 
numbered, prior to the world-war, no fewer than 500,000.  How is this great service 
recruited and on what terms do they serve the State? 
 
The ‘Spoils’ System  
Down to the year 1883 the American Civil Service was a byword for incompetence and 
corruption.  Employment under the State was the reward of services rendered to the 
victorious political party.  To thirty-six offices the [begin page 229] President personally 
nominates; over 10,000 appointments are made by him with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, the rest are made by the heads of departments or their subordinates.  This 
'spoils system' was initiated by Jefferson in 1800 and was firmly established under his 
successors.  It derived some sanction from the democratic principles of 'rotation' and 
equality, but was frankly defended on the ground that the spoils of victory properly 
belong to the victors.  Various attempts were made to reform a system which degraded 
politics, impaired the efficiency of public administration, absorbed the energies of public 
men, corrupted the sources of public life, which excited the contemptuous amusement 
of America's enemies, and made her friends ashamed.  Almost every American of 
repute outside politics condemned the system.  
Reform  
No real improvement was effected until after the passing of the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1883.  Writing soon after the passing of that Act Mr. (afterwards Viscount) Bryce 
said: 'If this Act is honestly administered, and its principle extended to other federal 
offices, if States and cities follow, as a few have done, in the wake of the National 
Government, the spoils system may before long be rooted out.'
14
 
When, more than a generation afterwards, Bryce gave to the world his Modern 
Democracies, he could note with satisfaction that, though traces of the old Adam still 
survived, an immense improvement had been effected.  More than half the posts under 
the Federal Government have been 'taken out of politics'; the appointments to them are 
made by open competitive examination and the civil servants enjoy fixity of tenure.  
This applies to most of the higher and a very large number of the inferior posts in the 
State Departments at Washington, to postmasters and to customs-house officials.  By 
the year 1916 the 'classified service' (i. e. the service recruited by competitive 
examination) included no fewer than 296,000 posts out of approximately 480,000.  To 
offices filled on the nomina- [begin page 230] tion of the President after confirmation by 
the Senate the Reform Acts do not apply.  There is, therefore, a large field - roughly 
200,000 posts - open to political patronage.  Even in the classified service the results of 
new the system have not quite justified expectations.  A Service Commission of three 
members assists the, President in making regulations for the service, and conducts the 
competitive examination, but the Act of 1883 provided that the examinations should be 
'practical in their character - and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which 
will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the 
duties of the service in which they seek to be appointed'. 
 
This is the exact opposite of the principle adopted in England where the examinations 
are designed to test general ability.  The result, in the judgement of a highly competent 
American critic,
15 is that the English service attracts a more highly educated class of 
men, who, though innocent of all technical training, quickly develop into valuable 
officials. 
 
'In the United States', the same writer proceeds, 'the examinations, except for the 
positions requiring scientific or technical knowledge, in general require not much more 
than the ordinary high school education, together with some practical efficiency.  As a 
result, the candidates do not have the education and general ability of the English 
officials and are frequently men of less capacity than are found in private enterprises.' 
 
Superannuation and Pensions. 
In another respect the American regulations work less satisfactorily than the English.  
There is no provision in America for pensionable superannuation.  Consequently, 
though the present system is barely forty years old, the Civil Service is already clogged 
with employees who ought to be retired.  The President and the Heads of Departments 
have the power of removal even in the 'classified’ service when removal is demanded 
in the interests of [begin page 231] efficiency.  But the absence of pension's naturally 
deters them from the exercise of the power save in flagrant cases.  Nevertheless, no 
one who is in a position to compare the American Civil Service of today with the 
Service of forty years ago can fail to appreciate the improvement which has been 
effected. 
                                                  
14   [229/1]  American Commonwealth, ii. 713. 
15    [230/1]  Dr. Everett Kimball, The National Government of the United States 
(Boston, 1920), p.229.  To this admirable work the preceding paragraphs owe 
much.  
A survey, however brief, of the Administrative systems of England, Germany, France, 
and the United States inevitably raises many detailed questions as to the most 
convenient distribution of functions between various departments; as to the best 
system of recruitment, as to tenure, and so forth.  Upon these questions preceding 
paragraphs have touched.  There remains, however, a more fundamental question 
which demands consideration before this chapter can close.  Few problems in Political 
Science have been discussed with greater amplitude than the problem as to the proper 
relation between the Legislature and the Political Executive.  Little attention, on the 
other hand, has been paid to the question as to proper form of legislation and the 
relation which should subsist between the work of the Legislature and that of the 
Permanent administration.  The relations between the Executive and the judiciary will 
be more conveniently considered in a later chapter. 
 
Delegated Legislation 
Problems as to proper form and contents of Statutes, and in particular as to the amount 
of detail into which it is desirable for the governing Legislature to go, and conversely 
the amount of discretion which may with propriety be left to administrative bodies, have 
lately received increased attention from publicists.  It has been a commonplace of 
criticism that in this matter a sharp contrast is to be drawn between England and the 
United States on the one hand, and, on the other, States like France and Germany 
where it has been customary in legislation to leave a great deal to the discretion of the 
administration.  France and America may, perhaps, be taken as the extreme examples 
of the contrasted methods of legislation.   [begin page 232] 
 
In United States 
The United States, as we have already in more than one connexion observed, adheres 
tenaciously to Montesquieu’s doctrine of the Separation of Powers.  The spheres of the 
Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary must be kept, as far as possible, 
absolutely distinct.  Consequently it is customary for legislation to go into minute detail, 
leaving a minimum of discretion as to the application of statutory enactments to the 
administrative authorities.  Yet such discretion, as Professor Willoughby has pointed 
out, must needs be given to these authorities: 
 
 (1)   to determine when and how powers conferred are to exercised; and 
 
(2)   to establish administrative rules a regulations, binding both upon their 
subordinates and the public, fixing in detail the manner in which the 
requirements of the statutes are to be met and the rights therein 
created are to be enjoyed.
16
 
The proper limits of delegation have frequently been defined by the American courts.  
Thus in the case of Field v. Clark the Court held: 'The true distinction is between the 
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what 
it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised 
under and in pursuance of the law.  The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid 
objection can be made.'  In another case the Court went even farther, insisting that 'a 
denial to Congress of the right, under the Constitution, to delegate the power to 
determine some fact or state of things upon which the enforcement of its enactment 
depends, would be "to stop the wheels of Government" and to bring about confusion if 
not paralysis, in the conduct of public business'.
17  These judgements may seem to 
labour a commonplace; yet the commonplace, and the supposed necessity to 
                                                  
16   [232/1]  The Constitutional Law of the United States, ii. 1318, ap. Kimball, op. 
cit., p. 233. 
17   [232/2]  Kimball, op. cit., pp. 232-4.  emphasize it are indicative of the extreme jealousy with which the average American 
regards any attempt on the part of the Executive to intrude upon the sphere of the 
Legislature, and any disposition on the part of the Legislature, in [begin page 233] 
heedlessness or laziness or under pressure of business, to delegate quasi-legislative 
authority to the Executive. 
 
In France 
No such apprehension is entertained in France.  On the contrary it is common form for 
the French Legislature to enact statistics in the most general terms and to impose upon 
the Administration - the President, the Ministers, the Prefects, and even the Mayors-the 
duty of issuing ordinances to carry out in detail the general intentions of the Legislature.  
The German practice approximates to that of France. 
 
In England 
England now stands, in this matter, midway between France and the United States.  In 
former days Englishmen were said to be distinguished from their continental 
neighbours by their  'instinctive scepticism about bureaucratic wisdom'.  Consequently 
Parliament attempted, in making laws, to provide beforehand, by precise statutory 
enactment, for every contingency which might reasonably be expected to arise.  This 
naturally rendered the form of English statutes exceptionally elaborate and detailed.  Of 
late years, however, Parliament has shown a marked tendency to abandon this 
tradition.  In our legislative forms we have moved towards continental methods.  Partly 
owing to the increasing complexity of industrial and social conditions, partly under the 
subtle influence of Fabian Socialism, partly from the general abandonment of the 
principle of laisser-faire and the growing demand for governmental guidance and 
control in all the affairs of life, partly from sheer despair of the possibility of coping with 
the insistent cry for legislation, Parliament has manifested a disposition to leave more 
and more discretion to the administrative departments.  Many modern statutes are 
mere cadres, giving no adequate indication of their ultimate scope.  They lay down 
general rules and leave it to the Departments concerned to give substance to the 
legislative skeleton by the issue of Administrative Orders.  This tendency has been 
noted not only by English publicists like the late Sir Courtenay Ilbert,
18 who, as Clerk 
[begin page 234] of the House of Commons, had exceptional opportunities for close 
observation of the form of legislation, but by more detached critics of English 
institutions like President Lowell of Harvard.  The latter, after a reference to the growing 
practice of delegating legislative power', adds: 
 
‘We hear much talk about the need for the devolution of Power of 
Parliament on subordinate representative bodies, but the tendency is not 
mainly in that direction. . . . The real delegation has been in favour of the 
administrative Departments of the Central Government, and this involves a 
striking departure from Anglo-Saxon traditions with a distinct approach to 
the practice of continental countries.'
19  
 
Parliament and the Public Departments 
That Dr. Lowell is substantially accurate in his diagnosis is not open to question, though 
he may, perhaps, underrate the extent to which Parliament has devolved quasi-
legislative powers upon local authorities whose function is primarily administrative.   
This point will demand attention in a later chapter.  Nor is this the appropriate place to 
deal with the disquieting features of recent relations between the Executive and the 
Judiciary.  We must for the moment concern ourselves only with the tendency, 
increasingly manifest in recent years, to confer upon Public Departments the functions 
                                                  
18   [233/1]  Cf. Legislative Methods and Forms, pp. 220-4. 
19   [234/1]  Government of England, i, PP. 363 seq. appropriate to subordinate legislative bodies.  'This is not merely', as a shrewd critic 
has observed, 'part of the damnosa hereditas, of the war; the bureaucratic tendency 
was developing long before 1914, but five years of emergency government have 
brought it to a pitch which is fast becoming intolerable.  It is idle to boast of the glories 




The action of the Executive in recent times might seem to have revived controversies 
which jurists had complacently assumed to have been finally settled by the 
constitutional contests of the seventeenth century.  Mr. Dicey, in his classical work on 
the Law of the Constitution, [begin page 235] claimed as a characteristic feature of the 
English Constitution the absence of any legislative authority which could compete with 
the exclusive prerogative of Parliament.
21  In earlier days there did indeed exist, side 
by side with Parliament, a system of royal legislation under the form of Ordinances,
22 
and (under the Tudors) of Proclamations.  Constitutional historians have been wont to 
illustrate the dictatorial character of Henry VIII's administration by reference to the 
famous Statute of 1539 which formally empowered the Crown to legislate by means of 
Proclamations.  That enactment marked, as Mr. Dicey observes, 'the highest point of 
legal authority ever reached by the Crown'; yet even that Act contained a limiting clause 
excluding from the ambit of legalized proclamations anything which could be 
'prejudicial to any person's inheritance, offices, liberties, goods, chattels, or life'.  The 
Statute of 31 Henry VIII, c. 8, was repealed in the reign of Edward VI, and Queen 
Elizabeth employed Proclamations, in a perfectly constitutional manner, as a means of 
enjoining obedience to the law-chiefly in ecclesiastical matters. 
 
James I, in this as in other matters, perverted the legitimate prerogative of the Crown 
to more questionable uses.  Consequently, in 1610 his ‘most humble Commons 
perceiving their common and ancient right and liberty to be much declined and 
infringed in these late years deemed that the time had come to demand justice and due 
redress'.  They pointed out that 
 
‘amongst many other points of happiness and freedom previously enjoyed 
by Englishmen there is none which they have accounted more dear and 
precious than this, to be guided and governed by certain rule of law, which 
giveth both to the head and members that which of right belongeth to them, 
and not by any uncertain or arbitrary form of Government. . . . Nevertheless 
it is apparent, both that proclamations have been of late years much more 
frequent than heretofore, and that they are extended not only to the liberty, 
but also to the goods, inheritances, and livelihood of men; some of them 
tending to alter some points of the law and make them new: other some 
[begin page 236] made shortly after a session of Parliament, for matter 
directly rejected in the same session: others appointing punishments to be 
inflicted before lawful trial and conviction: some containing penalties in form 
of penal statutes: some referring the punishment of offenders to the courts 
of arbitrary discretion which have laid heavy and grievous censures upon 
the delinquents . . . and some vouching former proclamations, countenance 
and warrant the latter.... By reason whereof there is a general fear 
conceived and spread amongst your Majesty's people, that proclamations 
will by degrees grow up and increase to the strength and nature of laws: 
whereby, not only that ancient happiness, freedom, will be much blemished 
if not quite taken away, which their ancestors have so long enjoyed, but the 
                                                  
20   [234/2]  C.K. Allen, Quarterly Review, No. 477, p. 259. 
21   [235/1]  2nd ed., p. 47. 
22   [235/2]  Ibid., p. 48. same may also in process of time bring a new form of arbitrary government 
upon the realm.' 
 
The Commons, therefore, humbly besought the King that no pains or penalties might 
be imposed upon his subjects unless they shall offend against some law or statute of 
this realm in force at the time of their offence committed.
23
 
Coke, being appealed to in reference to the legality of certain Proclamations, begged 
leave to be allowed to consult other judges, with the result that he and three of his 
colleagues delivered, in the presence of the Privy Council, an opinion of historic 
significance. 
 
'The King', they declared, 'cannot by his proclamation create any offence 
which was not an offence before, for then he may alter the law of the land 
by his proclamation in a high point. . . . The King hath no prerogative but 
that which the law of the land allows him.  But the King may by 
proclamation admonish his subjects that they keep the laws and do not 
offend them.' 
 
The soundness of the doctrine thus enunciated has never since been formally 
questioned, but recent tendencies in legislation and administration render it imperative 
to inquire whether serious encroachments upon the spirit of the Constitution have not 
been committed and to some extent condoned.  It may, indeed, be argued that 
conditions have been changed by the advent of Constitutional [begin page 237] 
Monarchy.  Admittedly the Prerogative of the Crown is now exercised by an Executive 
responsible to Parliament.  Nevertheless, it is far from certain that the liberties of the 
subject are not in process of being gravely infringed by the methods of legislation which 
have, in recent years, become increasingly fashionable. 
 
Subordinate Legislation 
The Administrative Departments and the Privy Council have virtually been erected, 
though admittedly by the action of the supreme Legislature, into subordinate legislative 
bodies.  Such bodies may be and have been used in a variety of ways: 
 
(i)   to effect the direct amendment of a Statute; 
(ii)   to create legislative machinery; and 
(iii)   to enact supplementary legislation. 
 
Examples of these methods are given in an exceedingly suggestive essay by Mr. C.T. 
Carr,
24 who has observed that the action of Acts of Parliament ever grows more and 
more dependent upon subsidiary legislation.  'More than half our modem Acts', he 
writes, 'are to this extent incomplete statements of law.'  Thus out of 102 Public Acts 
passed in the year 1919 no fewer than 60 delegated legislative power to some 
subordinate authority.  Illustrations of the power directly to amend Statutes passed by 
Parliament may be found in an Act of 1897 which empowered the Secretary of State to 
alter the table of fees prescribed in the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839; and again in 
the Companies Act of 1908, which empowered the Board of Trade to vary the tables 
and add to the forms in the schedules. 
 
Again, it is frequently found convenient to give to an Administrative Department 
authority to create legislative machinery, as, for instance, in regard to the 
commencement, duration, or application of an Act.  Thus 'the appointed day clause' is 
particularly useful in Acts which are designed to effect Constitutional changes, such as 
                                                  
23   [236/1]  Petyt, Jus Partiamentarium, pp. 319-20. 
24   [237/1]  Delegated Legislation. the British North America Act of 1867, the Australian Commonwealth Act of 1900, the 
Government of India Act of 1919, and the Government of Ireland Act 1920; or Acts 
which, like the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, [begin page 238] involve 
administrative changes.  Similarly the power is used to authorize the application or 
extension of an Act, as in the Trade Boards Act of 1918, where the Minister of Labour is 
authorized to apply the Act, by Special Order to trades other than those affected by the 
original Act of 1909.  The result has been that the Act which was applied by Statute to 
four trades and by Provisional Orders to four more has now been applied by the 
Minister of Labour to no fewer than thirty trades. 
 
Finally, the device of delegation is employed to enable a subordinate body to make 
rules, regulations, and orders which elaborate, supplement, or help to work out some 
principle which Parliament has laid down.  A conspicuous illustration of this use of 
delegation is to be found in the Aliens Restriction Amendment Act of 1919 which 
extended and prolonged certain powers conferred upon the King-in-Council by the 
Aliens Restriction Act 1914, and in particular empowered His Majesty-in-Council to 
repeal the Aliens Act of 1905 and to incorporate any of its provisions in an Order-in-
Council.  Under the powers thus conferred His Majesty made an Order, dated 25 March 
1920, which in form, length, and elaboration is not distinguishable from an Act of 
Parliament.
25  This Order, in addition, contains no fewer than twenty-six articles, 
arranged in three parts dealing with the admission, supervision, and deportation of 
aliens.  This delegation indeed constitutes, as Mr. Carr justly observes, 'a remarkable 
surrender' on the part Parliament.  Less conspicuous, but still very significant examples 
may also be found in the power conferred upon His Majesty-in-Council to make 
provision for various matters under the Representation of the People Acts (1918 to 
1922),
26 or, under the Municipal Corporations Acts of 1882 and 1893, to alter the 
number and wards of a Borough.
27
 
Essential Conditions of Delegation 
That such delegation of quasi-legislative functions is convenient, legitimate, nay, under 
modern conditions inevitable, is not denied.  But the device may obviously [begin page 
239] lend itself to grave abuse unless the employment is strictly circumscribed and 
carefully safeguarded.  It is clearly, in the first place, essential that the authority to 
which the power is delegated should be in the most literal sense trustworthy.  Then it is 
desirable that if particular interests are to be affected, representatives of these interests 
should be consulted, and it is indispensable that in every case the limits of the 
delegated authority should be defined.  In the famous Zamora case, in 1916, the Privy 
Council was impelled to 'give the Executive a rude reminder that the Crown cannot 
alter the law of the land by Order in Council'
28 - unless, indeed, such power is 
specifically delegated by Statute.  Above all, it would be in the highest degree 
dangerous to confer upon subordinate bodies delegated powers of legislation unless 
the Courts can be absolutely relied upon to interpret the law as between the Crown and 
the subject with complete impartiality and independence.  The warning recently uttered 
by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline was, in this connexion, far from superfluous: 'The 
increasing crush of legislative efforts and the convenience to the Executive of a refuge 
to the device of Orders in Council would increase that danger [of a transition to 
arbitrary government] tenfold were the Judiciary to approach any action of the 
Government in a spirit of compliance rather than of independent scrutiny.'  That is 
palpably true; but the powers of the Judicature may be and are circumscribed. 
 
                                                  
25   [238/1]  See Appendix B.   
26   [238/2]  Cf. Order-in-Council of 25 June 1925. 
27   [238/3]  For specimens of different types of Orders-in-Council, see Appendix B. 
28   [239/1]  Allen, op. cit., p. 251. 'The Courts,' as Mr. Allen has justly observed, 'though instinctively hostile to officialism, 
are powerless to curtail prerogatives definitely granted by Statute to subordinate 
authorities.  The most they can do is to say, in appropriate cases, that powers 
arrogated by officials are ultra vires the Statute under which they are claimed.  And this 




Nevertheless, it is plain that the rapid increase in the volume and complexity of 
legislation, and the ever-grow- [begin page 240] ing demand for an extension of the 
functions of the State, do lay an additional responsibility upon the Courts, and render 
the independence of the judicature more than ever essential to the liberty of the 
individual and the well-being of the community. 
 
To the position of the judiciary in the modern State the following chapters will therefore 
be devoted. 
 
                                                  
29   [239/2]  op. cit., p. 249.  
XXXI. Of The Judiciary (i) 
The Judges and the Law 
The Problem of Personal Liberty 
 
Die parlamentarische Regierung Englands ist eine Regierung nach Gesetzen 
und durch Gesetze.' - Rudolph von Gneist. 
 
'The legal spirit pervading the [English] system is the result of giving to 
public law the sacredness and inflexibility that pertains to private law, and 
this end is reached by fusing the two together and confiding them both in 
the last resort to the same Courts.' - A.L. Lowell. 
 
'That after the limitations shall take effect as aforesaid, judges' commissions 
be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and 
established; but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it may be 
lawful to remove them.' - Act of Settlement, § 7, A.D. 1700. 
 
With rare unanimity philosophers in all ages have agreed that of all human blessings 
the greatest is the enjoyment of personal liberty.  The poets have not been behind the 
philosophers in their apostrophes to Liberty: 
 
Ms Liberty alone that gives the flower 
Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume; 
And we are weeds without it. 
 
The Problem of Liberty 
So Cowper sang, and his song has been re-echoed by innumerable voices.  There has 
been less unanimity, however, as to what constitutes liberty; and still less as to the 
means by which it can most surely be attained and guaranteed.  'No obstacle', wrote 
Lord Acton, 'has been so constant or so difficult to overcome as uncertainty and 
confusion touching the nature of true liberty.’
1  To him it meant 'the assurance that 
every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of 
authority and majorities, custom and opinion'.  And again: 'Liberty is not a means to a 
higher end, it is itself the highest political end.'  Aristotle observed that liberty was the 
special characteristic of a democracy as virtue was [begin page 244] of an aristocracy 
and wealth of an oligarchy.'  If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to 
be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the 
Government to the utmost.'  He insisted, however, that liberty is not to be confused with 
licence:  ‘Men think that . . . freedom and equality mean doing what a man likes . . . . 
But that is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the 
Constitution; for it is their salvation.' 
2
 
The Rule of Law 
What is the rule of the English Constitution?  The most profound and discerning of 
German commentators on English political institutions found it in the supremacy of law.  
Gneist characterized England in a single word as a Rechtsstaat - a commonwealth 
                                                  
1   [243/1]  Essays on Freedom, p. 2. 
2   [244/1]  Politics, iv, 4, §§ 22, 23; v. 9, § 15.   based upon justice and law.  France, with its system of 'administrative law', he 
regarded as the antithesis, in this respect, of England.  Yet France, as will presently be 
shown, regards the system of administrative courts and administrative law as the 
fulfilment of Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers, and thus as an 
essential condition of liberty.  To the influence of that teaching in England and 
elsewhere frequent reference has been made in preceding chapters of this book.   
Blackstone emphasized its significance in the eighteenth century: 'Were [the judicial 
power] joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of the subject would be 
in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would then be regulated only by their 
opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law.’ 
3  Bacon, in the early years of 
the seventeenth century, had anticipated the doctrine of Montesquieu, though his own 
teaching on this vital matter was by no means free from ambiguity. 
 
The Judiciary 
‘Judges', says Bacon, 'ought to remember that their judiciary office is ius dicere, and 
not  ius dare; to interpret law and not to make law or give law.'  With the organs 
appropriate to the making of laws and to the execution of laws we [begin page 245] 
have already dealt.  It remains to consider the third of the three primary functions of 
Government, that which is concerned with the interpretation or declaration of law, and 
the administration of justice. 
 
Of all the functions of Government this is unquestionably of most immediate and 
intimate concern to the individual citizen.  It matters not how elaborate the machinery of 
legislation may be, how scientific the product, how Perfect the organization of the 
Executive. the life of the individual citizen may nevertheless be rendered miserable; his 
person and his property will be alike insecure, if there be any defect or delay in the 
administration of justice, or any partiality or ambiguity in the interpretation of law.  There 
is, as Bacon wisely says, 'no worse torture than the torture of laws'. 
 
A great jurist of the thirteenth century went so far as to affirm that 'it is for this end that 
the King has been created and elected, that he may do justice to all'.
4  The central 
clauses of Magna Carta, whatever the precise interpretation of words which have 
provoked much controversy, go far to justify Bracton. 
 
'No free man', declared the Charter, 'shall be taken or imprisoned or 
disseised or outlawed or exiled or anyways destroyed; nor will we go upon 
him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful judgement of his peers 
or by the law of the land.  To none will we sell, to none will we deny or 
delay, right or justice.' 
5
 
Only by slow degrees have the promises contained in Magna Carta been redeemed, 
and they have been redeemed, as already indicated, mainly by the firm establishment 
of the 'rule of law'.  That 'rule', however, has been rendered effective only by the 
differentiation of the functions appertaining to the exercise of sovereignty in its several 
spheres, legislative, executive, and judicial. 
 
The Curia Regis. 
The first stage in the process of differentiation was to separate the judicial from the 
executive functions of the Curia Regis, the King in his Court.  This process really [begin 
page 246] began with the organization by Henry II of a central judicial body to which the 
name Curia Regis was thenceforward exclusively applied.  But the process was slow 
                                                  
3   [244/2]  Commentaries, i, c. viii. 
4   [245/1]  Bracton, De logibus Angliae. 
5   [245/2]  Magna Carta, §§ 39, 40. the Concilium Ordinarium, which may be regarded as parent of the Privy Council, still 
retained judicial functions, some of which it carried into the Commune Concilium, or 
High Court of Parliament, some of which it retains in its more specialized form as the 
Privy Council. 
 
Prerogative Courts under the Tudors 
Nor was the development continuous.  Under the Tudor dictatorship the multiplication 
of 'prerogative courts', such as those of the Star Chamber, the Court of the Marches, 
the Council of the North, and the Stannary Courts in Cornwall enabled the Executive to 
exercise a considerable degree practical control over the administration of justice.   
There is no evidence that these prerogative courts were during the Tudor period 
unpopular.  On the contrary, men resorted to them freely, for there they got justice, 
which, if rough was prompt and comparatively cheap. 
 
Under the Stuarts 
It was an entirely different matter under the Stuarts.  What had seemed under their 
predecessors to be an appropriate cog in dictatorial machinery stood out as an 
oppressive engine of despotism.  Encouraged by the great authority of Bacon, the first 
two Stuart kings endeavoured to subordinate the Judiciary to the Executive.  'Encroach 
not', said James I to the judges, 'upon the prerogative of the Crown; if there falls out a 
question that concerns prerogative or mystery of State, deal not with it till you consult 
with the King or his Council, or both; for they are transcendant matters.  That which 
concerns the mystery of the King's power is not lawful to be disputed.’ 
6
 
Bacon's language points not less clearly in the same direction: ‘It is a happy thing in a 
State when Kings and States do often consult with Judges; and again when judges do 
often consult with the King and State: the one when there is matter of law intervenient 
in business of state the other when there is some consideration of state intervenient in 
matter of law. . . . Let judges also remember [begin page 247] that Solomon's throne 
was supported by lions on both sides; let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne, 
being circumspect, that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.’
7  The 
meaning is unmistakable: the judges were to become the handmaids of the Executive; 
the principle familiar today in many countries that administrative acts are to be judged 
by administrative law was to be imported into English jurisprudence. 
 
The Judges under the Early Stuarts 
The judges were not slow to take a hint dropped from a quarter so authoritative and 
influential.  Yet we need not on that account attribute to them an exceptional early 
measure of subserviency.  The question as to the precise limits of the prerogative was 
admittedly difficult.  Selden insisted that the King's prerogative was 'not his will, or - 
what divines make it - a power to do what he lists'.
8  Cowell, on the contrary, held that 
the prerogative was 'that especial power, pre-eminence, or privilege that the King hath 
in any kind, over and above other persons and above the ordinary course of the 
common law, in the right of his crown'.
9  Blackstone took much of the sting out of 
Cowell's unpopular Interpreter by substituting for 'above' the words 'out of'.  'By the 
word Prerogative', he wrote, ‘we usually understand that special pre-eminence which 
the King hath, over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the 
                                                  
6   [246/1]  Speech in the Star Chamber, 20 June 1616. 
7   [247/1]  Essays: 'Of judicature.' 
8   [247/2]  John Selden, jurist (1584-1654), Table Talk. 
9   [247/3]  John Cowell, Civil Lawyer (15 54-1611), The Interpreter (1607). common law, in right of his regal dignity.'
10  Blackstone thus substituted, as Dr. 
Prothero pointed out, a constitutional doctrine for one destructive of the Constitution. 
 
Yet the judges, in the early years of the seventeenth century, were faced by a real 
difficulty.  James I was bent upon reducing to theory practices which under the popular 
dictatorship of the Tudors had not been resented.  Parliament was determined not only 
to assert a contradictory theory, but to alter the practice.  The judges were in a dilemma 
less because they wished either to oppose or to [begin page 248] respect constitutional 
theory than because constitutional theory was in many of its applications as yet 
imperfectly established. 
 
Bates's Case 1606 
Take the much argued case of Impositions, raising the question as to the right of the 
Crown to impose additional duties upon various articles of import. The Tudors had 
freely and without question exercised the right in pursuance of the mercantilist policy of 
protecting home markets.  If it was within the competence of the Crown to regulate 
trade, the Commons could hardly complain if the regulations were productive of 
revenue.  The matter was raised by the imposition of a duty on currants imported from 
the Levant, and by the refusal of a merchant – Bates - to pay it.  The case was tried in 
the Exchequer Court in November 16o6, and was decided by the judges in favour of 
the Crown.  'Impositions' were admittedly on the border line, and that the judgement  
was legally correct few constitutional lawyers would be found to deny. 
 
Unfortunately, however, Baron Clarke and Chief Baron Fleming, whose judgements 
alone have been preserved, based their decision upon 'political theories capable of 
wide and dangerous application'.  Parliament acquiesced in the decision, but hotly 
contested the theory of the royal prerogative upon which it was based.  The judgement 
emphasized the doctrine that the Crown possessed a twofold power: ordinary and 
extraordinary; the one ascertained and limited by law, the other to be exercised at the 
absolute discretion of the King - though always with a view to the salus opuli of which 
he was, in a special sense, the guardian.  Such a theory would, if ultimately adopted, 
have cut straight across the principles which lie at the root of our English 'rule of law' 
and would have led directly to the acceptance of the doctrines of 'administrative law'. 
 
The Case of the Five Knights 1627 
Essentially the same issue was raised in the case of Sir Thomas Darnel or the Five 
Knights.  Darnel and others, having been committed to prison by the Privy Council for 
[begin page 249] refusal to contribute to the forced loan of 1626, appealed to the Court 
of King's Bench for a writ of Habeas Corpus.  Relying on the clause of Magna Carta 
which declared that ‘no man shall be imprisoned except by the lawful judgement of his 
peers or by the law of the land', they urged that they were at least entitled to know for 
what cause they were detained in custody.  The Crown lawyers contended that it was 
sufficient return to a writ of Habeas Corpus to certify that the prisoners were detained 
per speciale mandatum regis - by the special orders of the King.  The judges accepted 
this view so far as to refuse to liberate the five knights on bail, but, on the other hand, 
they declined to admit the principle that the Crown might persistently refuse to show 
cause. 
 
The plea of prerogative was, therefore, for the moment successful.  The discretionary 
power of the Crown - even to the extent of depriving a subject of liberty - was not 
denied by Stuart judges.  But the triumph of the Crown none too emphatic - was of 
short duration.  Nothing did more to move the Parliament of 1628 to enthusiastic 
acceptance of the Petition of Right than the doctrine affirmed in the case of the Five 
Knights.  The Petition itself, after recital of the clause already quoted from The Great 
                                                  
10   [247/4]  Commentaries, i. 7. Charter and subsequent Statutes, declared that ‘against the tenor of the said Statutes . 
. . divers of your subjects have of late been imprisoned without any cause showed, and 
when for their deliverance they were brought before your justices, by your Majesty's 
writs of Habeas Corpus . . . and their keepers to certify the causes of their detainer; no 
cause was certified, but that they were detained by your Majesty's special command, 
signified by the Lords of your Privy Council, and yet were returned back to several 
prisons, without being charged with anything to which they might make answer 
according to the law. . . .'  The Petition further demanded that 'no freeman, in any such 
manner as is before mentioned be imprisoned or detained'.
11
[begin page 250] 
 
The Case of Ship-money 
Precisely the same principle was raised by the even more famous case of ship-money. 
 
Between 1629 and 1640 Parliament was never summoned, but money had to be raised 
to carry on the King's Government, and it was obtained by recourse to a variety of 
expedients.  Monopolies were granted, contrary to statute, in some common articles of 
daily use such as soap, salt, and wine; duties were imposed upon merchandise 'some 
so unreasonable that the sum of the charge exceeds the value of the goods'; obsolete 
feudal obligations, such as distraint of knighthood, were revived; the claims of the 
Crown to royal forests were asserted in the most extravagant way: in the Forest of 
Dean alone seventeen villages had sprung up and were now compelled to ransom their 
property and to come under the jurisdiction of the forest law; profits were made from 
the sale of great offices of State, and a paltry fraud was practise, upon the counties by 
the exaction of 'coat and conduct’ money.  In these and other ways the necessities of 
the King were partially supplied.  But of all the devices to which a hard-pressed 
Treasury found it convenient to resort, none aroused so much popular clamour, or 
evoked such conspicuous resistance, as the collection of ship money.  On the 20th of 
October 1634 writs were issued to London and the other seaports bidding them deliver 
their quota of ships and men 'to the Port of Portsmouth before the first day of March 
next ensuing'.  The avowed reason for the levy are contained in the writ: 'Because we 
are given to understand that certain thieves, pirates and robbers of the sea as well 
Turks, enemies of the Christian name, as others, have spoiled and molested the 
shipping and merchandise of our own subjects and those of friendly powers.'  Further, it 
refers to 'the dangers which on every side in these times of war do hang over our 
heads'.  About a year later similar writs were addressed to the inland counties.  The first 
writ merely revived an ancient custom which had been enforced without protest so 
lately as 1626. As to the second there is much doubt, but the judges gave [begin page 
251] a strong opinion in favour of its legality.  Your Majesty may . . . command all your 
subjects of this your kingdom at their charge to provide and furnish such a number of 
ships, &c. . . . for the defence and safeguard of the kingdom . . . and by law your 
Majesty may compel the doing thereof in case of refusal or refractoriness, and we are 
also of opinion that in such a case your Majesty is the sole judge both of the danger, 
and when and how the same is to be prevented and avoided.'  London protested, but 
unavailingly, against the charge; individuals, like Lord Saye and Sele in Oxford and 
John Hampden in Buckinghamshire, did the same. 
 
An opinion favourable to the rights of the Crown was given by the judges in November 
1635; but it served only to intensify the dismay and apprehension caused by the impost 
among all classes in the kingdom.  Consequently, in February 1637, the King's case 
was again laid before the judges, who were asked to decide whether, when 'the whole 
Kingdom is in danger' the King may call upon all his subjects to provide ships with 
'mere victuals and munitions' for its defence, and 'by law compel the doing thereof in 
case of refusal or refractoriness’, and whether 'in such a case the King is not the sole 
judge both of the danger and when and how the same is to be prevented and avoided'.  
                                                  
11   [249/1]  Gardiner, History of England, vi. 213, and Select Documents, pp. 2, 4. The opinion given in writing over the signatures of twelve judges was on all points 
affirmative.  The counsel for John Hampden had relied primarily on 'a multitude of 
records, beginning with one in King John's time and so downwards' to prove the 
illegality of taxation without consent; and while admitting that 'in this business of 
defence the suprema potestas is inherent in his Majesty, as part of his Crown and 
Kingly dignity', they contended that such potestas must under ordinary circumstances 
be exercised in and through Parliament.  In a sudden emergency the King no doubt 
might and must act on behalf of the nation; but in what sense could emergency be 
pleaded in 1635?  To all men it was notorious that ship-money was merely one in a 
series of [begin page 252] devices to enable the King to raise money without the 
disagreeable necessity of summoning Parliament. 
 
The judgement in the King's favour was based upon the most extravagant 
interpretation of the doctrine of Prerogative.  ‘I have gone already very high,' said Sir 
Robert Berkeley, in his judgement, 'I shall go yet to a higher contemplation of the 
fundamental policy of our laws: which is this, that the King of mere right ought to have, 
and the people of mere duty are bound to yield unto the King, supply for the defence of 
the kingdom.'  It has been the fashion to assume that judgement in favour of the Crown 
was due to mere servility on the part of the judges.  This may or may not be true.  On 
the other hand, the judgement may have been perfectly good in law.  The fact remains 
that, whether good or bad in law, the judgement was in its political effects infinitely 
mischievous.  Clarendon not merely admits but insists upon this.  'I cannot but take the 
liberty to say that the circumstances and proceedings in those new extraordinary 
cases, stratagems and impositions were very unpolitic, and even destructive to the 
services intended.'  People are much more roused 'by injustice than by violence'.  Men 
who paid their quota more or less willingly were terrified by the grounds on which the 
judgement was based.  It was 'logic that left no man anything which he might call his 
own'.  'Undoubtedly,' he adds, 'my Lord Finch's speech . . . made ship-money much 
more abhorred and formidable than all the commitments by the Council-table and all 
the distresses taken by the sheriffs in England. . . . Many sober men who have been 
clearly satisfied with the conveniency, necessity and justice of many sentences, depart 
notwithstanding extremely offended and scandalized with the grounds, reasons and 
expressions of those who inflicted those censures.'
12
 
The Long Parliament 
The Long Parliament made a clean sweep alike of the men and the machinery 
associated with the eleven years of the rule of ‘Thorough'.  Ministers, judges, and 
Ecclesi-  [begin page 253] astics were impeached; Acts were passed to abolish the 
Prerogative Courts and to declare the illegality of ship-money; and, as we have seen, 
an attempt was made in the Grand Remonstrance to insist on the responsibility of 
Ministers to Parliament. 
 
Commonwealth and Protectorate 
Yet the House of Commons, when relieved of the checks imposed by the Crown and 
the Second Chamber, was to and prove itself no less inimical to personal liberty than 
the Crown itself.  We have already noted the results which followed on the attempt of 
the unicameral Parliament to perform the functions not only of a Legislature but of the 
Executive and judicature as well, and have quoted Cromwell's opinion of the 'horridest 
arbitrariness that ever existed on earth'.  The accuracy of his description is undeniable.  
Never was there a more conspicuous illustration of the soundness of Montesquieu's 
doctrine, or more striking testimony to the wisdom of those peoples who have adopted 
it as the sheet-anchor of their constitutional liberties. 
 
                                                  
12   [252/1]  History of the Great Rebellion, Book I. The Habeas Corpus Act. 
The Parliaments of the Restoration and the Revolution completed the work which, 
begun by the Long Parliament, had been interrupted during the Commonwealth and 
the Protectorate.  In 1676 the imprisonment, by order of the King-in-Council, of a 
London citizen named Jenkes brought to a head an agitation, which for some years 
past had been more or less persistently carried on in the House of Commons, in favour 
of more effectual guarantees for personal liberty.  Owing to difficulties interposed by the 
Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief justice it was several weeks before Jenkes, who 
was accused of making a seditious speech at the Guildhall, was released on bail.   
Public attention was thus called to the inadequacy of the existing procedure for 
enforcing the right to personal liberty hitherto based only upon Common Law.  As a 
result the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act was passed in 1679. 
 
Ever since Norman times the Common Law right to writs personal liberty had been 
secured, though hitherto imper- [begin  page 254] fectly, by a variety of writs.  The writ 
de odio et atia was intended to afford protection against malicious accusations of 
homicide.  In consequence of King John's exaction of exorbitant sums for the issue of 
this writ the Great Charter provided that this 'writ of inquest of life or limbs' should be 
granted without payment',
13 but the use of it gradually become obsolete.  A second writ 
of mainprize authorized the sheriff to take sureties (mainpernors) for the appearance of 
a prisoner, and having obtained them to set him at liberty.  A third writ de homine 
replegiando, which was of similar import, commanded the sheriff to release a prisoner 
from custody on repledge or bail. 
 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Most important of all was the writ of habeas corpus,
14 habeas corpus which gradually 
superseded the writs above mentioned.  This writ, obtainable from the King's Bench, 
might be addressed to any person who, under legal pretence or otherwise, detained 
another person in custody.  The detainer was ordered 'to produce the body of the 
prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention to do, submit to, and 
receive, whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall direct'.  Not, however, 
until 1679 was this procedure, though in use for many centuries, rendered really 
effective.  The Petition of Right had, as we have seen, reaffirmed the principle of 
personal liberty so manifestly infringed in the case of the Five Knights; but it failed to 
provide an effectual guarantee for its application.  The Act of the Long Parliament, 
which abolished the Star Chamber and all the procedure appertaining thereto, provided 
that any one committed to custody by the King or by the Council, could claim from the 
King's Bench or Common Pleas, without delay upon any pretence whatsoever, a writ of 
habeas corpus; and that within three days the Court should determine upon the legality 
of the commitment and act accordingly.  There [begin page 255] still existed, however, 
various methods of evading the action of the writ, even when it had been issued by the 
Court. 
 
Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. II, c. 2 
The Amending Act of 1679 was designed to put a stop to these evasions and delays.  It 
enacted that any person detained in custody (unless committed for treason or felony) 
should be produced for trial within twenty days at longest, and if the commitment were 
within twenty miles of the Court whence the writ issued, then within three days.  Nor 
could a person once delivered by habeas corpus be recommitted for the same offence.  
Further, all prisoners must be tried at the next gaol delivery or else released on bail; 
and after the second gaol delivery must, if still untried, be discharged.  To prevent 
                                                  
13   [254/1]  Magna Carta, § 36.  
14   [254/2]  For the 'Early History of Habeas Corpus', cf. E. Jenks, Law Quarterly 
Review, viii. 164. delays any Court was authorized to issue a writ, or, in vacation, a single judge.  Finally, 
no inhabitant of England, Wales, or Berwick-upon-Tweed was, save under certain 
specified circumstances, to be imprisoned in Scotland, Ireland, jersey, Guernsey, or 
Tangier, or any place beyond the seas.
15
 
The Act of 1679 has, from the day of its enactment, remained a corner-stone in the 
edifice of personal liberty, and its principles have been adopted throughout the English-
speaking world.  But experience revealed certain weaknesses in the Act.  It fixed no 
limit to the amount of bail that might be demanded.  The Bill of Rights (1689) 
accordingly enacted that excessive bail ought not to be required, while a later Act of 
1816 extended the action of the writ to non-criminal charges, and authorized the judges 
to examine into the truth of the facts alleged in the return to the writ, with a view to 
bailing, remanding, or even discharging the prisoner.
16
 
Position of the Judges. 
Neither a Habeas Corpus Act nor any other Act can, however, secure the liberty of the 
subject against the Executive, unless those who have to administer the Acts are placed 
in a position of complete independence.  So long [begin page 256] as the judges are 
'lions under the throne' there can be no effective guarantee for personal liberty.  The 
highest importance must therefore, be attached to the change in the tenure of the 
judges effected by the Act of Settlement. 
 
Under the early Stuarts the judges had been repeatedly reminded that they held office 
at the good pleasure of the King.  Chief justice Coke was dismissed by James I in 1616 
for refusal to assent to the King's wishes in the case of Commendams.  Chief Justice 
Crew was dismissed in 1626 by Charles I for his refusal to admit the legality of forced 
loans.  Chief justice Heath incurred a similar penalty in 1634 for his opposition to ship-
money.  Charles II dismissed, for political reasons, three Lord Chancellors, three Chief 
justices, and six judges.  James II carried out a still more drastic purge of the judicial 
bench, and even struck off the Commission of the Peace local justices who showed 
themselves disinclined to abet his tyranny.  The Act of Settlement finally took out of the 
King's hands this dangerous weapon.  It enacted that 'after the limitations shall take 
effect as aforesaid, judges' commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, and 
their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both Houses of 
Parliament it may be lawful to remove them'.  Thus was the independence of the 
judicial bench definitely secured.  Their salaries are now charged upon the 
Consolidated Fund, and they are virtually irremovable. 
 
General Warrants 
Yet despite the Habeas Corpus Act and Act of Settlement individual citizens were to 
discover in the course of the eighteenth century that there still survived 'remnants of a 
jurisprudence which had favoured prerogative at the expense of liberty'.
17  One such 
survival was illustrated by the career of the notorious John Wilkes.  In 1763 Lord 
Halifax, the Secretary of State, issued a general warrant for the apprehension of the 
authors, printers, and publishers of No. 45 of a certain paper, the North Briton, and for 
the seizure of their papers.  No persons were named in the warrant, but no fewer than 
forty-nine [begin page 257] persons were arrested under this roving-commission - this 
'ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation', as Wilkes himself termed it.   
Eventually the authorship of the incriminated article was discovered.  Wilkes was 
arrested and brought before the Secretaries of State, and by them committed to close 
                                                  
15   [255/1]  Robertson, Select Statutes, Cases and Documents, 46-54. 
16   [255/2]  Hallam, Constitutional History, iii. 14-15. 
17   [256/1]  Erskine May, Constitutional History, iii. 2. confinement in the Tower, whence he was shortly released, on a writ of habeas corpus, 
by reason of his privilege as a Member of Parliament. 
 
The legality of the whole procedure was promptly questioned in the Courts.  Some of 
the arrested printers recovered £300 damages against the messengers, Lord Chief 
justice Pratt having held that the general warrant was illegal, that it was illegally 
executed, and that the messengers were not indemnified by Statute.  The same judge 
also decided against the competence of a Secretary of State to issue warrants, 
declaring that such a power ‘may affect the person and property of every man in this 
Kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject'.  In this case Wilkes 
recovered £1,000 damages against Mr. Wood, the Under-Secretary of State, who had 
personally superintended the execution of the warrant and eventually got £4,000 
damages from Lord Halifax himself for false imprisonment.  The Court of Common 
Pleas also decided against the legality of a search warrant for papers, and Mr. John 
Entinck obtained £300 damages from a messenger who had executed it.  These 
decisions were subsequently confirmed - so far as the House of Commons can confirm 
a judicial decision - by resolutions of the House of Commons condemning general 
warrants, whether for the seizure of persons or papers, as illegal, and declaring them, if 
executed against a member of the House, to be a breach of privilege.  The House of 
Lords, it is true, rejected a declaratory Bill, passed by the Commons, in which these 
resolutions were embodied; but the practice of general warrants had been emphatically 
condemned and was not revived. 
 
The Law of Libel 
In 1792 an Act, commonly known as Fox's Libel Act, was passed to remove doubts as 
to the competence of [begin page 258] a jury to give their verdict upon the whole matter 
in issue and not merely upon the fact of publication.  In the recent case (1783) of the 
Dean of St. Asaph, Mr. justice Buller had left to the jury only the question of publication, 
and Lord Chief justice Mansfield, on a motion for a new trial on the ground of 
misdirection by the judge, had held that he was right.  The effect of Fox's Act has been 
to leave to the jury the question as to whether the words complained of do or do not 
constitute libel.  Formerly that had been the province of the judge, and the judiciary had 
tended to support the Executive of the day.  Consequently, Fox's Act has commonly, 
and rightly, been regarded as a notable contribution to the liberty of the individual 
citizen.  Another notable contribution was made by Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843, 
which permits a defendant to plead that the statements complained of are true and their 
publication is in the public interest; and also relieves a publisher of liability if he can 
prove that the publication of the libel was without his consent. 
 
Freedom of Speech. 
These Acts, taken in conjunction with the lapsing of the censorship of the Press in 
1695, constitute the foundations of that liberty of speech and writing on which 
Englishmen are prone to congratulate themselves.  Yet, as Dr. Dicey pointed out, no 
principle of freedom of discussion is recognized by English law.  English law only 
secures that no one shall be punished except for statements proved to be a breach of 
the law.  Nor is there, broadly speaking, anything which can be called a 'press law'.
18  
The freedom of the Press is based not on any specific enactment but upon the right of 
individual journalists to write what they will so long as they avoid collision with the law 
of libel. 
 
'The law of England', says Lord Ellenborough, 'is a law of liberty, and consistently with 
this liberty we have not what is called an imprimatur.  There is no preliminary licence 
                                                  
18   [258/1]  Dicey, Law of Constitution, Lecture vi. necessary, but if a man publish a paper he is exposed to the penal consequences, as 
he is in every other act if it be illegal.’
19  [begin  page 259] 
 
The Right of Public Meeting. 
The so-called 'right of public meeting' rests upon precisely parallel foundations.  It 
arises simply from an aggregate of the rights of individuals.  The right of Meeting 
assembling is, as Mr. Dicey has said, 'nothing more than a result of the view taken by 
the Courts as to individual liberty of person and individual liberty of speech'.
20  Most 
foreign constitutions specifically and in terms guarantee to the citizen freedom of 
speech and the right of public assembling.  The rights of the individual are in such 
cases deducible from and dependent upon constitutional law.  With us, on the contrary, 
the law of the Constitution is inductively built up from the rights of individual citizens.  
And the latter provides perhaps a more secure basis.  It is evidently more difficult to 
suspend or even curtail the rights of 40,000,000 individuals than to abrogate an article 
in a constitutional code. 
 
War and Liberty. 
But, though more difficult, it is not impossible.  Some curtailment of the ordinary rights 
of the citizen is, in periods of public danger or apprehension, plainly inevitable.  The 
right to personal liberty being guaranteed to a large extent by Statute may be thought to 
stand in a class apart.  Accordingly it is the less remarkable that the Habeas Corpus 
Act should have been from time to time temporarily suspended.  Yet it is noteworthy 
that the suspension has only been partial; it has never been general; the action of the 
writ has been suspended only in the case of persons charged with certain specified 
crimes such as treasonable practices.  Between 1688 and 1745 it was suspended nine 
times: several times immediately after the accession of William and Mary; again during 
the Jacobite rising of 1715; for a whole year during the alarm caused by the Jacobite 
'Plot' of 1720-1; and again, in consequence of the Young Pretender's invasion in 1745.  
It was not deemed necessary to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act during the American 
rebellion, but in 1777 an Act was passed empowering the King to secure persons 
suspected of high treason committed in America, or on the high seas, or of the crime of 
piracy.  [begin page 260]  
 
The Revolutionary and Napoleon Wars. 
The longest and most notable period during which the guarantees for personal liberty 
have been suspended in England was that which followed the outbreak of war with 
Revolutionary France.  The younger Pitt has been frequently charged with initiating a 
system of brutal coercion designed less to repel the assault of French jacobinism than 
to suppress Liberalism at home.  The charge is manifestly unfair.  There are some 
questions in the determination of which the historian has obvious advantage over 
contemporary criticism.  But in an attempt to estimate the gravity of symptoms of 
political and social unrest the advantages are all the other way.  Those contemporaries 
who were in the best position to know the facts had no doubt as to the reality and 
gravity of the conspiracy against which both the Executive Government and the 
Legislature of the day felt bound to adopt elaborate precautions.  On more than one 
occasion Pitt, in order to fortify the position of the Executive, procured the appointment 
of a Committee of Secrecy selected by ballot.  The Committee of 1794, which was in 
full possession of the information at the disposal of the Government, reported that there 
existed 'ample proofs of a traitorous conspiracy'.  Among later critics those are least 
disposed to question Pitt's wisdom who have themselves occupied the same position 
of responsibility.  Thus Lord Roseberry writes with a combination of sound sense and 
epigram: ‘What has been rendered abortive it is common to thin would never have 
                                                  
19   [258/2]  Rex v. Cobbott, 29 State Trials, 49. 
20   [259/1]  Op. cit., P. 285. possessed vitality.’
21  The late Lord Salisbury has left on record his own opinion that 
'strenuous efforts were made to bring about a bloody revolution such as that which was 
raging in France'.
22  Thanks in large measure to the precautions adopted by Pitt those 
efforts were happily abortive. 
 
That the precautions necessitated some curtailment the ordinary liberties of the citizen 
is undeniably and unfortunately true.  In December 1793 the tradition hospitality 
extended by Great Britain to foreigners of [begin page 261] every description was 
temporarily interrupted.  The Alien Act placed foreign immigrants under severe 
restrictions and gave the Secretary of State a discretionary power of expulsion.   
Originally passed for one year only, the Act was renewed from time to time and was not 
finally repealed until 1826.  The Executive was again armed with similar powers during 
the revolutionary period of 1848, but did not find it necessary to exercise them.  In 1794 




Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act. 
In view of the grave reports made by a Secret Committee 1817 the Act was again 
suspended; but the suspension lapsed on 1st March and has never since that day 
been re-enacted for Great Britain, though recourse to this Act precaution has 
unfortunately been frequently found necessary in Ireland.  In 1801, and again in 1818, 
it was deemed desirable to pass an Act of Indemnity for all those who, in virtue of the 
powers conferred upon them by the suspensory Acts, had detained suspects in custody 
or had suppressed 'tumultuous and unlawful assemblies'. 
 
The Indemnity Act of 1818, though a natural sequel of the suspension of the Habeas 
Corpus Act, and in accord with precedent, was fiercely opposed in both Houses.  The 
passing of such an Act may, however, be accepted as striking testimony to the way in 
which the principle of habeas corpus has intertwined itself with the fibres of the English 
Constitution.  It is noticeable that, though other precautions were necessarily taken, the 
Habeas Corpus Act was not suspended during the Great War 1914-18. 
 
The Alien Act and the Suspensory Act did not stand alone during the French War.  In 
1795 was passed the Treasonable Practices Act, which created a new law of treason, 
dispensed with the proof of overt acts, and made any writing, printing, speaking and 
preaching, or inciting to hatred or contempt of the Sovereign, or the established 
Government or Constitution, a high misdemeanour.  The [begin page 262] Seditious 
Meetings Act (also passed in 1795) prohibited meetings of more than fifty persons 
without notice to a magistrate, and empowered the magistrate to attend and break up a 
meeting, if, in his opinion, it was tumultus.  The control of the Government over the 
Press was tightened by increasingly stringent regulations; the stamp and advertisement 
duties were increased, and unlicensed debating societies and reading rooms were 
placed on the same footing as brothels.  To assert, as does Sir Erskine May, that by 
such measures 'the popular Constitution was suspended' would seem to savour of 
exaggeration.  The liberties of the citizen were unquestionably curtailed, but it is at 
least an open question whether without temporary curtailment those liberties could 
have been permanently preserved. 
 
                                                  
21   [260/1]  Pitt, p. 282. 
22   [260/2]  Essays, i, p. 168. 
23   [261/1]  Robertson, England under the Hanoverians, P. 364. Erskine May, op. cit., 
vol. iii, pp. 12, 50. The Great War, 1914-18 
A situation in many respects strikingly parallel to that of 1793-1815 recurred in 1914-18.  
To the drastic measures enforced during the earlier crisis there was indeed, no 
recourse during the later, but by the Defence of the Realm Act extended powers were 
conferred upon the Executive and numerous regulations were issued and enforced.  A 
censorship of the Press and of correspondence was an obvious military precaution, but 
the censorship itself was of a limited character; it was not invested with an autocratic 
power of veto; it could advise, and the advice was usually followed; it could forbid, but 
to disobey its prohibition was not in itself an offence in law an editor could not be 
prosecuted on the charge of having published matter which the Press Bureau had 
forbidden he could only be charged with having published matter which, on certain 
specified grounds, was injurious to the national interest; and it was for the Courts, not 
for the censorship, to decide, in the last resort, whether the matter complained of was 
injurious.  If the Executive seized, as it did, the plant of an offending journal, the legality 
of the seizure could be tested by an action for damages for trespass.  In fine, it is, as 
Sir Herbert Samuel who was Secretary of State, has forcibly remarked, 'an [begin page 
263] error to suppose that the Government sought, of Parliament established, a 
censorship above the law.’
24
 
Liberty of Speech. 
Nor did the Government attempt to prohibit the expression of opinions in opposition to 
the war.  It did prohibit the communication of military information useful to the enemy, 
propaganda against voluntary recruiting, attempts to induce men liable to compulsory 
service in the army to disobey the law, attempts to foment strikes or disaffection among 
the workmen in essential occupations.  The citizen was, however, free to express 
opinions as to the origin of or responsibility for the war, as to ending it, and as to the 
propriety of conscription.
25  A demonstration proposed to held on Easter Sunday, 1916, 
in Trafalgar Square was indeed prohibited, under the Defence of the Realm Act, but 
less because it was a 'peace' demonstration than in the interests of public order in 
London.  Elsewhere meetings with similar objects were permitted.  On the whole the 
Act was administered as regards freedom of speech and of the Press with 
conspicuous, and as some thought excessive, regard for the rights of individuals. 
 
Personal Liberty. 
Not less conspicuous was the regard shown for personal liberty.  By a regulation, No. 
14, B, made under the Defence of the Realm Act, the Secretary of State was 
empowered to order the internment of any person 'of hostile origin or associations', 
when he considered internment expedient in the interests of public safety.  Many 
persons were so interned; and by test cases carried to the House of Lords the Judiciary 
confirmed the legality of the methods employed by the Executive.  Those methods 
were, however, incomparably less drastic, though the public safety was perhaps, even 
more imperilled, than during the Napoleonic wars. 
 
Rights of Property. 
The Executive was less tender in regard to rights of trading and property.  No one could 
question the propriety of the regulations, perhaps insufficiently drastic, to [begin page 
264] prevent trading with the enemy, but there was naturally less unanimity in regard to 
some other matters.  The Government took possession, under the elastic terms of 
D.0.R.A., of land, buildings, plant, commodities, securities; they regulated investments, 
restricted imports, fixed prices, and controlled the purchase of food; they forbade the, 
manufacture of this and insisted upon the manufacture of that.  Yet here again the 
                                                  
24   [263/1]  The Way and Liberty (London, 1917), PP. 32-3. 
25   [263/2]  House of Commons Official Report for Jan. 17, May 3, and June 1, 1916, 
referred to by Samuel, op. cit., P. 40. dictatorship was at only temporary and legal.  The Courts were open to, the aggrieved 
citizen; but although the 'rule of law’ was not transgressed the latitude given by the law 
to the Executive made many hard cases. 
 
Recent Tendencies. 
Yet there would be little ground for apprehension if the citizen could feel assured that 
the increased power exercised by the Executive were merely a transitory phenomenon, 
and that emergency legislation would leave no permanent mark upon the Constitution.  
Still more assurance would be felt if it could be shown that the intrusiveness of the 
Executive were only an incident – an inevitable incident - of war-time, and that the 
phenomenon was not discernible before the year 1914.  Unhappily, no such assurance 
is possible.  A comparison of the first and last editions of Mr. Dicey's illuminating work, 
published respectively in 1885 and 1915,
26 supplies a conclusive illustration of this 
statement.  No part of the earlier edition attracted more attention, alike in this country 
and among foreign publicists, than the author's unqualified insistence upon the 'Rule of 
Law', as observed in England, in contrast with the droit administratif which is a 
characteristic feature of the administrative system of France, as of all countries which 
have adopted the principles of the Code Napoleon.  The 'rule of law' was then reduced 
by Mr. Dicey to three distinct propositions: 
 
1.  ‘That no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body 
or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land'; 
[begin page 265] 
2.  'That not only is no man above the law but (what is different thing) 
that here every man whatever be his rank or condition is subject to 
the ordinary law of the Realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals'; and 
3.  'That with us the law of the Constitution, the rules which in foreign 
countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the 
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals as defined 
and enforced by the courts'. 
 
The first proposition asserts, in the most emphatic manner, the right of the individual 
citizen to personal property.  No man is punishable except for a proved offence against 
the law.  Two points are noteworthy: 
 
(1)   there must be a distinct breach of the law; and 
(2)   this breach must be proved in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts of the land. 
 
To most Englishmen such a proposition must seem to be an obvious commonplace.  
But if we would understand its full significance, we need only turn to the experience of 
France under the Ancien Regime, or to the events, briefly summarized above, of our 
own history in the first half of the seventeenth century.  Charles James Fox, on hearing 
of the fall of the Bastille (14 July 1789) is said to have exclaimed: 'How much the 
greatest and best event that ever happened in the history the world!'  To us such an 
exclamation would seem to the outcome of political hysteria.  It becomes intelligible 
however, when we realize that the Bastille was the outward and visible sign of a judicial 
system which was the negation of the first proposition of our 'rule of law'.   Hundreds of 
men had under that system suffered loss of liberty not for distinct and proven breach of 
the law but because they had rendered themselves obnoxious to those were powerful 
enough to procure a lettre de cachet consigning their enemies to imprisonment which 
might be lifelong.  The Bastille stood not for the rule of law, but for the rule of privilege.  
Hence its destruction was hailed, and by sympathizers abroad, with an [begin page 266] 
                                                  
26   [264/1]  Eighth Edition. enthusiasm which to the average Englishman seems hysterical.  In proportion, 
however, as we appreciate blessings of the 'rule of law ' can we sympathize with the 
destruction of the rule of might. 
 
If the first rule illustrates the 'legality' of our Constitution, the second supplies a 
guarantee for its impartiality. 
 
It is commonly said that in England 'there is one law for all', that 'all men are equal 
before the law'.  It might be doubted whether half the people who quote these 
aphorisms are aware of their precise significance.  They not only affirm an important 
principle, but point an instructive contrast.  In, England not only is no man ‘above the 
law', but every man is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.  This, to a constitutional lawyer, is the real meaning 
of the assertion, constantly reiterated, that in England Ministers are 'responsible'.   
Strictly speaking as Maitland pointed out, 'Ministers are not responsible to Parliament; 
neither House, nor the two Houses together has any legal power to dismiss one of the 
King's Ministers.  But in all strictness the Ministers are responsible before the Courts of 
Law, and before the ordinary Courts of Law, and they are there responsible even for 
the highest acts of state; for those acts of state they can be sued or prosecuted, and 
the High Court of justice will have to decide whether they are legal or no.
27
 
These rules of law provide the foundations on which the whole fabric of personal liberty 
has, in this country, been erected.  They also point to a contrast between the legal and 
administrative system of our own country and that of countries where the droit 
administratif is administered by Tribunaux administratifs.
28    [begin page 267] 
 
Declining Respect for Law. 
In the introduction to the latest edition of the Law of the Constitution Mr. Dicey, while 
affirming that the principles laid down in the original treatise with regard to the rule of 
law and to the nature of droit administratif were little changed, nevertheless deemed it 
proper to call attention to a 'singular decline among modern Englishmen in their respect 




                                                  
27   [266/1]  Const. Hist., p. 484. 
28   [266/2]  The extent of this contrast was undoubtedly overstated, even if the, nature 
of it was not misunderstood, by Dicey when he published the earlier editions of 
his great work.  The following paragraphs will show that Dicey did in some 
measure recognize these truths, though he was naturally reluctant to retract his 
original propositions and rather disposed to attribute the necessity for restatement 
to a change in the facts of the situation.  Unquestionably recent tendencies, both in 
England and on the Continent, have been very markedly, in the direction opposite 
to that indicated by Dicey forty years ago. 
Just as this book is going to press an exhaustive treatise on Public Authorities 
and Legal Liability has been published by Dr. Gleeson E. Robinson (London 
University Press, 1925).  To this treatise Professor J.H. Morgan contributes a most 
valuable introduction, in which he rightly emphasizes and illustrates recent 
tendencies, though his strictures on Dicey are perhaps unduly severe and take too 
little account of the modifications of his original views to which Dicey himself 
called attention.  But Dr. Robinson's valuable work and Mr. Morgan's brilliant 
introduction deserve the close attention alike of jurists and legislators. 
29   [267/1]  p. xxxviii. He found proof of the declining veneration for the rule law in England in three 
directions: 
 
(i)   in the character of recent legislation; 
(ii)   in the existence among some classes of a certain distrust both of the 
law and of the judges; and 
(iii)   in a marked tendency towards the use of lawless methods for the 
attainment of social or political ends. 
 
The last he attributes to a variety of causes.  Firstly, to the fact that a vote has now 
been given to citizens who 'partly because of the fairness and the regularity with which 
the law has been enforced for generations in Great Britain hardly perceive the risk and 
ruin involved in a departure from the rule of law'.  The consequence is that large 
classes of 'otherwise respectable persons now hold the belief and act on the conviction 
that it is not only allowable but even praiseworthy to break the law of the land if the 
lawbreaker is pursuing some end which to him or her seems to be just and desirable'.  
In this connexion he instances certain of the English clergy, passive resisters against 
education rates, those who 'conscientiously' object to vaccination, and militant 
suffragettes.  Other illustrations of this deplorable tendency [begin page 268] would 
doubtless have occurred to him (as they will occur to others) had the Introduction been 
written even a few months later than it was. 
 
The tendency may also, in Dicey's opinion, be attributed to the democratic sentiment 
that law should on the whole correspond with public opinion, and to the perplexity 
occasioned thereby to the honest democrat when he is confronted by the phenomenon 
of a large body of citizens who are not only opposed to a particular law but actually 
question the moral right of the State to impose or maintain it.  Hobbes held that no law 
could be unjust.  Many worthy citizens now hold that any law is unjust which is opposed 
to the deliberate convictions of a large body of citizens, and that it may rightly be 
resisted by the use of force.  Yet that way lies the dissolution of society. 
 
A third explanation, if not justification, for lawlessness Mr. Dicey found in the 'mis-
development of party Government' which would sometimes tend to confuse loyalty to a 
party with allegiance to the State.  But candour compels him to add that no one who 
sympathizes with the principles of the Revolution of 1688 can refuse to admit that 
crises occasionally, though very rarely, arise when armed rebellion against unjust and 
oppressive laws may be morally justifiable'.  Yet no loyal citizen will be quick to 
emphasize this admission.  Discussion of so delicate a point is, however, outside the 
scope of this work. 
 
Tendencies in Legislation. 
More pertinent to our immediate purpose is the marked we, tendency of recent 
legislation to confer judicial or quasi-judicial authority upon officials and public 
departments.  Reference has already been made to this tendency in a preceding 
chapter.
30  Mr. Dicey further illustrates it by reference to the powers conferred upon 
Local Education Authorities by Section 7 of the Education Act of 1902, upon the 
Insurance Commissioners and other officials by the National Insurance Acts of 1911 
and 1913,
31 and upon the Commissioners of Customs and Excise and the Commis- 
[begin page 269] sioners of Inland Revenue by the Finance Act of 1910.  He also refers 
to Section 3 of the Parliament Act of 1911 which appears to put the Speaker of the 
House of Commons above the law, by enacting that any certificate given by him under 
the Act 'shall not be questioned in any court of law '. 
 
                                                  
30   [268/1]  supra, c. XXX. 
31   [268/2]  Cf. in particular §§, 67, and 88 (1) of the Act of 1911. The War and Bureaucracy 
A tendency already marked was naturally accentuated by the circumstances of the 
Great War.  Inevitably, as we have seen, the Legislature was compelled to delegate 
much of its authority to subordinate bodies, and in particular to the Public Departments 
old and new. 
 
The Judges and the Law. 
It is evident that the position of the Judiciary has been thereby rendered infinitely more 
difficult, and at the same judges and the time even more responsible.  During the War 
administrative regulations poured from public departments with such bewildering 
rapidity that even lawyers find it almost impossible to ascertain whether official claims 
alleged to be based upon such regulations were or were not legally justified.  The 
difficulty, hardly noticed in the ferment of war, was accentuated when, after the 
conclusion of peace, private citizens attempted to enforce their rights against the 
Crown. 
 
'I personally feel', said Lord justice Scrutton, 'that the whole subject of 
proceedings against Government Departments is in a very unsatisfactory 
state . . . it is of great public importance that there should be prompt and 
efficient means of calling in question the legality of the action of 
Government Departments, which owing to the great national emergencies 
arising out of the war, have been inclined to take action that they 
considered necessary in the interests of the State without any nice 
consideration of the question whether it was legal or not.' 
32
 
The Defence of the Realm Acts. 
The judiciary has, on the whole, shown itself tenacious of its honourable tradition in 
favour of the rights of private subjects, even when in conflict with the Crown.  But the 
Defence of the Realm Acts and the innumerable regulations issued under those Acts 
placed many obstacles [begin page 270] in the path of the lions of justice.  On Friday, 7 
August 1914, the Defence of the Realm Act passed, without discussion, through all its 
stages in the House of Commons, and on Saturday the 8th received the Royal 
assent.
33  On 28 August a further Act was passed, and the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act became law.  Neither the Consolidating Act nor its immediate 
predecessor reproduced the title of the Act of August 8, and the omission to do so had 
special significance.  The first of the series was designed 'to confer on His Majesty 
power to make regulations during the present war for the defence of the Realm'.  Had 
the Executive in the meantime received warnings that the title might prejudice and limit 
the Prerogative and hamper the action of the Government?  However that may be, the 
fact remains that the Consolidating Act was declaratory.  It declared that 'His Majesty in 
Council has Power', &c.  Nor was the sword thus placed in the hands of the Executive 
allowed to rust. 
 
The Case of Requisition. 
The Crown even went so far as to attempt to establish a right to expropriate the subject 
without compensation, but the attempt was stoutly and properly resisted.  The leading 
case was that of De Keyser's Royal Hotel, which in 1916 was requisitioned by the War 
Office.  The requisition was in order, but the question was subsequently raised whether 
the Crown could requisition the hotel without paying legal compensation.  The Crown 
did not, of course, propose to seize private property without compensation, but it 
claimed that this payment should be 'of grace' and that the amount should be 
determined by the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission -subsequently known as 
                                                  
32   [269/1]  Marshal Shipping Co. v. Board of Trade [1923], 2 K.B. at p. 352. 
33   [270/1]  4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 29. the War Compensation Court.  The proprietors of the hotel declined to accept anything 
as of grace: they claimed their legal rights, and the case was ultimately decided in their 
favour by the House of Lords.  Before judgement was given, very elaborate researches 
into historical precedents were carried out, and referring to these Lord Swinfen said: 'It 
does not appear that the Crown [begin page 271] has ever taken the subject's land for 
the defence of the realm without paying for it; and even in Stuart times I can trace no 
claim by the Crown to such a prerogative.'
34
 
Revenue from Licences. 
A different but not less important point was raised by a sheaf of cases which arose from 
the attempt of the Executive to raise a revenue for the State without the sanction of 
Parliament.  Various Ministries were, during the War, empowered to grant licences for 
the export, import, and distribution of commodities, for the sale of ships, and other 
purposes.  The Food Controller refused to grant a licence for the sale of milk to a large 
dairy company unless and until it agreed to pay a toll of 2d. per gallon on the milk sold.  
The tolls were paid, but, as the company contended, under duress, and they claimed, 
after the War, that the money, illegally extorted, should be refunded.  The House of 
Lords finally derided that the imposition amounted to taxation imposed on the subject 
without the authority of Parliament and was consequently illegal. 
 
The War Charges Validity Act. 
The prospect of having to repay not only the amount claimed by the Wilts United 
Dairies, Ltd., but by many other subjects upon whom similar impositions had been laid 
alarmed the Treasury, and in 1922 a Bill was introduced, and in somewhat amended 
form became law in 1925.  The resolution on which the Act was founded sufficiently 
explains its scope.  It affirmed 
 
'that it is expedient to give legal validity to the imposition and levying of 
certain charges which, during the late war, certain Government 
Departments, purporting to act in pursuance of powers conferred by the 
Defence of the Realm Regulations, or otherwise, imposed by way of 
payments required to be made either on or in connexion with the grant of 
licences or permits issued or purporting to be issued in pursuance of the 
said powers or in connexion with the control of supplies or of the prices of 
certain commodities other than milk.' 
 
The last words are significant.  Parliament hesitated to [begin page 272] invalidate a 
judgement of the House of Lords.  That judgement, still stands, and the dairy company 
obtained its money, but the claims of others, similarly situated, were barred, and the 
Treasury remains in possession of funds which it had secured by a process admittedly 
illegal, though neither vindictive, nor even, under the circumstances, unreasonable.   
Nevertheless the War Charges Validity Bill raised serious misgivings in the minds of 
those to whom the independence of the judiciary and the liberty of the subject are 
pearls of even greater price than the balancing of the national budget.  If ever a 
validating Act could be justified, however, it was in this case.  Illegal as the action of the 
Executive was, it had inflicted no damage on the licensees.  They had paid for a 
privilege which was presumably as lucrative to themselves as it was to the State.  The 
blunder was technical rather than substantial, and though a protest was properly 
entered against the type of legislation which the Act represented, it may be that greater 
injustice would have resulted from its rejection than from its enactment. 
 
                                                  
34   [271/1]  On the whole of this exceedingly interesting and important case, cf. The 
Case of Requisition, by Sir Leslie Scott and A. Hildesley, with an introduction by 
Sir John Simon. Oxford, 1920. Indemnity Act, 1920.  
Of similar import, though much wider scope, was the Act which had been passed in 
1920 to 'restrict the taking of legal proceedings in respect of certain acts and matters 
done during the War, and provide in certain cases remedies in substitution therefor, 
and to validate certain proclamations, orders, licences, ordinances, and other Laws 
issued, made, and passed; and sentences, judgements and orders of certain Courts 
given and made during the War'.  Some legislation of the sort was obviously necessary 
after a period of such profound upheaval, but an indemnity Act being, in Mr. Dicey's 
words, 'the legalization of illegality' needs to be very closely scrutinized.  Scrutiny in this 
particular case showed that the Bill had been drawn in exceptionally wide terms; it was 
stoutly opposed during its passage through Parliament, and the Lords inserted valuable 
amendments.  The general effect of the Act was to close the doors of the ordinary 
Courts to persons who alleged damage and loss [begin page 273] at the hands of the 
Executive during the War, and to compel them to seek ex-gratia redress at the hands of 
a tribunal which might fairly be described as 'administrative'.
35
 
Thus the distinction between England and those countries where the droit administratif 
obtains has unquestionably diminished; but it would be a palpable error to suppose that 
it had been removed.  Whether the subject gains or loses by the existence of 
administrative Courts is a question which, in the opinion of some recent writers
36 has 
been too hastily answered.  But the consideration of that question must be postponed. 
 
                                                  
35   [273/1]  For debate on Second Reading, cf. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 
vol. 128, PP. 1741-1855. Cf. especially speeches of Sir E. Pollock and Sir Gordon 
Hewart (subsequently Master of the Rolls and Lord Chief Justice respectively, Mr. 
(now Sir) Leslie Scott and Sir E. (now Lord) Carson. 
36   [273/2]  See in particular articles on the Growth of Bureaucracy by Mr. C.K. 
Allen, Quarterly Review, NO. 477, and Robinson and Morgan, Public Authorities 
and Legal Liability. XXXII. The Administration of Justice (2) 
The Courts of Law 
 
‘It is for this end that the King has been created and elected that he may do 
justice to all.' - Bracton (13th century). 
 
'No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled 
or anyways destroyed; nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon him, 
unless by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.  To 
none will we sell, to none will we deny or delay, right or justice.' - Magna 
Carta, §§ 39, 40. 
 
Law and Justice 
The preceding chapter was concerned with the problem of Liberty, and indicated the 
way in which that problem has been solved in England by the gradual establishment of 
the 'Rule of Law'.  Of that rule the judges are the guardians and trustees.  Their 
position in the Polity is consequently of supreme importance to the individual citizen, to 
his enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.  The general position of the judiciary in 
England has been already discussed; in particular, attention has been paid to the 
practical application of Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers, and to the 
necessity of keeping the judicial functions of Government separated, as clearly as may 
be, from the executive and legislative functions.  Apart from the elementary principles 
of the division of labour it is plainly desirable to separate the judiciary from the 
Legislature in order that there may be no confusion between the question as to what 
the law is, and what the law ought to be.  It is, moreover, of supreme moment to the 
maintenance of justice in the Commonwealth that law should be applied according to 
an established and impartial method of interpretation.  This end is more likely to be 
attained, as Mr. Henry Sidgwick pointed out, if those who apply the law are not also 
responsible for its enactment.
1  Not less important is it, as already indicated, that the 
judicial power should be separated [begin page 276] from the Executive.  Nothing, as we 
have seen, can be of greater moment to the individual citizen than that the Executive 
should be kept within the restraints of law.  Yet those restraints 'can hardly be expected 
to be effective unless the question whether acts done by Executive officials are or are 
not illegal can be referred - in the last resort - to the judicial decision of some organ 
independent of the Executive'.
2  Such an organ is also necessary in order to determine 
any conflict which may arise between the legal rights of one citizen and another; to 
compel the individual to perform his legal obligations as a citizen, and to punish those 
who transgress the law.  'In determining a nation's rank in political civilization,' writes 
Mr. Henry Sidgwick, 'no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice as 
defined by the law is actually realized in its judicial administration; both as between one 




The same writer lays down the essential conditions of a system such as will enable a 
nation to satisfy this test.  The first essential is a judicial bench at once learned, skilled, 
impartial, incorruptible, and independent.  The second is that the Courts in which 
justice is administered should be sufficiently numerous and accessible to all suitors, 
and a third is that no one should be hindered either by official or private obstruction 
                                                  
1   [275/1]  Elements of Politics, p. 345. 
2   [276/1]  Op. cit., p. 343. 
3   [276/2]  Op. cit., p. 457. from seeking judicial remedies for legal wrongs.  Accordingly, 'the judicial process 
should be as simple, short, and inexpensive as is consistent with adequate security for 
justice, and adequate provision for the correction of judicial errors', while at the same 
time 'vexatious litigation should be discouraged lest the remedies for social mischief 
prove worse than the disease '.
4
 
In the light of principles thus laid down we may now proceed to analyse the actual 
organs of the judiciary in England and to describe the machinery by which the law is 
administered.  The task is greatly simplified by the fact [begin page 277] that the 
machinery was completely overhauled in the year's 1873-94. 
 
The Courts of Law. 
The Courts may be divided into two categories: 
 
(1)   the Central or 'Superior' Courts located (with exceptions to be noted 
presently) in London; and 
(2)   the 'Local' or 'Inferior' Courts scattered throughout the country. 
 
They may further be subdivided into civil and criminal: Courts which are concerned with 
rights of citizens inter se, in other words with private law, and Courts which are 
concerned with offences against the Crown, as representing the State, in other words 
with crime-a breach of Public law. 
 
Criminal Justice. 
We deal first with procedure in criminal cases, and trace it from the lowest to the 
highest rung of the judicial ladder. 
 
Offences against the Criminal Law are of two kinds: indictable - the more serious - and 
non-indictable.  An 'indictment' is technically an accusation preferred by a Grand Jury 
of Presentment, an institution the history of which must be sought in the origines of the 
English Constitution.  The value of this ancient institution has indeed of late years been 
impugned, but the weight of authority is in favour of its retention, as a safeguard of the 
liberty of the subject.
5  Certain 'indictable' offences may, however, be dealt with 
'summarily': notably offences committed by children and young persons, and cases in 
which the value of the property in question does not exceed 40s., and when the 
accused elects to be tried by the Court of summary jurisdiction, or when the accused 
pleads guilty. 
 
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction 
Non-indictable offences are dealt with summarily by a Court consisting of justices of the 
Peace, or by a stipendiary or Police magistrate, who is invested with the powers of two 
ordinary justices of the Peace and may consequently sit alone.  The history of the 
justice of the Peace, an historic and still important functionary, will be dealt with in a 
subsequent chapter.  Justices of the Peace are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, 
acting on behalf of the Crown, to whose notice they are now recommended, [begin page 
278] in the case of county magistrates, by the Lord-Lieutenant, in the case of boroughs 
by local advisory committees, representative of all political parties.
6
 
                                                  
4   [276/3]  Op. cit., p. 547. 
5   [277/1]  Cf. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, PP. 456-7, notes. 
6   [278/1]  The Lord-Lieutenants are now advised by similar committees.  Formerly, 
borough magistrates were appointed on the recommendation of the Town Council, 
or other local bodies, but in many cases the appointments were frankly political. A large proportion of non-indictable offences, though technically criminal, are of a petty 
character, and 'consist mainly-of breaches of municipal regulations made in the 
interests of the public safety, or health', and not involving 'violence, cruelty, or gross 
dishonesty’.
7  Such cases are dealt with in Police Courts or Petty Sessions, which in 
large towns sit daily, and in smaller towns and country districts at, frequent intervals.  In 
these Courts justice is administered, by magistrates who are for the most part unpaid.  
In counties, the chairmen of county and district councils; in boroughs, the mayor, and, 
for one year after vacating office, the ex-mayor, are ex-officio magistrates.  In boroughs 
which have a separate Commission of the Peace there are, in addition to these two 
functionaries, borough magistrates whose jurisdiction is limited to the borough and who 
sit only in Petty Sessions.  The county magistrates administer justice in two Courts in 
Petty Sessions, as in boroughs, and in' Quarter Sessions' which are held four times a 
year, and at which more serious offences are tried. 
 
Petty Sessions. 
All persons accused of crime are brought in the first Sessions instance before a 
magistrate or magistrates sitting in a Police Court or Petty Sessions.  In all cases an 
'information' or 'complaint' must be laid by some one who knows the facts.  If the case 
be trivial, a summons to attend and answer the charge is issued by a magistrate.  If the 
defendant fails to appear the case may be determined in his absence, or a warrant may 
be issued for his arrest.  In grave cases a warrant is issued under the hand and seal of 
a magistrate or a judge of the King's Bench Division.  [begin page 279]  
 
Justices of the Peace, being as a rule laymen without special legal knowledge, must 
appoint a salaried clerk with Clerks legal qualifications to assist them in their judicial 
work.  It is the duty of the clerk to advise the justices on points of law, to take minutes 
of the proceedings, and in the case of indictable offences to take the depositions and to 
transmit them to the Director of Public Prosecutions, if the case is taken up by him, or 
to the Court of trial. 
 
The relations of the lay justice of the Peace and his expert adviser have for many 
centuries attracted the shafts of satire.  Early in the seventeenth century Fletcher in 
The Elder Brother makes Miramont say to Brissac” 
 
Thou monstrous piece of ignorance in office! 
Thou hast no more knowledge than thy Clerk infuses. 
 
Fielding makes the same point in Tom Jones, while the famous scene between Mr. 
Nupkins and his, clerk Mr. jinks is familiar to all readers of Pickwick.  A distinguished 
American commentator on English institutions quotes the relation of justice and Clerk in 
illustration of the thesis that the co-operation of professional and lay elements is one of 
the most outstanding and characteristic of existing political traditions in England.  'In 
order', he writes, 'to produce really good results, and avoid the dangers of inefficiency 
on the one hand and of bureaucracy on the other, it is necessary to have in any 
administration, a proper combination of experts and men of the world.'  This 
combination is seen not only, as already noted, in the co-operation of parliamentary 
ministers and civil servants, but in that of judge and jury, and-with a reversal in the 
mutual relation of the two elements - in that of justice and Clerk. 
8
 
                                                  
7   [278/2]  Introduction to the judicial (Criminal) Statistics for the year 1908, p. 12, 
note (quoted by Alexander, Administration of Justice, p. 147). 
8   [279/1]  A.L. Lowell, The Government of England, i. 173-6.  Stipendiary Magistrates. 
The Council of a Municipal Borough,
9 or indeed any ‘populous place' of 25,000 
inhabitants,
10 may petition the Home Secretary to appoint one or more stipendiary 
magistrates.  A stipendiary is paid by the borough, [begin page 280] though he holds 
office during His Majesty's pleasure; he must be a barrister of seven years' standing, 
and becomes, by virtue of his office, a justice of the Peace for the borough.  Except for 
the fact, already stated, that a stipendiary is invested with the powers of two ordinary 
justices and may consequently sit alone, the procedure of the Court is identical whether 
the magistrate be paid or unpaid.  In the metropolis and in all the larger boroughs 
summary jurisdiction is virtually entirely in the hands of stipendiary or 'Police Court' 
magistrates.  Like unpaid Justices they cannot try, save in the cases already 
mentioned, persons accused of indictable offences, nor impose a sentence of more 
than six months' imprisonment.  Justices of the Peace, paid and unpaid, are amenable 
to the control of the High Court of justice.  This control can be exercised in three ways.  
The High Court can, by a writ of mandamus, order the justices to hear cases which are 
within their jurisdiction; or by a writ of prohibition can prevent them from interfering in 
matters beyond it; or by a writ of certiorari can call up any case in which there has 
been, or threatens to be, a failure of justice.  In certain cases an appeal lies from Petty 
Sessions to Quarter Sessions on the facts, and to the High Court on points of law, but 
appeals, in proportion to the vast number of cases dealt with by the Courts of Summary 
jurisdiction, are relatively rare. 
 
The more serious - 'indictable' - cases must be sent for trial to Quarter Sessions or to 
the High Court, and in the latter case must be 'presented' to the Superior Court by a 
Grand jury.  In such cases the function of the Inferior Court is merely of a preliminary 
character: to investigate the prima facie facts, and, in particular, to grant or refuse bail 
to the defendant. 
 
The Coroner. 
The Another Court which makes preliminary investigations Coroner into cases of 
suspected crime is that of the Coroner.  The Coroner's Office is one of great antiquity, 
having existed at least from the year 1194,
11 if not from an earlier date.
12
[begin page 281] 
 
The Coroner, though elected in the Shire Court, was primarily, as his name implied, the 
representative of the King.  'He hath principally', writes Blackstone, 'to do with the pleas 
of the Crown - and in this light the Lord Chief justice of the King's Bench is the principal 
Coroner in the kingdom and may (if he pleases) exercise the jurisdiction of a Coroner in 
any part of the realm.'
13  There were usually four coroners in a county, though some 
counties had fewer.  There are now three types of Coroners: County Coroners, who 
since 1889 are appointed by the County Council; Borough Coroners, who in the larger 
boroughs are appointed by the Borough Council; and certain 'Franchise' Coroners such 
as those for the University of Oxford and City of London.  All judges of the High Court 
are ex-officio Coroners in any locality.  The duty of a Coroner is to hold inquests, with 
the aid of a jury, into cases of sudden or suspicious death, and to look after treasure-
trove.  In the event of a verdict against some person accused of causing another's 
death the accused may be committed for trial on the warrant of the Coroner, but such 
committal does not, as a rule, supersede the preliminary investigation of the supposed 
crime before justices of the Peace. 
 
                                                  
9   [279/2]  Under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. 
10   [279/3]  Stipendiary Magistrates Act, 1863. 
11   [280/1]  Stubbs, Select Charters, 260, § 20. 
12   [280/2]  Select Coroners Rolls, Introduction, pp. xv-xix. 
13   [281/1]  Commentaries, i. 345. Quarter Sessions. 
By an Act of 1362 the transformed justices of the Peace were required to hold 
Quarterly Sessions for the discharge of their rapidly accumulating duties.  With those 
duties, so far as they were administrative in character, a subsequent chapter will deal.  
From the first, however, an important part of the work in Quarter Sessions was judicial.  
That portion is still retained by the County magistrates and must, therefore, claim 
attention at this point.  Quarter Sessions are also held in more than one hundred 
boroughs.  In these latter Courts the sole judge is the Recorder.  The Recorder is a 
professional lawyer, a barrister of not less than five years' standing; he is appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor and receives a small salary.  Unlike County Court judges and 
stipendiary [begin page 282] magistrates, Recorders are not disqualified from sitting in 
Parliament, save for their own boroughs, nor from practice at the bar.  The position, 
therefore, though not highly remunerated, is eagerly sought after by political barristers 
who are looking for promotion to the judicial bench.  Quarter Sessions in counties are 
presided over by a chairman, who may or may not have legal qualifications, but who is 
frequently a layman. 
 
The Clerk of the Peace. 
Like the justices in Petty Sessions the County magistrates in Quarter Sessions have 
the assistance of a trained legal adviser in the person of the Clerk of the Peace.  This 
office is of great historic antiquity as well as of modern utility, dating back at least as far 
as the fourteenth century.  The Clerk of the Peace keeps the records of Quarter 
Sessions, which is a Court of Record, and otherwise assists the magistrates in the 
discharge of their important judicial functions. 
 
Jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions. 
The jurisdiction of the Court is threefold.  It can try all indictable offences committed to 
it for trial except such felonies as are punishable, on a first conviction, by death or 
penal servitude for life, and certain crimes such as libel, perjury, and forgery, which may 
involve difficult questions of law.  Its appellate jurisdiction extends to all appeals from 
the convictions and orders of Courts of summary jurisdiction and to licensing appeals in 
licensing, rating, poor law, and similar non-criminal cases.  It also possesses 
'jurisdiction of a miscellaneous character, in certain miscellaneous cases, conferred by 
special statutes, e.g. the enrolment of certificates relating to the division or stopping up 
of highways . . . the granting of licences to keep private lunatic asylums (under the 
Lunacy Act 1891), &c.’
14  Appeals are (with four exceptions) heard without a jury and 
are decided by the majority of justices present.  Cases which come before Quarter 
Sessions as a Court of First Instance must, on the contrary, be tried with a petty jury.  
The importance of the jurisdiction thus exercised may be judged by the fact that some 




The Fount of Justice. 
The apex of the administration of the Criminal Law is formed by the High Court of 
justice, either in London or at Assizes.  To this Court all the gravest offences must, as 
we have seen, be sent for trial.  This Court in particular (though all Courts of justice 
share it) represents the majesty of the King as the source or fount of justice.  That is, 
indeed, the first and foundational principle on which English legal administration has 
from the first rested.  But there is a second principle of almost equal significance: that 
'the suitors are the judges'.  These two principles, at first sight contradictory, have in 
course of time been blended into the system with which we are familiar.  The 
                                                  
14   [282/1]  Alexander, op. cit., p. 8o and passim. 
15    [283/1]  The Criminal jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions has been considerably 
extended by the Criminal justice Act, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 86. administration of justice must in primitive societies necessarily be mainly local.  Hence 
the importance of the local Courts of the Shire and the Hundred to be presently 
described.  In those popular or 'communal' courts the 'justice' is practically 'folk right', 
and is administered by the freemen themselves, or in technical phrase the 'suitors are 
the judges'.  But against the maintenance of this idea two forces soon came to operate: 
the centralizing authority of the Crown, and the more immediate authority of the local 
territorial magnate: the force of feudalism.  To some extent, however, in justice, as in 
government, these two forces cancelled out.  Between royal justice and feudal justice 
there was more of antagonism than between royal justice and communal.  Hence the 
stern insistence of the Norman and Angevin kings upon the attendance of the tenants-
in-chief at the Shire Courts: upon the rights of the Sheriff even as against the 
'franchises' of the Barons. 
 
Historical Development of the Judiciary. 
Under Henry I, still more systematically under Henry II, we see new machinery in 
operation.  The Barons of the Exchequer, the King's Justices go forth as Royal 
Commissioners to collect revenue and incidentally (at first) to [begin page 284] 
administer justice.  Their first business is to hold 'Pleas of the Crown', to decide, that is, 
any suits in which the King is interested.  Simultaneously the central Curia takes on a 
specialized organization.  At first it is difficult to draw any line between legislative, 
administrative, and judicial work.  Gradually the functions are differentiated and the 
Curia Regis (as distinct from the Concilium Regis) emerges specifically as a Court of 
justice.  Later still we perceive three divisions of this Court: 
 
(1)    the King's Bench - the King's own Court, held coram ipso domino 
Rege - the Court which had jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and in all 
Pleas of the Crown; 
(2)   the Court of Common Pleas, for the trial of all cases between subject 
and subject; and 
(3)   the Court of Exchequer, dealing with all cases involving revenue. 
 
By the reign of Edward I, each of these Courts has its own staff of judges.  But the 
parent Concilium has not parted with all judicial function.  It still belongs to the King-in-
Council to redress inequities in the working of his Courts, and to correct the errors of 
his judges.  These two germinal ideas eventually give us the specialized Court of the 
Chancellor and the supreme appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. 
 
To some extent these two Courts are in conflict.  Between Parliament and the Council 
there was, as we have seen, a long and bitter struggle.  Eventually the House of Lords 
finds its own work in correcting the errors in law of the ordinary Courts.  Meanwhile, the 
Chancellor has been developing, side by side with the ordinary Courts but outside 
them, a jurisdiction of his own.  It arises naturally from his function as Keeper of the 
King's Conscience.  There are cases in which the application of strict rules of law will 
result in a denial of equity.  Thus there is gradually evolved a system of equity, 
designed to supplement the deficiencies and to correct the inequities of the common 
law; thus the Court of Chancery has come into being.  In time, particularly in the 
fifteenth century, and for reasons already explained, the Common Law Courts reveal 
weaknesses and deficiencies in the administration of criminal [begin page 285] justice.  
There is room for a Court of 'criminal equity' (if one may so phrase it), particularly for a 
Court strong enough to deal with powerful offenders.  The King's Council is the obvious 
resource, and the regular exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the Court of the Star 
Chamber is the result.  The many controversial questions as to the precise status of 
this Court are beyond the scope of this book.  Clearly and indisputably, however, the 
Court of Star Chamber represents the jurisdiction of the Council, and by the Statute of 
1641 the Council, as clearly, is deprived of it. 
 First, then, the Courts of Law enshrine the idea that the King in person is the source of 
justice, delegating the administration of it to whomsoever he will.  But there is another 
root-idea of which it were unsafe not to take account.  The 'suitors are the judges'.  
Justice is communal as well as regal.  We must not dogmatically connect this idea with 
the institution of trial by jury; there are too many pitfulls in the path; communal justice is 
clearly a Teutonic principle; trial by jury is mainly the development of a Norman idea.  
But the latter seems in a sense to fulfil an instinct which was deep rooted in our English 
system long before the Conqueror landed at Pevensey. 
 
Trial by jury represents two distinct ideas: on the one hand, the obligation resting upon 
the lawful men of a particular district to bring before the King's justices those who are 
suspected of crime; and, on the other, the ascertainment of facts by a process of 
inquest, by the sworn information of those who are personally cognizant of the facts.  
We can trace here the lineaments of our 'grand' and 'petty' juries.  It is still the business 
of the legal men of the shire - of the county magistrates sitting as a 'grand jury' - to 
indict before the King's judges the persons reasonably suspected of crime; to find 
against them 'a true bill'.  The 'petty' jury were originally not judges of fact, but sworn 
witnesses.  They represented a form of 'inquest applied in the first instance to an 
ascertainment of the fiscal rights of the Crown.  The facts [begin page 286] recorded in 
the Domesday Survey were obtained by commissioners, from sworn information laid 
before them by the men of the particular locality concerned.  The procedure was 
subsequently adapted to many other purposes: to the determination of questions of 
ownership; of obligations in regard to national defence; and ultimately to criminal 
investigations.  The 'sworn men' were witnesses to facts.  Later on, the original jury, 
imperfectly acquainted with the facts, were 'afforced' by others who could speak to 
them from personal knowledge.  Thus the 'jury' was gradually distinguished from 
'witnesses'.  Ultimately the divorce becomes complete.  The jury must arrive at a 
decision as to the facts from the sworn testimony laid before them by witnesses and 
from that only.  The Grand jury of presentment, the Petty jury empanelled to decide on 
the facts of the case, and the witnesses sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, have still their several functions to perform. 
 
Assizes. 
The significance of these functions is brought home to the ordinary citizen most vividly 
by the periodical visits of the judges of the High Court to the Assize towns.  Now, as for 
centuries past, the King's Courts are partly stationary (in banco), partly itinerant.   
Equally in both cases the judges represent the Sovereign, and their arrival at and stay 
in the several towns is consequently, and properly, attended by stately and impressive 
ceremonial.  The judges are technically Commissioners of oyer and terminer, gaol 
delivery and Assize, and their Commissions are for the counties comprised in the 
circuit, though all judges of the Supreme Court are in the commission of the peace for 
all counties. 
 
For the purpose of holding Sessions of the High Court in different localities, England 
and Wales are divided up into eight circuits.  On each circuit there are at least two 
Assizes a year; in Manchester, Leeds, and Liverpool there are four.  To each circuit one 
or sometimes two judges are assigned to try criminal, and, where necessary, civil 
cases [begin  page 287] as well.
16  In all criminal cases a 'true Bill' must first be found by 
the Grand jury before an accused person can be put on his trial, while the question of 
guilt or innocence is subsequently decided by the petty jury of twelve persons whose 
verdict must be unanimous.  Whether the trial takes place before a judge on circuit or in 
London the procedure is the same. 
                                                  
16   [287/1]  Additional powers for the regulation of Circuits have been granted to the 
Crown (acting by Order in Council) by the Supreme Court of judicature 
(Consolidation) Act, 15 16 Geo. V, c. 49.  
Court of Criminal Appeal. 
Until the year 1907 there was technically no right of appeal in criminal cases.  The 
Home Secretary, exercising on behalf of the Sovereign the prerogative of mercy, 
possessed a power of revision which amounted to something like an appeal on matters 
of fact; while the Court for Crown Cases Reserved could quash a conviction, if a point 
of law reserved at the trial was decided in favour of the prisoner.  In 1907 a Court of, 
Criminal Appeal consisting of two or more judges of the High Court was established.  A 
convicted prisoner may now appeal on a question of law; or, by leave of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal or of the judge who originally tried the case, he may appeal on a 
question of fact or mixed law and fact.  The Crown's prerogative of pardon, as 
exercised by the Home Secretary, remains in theory unaffected; in practice, however, 
many cases which were formerly reviewed at the Home Office now come before the 
Court of Criminal Appeal.  In the year 1922 there were 415 applications for leave to 
appeal, and of these the Court of Criminal Appeal heard or otherwise disposed of 86.  
In 17 cases the conviction was quashed, and in 28 cases the sentence was varied. 
 
We turn to the administration of Civil justice. 
 
County Courts. 
The Civil Court to which there is easiest access is the ‘County Court'.  These 'County 
Courts' are brand-new tribunals created under an Act of 1846, and must be carefully 
distinguished, therefore, from the historic Courts of the Shire or County, with which they 
have no sort of connexion.  For County Court purposes England is divided into some 
five hundred districts, in each of which a Court [begin page 288] is generally held every 
month.  The districts are grouped into fifty-five circuits, to each of which as a rule a 
judge is assigned; each judge, therefore, is responsible on an average for ten districts.  
County Court judges, who must be barristers of at least ten years' standing, are 
appointed and removable by the Lord Chancellor.  Successive Acts have extended 
their powers so widely that these Courts are now competent to try almost any civil case 
(except breach of promise of marriage) which does not involve more than £100.  They 
have equity jurisdiction in cases up to £500; Probate jurisdiction if the estate does not 
exceed £200 personalty and £300 realty; and Bankruptcy jurisdiction to any amount.  
They can wind up companies whose capital does not exceed £10,000 and some Courts 
have in certain cases Admiralty jurisdiction.  If the amount at issue exceeds £5 either 
party may demand a jury of five persons, or the judge may at his discretion allow a jury 
in cases involving a less amount.
17  These Courts are freely resorted to, for in them 
justice is promptly, efficiently, and cheaply administered.  Hence there is a natural 
tendency still further to enlarge their competence.  A plaintiff may, as a rule, elect 
whether he will proceed in the County or the High Court, but if the action is one which 
could legally be tried in the inferior Court, resort to the High Court is, by the rules as to 
costs, discouraged.  In nearly all cases an appeal from the County to the High Court is 
allowed on questions of law, an appeal which may be carried stage by stage to the 
House of Lords.  But having regard to the number of cases tried in County Courts - 
about 1,000,000 per year - appeals are comparatively rare, - a striking testimony to the 
satisfaction which is given to suitors by these Courts. 
 
Local Courts of Records. 
Apart from the modern County Courts there still survive Courts of more than twenty 
local Courts of Record, with limited or local civil jurisdiction.  Such Courts formerly 
existed in great numbers, particularly in the Counties Palatine of [begin page 289] 
Chester, Durham, and Lancaster.  Until 1830 Chester had a local Chief justice and 
second justice, but they were abolished in that year, and in 1873 the Judicature Act 
                                                  
17   [288/1]  Holdsworth, History of English Law, i. 192. provided that the Counties Palatine of Lancaster and Durham should respectively 
cease to be Counties Palatine as regards the issue of commissions of assize or other 
like commissions, but no farther.  The Chancery Court of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
however, not merely survives, but under the presidency of a Vice-Chancellor, appointed 
by the Chancellor of the Duchy, continues to perform important judicial functions in 
Lancashire.  By an Act of 1890
18 the Palatine Court of Chancery was brought into 
closer relation with the judicial system of the country at large; it was given substantially 
the same jurisdiction as the Chancery Division of the High Court; and appeals from it 
were henceforward to go to the Court of Appeal (instead of as formerly to the 
Chancellor of the Duchy) and to the House of Lords.
19  The Chancery Court of Durham 
has also survived all reforms in the system of judicature; and, among other 
conspicuous instances of the survival of historic local Courts of Record, are the City of 
London Court, the Lord Mayor’s Court, the Bristol Tolsey Court, the Liverpool Court of 
Passage, and the Court of the Salford Hundred.  'Thus, except in those few cases in 
which a borough has an active Court of Record, the Courts of the boroughs, whether 
they are Courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction, have been assimilated to the local courts 




It is, however, in regard to the superior Civil Courts that the simplification effected 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century is most conspicuously seen.  Down to 
1873 there were eight superior Courts of First Instance: the King's Bench, the Common 
Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, the Chancery Court, the High Court of Admiralty, the 
Court of Bankruptcy, the Court of Probate, [begin page 290] and the Court for Divorce 
and Matrimonial Causes.  Most of these Courts had separate staffs of judges. 
 
Mainly by the judicature Acts of 1873, 1875, 1876, and 1894, taken in conjunction with 
an important Order in Council of December 16, 1880, order has been evolved out of 
the chaos which, however suggestive to the student of history, was distracting to 
litigants and lamentably wasteful both of time and money. 
 
The Supreme Court. 
There is now one Supreme Court of judicature divided into (1), the High Court of 
justice; and (2), the Court of Appeal.  The former has three divisions: 
 
(1)    The King's Bench Division, which now exercises the jurisdiction 
formerly exercised by the Courts of King's Bench Common Pleas, and 
Exchequer, and the Court of Bankruptcy.  The Lord Chief Justice acts 
as President, assisted by a staff of seventeen puisne judges. 
(2)    The Chancery Division, under the Lord Chancellor and six puisne 
judges. 
(3)   The Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, under a President and 
two puisne judges. 
 
Questions of fact may, in Divisions (1) and (3), be referred to a jury at the instance of 
either party; and in division (2) with the-leave of the judge.  But except in the King's 
Bench Division jury actions are rare, and even there tend to become less frequent.  
The importance of the change effected by the judicature Acts is thus summarized by 
Maitland: ‘To each of these divisions certain business is specially assigned. . . . But this 
distribution of business is an utterly different thing from the old distinction between 
                                                  
18   [289/1]  53 & 54 Vict. c. 23.  
19   [289/2]  Holdsworth, A History of English Law, i, p. I 17, and for-local courts 
generally, and their decline, see chapter ii of the same learned work. 
20   [289/3]  Op. cit., p. 151. courts of law and of equity.  Any division can now deal thoroughly with every action; it 
can recognize all rights whether they be of the kind known as "legal", or of the kind 
known as "equitable”; it can give whatever relief English law (including "equity") has for 
the litigants.’
21  It should, however, be observed that although a distribution of business 
is a very different thing from a distinction of jurisdiction, yet the suitor who brings an 
action in the [begin page 291] inappropriate Division finds to his cost that the distribution 
of business is still a real distinction. 
 
To the High Court there is, in certain cases, an appeal from inferior Courts. 
 
From the High Court (including Courts of Assize) an appeal lies in almost every case to 
the Court of Appeal.  This Court now consists of certain ex-officio judges: the Lord 
Chancellor, any ex-Lord Chancellor, any Lord of Appeal in Ordinary,
22 the Lord Chief 
justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Probate Division, and 
five 'Lords justices of Appeal'.  Ex-Lord Chancellors, though ex-officio judges of appeal, 
can only be called upon to sit with their own consent at the request of the Chancellor. 
 
From the Court of Appeal and from the Scotch Courts an appeal lies to the House of 
Lords - a tribunal the composition and procedure of which have been already 
described. 
 
The Privy Council. 
There remains yet another Court of Appeal in regard to which something must be said.  
The Act of the Long Privy Parliament (1641) which abolished the Court of Star Council 
Chamber deprived the Privy Council of all jurisdiction in England, but the Council still 
remained the supreme Court of Appeal for admiralty cases and for all the King's 
oversea dominions.  This remnant of jurisdiction was not at the time important, 
extending only to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and the American 'plantations'.  
With the growth of oversea dominions it has, however, become far reaching and highly 
important.  In 1832 a further jurisdiction was conferred upon the King in Council.  Henry 
VIII had created a Court of Delegates for hearing appeals from the Ecclesiastical 
Courts; Elizabeth a similar Court for admiralty appeals.  These Courts were abolished 
in 1832, and their jurisdiction was transferred to the Privy Council. 
  
Judicial Functions of the Privy Council. 
In the following year an important change was effected in the constitution of the Court 
which exercised the [begin page 292] judicial functions of the Privy Council.  Down to 
1833 the work was in fact done by such members of the Council as had held high 
judicial office.  But by an Act of that year (3 & 4 William iv, c. 41) the judicial work of the 
Council was transferred to a special Committee.  This was to consist of the Lord 
President, the Lord Chancellor, and such other members of the Council as held or had 
held high judicial office.  These were to include, in ecclesiastical cases, all the 
archbishops and bishops who were members of the Council.  Under an Act of 1871 the 
Crown was empowered to appoint four paid members from among the judges of the 
High Court or the Chief justices of the High Courts in Madras or Bombay, but their 
places have now been taken by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary - the four 'law lords`
23 
designated by the Act of 1876 for the judicial work of the House of Lords.  Under the 
same Act (1876) the archbishops and such bishops as are members of the Privy 
Council may be summoned, for the hearing of appeals in ecclesiastical cases, as 
                                                  
21   [290/1]  Op. cit., P. 472. 
22    [291/1]  Holding certain qualifications, cf. Supreme Court of judicature Act 
(1925), § 6. 
23   [292/1]  Now (1925) Six. assessors, but they are no longer members of the Committee.  Subsequent Acts
24 
have added to the Committee certain Canadian, Australian, and South African judges 
who are also members of the Privy Council.  But, generally speaking, the composition 
of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council is almost identical with that of the House 
of Lords sitting in a judicial capacity, and proposals have frequently been made for their 
amalgamation. 
 
But there is an important difference in procedure.  A judgement of the House of Lords is 
a quasi-legislative Act.  A vote is taken and (if there be a division) the division list is 
published.  The judicial Committee, as befits a Committee of the Council, 'advises' the 
Crown.  It is the King in-Council by whom the Order, embodying the judgement, is 
formally made.  The judgement of the judicial Committee must, therefore, unlike that of 
the House of Lords, be unanimous; or at any rate dissent must not be [begin page 293] 
published.  Moreover, while the latter is bound by its own decisions, the former is not. 
 
Such is the machinery which now exists for the administration of justice in England.  It 
is necessarily elaborate, but since 1873 it has been straightened out and simplified to 
an almost incredible extent, and it now operates, if not to the satisfaction of all suitors - 
an ideal impossible of attainment - at least to the admiration of those who are 
competent to express an expert opinion.  Wherein the English system differs from that 
of some other countries will be indicated, in a general way, in the next chapter. 
 
                                                  
24   [292/2]  58 & 59 Vict., c. 44, and 3 & 4 Geo. V., c. 21. XXXIII. The Judiciary (3) 
Some Comparisons.  The United States, 
Switzerland, and Germany 
 
'The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.  The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, 
shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, 
receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their continuance in office. 
 
'The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other 
public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; - to 
controversies between two or more States (between a State and citizens of 
another State); between citizens of different States; between citizens of the 
same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.' - 
American Constitution, Art. iii, §§ 1 and 2. 
 
'The standard of good behaviour for the continuance in office of the judicial 
magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern 
improvements in the practice of government.  In a Monarchy it is an 
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a Republic it is a no less 
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the legislative 
body,' - Hamilton, in the Federalist. 
 
'Je ne pense pas que jusqu'à present aucune nation du monde ait constitué le 
pouvoir judiciaire de la même maniére que les Americains. 'De Tocqueville. 
 
'The highest Court of the. United States . . . holds a unique place in our form 
of Government, and one not found in any other governmental system.  It 
wields a greater power than is exercised by any other judicial tribunal in the 
world.' - Eaton Drone. 
 
Law and Justice in England 
The legal system of England - the conception of law, and the position of the judiciary 
and the organization of the Courts - is, if not unique, at least sui generis.  In England, 
as we have seen, the judges are, in exceptional degree, independent of the Executive; 
for all citizens, alike official and unofficial, there is but one law, and all have access to 
one and the same set of Courts; the Legislature [begin page 296] is, indeed, sovereign 
and can override, though it cannot technically reverse, the decisions of the Courts, but 
the judiciary is vested with immense power over the Executive.  It was a principle of old 
Teutonic law that all officials should be subject to the law of the land in the same way 
as private individuals, and should be held responsible by the Courts for their actions 
committed without authority of law, whenever such actions caused damage to individuals.
1  This principle found its way into the English legal system - predominantly 
Teutonic in origin, - and members of the Administration have never been, on account of 
their official position, exempted in any way from the observance of the ordinary law of 
the land.  Consequently the question to be decided by the Courts whenever the act of 
an official came up before them, was one of jurisdiction.  Did the law give the official 
the power to act as he had acted in the particular case, or not?  It will at once be seen, 
as Professor Goodnow pertinently observes, 'what an enormous power the Courts had 
and have through the adoption of this principle over the acts of the administration.  Any 
act of any officer may give rise to a complaint which the Courts have to decide.  In 
deciding these complaints the Courts delimit the sphere of administrative competence 
in all its details in that they settle what is the jurisdiction of all officers of the 
Government.’ 
2  But, on the other hand, while officials are thus responsible to the 
ordinary law, the Sovereign is irresponsible - the King can do no wrong.  The 
acceptance of this latter principle has, as the same acute critic points out denied to the 
individual the right to sue the Crown i.e. the Executive, except with its own consent.  
The only remedy open to the private citizen against the Crown is by the ancient 
procedure of Petition of Right.  It lies with the Home Secretary and the Attorney-
General to allow or refuse such a petition, but only if they allow it can the Courts 
entertain the action.  [begin page 297] 
 
The immense powers conferred upon the Executive during the Great War gave, as 
already indicated, to this procedure an additional significance, and the hardships which, 
in consequence, accrued to individuals have led a competent critic to declare that 'the 
remedies of the subject against the State in France are easier, speedier, and infinitely 
cheaper than they are in England to-day.’
3  The impression made upon a legal mind by 
an Executive temporarily invested with quasi-dictatorial powers may perhaps have 
induced to over-hasty generalization from a transitory situation.  Yet, thirty years earlier, 
Professor Goodnow had observed that France - the home of Administrative Law - was 
singular in recognizing a direct remedy against the general acts of the heads of 
departments.  In France any subject may appeal to the Council of State to have an 
objectionable ordinance quashed, on the ground that it has been issued by the head of 
a department in excess of his powers.  In most countries there is a remedy against the 
special acts of the Executive.  But while in France such an appeal goes to the Council 
of State, acting as an Administrative Court, in England and the United States the 
remedy is found in an appeal to the ordinary Courts.
4  English and American students 
will, however, be well advised not to be too quick in concluding that the liberties of their 
nationals are, on this account, more effectively safeguarded. 
 
Comparisons and Contrasts. 
Such considerations would seem to suggest that, in order to appreciate more clearly 
the peculiar characteristic and contrasts of the English system of law and justice, it may 
be advantageous to describe in broad outline the systems which prevail in some other 
typical States of the modern world. 
 
Comparisons will, however, serve only to mislead unless it is constantly borne in mind 
that the conditions of the problem differ widely in unitary and in federal States, in States 
where the Constitution is rigid and in States where it is flexible, and, above all, in States 
which have, and [begin page 298] those which have not, adopted the principles of the 
Droit Administratif. 
                                                  
1   [296/1]  Loening, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, PP. 771-84, cited by Goodnow 
Administrative Law, ii. 163.  
2   [296/2]  Op, cit., ii. 154-5. 
3   [297/1]  C.K. Allen, 'Bureaucracy Triumphant' (Quarterly Review, No. 477, p. 
247).  
4   [297/2]  Goodnow, op. cit., i. 158-9.  
Reference will first be made to three States which are alike in the possession of federal 
Constitutions, but wherein Federalism has assumed widely different forms. 
 
 
The Judiciary of the United States. 
De Tocqueville declared that no nation in the world has ever constituted its judiciary in 
the same way as the United States, and De Tocqueville's great authority has gone far 
to stereotype the impression that of all parts of the American Constitution the judiciary 
is the most original and most interesting.  Nor can any student of American Institutions 
fail to be struck alike by the dignity which attaches to the Supreme Court and by the 
significant functions assigned to it by the Constitution.  The fathers of the American 
Constitution, deeply imbued, as we have seen, with the philosophy of Montesquieu, 
emphasized the importance of separating the 'power of judging' from the legislative and 
executive powers.  They were, moreover, concerned to draft the terms of a Treaty, 
almost international in character, which should to all time secure the rights of the 
several parties thereto.  To whom if not to the judges was the interpretation of those 
terms and the enforcement of those rights to be entrusted?  Thus the power of the 
judicature arose naturally out of the circumstances under which the federal Constitution 
was framed.  None the less is it necessary to insist that the principles at the root of the 
judicial system of the United States are essentially and demonstrably English in origin.  
The whole conception of American law is in conformity with the English idea that law is 
the embodiment of justice and the guardian of liberty, but that personal rights and 
political liberties are of no avail unless there exists a sanction, an appropriate 
machinery, by which they can be enforced.  Ubi ius ibi remedium: this principle is at the 
root of the English legal system; it is at the root also of the American.  The difference 
between the two lies in the application of the principle, and it arises largely from the 
necessary implications of Federalism: a sacrosanct Instru- [begin page 299] ment, or 
written Constitution; the precise definition and rigid separation of powers; and the need 
for an authoritative, interpreter of the Constitution and a guardian of the powers thereby 
distributed. 
 
The Constitution itself (Article vi, § 2) decrees as follows: 
  
‘This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof . . shall be the supreme law of the land.'  
 
Only those laws, it will be noted, - which are made in pursuance of the Constitution 
form part of the supreme law of the land.  Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall stated in a 
famous judgement, in the case of Hylton v. United States (1803), 'the particular 
phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the 
principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to 
the Constitution is void and that the Courts as well as other departments are bound by 
that instrument.'  With equal clearness that great judge laid down the limits of the 
legislative authority of Congress: 'Between these alternatives there is no middle 
ground.  The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts is 
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.  If the former part of the alternative 
be true, then a legislative act, contrary to the Constitution, is not law; if the latter part be 
true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a 
power in its own nature illimitable.’ 
5
 
The judgement of Marshall has never been impugned, and is now wrought into the very 
texture of the American Constitution. 
 
                                                  
5   [299/1]  Marbury v. Madison. The more important provisions of the Constitution, in reference to the judiciary, are as 
follows: 
Article III 
Section I.  The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.  The [begin page 300] judges, both of the 
Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, 
and shall, at stated times receive for their services a compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
 
Section 2.  (I) The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties 
made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting 
ambassadors other Public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall 
be a party; to controversies between two or more States (between a State 
and citizens of another State) between citizens of different States; between 
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, 
and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States citizens or 
subjects. 
 
(2) With all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and 
consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction.  In all the other cases before mentioned the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, 
with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
 
The words placed between brackets were, however, limited by the eleventh 
amendment (1798), which runs: 
 
'The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign State.' 
 
It will be observed that the Constitution does not, as is sometimes loosely said, ‘create 
the Courts'.  It provides that Courts there shall be, and that they shall exercise a certain 
jurisdiction.  But it remains for the Legislature to fix by statute the number and 
remuneration of the judges of the Supreme Court, and for the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate to appoint them.  Thus, as an American writer has recently 
pointed out, it is possible, since the organization and composition of the [begin page 
301] Court are dependent upon Congress and the President, for Congress to increase 
the number of Judges, and with the connivance of the President to 'pack' the Court so 
that a majority out of sympathy with Congress might be overborne.  Or, on the other 
hand, Congress may, as it did during the administration of Johnson, enact that 
vacancies should not be filled, and thus reduce the number of justices.
6  But, after all, 
the tenure of Congress is brief; that of the justices is, generally speaking, lifelong.  The 
reduction of numbers could, therefore, only be accomplished by a process extending 
over several Congresses, while an attempt to 'pack' the Bench would almost certainly 
attract very unfavourable attention. 
 
                                                  
6   [300/1]  Kimball, op. cit., p. 379. The Federal Courts. 
The federal judicial system consists of three parts: the District Courts, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and the Supreme Court; and in addition there are several special courts. 
 
The Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court, as at present constituted, consists of a Chief justice and eight 
associate justices.  Its Sessions are held annually in the city of Washington and begin 
on the second Monday of each October, Six justices constitute a quorum.  The 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rests partly, as we have seen, upon the provisions of 
the Constitutional instrument, but much more upon statute.  Its original jurisdiction is 
determined by the Constitution and includes only cases in which either ambassadors or 
States are parties; its appellate jurisdiction is determined mainly by statute, and 
includes all cases from State Courts involving conflicts between State Law and Federal 
Law, all cases involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution or any Federal 
Law or Treaty, cases involving a conflict between a State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States, and all cases where the decision of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals is not final.  Appeals also lie under certain conditions to the Supreme Court 
from the Court of Customs Appeals, the Court of Claims, from the District Court when 
sitting as a Prize [begin page 302] Court, and from the District Courts of the Philippine 
Islands, Hawaii, and certain other District Courts.  The judicial power of the Federal 
Government, as Mr. Woodrow Wilson has pointed out, is thus made to embrace two 
distinct classes of cases: on the one hand, those in which, by reason of the nature of 
the questions involved, it is manifestly proper that the authority of the Federal 
Government, rather than the authority of a State, should prevail: in particular, admiralty 
and maritime cases, cases arising out of the constitutional laws or treaties of the United 
States, or out of conflicting grants made by different States; and, on the other hand, 
those in which, by, reason of the nature of the parties to the suit, the State Courts could 
not properly be allowed jurisdiction, as for instance cases affecting foreign 
ambassadors or the citizens of different States.
7
 
The Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Below the Supreme Court there formerly existed two sets of Circuit Courts, for which 
purpose the United States was divided into nine circuits, to each of which a judge of the 
Supreme Court was assigned.  Each Judge was required to hold two circuits a year, 
but the duty was found intolerable, and in 1869 nine Circuit justices were appointed.  In 
1911, however, the ordinary work of the, Circuit Courts was handed over to the District 
Court, and: there was established in each circuit a Circuit Court of Appeals.  This 
tribunal consists of Circuit judges, judges of the District Court, and justices of the 
Supreme Court, but in practice the latter never attend.  The Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the District Court, except certain classes of cases 
which have to be carried directly to the Supreme Court. 
 
District Courts. 
Lowest in the series of Federal Courts is that of the District.  For this purpose the 
United States is divided into eighty-one districts; each State constitutes at least one 
district, and the larger States are subdivided into several.  The District judges, like 
those of the other Federal Courts, are appointed by the President of the [begin page 
303] United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.  In addition there is in 
every district a Federal District Attorney, or Public Prosecutor, who acts under the 
direction of the Attorney-General of the United States.  The executive officer of the 
District Court is a United States Marshal who acts as the Federal Sheriff and executes 
with his assistants all the orders and processes of the District Courts.  The Marshal 
                                                  
7   [302/1]  The State, § 1307. may, if necessary, call upon the military force of the United States to assist him in the 
execution of his duties. 
 
With the exception of the cases reserved for the Supreme Court, the District Court has 
original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising under the Federal Laws. 
 
The Supreme Court and the Constitution. 
Of the functions performed by the Supreme Court the most interesting remains to be 
noticed, and in view of the contrast between the position of the judiciary in America and 
England respectively it must be analysed with some precision.  The contrast arises, as 
already hinted, from the essential difference between a federal and a unitary 
Constitution.  In a federal Constitution it is essential not only that the Constitution 
should be above the law, or at least above the ordinary law, but also that authority 
should be given to the Courts to act as interpreters of the Constitution.  In England the 
judges are never called upon to interpret the Constitution, they have only to interpret 
the law.  In America, on, the contrary, they are required to determine the legality of the 
law itself.  An English Court may hold the opinion that in enacting a particular law the 
Legislature acted with conspicuous folly.  But any such opinion they must keep to 
themselves; it is no part of their business to express it, still less to act upon it.  Least of 
all are they called upon to decide whether the Legislature was legally competent to 
enact it.  No such question can, with us, possibly arise, for the simple reason that in 
England there are no limits to the legal competence of Parliament. 
 
In America, on the other hand, the judges are constantly called upon not merely to 
interpret a given law, but to [begin page 304] decide whether the law is law; that is, 
whether the Legislature in enacting it acted within the limits of the power assigned to it 
by the Constitution.  In other words, the judges are actually guardians of the 
Constitution lest a purist should take exception to this description it is desirable to 
explain precisely the sense in which the judges of the Supreme Court act as 'guardians' 
or interpreters of the Constitution. 
 
The Court never presumes to act in this capacity on its own initiative; it can do so only 
when in the ordinary course a case is brought before it.  'The Court', says Mr. Eaton 
Drone, 'has authority to expound the Constitution only in cases presented to it for 
adjudication.  Its judges may see the President usurping powers that do not belong to 
him, Congress exercising functions it is forbidden to exercise, a State asserting rights 
denied to it.  The Court has no authority to interfere until its office is invoked in a case 
submitted to it in the manner prescribed by law.'
8  In other words the function of the 
Court is purely judicial.  Lord Bryce, therefore, was clearly right in affirming that the 
duty of American Judges 'is as strictly confined to the interpretation of laws cited to 
them as it is in England or France'.  Such a statement, however, if it stood alone would 
give an erroneous impression of the position of the American Judiciary.  Lord Bryce 
himself supplies the necessary corrective by pointing out that whereas in England there 
is only one law for the judges to interpret or rather that all laws are of equal validity, in 
America there are four different kinds of law possessing varying degrees of authority.  
Stated in order of authority they are: 
 
(1)   The Federal Constitution; 
(2)   Federal Statutes 
(3)   State Constitutions; and 
(4)   State Statutes. 
 
Of these the first prevails against all the rest.  Technically, therefore, the function of the 
judges is to interpret the law of the Constitution.  But on that interpretation depends the 
question as to the validity of other laws.  'The only question they have to consider', 
                                                  
8   [304/1]  Forum, Feb. 1890. says Mr. Eaton Drone, [begin page 305] is whether the power in dispute is granted or 
withheld by the Constitution.  It is not for them to say whether the grant or the denial is 
a defect in the Constitution. . . . The judges may regard the law under consideration as 
highly beneficial.  If they think it contrary to the Constitution they must declare it void.  
They may look upon it as mischievous, tyrannical, or dangerous.  If they find it 
warranted by the Constitution they are bound to pronounce it valid.  They are not to 
consider whether the effect of their decision will be to annul a good law, or to uphold a 
bad one.  That is the theory of the judicial function.' 
9
 
Nevertheless, desirable though it has seemed to define that function strictly, it remains 
true that in effect the judges do act as guardians of the Constitution against the 
possible assaults of the Executive or the Legislature.  It is, indeed, possible that a law 
which was enacted in contravention of the Constitution may remain law, provided that 
no question as to its legality is raised before the Courts; but such a contingency would 
mean the assent or acquiescence of every individual citizen of the United States, and is 
too remote for serious consideration. 
 
The broad contrast remains therefore true: in England the judges can under no 
circumstances entertain the question as to the competence of the Legislature to enact 
a given law.  If it is on the Statute-book it is binding on them until it is amended or 
repealed.  In America the judges are constantly compelled to entertain this question; 
they must ask not merely whether the law is on the Statute-book, but whether it has a 
right to be there.  The distinction is fundamental.  It is true that in both cases the Court 
is performing a judicial function; that in both cases it is interpreting law; but in England 
it has only one law to interpret, in America it must have two and may have four. 
 
There are probably many laws upon the Statute-book in America the provisions of 
which, if challenged, would be [begin page 306] pronounced ultra vires, and therefore 
invalid by the Courts.  So long as they are unchallenged they are cheerfully, obeyed.  
Nor is it the duty of the Courts to interfere.  Their function is in no sense revisional but 
purely judicial: to act, indeed, as interpreters of the Constitution.  The only difference, 
indeed, between the English Courts and the Federal Courts is that in England all laws 
are of equal validity, whereas in America there are four different kinds of law, with four 
graduated degrees of authority.  The Federal Constitution prevails, in the event of 
conflict, over, all other laws; Federal Statutes, if within the competence, of the Federal 
Legislature, prevail alike over State Constitutions and State Statutes; the State 
Constitutions prevail over State Statutes. 
 
The Supreme Court cannot, then, in strictness be said to possess or exercise a 'veto' 
upon unconstitutional legislation: but by the mere function of interpretation it has 
exercised a tremendous influence upon the course of legislation. 
 
Down to the year 1911 no fewer than 1,183 cases involving the Constitutionality of a 
Federal or State Statute came before the Supreme Court.  In 279 cases the objection 
was upheld; in 904 it was dismissed.  Out of 218 cases involving the validity of Federal 
Laws, the validity of the statute has been upheld in 185, or nearly 85 percent State, 
Statutes or municipal ordinances came before the Court in 965 cases, and in 719, or 
over 74 percent, were upheld.  Those figures do not tend to substantiate the charge, 
not infrequently preferred, that the judges have attempted to dominate the sphere of 
legislation.  Jefferson, in the virulence of his antagonism to Marshall, lent the weight of 
his authority to this aspersion.  'The judiciary of the United States', he said, 'is the 
subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine the 
foundations of our constitutional fabric.'  This is the language of the political partisan, 
obstructed in the pursuit of party ends by the wise provisions of the Constitution.  The 
foundations of the Constitutional fabric were, [begin page 307] as Jefferson knew well, 
                                                  
9   [305/1]  Forum, p. 657. laid far too deep and broad to encourage the efforts or permit the success of 
unscrupulous sappers.  The exercise of power was, under the Constitution, carefully 
distributed, but the ultimate repository was and is the sovereign people.
10
 
To that tribunal Legislature and judiciary are alike accountable.  The Legislature may 
exceed its powers in the enactment of laws; the Judiciary may declare their invalidity; 
but the ultimate decision rests with the people. 
 
On the whole, thanks to the sagacious prevision of the fathers of the Constitution, and 
thanks not less to the legal-mindedness of the American people, the system has 
worked with conspicuous smoothness and success.  The independence of the judiciary 
was one of the cardinal tenets of Hamilton and his colleagues, and their insistence 
upon the principle has been more than justified in the event.  The appointment of the 
judges, as already indicated, rests with the President, subject to the sanction of the 
Senate; but once appointed they hold office for life, being removable only by 
impeachment.  Resort to this procedure has been rare, and still more rarely successful.  
Only once has a judge of the Supreme Court been impeached, and then without 
success.  Two federal judges have been convicted and removed; some have resigned 
rather than face impeachment, and in one case the method was adopted as the only 
means of removing a judge who had become insane.  In view of the all-pervasiveness 
of party politics in patronage, a pervasiveness from which not even the judicial sphere 
is exempt, this record, it must be conceded, is in the highest degree creditable to the 
legal profession in the United States. 
 
One other feature of the Federal judiciary calls for brief notice.  The Federal Courts, like 
the Federal Laws, operate directly upon the individual citizens.  In Switzerland, as will 
be seen, there is no immediate contact between the [begin page 308] organs of the 
Federal Government and the citizens, the carrying out of the laws and decrees made 
by the National Council being entrusted, as in Germany, to the cantonal administrators 
and Courts of justice.  But in America the Federal Courts, constituting a complete 
judicial hierarchy, are equipped with powers sufficient to compel obedience to the laws 
embodied in the Constitution or enacted by Congress.  In particular, the Supreme Court 
occupies a position of unique authority, and probably, as an American jurist maintains, 
'wields a power greater than is exercised by any other judicial tribunal in the world'.
11
 
The State Courts. 
The administration of federal justice leaves little to be desired; but unfortunately the 
case is far otherwise in the several States of the American Union.  So great, however, 
is the variety which exists among the laws of the several States regarding the 
constitution and function of the State Courts, that, as Mr. Wilson has pointed out, a 
generalized description is difficult.  One general observation is nevertheless called for; 
the State Courts are wholly distinct from the Federal Courts, the bifurcation of judicial 
administration being absolute and complete.  Each State has its own series of Courts, 
and appeals from those Courts to the Federal Courts of the United States lie, as we 
have seen, only in cases involving Federal Law, or in cases where one of the parties to 
the suits belongs to a different State. 
 
There are, as a rule, four grades of jurisdiction, with corresponding Courts in each 
State: 
 
(1)   Justices of the Peace, and Mayors' Courts, which roughly correspond 
to Petty Sessions and Police Courts in England; 
                                                  
10    [307/1]  On the whole subject cf. B.F. Moore, The Supreme Court and 
Unconstitutional Legislation, quoted by Kimball, op. cit., cc. xv and xvi passim. 
11   [308/1]  Eaton Drone, ap. The Forum, February 1890. (2)   County or Municipal Courts which hear appeals from the Courts of 
summary jurisdiction, and exercise original jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal cases of greater though not of the greatest importance.   
These may be said roughly to correspond to Quarter Sessions in 
England, and indeed in New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky, the 
English name of Quarter Sessions is retained; 
(3)   Superior Courts, which again hear appeals from the inferior Courts 
already [begin page 309] described, and possess original jurisdiction 
in civil and criminal cases of more important character; and finally 
(4)   Supreme Courts which, as a rule, have only appellate jurisdiction. 
 
In addition, all the States have Equity Courts and most of them have special Probate 
Courts, though in some probate jurisdiction is left to the ordinary Courts of Law. 
 
State Judges. 
In the great majority of States the judges of every grade State are directly elected by 
the citizens; in seven States they judges are appointed by the Governor with the 
approval of the Legislature or the Council; in four they are elected by the State 
Legislature.  The tenure of judges varies from two years up to life tenure during good 
behaviour; but as a rule the tenure is short.  Salaries, like tenures, vary greatly, but, as 
a rule, are on a relatively low scale and much below the incomes made by the best 
lawyers in private practice.  The quality of the judges in most States is, therefore, not 
conspicuously high.  Low salaries, short tenure, and election by a popular vote on a 
party ticket, combine to exclude from the judicial bench, in the majority of States, 
lawyers of eminence.  Lord Bryce goes farther in his condemnation of the system.  'In 
some States', he writes, 'it is not only the learning and ability but also honesty and 
impartiality that are lacking . . . in some States of the American Union the bench is now 
and then discredited by the presence of men known to have been elected by the 
influence of great incorporated companies or to be under the control of powerful 




Bad as is the effect of the election of judges upon civil justice, it is even worse upon 
criminal justice.  Ex-President Taft has pointed to the lax 'enforcement of criminal law 
as one of the greatest evils from which the people of the United States suffer', while 
Lord Bryce, a more indulgent critic of all things American, has declared that with few 
exceptions criminal procedure is 'cumbrous and [begin page 310] regrettably ineffective'.  
'Trials', he says, ‘are of inordinate length, and when the verdict has been given, months 
or years may elapse before the sentence can be carried into effect.  Many offenders 





The election of judges is not, however, the worst feature of the administration of justice 
in the States.  Even more disastrous in its effect upon the impartiality of the judicial 
bench is the application of the principle of the Recall both to the judges themselves and 
to their decisions.  The principle is not applied only to judges; in ten States it is applied 
to all elective officers except judges; in six States it is applied to the judges as well.  
The working of the principle is thus described by Mr. Elihu Root 
 
‘If a specified proportion of the voters are dissatisfied with the judge's 
decision they are empowered to require that at the next election, or at a 
special election called for that purpose, the question shall be presented to 
                                                  
12   [309/1]  Modern Democracies, ii, PP. 424 and 526. 
13   [310/1]  Op. cit., ii, P. 95. the electors whether the judge shall be permitted to continue in office or 
some other specified person shall be substituted in his place. . . . This 
ordeal differs radically from the popular judgement which a judge is called 
upon to meet at the end of his term of office, however short that may be, 
because when his term has expired, he is judged upon his general course 
of conduct while he has been in office and stands or falls upon that as a 
whole.  Under the Recall a judge may be brought to the Bar of public 
judgement immediately upon the rendering of a particular decision which 
excites public interest and he will be subject to punishment if that decision 
is unpopular.' 
 
The effect of such a device cannot be doubtful.  Judges will naturally play for safety 
and popularity; they will, as Mr. Root insists, 'hear and decide cases with a stronger 
incentive to avoid condemnation themselves than to do, justice to the litigant or to the 
accused. . . . That highest duty of the judicial power, to extend the protection of the law 
to the weak, the friendless, the unpopular, will in [begin page 311] a great measure fail.  
Indirectly the effect will be to prevent the enforcement of the essential limitations upon 
official power because the judges will be afraid to declare that there is a violation when 
the violation is to accomplish some popular object.'  This, however, does not exhaust 
the disadvantages of the principle of Recall.  One State, Colorado, has gone beyond 
the Recall of the judges to a so-called Recall of decisions.  This is intended to apply in 
particular to cases in which the Courts have decided that a given law is in violation of 
one of the fundamental rules of limitation prescribed in the Constitution.  The idea is 
that if public feeling runs strongly in favour of the law, and in favour, therefore, of 
disregarding the constitutional limitation in the particular case, the question shall be 
submitted to a plebiscite.  If the people decide that the law shall stand despite the 
decision of the Court that it violates the Constitution, stand it will.  The exercise of such 
a power would, as Mr. Root justly observes, strike at the very foundation of the whole 
system of American Government.  The inalienable rights with which according to the 
Declaration of Independence all men are endowed, are not, as he finely says, 
 
'derived from any majority. . . They are not disposable by any majority.   
They are superior to all majority. . . . The most friendless and lonely human 
being on American soil holds his right to life and liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness and all that goes to make them up, by title indefeasable against 
the world, and it is the glory of American self-government that by the 
limitation of the Constitution we have protected that right even against 
ourselves. . . . The makers of our Constitution, wise and earnest students of 
history and of life, discerned the great truth that self-restraint is the 
supreme necessity and the supreme virtue of democracy.'
14
 
For a foreigner to attempt to emphasize a judgement so impressive would be little short 
of an impertinence; although Lord Bryce did venture, following the best American 
commentators, to describe the popular election [begin page 312] of judges as an 
'indefensible system'.  Even less defensible is the Recall of judges so elected, and 
least defensible of all is a popular veto upon their decisions in individual cases. 
 
We must conclude then, that the administration of justice in the States of the American 
Union contrasts very disadvantageously with the work of the Federal Judiciary.  The 
latter, as we have seen, is admirably done; the former, in the judgement alike of native 
and of alien critics, calls insistently for amendment. 
 
                                                  
14   [311/1]    Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the Constitution. 
Princeton, 1913. Switzerland. 
From the American Commonwealth it is an easy step to the Helvetic Republic.  The 
Federalism of Switzerland is, however, of a different type from that of the United States, 
and the difference is most clearly reflected in their respective arrangements for the 
administration of justice. 
 
The Swiss polity differs also from the American in that it contains a considerable 
infusion of the principles of Administrative Law, though the infusion is much weaker 
than in France.  There are, indeed, no special administrative tribunals in Switzerland, 
but a considerable amount of administrative jurisdiction is vested in the Federal 
Council. 
  
The Federal Council. 
It will be remembered that, except in regard to foreign and military affairs, to customs, 
posts, telegraphs, and Council telephones, the Federal Council has no direct executive 
authority.
15  Ordinary federal laws and the judgements of the Federal Court are carried 
out by the Cantonal authorities, though they are executed under the control and 
supervision of the Federal Council.  In its judicial capacity the Council deals with a 
large class of administrative questions which are, under the terms of the Constitution, 
excluded from the competence of the Federal Tribunal.  It is provided, however, that 
from the Council an appeal should lie to the Federal Assembly.
16
 
The Federal Court 
The Constitution further provides for a Federal Tribunal [begin page 313] 
(Bundesgericht).  This Court now consists of twenty-four judges, with an equal number 
of substitutes, who are appointed by the Federal Assembly (i. e. the two houses of the 
Legislature sitting as a single chamber), which, in making its appointments, must have 
regard to the three national languages: German, French, and Italian.  Judges may not, 
during their term of office, engage in any other employment either Federal or Cantonal.  
They are appointed for six years, but are re-eligible, and like the members of the 
Federal Council, are so generally reappointed that they may be said to enjoy a life 
tenure subject to good behaviour.  Each judge receives a salary of £600 a year, and the 
President of the Court has an additional, £40 a year.  Perhaps as a concession to the 
French-speaking Cantons, perhaps in order to separate the judicial from the legislative 
function, the Federal Court is located at Lausanne while the political capital is at Bern. 
 
Jurisdiction. 
The Court exercises both criminal and civil jurisdiction.  As a criminal Court the judges 
sit with a jury.  The country is divided for purposes of criminal justice into five Assize 
districts, and a section of the Federal Court is assigned to each.  The competence of 
the Court in criminal matters is, however, severely restricted, and in fact its functions 
are rarely exercised. 
 
The civil competence of the Court is much more extensive, and, in accordance with the 
discretion given by the Constitution, has been greatly enlarged by legislation.  It acts as 
a Court of Appeal from the Cantonal Courts in all cases arising under Federal Law, if 
the amount at issue exceeds three thousand francs; it has primary jurisdiction in all 
suits between the Confederation and the Cantons, between Canton and Canton, and 
between private citizens and the Government, Federal and Cantonal alike.  The main 
function of the Court according to Swiss jurists is, however, the exposition of public law, 
or constitutional questions, and the determination of conflicts of jurisdiction either 
between Canton and Canton, or between the Federal Government and one of the 
                                                  
15   [312/1]  Supra, Book II, chapter iv. 
16   [312/2]  Article 85, Section 12 ; Article 102, Section 2. Cantons.  But it must again be [begin page 314] emphasized that the Federal Court 
operates in isolation it is not, like the Supreme Court of the United States, the apex of a 
judicial hierarchy; there are no inferior Federal Courts and the Federal Tribunal has no 
staff to which it can entrust the execution of its judgements.  Nor is it only in this respect 
that the Federal Court of Switzerland is at a disadvantage as compared with the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Emphasis has already been laid on the 
importance of the functions of the Supreme Court as the guardian or interpreter of the 
American Constitution.  No such function is assigned to the Federal Tribunal, which, 
under the Constitution (Article 13) is bound to apply all laws made by the Federal 
Assembly.  Dr. Dubs, an eminent Swiss jurist and for many years a member of the 
Tribunal deplores on the one hand its limited competence in constitutional matters, and 
on the other the extension of its ordinary civil jurisdiction.  Regarding the exposition of 
public law as the primary duty of the Federal Tribunal, he holds, that the increase of its 
civil jurisdiction has tended to obscure the real purpose and alter the essential 
character of the Court.  Dr. Lowell has, however, justly observed that the existence of a 
general referendum in Switzerland renders it hardly possible for the Federal Court to 
exercise the powers which by general consent are entrusted to the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  To the American citizen the Constitution, as Dr. Lowell points out, is 
something more sacred and enduring than ordinary laws, ‘something that derives its 
force from a higher authority'.  With a referendum in general operation there would 
cease to be any reason for considering one law more sacred than another, and the 
Supreme Court would almost inevitably lose the power, denied to the Federal Tribunal 
in Switzerland, to pass judgement upon the constitutionality of statutes.
17  Finally, the 
Federal Tribunal is inferior to the Supreme Court in its inability to decide the question of 
its own competence.  The most serious restriction upon its practical jurisdiction arises, 
however, from the general [begin page 315] inclination of the Swiss Constitution, and 
still more of the historic traditions of the Swiss peoples, to maintain in judicial, as in 
other matters, the independence of the Cantons. 
 
The Cantonal Courts. 
The Cantons are entitled under the Federal Constitution to organize their judiciaries as 
they please.  Considerable variety therefore prevails; but generally speaking there are, 
in all except the smallest Cantons, three sets of Courts: 
 
(1)  The justices of the Peace, whose primary duty it is to act as 
mediators in legal disputes, and who exercise magisterial functions 
only when their mediation fails; 
(2)  District Courts, or Courts of First Instance; 
(3)  Supreme Cantonal Courts of Appeal. 
 
Zurich and Geneva have special Commercial Courts, and in some of the larger 
Cantons, including the two named, there are special Cassation Courts as well.  The 
judges of the inferior Courts are as a rule directly elected by the people; the judges of 
the Supreme Courts are appointed by the Great Council of the Canton.  They are 
generally appointed for short terms-three, four, or six years, but are generally re-
elected.  Salaries are low, but Cantonal judges are generally men of high character, if 
not of great legal attainments, and are fully competent to administer the rough-and-
ready justice which is acceptable to the Swiss peasant.  Juries are rarely empanelled in 
civil cases, and only in the graver cases in criminal trials.  Generally speaking, it may 
be said that throughout the Confederation law is administered with a minimum of 
friction, and public order is well maintained. 
 
                                                  
17   [314/1]  Op. cit., ii. 219, 297. Germany. 
From Switzerland we pass to Germany.  The position of the Judiciary in Germany is 
largely determined by the peculiarities of German Federalism.  Recent events have 
tended if not to obliterate at least to mitigate those peculiarities, but it still remains true 
that, as compared with the United States, Australia, or Switzerland, German Federalism 
is of an imperfect type.  From the point of view of essential federal principles, the 
German Constitu- [begin page 316] tion, though in a less degree now than formerly, is 
vitiated by the predominance of one of the component States.  Traces of Bismarck's 
grim resolution that Prussia should not be absorbed in Germany are still apparent in 
the constitutional arrangements of the German Reich.
18  The peculiarity of German 
Federalism under the Empire was the combination of administrative decentralization 
with legislative centralization.  The Federal Legislature is responsible in large measure 
for the making of laws; the component States are responsible for their execution.  The 
general tendency of the new Constitution is to reduce the power and responsibility of 
the component States, now to be known as Länder, and to increase that of the Central 
Government; but the essential characteristics of the Constitution remain unchanged.  In 
addition to the Reichsgericht, which remains the Supreme Court for ordinary cases, 
there was established in 1921 the Staatsgerichtshof to try impeachments against the 
President and ministers, and to decide questions arising under the Constitution. 
 
According to the new German Constitution (Section vii) justice is ordinarily to be 
administered through the Court of the Realm and the Courts of the Länder.  Judges are 
to be appointed for life, and may not be deposed except in consequence of a judicial 
decision, though the Governments of the Länder may require judges to transfer their 
services to another bench.  Extraordinary Courts are forbidden, and Military Courts of 
honour are abolished.  Military and Naval Courts are abolished except in time of war.  
Every citizen has the right to demand that he be produced before the competent Court.  
Judges are to be independent and subject only to the law. 
 
These principles are to apply both in the Reich and in [begin page 317] the component 
Lands.  Provision is, however, made for the setting up by legislation of Administrative 
Courts both in the Reich and in the Lands, though it is noticeable that such Courts are 
to be set up 'for the protection of the individual against decrees and ordinances of the 
administrative authority' (Article 107).  The precise significance of this limitation will be 
considered later when we come to deal with the Administrative Tribunals of France.  It 
may here suffice to say that the principle of Administrative Law is deeply imbedded in 
the traditions both of the German Government and of the German people.  The Federal 
Administrative Courts under the Empire, though numerous, possessed a limited 
jurisdiction, being confined severally to the decision of a certain class of cases, and 
generally acting in an executive as well as a judicial capacity.  Among them may be 
mentioned the Imperial Poor Law Board, the Imperial Railway Court, the Imperial 
Fortress Belt Commission, and the Imperial Superior Marine Office.  In Prussia, 
however, and in other States, there were Administrative Courts of First Instance and of 
Appeal.  They were based generally upon the French plan and the position of such 
Courts may therefore be more conveniently considered in relation to France. 
 
                                                  
18   [316/1]  The title both of the new German Republic and its component States was 
the subject of acute controversy in the Constituent Assembly at Weimar.   
Eventually Reich (the existing title of the Empire) was retained in preference to 
Bund for the former, and Land was adopted in preference to Mitglied for the latter.  
Reich is untranslatable: 'Empire' would be repudiated; 'Republic' would be 
incorrect; though Article 1 of the Constitution runs 'The German Reich is a 
Republic'. XXXIV. The Judiciary (4) 
Law and Justice in France 
 
When a man travels in France he changes laws almost as often as he 
changes horses.' - Voltaire. 
 
'The [French] Executive inherits a very absolute tradition of power.' - 
Woodrow Wilson  
 
'On a subi l’influence de ce préjugé dominant chez les gouvernants, dans 
1'administration, et même chez la plupart des jurisconsultes, que les agents 
judiciaires sont les ennemis nés des agents administratifs.' - JĖZE,  Les 
Principes généraux du Droit Administratif. 
 
'The development of French administrative law in the last century has been 
very much more in favour of the subject than of the administration.  The 
remedies of the subject against the State in France are easier, speedier, and 
infinitely cheaper than they are in England today.  It has become a maxim of 
constitutionalists, and a bulwark of French democracy, that the Conseil 
d'Etat is the great buffer between the public and the bureaucrat.' - C.K. 
Allen. 
 
'The slightly increasing likeness between the official law of England and the 
droit administratif of France must not conceal the fact that the droit 
administratif still contains ideas foreign to English convictions with regard 
to the rule of law, and especially with regard to the supremacy of the 
ordinary Law Courts.' - Dicey, Introd. to 8th Edition (1915). 
 
England and France. 
In the administration of justice, as in other spheres of Government, the United States, 
Switzerland, and Germany offer a striking contrast to England.  But in the case of these 
States the contrast arises primarily from the fact that, while England possesses a 
Constitution technically unitarian, their Constitutions are federal.  France, like England, 
and even more than England, is unitarian in government; yet, in respect of the 
Judiciary, France offers to England a contrast even more marked than do the above-
named typically federal States.  France may, indeed, be taken as typical of the States 
whose systems are permeated by the principles of Administrative Law, while England is 
exceptionally free from the infusion; but the contrast goes deeper than that, depending 
on causes which, though largely historical, are partly also temperamental.  [begin page 
320] 
 
The unification of France, political, commercial, and judicial, dates only from the days 
of the first Revolution and the first Napoleon.  England owed what a French jurist has 
well described as her 'precocious sense of national unity' to a variety of causes, but 
among them not the least potent was the development, at an exceptionally early stage 
of her political evolution, of a strong central administration in the hands of a succession 
of gifted and masterful kings. 
 
Thanks, on the one hand, to the regular circuits of the justices in eyre, and, on the 
other, to the survival of popular institutions such as the Shire Court, the hand of the central authority was-felt in the remotest parts of the kingdom.  As a result feudalism 




Not, indeed, until the thirteenth century did Royal justice begin to make headway in 
France against the disintegrating forces of feudalism; and not until the Revolution were 
those forces overcome, and the permeating influence of feudalism finally eradicated 
from the body politic of France.  The Parliament of Paris - the great central law-court of 
France, reorganized by Louis, IX - had indeed exercised a certain measure of 
centripetal influence, but so strongly entrenched were the centrifugal forces opposed to 
it, that Courts of appellate jurisdiction were gradually set up in the provinces, and by 
the latter half of the eighteenth century provincial Parliaments existed at Toulouse, 
Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Aix, Pau, Rouen, Metz, Douai, Nancy, and in Brittany and 
Franche-Comté. 
 
The French Parliaments. 
Meanwhile the lawyers who constituted the Parliament French of Paris gradually 
established themselves as an hereditary Noblesse de la Robe.  By a law known as the 
Paulette (1604) it was provided that the judges by paying to the Crown an annual 
commission amounting to one-sixtieth of their official incomes might secure the 
hereditary transmission of their offices.  This practice, known as the Vénalité des 
charges, though open to obvious criticism, was commended [begin page 321] by 
Montesquieu (Esprit des lois, liv. 5, c. 19) and undoubtedly secured to France a 
succession of learned and independent magistrates, who, in the absence of other 
constitutional restraints upon the Crown, were able to offer some opposition, not wholly 
ineffective, to the inroads of autocracy.  But in time the judges of the Parliament 




Effect of the Revolution Upon the Judiciary. 
The Constituent Assembly of 1789 not only made a clean sweep of the whole of the 
judicial system of the Ancien Regime, including the Parliaments, but laid the upon the 
foundations on which the organization of justice has rested judiciary from that day to 
this. 
 
The judicial system of France now consists of two parts almost wholly distinct: the 
ordinary Courts and the so called 'administrative' tribunals. 
 
Ordinary Courts. 
The administration of ordinary justice in France is not Ordinary specially distinctive and 
need not detain us at great length, but it is otherwise, as will presently be seen, with 
administrative law and with the Courts or Councils which in this sphere exercise 
jurisdiction. 
 
Juges de Paix. 
Of the ordinary Courts the lowest of the series are those of the Juges de Paix.  In every 
Canton there is, under decree of the Constituent Assembly in 1789, a justice of the 
Peace.  The duty of this magistrate, as defined by ex-President Poincaré, is less to try 
lawsuits than to endeavour to prevent them.  Petty disputes are brought before the 
                                                  
1   [321/1]  On the Parliament of Paris cf. Gasquet, Précis des Institutions de France; 
Rambaud, Histoire de la Civilisation de France, and Sir James Stephen, Lectures 
on the History of France, pp. 259 seq. justice of the Peace, under a procedure which is known as the 'Preliminary of 
Conciliation'; the parties appear privately before the magistrate, who endeavours, 
frequently with success, to persuade them to accept a friendly settlement. 
 
Apart from his function as a conciliator, the justice of the Peace has legal jurisdiction 
both civil and criminal.  Civil cases involving only small sums are decided by him, [begin 
page 322] subject to an appeal; and he also deals with petty violations of Police 
Regulations. 
 
Courts of the First Instance. 
In each arrondissement there is a Court of the First Instance which must consist of at 
least three judges: a President, sitting with two assessors.  In the larger and more 
thickly populated arrondissements there are several such Courts.  These Courts are 
competent to hear appeals from the Juges de Paix, and act as a Court of the First 
Instance in civil cases where a claim does not exceed a certain figure, and in criminal 
cases for the trial of misdemeanours (Délits). 
 
Courts of Appeal. 
Courts of Appeal,' twenty-five in number, exercise the final appellate jurisdiction (with 
the exceptions to be noted later) both in civil and criminal jurisdiction.  Several of them 
sit in the old Parliament town and include a varying number of Departments within their 
jurisdiction.  To each of these Courts a minimum of five judges or councillors is 
assigned. 
 
The Courts of Assize. 
The Courts of Assize are the highest criminal Courts, appointed to try the gravest 
crimes, and to exercise jurisdiction in certain Press trials.  Three judges preside, but in 
Courts of Assize, and there only, questions of fact are determined by a jury of twelve 
persons.  From the Assize Courts there is no appeal on questions of fact, but an appeal 
on points of law lies from them to the Court of Cassation. 
 
Cour de Cassation  
The Court of Cassation is not in the ordinary sense a Supreme Court of Appeal; it is 
rather in M. Poincaré's words, 'a supreme controlling, Court charged with the cassation 
of all decisions which would be contrary to the law, or which would interpret them 
inexactly.'  It is called upon to decide, on the one hand, whether the procedure in the 
inferior Court was regular, and, on the other, whether the law was properly interpreted 
by the judges.  If either of these questions is decided in the negative, the decision of 
the lower Court is quashed, but no new decision is given.  The case is referred back to 
another tribunal of the same degree as that in which the offending decision was given.  
[begin page 323] 
 
Should the judges of the lower Court reaffirm, the decision of their colleagues, the 
Court of Cassation will, on a second appeal, finally decide the disputed point.  The 
Court ordinarily sits in three Chambers: the Chamber of Requests, the Civil Chamber, 
and the Criminal Chamber - each presided over by its own President; but for the 




In addition to the ordinary Courts enumerated above there are certain special tribunals 
exercising quasi-judicial Courts functions.  Among these may be mentioned the 
Commercial Tribunals which perform the functions assigned in this country to 
                                                  
2   [323/1]  Poincaré, op. cit., PP. 241-3. Registrars in Bankruptcy and to Commercial Arbitrators.  The Councils of Prud'hommes 
act as Courts of Industrial Conciliation, and are composed of employers and 
employees in equal numbers.  'Juries of expropriation' deal with questions of 
compensation to be paid to private individuals for the extinction of rights of property 
taken over by a public authority for public purposes.  These juries are appointed in 
each department by a Court of Appeal or by the Court of the chief town of the 
department. 
 
Appointment of Judges. 
The judges of all the ordinary Courts of Law are appointed by the Minister of justice.  
The Constituent Assembly of 1789 decreed that all judges from the Juges de Paix 
upwards should be directly elected by the people, but this vicious principle did not 
survive the earlier days of the Revolution.  Yet the results obtained by the present 
system are not wholly satisfactory.  The judges in France are not, as in England and 
America, appointed from the ranks of those who have had experience at the Bar, but 
belong to a distinct calling.  A judgeship is not, therefore, 'the crowning-stage of a 
forensic career'.
3  Salaries are small, but judges enjoy a life tenure and cannot be 
removed except with the consent of the Court of Cassation.  A fairly high standard of 
efficiency is reached by the [begin page 324] generality of French judges, and justice is 
for the most part honestly and capably administered, though, in Lord Bryce's 
judgement, 'not with so full a confidence of the people in the perfect honour of all the 
Courts' as is the case, for example, in Switzerland.
4  The appointment of judges is not, 
as a rule, political in character, but judges have from time to time been required by the 
Government of the day to swear fidelity to the Republic, and on two occasions, in 1879 
and in 1883, a large number of judges and other legal officials whose loyalty to the 
Republic was suspected were removed by a wholesale process of purgation.  These 
purges resulted in the removal of nearly one thousand judges and over seventeen 
hundred legal officials.  The circumstances of the day were, however, in both cases 
exceptional: the new Republican Constitution was in its infancy and politicians were not 
unreasonably fearful the stability of the Republic. 
 
Administrative Law. 
If it be true that no peculiar interest attaches to the administration of ordinary justice in 
France, it is otherwise in regard to the system of Administrative Law, and to the working 
of the Administrative Tribunals. 
 
Administrative Law is not, as is commonly imagined the invention of Republican 
France.  The principles which lie at the root of it are, on the contrary, deeply embedded 
in the fibres of the social and constitutional life of the French people.  Writing of the 
Ancien Regime Tocqueville says: 'in no country in Europe were the ordinary Courts of 
justice less dependent on the Government than in France; but in no country were 
extraordinary Courts of justice more extensively employed.  These two circumstances 
were more nearly connected than might be imagined.'
5  In consequence of the 
intrusion of the judiciary - and in particular the Parliament of Paris – into the sphere of 
administration, the Crown was tempted retaliate by withdrawing from the jurisdiction of 
the Courts suits in which the Government was interested by calling into being special 
tribunals.  [begin page 325] 
 
The tendency of the Revolution was in the same direction.  The Constituent Assembly 
applied with rigour (as we have already seen in other connexions) Montesquieu's 
doctrine of the separation of powers, and all the subsequent Constitutions of France 
                                                  
3   [323/2]  Bryce, Modern Democracies, i. 304. 
4   [324/1]  Op. cit., ii. 578. 
5   [324/2]  France before the Revolution (Eng. Tr.), p. 95. have confirmed that doctrine.  It must be observed, however, that to Montesquieu's 
doctrine widely divergent interpretations were given by the Republicans of France and 
the Republicans of the United States of America respectively.  Both applications, as an 
American commentator has observed, are 
  
'perfectly logical, but they are based on different conceptions of the nature 
of Law.  The Anglo-Saxon draws no distinction between public and private 
law.  To him all legal rights and duties of every kind form part of that 
universal system of positive law, and so far as the function of public officials 
are not regulated by that law, they are purely matters of discretion.  It 
follows that every legal question, whether it involves the power of a public 
officer or the construction of a private contract, comes before the ordinary 
Courts.  In France, on the other hand, private law, or the regulation of the 
rights and duties of individuals among themselves, is treated as only one 
branch of Jurisprudence; while public law which deals with the principles of 
Government and the relations of individuals to the State is regarded as 
something of an entirely different kind.' 
6
  
The fathers of the American Constitution accepted Montesquieu’s principle as 
inculcating the necessity of protecting the Courts of justice from the control or influence 
of the other branches of Government.  The French Republicans, with equal deference 
to Montesquieu's doctrine, interpreted his teaching in the sense that the Executive 
ought to be free to act in the public interest without hindrance from the Courts of Law. 
 
Definitions. 
What, then, is the precise nature of Administrative Law   It has been defined by Aucoc 
as 'the body of rules which regulates the relations of the administration or of the 
administrative authority with private citizens'. It determines, he says, '(1) The 
Constitution and the rela- [begin page 326] tions of those organs of society which are 
charged with the care of those collective interests which are the object of public 
administration, by which term is meant the different representative societies among 
which the State is the most important; (2) the relation of the administrative authorities 
towards the citizens of the State.' 
7  Professor Goodnow defines it as 'that part of the 
public law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of the 
administrative authorities, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of 
his rights.
8  It will escape notice that the last words of Professor Goodnow’s definition 
suggest a function of Administrative Law very different from, if not actually opposed to, 
the function ascribed to it by Professor Dicey.  But the American critic holds Mr. Dicey's 
conception of the French Droit administratif to be quite unwarranted.  To the discussion 
of somewhat controversial point we shall return later. 
 
The Administrative Courts. 
We must first pass in brief review the chief Administrative Courts, or as they are 
technically, and perhaps more accurately, termed, 'Councils'.  For none of them (unless 
we include among them the Tribunal des Conflits) is wholly judicial in its operation.  
Only, however, with their judicial or quasi-judicial functions are we concerned in this 
section. 
 
The Conseil de Préfecture  
The Council of the Prefecture forms the first degree of administrative jurisdiction, and 
has competence to decide almost all questions which arise between the lower 
                                                  
6   [325/1]  Lowell, op. cit., i, pp. 55-6. 
7   [326/1]  Droit administatif, i, §  
8   [326/2]  Comparative Administrative Law, 1, 9. branches of the Executive Government and private citizens.  In particular, it decides 
questions arising in connexion with direct taxation, and also certain special questions of 
fact relating to the indirect taxes, though, generally speaking, questions of indirect 
taxation lie within the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts.  The Council of the Prefecture 
determines the validity of the elections to the Council of Arrondissement and to the 
Municipal Council, and questions relative to the administrative control over the [begin 
page 327] Communes and public establishments.  It deals also with infractions of police 
regulations relating to main roads (grandes voiries) (though questions relating to by-
roads (petites voiries) come before the ordinary Courts), with the draining of marshes, 
and with quarries.  The Council has an extensive jurisdiction over the contracts made 
by the Government for public works, both central and local, for materials and supplies, 
and for the public domain; and it also acts as a board of audit for the accounts of the 
officials of public establishments and of the less important communes. 
 
The 'Court' is composed of three or four Councillors, with the Prefect as President 
(though the latter seldom sits), and the Secrétaire Général of the Prefecture, who 
represents the Government.  The Councillors are appointed and removable by the 
President of the Republic; they receive a salary and are required to give their whole 
time to the work of the Council. 
 
In all cases an appeal lies from the Prefectural Council to the Council of State.
9
 
Special Administrative Courts. 
Parallel with the Councils of the Prefectures, which exercise a general administrative 
jurisdiction, are certain special Courts, such as the Educational Councils and Courts 
Councils of Revision. 
 
The Educational Councils are largely composed of teachers, and deal mainly with the 
complaints of teachers against the officials of the State.  The Councils of Revision deal 
similarly with complaints arising from the operation of the conscription laws. 
 
Conseil d’etat. 
The supreme and by far the most important administrative tribunal is the Council of 
State.  This institution has had a long and chequered history, but is now firmly 
established as one of the most important bodies in the goverrnment of modern France. 
 
As the Conseil du roi it played an immensely important during the Ancien Regime, and, 
in particular, during the period of the absolute monarchy.  Abolished by the Constituent 
Assembly in the first days of the Revolution, [begin page 328] it was revived during the 
Consulate by Buonaparte as the Conseil d'Etat.  Its members were divided into various 
commissions - Finance, justice, War, the Navy, and the Interior - and all of them met 
daily at the Tuileries, generally under the presidency of the First Consul himself.  Under 
the supervision of this Council all the great legal and administrative reforms of the 
Consulate and Empire were carried out, and the domestic structure of modern France 
was reared.  Its functions were greatly circumscribed under the Governments of the 
Restoration, and of the Orleans Monarchy, but were again enlarged under the Second 
Empire.  Suppressed on the fall of the Napoleonic regime in 1870, it was provisionally 
reconstituted in 1872, and was finally adopted into the new Constitution of the Third 
Republic by the Law of 13 July 1879.  The Council performs a variety of functions, 
legislative and administrative, with which in the present connexion we are not 
concerned, except to observe that in view of the form of French statutes, which contain, 
as a rule, nothing but an enunciation of certain general principles, and which delegate 
to the Executive the power to regulate details by ordinance, an immensely important 
quasi-legislative function is imposed upon the Council of State.  To this body it is left not 
                                                  
9   [327/1]  Aucoc, op. cit., i. 495-517; Goodnow, op. cit., ii. 233 seq. merely to advise on matters within the sphere of the Executive, and also to act in a 
judicial capacity, but actually to play a determining part in the details of legislation. 
 
The Council is composed of thirty-five councillors en service ordinaire and twenty-one 
extraordinary members.  The former are permanent members and receive salaries.   
They must be at least thirty years of age and are appointed by the President of the 
Republic on the recommendation (which is not invariably followed) of the Cabinet.   
They are selected from among high officials and the maîtres des requêtes or 
commissioners.  The masters of requests, thirty-seven in number, also form part of the 
Council of State, being appointed by decree, and charged with the special duty of 
preparing dossiers.  There are, in addition, [begin page 329] fifty auditors, twenty-eight 
of the first class and twenty-two of the second, all of whom are recruited by competitive 
examination. 
 
The twenty-one Councillors in extraordinary service are not permanent members of the 
Council, and are appointed by the President of the Republic from among civil servants 
whose advice is desired on matters pertaining to the several departments. 
 
Cabinet Ministers have also the right to attend the plenary sessions of the Council, and 
to vote on administrative (but not judicial) matters affecting their respective 
departments; but the main work of the Council is done not in general assembly but in 
sections and subsections.  The sections deal respectively with legislation, justice, 
foreign affairs, home affairs, education, fine arts and religion, finance, war, marine and 
colonies, public works, posts and telegraphs, agriculture, commerce and industry, 
labour and social insurance.  The Minister of justice is the nominal president of the 
Council of State (except when the Council sits as an administrative tribunal), but the 
actual work is delegated to a vice-president, assisted by the presidents of sections. 
 
Judicial Work of the Council. 
As an Administrative Tribunal the Council was reorganized by the Law of 8th April 
1910.  In this capacity it acts as a Court of Appeal from the decisions of the Conseils de 
Préfecture, and also as a Court of First Instance to try questions at issue between 
private citizens and officials of the State.  The Court is highly respected and the number 
cases referred to it is immense.'
10  
 
The Criminal des Conflits. 
To bring into harmony the civil and the administrative tribunals there was constituted in 
1848 an independent Conflict Court.  After the coup d’etat of 1851 this Court ceased to 
function, but it was reconstituted by the Law of 24th May 1872. 
 
It consists of eight elected judges, together with the Minister of Justice (Garde des 
Sceaux) who is ex-officio [begin page 330] President of the Court; but the Minister, 
though entitled to vote, rarely attends, and a Vice-President is elected by and from the 
eight elected judges and generally presides.  The elected judges are carefully chosen 
to represent equally the authority of the Cour de Cassation, which, as we have seen, is 
the highest judicial Court of France, and the authority of the Council of State, which 
stands at the head of the administrative hierarchy.  Three judges are, therefore, elected 
from among and by the judges of the Cour de Cassation, and three from among and by 
the Conseillers d'Etat en service ordinaire, i.e. the permanent members of the Council 
of State.  One additional judge is co-opted by each of the two groups named above, 
and as a rule each elects one of their own colleagues belonging respectively to the 
Court of Cassation and the Council of State.  In every case the judge is elected for 
three years, but is re-eligible and is, as a rule, re-elected.  There are also two 
                                                  
10   [329/1]  Aucoc, op. cit., i. 126 seq. Poincaré, op. cit., 272-4; Goodnow, op. cit., i. 
107 seq. substitutes similarly elected from the two groups, but they act only in the absence of a 
colleague.  Finally there are two so-called Commissaires du Gouvernement appointed 
in each case for one year by the President of the Republic: one from the maîtres des 
requêtes belonging to the Council of State; the other from the public prosecutors 
attached to the Court of Cassation. 
 
The presence of these Commissaires, taken in conjunction with the right of a Cabinet 
Minister to preside and vote, might provoke apprehensions lest this most important 
tribunal should be unduly under the influence of the Government of the day.  The 
apprehension is, moreover, emphasized by the brief tenure which, theoretically, the 
judges themselves enjoy.  This is an obvious defect which might and should be 
removed; but, in the opinion of Mr. Dicey and of the best French authorities, the 
Tribunal des Conflits comes near to an absolutely judicial body and commands general 
confidence.
11  [begin page 331] 
 
Administrative Law and Personal Liberty. 
It remains to consider how far the existence of a body of Administrative Law and of a 
series of special Tribunals charged with the application of this Law is compatible with 
personal liberty, and, in particular, with the ideas of personal liberty which have long 
been held by Englishmen and by the English-speaking world? 
 
Only in the last forty years has this question, as it affects the customs and traditions of 
two neighbouring peoples of Western Europe, become a subject of consideration by an 
average citizens in either country.  The matter was first introduced to the notice of 
Englishmen by the publication of a treatise, already classical, written by a jurist of 
unquestionable genius.  The besetting sin of great teachers (and since Blackstone 
there has been no greater expositor of English law than Albert Venn Dicey) is over-
emphasis.  It may be that in the earlier editions of his masterly treatise Dicey tended to 
exaggerate the distinction between the 'Rule of Law' and the droit administratif, and 
that, in consequence, he was inclined to deny to Frenchmen the enjoyment of those 
guarantees for personal liberty which are the cherished birthright of Englishmen.  The 
pervasive influence of Dicey's teaching may be appraised from the fact, stated on the 
authority of a recent writer, that 'ninety percent of students beginning the study of 
constitutional laws form the impression that France lives under a system of 
bureaucratic tyranny little short of Tsarism’, or we might say of Bolshevism.  Of course, 
as Mr. Allen is careful to add, nothing could be further from the truth; and, as we shall 
see, Dicey lived to modify in some degree the sharpness of outline of the contrast as 
he originally pointed it. 
 
No Englishman can, however, approach the consideration of this interesting question, 
with any measure of detachment or impartiality, who has not been at pains to 
appreciate the strength of French tradition in regard respectively to the Executive and 
the judicial spheres of government.  The French tradition is wholly in favour of a strong 
Executive; and naturally so.  France, as modern Frenchmen know it, was made by its 
kings.  Autocratic [begin page 332] centralization was essential to the defeat of the 
disintegrating influence of the feudal nobility.  The unity of England was secured, as we 
have seen, at a much earlier stage of national development.  Consequently 
Englishmen have been more concerned with the assertion of their personal rights 
against the Executive. 
 
Another reason has been operative in France.  Whether Montesquieu did or did not 
rightly apprehend the spirit of English institutions; whether the French people have 
correctly or incorrectly interpreted Montesquieu's teaching, the fact remains that they 
                                                  
11    [330/1]  Dicey, op. cit. (7th Edition), pp. 360-2, and Note xi (pp. 555-6); 
Laferrére, Traité de la Juridiction administrative, i. 24; Jéze, op. cit., pp. 133-4. have believed themselves to be deferential to that teaching in their refusal to allow the 
Judiciary to invade the sphere of the Executive.  The experience of the Ancien Regime 
taught them to be much more suspicious of the judiciary than of the Administration.  
Moreover, they have for at least a century been wont to resort to the Administrative 
Tribunals, just as in the sixteenth century Englishmen resorted to the Tudor Star 
Chamber, in the well-grounded belief that there they could obtain justice at relatively 
small cost and with a minimum of delay. 
 
English tradition has, on the contrary, tended to dispose the citizens of this country, if 
not to opposition to the Government, at least to suspicion of its subordinate officials.  It 
is therefore inconceivable that they should ever have permitted such a provision as the 
famous Article 75 of the Constitution of the year viii (1799) to have been incorporated in 
a statute, much less to have been wrought into the very texture of the Constitution 
itself.  That Article provided that agents of the Executive Government, other than the 
Ministers, could only be prosecuted for their conduct in the discharge of their functions 
in virtue of a decision of the Council of State. 
 
It is, indeed, as Mr. Dicey has pointed out, one of the cardinal principles of 
Administrative Law that servants of the State who, 'whilst acting in pursuance of official 
orders or in the bona fide attempt to discharge official duties, are guilty of acts which in 
themselves are wrongful [begin page 333] or unlawful must be protected from the 
ordinary Courts.  He admits, however, that this protection, once almost complete, is 
now far less extensive than it was even forty years ago.  He points out that, as 
amended since 1870, partly by legislation and still more by case-law, the modern droit 
administratif of France approaches 'to a regular though peculiar system of law'.   
Developing under the influence of lawyers rather than politicians, it has during the last 
half-century 'to a great extent divested itself of its arbitrary character, and is passing 
into a system of more or less fixed law administered by real tribunals'.  The 
Administrative Tribunals may still lack some of the qualities of genuine Law Courts, but 
they are 'certainly very far indeed from being mere departments of the Executive 
Government'.  He regards it, therefore, as possible, or even probable, that droit 
administratif may ultimately, under the guidance of lawyers, become, through a course 
of evolution, as completely a branch of the law of France (even if we use the word' law' 
in its very strictest sense), as Equity has for more than two centuries become an 
acknowledged branch of the law of England'.  Nevertheless Mr. Dicey, so lately as 
1908, persisted in his original contention that droit administratif 'is opposed in its 
fundamental principles to ideas which lie at the basis of English constitutional 
government', while admitting that ‘mainly owing to the enlightenment of French jurists' 
this opposition 'tends every day to diminish'.
12
 
Another question at this point obtrudes itself: Has the approximation between the legal 
systems of France and England come from one side only?  Is it only true that the 
administration of the law in France has tended to approach more near to its 
administration in England?  Has not the approximation been mutual?  Mr. Dicey, in the 
Introduction to the last edition (1915) of his famous treatise, admitted the existence of 
'a very noticeable though slight approximation towards one another of what may be 
called the official law of England and the droit  [begin page 334]  administratif of 
France'.
13  That there has, in fact, been some measure of approximation can hardly be 
question by any readers who have followed with attention the argument of the 
preceding chapters of this book.  The remarkable increase in the number and variety of 
the duties now imposed upon the State and its officials, combined with the latitude 
permitted by recent legislation to civil servants in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions 
would seem to render it impossible to maintain that rigid demarcation of boundaries 
between the judiciary and the Executive which has so long characterized English 
                                                  
12   [333/1]  Op. cit., 7th edition. Preface, p. ix, and pp. 377-8. 
13   [334/1]  p. xliii. constitutional law.  Of the tendency to entrust the Executive with the power to carry 
through subordinate legislation as well as of the tendency to confer upon officials 
judicial authority, illustrations have already been given.  Mr. Dicey is then more than 
justified in his cautious conclusion: 
 
It may not be an exaggeration to say that in some directions the law of 
England is being "officialized . . . by statutes passed under the influence of 
Socialistic ideas.  It is even more certain that the droit administratif of 




There remains the question: Is it well?  Such tendencies as have been diagnosed 
above must be viewed with suspicion unless it can be shown that they contribute to 
efficiency of administration, and, further, that increased efficiency is fraught with 
advantage to the citizens of the State.  Do contemporary tendencies in England react to 
this elementary test?  Does the individual citizen stand to gain or lose by the increased 
activity and enhanced power of the Executive Government?  An attempt to answer 
these questions with any approach to thoroughness would carry us into the domain of 
political philosophy, even if it did not involve us in the current controversies of party 
politics.  In either case detailed discussion would be repugnant to the purpose of the 
present work.  Summarily, however, it may be said that this is evidently a matter in 
which the interests of the many may well [begin page 335] conflict with the convenience 
and even with the legitimate interests of the relatively few.  An extension of 
bureaucratic authority is almost certain to bring the officials of the State into conflict 
with individuals who resent the intrusion of the Government and its myrmidons into 
affairs which the individuals reasonably regard as exclusively their own.  Yet regard for 
the interests of the community at large may justify the intrusion.  Familiar illustrations of 
such intrusion is found in the violation of the amenities of a country estate by the 
making of a railway or the construction of sewage works.  But the real point at issue is 
not the expediency or inexpediency of such intrusion, but the propriety of delegating 
the authority to intrude to any body less representative of the whole community than 
Parliament itself.  Yet the two questions are more closely interconnected than at first 
sight may appear.  Delegation of authority-quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial-to 
officials is the almost inevitable concomitant of a rapid extension of the functions of 
Government.  Only by some measure of delegation can the Legislature and the 
judiciary respectively keep abreast of their work. 
 
Those who regard the multiplication of State activities as in itself mischievous will find 
no difficulty in answering the question proposed in the preceding paragraph without 
hesitation or ambiguity.  They at least are logically entitled to deplore the tendency to 
erase the boundary lines which delimit the several spheres of the Legislature, the 
Executive, and the judiciary.  To them administrative law is as much anathema as 
delegated legislation.  They can hardly fail, therefore, to be startled by the contention of 
a highly competent critic that the country which has led the world in both these 
directions offers securities to the private citizen at once more accessible and more 
effective than those which are enjoyed under the English 'rule of law'. 
 
'The development of French administrative law in the last century has been very much 
more in favour of the subject than of the administration.  The remedies of the subject 
[begin page 336] against the State in France are easier, speedier, and infinitely cheaper 
than they are in England today.  It has become a maxim of Constitutionalists, and a 
bulwark of French democracy, that the Conseil d'Etat is the great buffer between the 
public and the bureaucrat.'
15
                                                  
14   [334/2]  Op. cit., Introduction (8th edition), p. xliv. 
15   [336/1]  Allen, op. cit., P. 247.  
Can this contention be sustained?  If it can, it is evident that some of the lessons which 
a whole generation of Englishmen have learnt from Mr. Dicey will have to be modified if 
not discarded, But this is obviously a question which a foreigner should be slow to 
express a dogmatic opinion.  It is at least as difficult for an Englishman to speak 
positively about the practical working of French institutions as it is for most Frenchmen 
really to appreciate the genius of the English Constitution.
16  Perhaps reconciliation 
between opposite views is to be found in the words of the quotation which I have 
italicized.  It is notoriously difficult for an English citizen to enforce rights against the 
State, or, as we should say, the Crown, while it is exceptionally easy for him to obtain 
redress for injuries against the agents of the Crown.  Moreover it must be remembered 
that Mr. Allen wrote under a sense of irritation (wholly natural and pardonable in a 
lawyer) induced by war-time circumstances and by the efforts of the Executive and the 
Courts to decide, on reasonably equitable rather than strictly legal terms, the disputes 
between the Crown and the subject to which those circumstances inevitably led. 
 
The only conclusion to which a foreign commentator from either side of the Channel, or 
of the Atlantic, can safely come - and it is a lamentably lame one - may expressed in 
the adage chacun à son goît. The sense of an Englishman would be as much outraged 
by inability to proceed against an official in an ordinary Court, under the ordinary law, 
as would be that of a Frenchman who found himself suddenly deprived of recourse to 
those accessible administrative tribunals to which he has long been accustomed, and 
in whose judgements he has learnt to confide. 
 
                                                  








XXXV. Local Government: Rural 
  
England alone among the nations of the earth has maintained for centuries a 
constitutional policy; and her liberties may be ascribed above all things to 
her free local institutions.  Since the days of their Saxon ancestors, her sons 
have learned at their own gates the duties and responsibilities of citizens.' - 
Sir T. Erskine May. 
 
'Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations.  Town 
meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it 
within the people's reach; they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it.  A 
nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of 
municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.' - Tocqueville. 
 
'Year by year the subordinate government of England is becoming more and 
more important.  The new movement set in with the Reform Bill of 1832; it 
has gone far already and assuredly it will go farther.  We are becoming a 
much governed nation, governed by all manner of councils, boards and 
officers, central and local, high and low, exercising the powers which have 
been committed to them by modern statutes.' F.W. Maitland. 
 
'Whatever "Educative" value is rightly attributed to representative 
government largely depends on the development of local institutions.' Henry 
Sidgwick. 
 
Reorganisation of Local Government in the Nineteenth Century. 
The nineteenth century witnessed, as we have seen, a far-reaching revolution in the 
constitution of the Central Legislature.  It witnessed a revolution hardly less striking in 
the structure and machinery of local administration.  Of that revolution and its results 
we must now give some account; since it is-manifest that local administration affects 
the well-being of the community, perhaps more vitally, certainly more directly, even than 
that of the Central Government.  Men the century opened, and, indeed, throughout 
more than three-quarters of its course, the squirearchy, officially represented by the 
County Magistrates, were securely established in the citadel of Local Government.   
From their dominating position in Parliament they were driven, theoretically, by the Act 
of 1832, practically by that of 1867.  But in County Government they continued to bear 
sway until 1888.  [begin page 340] 
 
The Corporate Municipalities at the opening of the last century were governed by 
Corporations which for the last four hundred years had been steadily growing more 
oligarchical in character.  These local urban oligarchies survived the overthrow of the 
great central oligarchy by only three years, one of the first-fruits of the reformed 
Parliament being the Municipal Reform Act of 1835.  
The present chapter will describe in outline the existing machinery of rural Local 
Government.  But if it be true of the Central Government that the roots of the present lie 
deep in the past, and that consequently analysis of existing conditions is unintelligible 
without some historical retrospect, not less but even more is this true of Local 
Government. 
 
The towns, whatever their origin (a highly debatable question), have almost from the 
first been regarded as something anomalous and exceptional.  Apart from them, there 
have, from time immemorial, been three main areas of local administration: the Shire or 
County, the primary unit of the Township (or Parish), and the intermediate area of the 
Hundred - represented later by the Union, and now in some sort by the District. 
 
The history of Local Government divides into four great periods: the first extends from 
the earliest times down to the Norman Conquest; this may be distinguished as the 
period of popular Local Government; the second, from the Norman Conquest to the 
fourteenth century, a period of strong and centralizing monarchy; the third, from the 
fourteenth century to 1888, an aristocratic period, and the fourth, from 1888 onwards, a 
period increasingly democratic in tendency. 
 
The Shire or County. 
The Shire or County, as the most important area of Local Government, must engage 
our attention first.  From the earliest times to the present one officer has maintained his 
position in the Shire, though the position has implied at different times very varying 
degrees of authority.  That officer is the Shire-reeve or Sheriff.  From Saxon days to 
those of the later Plantagenets the Sheriff was the pivot of [begin page 341] county 
administration; in the fourteenth century he was superseded, for most purposes, by the 
justices of the Peace, as they in turn were, for many purposes, superseded in 1888 by 
elected County Councils.  But the office of Sheriff still survives all vicissitudes. 
 
The earliest Shires, such as Kent, Sussex, Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, Dorset, 
Somerset, represent the original settlement of Teutonic tribes, and in some cases 
original heptarchic kingdoms.  Thus Kent represents the original kingdom of the jutes, 
Sussex of the South Saxons, and so forth. 
 
The next batch of Shires represent artificial delimitation rendered possible by the West-
Saxon reconquest of the Danelaw.  In these cases the Shire takes its name from the 
principal or 'County' town, as in Oxfordshire, Hertfordshire, Warwickshire, 
Worcestershire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Northamptonshire, and so on.  A few 
Shires such as Cumberland and Lancashire represent even later absorptions or 
delimitations.  Latest of all were the counties of Wales. 
 
The Shire Court. 
In every Shire there was a Court consisting partly of elected representatives from the 
subdivisions of the Hundred and Township, partly of nominated members.  This Court 
or Moot represented the folkmoot or Witan of the original Teutonic kingdoms - the 
Civitas described in the Germania of Tacitus.  Its roots therefore lay in the most distant 
past.  It met twice a year for the dispatch of business: legislative, administrative, and 
judicial.  Its officers were the Ealdorman (afterwards Earl), the Bishop, and the Sheriff.  
The first was a national officer appointed by the King and the National Council 
(Witenagemot), but he originally represented the old royal houses in the Shires which 
had been independent kingdoms.  With the Ealdorman sat the Bishop, representing an 
authority not yet differentiated from that of the State, while the Sheriff was the special 
representative of the King or Central Government, responsible to the King for the local 
administration of justice and for the collection of all financial dues.  [begin page 342] 
  The Sheriff. 
After the Norman Conquest the importance of this functionary was rapidly enhanced.  
The Norman and Angevin kings, quick to adapt existing institutions to their own 
purposes, saw in the Sheriff and the popular Court of the Shire valuable instruments for 
holding in check the disruptive tendencies of the feudal system.  To this end the Sheriff 
and his Court were sedulously encouraged and maintained. 
 
The survival of popular local institutions is, indeed, one of the many benefits which 
England derived from the exceptionally early development of the royal power and from 
the creation of a central administration exceptionally strong and efficient.  Had the 
Norman Conquest imported into England the feudalism of France, the free local 
institutions which were so characteristic a feature of the Anglo-Saxon polity must 
inevitably have perished.  A monarch powerful and in some respects highly centralized, 
found its most trustworthy support against the barons in the local institutions and 
officials inherited from pre-Conquest days.  The advantages were mutual.  The Crown 
relied upon the people in the contest against feudal independence; the people found in 
the Crown their most efficient protect against local tyranny. 
 
When, under Henry I, and still more under Henry II, the administrative and judicial 
system was reorganized, when regular circuits of officers of the central Curia were 
instituted, it was the Sheriff who had to prepare for their coming, and it was in the Court 
of the Shire that their duties, fiscal and judicial, were performed.  It is today the chief 
surviving function of the Sheriff to prepare for the coming of the King's judges of Assize, 
to attend them in Court, and to execute the sentences they pronounce. 
 
Towards the end of the thirteenth century, still more rapidly in the fourteenth, the power 
of the Sheriff declines.  In the justice of the Central Court (Curia Regis), with his regular 
circuits, the Sheriff had long had a serious rival.  The development of feudal jurisdiction 
in the manorial courts had already impaired his authority locally.  But the most serious 
blows came from the development of central [begin page 343] representation in 
Parliament, and the evolution of a new set of local functionaries, originally designated 
Guardians of the Peace (Custodes Pacis), and, from 1360, justices.   
 
The rise of the House of Commons diminished the lustre of the local moots of the 
Shire, but at the same time, as we have seen, gave them a new and important function.  
The Sheriff became the returning officer for knights and burgesses, and in his Court 
they were elected.  This duty the Sheriff still retains
1 as regards parliamentary elections 
in counties, and in the few historic cities which, in virtue of the fact that each is in itself 
a 'county of a city', possess a Sheriff.  The Parliamentary boroughs which are (or prior 
to 1918 were) counties of themselves are London, Bristol, Canterbury, Chester, Exeter, 
Gloucester, Kingston-upon Hull, Lincoln, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Norwich, Nottingham, 




From the medieval Shire we may pass to the Hundred.  What was the origin of the 
Hundred?  That is a question which would involve us in a prolonged antiquarian inquiry 
from which we should emerge without any certainty.  The Hundred may have originated 
in the settlement of a hundred warriors of the Teutonic host; or perhaps we must regard 
as a unit for the assessment of taxation; or possibly as an artificial subdivision of the 
Shire selected primarily for police administration by one of the later Saxon kings.  We 
cannot, positively say.  But certain points are clear.  The Hundred, if a territorial 
                                                  
1   [343/1]  Not, however, in Oxford, which is not included in the list of counties, of 
cities and towns given in Halsbury, Laws of England, vol. xix, p. 540, and cf. xii. 
240, and xxv, p. 796. 
2   [343/2]  Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 50), S. 244 (1). subdivision, was not of uniform size; there were sixty-three Hundreds in Kent, sixty-four 
in Sussex, but only five in Leicestershire.  If the Hundred was the area originally 
occupied by one hundred warriors this discrepancy would be accounted for.  Further, 
we know that in later Saxon days the Hundred moot or Court was the ordinary resort of 
the men of the Hundred for the administration of justice, civil and criminal; further, that 
'all the suitors were the judges', [begin page 344] though they acted through a jury of 
twelve.  The Court met monthly, and twice in the year the Sheriff attended and held his 
'tour' to see that the police regulations of the district were being faithfully observed.  
After the Norman Conquest, however, the importance of the Hundred Court somewhat 
rapidly diminished.  Its decay was due partly to the development of private jurisdictions 
in the manorial courts of the feudal lords, and later to the increasing ubiquity of the 
King's judges and the growth of the Royal Courts. 
 
But in the judicial and administrative system of the Angevin kings the Hundred had still 
an important place.  It was still the unit of the police system and of the military system 
for the arming of the people in the national militia; it was still responsible for the pursuit 
of malefactors, and for presenting, through its grand jury of twelve lawful men, the 
criminals of the district for trial before the King's judges of Assize.  Of this last function 
there are still lingering traces.  Thus Manchester, for Assize purposes, is still in the 
'Hundred' of Salford; Liverpool in that of West Derby; Birmingham in that of 
Hemlingford.  Down to 1886 the Hundred was still responsible for damages due to 
riots.  But, long before that, the Hundred and its Court had for all practical purposes 
ceased to exist, and today the interest which attaches to it is purely antiquarian. 
 
The Township Manor, and Parish. 
It is far otherwise with the Township - the Vill or Tun,
3 Town - the unit of local self-
government from time immemorial.  Into Townships the whole of England was 
exhaustively divided, and the Township was, as Maitland points out, selected by the 
State as the 'unit responsible for good order'.  As a unit for fiscal purposes the 
Township, as we have seen, was represented in the Court of the Shire by the 'Reeve 
and four best men', and it is from the Townships on the royal demesne that John first 
summoned representatives to the Central Assembly of the realm.  Yet the name 
'township', still more 'vill', has an antiquarian flavour; [begin page 345] and for a simple 
reason.  From the seventh century the 'Township' was captured by the Church as the 
unit of ecclesiastical organization, and for all practical purposes became henceforward 
known as the 'Parish' (παροικία), or dwelling-place of the priest. 
 
But before final victory was assured to the 'Parish' a long contest was waged between 
the ecclesiastical and the feudal authorities; between the Court of the Parish Meeting in 
the Vestry, and the feudal Courts of the Manor.  That the cause of the Church was the 
cause of freedom cannot be denied, and to that side victory ultimately inclined; but the 
strife was long and bitter. 
 
At an early stage the Township virtually disappeared.  Even before the Norman 
Conquest a very large number of 'Townships' had become dependent upon a 'lord', or, 
in technical language, had become manors - a manerium being merely, in the first 
instance, the abiding-place of a lord, just as a 'Parish' was the dwelling-place of the 
priest.  Into the history of the manor, with its elaborate organization, social, agricultural, 
and judicial, it is impossible to enter here.  It must suffice to point out that for all 
practical purposes the legal Township merged, from the eleventh century onwards, into 
a manor, and as a manor was regarded and organized until the decay of feudalism in 
the fourteenth century and the reorganization of Local Government under the Tudor 
sovereigns.  When the Township re-emerged from under the ruins of the feudal 
                                                  
3   [344/1]  This is not the place for the discussion of the highly technical question as 
to the precise character of the Vill. superstructure elaborately imposed thereon, it was as the 'Parish' selected by the 
Tudors to be the unit of their new administrative system.  We are now approaching the 
close of the second great period in the history of Local Government.  The popular or (to 
adopt Maitland's emendation) the 'communal' Courts of Shire and Hundred have fallen 
into all but complete decay.  The Shire Court had lost its criminal jurisdiction before the 
end of the thirteenth century, and by the end of the fifteenth the Courts both of Shire 
and Hundred survived only as 'petty debt courts held by the under-sheriff' - a function to 
which, curiously [begin page 346] enough, the new County Courts of the nineteenth 
century have been primarily devoted. 
 
The Shire Court has already entered upon a new phase of political importance; but in a 
judicial sense the old Communal Courts have gone down before the competition first of 
the feudal, then of the royal Courts, while the presiding officer, the Sheriff, has similarly 
given place to the justice of the Peace or County Magistrate. 
 
The power of the 'provincial viceroy' had been waning ever since the great commission 
of inquiry known as the Inquest of Sheriffs (1170).  The growth of the power of the 
'Legal Knights', culminating in their admission to Parliament; the development of towns 
(to be noticed presently), with their independent fiscal and judicial powers; the 
institution of the office of Coroner (1194), and the significant transference of criminal 
jurisdiction from the Sheriff in the Great Charter (1215) - all these represent stages in 
the decay of the authority of this once all-powerful functionary.  The end really came 
with the institution of a new class of local officials ultimately known as justices of the 
Peace. 
 
The Justice of the Peace. 
The origin of the new office may be found in the Proclamation for the Preservation of 
the Peace (1195), by which knights were appointed to receive the oaths for the 
maintenance of the peace.  Knights were similarly assigned to ‘maintain the peace' in 
1253 and 1264, and in 1285 Custodes Pacis were elected in the County Courts to 
secure the enforcement of the great police measure, the Statute of Winchester.  By an 
Act Of 1327 Conservators of the Peace were to be appointed in every county, and 
thirteen years later the office of Sheriff became an annual one.  'No Sheriff shall tarry in 
his bailiwick over one year' (14 Edward III, c. 7).  In 1360 the Conservators of the 
Peace  were transformed into 'justices of the Peace', and were endowed with authority 
to try felonies.  Two years later, the new justices were required by statute to hold 
meetings four times a year, and thus Quarter Sessions knocked the last nail into the 
coffin of the old communal Court of the Shire.  [begin page 347] 
 
Fifteenth Century England. 
The fifteenth century was a period of rapid constitutional development, but of ever-
deepening social anarchy.  Reiterated complaints laid before the House of Commons, 
taken together with the revelations of contemporary literature,
4 afford conclusive 
testimony to the prevailing sense of 'lack of governance'.  They point at the same time 
to some of the causes and symptoms of the disease.  Perhaps the most sinister 
phenomenon was the revival of a 'bastard' form of feudalism and the emergence of the 
'over-mighty subject'.  ‘Certainly,' wrote Fortescue, 'ther mey no grettir perell growe to a 
prince, than to have a subgett equepotent to hym selff.'  The most disquieting symptom 
of the new feudalism was the growth of a custom of 'livery and maintenance'.  The 
great lords surrounded themselves with crowds of retainers - many of them disbanded 
soldiers who had fought in the French wars - who wore their livery and fought their 
battles, while in return the lords 'maintained their quarrels - and shielded their crimes 
from punishment.’  The 'livery of a great lord was', says Bishop Stubbs, 'as effective 
                                                  
4    [347/1]  Notably Fortescue, Governance of England (ed. Plummer), and the 
Paston Letters (ed. Gairdner). security to a malefactor as was the benefit-of-clergy to a criminous clerk '.  One of 
Suffolk's men boasted 'that his lord was able to keep daily in his house more men than 
his adversary had hairs on his head.’
5  Repeated complaints were lodged by the House 
of Commons.  Thus in 1406 they complained that 'bannerets, knights, and esquires 
gave liveries of cloth to as many as three hundred men or more to uphold their unjust 
quarrels and in order to be able to oppress others at their pleasure.  And no remedy 
could be had against them because of their confederacy and maintenance.'  Legislation 
was repeatedly attempted; but legislation was wholly ineffective to remedy the disease.  
What was needed was strong and equal administration.  The country was 'out of hand'; 
law was paralysed; judges and jurors were equally corrupt or equally intimidated by the 
'over-mighty subject'.  The Paston Letters teem with illustra- [begin page 348] tions of 
the prevailing evils.  'Nothing is more curious', writes Mr. Plummer, 'than the way in 
which it is assumed that it is idle to indict a criminal who is maintained by a powerful 
person; that it is useless to institute legal proceedings unless the sheriff and jury can 
be secured beforehand.’
6  The natural consequence ensued.  All who had might took 
the law into their own hands.  Private  wars were common as they had never been 
since the evil  days of Stephen.  Noble was at war with noble, county with county. 
 
It was this social anarchy which called for the strong hand of the Tudor 'dictators', to 
whom for a time men were willing to surrender much in order to obtain the supreme 
blessing of administrative order. 
 
The Tudor Man-of-all-work. 
The Tudors took vigorously in hand the reorganization of Local Government.  With their 
sure instinct for the vitalities they took the Parish as their administrative unit, and made 
the Justice of the Peace their man-of-all-work.  William Lambarde, writing under Queen 
Elizabeth, complains that he and his brother magistrates were utterly overloaded, and 
fears that their backs would be broken by these 'not loads, but stacks of statutes'.  His 
groans were not without justification.  Henry VII passed twelve, Henry VIII no less 
than fifty, Edward VI nineteen, Queen Mary nineteen, and Queen Elizabeth fifty-four 
statutes (down to 1579 only) affecting in one way or another the functions of this over-
burdened official.  Well might Sir Thomas Smith, also writing under Queen Elizabeth, 
declare that 'the justices of the Peace be those . . . in whom the Prince putteth his 
special trust'.  It is essential, therefore, to get some notion of the work which the justice 
of the Peace at this period had to do. 
 
He was at once judge, policeman, and administrative man-of-all-work; he was 
responsible for the trial of criminals, for the maintenance of order, and for carrying into 
effect that huge mass of social and economic legislation which was particularly 
characteristic of Tudor rule.  [begin page 349]  He was primarily a judge.  In his own 
parish he sat alone and tried petty cases without a jury; four times a year he met his 
brother magistrates of the whole county in Quarter Sessions; later on (in 1605), an 
intermediate division was created in which he sat with two or more brethren in Petty 
Sessions.  With his judicial duties, however, we have dealt in preceding chapters.  His 
special significance in relation to the Tudor Dictatorship consists rather in the multitude 
of administrative duties which he was expected to perform.  He had to fix the rate of 
wages for servants and labourers; to bind apprentices and cancel indentures; to fix the 
prices of commodities; to appoint and dismiss constables; to see to the maintenance of 
jails and bridges and highways; to supervise the payment of pensions to maimed 
soldiers and sailors; to determine all questions of settlement and affiliation; to search 
out recusants and enforce the law against them, and to see that Sunday was properly 
observed.  He was the sole sanitary authority, the sole licensing authority (for all trades 
except monopolies), and the chief poor law and vagrancy authority.  Such were some 
                                                  
5   [347/2]  Plummer's Fortescue, p. 27 
6   [348/1]  Plummer's Fortescue, p. 29. of the many duties under which Lambarde groaned.  And no shirking was possible; for 
at every Assize the Clerk of the Peace had to hand in a certificate giving the names of 
all justices absent from Quarter Sessions since the last Assize, and the judge had to 
examine into the cause of absence, and report thereon to the Lord Chancellor.
7
 
Yet there can be no question that on the whole the work was admirably done, and that 
social order was gradually evolved out of the weltering chaos of the fifteenth century.  It 
was good for the country, and it was good for the justices.  Nothing is more striking 
than the contrast between the turbulent neo-feudalists of the fifteenth century - Percies 
and Nevilles and the rest - and the legally minded, Parliament-loving squires of the 
seventeenth century, the Pyms, Eliots, and Hampdens.  The [begin page 350] 
explanation of the contrast is to be found in the training and discipline of the justice of 
the Peace under the 'dictatorship' of the intervening century. 
 
The Parish and the Poor. 
In their administrative reorganization the Tudors, as we have seen, selected as their 
unit the Parish, and upon the Parish they thrust a new responsibility which from that 
day to this has been popularly regarded as its most distinctive work.  A Parish is, now, 
for local government purposes defined as a place for which a separate poor-rate is or 
can be made, or for which a separate overseer is or can be appointed.
8  To accept 
poor-relief is in the vernacular 'to go upon the parish'.  The popular phrase is 
characteristic of Tudor administration. 
 
The sixteenth century witnessed an economic revolution into the details of which it is 
impossible to enter, but this one symptom of it, as closely concerning local 
administration, must be briefly noticed here.  Throughout the whole period we have 
evidence of the anxiety of the Tudors to grapple with the problem of pauperism, 
vagrancy, and unemployment.  Vagrancy and the crimes incident thereto are the first 
objects of their legislative solicitude; but, hand in hand with penal measures directed 
against 'lusty vagabonds' and 'valiant beggars', we have provision for poor, sick, 
impotent, and diseased people being not able to work who 'may be holpen and 
relieved'.  But the relief is to come from charity, the help from individuals.  The State will 
exhort to good works, but hesitates to undertake them.  There is considerably more 
than half a century of exhortation and experimental legislation before in 1601 the State, 
at last convinced of the inadequacy of voluntary effort, steps boldly in, and assumes a 
new and, as it was to prove, an almost overwhelming responsibility.  It is the English 
way; in the main, a wise way. 
 
The Poor Law. 
The great Poor Law of 1601, when at last it comes, is characteristic of Tudor 
thoroughness and method.  Poor [begin page 351] Relief is definitely recognized in 
principle as a matter of public concern; the Parish becomes the area of administration; 
the instruments are to be Overseers appointed and controlled by the Justices of the 
Peace.  Funds are to be raised by a weekly rate levied parochially, and are to be 
applied for the benefit of three distinct categories: 
 
(a)   the 'lusty and able of body' who are to be 'set on work'; 
(b)   the 'impotent' poor who are to be relieved and maintained; and 
                                                  
7   [349/1]  On the whole question cf. Hamilton, Quarter Sessions under Elizabeth 
and James I. 
8    [350/1]  Cf. Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 55), s. 4, Local 
Government Act, 1894 (56 57 Vict., c. 72), s. 75 (I); Poor Law Amendment Act, 
1868, s. 18. (c)   the children who are to be apprenticed to trades, the boys till the age 
of 24, the girls to that of 21, or until marriage. 
 
This Act, as will 'be seen, is the foundation of the English Poor-Law system, and for a 
period of more than two hundred years governed the administration of Poor Relief.  
Under Charles II it was found necessary to define 'Parishioners', and the Act of 
Settlement, which inflicted great hardship, on the poor, was the result.  Early in the 
eighteenth century the system was overhauled; the cost of poor relief was mounting 
rapidly without adequate reason, and the result was an Act (1723) which provided for 
an enlargement of the area of relief, the formation of unions of parishes, the building of 
workhouses, and the imposition of a workhouse test.  During the next half-century 
administration was greatly improved, but the last two decades of the eighteenth and the 
first three of the nineteenth century witnessed a terrible relapse.  There was some 
excuse.  The coincidence of the greatest economic revolution in world history, and a 
war, unusually prolonged, undoubtedly created problems, social and industrial, such as 
no administrators had ever had to confront before.  Some of the legislation and most of 
the administration was undeniably due to a combination of panic and philanthropy: a 
fear lest the scenes of the Terror might be re-enacted in London, and a desire to relieve 
the suffering almost inevitably entailed by a period of rapid economic transition upon 
the weakest economic class.  Gilbert's Act (1782) was a permissive measure passed to 
enable the [begin page 352] overseers to dispense with the 'workhouse test' and make 
allowances in aid of wages to able-bodied labourers.  The principles thus enunciated 
were carried farther and translated into action by a resolution of the Berkshire 
magistrates, adopted at a meeting at Speenhamland in 1795.  This resolution, known 
as the 'Speenhamland Act', recommended the farmers to raise wages in proportion to 
the increase in the price of provisions.  If the farmers refused, the deficiency was to be 
made good out of the rates.  The example of Berkshire was followed throughout the 
greater part of England south of the Trent, and with disastrous results.  Pauperism 
became endemic among the agricultural labourers; rates rose with appalling rapidity;
9 
rent was swallowed up in rates; land not seldom went out of cultivation; worst of all, 
whole districts became hopelessly demoralized: it did not pay for a man to be 
industrious or a woman to be chaste.  From a situation which, in the south at any rate, 
was threatening, England was saved by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834.  This 
Act abolished, by a stroke of the pen, outdoor relief to the able-bodied; it imposed a 
rigorous workhouse test; it enlarged the area of administration from the Parish to the 
Union; it established a central Board of Poor Law Commissioners and systematic 
inspection in the hope of securing some uniformity of administration; it relaxed the Law 
of Settlement, and it committed the local administration of poor relief to Boards of 
Guardians, consisting partly of magistrates, who sat ex officio, and partly of guardians 
elected  ad hoc by those who paid the rates.  Thanks, in large measure, to the 
remarkable set of men into whose hands the central administration of the Act fell, it 
proved a conspicuous success.  It restored to the working classes a sense of 
independence almost lost; it relieved [begin page 353] property of an intolerable strain; it 
reduced rates and diminished pauperism. 
 
This chapter is, however, concerned less with the social and economic results of the 
Act than with its bearing upon local administration.  It marks the first inroad upon the 
system established by the Tudors, the beginning of the end of the old order, which was 
                                                  
9   [352/1]  The total expenditure on Poor Relief was: 
In 1760  =  £1,250,000  or 3/7 per head of population. 
1803   =  £4,077,000    “ 8/11 “     “      “      “ 
1815  =  £7,870,000   “ 13/3 “     “      “      “  
1887  =  £9,008,180   “ 5/10½     “     “       “ 
1922   =  £42,500,000  or over 20/- per head of population. 
 based territorially upon the Parish, and in an administrative sense upon the County 
Magistracy.  An administrative area, intermediate between Shire and Parish, reappears 
- that of the Union - and the principle of election as applied to local administrators takes 
its place by the side of the autocratic principle embodied in the justice of the Peace. 
 
That principle had been rapidly gaining ground during the period which intervened 
between the Poor Law of Elizabeth and the amending Act of 1834.  Down to the end of 
the seventeenth century the County Magistracy had been held in cheek partly by the 
Crown and by the general application of the Writ of Certiorari which compelled the 
attendance of the magistrates to answer for their doings before the King's Court; partly 
by the existence of a large and powerful class of yeomen, small landowners, and big 
farmers, whose influence in local business was not-yet swamped by that of the great 
territorial magnate.  But with the Revolution of 1688 there dawned the brief day of the 
political and social ascendancy of the landed aristocracy.  The imposition of a high 
qualification in landed property for the tenure of certain offices for Members of 
Parliament, County Magistrates, Deputy Lieutenants, and Militia officers - made the 
discharge of administrative functions dependent for the first time upon the ownership of 
land.  From 1688 to 1888 the County Magistrates had it all their own way in local 
administration; and their work was by general admission admirably done.  It was 
efficient and economical.  But, long before the great revolution was effected in 1888 
and 1894, there had been a demand, increasingly articulate, for a radical reform of 
local government in the rural districts.  [begin page 354] 
 
Reform of Local Government.  
For this there were many reasons.  Half a century had elapsed since the breakdown of 
the oligarchical system in the towns, and it was thought that the time for the application 
of a similar principle to county government was overdue.  Moreover, the democratic 
idea has been waxing strong, as was proved, inter alia, by the Reform Acts of 1867 and 
1884.  Perhaps in consequence of the growth of political democracy, the State was 
every day assuming larger and larger responsibilities.  Some of these the central 
government wished - and very properly - to delegate to local administrators.  But most 
of the new functions involved financial responsibility, and it was contrary to the 
fashionable principles to entrust this to non-elected bodies.  The principle of 'no 
taxation without representation' demanded that if the local authorities were to be 
charged with duties involving large expenditure, they must be directly responsible to 
the local taxpayer. 
 
But there was a more potent and pressing reason for reform.  During the last half-
century local government had been sinking, deeper and deeper into chaos.  It was Mr. 
(afterwards Lord) Goschen said, a 'chaos of authorities, a chaos of jurisdictions, a 
chaos of rates, a chaos of franchises, a chaos worst of all of areas'.  In 1883 there 
were no less than 27,069 independent local authorities taxing the English ratepayer, 
and taxing him by eighteen different kinds of rates.  Among the 'authorities' were 
Counties (52), Municipal Boroughs (239), Improvement Act Districts (70), Urban 
Sanitary Districts (1,006), Port Sanitary Authorities (41), Rural Sanitary Districts (577), 
School Board Districts (2,051), Highway Districts (424), Burial Board Districts (853), 
Unions (649), Lighting and Watching Districts (194), Poor Law Parishes (14,946), 
Highway Parishes not included in urban or highway districts (5,064), Ecclesiastical 
Parishes (about 1,300). 
 
How had this 'jungle of jurisdictions'
10 arisen? For the last half-century Parliament had 
been busily at work attempting to adapt the existing framework of the adminis- [begin 
page 355] trative system to the rapidly changing conditions of a rapidly increasing 
population.  And this had been done, perhaps inevitably, by a long course of tinkering, 
piecemeal, legislation.  No attempt whatever was made to fit in the new with the old.  
                                                  
10   [354/1]  Chalmers, Local Government. Act was piled upon Act; each involving new administrative functions and each creating 
a new authority to perform them.  The result was an appalling mass of overlapping, 
intersecting, and conflicting jurisdictions, authorities, and areas, bewildering to the 
student and fatal to orderly administration. 
 
Reform was imperatively demanded in two directions: (i) the concentration of 
authorities, and (ii) the readjustment and simplification of areas. 
 
Local Government Act of 1888. 
These may be regarded as the guiding principles of the Local Government Acts of 1888 
and 1894.  The former, popularly known as the County Councils Act, 
 
(i)    provided for the creation of 62 'Administrative Counties', some of 
them coterminous with the 52 historic shires, but some representing 
subdivisions of the same, and sixty or more ‘county boroughs'
11 '-- 
towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants; 
 
(ii)   set up in each county or county-borough a council consisting of (a) 
councillors elected for a term of three years by the ratepayers, (b) 
aldermen co-opted for six years from among the councillors or 
persons qualified to be councillors, - but not exceeding in number 
one-third of the elected councillors; 
 
(iii)   transferred to these councils the administrative functions of Quarter 
Sessions, such as the control of pauper lunatic asylums, of 
reformatory and industrial schools, local finance, the care of roads 
and bridges, the appointment of certain county officials, &c.; 
 
(iv)    left to the Justices of the Peace all their judicial and licensing 
functions; and 
 
(v)   committed to a joint Committee of justices and County Councillors the 
control of the county police force. 
 
To the above important functions of the County Council, subsequent Acts (1889 and 
1902) have added that of the control of education, higher, secondary, and elementary; 
the duty [begin page 356] of dealing with distress under the Unemployment Acts (1905 
and others); Old Age Pensions (1908); Public Health and Housing (1909, &c.); Shops 
(1912 and 1913); War Pensions (1915): not to mention milk and dairies 
cinematographs, allotments, small holdings, rivers' pollution, diseases of animals, and 
other matters. 
 
The Act of 1888, at once radical in scope and conservative in temper, has, in the main, 
more than fulfilled the anticipations of its authors.  The county magistrates instead of 
sulking at their partial dethronement, came forward with public spirit to assume a new 
role and new duties.  To their experienced guidance is owing the fact that a profound 
transition has been effected without friction and without breach of continuity.  The 
elected councils have in the main proved themselves, if not economical, undeniably 
efficient. 
 
District and Parish Councils. 
Complementary to the County Councils Act of 1888, was the District and Parish 
Councils Act of 1894.  Every county is, under the latter, divided into districts, urban and 
rural, and every district into parishes.  In every district and in every rural parish (with 
                                                  
11   [355/1]  There are now (1925) 82 County Boroughs. more than three hundred inhabitants) there is an elected council; in the smallest 
parishes there is a primary meeting of all persons on local government and 
parliamentary register.
12  To the parish council or meeting the Act has transferred all the 
civil functions of the vestries, the appointment of overseers and assistant-overseers 
and the control of parish properties, charities, footpaths, &c.  Ambitious parish councils 
have also the power to 'adopt' certain permissive Acts for providing the parish with 
libraries, baths, light, recreation grounds, &c.  In some 10,000 out of the 14,578 
parishes in England and Wales the Poor Rate is the only rate levied.  Of the 12,850 
rural parishes some 7,200 have parish councils.  Over purely ecclesiastical matters - 
including ecclesiastical charities - the vestry still retains control. 
[begin page 357] 
 
 The area intermediate between the County and the Parish has since 1894 been known 
as the District.  The urban districts will be dealt with in the following chapter.  The area 
of each county, exclusive of boroughs and urban districts, is divided into rural districts 
which roughly coincide with the area of the Poor Law unions.  The Preliminary Census 
Report (1821) enumerated 672 rural districts in England and Wales, with an aggregate 
population of 7,850,857, or 20.7 percent of the total population. 
 
Each rural district is governed by an elected Council, the members of which are ex-
officio the guardians of the poor for the rural parishes.  In those parishes there are, 
consequently, no longer any separate elections for guardians.  In addition to Poor Law 
functions there are various functions, chiefly in relation to Public Health, which may, or 
may not, be conferred upon a Rural District Council, on its own application, but at the 
discretion of the Ministry of Health.  The Council is the local highway authority for its 
own district; it can build or provide working-class dwellings, control markets, protect 
rights of way and encroachments on roadside wastes, and it is obliged to see that 
every house in the district has a proper water supply. 
 
The Acts of 1888 and 1894 have unquestionably done much to bring order out of the 
chaos which had existed in local government for the previous half-century, and more 
recent legislation has shown an increasing tendency to simplify areas and consolidate 
authorities.  Notably the Education Act of 1902, which abolished the ad hoc education 
authorities known as School Boards, and transferred their duties to the several councils 
of counties, boroughs, and districts.  This tendency is in the main sound.  The more 
varied and important the functions committed to the local governing bodies, the more 
likely are they to enlist the services of men of position, character, and independence.  
And on their doing so the future of local government obviously depends.  Should they 
fail to attract such men and women the multiplication of responsibilities [begin  page 
358] and the concentration of powers can have only one result: the development of a 
local bureaucracy the increased authority of a vast army of local officials.  Signs of 
such a tendency are not lacking even now, and with the aggregation of population in 
urban areas it is probably inevitable; but it is one which must be carefully watched, for it 
is foreign to the genius and tradition which have made England pre-eminently the land 
of vigorous and independent local government. 
 
                                                  
12   [356/1]  This includes women and lodgers.  Parishes of less than 300 inhabitants 
may have Councils, if they desire it.  The smallest Parishes (under 100 
inhabitants) must obtain the consent of the County Council. 
XXXVI. Local Government: (2) Urban 
 
'There hardly can be a history of the English borough, for each borough has 
its own history.' - F.W. Maitland. 
 'England is becoming more and more a collection of cities, and this has 
already wrought a marked change in the character and political temperament 
of her people.' - A.L. Lowell. 
 
'All tendency on the part of public authorities to stretch their interference 
and assume a power of any sort which can easily be dispensed with should 
be watched with unremitting jealousy.  Perhaps this is even more important 
in a democracy than in any other form of political society.' - J.S. Mill. 
 
The Urbanisation of England. 
Nearly four-fifths of the people of England and Wales now dwell in towns.  Two 
centuries ago more than three-fourths were country folk.  According to an estimate of 
1696 London and the other cities and market towns contained 1,400,000 people, or 24 
percent of the whole; the villages and hamlets contained 4,100,000, or 76 percent. 
According to the last census (1921) the position has been reversed.  London alone, 
with its 7,476,68 inhabitants,
1 had a population greater than the whole rural population 
of England and Wales two centuries before, while the town dwellers numbered in all 
30,034,385, or 79.3 percent of the whole; the country folk only 7,850,857. 
 
This is, beyond all comparison, the most portentous symptom of the social and political 
life of modern England, and it justifies a separate, though necessarily brief, treatment of 
municipal hist and organization.  There is historical justification as well.  For the towns-
cities and boroughs - have almost from the first presented certain anomalies and 
exceptions, though in a less degree than the Communes of Italy and France, to general 
rules of local government.  Among English towns, again, the position of London has 
always been exceptional.  [begin page 360] 
 
The Burgh 
Originally the burgh was, as Freeman put it, 'only that part of the district where men 
lived closer together than before.'  But the mere aggregation of population soon gave to 
the townships thus distinguished a differentiated organization.  The aggregation was 
itself due to one of many causes, or to several in combination.  Many towns, like 
London, sprang up on the tideway of great rivers at a point as remote from the sea as 
possible; others, like St. Edmunds or St. Albans, found a nucleus in the shrine of a saint 
whose fame attracted pilgrims; others, like Canterbury or Norwich, grew up under the 
shadow of a great monastic house; others at the junction of roads or at the fordable 
point of a river, like Hertford; others were artificially created for strategic reasons.  The 
Danish invasions, in this way, gave an immense impulse to the foundation of towns.  
Oxford owes its origin to a combination of circumstances: the shrine of a saint (St. 
Frideswide), a ford across the Thames, a nodal point on the old road system, a border 
fortress against Danish incursions. 
 
But whatever the motive, religious, economic, or strategic, which brought men together, 
the mere aggregation necessitated or at least suggested a completer organization than 
that which sufficed for the rural townships.  That organization reflected the 
amalgamation or conflict of three different elements or ideas: the agricultural, 
representing the Anglo-Saxon tun or burgh, with its Folkmoot; the feudal, typified by the 
Court Leet; and the commercial, by the Merchant Guild.  These ideas were, to a great 
extent, successively dominant in the town-life of early England.  At first the urban 
township was differentiated from the rural townships around it only by size and 
numbers.  Like the latter it might be either independent or (much more often) 
                                                  
1    [359/1]  This is the London Police District, the County of London contains 
4,483,249 inhabitants, the City of London 13,706. The proposed 'Health Area', of 
London is estimated to contain between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000.  'dependent', i.e. in the soke of some lord.  Before the Norman Conquest all towns, 
whether originally 'dependent' or not, had passed either into the 'soke' of a lord or into 
the demesne of the King.  As a rule the organization of the towns was assimilated 
rather to that of the Hundred than of the Township, but (except in [begin page 361] the 
case of London and other 'Counties of Cities') they were subject to the jurisdiction of 
the sheriff and the Shire Court. 
 
The great ambition of these incipient municipalities was to obtain independence, fiscal 
and judicial, from the local authority of the sheriff and the shire. 
 
Borough Charters. 
This they accomplished by slow degrees and in a variety of ways.  The most obvious 
method was to obtain from the lord in whose demesne the town lay a recognition of 
local customs embodied in a Charter.  Such a privilege was not of course granted 
without valuable consideration.  The first step was, as a rule, to get immunity from the 
jurisdiction of local courts and a recognition of the right to hold courts of their own; the 
second was fiscal independence.  This latter was secured in two stages.  In the first 
place, a body of the wealthier inhabitants would compound with the sheriff for the 
payment of dues; would undertake to 'farm' the borough.  In the second, the town 
would acquire the right of paying this firma burgi direct into the exchequer without the 
interposition of the sheriff.  Another stage towards independence was marked by the 
acquisition of the right of electing their own magistrates, their bailiffs or reeves, or even 
in a few cases a mayor.  London, far ahead of other towns in this as in other ways, got 
a sheriff of its own under Henry I, a mayor under Richard I, and the right of electing the 
mayor by the Great Charter of 1215.  Thus London gave the lead, and only after long 
intervals were other towns able to follow it.  Another highly prized privilege was the 
recognition of the Merchant Guild or Hansa, with its extensive powers for the regulation 
of trade. 
 
The Merchant Guild. 
The precise relation of the Merchant Guild to the municipality is a technical and indeed 
highly controversial question with which we are not concerned.
2  But this much must be 
said: the Merchant Guild was, in most towns, an exceedingly influential association of 
traders, [begin page 362] who in a corporate capacity did much to stimulate and assist 
the evolution of municipal independence.  Still, the Guild must not be identified, either 
in theory or fact, with the Communa or municipality.  The former was a powerful adjunct 
to the latter but was not the less distinct from it.  As early as the time of Henry I the 
Merchant Guild was frequently specified as one of the privileges secured to a town by 
Charter; such was the case with Leicester (1107), with Beverley (1119), and with York 
(1130).  It is definitely proved to have been established under the Angevins in no less 
than 102 towns - practically in every town of importance outside London.  Bishop 
Stubbs is doubtless right in his assertion that in the twelfth century the possession of a 
Merchant Guild was 'a sign and token of municipal independence', but neither then nor 
at any time did it cover the whole field of municipal activity.  It was, as Mr. Gross says, a 
'very important but only a subsidiary part of municipal administrative machinery', 
concerning itself primarily with the regulation of trade, owning property which was 
distinct from municipal property and governed by officials who were not identical with 
those of the municipality.  That there was a tendency, in some cases irresistible, for the 
two organizations in time to merge is undeniable; but they must not therefore be 
regarded as substantially and universally identical.  As the Merchant Guild tended more 
and more to absorb the government, the specialized trading interests began to be 
relegated to the Trade or Craft Guilds.  Their functions, however, were unequivocally 
economic and must not occupy our attention here. 
                                                  
2   [361/1]  Cf. Gross, Gild Merchant; Brentano, English Guilds; Ashley, Economic 
History.  
Municipal Corporations. 
Meanwhile, there developed by slow degrees the modern idea of a municipal 
'corporation'.  'Incorporation' was sometimes accomplished by statute, but more often 
by Royal Charter, as it still is.  In this way the town became a legal 'person', with the 
rights appertaining thereto: the right of perpetual succession, of holding land, of using a 
common seal, of suing and being sued, and of making by-laws.  But this legal 
conception was not fully worked [begin page 363] out until the close of the fifteenth 
century.  By that time there were some 200 'boroughs' or towns incorporated by Charter 
with a defined though not uniform constitution.  For herein lies the main difficulty of 
English municipal history.  'There hardly can be a history of the English borough,' as 
Maitland pithily phrases it, 'for each borough has its own history.'  Bearing this caution 
in mind we may say broadly that by the end of the fifteenth century the typical municipal 
constitution had been evolved: 'an elective chief magistrate, with a permanent staff of 
assistant magistrates and a wider body of representative councillors' - in other words, 
'the system of mayor, alderman, common council which with many variations in detail 
was the common type to which the Charter of incorporation gave the full legal status.
3
 
Already, however, a strangely oligarchical tendency had revealed itself.  The, governing 
bodies were as a rule self elected, and in the management of town business the 
ordinary burgess had little or no part.  This tendency became still more strongly marked 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  In the creation or restoration of 
parliamentary boroughs there was an increasing tendency to vest the election of 
members in the 'close corporations'.  The later Stuarts attempted to make the practice 
uniform.  Writs of Quo Warranto were issued; ancient Town Charters were forfeited or 
surrendered wholesale, and in the remodelled municipal constitutions the right of 
electing members to the House of Commons was vested in corporations nominated by 
the Crown.  Some of the old Charters were restored after the Revolution, but not all, 
and town government became, therefore, as we have already seen, increasingly 
narrow and oligarchic down to the Municipal Reform Act of 1835. 
 
Municipal Reform Act, 1835. 
With the passing of that Act we get for the first time on to really firm ground.  By its 
provisions the municipal constitutions of all boroughs except London and Winchelsea 
were remodelled on a uniform plan.  The governing [begin page 364] authority is now a 
Council consisting of a varying number of members elected for three years by the 
whole body of ratepayers, men and women.  The Council annually elects a mayor, and 
also elects a body of aldermen who hold office for six years.  The number of aldermen 
thus elected must not exceed one-third of the number of councillors.  The main work of 
the council is discharged in a number of standing committees which, like the council 
itself, are assisted by a staff of permanent officials of which the chief is a town clerk.  
Upon this functionary, his public spirit and ability, the administration of municipal affairs 
very largely depends.  The other officials vary in different towns, but among them are, 
generally found a chief engineer, a sanitary officer, a medical officer, an education 




There are now about 335 municipal boroughs in England and Wales, but they vary 
enormously in status, size, and population.  Birmingham, for example, had (1921) 
                                                  
3   [363/1]  Stubbs, iii. 585. 
4   [364/1]  President Lowell, 'after studying a number of English cities was led to 
imagine that the excellence of municipal government was very roughly 
proportional to the influence of the permanent officials,' but that view would not 
be universally accepted. 919,438 inhabitants; Winchelsea had 693; thirty-nine had, at the same date, a 
population of over 100,000; sixty-seven had less than 5,000. 
 
Cities and Boroughs 
They differ also in status.  We may notice, first, the distinction between 'cities' and 
'boroughs'.  This is merely complimentary - a distinction of name.  How has it arisen?  It 
is generally supposed that a city is a borough which contains a cathedral and the seat 
of a bishop.  But there seems to be no legal sanction for this view.  Ely and St. Davids 
are 'cities’, but neither is a municipal borough.  Truro and Wakefield, after the creation 
of bishoprics, with a seat therein, were raised to the rank of cities; but to effect this a 
Royal Proclamation was required.  A similar distinction has been in the same way 
conferred upon boroughs like Nottingham which are not episcopal sees.  Again, Oxford 
and Gloucester were distinguished as civi- [begil page 365] tates in Domesday, but 
neither was the seat of a bishopric until the reign of Henry VIII.  If we are compelled to 
generalize, we can hardly go beyond two propositions: (i) that a town (whether ' 
borough' or not) which is the seat of a bishopric, is entitled to be or to be created a 
'city'; (2) that the same power, that of Royal Proclamation, which confers the dignified 
title upon an episcopalized town, may also confer it upon any other town. 
 
We pass to the surer ground of legal status.  Legally, municipal boroughs may be 
distinguished as: (1) Counties of cities or towns; (2) 'County' boroughs (3) Boroughs 
with a separate Court of Quarter Sessions (4) Boroughs which have, and (5) Boroughs 
which have not, a separate Commission of the Peace; (6) Boroughs which have, and 
(7) Boroughs which have not, a separate police force. 
 
Counties of Cities. 
The first category is historic.  There are nineteen ancient boroughs which have long 
possessed all the organization of a county and which for certain purposes, notably the 
administration of justice, are deemed to be separate counties.  These are distinguished 
by possessing a sheriff of their own.
5  Bristol, Canterbury, Gloucester, Chester, Exeter, 
Norwich, and York are typical of this class. 
 
County Boroughs. 
Sharply to be distinguished from them are the county boroughs, now eighty-two in 
number, which are the creation of the Act of 1888.  'The same place may be both a 
county of a city or town, and a county borough; though most county boroughs are not 
counties of towns; while a few counties of cities or towns, such as Lichfield and Poole, 
are not county boroughs.' 
 
The Act of 1888 provided that every borough which had or should obtain a population 
of 50,000
6 should for administrative purposes be treated as a separate county.  The 
council of such a borough is for all practical purposes a county council, while the 
borough itself is wholly independent, financially, administratively, and judicially, of the 
county or counties in which it lies.  [begin page 366] 
 
London Government. 
This is perhaps the least inappropriate place to speak of one town, which is, as it 
always has been, unique among English cities.  London, as regards the square mile of 
the 'City', shares with Winchelsea the distinction of having escaped the hand of the 
reformer in 1835.  London outside the City was, down to 1888, merely an aggregate of 
                                                  
5   [365/1]  Oxford has a sheriff, but it is not a county of a city, and its sheriff does 
not act as returning officer. 
6   [365/1]  And for historical or other special reasons a few others. parishes governed like the tiniest country parishes by their vestries, but subject, in 
certain matters, to the control of a central authority known as the Metropolitan Board of 
Works.  The Local Government Act of 1888 abolished the Board of Works and 
transformed extra-city London into an administrative county under a county council.  
Upon this council were conferred powers similar to those of other county councils but 
enlarged and adapted to the more complex conditions of urban life.  A later Act of 1899 
transformed the vestries into metropolitan boroughs, of which there are twenty-eight, 
each with its mayor, aldermen, and councillors like any provincial borough, but with less 
financial independence, being controlled on the one hand by the Ministry of Health, on 
the other by the London County Council. 
 
The brand-new bodies brought into being by the Acts of 1888 and 1899 have wrought a 
marvellous change in the Metropolis, alike in outward visible form and in administrative 
symmetry.  The County Council has been the object of much criticism; the local 
boroughs of some ridicule but both are what Londoners make them and neither ridicule 
nor criticism has done harm. 
 
The City 
By the reforms of 1888 and 1899, as by that of 1835, the historic 'City' of London was 
untouched; it has been often threatened but it is not now likely to encounter perils so 
great as those it has survived.  For many centuries London afforded the model to which 
other cities were always striving to attain.  Already by the time of the Norman Conquest 
it had acquired the organization of a shire.  It got its Communa with a mayor and a 
small body of aldermen in 1191, and the right of electing the mayor in 1215.  At this 
time the Corporation consisted of [begin page 367] a mayor, twenty-five aldermen of the 
wards, and two sheriffs.  Before the close of the century, twelve elected common 
councillors had come into being to assist the aldermen in their several wards.   
Superimposed upon or rather intermingled with the municipal organization or 
Communa was that of the Merchant and Craft Guilds.  From them come the liverymen 
of the Companies.  By Edward IV the constitution was further defined, and the formal 
'incorporation' of the City completed.  The mayor, sheriffs, and parliamentary burgesses 
were to be elected by the liverymen and the common council; the aldermen were to be 
elected for life, one for each of the several wards.  This constitution has subsisted, 
unchanged in essentials, from that day to this. 
 
Non-County Boroughs. 
Of non-county boroughs there are now 253, and these must again be subdivided into 
various categories. 
 
Boroughs with a separate Court of Quarter Sessions belong for certain administrative 
purposes to the county, but for most judicial purposes are independent of it.  Inclusive 
of county-boroughs, boroughs with separate Courts of Quarter Sessions number 116.  
They are distinguished by the possession of a Recorder, who is the judge of the Court 
of Quarter Sessions, and of a Clerk of the Peace, and, as a rule, by the right to elect 
their own coroners.  Another class of non-county boroughs consists of those which, 
though not endowed with a separate Court of Quarter Sessions, have a separate 
Commission of the Peace or Borough magistracy.  Others again have only a separate 
police force.  But these are merely matters of administrative convenience which do not 
greatly affect the status of the boroughs nor demand further explanation. 
 
There remains yet another class of boroughs, ancient, proud, but in population 
insignificant and not endowed even with a separate police force.  They may indeed 
retain their own Quarter Sessions and Recorders and a separate Commission of the 
Peace.  But should they elect to do so they must pay heavily for their dignity since they 
are not thereby exempted from contributing to the [begin page 368] judicial expenditure 
of the county.  All boroughs, which at the census of 1881 had populations of less than 10,000 belong to this category, and by the Act of 1888 they were deprived of most of 
their powers and functions which were handed over to the County Councils, to whose 
expenses these small boroughs must contribute.  Among them are many old 
parliamentary boroughs situated mainly in the south and west of England, such as 
Abingdon, Arundel Bodmin, Calne, Malmesbury, Wallingford, Winchelsea, and many 
others which have played, in their several ways, a part in history and are justly jealous 
of their ancient dignity. 
 
Urban Districts 
In striking contrast with the ancient boroughs, and sharply to be distinguished in status 
from all classes of municipal boroughs, yet closely akin in administrative functions to 
non-county boroughs, are the new Urban Districts.  They represent part of the 
simplifying process carried out under the Act of 1894, and, including boroughs, now 
number 1,126. 
 
Like the rural districts they are governed by elected Councils consisting of one 
councillor for each parish of 300 population.  Certain powers and duties the Urban 
District Councils share with the Rural Councils; others are peculiar to the Urban 
Councils; while others again depend on the population of the particular Urban District.  
To return to the municipal boroughs. 
 
Powers and Functions. 
The powers and functions of municipal authorities are wide, and constantly increasing.  
Generally speaking, they may be said to be responsible for public order, for public 
health, housing, and for elementary education.  But few boroughs, especially large 
boroughs, are content with the performance of these elementary duties.  They may 
acquire further powers in three ways: (a) by 'adopting one or more of the innumerable 
'permissive’ Acts already on the Statute-book; (b) by obtaining special 'Private Acts'; or 
(c) by obtaining from the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders'.  In one or other of these 
ways they may be authorized to provide water, gas, electricity markets, cemeteries, 
gymnasiums, housing accommoda- [begin page 369] tion, baths and wash-houses, 
tramways, public libraries, parks, bands, museums, golf links, and many other 
amenities, conveniences, and necessaries of modern social life. 
 
How far it is expedient that public authorities should undertake these and similar 
enterprises is one of the most highly disputable questions with which the modern 
citizen is confronted.  Nor can it be dogmatically answered.  But it is too important to be 
ignored, and one or two considerations may, therefore, be suggested. 
 
Necessaries and Conveniences. 
In the first place a distinction may be drawn between necessaries and conveniences, 
and another between services and commodities.  Water, for example, is a necessary; 
the supply of it is limited, but apart from the initial enterprise of obtaining an abundant 
and pure supply, no great skill is demanded in the provision of it.  In cases where 
private enterprise has procured such a supply - good, abundant, and cheap - there is 
no pressing reason why a municipality should desire to acquire it:  but equally there is 
no special reason against it.  If the private supply is impure, insufficient, or expensive, a 
municipality is bound to intervene and obtain a monopoly.  For obvious reasons there 
cannot, in an ordinary town, be two competing water systems.  Similarly in regard to 
drainage.  This also is a matter of public health, and any system must be universal.  No 
sane person would wish to revert to an individualistic scheme of drainage.  Artificial 
light is almost as much a necessity as water; should the supply of it also be, therefore, 
a municipal monopoly?  Here a distinction creeps in.  Every citizen requires water; but 
not every citizen requires, for private consumption, gas.  He may prefer another 
illuminant: electric light, oil, or candles.  If, however, the municipality owns and 
manages the gas works, he may have to wait for some time before he is permitted to obtain electric light.  This apprehension has a basis of proved fact.  Parks and open 
spaces may fairly be deemed necessities to public health; museums and free libraries 
desirable if not indispensable adjuncts to public education; but between these and 
[begin page 370] municipal golf links there seems to be a distinction.  Amusement and 
exercise may be as indispensable as open spaces; but it is a matter for argument 
whether it be the business of the public authority to supply them. 
 
It seems desirable at this point to set forth as briefly and dispassionately as possible 
the arguments which are urged for and against the extension of municipal activities and 
responsibilities; for and against what is popularly known as 'municipal trading'. 
 
Municipal Trading. 
On behalf of municipal trading it is urged 
 
(1)   that Trading certain fields of commerce are virtually monopolies, and 
that monopolies with their vast potential profits ought not to be vested 
in individuals or private syndicates or associations; 
 
(2)   that in matters which though not monopolistic are still of great and 
general importance to the health or well-being or convenience of the 
community, the municipality, as representing the community, should 
intervene to mitigate the 'greed' of the private trader and should, by 
underselling him, cheapen the commodity to the consumer: the 
provision of means of transport, of working class dwellings, &c., may 
be held to come under this category; 
 
(3)   that it is the duty of public authorities to improve in every possible way 
the conditions of manual labour to act as a 'model employer', to 
employ labour always under model conditions, to pay the union rate 
of wages, and so forth; and 
 
(4)   that since public authorities can raise capital on more advantageous 
terms than private traders, it is an actual economic disadvantage to 
leave large enterprises in private hands. 
 
These arguments clearly demand serious consideration: but this is not the place for 
exhaustive discussion; a few words must suffice. 
 
(1)   As to monopolies.  The number of these, when closely scrutinized, is 
fewer than is commonly supposed.  Real monopolies may properly be 
left to municipalities; but how many are there?  No town could tolerate 
more than one gas supply; gas is sufficiently monopolistic to justify 
and require that the conditions under which it is supplied to the public 
- its quality, price, [begin page 371] and so forth - should be under the 
closest public scrutiny but it is at least a matter for argument whether 
the public authority is not better occupied in controlling the purveyors 
than in directly manufacturing and distributing the commodity.   
Similarly in regard to means of public locomotion, involving, like 
tramcars (but not motor omnibuses) the concession of a virtual 
monopoly. 
 
(2)   In regard to the supply of necessaries which are not monopolies.  Is it 
the duty of the public authority to intervene between the greed of the 
private capitalist or trader and the well being of the community?  It is 
difficult to give any general answer to this question, other than to say 
that it must depend on circumstances.  Take the case of working 
class dwellings.  An enterprising municipality is invariably confronted by this dilemma.  The provision of such dwellings is either a 
remunerative investment or it is not.  If it is, it is quite certain that it will 
be undertaken by private 'speculators', and it is highly probable that, if 
the profits are excessive, they will be reduced to a fair level by 
competition. 
 
  There may be exceptional cases in which these conditions are 
temporarily or even permanently not fulfilled.  In such cases no one 
would demur to the enterprise of the municipality.  But it may be that 
the investment is commercially unremunerative.  What under these 
circumstances is the duty of a public authority?  If it houses the 
workmen at unremunerative rates it is clearly providing exceptional 
advantages for one class at the expense of another.  Does it not do 
the same in the cage of education?  And if it may provide education 
for the young, why not housing both for the children and their 
parents?  It may be answered that it educates the children not in their 
interests, but in those of the community.  And, moreover, the provision 
of education is universal.  It is open to all.  Housing schemes are in 
practice partial.  But if the supply of municipal houses is strictly 
limited, how are the privileged tenants to be selected?  Who are to be 
housed at the expense of the ratepayers at large?  If, on the contrary, 
the scheme is on a large scale, the elected [begin page 372] 
municipality will become the landlords of a large body of its 
constituents.  The situation thus created would not be free from 
difficulty.  If the relation is on a purely commercial basis, if the houses 
are let at rack rents, little harm will be done; but also little good.  If 
they are let at anything less than the commercial rent, a body of 
privileged tenants is necessarily created.  And that way danger lurks. 
 
(3)    But if there is danger to purity of municipal government in the 
existence of a body of municipal tenants, is there none in the 
existence of municipal employees?  The provision of services, still 
more the production and distribution of commodities, necessarily 
involves the employment of labour.  There are those in England who 
would like to extend the scope of municipal activities, but who 
hesitate to do so because they discern the danger inherent in the 
creation of large bodies of municipal employees who are practically 
the masters of there employers.  To disfranchise them is evidently 
impossible even were it consonant with social justice: but it is a 
matter for consideration whether, in the higher interests of the State, it 
may not be necessary to devise an electoral scheme under which 
such voters would be withdrawn from local constituencies, and 
grouped into constituencies of their own. 
 
There remains to be considered the purely economic argument: that it is an actual 
economic disadvantage to leave large enterprises in private hands when public 
authorities can raise capital on more advantageous term than private traders.  That for 
certain purposes they can do so is undeniable.  But two questions demand an answer.  
Is it certain that this advantage will be maintained?  As long as local authorities confine 
themselves to enterprises which old-fashioned people regard as 'legitimate', it is 
probable that it will.  The security is clearly superior to that which any individual can 
offer.  But if the municipalities embark on speculative enterprises, if the take the risks 
which are incidental to private trade, however conservative its conduct, they may lose 
their advan- [begin page 373] tage in the money market.  At present they have an 
advantage of something less than 1 percent.  A first-class industrial concern can borrow 
on debentures at about 5½ to 6 percent.  Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester have to pay about 5 percent.
7  But another question arises.  Assuming that capital can be 
borrowed to this extent cheaper, will it be employed to equal advantage?  Capital 
charges are no doubt a serious item in any large undertaking, but they are trifling as 
compared with the wages bill.  Increased cost of labour or management on the one 
hand, deficiency of output on the other, may very soon counterbalance any advantage 
secured from cheapness of capital.  And no one contends that municipal management, 
however efficient, has yet proved itself to be economical. 
 
The facts, however conclusive the explanation may be, are in themselves indisputable, 
The liabilities of local authorities in England and Wales in 1815 stood, in round figures, 
at £92,820,000; in 1905 at £482,984,000; in 1921-2 at £704,000,000.  Nor has there 
been any corresponding increase either in population or in rateable value.  The 
population (in 1871) was 22,905,000, in 1901 it was 32,526,075; in 1921-2, 
37,885,242.  The debt per head was in 1875 £4 per head of population; in 1905, £15; in 
1921-2 it was £18 11s. 7d.  In 1871 it was about 16s. per £1 of rateable value; in 1905 
it was about 44s.; in 1921 it was nearly 66s. 
 
It is contended that these vast liabilities are represented by corresponding assets, that 
the capital expenditure has been to a great extent upon remunerative undertakings.  It 
is not easy to test the accuracy of this contention, nor to measure its force.  Hostile 
critics cast a good deal of suspicion upon the methods of municipal book-keeping, and 
suggest that the application of a commercial audit would reveal the fact that these 
'remunerative' enter- [begin page 374] prises are actually conducted at a loss.  The point 
is too technical for more than a passing reference in these pages; but one test may 
perhaps be suggested.  If these municipal enterprises are really remunerative, the 
benefits ought to be perceptible in a diminution of annual expenditure.  But of this there 
is no indication.  On the contrary: the rates raised in 1875 amounted to £19,000,000 or 
3s. ¾d. in the £ of valuation, or 16s. 2d. per head of population.  In 1905 they 
amounted to £58,000,000 or 6s. 1¼d. in the £, or 34s. 1d. per head of population; in 
1921-2 to £170,871,876 or 14s. 7¼d. per £ of assessable value, or £4 10s. 2d. per 
head of population.  These facts so far as they go speak for themselves.  But though 
indisputable they do not close the argument.  We may be getting good value for the 
money spent; capital expenditure may be remunerative in the larger, if not in the 
narrower sense, expenditure maybe justified by the increased intelligence and 
longevity, the enhanced economic efficiency, and the improved moral and physical 
condition of the great masses of our urban populations. 
 
Two things, however, may be demanded of those who advocate the extension of 
municipal activities: they must show, first, that this increase, enhancement, and 
improvement has actually taken place; and, secondly, that it has not been purchased at 
too high a, price, not in the economic, but in the moral and political sense.  These 
things are not easily measured; proved or disproved.  That there has been 
improvement along certain lines no one with a discerning eye and an understanding 
heart can question.  Does the balance incline that way?  Or do the more subtle 
disadvantages outweigh the more palpable benefits?  It is men, not officials, who make 
the greatness of states; not machinery, however perfect, but the personal initiative of 
individuals. 
 
Centra and Local Government. 
One point remains to be noticed.  We have now described the organization of the 
Central and of the Local Government.  What is the nature of the connexion between 
                                                  
7   [373/1]  Local authorities when raising by 'Housing Bonds' large sums for housing 
schemes in the years after the war had as a rule to pay 6 percent, and may have to 
offer a similar rate of interest if they again become large borrowers for similar 
purposes. them?  Incidentally we have touched it at many points, but it needs to be described 
more explicitly.  [begin page 375] 
 
There are two features of recent political development in England which are at first 
sight contradictory.  On the one hand we have seen the enormous progress made in 
local administration - its systematization, its extension, and the multiplication of its 
activities.  But coincidentally with this we have to note the increasing interference of the 
central government in local affairs; the expansion of the work of the Ministry of Health, 
of the Home Office and the Board of Trade, and the creation of a small standing army 
of inspectors, entrusted primarily with the duty of seeing that the rules of the central 
authority are carried out by the several local authorities.  The reformed Poor Law of 
1834 provided the model.  The widely divergent principles, on which, prior to 1834, the 
Poor Law was administered in different localities, suggested the advisability of a central 
Poor Law Board to secure some semblance of uniformity, and to maintain a standard of 
efficiency.  The Poor Law Board developed into the Local Government Board, and the 
Local Government Board into the Ministry of Health.  The example it set was 
extensively followed; at the Home Office, for example, in regard to factories, mines, 
and prisons; at the Board of Trade, the Board of Education, the Board of Agriculture, 
and elsewhere. 
 
But although in all these matters the hand of the central government is increasingly felt, 
and the work of inspection is close and efficient, the greater local governing bodies are 
subjected to curiously little restraint.  This is, no doubt, in harmony with the genius and 
tradition of our people.  'We have in England', says Mr. Percy Ashley, 'traditional ideas 
as to the autonomy of local communities which are the outcome of our political and 
constitutional history.'  In England, as we have seen, the central government is the child 
of local government; in France and Prussia, on the contrary, it is the parent.  This is a 
great and essential difference which has left a profound and permanent impress upon 
our institutions, and still more upon the spirit of our administration.'  The influence of 
the historical tradition is so strong that the English citizen probably [begin page 376] still 




Nevertheless the local authorities are by no means free to do or leave undone as they 
will.  The central government is alert both to restrain and to stimulate.  The control of 
the central over the local government is three-fold - judicial, legislative, and 
administrative.  Local authorities are in no real sense autonomous; if they exceed their 
powers or neglect their duties, they may find themselves in conflict with the law, with 
Parliament, or with one or more central administrative departments. 
 
Judicial Control. 
The responsibility of officials to the law is, as we have seen, a characteristic feature of 
English public life.  It is a result of the absence of that system of 'administrative law' 
which gives to the executive of so many other countries peculiar privilege and authority.  
In England all local officials are amenable to the ordinary law of the land, and for any 
violation of the law must, as a rule, answer before the ordinary tribunals.  But this is a 
responsibility which they share with the officials of the central government, from the 
Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor downwards. 
 
Parliament and Local Government 
The control of Parliament over local bodies is exercised by legislation of four different 
kinds:
9
                                                  
8   [376/1]  Ashley, Local Government, p. 4.  
9   [376/1]  I follow here the categories of and quote freely from Mr. Percy Ashley's 
admirable chapter on the subject in Local Government, c. ix, § 2.  
(1)   Constituent Acts, which 'create the various classes of local 
government authorities and arm them with the powers necessary for 
the fulfilment of the duties intended to be discharged by them'.  Such 
were the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, already 
described. 
 
(2)   General Acts, giving power to local authorities generally to deal with a 
specific subject, such as public health or education. 
 
(3)   Adoptive Acts.  To this device, a favourite one with the English 
Parliament, incidental reference has already been made.  An 
'adoptive' Act is a permissive measure which local authorities may 
adopt or not, as they choose.  A familiar [begin page 377] instance of 
such legislation is the Public Libraries Act of 1892.  As a rule such 
Acts can be adopted only after a referendum, or direct poll of the 
ratepayers.  The method has its advantages and its dangers.  It gives 
opportunities for the trial of experiments; it stimulates, by the 
referendum, interest in local affairs, but it tends to penalize financially 
the more progressive localities.  Adoption on a large scale generally 
means high rates; high rates mean high rents, and high rents 
accentuate the housing problem. 
 
(4)   Private Acts, the method and operation of which have already been 
described. 
 
Provisional Orders represent, as we have seen, a half-way house between legislative 
and administrative control over local authorities.  They must be obtained through a 
Department, but sanctioned by Parliament.  If unopposed they afford a decidedly 
cheaper method than private bill legislation, and a less precarious one.  But the 
conditions – especially - the financial conditions - imposed by a Department are not 
infrequently more exacting than those imposed by a select Committee, and some local 




Is the control exercised by the central over the local Administrative government 
adequate?  The question is not an easy one, Control and will be variously answered.  
There are, on the one hand, those who, for reasons already adumbrated, resent any 
interference on the part of the central government with the governing bodies of 
important localities.  The inhabitants, for example, of Manchester, Liverpool, and 
Birmingham think, and with some reason, that they are at least as competent to 
manage local affairs as any Government Department in London.  On the other hand, 
there are those who would like to see some more effective check than at present exists 
upon the spending and borrowing proclivities of ambitious local authorities.  Even now, 
no loan can be raised without the sanction either of Parliament or of the Ministry of 
Health.  The latter control is the more effective, since the Ministry satisfies itself that 
proper [begin page 378] provision is made for repayment.  But many contend that even 
this is inadequate and that nothing short of a regular audit, at the hands of an officer of 
the central Department, will secure effective control over the vagaries of local 
accountancy. 
 
Taxation and Representation. 
But the difficulty goes deeper.  There is a divorce and already serious between local 
representation and local taxation.  Rates are in too many cases half concealed by 
rents, owing to the fact that the rates are paid by the landlord and not the tenant.  In Birmingham, for example, it was estimated by the town clerk that from 70 to 75 percent 
of the inhabitants were 'compound householders', i.e. lived in houses on which the 
landlord paid the rates.  In London nearly half the municipal voters are not direct 
ratepayers.  This is a serious danger, and one which, even at the expense of some 
administrative inconvenience, ought not to be allowed to continue.
10  But if there are 
many municipal electors who feel no direct responsibility for the financial policy of their 
representatives, so there is much rate-paying property which is unrepresented.  This is 
due to the development of joint-stock companies.  There are, for example, some 
parishes in which almost the whole of the rates are paid by a single railway company.  
The great Railway Companies pay over £7,000,000 a year in rates, and have no 
representative on any of the bodies to which they are paid.  In Manchester and 
Liverpool practically one-third of the rateable hereditaments are in the hands of 
corporations or companies without a vote between them.
11  There are, therefore, at 
least three dangers to which municipal government in England is, at present, exposed: 
the multiplication of municipal activities may bring about an undesirable 
correspondence between candidate and elector on the one hand and employer and 
employed on the other; the extension of joint-stock enterprise may widen the divorce 
between local [begin page 379] taxation and representation; and, finally, an excessive 
demand upon unpaid services may disgust the elected local administrator and throw 
increased responsibility and power into the hands of the local bureaucracy.  To the 
gravity and reality of these dangers no thoughtful citizen can be blind. 
 
It is consolatory to find that competent and impartial observers can still bear testimony 
to the purity and efficiency of English local government, although it is true that one such 
observer both friendly and competent holds the opinion that the personnel of the 
representative local bodies shows signs of deterioration.
12  That is disquieting, even 
though he appears to find more than counterbalancing advantage in the improvement 
of the permanent officials.  The officials are, beyond question, increasingly zealous and 
efficient; but no one who is imbued with the genius of English local government would 
regard this as a satisfactory set-off against a deterioration in the quality of the elected 
representatives on local governing bodies.  On this point it is difficult to reach a 
conclusion; but if it be true, no countervailing improvement in mere administrative 
efficiency will long retard the decay of those local institutions which for centuries have 
formed the nursery of political liberty in England. 
 
                                                  
10   [378/1]  It is one of the many excellent rules of the Co-operative Tenants Society 
that every tenant shall pay his rates directly.  
11   [378/2]  Avebury, Municipal and National Trading, c. x. 
12   [379/1]  Lowell, Government of England, ii. 180, 199. XXXVII. The Composite State 
Personal Unions and Confederations. 
The United Provinces of the Netherlands 
 
'Federal Government is no more than a prolongation into the sphere of 
general government of the principle of local self-government with which all 
Anglo-Saxons are familiar.  It is created by the same kind of division of 
powers; it operates in the same way, each government supreme and 
independent within its own sphere and each acting upon all citizens alike.' - 
George Burton Adams, Federal Government. 
 
'Federalism is a natural constitution for a body of States which desire union 
and do not desire unity.' - A.V. Dicey. 
 
'La République des Provinces Unies était une fédération d’états plutôt qu'un 
état fédératif.' - Laveleye. 
 
'It is very probable that mankind - would have been at length obliged to live 
permanently under the government of a single person had they not contrived 
a kind of Constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, 
together with all the external force of a monarchical government.  I mean a 
confederate republic.  This form of government is a convention by which 
several petty states agree to become members of a larger one which they 
intend to establish.' - Montesquieu. 
 
The Classification of States. 
In attempting to discover for the classification of modern States a basis more logical, 
more differentiating, and more appropriate to modem conditions than the categories 
inherited from Aristotle, the suggestion was hazarded that States might be classified as 
unitary and federal, simple or composite.  The subsequent course of the narrative has 
involved frequent reference to a number of States belonging to both categories.  As yet, 
however, no attempt has been made to draw out systematically the essential principles 
which lie at the root of these two distinct types of State.  That task can no longer be 
deferred. 
 
Federalism and Local Government. 
Sir John Seeley demurred to this new basis of classification, to which he found the 
same objection as to the distinctions of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy.  To [begin 
page 382] him it seemed 'too purely formal and verbal'.  He denied, in fact, that between 
the unitary State and the federal State there is any fundamental difference in kind; he 
denied that 'the one is composite in any sense in which the other is simple'.  The 
difference, he held, was one of degree, not of kind, and depended on the extent, to 
which the principle of local government was carried. 
 
With all deference to a great historical teacher I am constrained to insist that, on the 
contrary, the distinction is one of kind and not merely of degree.  England, as we have 
seen, is pre-eminently the land of vigorous local government, yet the basis of English 
government (using 'English' in the narrowest sense) is essentially unitary.  The 
component States of the American Union and in particular the new England States - 
have closely followed English traditions in the matter of local government, yet they 
have agreed to form parts of a greater whole, conceived not in a unitarian but in a federal spirit.  The existence of vigorous local governments is, then, consistent equally 
with the federal and the unitary type of government; but it has no special relation to 
either.  France and England, for example, are alike in being unitary States; but of local 
government, as Anglo-Saxons understand it, France is almost innocent.  On the other 
hand England and France are sharply differentiated from States like Switzerland, 
Canada, the United States, Germany, and the Australian Commonwealth, which, 
though endowed with differing types of federal government, are all undeniably federal 
in form. 
 
We are impelled, then, to examine more closely and systematically than has hitherto 
been possible in the present work, the meaning and implications of Federalism. 
 
Growth of Federalism. 
On the threshold of the investigation one fact obtrudes itself.  The principle of 
Federalism maybe sound or unsound; it may represent, as some contend, a clumsy 
contrivance for 'papering over political cracks'; or, as others hold, it may contain the 
germ of a political experiment more hopeful for the future of mankind than any of which 
the [begin page 383] world has hitherto had experience.  Be that as it may, this much is 
certain: that the principle has within the last sixty years exhibited extraordinary vitality, 
and has been more widely applied than at any previous period in world-history. When 
Mr. Freeman embarked, in 1863, upon the task of writing the history of Federal 
Government, he could rely for illustration of the principle upon only three conspicuous 
instances among the States of the modern world: the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands, the United States of America, and the Swiss Confederation; and of these 
the first afforded a very imperfect example of Federalism, while the last was still short 
of the perfect form attained in 1874.  As a fact almost the whole of Freeman's 
uncompleted work was devoted to an analytical examination of the 'Leagues' among 
the ancient Greek States.  In the sixty years which have elapsed since the publication 
of Freeman's torso there have come into being the Federal Dominion of Canada, the 
North German Confederation, subsequently developed and expanded into the German 
Empire, and the Commonwealth of Australia, not to mention the federal republics, too 
frequently neglected by the Constitutional jurist, of Central and Southern America. 
 
Centripetal Tendency of Federal States. 
Another point in connexion with the recent history of Federalism is not less remarkable 
than its rapidly extending application.  Not only have more and more States adopted 
this form of government, but, in the States which have adopted it, there has been an 
intensification of the principle.  Centripetal forces have almost everywhere gained at 
the expense of centrifugal.  Take the federal Republic of Switzerland.  The Cantons, as 
we have seen, still jealously maintain their traditional autonomy; the forest communities 
still adhere to the primitive methods of direct democracy, and have indeed infused the 
whole federal Constitution with something of their own faith and practice; yet even in 
Switzerland the centripetal principle is unmistakably asserting itself.  In the United 
States of America, still more markedly in Germany, and even in [begin page 384] 
Australia, the same tendency is observable.  In the Netherlands State individualism has 
almost disappeared. 
 
Composite States, which have not adopted the federal principle, have exhibited, on the 
contrary, a marked tendency towards disruption.  The union which subsisted between 
Norway and Sweden from 1814 to 1905 was not genuinely federal but personal.  The 
same is true of Austria-Hungary.  In neither case has union survived.  The tie which 
united Ireland to Great Britain under the Grattan Constitution (1782-1800) was hardly 
more than personal, and it is difficult to resist the contention that in 1800 the only 
alternative to separation was that which Pitt adopted. 
 May we, then, infer that a bias towards integration is inherent in all genuinely federal 
Constitutions?  The temptation is strong, and would seem to be encouraged by what 
formal logicians know as the 'method of agreement and differences'; but it must at least 
be resisted until we are in a position to decide what Federalism really implies. 
 
What is Federalism? 
What, then, is Federalism?  'A Federal Commonwealth writes Freeman, 'in its perfect 
form is one which forms a single State in its relations to other nations but which 
consists of many States with regard to its internal government.
1  ‘A federal State', writes 
Dicey, ' is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power with the 
maintenance of State rights.
2  More scientific and more precise is Monsieur Borel's 
definition: 
 
‘Létat fédératif est l'état dans lequel une certaine participation à l'exercice 
du pouvoir souverain est accordée à des collectivités inférieures, soit qu'on 
les adjoigne à l'organe souverain pour la formation de la volonté nationale, 




Sir Herbert Samuel's definition is as follows: 
 
'A federal State is one in which there is a central authority that represents the 
whole, and acts on behalf of the whole in [begin page 385] external-affairs 
and in such internal affairs as are held to be of common interest; and in 
which there are also provincial authorities with powers of legislation and 
administration within the sphere allotted to them by the Constitution.’
4
 
Is the Tendency of Federalism Centripetal?  
At this point the question, already noted, again obtrudes itself.  There is no doubt that, 
speaking generally, federation has marked a stage, in some cases a transitory stage, 
on the road towards unification, not on that towards disintegration.  Is this of the 
essence of federalism?  Or is it accidental?  Mr. Freeman answers the question without 
hesitation: 
 
'A Federal Union', he writes, 'to be of any value must arise by the 
establishment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, 
not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely 
united. . . . No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a 
Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or 
even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-federal position which they 
held before their respective unions. . . . Federalism is out of place if it 
attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united, or to 
unite what is wholly incapable of union.’
5
 
It may, perhaps, be objected that Freeman's conclusion, stated with characteristic 
dogmatism, was the result of an over-hasty generalization from instances which in 
                                                  
1   [384/1]  History of Federal Government, p. 9. 
2   [384/2]  Law of the Constitution, p. 131 
3   [384/3]  Ėtat Fédéral, p. 172. 
4   [385/1]  Nineteenth Century, No. 428, p. 676. 
5   [385/2]  Federal Government, pp. 72, 85. 1863 were less numerous than they are today.  But a writer who has had the advantage 
of another half-century of experience reaches a similar conclusion: 
 
'Federalism', he writes, 'is the coming together of a number of States 
formerly separated and sovereign into some kind of arrangement to secure 
the common safety and prosperity.  These various independent or quasi-
independent Governments agree to give up to the Federal Government a 
greater or less proportion of their independence. . . .  It is a movement from 
disunion towards union, a change from the centrifugal principles of political 
action to the centripetal.’
6
[begin page 386] 
 
Professor Henry Sidgwick, an authority not less entitled to respect, expresses a 
contrary view; he points to 
 
‘another way distinct from union of communities previously independent, in 
which in modern times federality has come to, be developed: namely by the 
establishment of secured local liberties, mainly under the influence of the 
sentiment of nationality, in States that were previously of the unitary type.
7
 
Conditions of Federalism. 
These opinions and definitions are cited as the readiest means of indicating some of 
the outstanding characteristics of federal government, and also because they point to 
certain conditions essential to the success of a peculiarly delicate and difficult form of 
constitution.  Among these conditions three stand out conspicuously. 
 
I.  First, there must be a group of communities, so far united by blood, or creed, or 
language, by local contiguity or political tradition, as to desire union; but not so 
closely connected by all or any of these ties as to be satisfied with nothing short 
of unity.  Nowhere is this condition more literally fulfilled than in the Swiss 
Confederation; though it is hardly less so in the modern German Reich. 
II.  Secondly, none of the States should be individually so powerful as to be able 
single-handed to resist foreign encroachments, and maintain their own 
independence.  This was, as we have already seen, the finally compelling 
motive which brought into federal union the Australian Colonies of the British 
Crown.  So long as those colonies had the Southern Pacific to themselves 
attempts at union were repeatedly disappointed: the appearance of European 
neighbours induced a more accommodating spirit. 
III.  A third condition is, that there should be no marked inequality among the 
several contracting States.  This is a condition which in its entirety is virtually 
unattainable.  But it is important, as John Stuart Mill points out, 'that there 
should not be any one State so much more powerful than the rest, as to be 
capable of vying in strength with many of them combined.  If there be such a 
one, it will insist on being master of the [begin page 387] joint deliberations: if 
there be two they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ 
everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.
8
 
To this defect Mill ascribed the failure of the German Bund (of 1815), and many 
publicists hold the opinion that the predominance of Prussia vitiates the federal 
principle in the modern German Reich.  Bismarck unquestionably aimed rather at the 
Prussianization of Germany than at the creation of a true federal State.  He did not 
                                                  
6   [385/3]  Federalism and Home Rule, by 'Pacificus' (F.S. Oliver) (1910). 
7   [386/1]  Development of European Polity, P. 438. 
8   [387/1]  Representative Government, p. 125 (Popular Edition). succeed to the full extent of his ambition.  Nevertheless, it remains true that Germany 
is on this account a less perfect type of the federal State than the United States of 
America or the Australian Commonwealth. 
 
Federalism, then, must be regarded as a half-way house between entire independence 
and a compact and completely homogeneous national unity.  Mazzini was not without 
fear lest his ideal of a united Italy should be frustrated by a federal compromise 
promoted by the diplomatists.  'Never rise in any other name than that of Italy, and of all 
Italy.'  Such was the adjuration addressed to his disciples in the Young Italy 
Association.  'Federalism', he insisted, 'would cancel the great mission of Italy in the 
world.'  Young Italy, therefore, must be steadfastly unitarian.  The genius of Richelieu 
and Colbert overcame the disintegrating elements which down to the seventeenth 
century still threatened the unity of France.  Richelieu's victory over the Huguenots and 
the great nobles, the commercial unification carried through by Colbert, gave to the last 
days of the old monarchy a delusive appearance of centralization.  But not until the 
steam roller of the Revolution had passed over her surface, levelling all excrescences, 
constitutional, ecclesiastical, social, and economical, did France become really and 
effectively one.  Not even in France, still less in Italy, least of all in Germany, has 
unification been an unmixed advantage, yet, politically, no one can doubt that to that 
side the balance [begin page 388] heavily inclines.  Federalism, then, is essentially a 
compromise.  John Stuart Mill declared that ‘where the conditions exist for the 
formation of efficient and durable federal unions the multiplication of them is always a 
benefit to the world'.  But Mill, as we have seen, regarded federalism solely as an 
integrating process; he was contrasting federal union not with unit but with separation 
and independence.  Mr. Freeman, on the other hand, contrasting it on the one side with 
the small City-State of antiquity and, on the other, with the big unitary States which are 
characteristic of the modern world, found it to, exhibit some of the advantages, but also 
some of the disadvantages, of both systems.  As compared with the City-State, 
Federalism is, he contended, less effective in promoting the political education of the 
individual citizen; but it is more effective as a factor in the maintenance of international 
peace and order.  Compared, on the other hand, with the big unitary Nation-State, it is 
better calculated to improve the political education of the citizen, but more apt to 
promote or to invite international hostilities. 
 
Federalism and Peace 
Is this comparison a fair one or the inference sound?  Is it true that Federalism is less 
favourable to the maintenance of international peace than unitarianism on the large 
scale.  Would Germany, for example, have been less menacing to European peace if 
the work of Bismarck had been carried to its logical conclusion, and the Hohenzollerns 
had established a unitary State?  But this illustration is not perhaps at the moment 
felicitous.  Switzerland is a safer one.  Does federal Switzerland more seriously 
threaten the peace of Europe than Norway?  But again the comparison is something 
less than satisfactory.  For Switzerland is in a peculiar international position.  Let us go 
farther a field.  Is federal Australia more likely to invite attack or to initiate hostilities 
than unitary South Africa?  He would be a rash man who would answer these questions 
with a categorical affirmative. 
 
If then we are bidden to regard federalism as merely [begin page 389] a compromise; if 
it be dismissed as a half-way house; we may fairly retort that it is a compromise which 
is by no means devoid of compensating advantages as compared with the unitary City-
State of the ancient world; and that it is not inherently inferior to the great Nation-State 
which, for some four hundred years, was the typical product of modern political 
development. 
 Embryonic Federal Forms. 
For the better apprehension of the characteristic features of the genuine federal State it 
may be useful, in the next Federal place, to notice certain types of constitutions which 
though not unitary still fall demonstrably short of true federalism.  These 'composite' 
States are of various grades. 
 
Personal Union: the Hapsburg Monarchy. 
Lowest in the scale of composite States is the Personal Union, a species of which the 
dual monarchy of the Hapsburgs was typical.  After the defeat of Austria at the hands of 
Prussia at Königgrätz (Sadowa), the Hapsburg Emperor, expelled by Bismarck from 
Germany and from Italy, was impelled, if his Empire was not to forfeit its high estate 
among the 'Powers', to come to terms with his Hungarian subjects.  The Constitution of 
Hungary, dating in large part from immemorial antiquity, had been further defined by the 
Golden Bull of Andreas II in 1222, but from 1527 onwards a part of Hungary, and 
eventually the whole of that ancient kingdom, was attached to the Crown of Austria.  
Until the close of the seventeenth century the union of the Crowns was purely personal; 
but in 1687 the Emperor Leopold I induced his Hungarian subjects to abrogate certain 
portions of the Golden Bull, and in particular the clause which guaranteed the elective 
character of the Hungarian Crown.  The Crown was henceforward to be hereditary in 
the House of Hapsburg.  A further step was taken by the Emperor Charles VI, in the 
Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, whereby Hungary was declared inseparable from the 
Hapsburg dominions, so long as there should be a legal heir, while, on the other hand, 
the Hapsburg Sovereign swore to preserve the Hungarian [begin page 390] Constitution 
intact, with all the rights, privileges, laws, and customs of the Kingdom.  'Threatened by 
the centralizing policy of Joseph II, Hungarian autonomy was saved by the tact of his 
successor, Leopold II, only, however, to be sacrificed to the reaction which followed on 
the abortive risings of 1848.  The abolition of the Hungarian Constitution in 1848 was 
followed by ten years of repression; but in October 1860 the Emperor Francis Joseph 
issued the 'October Diploma' by which a species of federalism was introduced into the 
institutions of the Empire; all its 'provinces' (of which Hungary was one) being invited to 
send representatives to a federal diet in Vienna.  Federalism, under a predominant 
partner, failed, however, to satisfy the autonomist aspirations of a people who for seven 
hundred years had been wont to elect their own King, and for eight hundred had 
enjoyed at least a semblance of constitutional government. 
 
Consequently, after the Austrian defeat by Prussia in 1866, Francis Déak, the leader of 
the Hungarian autonomists, was summoned to Vienna, and the details of a 
Compromise (Ausgleich) were worked out between him and the Austrian Chancellor, 
Baron Beust. The Emperor Francis Joseph consented to be crowned apostolic King of 
Hungary in the cathedral of Buda Pesth, and the two kingdoms were placed on a basis 
of complete equality and, technically, of independence.  Each kingdom was to have its 
own Legislature, its own Executive, and its own Judiciary; but, in addition, each 
Legislature was to appoint a Delegation of sixty members for common consultation on 
the affairs of the dual (but not joint) monarchy, and there were to be three joint 
ministries for Foreign Affairs, Finance, and War.  After the Treaty of Berlin (1878) it was 
further agreed that Bosnia and the Herzegovina should be jointly administered as 
'Common Imperial Territory’. 
 
Had the Government of Austria-Hungary been genuinely parliamentary, the Ausgleich 
of 1867 might, through the ‘Delegations’, have developed into a closer form of union, 
[begin page 391] in fact into a species of Federalism; but the Emperor Francis Joseph 
being, to all intents and purposes, a personal ruler, the connexion between the Austrian 
Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom remained essentially personal.  Consequently, on 
the fall of the Monarchy in Austria, the slender tie was snapped. 
 Sweden and Norway. 
Even more purely personal were the relations of Sweden and Norway between 1815 
and 1905.  The tie which bound the two countries, as we have already noted, was 
merely that of allegiance to a common monarch.  Consequently when, in 1905, Norway 
resolved to renounce allegiance to King Oscar, the Constitution of Norway as a 'free, 
independent, indivisible, and inalienable State' remained intact.  Prince Carl of 
Denmark was substituted for King Oscar of Sweden as King of Norway, but the rupture 
of the personal tie involved no further change. 
 
England and Scotland; Great Britain and Ireland  
Precisely parallel were the relations between the Crowns of England and Scotland from 
1603 to 1707.  Had the Scottish Act of Security, passed in 1704, not been abrogated by 
the Act of Union in 1707, Scotland might, in a constitutional sense, have been severed 
from England in 1714, Ireland as easily as was Norway from Sweden in 1905.  The 
King of England was King of Scotland, as the Emperor of Austria was also King of 
Hungary, but between the two countries there was not even so much semblance of 
community as is implied in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. 
 
6 George I 
Similarly, after the repeal of the Declaratory Act of 6 George I and the partial repeal of 
Poynings' law in 1782, still more after the Renunciation Act of 1783, the only formal link 
between Great Britain and Ireland was that afforded by the fact that King George the 
Third was King of Great Britain and also King of Ireland.  Had the King not recovered 
from his illness in 1789, and had the two Parliaments, as seemed at one time not 
unlikely, appointed different Regents, even this precarious link would have been 
snapped.  The union between England and Hanover, which subsisted from 1714 to 
1837, was merely personal, and was dissolved without friction by the [begin page 392] 
accession of a female sovereign to the English Crown in 1837.  Personal union, then, is 
the least binding form association between two or more sovereign States. 
 
Confederation (Staatenbund)  
Next to Personal union in the ascending scale is a Confederation, or Staatenbund.  
This is a lower and less coherent form of a Federation, or Bundesstaat. 
 
'It is rather a conglomeration of States than a real State, as it wants the 
necessary organs for legislation, government, and jurisdiction.  It stands 
half-way between a permanent international alliance and a regularly 
constituted State, and is therefore, an incomplete and transitional form.  In 
this form there may be a common people, but there is no real united nation. . 
. .  It presents, at least externally, the appearance of one State, of an 
international personality, but yet is not organized into one central State 
distinct from the particular States.'
9
 
It is this lack of federal or national organs, and the absence of a collective State, 
distinct from the sum of the constituent States, which distinguishes the looser 
Staatenbund from the more coherent Bundesstaat.  In the latter, as Bluntschli points 
out, both the collective State (Gesammtstaat) and the particular States (Einzelstaaten) 
have an organization complete and distinct.  In a Federation, he says, 'there are not 
merely completely organized particular States, but there is an independently organized 
common or central State.  The power of the Federation is not left to one of the 
                                                  
9   [392/1]  Bluntschli, Lehre vom modernen Staat (Eng. trans.), pp. 457, 252. particular States, nor entrusted to the States in common.  It has produced its own 
Federal or National organs which belong only to the collective body.’
10
 
The Germanic Confederation 1815-66. 
Here it is necessary to observe an important historical fact, viz. that a, Slaatenbund 
frequently precedes, in the ordered process of constitutional evolution, the more highly 
developed Bundesstaat.  Germany, Switzerland, and the United States of America all 
afford notable examples of this truth.  The Germanic Confederation of 1815 was a 
typical  Staatenbund; hopelessly ineffective for political [begin page 393] and military 
purposes; potent only, when manipulated by the strong hands of Metternich, to arrest 
constitutional progress in the smaller States adhering to the Bund.  Broken by the 
action of Prussia and the exclusion of Austria it gave place in 1867 to the more 
coherent but less extensive North German Confederation, as this in turn expanded and 
deepened, after the Franco-German war, into the Federal Empire of 1871.  America, as 
we have seen, went through a similar experience.  Called into being by military 
exigencies in 1778, but not finally ratified by all the constituent States until 1781, the 
Confederation proved anything but satisfactory, either for the purposes of the war, or, 
on the conclusion of peace, for civil government.  Nothing less than sheer necessity 
drove the statesmen of the young Republics into the Federal Constitution of 1787.  In 
the history of Switzerland the same process is observable.  Its existing Constitution is 
by several degrees less completely federal than that of Germany or the United States; 
but it represents a marked advance upon the Constitution of 1848, still more upon the 
pact of 1815, and most of all upon the loose Confederation which subsisted between 
the thirteen cantons prior to the establishment of the Helvetic Republic, one and 
indivisible, in 1798. 
 
The United Provinces of the Netherlands 
The history of the United Provinces of the Netherlands was - up to a point - strikingly 
parallel with the history of Switzerland.  Jealously guarding, one the source, the other 
the mouth of the greatest of Central European rivers; both originally integral parts of the 
Holy Roman Empire; both attaining to formal independence of the Empire by the Treaty 
of Westphalia (1648); alike in their sturdy championship of political liberty; alike in 
hardy frugality and in the economic prosperity which waits upon thrift; alike in the 
possession of wealthy cities, with their powerful burgher aristocracies; alike in the 
possession of a hardworking peasantry intent upon extracting the last ounce of 
nutriment from a not too kindly soil; alike in the pursuit of democratic ideals without the 
sacrifice of [begin page 394] practical utilities; alike engaged in a ceaseless conflict with 
great elemental forces; alike inured to hardship - in the one case by the snow-clad 
Alps, in the other by a storm-swept sea; alike in a strong sense of local patriotism, but 
compelled to accept, under the stress of political expediency, a certain measure of 
centralized authority - there is, indeed, a striking parallel between the fortunes of the 
two countries.  Yet with all these points of resemblance Switzerland and the Low 
Countries present striking divergencies of political development.  One of the most 
curious but characteristic features in the political history of Switzerland is the absence 
of great names.  For a 'hero' of the Swiss nation we have to fall back on a more or less 
legendary Tell.  We should not expect Switzerland to have produced a Bismarck or a 
Cavour; we might have looked for a George Washington or an Alexander Hamilton; but 
we should look in vain.  The United Netherlands, on the other hand, is, in large 
measure, the creation of great men: William the Silent, Prince Maurice, Prince 
Frederick, Henry John Van Olden Barneveldt and John de Witt; William III and 
Heinsius.  Again, whereas the Swiss Confederation was the product of many centuries 
of territorial expansion and accretion, slowly evolving from a mere perpetual alliance of 
three forest communities into a strong and compact federal State, the United Provinces 
were called into being under the stress of one insistent and momentous crisis.   
                                                  
10   [392/1]  Op. cit., p. 252. Switzerland, moreover, never for a moment wavered in her strict adherence not merely 
to the democratic, but to the republican ideal.  The Netherlands were from the first 
divided in their allegiance to the republican and the monarchical principles.  But from 
the standpoint of the present chapter it is the final result which is significant.   
Switzerland stands today for pure federalism - an agglomeration of sovereign States.  
In the Netherlands, on the contrary, the centripetal principle has achieved a notable 
victory, and, under the Constitutional Monarchy of today, provincial distinctions are 
tending to insignificance, if not to obliteration.  [begin page 395] 
 
Nevertheless, any analysis of the composite forms of the State would be singularly 
incomplete without at least a passing reference to a formation which for two hundred 
years played so great a part in European, indeed in world history. 
 
The Union of Delft, 1576. 
With the circumstances under which the Union of the Netherlands came into being - the 
heroic struggle between Delft, the Low Countries and Philip II - we cannot concern 
ourselves.  The constitutional evolution of the independent State begins with the Union 
of Delft (25 April 1576).  By this agreement the two sea-board provinces of Holland and 
Zeeland bound themselves in an indissoluble union; they constituted William of Orange 
'Sovereign ad interim', authorized him to treat with foreign powers for a 'Protectorate' 
and entrusted him with the supreme command in war, with the control of all money 
voted by the Estates, with the execution of the laws, and the exercise of patronage to 
the higher offices.  On his part, he undertook to uphold the reformed religion and to 
suppress any worship contrary to the Gospel, though it was expressly and somewhat 
contradictorily ordained that no inquisition should be 'permitted into any man's faith or 
conscience, nor should any man be troubled, injured or hindered by reason hereof'. 
 
The Pacification of Ghent, 1576. 
But the union of the two sea-board provinces supplied only the protoplasm of the later 
organism, and if the process of evolution had not been hastened by the genius and 
enthusiasm of William of Orange, the organism might never have developed.  The 
Prince issued a series of passionate appeals to the other Provinces to come into the 
embryonic union, and the first fruits of his enthusiasm were reaped in the Pacification 
of Ghent, a compact concluded on 8 November 1576.
11  By this famous Treaty the 
whole seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands were for the moment brought into line; 
they swore eternal friendship and agreed to succour each other in all their under- [begin 
page 396] takings it was agreed that the Spanish troops should be expelled from the 
Netherlands; that a States-General, representative of all the seventeen Provinces, 
should be called to take measures for their common government and defence, and for 
the maintenance of religion; and there should be complete freedom of trade between 
the Provinces.  The authority of the Spanish Sovereign was however, scrupulously 
respected.  Nothing was to be done to impinge upon his Sovereignty, though the Prince 
of Orange was to act permanently as his Majesty's Lieutenant Admiral and General, in 
the Provinces of Holland Zeeland. 
 
The  Pacification of Ghent was in fact and form a compact between the Prince of 
Orange, together with the estates of Holland and Zeeland, on the one part, and the 
other fifteen Provinces upon the other; and it was ratified by the Union of Brussels in 
January 1577.  It did not, however, correspond to the realities of the situation and it was 
destined, consequently, to a short life.  It was, indeed accepted by Don John of Austria, 
hardly less adroit in diplomacy than successful in the field, and on 17 February 1577 
the Perpetual Edict, which confirmed the Pacification was actually accepted and signed 
by Philip II himself.  Seven months later (September 1577) the pacificator William of 
                                                  
11   [395/1]  Harrison, William the Silent, pp, 180, 181, where many extracts from 
these eloquent appeals are quoted. Orange, made a triumphant State entry into Brussels, and the Union of the Seventeen 
Provinces, under the distant suzerainty of Philip of Spain, under the immediate 
leadership of William of Orange, seemed to have emerged from the land of dreams and 
to have taken bodily shape among political realities.  But the truce was, in fact, hollow.  
And no man was more conscious of its unsubstantiality than its author.  No man knew 
better the antagonism which persisted between the northern and southern Provinces; 
the jealousy of city against city the hostility of the nobles against himself; the 
ecclesiastical strife between Catholic Flanders and Calvinist Holland.  Of these 
elements of weakness his adroit adversary, Don John of Austria, took full advantage, 
and by [begin page 397]  a combination of diplomacy and force quickly sapped the 
foundations of the unsubstantial structure.  By the opening  months of 1578 the 
'Pacification of Ghent' was at an end. 
 
Don John died on 1 October 1578, but his task was carried on by his nephew, 
Alexander of Parma.  In particular Alexander spared no effort to conciliate the Flemish 
nobles, already jealous of the Silent Prince, always suspicious of the burgher 
aristocracies and increasingly alarmed by the spread of Calvinism.  The fruit of 
Alexander's tactful diplomacy was quickly apparent. 
 
The Union of Arras, 1579. 
The Provinces of Artois and Hainault and the cities of Lille, Douay, and Orchies 
detached themselves from the Union of Brussels, and on 6th January 1579 formed the 
1579 separate Union of Arras, and later came to terms with Alexander of Parma. 
 
William's counter-stroke followed within the month. 
 
The Union of Utrecht, 29 January, 1579.  
 On 29 January 1579 there was published from the Town House of Utrecht the most 
famous document in the Constitutional history of the Netherlands. 
 
Drafted by William of Orange and his brother, John, Count of Nassau, the Union of 
Utrecht is the real starting point in the history of the Confederation, which was 
subsequently known as the United Provinces.  It forms, moreover, no unimportant 
epoch in the evolution of federal government.  It demands on this account detailed 
consideration.  Confined in the first instance to the five States of Holland, Zeeland, 
Utrecht, Gelderland, and Friesland, it was afterwards joined by Overyssel and 
Groningen, and, for a time, by the cities of Bruges, Antwerp, Ghent, and Ypres. 
 
Under the terms of this Instrument the five federating Provinces bound themselves, 'as 
if they were one Province', for the mutual defence of their rights and liberties, 'with life, 
blood, and goods' against all foreign potentates, including the King of Spain.  Each 
Province renounced the right to conclude separate treaties, but was to retain its own 
'special and particular privileges, freedoms, exemptions, laws, statutes, laudable and 
ardent customs, usages, and all other rights whatsoever'.  The Govern- [begin page 398] 
ment was to be vested in a General Assembly, composed of deputies from each 
provincial assembly, and there was to be an Executive Council responsible to the 
General Assembly.  No Treaty, however, was to be concluded; no war to be begun, no 
peace concluded, and no common taxes levied, nor was the Constitution to be revised, 
nor new State admitted, except with the unanimous assent of the Provinces.  Other 
matters of less importance were to be determined by a majority of votes taken in the 
manner then customary in the States General.  In the event of disputes between one 
Province and another, the matter was to be referred to the Stadtholders then in office 
they failed to agree, they were to appoint arbitrators.  The common revenue was to be 
raised from excise and import duties, and all the Provinces were to enjoy equality in 
trade conditions.  As regards defence, the fortification of frontier towns was to be 'at the 
cost of the cities and Provinces wherein they are situated, but having assistance thereto as to half from the generality'.  For any new fortresses the generality was to pay 
the whole cost.  All citizens between the ages of 18 and 30 were to be enrolled and 
liable to service.  For the admission of any neighbouring Province or City into the 
Confederacy the unanimous consent of the Provinces was required.  Finally, in regard 
to religion, it was laid down that Holland and Zeeland were 'to comport themselves as 
best they think’; the other Provinces were to conform to the terms of the Pacification of 




Some pains must be taken to apprehend the precise significance of this historic 
document.  It was not intended to constitute thereby an independent State, or an 
independent federal system.  The sole immediate object was, as Motley insists, to 
provide for 'defence against foreign oppressor': 
 
‘The establishment of a Republic, which lasted two centuries, which threw a girdle of 
dependencies entirely round the [begin page 399] globe, and which attained so 
remarkable a height of commercial prosperity and political influence was the result of 
the Utrecht Union: but it was not a premeditated result.  A State, single toward the rest 
of the world, a unit in its external relations, while permitting internally a variety of 
sovereignties and institutions - in many respects the prototype of our own much more 
extensive and powerful nation . . . was destined to spring from the act thus signed by 
the envoys of five provinces.  Those envoys were acting, however, under the pressure 
of extreme necessity for what was believed an evanescent purpose.  The future 
confederacy was not to resemble the system of the German Empire, for it was to 
acknowledge no single head.  It was to differ from the Achaian League in the far inferior 
amount of power which it permitted to its general assembly, and in the consequently 
greater proportion of sovereign attributes which were retained by the individual States.  
It was, on the other hand, to furnish a closer and more intimate bond than that of the 
Swiss Confederacy, which was only a union for defence and external purposes, of 
cantons otherwise independent.  It was finally to differ from the American Federal 
Commonwealth in the great feature that it was to be merely a confederacy of 
Sovereignties, not a representative Republic.  Its foundation was a compact, not a 
Constitution.  The contracting parties were States and Corporations who considered 
themselves as representing small nationalities de jacto et de jure, and as succeeding 
to the supreme power at the very instant in which allegiance to the Spanish monarch 
was renounced.  The general assembly was a collection of diplomatic envoys bound by 
instructions from independent States.  The voting was not by heads, but by States.  The 
deputies were not representatives of the people, but of the States; for the people of the 
United States of the Netherlands never assembled as - did the people of the United 
States of America two centuries later - to lay down a Constitution by which they granted 
a generous amount of power to the union, while they reserved enough of sovereign 
attributes to secure that local self-government which is the life-blood of liberty.’
13
 
Defects in the Union of Utrecht. 
The Constitution thus analysed by Motley was in truth of one of the clumsiest, most 
complicated, and most unworkable Constitutions with which any people ever elected to 
[begin page 400] burden themselves.  Fundamentally, it was a loose confederation of 
five (afterwards seven) Sovereign States.  But each Province was in turn a federation 
of municipal Councils, which entrusted the Government of the Province to the 
Provincial Estates and its Stadtholder.  These Municipal Councils were oligarchical in 
the extreme, formed by co-optation within a contracted range of patrician burgher 
families.  Such unity as existed was represented by the States-General and the 
Executive dependent upon it - the States' Council.  But the States-General, like the 
                                                  
12   [398/1]  Cf. Reich, Select Documents, pp. 593-615, for full text. 
13   [399/1]  Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 415-16. Swiss Diet, consisted not of representatives, but of envoys who had to vote in 
accordance with instructions issued to them by their several Provincial Governments.  
Ordinances might be issued by the States-General, but they could be proclaimed and 
executed only by the Provincial Estates.  Similarly in regard to taxation for common 
purposes.  Requisitions were issued by the States-General to the Provincial Estates; 
whether any response was made to them depended not upon the former, but upon the 
latter, and the response, as may be supposed, was not invariably ready.
14
 
Apart from the inherent unwieldiness of the Constitution there were many difficulties to 
be overcome.  Between the burgher aristocracies of the cities and the nobles and 
peasants of the country districts, there was little unity of sentiment and not much of 
interest.  The cities again, were jealous both of each other and of the authority of the 
Stadtholder.  The latter was consequently disposed to look for support to the 
unenfranchised citizens in the towns and to the peasants.  Opposed to both were the 
exclusive civic oligarchies in whom, as we have seen, municipal government was 
vested.  The political antagonism was further intensified by ecclesiastical differences.  
The wealthy burghers tended towards the more liberal Theology associated with the 
'heresy' of Arminius; the Stadtholder and the lower classes were rigid in their 
adherence to Calvinism.  [begin page 401] 
 
Reasons for success of the United Provinces. 
How, under these untoward circumstances, did the United Provinces manage to wrest 
their independence from Spain?  How did the Confederation, when once the great 
crisis was over, manage to maintain even a semblance of unity? 
  
The answer to the first question is writ large in the glowing pages of Motley's famous 
epic and is familiar to every student of the European history of the seventeenth century.  
It is, therefore, unnecessary to do more than glance at the outstanding reasons.  The 
first is to be found in the position of the great antagonist.  Philip II of Spain was a 
vigilant and untiring enemy; but he was relatively remote from the scene of operations, 
and although he was, on the whole, faithfully and skilfully served, he had domestic 
difficulties to contend with, which, as Queen Elizabeth discovered, rendered him less 
formidable in practice than on paper.  The general European situation was, moreover, 
strongly in favour of the Dutch.  Queen Elizabeth, it is true, had a constitutional 
aversion both to Calvinists and to rebels, but she had enough detachment to form a 
shrewd estimate of the importance of the insurrection in the Netherlands to her own 
diplomatic game.  She had no mind to be their Sovereign, and their ultimate success 
may have been more complete than she cared for; but she would, if necessary, have 
made real sacrifices to prevent them from being crushed by Philip.  As it was, their 
interests were well served by English privateers, and at critical moments the Queen 
herself was willing to risk the enmity of her brother-in-law by timely seizure of Spanish 
treasure and Spanish ships.  In regard to France, also, fortune was kind to the States.  
A union between the two great Catholic Powers would have seriously menaced the 
liberties both of England and the Netherlands.  But political rivalries cut across religious 
sympathies.  France had her own domestic complications to deal with; and even had 
there been no Huguenots to engage her attention, she would have been slow to aid 
Philip in removing a difficulty from his political path.  Still, when all is said, European 
complications would have availed [begin page 402] little but for the sturdy and 
indomitable spirit of the Dutch patriots, the brilliant inspiration which led them to 
transfer the duel to the sea, and the splendid leadership of a great statesman and a 
great soldier, both vouchsafed to them, in the crisis of their fate, by the House of 
Orange.  'Neither the sympathy of the Huguenots, nor the gold of Elizabeth, nor the 
marshes of Holland, nor the defeat of the Armada would have availed one jot to save 
                                                  
14   [400/1]  Cf. Blok, People of the Netherlands (Eng. trans.), vol. iii, c. xiii; and Le 
Fier, p. 72. the Confederation from ultimate ruin had it not been for the tenacity, the patriotism, and 
the self-sacrifice of the nation itself.  Never since the days of Miltiades and 
Thermistocles, did a people better deserve their freedom than the patient Dutch under 
their silent prince.’
15  It is well and truly said. 
 
In 1584 the 'Silent Prince' was struck down by the hand of the assassin, his work only 
half accomplished; the future of his country dark and uncertain; the Constitution 
evolved from its peculiar circumstances almost unworkable in its complexities and 
contradictions.  ‘Rarely', says Blok, 'has any State Government been so complicated as 
was that of the young Commonwealth in its early years of acknowledged 
independence.’
16  That the Constitution stood the strain at all was due to two or three 
circumstances unconnected with its formal terms, and apparent contradictory to its 
inherent genius.  The first is the fact that among the seven Sovereign States one stood 
out predominant if not supreme.  Holland was equal in wealth, reputation, importance, 
and population to all the other Provinces combined.  It was with Holland, not with the 
United Provinces, that France and the Empire held diplomatic intercourse.  Holland, 
alone of the States, was represented at the Courts of Paris and Vienna.  Holland 
contained within its borders the great trading towns of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft 
and Dordrecht, Leyden, the seat of the University, and the Hague, the centre of the 
Government’.
17  [begin page 403] 
 
‘Holland’ 
Holland, however, had its own constitutional complications.  It was no more a political 
unit than the United Provinces themselves.  Just as the latter formed a federation of 
Sovereign States, so Holland itself was a federation of Sovereign Municipalities.  But 
here again salvation was found in an accidental pre-eminence.  As the Provincial 
States of Holland could defy the States-General of the Netherlands, so the burgher 
aristocracy of Amsterdam could defy the Estates of Holland. 
 
'The great city of Amsterdam, with its banks, its docks, and its thousands of 
fishermen and artisans, founded, it was said, on the carcases of herrings, 
was the centre of the commerce and the opulence of Northern Europe.   
The Venice of the North, alike in her commercial prosperity and her close 
oligarchical Government, she so far dominated over her colleagues that in 
the days of her greatness the United Provinces were little less than 
Amsterdam writ large.' 
 
The predominance of Amsterdam suggests another unifying factor in the conglomerate 
confederacy of the Netherlands.  Reference has been made more than once to the 
oligarchical character of the municipal Governments.  In the Dutch, as in the Swiss 
Confederation, the civic oligarchies had their good as well as their bad side.  Socially 
and economically oppressive as the patrician families may have been, their political 
pre-eminence unquestionably supplied an element of unity in the midst of diversity. 
 
The House of Orange. 
Yet another element was supplied by the steady development of the quasi-monarchical 
power of the House of Orange.  The office of Stadtholder was nominally a provincial 
one.  The offices of captain-general and admiral-general were federal.  Both were 
elective.  But there was a persistently increasing tendency on the part of the Provinces 
to elect the same Stadtholder, while for eighty of the most critical years in the history of 
the Republic the supreme command of its military and naval forces was vested in the 
head of the same great family.  The advantages thus secured cannot be over-
                                                  
15   [402/1]  Wakeman, Ascendancy of France, p. 217. 
16   [402/2]  People of the Netherlands (Eng. trans.), iii. 377. 
17   [402/3]  Wakeman, op. cit., p. 219. estimated.  The contrast, no less than the parallelism, between the history [begin page 
404] of federal Switzerland and that of the federal Netherlands, is now becoming more 
clearly apparent.  On paper the centrifugal forces in the Low Countries were hardly less 
potent than among the Swiss Highlands.  The Provinces of the former were not less 
tenacious of their sovereign rights than the Swiss cantons.  In both, city-republics were 
politically predominant.  In both, the central institutions were contemptible in their 
weakness; if the States-General seemed to exercise more of authority than federal Diet 
it was due to accidental circumstances unconnected with the Constitution.  But amid 
many points of resemblance there are three of contrast, and each is supremely 
significant.  Neither Bern, Zurich, nor Lucerne could pretend to the predominance of 
Amsterdam, still less of the County of Holland; nor could Switzerland rely upon such 
hereditary services as those of the House of Orange; nor did the Helvetic Republic 
produce a succession of statesmen like Jan van Oldenbarneveldt, John de Witt, and 
the pensionary Heinsius.  Switzerland was seemingly independent of individual genius; 
Holland, if not actually made, was tended in her cradle, nurtured in her youth, and 
governed in her manhood, by some of the greatest statesmen whom modern Europe 
has produced. 
 
Later history of the United Provinces. 
Only a few words must be added to summarize the later stages in the constitutional 
evolution of the United Provinces.  For more than a century and a half after death of 
William of Orange (1584) two parties strove for, and periodically achieved, pre-
eminence.  On the one side was the Orange party, tending always to the unification of 
the Provinces, and relying for support mainly on elements of the population which 
would now be described 'democratic'.  On the other side were the burgher oligarchies 
in the larger cities: stern in their adherence to republicanism; mistrustful of the 
'monarchical tendencies' of the House of Orange, and jealous of all encroachments, 
even in the cause of 'national' unity, upon municipal autonomy. 
 
Meanwhile, the Dutch Republic took its place among the Sovereign States of Europe.  
The long struggle with Spain [begin page 405] was virtually ended by the truce of 1609, 
and though the United Provinces were involved in the Thirty Years' War, the Treaty of 
Westphalia brought to them, as to the Helvetic Republic, a formal acknowledgement of 
independence. 
 
Coup d’état of William II, 1650. 
Internally, however, the country was distracted by the unending strife of the two parties 
mentioned above.  From the death of William of Orange down to 1651 a succession of 
Orange princes retained a varying measure of authority, until in 1650 William II 
attempted, in the interests of unification, a coup d’état.  The Stadtholder had hitherto 
been the servant of seven Sovereign States: the members of the States-General were 
merely delegates of the same sovereigns; between the States-General and Holland, 
which in wealth and importance equalled, if it did not exceed, the six other Provinces 
combined, there was constant friction; while the city of Amsterdam defied alike the 
States-General of the Netherlands and the Provincial Estates of Holland. 
 
The new Stadtholder was supported by the army, the navy, and by all the Provinces 
save Holland, and in October 1650 greatly strengthened his position by a treaty with 
France.  A fortnight afterwards, however, the Stadtholder was carried off by small-pox, 
and in 1651 Holland summoned a grand Assembly to revise the Constitution.  The 
general effect of the revision is summarized by Dr. Edmundson as 'the establishment of 
the hegemony of Holland in the Union, and the handing over of the control of its policy 
to the patrician oligarchies which formed the town-councils of Holland'. 
 John de Witt and William III. 
Save for the predominant genius of John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, the 
new scheme would have proved entirely unworkable.  For nearly twenty years (1653-
72) John de Witt made himself supreme in Holland, and made Holland supreme in the 
Dutch Confederation.  Louis XIVs attack on the Republic in 1672 brought De Witt's 
supremacy to an end, and the Orange Party came back to power in the person of 
William III, who was confirmed in the hereditary stadtholderate of five out of [begin page 
406] the seven Provinces.  De Witt was murdered in 1673, and for thirty years the 
ascendancy of William of Orange was undisputed.  But on his death (1702) the male 
line of William the Silent became extinct, and the tide swayed once again in favour of 
the burgher oligarchy.  From 1702 to 1720 Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland 
was practically ruler of the United Provinces, but in 1748 a collateral Prince of the 
House of Orange was appointed Stadtholder of all seven Provinces with the title 
William IV, and shortly afterwards the position w, declared hereditary. 
 
Hereditary Monarchy. 
Thus the Confederated Republic became to all intents and purposes an hereditary 
monarchy, and though violent oscillations continued in the fortunes of the House of 
Orange, the close of the Napoleonic wars witnessed their restoration and the formation 
of a kingdom of the Netherlands in which for the first time Belgium was incorporated.  
The union - an ill-assorted one - lasted only fifteen years; in 1830 Belgium reasserted 
its independence.  By this time, however, the unification of the Dutch Provinces was 
well nigh complete; the revisions of the Constitution in 1848 and 1887 were all in a 
unitary direction, and, save in the method by which the Upper Chamber of the 
Legislature is elected, the Constitution of the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands 
retains scarcely a trace of its federal origin. 
 
The history of the United Provinces, thus briefly and barely summarized, possesses in 
relation to Federalism a unique significance.  It affords the sole instance in which an 
exceptionally loose Confederation has issued in the formation not of a federal republic 
but of a unitarian monarchy.  The Confederation was itself unique in character, 
exhibiting as a whole, or in its component parts, almost every variety of political 
association.  But its special significance, in relation to the type of State under analysis 
in the present chapter, consists in the illustration it affords of what Federalism is not.  
The implications of genuine Federalism must engage attention in the next chapter. 
 XXXVIII. Federalism and Devolution 
 
‘Where the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable 
Federal Unions, the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world.' 
- J.S. Mill. 
 
'Un régime fédéral plus ou moins étroit sera généralement adopté dans 
1'avenir parce que e'est le seul moyen d’assurer l’union des races et plus 
tard de 1'espéce sans briser les diversités locales et sans asservir les hommes 
à une étouffante uniformité.' - Laveleye, Le Gouvernement dans la 
démocratie. 
 
'The federal system limits and restrains the sovereign power by dividing it, 
and by assigning to Government only certain defined rights.  It is the only 
method of curbing not only the majority but the power of the whole people, 
and it affords the strongest basis for a second chamber, which has been 
found the essential security for freedom in every genuine democracy.' - Lord 
Acton. 
 
'When we turn our gaze from the past to the future an extension of 
federalism seems to me the most probable of the political prophecies 
relative to the form of Government.' - Henry Sidgwick. 
 
Weakness of the Personal Union. 
The preceding chapter should have made it plain that the lower forms of the composite 
State are not designed for permanence.  Personal Unions are, from their nature, 
dependent upon factors which may or may not persist in successive generations.  Of 
the Personal Unions surveyed in the previous chapter only one has issued in organic 
union; two have led to separation; the fourth was brought to an end by the Legislative 
Union between Great Britain and Ireland, a union which has itself proved to be 
transitional.  The purely personal tie, which from 1714 to 1837 united Great Britain and 
Hanover, came to an end with the accession of a female sovereign to the English 
throne; a similar tie between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Duchy of Holstein, after 
persisting for many centuries, was sundered by the forcible intervention of Prussia. 
 
Of Confederations. 
Of the Confederations which have been subjected to analysis three proved to be half-
way houses on the road [begin page 408] from severalty to federal union; the fourth 
issued in a unitarian monarchy.  That a Confederation of States may fulfil a useful 
purpose is not denied: this particular form of political organization has proved its value 
both, in the conduct of war and in the organization of peace, and not less in the 
protection and promotion of trade.  Yet, as compared with a federal State, still more 
with a unitarian State, of equal magnitude and resources, its efficiency is impaired by 
characteristics which are not accidental but inherent.  Never has the inherent weakness 
of a Confederation (Staatenbund) been more clearly exposed than by a philosophical 
statesman who had personal experience of the inconvenience and danger which this 
clumsy political contrivance involved.  Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist as 
follows: 
 
'The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation 
is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of 
which they consist. . . . Government implies the power of making laws.  It is 
essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other 
words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience.  If there be no penalty 
annexed to disobedience the resolutions or commands which pretend to be 
laws will in fact amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.  
This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two, ways: by the 
agency of the Courts and Ministers of Justice, or by military force; by the 
coercion of the magistracy or by the coercion of arms.  The first kind can 
evidently apply only to men; the last kind must, of necessity, be employed 
against bodies politic, or communities, or States. . . . In an association where 
the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities 
that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and 
military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience.   
Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of Government, 
nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.'
1
 
Characteristic Features of True Federalism. 
The elements of weakness thus discerned by Hamilton [begin page 409] in a 
Confederation of States were further exemplified in the notorious cases of the 
Germanic Bund of 1815, and in the Swiss Confederation: nor have they, as we shall 
see, been entirely eliminated from the higher form of Federalism subsequently adopted 
in both those countries.  Having then cleared the ground by an examination of certain 
types of bastard Federalism we may, the more confidently, proceed to analyse the 
distinctive characteristics of the true and perfect form of Federalism.  
 
First, a Federal Constitution must be the result of a deliberate and conscious act of 
political construction.  A Federation is made, not born.  'It cannot’, as Dr. Adams insists, 
‘grow up of itself out of an earlier different situation by a series of more or less 
unconscious changes, as the Constitution of England was formed, so that after a lapse 
of time the nation finds itself living under a federation whose adoption it can assign to 
no specific date nor to any deliberate act of choice.' 
2  It follows, secondly, that the 
results of this conscious and deliberate act must be embodied in a written document or 
Instrument.  A Federal Constitution partakes, as we have seen, of the nature of a treaty 
between Sovereign States, and it is evident that the terms of a treaty must be reduced 
to writing.  Nor is it desirable that the terms should be varied save by the deliberate 
action of the parties to the pact.  Hence, thirdly, a Federal Constitution must almost of 
necessity be rigid.  There are, as we have seen, degrees of rigidity in Federal 
Constitutions: the Constitutions of the United States, Australia, and Switzerland are 
much more rigid than that of Germany, while that of the Dominion of Canada is 
embodied In a Statute which may (theoretically) be amended or repealed by the same 
process as that which applies to any other Statute of the Imperial Parliament.  But, 
though the degree of rigidity may vary, no Federal Constitution can be exposed to such 
a full measure of flexibility as is possessed by the unitary Constitution of Great Britain.  
[begin page 410] 
 
It follows from what has been said that in every Federal Constitution there must be, 
fourthly, some body, presumably judicial in character, entrusted with authority to 
safeguard the Constitutional Instrument and competent to interpret its terms.  Fifthly, 
there must be a precise distribution of powers; on the one hand, between the several 
organs of the Federal Government - the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary; 
                                                  
1   [408/1]  The Federalist, No, xv. 
2   [409/1]  Federal Government, p. 84.  and on the other as between the Federal Government and the Government of the 
component States. 
 
The Vital Question in a Federal State. 
The manner in which powers are distributed as between the Central and the State 
Governments is, indeed, vital: it determines the whole character of the Federal State.  
As a fact, the solution of the problem has depended, in large measure, upon the 
circumstances under which the Federal State has come into being.  The thirteen 
confederated republics which in 1788 agreed to form the federal union now known as 
the United States were intensely tenacious of their rights as Sovereign States and only 
agreed to delegate to the central authority certain specified functions.  All powers not 
so specified remain vested in the component States. 
 
The same principle was adopted in the case of the Australian Commonwealth, where a 
similar jealousy for the rights appertaining to independent existence long, delayed the 
consummation of federal unity.  Thus the, Commonwealth Act enumerates (Part V, § 
51) thirty-nine, matters in regard to which the Federal Legislature is competent to 
legislate; but in a later section (§ 107) it expressly states: 'Every power of the 
Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State shall, unless it is by this 
Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn 
from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may 
be.' 
 
The British North America Act of 1867, on the contrary, enumerates sixteen subjects as 
being exclusively vested [begin page 411] the Provincial Legislatures, and twenty-nine 
subjects as belonging to the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament.  It is, however, 
expressly stated (§ 91) that the enumeration of the powers of the Dominion Parliament 
is ‘for greater certainty', but not so as to restrict the right of that Parliament to deal with 
any matter 'not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to 
the Legislatures of the Provinces '. 
 
Judgement of Privy Council Judicial Committee, 17 December, 1913.  
So vitally important, indeed, is this question as to the distribution of powers, and in 
particular the residuality of powers, that the judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
went so far as to deny to the Dominion of Canada the true federal quality, on the 
ground that the federating Colonies failed to preserve their original constitution and 
status.  The words of the judgement, delivered by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane), 
are remarkable: 
 
'In a loose sense the word 'federal' may be used as it is there [i.e. in the 
British North America Act, 1867] used, to describe any arrangement under 
which self-contained states agree to delegate their powers to a common 
government with a view to entirely new constitutions even of the states 
themselves.  But the natural and literal interpretation of the word confines 
its application to cases in which these states, while agreeing on a measure of 
delegation, yet in the main continue to preserve their original constitution.  
Now, as regards Canada, the second of the resolutions passed at Quebec in 
October, 1864, on which the British North America Act was founded, shows 
that what was in the minds of those who agreed on the resolutions was a 
general government charged with matters of common interest and new and 
merely local governments for the provinces.  The provinces were to have 
fresh and much restricted constitutions, their governments being entirely 
remodelled.  This plan was carried out by the imperial statute of 1867.  By 
the ninety-first section a general power was given to the new parliament of Canada to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada 
without restriction to specific subjects and excepting only the subjects 
specifically and exclusively assigned to the provincial legislatures by 
section 92. . . . The Act therefore departs widely from the true federal model 
adopted by the constitution of the [begin page 412] United States, the tenth 
amendment to which declares the powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to States 
respectively or to their people.'
3
 
Sir John Bourinot, with all the authority attaching to the Clerk of the House of 
Commons of Canada, maintained a contrary opinion: 
 
'The weight of authority now clearly rests with those who have always 
contended that in entering into the federal compact the provinces never 
intended to renounce their distinct, and separate existence as provinces 
when they became part of the confederation.  This separate existence was 
expressly reserved for all that concerns their internal government. . .  Far 
from the federal authority having created the provincial, powers, it is from 
these provincial powers that there has arisen the federal government to 
which the provinces ceded a portion of their rights, property and revenues.'
4
 
With all deference to the judicial Committee of the Privy Council I cannot but agree with 
a distinguished publicist that the judgement of 17th December 1913 savours of legal 
pedantry, and betrays a failure to distinguish between two types of a Federal State, 
each, equally entitled to be regarded as orthodox, though one of them may be 
described as centripetal, the other as, centrifugal.
5  Nevertheless, the judgement does 
illustrate the immense significance attached, by the highest legal authority in the British 
Empire, and indeed by every jurist of repute, to the allocation of the residual powers; 
and it may frankly be conceded that of two orthodox forms of Federalism the more 
perfect is represented by the Constitutions of the Commonwealth of Australia and of 
the United States; the less perfect by that of Canada. 
 
Government of Ireland Bill, 1920. 
Precisely the same point was raised in the discussions in the British Parliament on the 
abortive Bill for the [begin page 413] Government of Ireland (1920).  The Bill, as drafted, 
reserved to the Imperial Parliament certain enumerated powers, and conferred upon 
the Parliaments of Southern and Northern Ireland power to make laws on all subjects 
not so enumerated.  An amendment was moved to reverse the process, and to confer 
upon the two Parliaments which the Bill proposed to set up in Ireland power to deal 
with certain subjects, fourteen in number, enumerated in the amendment.  The 
amendment, though resisted by the Government and ultimately rejected by the House, 
was framed upon the Canadian analogy - professedly the model on which the Bill itself 
was founded - and was supported on the constitutional ground that it was of the 
essence of the federal principle that the residue of powers should vest in the originating 
authority, while only enumerated powers should be exercised by the delegated 
authorities.  In the case of Australia and the United States the separate Colonies or 
States supplied the originating authority, and the residue of powers was, consequently, 
                                                  
3   [412/1]  Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia & Ors. v. Colonial 
Sugar Refining Co., Ltd., & Ors. (The Times, 18th Dec. 1913). 
4   [412/2]    Federal Government in Canada, p. 124, published in Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 7th Series,  Baltimore, 
1889. 
5   [412/3]  T.G. Bowles, ap. Candid Review, pp. 217, 218.   vested, and properly vested, in them.  In those cases the process was, as we have 
seen, centripetal: States, formerly independent, were brought together into a federal 
unity.  In the case of the Dominion the process was mainly, though not wholly, 
centrifugal: certain powers were conferred by the Imperial Parliament upon the 
Canadian Provinces.  The Government of Ireland Act professed to do the same thing; 
but it was untrue to its professions.  Since the Act has proved, as regards Southern 
Ireland, abortive, the point may be regarded as academic; but the discussion, during 




Dualism of Law. 
Further points of great importance remain, however, to be considered.  Whether the 
process of division of powers be by reservation or enumeration; whether the residue of 
powers be vested in the Federal Government or in the [begin page 414] component 
States, there must necessarily result a dualism of law, and there ought to be a 
complete reduplication of political organs. 
 
Perhaps the most obtrusive differentia between a unitary and a federal State is the 
unity or duality of the legal system.  An English citizen owes obedience only to one 
body of law; a citizen of Prussia or Bavaria or Pennsylvania owes obedience to two.  In 
fact, in the United States there are four competing kinds of laws the federal 
Constitutional law; the ordinary federal law the law of the State Constitution; and the 
State law.  In a unitary State, such as England, there is but one.  In France, it is true, 
the citizen is, in certain relations, subject to 'administrative' law as well as ordinary law. 
But the essential point is that all citizens of France are subject to the same laws 
whether they belong to Brittany or Languedoc, whether they dwell in Paris or Bordeaux.  
In a federal State it is otherwise.  The citizen of Virginia and the citizen of New 
Hampshire owe common obedience to the federal law of the American Union, but the 
State law of Virginia, to which the Virginian is also subject, may and does differ widely 
from that of Maine.  Similarly in Germany.  To federal statutes Saxon and Hessian owe 
obedience in common, but in addition each must know and obey the laws of his own 
State.  The citizen of a unitary State like England knows nothing of any such 
complication and possible conflict. 
 
The Federal Government and component states. 
In this connexion Mr. Dicey
7 raised a point of great importance to the working of federal 
institutions, viz. how far the Federal Government can control the legislation of the 
component States?  We have already seen that in the United States, as well as in 
Australia and Canada, the competence of the Federal Legislature is limited by the 
Constitution, of which the judiciary is the guardian and interpreter.  It is otherwise in 
Switzerland, where the Courts must treat federal (though not cantonal) legislation as 
valid, and where no question as to the competence of the [begin page 415] Federal 
Legislature can, therefore, be raised.  Frequent recourse to the Referendum must, 
however, be held to place Switzerland, as regards federal legislation, in a class apart. 
 
The point now under discussion is a separate though a cognate one.  Neither in the 
United States nor in Switzerland is the Federal Government competent to annul or 
disallow ordinary State legislation, though in the United States the Federal Constitution 
guarantees the maintenance of the republican form of government in every State.  In 
Switzerland, the Cantonal Constitutions and any amendments thereto require the 
                                                  
6   [413/1]  Cf. Official Report (Commons), Vol. 129, pp. 1509 seq. An amendment in 
similar terms was subsequently moved in the House of Lords (Official Report 
(Lords), vol. 42, p. 869). 
7   [414/1]  In the last (1915) edition of The Law of the Constitution, Appendix. assent of the Federal Government, nor will the Federal Government recognize any 
article in a Cantonal Constitution which is repugnant to the Federal Constitution.  In 
Canada, on the contrary, the Dominion Government can disallow any Act passed by a 
Provincial Legislature.  In Germany there would seem to be (though the point is not 
free from ambiguity) no such power vested in the Government of the Reich. 
 
The complication, inherent in Federal Constitutions, and arising from the dualism of 
laws and the reduplication of legislative organs, extends also to the spheres of the 
judiciary and the Executive. 
 
The Judiciary 
The position of the judiciary is from the point of view of Federalism of supreme 
significance.  In this respect the United States presents perhaps the most perfect 
federal type.  There we find a complete system of federal judicature existing throughout 
the Union side by side with and quite independent of the State Courts.  So completely 
self-contained are the two systems that no appeal can lie from the State to the federal 
Courts.  Canada goes, in this matter, to the opposite extreme. It is one of several marks 
of the distinctly unitarian bias of the Canadian Constitution that there is no reduplication 
of Courts.  Canada has only one set of Courts and one staff of judges - the latter being 
appointed by the Dominion Government.  Australia stands midway between Canada 
and the United States.  [begin page 416] 
 
Less unitary and more federal than the former, the Commonwealth is more unitary and 
less federal than the latter.  This point has already received attention; here it may 
suffice to say that the High Court of Australia is the supreme federal Court; that the 
State Courts are invested with federal jurisdiction, and that an appeal does lie from the 
State Courts to the High Court of Australia. 
 
The German Reich. 
In this respect the position in the German Reich is peculiar, and perhaps to some 
extent transitional.  The Reichgericht remains the Supreme Court for ordinary cases; 
but, as already indicated, the Staatsgericht-hof was set up in 1921 to try impeachments 
against the President and Ministers, and in particular to determine questions arising out 
of the interpretation of the Constitution, and all conflicts between the Federal 
Government and the States, and between one State and another.  To this extent the 
German judiciary is centralized; but, on the other hand, the ordinary administration of 
justice is still vested not in the National Government but in that of the States, though 
the  Slaatsgericht-hof is charged with the duty of deciding disputes between the 
National Government and those of the States in regard to the administration of national 
laws by the States.
8
 
In Switzerland, as we have seen, there is a National Tribunal to which in certain cases 
an appeal lies from the Cantonal Courts; though, generally speaking, the administration 
of justice is cantonal.  Thus among the examples cited, Canada approaches, in regard 
to the judiciary, most nearly to the unitarian model; in Switzerland justice is most 
completely decentralized.  In the United States a perfect equipoise between the two 
principles is attained. 
 
The Executive. 
A similar difference in the intensity of the federal principle may be observed, also, in the 
Executive sphere of Government.  In administrative matters, as in judicial organization, 
Switzerland exhibits her characteristic [begin page 417] centrifugal tendency.  Except in 
                                                  
8   [416/1]  Const. of Weimar, Art. 15, and cf. Laurence Lowell, Greater European 
Governments, ch. x. regard to foreign and military affairs, to customs, railways, posts, telephones and 
telegraphs, and one or two other matters, the Federal Council has no staff of 
administrative servants and exercises no direct or immediate executive authority.  This 
is one of the features of the existing Swiss Constitution which recalls the earlier stage 
of a Confederation.  Ordinary federal laws are executed, and the judgements of the 
Federal Courts are carried out, by the cantonal authorities, though the latter act, in a 
general sense, under the supervision if not the control of the Federal Council. The 
United States is, in this as in other respects, consistently federal, possessing a 
complete hierarchy of federal officials who function, each in the appropriate sphere, 
side by side with the official hierarchy of the component States. 
 
Germany represents a compromise between the cantonal bias of the Swiss 
Constitution and the federal genius embodied in American institutions. In the sphere of 
legislation the German Reich tends to the unitary principle much more decidedly than 
the United States; but the execution of the law is entrusted, to a far larger extent than in 
America, to the States or Länder. 
 
While, however, there are degrees of federal intensity even in Constitutions of 
unexceptionable federal orthodoxy, we must nevertheless conclude that a reduplication 
of organs, legislative, administrative, and judicial, is one of the indispensable marks of 
true Federalism. 
 
Bicameralism and Federalism. 
To another question it is hardly possible to give an equally positive answer.  Is 
Bicameralism an essential feature of a truly Federal Constitution?  It is at least highly 
significant that there is, in fact, no Federal Constitution in existence which does not 
provide for a Second Chamber or Senate.  Moreover, such Second Chambers have, as 
a rule, been deliberately constituted in such a way as to embody and emphasize the 
federal principle.  A genuine Federation (Bundesstaat) as opposed to a Confederation 
(Slaatenbund) represents not only a union of States [begin page 418] but a union of 
citizens. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that while one of the two Chambers of the 
Legislature should represent the aggregate of citizens, the other should represent the 
union of States.  That principle carried out, as we have seen, to its farthest logical 
conclusion in the Senates of the United States, of Australia, and of Switzerland.  So 
fully, indeed, that in the Senates of those countries the component States enjoy equal 
representation, irrespective of their size, population, or wealth.  The Senate of the 
Canadian Dominion and the German Reichsrat are also based upon the idea of the 
representation of States, but the principle is less logically and more timidly applied.  
The question, however, remains whether a Federal Senate is essential to the 
successful working of federal institutions. 
 
With the example of the Senate of the United States before him, and confronted by the 
fact that no attempt has yet been made to work a Federal Constitution on a unicameral 
basis, the comparative jurist is under a strong temptation to answer this question in the 
affirmative.  This at least may be affirmed with confidence that no device has yet 
occurred to the wit of man so well adapted as Bicameralism to fulfil the essential 
purpose of emphasizing the union of States, as distinguished from the union of 
peoples.  Should it, hereafter, be found possible to dispense with a second Chamber in 
a Federal Constitution the possibility will be due either to the weakening of the federal 
principle and the encroachment of the unitarian principle in that particular country; or to 
the invention of some device, not yet disclosed, better adapted than a Senate to the 
preservation of the distinctive character of Federal Government. 
 
Cabinet Government and Federalism. 
An even more disputable question claims brief notice.  Is there any reason to 
apprehend that the Cabinet form of Executive is inconsistent with the smooth working of Federal Constitution?  In those British Dominions which have adopted the federal 
principle the attempt has been made to engraft it on to the Cabinet principle as [begin 
page 419] evolved in England, and by England bequeathed to her self-governing 
Colonies.  In the United States, on the other hand, the Executive is Presidential, not 
Parliamentary; in Switzerland it cannot be classed in either category.  In Germany the 
transition from Presidential to Parliamentary Government is so recent as to afford very 
insufficient ground on which to base a conclusion.  Federalism is, indeed, itself so 
recent a device, in relation to the history of Political Institutions, that any generalization 
connected with its machinery must be stated with the utmost caution.  This much, 
however, is plain: that of the three most perfect examples of Federal Constitutions as 
yet devised, only one has attempted to combine the Cabinet principle with that of 
Federalism: and the strength of inherited English traditions may, in that case, account 
for the attempt.  Whether, in the case of Switzerland and America, the omission is 
accidental or essential, it is not possible to say.  Time alone, therefore, can supply an 
answer to a question which may well prove, in the near or distant future, to be of more 
than academic interest. 
 
Federalism and Devolution. 
This chapter must not close, though the transition is Federalism and somewhat abrupt, 
without a passing reference to another aspect of the problem of Federalism. 
  
During the first two decades of the present century ‘Federalism' was strongly 
recommended by physicians of different schools as an anodyne for the many ills from 
which the British Constitution was believed to be suffering.  The prescription took two, if 
not more, forms: on the one hand, it was proposed to bring into a federal union the 
various self-governing Dominions of the British Crown, including the United Kingdom or 
its component parts, on the other hand, it was suggested that the domestic maladies of 
the United Kingdom could be cured only by the adoption of the principle of 'devolution', 
and the setting up of subordinate legislatures in Scotland and Ireland, and possibly 
also in Wales and England.  The [begin page 420] proposals varied almost infinitely in 
detail; but, broadly they may be distinguished as centripetal or centrifugal; one section 
of federalists looked primarily to a federalization of the Empire; the other to a 
federalization of United Kingdom.  Some there were who combined both propositions. 
 
Of Imperial Federation, of the transient popularity of the idea, and of its gradual 
weakening in face of the growth of self-conscious nationalism in the Oversea 
Dominions, something has been said in an earlier chapter of this book.  Something 
remains to be said of the other aspect of British Federalism - the movement which 
more properly be described as 'Devolution'. 
 
Congestion of Parliamentary Business. 
The Imperial Parliament - so the argument ran - is hopelessly overworked.  Its time is 
largely occupied by the discussion of matters which are of merely parochial or at the 
best, of provincial importance.  Reference has been already made to the fact that, of 
the total legislative output of the Imperial Parliament, only a relatively small proportion 
is applicable uniformly to the several parts of the United Kingdom.  In the years 1901-
10 only 252 out of the 458 Public Acts applied to the United Kingdom as a whole.  Why 
not, then, recognize facts, and devolve upon subordinate legislative bodies the duty of 
legislating on matters of purely provincial importance?  That there are sufficient matters 
of Imperial moment, or of matters common to the whole United Kingdom, to occupy the 
whole time and attention of the Imperial Parliament, is a proposition hardly disputable; 
and it is urged, with much force, that so long as no clear line is drawn between Imperial 
and domestic affairs there is perpetual danger lest a nominally Imperial Parliament may 
be elected on issues which are, in fact, purely parochial.  That this danger is fanciful no 
one conversant with English politics during the last half-century can possibly pretend.  
Whether a more appropriate solution of the difficulty might not be found in the creation of a truly Imperial Parliament is a question which must, for the moment, be regarded as 
[begin page 421] outside the sphere of practical politics; but it may not always remain 
so. 
 
Federalism and Ireland. 
It would, however, be sheer affectation to ignore the Federalism and fact that even 
devolutionary Federalism would hardly have come within the sphere of practical politics 
save for the insistent pressure of the Irish Question. 
 
For many years past an influential group of publicists
9 had been preaching the doctrine 
that 'Federal' Home Rule was the only solution of the Irish problem consistent both with 
the Imperialist sentiment of the English and the Nationalist aspirations of the Irish.   
Towards the end of the War, this group was confronted by the fact that a Home Rule 
Act, by no means federal in character, was on the Statute Book, and that on the legal 
termination of the War it would become operative.  The leaders of the group redoubled 
their activities and formulated a definite scheme of 'Home Rule all round' on a federal 
basis.  It was of the essence of that scheme that the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
should stand in the same relation to all the component Provinces. 
 
'It must not', as Mr. F.S. Oliver said, 'be the Union Parliament as regards England, 
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, and at the same time in addition the National Legislature 
of England, Wales, and Scotland.  The domestic affairs of England, Wales, and 
Scotland must come right out and be given into the charge of some other body or 
bodies.  It would not be a true federation . . . if the Parliament of the Union stood in a 





In other words, the principle of dualism of law, as described above, was to be rigorously 
applied, and the reduplication of organs, legislative, administrative, and judicial, was to 
be complete.  That unquestionably was sound federal doctrine: but the, argument did 
not prevail. 
 
Meanwhile the problem was attacked on parallel lines from another side.  On the 4th 
June 1919 the following [begin page 422] Resolution was agreed to by the House of 
Commons a majority of 137 to 34: 
 
'That, with a view to enabling the Imperial Parliament devote more attention 
to the general interests of the Unit Kingdom and, in collaboration with the 
other Governments of the Empire, to matters of common Imperial concern, 
the House is of opinion that the time has come for the creation of 
subordinate Legislatures within the United Kingdom, and that to this end 
the Government, without prejudice to any proposals it may have to make 
with regard to Ireland should forthwith appoint a Parliamentary body to 
consider and report- 
 
(1)    upon a measure of Federal Devolution applicable to England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, defined in its general outlines by existing 
differences in law and administration between the three countries; 
(2)   upon the extent to which these differences are applicable to Welsh 
conditions and requirements; and 
(3)   upon the financial aspects and requirements of the measure. 
                                                  
9   [421/1]  e.g. the late Thomas Albert, second Lord Brassey, William, Second Earl 
of Selborne, and Mr. F.S. Oliver. 
10   [421/2]  F.S. Oliver, The Possibilities of a Federal Settlement (1918).  
A 'Conference' of thirty-two members was accordingly set up under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Speaker Lowther, to consider and report upon a scheme of Legislative and 
Administrative Devolution within the United Kingdom having regard to 
 
(1)  The need of reserving to the Imperial Parliament the exclusive 
consideration of 
(a)  Foreign an Imperial affairs; and 
(b)  subjects affecting the United Kingdom as a whole. 
 
(2)  The allocation of financial powers as between the Imperial Parliament 
and the subordinate legislatures, special consideration being given to 
the need of providing for the effective administration of the allocated 
powers. 
 
(3)  The special needs and characteristics of the component portions of 
the United Kingdom in which subordinate legislatures are set up. 
 
The Conference proved abortive.
11 No reconciliation was found possible between 
those members of the Conference who were inspired by the idea of Scottish and [begin 
page 423] Welsh nationalism and those who looked primarily to the relief of the 
congestion of the Imperial Parliament.  Nor did the Conference attempt to deal with 
Ireland.  The Coalition Government had decided, in the autumn of 1919, to bring 
forward a scheme for the government of Ireland on lines which, in effect, knocked the 
bottom out of any scheme for 'Devolution'.  Treatment, simultaneous and identical, for 
each component part of the United Kingdom was, as we have seen, the vital condition 
laid down by the advocates of a 'Federal Solution'.  The Home Rule Bill of 1920 
dissipated all hopes of such a solution and, at the same time, brought down the 
ambitious edifice of a federal scheme for the whole of the United Kingdom. 
 
The truth is that, specious as was the proposal of Federal Home Rule, it never had any 
serious chance of acceptance.  The Irish Separatist would, of course, have none of it, 
nor could it be expected to satisfy the nationalist who demanded 'Dominion Status' for 
Ireland.  The southern Nationalist liked Federalism very little better than Unionism; 
Ulster (though preferring it to Home Rule) liked it much less.  From the moment the 
Government produced the Bill of 1920, 'devolution' as regards Ireland was dead.   
Except as a solution of the historic problem of Ireland the idea of 'devolution' had never 
possessed any real vitality: it was killed by the fourth edition of 'Home Rule'. 
 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920. 
The Government of Ireland Act (1920) was not genuinely federal in texture.  The only 
trace of federalism was the continued representation of the two Irelands in the Imperial 
Parliament.  For the rest, the Act provided for the setting up at Dublin and Belfast 
respectively of two Parliaments, with Executives responsible thereto, and each 
Parliament was to contribute twenty members to an all-Ireland Council, which was 
intended to form the nucleus, when the differences of North and South were finally 
appeased, of an all-Ireland Parliament.  The Act, save in so far as it repealed the Home 
Rule Act of 1914, never operated in Southern Ireland, the Nationalists [begin page 424] 
bitterly resented the idea of partition; the Separatists would accept nothing short of an 
Irish republic. 
 
Northern Ireland - the six counties of Ulster - accept the scheme as at least preferable 
to subordination to a Dublin Parliament, and have worked it with success, Southern 
Ireland adopted the principle of non-co-operation; refused to work the Act of 1920 and 
carried on guerrilla war against the forces of the Crown.  In July 1921, however, a truce 
                                                  
11   [422/1]  Letter from Mr. Speaker to the Prime Minister (Cmd. 692 of 1920). was proclaimed, and, after much haggling, a 'treaty' was signed between the British 
Government and the leaders of the Southern Irish rebellion. 
 
Irish Free State Act, 1922. 
On 31 March 1922 an Act embodying the terms of the Treaty received the Royal 
assent.  Ireland was to enjoy Dominion status under the style of the Irish Free State, 
and to form, under the British Crown, a member of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.  The six counties Ulster retained the right, which they promptly exercised, to 
contract out of the Irish Free State, and to retain the status conferred by the Act of 
1920. 
 
The principle of Federalism has, therefore, been in nowise advanced by the concession 
of Home Rule to Ireland.  The Act of Union (1800) has been virtually repealed; a new 
'Dominion' has, under unprecedented circumstances, been recognized; but no advance 
has been made on the path towards Federalism in the Empire, or towards Devolution in 
Great Britain.  In a masterly analysis, published shortly before the Irish Bill of 1914 
reached the Statute Book, Mr. F.S. Oliver showed that Mr. Asquith's Bill, whatever its 
intention, was not in fact federal, and he defined the position of federalists thus: 
 
'What we mean when we say that the Home Rule Bill should be federal in 
tendency is that, whatever its form, its effect should be to grant to Ireland 
powers of local government, substantially similar to those exercised by 
local assemblies in Canada, Australia, and South Africa, while reserving to 
the Westminster Parliament powers not substantially less than those 
reserved to the Central Government of those three great self-governing 
Dominions.’
12
[begin page 425] 
 
It may be thought that Mr. Oliver somewhat confused the issue by the inclusion of 
South Africa, the Constitution of which is not federal but unitary.  Nor is the status of a 
Canadian 'Province' precisely parallel with that of a State of the Australian 
Commonwealth.  But his meaning was nevertheless unmistakable.  The new Irish 
Parliament was to stand to the Parliament at Westminster not in the relation of the 
Australian, Canadian, or South African Parliaments to the Imperial Parliament, but in 
that of one of the State Legislatures in the United States to the Congress at 
Washington.  But he rightly argued that such was not the status assigned to the Dublin 
Parliament by the Act of 1914; nor was it the status acquired in 1922. 
 
Constitutional jurists may well deplore the fact that in 1922 an opportunity was missed 
for the trial of an interesting political experiment; politicians may justly retort that the 
opportunity was not within their grasp. 
 
This work is, however, concerned not with political possibilities, but with the actual 
machinery of government.  The Anglo-Saxon race has made three important 
contributions to the experimental philosophy of Federalism.  Two have been made 
under the aegis of the English Monarchy.  There was plainly room for a fourth; and 
some publicists were hopeful that the success of the fourth might pave the way for a 
fifth - which if achieved would be by far the greatest and most interesting as yet 
attempted in the world.  But the time is not yet; and the student of Comparative Politics 
must possess his soul in patience. 
 
                                                  






Parties and Principles. 
 
 
XXXIX. Parliamentary Government and the Party System 
The Evolution of English Parties. Party Organizations 
 
'The Cabinet System presupposes a party system, and more than that, a two-
party system.' - Sir Courtenay Ilbert. 
 
'Without parties no effective scheme of self-government could be devised . . 
. in recent English parliamentary affairs, party organization has always been 
taken for granted, and the assumption of its existence has been transferred to 
the systems of all parliamentary nations.  The rise of parties, political and 
yet national, marks the coming of age of the [English] people.' - Dr. Joseph 
Redlich. 
 
‘Of such a nature are connexions in politics: essentially necessary to the full 
performance of our public duty: accidentally liable to degenerate into 
faction. . . . Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint 
endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which 
they are all agreed.' - Edmund Burke. 
 
'Who born for the universe narrowed his mind 
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind.' 
Goldsmith (on Burke). 
 
Party discipline is a means to a great end; but in some emergencies and 
under some leaders it may be made to frustrate the end at which it aims. . . .  
It is the great end on which all are in common bent which contributes all 
that is noble or even innocent to party warfare. . . . The one ennobling 
element, the palliation, if not the atonement for all shortcomings, is that all 
members of a party are enlisted in common to serve one unselfish cause, 
and that it is in that service that their zeal, even when least scrupulous, is 
working.  Take this great end away and parties become nothing but 
joint-stock companies for the attainment and preservation of place.' - Robert 
Marquis of Salisbury (1867). 
 
The Place of Party Politics. 
A book devoted to an analysis of the machinery of government cannot, if it pretend to 
any sort of completeness, close without some reference to the history and organization 
of political parties.  Party organizations are, of course, entirely unofficial; they work in 
the twilight; their offices have none of the imposing magnificence of the great Public 
Departments; yet their contribution to the business of government is, under the system 
of representa- [begin page 430] tive democracy - perhaps under any form of democracy not only important but indispensable.  From the chairman of the party, the chief 
organizer or agent, and the central executive, down to the constituency agent and the 
ward committee, the party organization has its appropriate part to play in the working of 
modern democracy, and is, therefore, entitled to separate analysis.  It cannot, however, 
be denied that there has been a persistent disposition to look askance upon this 
particular cog in the machinery of democracy.  Thus Bolingbroke, one of the least 
consistent of party politicians and one of the most fretful of political philosophers, 
lamented our 'national divisions': 
 
'No grief hath lain more heavily at the hearts of all good men than those . . . 
about the spirit of party, which inspires animosity and breeds rancour; which 
hath so often destroyed our inward peace; weakened our national strength, 
and sullied our glory abroad.  It is time, therefore, that all who desire to be 
esteemed good men . . . should join their efforts to heal our national 




It is consoling, however, to those who believe in party government to remember that, 
behind all this eloquent elaboration of the commonplace, lay a simple human desire to 
get Walpole and the Whigs out, and to let Lord Bolingbroke in.  Yet when Goldsmith 
declared that Burke 'to party gave up what was meant for mankind' he coined an 
epigram which certainly crystallized a common sentiment, if it did not perpetuate a 
vulgar error. 
 
Party government has always offered an easy target for the shafts of light-thinking and 
careless critics.  Why should the nation be deprived, by an arbitrary line of division of 
the services, at any given moment, of at least fifty percent of its efficient 
administrators?  Why should even 'the lowliest of politicians dedicate to the service of 
party such modest talents as he may possess?  Those who thus argue may be invited 
to reflect on the coincidence, frequently noticed, between the disintegration of parties 
and [begin page 431] the alleged decadence of the parliamentary principle.  Whether it 
may not be more than coincidence; whether the phenomena may not be logically 
related as cause and effect, are questions which will demand consideration in the 
course of this chapter.  But this much is certain: the parliamentary system, nay the 
whole principle of representative democracy, has fallen on days which are difficult, if 
not actually critical.  The rapid development in the means of communication; the 
marvellous organization for the supply of information, if not of intelligence; the, 
extension of the parliamentary franchise, and the diffusion of education; the increasing 
subordination of politics to economics; the substitution of vocation for locality as the 
bases of association; - all these have, as already indicated in preceding chapters, 
tended towards the weakening of the representative principle and the substitution of 
methods appropriate to a more direct form of democracy.  The Press, the platform, the 
trade union, and the caucus have unquestionably done something to decentralize 
political activity and to transfer discussion from Westminster to the constituencies, be 
they local or vocational.  Simultaneously with the operation of these and similar 
tendencies, there has been delivered a determined assault upon the theory and 
practice of party government.  Nor are the reasons unintelligible.  Party allegiance, if 
carried to excess, may easily obscure the claims of patriotism.  Concentration upon the 
business of vote-catching may tempt party leaders and party managers to ignore or to 
postpone the higher call of country.  Plainly, this is a weakness incidental to, if not 
inseparable from, party government, and it is one whose insidious growth must ever be 
closely watched and guarded against by patriotic statesmen.  The momentous question 
is, whether the predisposition to this malady is sufficiently serious to invalidate the 
claim which is preferred on behalf of the party system, and to justify the attempt to 
                                                  
1   [430/1]  Dissertation on Parties, Letter 1. eradicate a growth which may become so malignant as to poison the whole body-
politic.  [begin page 432] 
 
A brief historical retrospect may help towards answer to a question, at all times of 
speculative-interest and today of special and insistent significance. 
 
The Central Problem of Parliamentary Government. 
The revolution of 1688 in effect transferred sovereignty from the Crown to Parliament, 
or more strictly to the King in Parliament; but Parliament as then organized found itself 
unequal to the discharge of its new responsibilities, Pass laws and impose taxes it 
could, but how was it to carry on or to supervise the day-to-day work of administration?  
John Pym, with the insight of real statesmanship, had half a century earlier pointed the 
way to a solution of the problem.  Let the King choose as counsellors and ministers 
those whom Parliament may have cause to 'confide in'.  There only lay the way of 
escape from the dilemma which had confronted the Stuart kings and their parliaments.  
But Parliament, though eager to play a more important part in public affairs, was 
obviously in doubt as to the precise part it was to play, and as to the actual means by 
which it was to assert the new authority it claimed.  The tactlessness of James and the 
vagaries of Buckingham led Parliament to reassert the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, and from that doctrine to advance to the principle that the Legislature 
should control the Executive. 
 
Party Organization essential to the working of Representative Democracy. 
How should that control be exercised?  The solution of the problem was, as we have 
shown, found in the evolution of the Cabinet.  A small committee, composed of 
members of the Legislature, agreed on certain of principles of government and on the 
main lines of policy; willing to accept collective responsibility for the administrative acts 
of colleagues; united in subordination to a common leader; at once servants of the King 
and answerable to Parliament - herein was discovered a device for reconciling the 
historic position of an hereditary monarchy with the advancing claims of a Legislature, 
in part elected, but largely nominated by a territorial oligarchy.  But the new mechanism 
did not work easily until the Legislature had organized itself on party lines.  Very slowly 
was it [begin page 433] perceived that more or less organized parties were essential to 
the smooth and efficient working of parliamentary government.  Representative 
democracy as first elaborated in England rests upon a dual foundation; a Legislature 
which shall represent and be responsive to the wishes of the electorate; and an 
Executive responsible to the Legislature.  This twofold responsibility presupposes 
organization alike in the constituencies an in the representative assembly.  On what 
lines is such organization to proceed? 
 
'Idem sentire de republica was with them ("the best patriots in the greatest 
commonwealths") a principal ground of friendship and attachment; nor do I know any 
other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable, and more 
virtuous habitudes. . . . Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint 
endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all 
agreed.  For my part, I find it impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own 
politics, or thinks them to be of any right who refuses to adopt the means of having 
them reduced into practice.  It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark 
the proper ends of government.  It is the business of the politician, who is the 
philosopher in action, to find out proper means to those ends, and to employ them with 
effect.  Therefore, every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose to 
pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition 
as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and 
authority of the State.  As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to 
contend for these situations . . . men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think 
differently.  But still as the greater part of the measures which arise in the course of public business are related to, or dependent on, some great leading principles in 
government, a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political 
company if he does not agree with them nine times out of ten. . . . Thus the 
disagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom without 
violating concord or disturbing arrangement.  And this is all that ever was required for a 
character of the greatest uniformity and steadiness in [begin page 434] connexion.  How 
men can proceed without any connexion at all, is to me incomprehensible.' 
 
In this classical passage Burke has for all time presented the apology for party 
government.  Originally indited with a view to the contemporary situation, shrewdly 
thrusting at the weaknesses of conspicuous individuals, and relentlessly analysing the 
distempers from which in 1770 the body politic seemed to be suffering, the Thoughts 
on the Causes of the Present Discontents contains reflections, profound in their 
sagacity, and of enduring value.  But this reference to Burke anticipates the sequence 
of the argument.  
 
The Origin of English Parties. 
Various precise dates have been assigned to the rise of the historic parties which, 
under one designation or another, have, for nearly three centuries, confronted each 
other in, England.  Hallam traced the origin of Whigs and Tories to the struggle over the 
Exclusion Bill in 1679.  A more recent writer discovers the rise of parties in the 
ecclesiastical divisions which manifested themselves in Parliament after the passing of 
the Act of Uniformity under Elizabeth.  'The formation of sects consequent on this 
division,' he writes, 'by uniting in groups the adherents of the various religious 
persuasions, created the first political and parliamentary parties in England.’
2  In truth, 
the real genesis of the party system is to be found in the prolonged and acrimonious 
debates of the first sessions of the Long Parliament.  It was then that the two historic 
parties first began to define their position.  Roundheads and Cavaliers were the 
predecessors in title of Whigs and Tories, of Liberals and Conservatives.  The Whig 
party descends generically from the Puritans who, in 1640, ranged themselves under 
the leadership of Pym and Hampden against the 'Court' and the Laudian Bishops; the 
fons et origo of modern Toryism may be discovered in the party, consisting for the most 
part of devoted adherents of the Anglican Establishment, who were reluctantly 
compelled, by the increasing violence of the Puritans, and the 'Root and Branch' [begin 
page 435] attack upon Episcopacy, to espouse the cause of the Stuart monarchy.  The 
first 'party' division in the modern sense was taken on the Grand Remonstrance (22-3 
November 1641).  Pym carried his Remonstrance by 159 votes to 148, and Falkland, 
who led the opposition to it, was in consequence unwillingly obliged to accept the full 
responsibility for his action on that critical occasion, by taking office as Secretary of 
State and the virtual head of a 'Royalist' Ministry.  In those debates, in that division and 
its consequences, the party system originated.
3
 
Whigs and Tories. 
After the Restoration parties began to define themselves more and more distinctly, and 
the adoption, about 1679, of the labels 'Whig' and 'Tory' clinched the matter.  The actual 
names were as senseless and irrelevant as nicknames commonly are, but 
thenceforward, as Sir W.S. Gilbert taught, every Englishman born into the world was 
the destined occupant of one of two camps; he was either a little Liberal or a little 
Conservative. 
 
                                                  
2   [434/1]  Redlich, Parliamentary Procedure, i. 33-4. 
3   [435/1]  S.R. Gardiner prefers the division of the 8th of February 1641 upon the 
question of the abolition of Episcopacy (Hist. of England, ix. 281). There is not 
much between us; but my date is more strictly political. Hobbes and Locke. 
Meanwhile, Philosophy came to the aid of party politics.  Hobbes, in The Leviathan 
(1651)', so manipulated the doctrine of the 'Social Contract ' as to make it serve as the 
basis of that principle of the Royal Prerogative which lay at the root of the Stuart theory 
of Government.  The Tories of the Restoration period imbibed the doctrine, and found 
in it an apology for the dogma of 'Non-Resistance'.  John Locke, similarly saturated 
with the principles of the 'Social Contract', gave to those principles, in his Treatises on 
Civil Government (1691), a new interpretation, which supplied for the Whig theory of 
limited monarchy a sufficient philosophical apology.  'King James II having 
endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom by breaking the original 
contract between King and People . . . the throne is thereby vacant.'  So ran the 
famous resolution passed by the House of Commons on 28 January 1689.  It re-
echoed the doctrine preached by Locke, and the [begin page 436] Treatises of Locke 
consequently became the political Bible of the eighteenth-century.  Whigs - the 
champions of the ‘glorious' Revolution of 1688, and the vigilant guardians of the 
settlement based thereon. 
 
Parliament, the Public and the Press. 
Paradoxically, however, the years immediately succeeding the triumph of 1688 
exhibited Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons, at its worst.   
Emancipated and the from the control of the Crown, it had not yet become conscious of 
its responsibility to the electorate.  Unorganized, petulant, and overbearing, Parliament, 
as Lord Macaulay observed, then began to exhibit some of the worst symptoms of 
irresponsible autocracy.  Conscious of power, it manifested a curious incapacity to 
exercise it.  Anxious to maintain a continuous control over the Executive, it knew not 
how it was to be done.  The evolution of the Cabinet, and the gradual definition of the 
party system, eventually provided the instruments for lack of which Parliament could 
not at first make full use of the victory it had won.  In the meantime, despite its victory 
over the Executive, the Legislature found itself threatened by a serious rival.   
Notwithstanding the inequalities, the irregularities, and the anomalies of the system of 
representation, public opinion was becoming a potent political force.  Of the new force 
thus manifested legislators and ministers were alike compelled to take account.  But 
how was the populace to be reached, much less rationally influenced?  The 
pamphleteer stepped into the breach.  Queen Anne's reign was the heyday of the 
political pamphlet.  The heroics of the Puritan Revolution had found natural expression 
in the epic of Milton; the reaction of the Restoration in the satire of Dryden.  The 
ever-widening electorate of the nineteenth century obtained political nourishment from 
daily and weekly journalism.  The incipient parties of the eighteenth century looked for 
inspiration - and not in vain - to the pamphleteers: the Whigs to Defoe, Steele and 
Addison; the Tories to Swift and Atterbury, to Arbuthnot, Prior, and Bolingbroke.  
[begin page 437] 
 
For once a passing fashion secured for us a permanent endowment.  The transitory 
interests of the party leaders of Queen Anne's reign for all time enriched English 
literature.  Swift's greatest work was not, of course, done to the order of political 
patrons; nor was Addison's; but Swift's Conduct of the Allies has been described, not 
unjustly, as 'the most effective party pamphlet of the century'.  It certainly did more to 
commend to the country the Treaty of Utrecht than all the brilliant oratory of 
Bolingbroke. 
 
Yet in the evolution of English politics, and the gradual establishment of the party 
system, the significance of Bolingbroke's tempestuous and tragic career is second to 
none.  Endowed with almost every gift essential to success in the parliamentary arena - 
keen of intellect, eloquent alike with pen and tongue; with a mind richly stored, and with 
an immense capacity for work - his career nevertheless affords a warning rather than 
an example. 
 ‘Lord, what a world it is and how does fortune banter us.’  Fortune did indeed banter 
Bolingbroke.  Deprived, by the sudden death of Queen Anne, of place and power, he 
took up his pen, and the Letter to Sir William Wyndham (1717), The Dissertation upon 
Parties (1733), and The Patriot King (1749) (to mention only those works which are 
pertinent to the present argument) attest his ingenuity and his industry. 
 
Philosophical in form, these works are in fact elaborate party pamphlets.  They were all 
written with an immediate object: to vindicate Bolingbroke's political position, to regain 
for him power if, not place, and to provide the Tory party with a policy and a 
programme.  A brief experience of service under the Old Pretender had sufficed to 
convince Bolingbroke that it was not to St. Germain that the Tory party must look for the 
means of restoration to power, and that their only hope lay in a frank repudiation of the 
Stuart cause and of the doctrine of Divine right, upon Which philosophically that cause 
rested.  The Letter to Sir William Wyndham, written in 1717 but not published until after 
the author's death, was an elaborate [begin page 438] attempt to vindicate his own 
conduct in relation to his, party, and his party's policy in relation to the country.   
National in its composition and wholly patriotic in its aims, the Tory party had (so 
Bolingbroke argued) succeeded in bringing to a close a war which, while enriching the 
Whig merchants, was impoverishing the country and was no longer calculated to serve 
national interests.  He frankly admitted that the Peace of Utrecht, for the conclusion of 
which he was primarily responsible, was 'less answerable to the success of the war 
than it might and it ought to have been'.  Still it was preferable to the continuation of a 
Purposeless war.  Besides, the succession question was imminent and it was essential 
that in the crisis which might ensue the hands of the Government should not be tied by 
the preoccupation of a continental war.  In plain English, Bolingbroke wanted to be free 
to make terms either with Herrenhausen or St. Germain, as party interests might 
dictate.  But he was too late; the Queen's death was too sudden; the Whigs reaped the 
reward of preparation and promptitude; and the Tories were forced by the partisanship 
of King George to put their money on the Pretender.  The fiasco of 1715, inevitable in 
view of the circumstances disclosed by Bolingbroke, ought, he argued, to cure the 
Tories of any further leanings towards Jacobitism.  The sole hope for the future of the 
Party lay in final repudiation of the doctrine of Divine right and in frank acceptance of 
the 'revolution settlement' and the Hanoverian dynasty. 
 
Whig Ascendancy, 1715-60. 
The Tory Party was, however, slow to accept the cynical but sensible advice of 
Bolingbroke.  For nearly half a century the Whigs were in power.  Led by the great 
'revolution families', dominated by the territorial aristocracy, the Whig Party had also 
attached to itself the bulk of the new 'moneyed' interest, the Latitudinarian Churchmen, 
and all the Nonconformists.  Throughout the reigns of the first two Hanoverian kings 
their ascendancy was unshaken.  But Bolingbroke's untiring pen was gradually 
undermining their position.  Walpole might [begin page 439] withstand the attacks of The 
Craftsman, nor was he shaken in his seat by the Dissertation on Parties - a political 
tract under the thin disguise of an historical treatise; but The Patriot King, despite the 
superficiality of its philosophy, was profoundly influential in restoring the morale of the 
party which Bolingbroke had espoused. 
 
'For some years it formed the manual of a large body of enthusiasts.  From its pages 
George III derived the articles of his political creed.  On its precepts Bute modelled his 
conduct.  It called into being the faction known as the King's Friends.  It undoubtedly 
contributed to bring about that great revolution which transformed the Toryism of Filmer 
and Rochester into the Toryism of Johnson and Pitt.'
4
 
                                                  
4   [439/1]  C. Collins, Bolingbroke and Voltaire, c. iii. This passage contains a sound estimate of Bolingbroke's essential service to his party. 
As a political leader he was a failure. 'Three years of eager, unwise power, and thirty-
five of sickly longing and impotent regret - such or something like it, will ever be in this 
cold, modern world, the fate of an Alcibiades.' That is Walter Bagehot's caustic 
summary of this singular career, and if we have regard only to immediate and practical 
achievement it cannot be regarded as unfair. Yet it is poles asunder from the deliberate 
estimate of the most brilliant of Bolingbroke's successors in the leadership of the Tory 
Party. 
 
'He eradicated from Toryism all the absurd and odious doctrines which Toryism had 
adventitiously adopted, clearly developed its essential and permanent character, 
discarded jure divino, demolished passive obedience, threw to the winds the doctrine of 
non-resistance, placed the abolition of James and the accession of George on their 
right bases, and in the complete reorganization of the public mind, laid the foundation 
for the future accession of the Tory party to power and to that popular and triumphant 
career which must ever await the policy of an administration inspired by the spirit of our 
free and ancient institutions.
5
 
In this characteristic passage the young Disraeli paid just tribute to the influence of his 
predecessor.  [begin page 440] 
 
 
Disraeli and Bolingbroke. 
Wherein lay the affinity between these two eminent ‘schoolmasters of the Tory Party'?  
It is not far to seek.  Compare the following passages. 
 
‘The State is become, under ancient and known forms, a new and 
undefinable monster; composed of a King without monarchical splendour, a 
Senate of Nobles without aristocratical independence, and a Senate of 
Commons without democratical freedom.' 
 
So wrote Bolingbroke in The Dissertation on Parties.  Disraeli, in reference to the 
middle period of the eighteenth century, wrote: 
 
'It could no longer be concealed that, by virtue of a plausible phrase, power 
had been transferred from the Crown to a Parliament, the members of 
which were appointed by an extremely limited and exclusive class, who 
owned no responsibility to the country, who debated and voted in secret, 
and who were regularly paid by the small knot of great families that by this 
machinery had secured the permanent possession of the King's Treasury.  
Whiggism was putrescent in the nostrils of the nation.
6
 
To Disraeli as to Bolingbroke the 'Venetian oligarchy’ was anathema.  In 1688 the 
Whigs had usurped the power of the State, their ascendancy was confirmed by the 
coup d’état of 1714, and thenceforward for a good half-century they resisted all 
assaults upon the citadel of Whiggism.  The breach effected in 1770 was due partly to 
the disintegration in the work of the Whig party - to their break-up into family groups, to 
the corruption which had indeed become 'putrescent'; partly to the persistence of 
George III, determined to reassert the authority of the Crown; partly to the detachment 
of the elder Pitt; partly to the growing influence of the unrepresented classes; but not 
least to the untiring literary activity by which, deprived of other means, Bolingbroke had 
endeavoured to reanimate the spirit of his party, and to provide them with a practical 
programme and a political ideal.  Those efforts at last fructified, when, in 1770, Lord 
                                                  
5   [439/2]  Vindication of the English Constitution, p. 188. 
6   [440/1]  Sybil, c. iii. [begin page 441] North came into power and inaugurated a half-century of virtually 
continuous Tory ascendancy. 
 
That half-century (1770-1832) covered one of the most momentous periods of English 
history: the loss of the American colonies; the dissolution of the first Empire, the 
foundation of a second; in Ireland, the trial and failure of the Grattan Parliament, the 
rebellion, the union, and catholic emancipation; the prolonged struggle with 
revolutionary and Napoleonic France; the slow but sure recovery after the devastations 
of war; the passing of the old agricultural England; the emergence of a new industrial 
England; finally, and from the standpoint of this chapter not least significant, the clear 
definition of the party system and the firm establishment of parliamentary government.  
In 1770 the parliamentary system was still in the balance; by 1832 the scales had quite 
definitely tilted, and the principle of representative democracy was firmly established. 
 
Edmund Burke. 
To this consummation Walpole had contributed much; Pitt the younger had contributed 
even more.  The pivot of parliamentary, as opposed to presidential democracy, is a 
Premier.  From Pitt's day onwards England has been governed by a series of first 
ministers.  But if Pitt left an imperishable mark on the development of English 
Constitutionalism in its practical, administrative aspect, it was Burke who provided for 
all time the philosophical apology upon which - that singular form of government funda-
mentally rests.  Of all commentators upon the English Constitution Burke is 
incomparably the greatest.  He penetrates farthest into the recesses of its peculiar 
genius, and with unfaltering sagacity and insight reveals the spirit which animates the 
working of its institutions.  If reverence be the essence of Conservatism, Burke was the 
greatest Conservative that ever lived.  He is even more than that; he is the central 
figure in the evolution of the party system.  Pre-eminent as the apologist of party 
government, Burke was at once a Whig of the Whigs, and of all Conservatives the most 
rational and philosophical.  [begin page 442] 
 
That he was an infallible guide to the solution of contemporary problems it would be 
rash and indeed untrue to affirm: on many of the subjects which gave occasion to his 
speeches he was inadequately informed; but he never touched a question without 
enriching the discussion by reflections of permanent value. 
 
Illustrations will readily suggest themselves even from the writings more strictly relevant 
to the subject in hand.  Take the Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, 
or the Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, or the Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol.  In 
the first, Burke may have exaggerated the significance of the symptoms which he 
diagnosed: yet he pierced to the heart of the political situation: he perceived that the 
distemper of the time arose from the fact that the House of Commons, internally 
disorganized, was out of touch even with the electorate it was supposed to represent, 
and still more with the growing force of public opinion, which had been the support and 
strength of the elder Pitt in his prime. 
 
Burke shrank characteristically from the appropriate remedy - an extension of the 
franchise and a redistribution of seats - although he accurately diagnosed the seat of 
the disease.  The remedy he preferred was administrative and economic reform, 
together with a reorganization of parties and a revival of party government. 
 
'When, through the medium of this just connexion with their constituents, 
the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is restored, it will begin to 
think of its old office of control.  It will not suffer that last of evils to 
predominate in the country, men without popular confidence, public opinion, 
natural connexion or mutual trust, invested with all the powers of 
government.' 
 The 'fundamentals' of the historic constitution he would not touch. 
 
'Never will I cut it in pieces and put it into the cauldron of any magician, in 
order to boil it with the puddle of their compounds into youth and vigour; on 
the contrary, I will drive [begin page 443] away such pretenders; I will nurse 
its venerable age and with lenient arts extend a parent's breath.' 
 
Bentham and Modern Liberalism. 
That is the authentic voice of Burke: genuine in his Bentham, passionate in his 
conservatism.  But for the greater part of the nineteenth century the dominant voice in 
English politics was not Edmund Burke's, but Jeremy Bentham's.  Bentham it was who 
inspired the philosophical Radicalism which, in combination with the personal survival 
of Whiggism, gave to the new Liberal Party a half-century of political ascendancy.  For 
the new Liberalism laisser faire provided a compact and convenient formula, and from 
the passing of the first Reform Bill in 1832 to the passing of the third in 1884-5 the 
continuity of Liberal rule was hardly interrupted save by Peel's ministry (1841-6) and 
Disraeli's (1874-80).  The truth is that the differences of principle between the two 
historic parties lessened during this period almost to the vanishing point.  Peel, though 
he collected around him a gifted group, did not reconstitute a shattered party.  Disraeli 
emphatically did; and he reconstituted it on the basis of the philosophy of Burke.  To 
him, as to Burke, the utilitarian philosophy of the State was anathema: 'in order to make 
their politics practical, they are obliged to make their metaphysics impossible.'  'If 
government is not divine,' he said in 1868, 'it is nothing.  It is a mere affair of the police 
office, of the tax-gatherers, of the guard-room.' 
 
The choice of a political party is no doubt largely temperamental, but the temperament 
depends upon adherence, largely unconscious, to a particular theory of the State and 
the relation of the individual thereto.  Political institutions are the outward and visible 
signs of an inward philosophy of government.  The English people have in the course 
of centuries evolved a form of government, unknown to the ancient world, and in the 
modern world peculiar to themselves.  That Constitution has, during the last one 
hundred years, been extensively copied - in some cases with disastrous disregard for 
the presuppositions [begin page 444] which alone rendered its success possible in the 
country origin.  Parliamentary Government is of all forms of Constitution the most 
delicate in its adjustments and, therefore, the most easily thrown out of gear.   
Depending, for the most part, upon conventions; perpetually adapting itself to new 
conditions, social and political; subject to continuous modification in detail, it demands 
from those responsible for its working unceasing vigilance, a clear apprehension alike 
of practical conditions and of philosophical implications; above all it demands a 
reverence almost religious in character, for the inner spirit which ha inspired and still 
informs it. 
 
Among the practical conditions essential to the working of Parliamentary Government 
not the least important is efficient Party organization.  In the home of Parliamentary 
Government that truth is consciously or unconsciously realized.  Consequently, in 
England the supremacy of the Party system, though not unchallenged, has remained 
unbroken. 
 
Third Parties: the Irish Separatists. 
Its operation has, however, been complicated during the last forty years by the rise of a 
third Party, or rather of two 'Third' Parties in succession.  From 1885 to 1914 the Irish 
Nationalists, led by Parnell, formed a compact body of some eighty members.  The 
Unionists were from 1886 to 1905, and the Radicals from 1906 to 1910, sufficiently 
numerous to ignore them; but when the two historic parties were more evenly balanced 
- as in 1885 and 1892-5 - the Irish Party exercised a considerable, and from 1910-14 a 
dominating, influence upon the parliamentary situation. 
 The Labour Socialists. 
In 1906 a new portent appeared on the stage of Westminster.  A group of twenty-nine 
members, elected under the auspices of the Labour Representation Committee, were 
returned to Parliament at the General Election of that year.  The formation of the new 
group was the outcome of a Conference (February 1900) on the question of direct 
labour representation, called by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union 
Congress, and attended by [begin page 445] representatives of the Independent Labour 
Party, - the Fabian Society, and the Social Democratic Federation, as well as by trade 
union delegates.  The first-named society had been formed at Bradford in 1893, largely 
through the efforts of Mr. Keir Hardie, the Secretary of the Lanarkshire Miners Union, 
who in 1892 was returned to the House of Commons, as an avowed Socialist, for West 
Ham.  The joint Conference of 1900 resolved 'to establish a distinct labour group in 
Parliament, who shall have their own whips, and agree upon their own policy, which 
must embrace a readiness to co-operate with any party which for the time being may 
be engaged in promoting legislation in the direct interest of labour'. 
 
Progress of the Socialist Party. 
This new Party descends intellectually from Karl Marx and Henry George, and it has in 
consequence declared war alike upon the Radical capitalist and the Tory landlord.   
From Marx and his doctrine of 'surplus value' the hand-worker learnt to believe that 
under a system of 'wage slavery' he was perpetually exploited by that 'unconscious 
thief’ the owner of capital; from George's Progress and Poverty the landless man 
learned that there could be no amelioration in the lot of the poor so long as the 
institution of private property in land cumbered the earth and impeded the progress of 
society.  The progress of the party which demands the socialization of all the 
instruments of production, distribution, and exchange has been astonishingly rapid.  Its 
electoral progress can be most clearly indicated by the following table, which refers 










1900   15   2   62,698 
1906  50   29   323,195 
1910 Jan.   78   40   505,690 
1910 Dec.   56   42   370,802 
1918  361   57   2,244,945 
1922   414   142   4,236,733 
1923   427   191  4,348,379 
1924   514   151   5,487,620 
 
In 1900-1 the Party claimed a membership of only [begin page 446] 375,932 persons, 
and of these only a very small proportion supported it at the polls.  By 1920 it had 
reached a membership of 4,359,807 - the highest figure yet touched.  By 1924 it had 
fallen to 3,194,399 - reflecting very closely the rise and fall in Trade Union membership 




After the General Election of 1918 the Labour Part numbering 57 members as against 
33 non-Coalition Liberals, claimed to occupy the front Opposition Bench and their 
leaders did in fact share it with the Liberals.  In 1922 the Socialists almost doubled their 
vote in the country, as compared with 1918, and having contested no fewer than 414 
seats, returned to the House 142 strong.  In the election of 1923 they further increased 
their representation to 191.  The Liberals, impelled towards reunion by Mr. Baldwin's 
programme of Protection, numbered 159, and combined with the Socialists to defeat 
                                                  
7   [446/1]  3,158002 out of the total enumerated above. the Conservative Government, which could count only on 258 supporters.  As a result 
of the hostile, though composite, majority opposed to him, Mr. Baldwin resigned, and 
the Socialists formed an administration under the premiership of Mr. Ramsay 
Macdonald.  But, dependent on Liberal sufferance, their tenure of office was 
precarious, and when, in the early autumn of 1924, the Liberal support was withdrawn, 
Mr. Macdonald's Government was defeated and he appealed to the country.  The 
electorate, tired alike of coalitions and of minority government, returned a solid phalanx 
of about 420 Conservatives.  The Socialist representation, despite the fact that More 
seats than ever were challenged, was reduced from 191 to 151.  The Liberals fared 
even worse: they lost over 100 seats and appeared in the new Parliament an 
attenuated and disunited group of only 40 members. 
 
It would seem then that in Parliament things are once more tending towards the historic 
two-party system, with only this difference: that the Socialists have displaced [begin 




His Majesty’s Opposition. 
Such an Opposition, always providing the nucleus of an alternative Government, is the 
natural corollary of the evolution of Party Government.  Its existence corresponds, 
moreover, to a deeply rooted instinct in the intellectual and social equipment of the 
English people.  The national love of games emphasizes the idea of rivalry between 
opposing teams.  The same spirit has long since manifested itself in politics.  The Red 
Rose and the White were symbols of opposing policies even more than of hostile 
dynasties: Cavalier and Roundhead, Jacobite and Hanoverian, were the natural 
ancestors of Tory and Whig, Conservative and Liberal. 
 
‘Fundamentals and Circumstantials.’ 
Between the latter parties differences were not, however, fundamental.  They might 
differ as to the expediency of a particular policy, but down to 1867 the parliamentary 
contests were fought out between men who, though labelled respectively Tories and 
Whigs, all belonged to the same social class, had been educated in the same schools 
and universities, had been fellow officers in the same regiments -in fine, represented 
broadly the same general outlook upon life.  The appearance first of a strong party of 
Irish Separatists, and, later, of a still stronger party of British Socialists, has brought 
about a transformation in the political scene.  Between Conservative and Socialist the 
difference is not a difference in methods of administration: it goes down to the roots of 
social life and economic organization.  They differ, in Cromwell's phrase, not on 
'Circumstantials', but on 'Fundamentals' - on principles which affect the ultimate 
construction of society. 
 
Cromwell held that agreement on 'Fundamentals' was essential to the success of 
parliamentary government.  The lack of such agreement brought disaster to his own 
experiments in that difficult art.  Whether fundamental differences will once again result 
in the breakdown of [begin page 448] parliamentary government, or whether, as is more 
likely some basis of reconciliation is evolved between creeds which, in terms at least, 
are diametrically opposed, time alone will show.  In the United States of America the 
economic problem has been, to a large extent, solved the diffusion of capital among 
the wage-earners.  Diffusion has gone much farther even in England than is commonly 
suspected.  A clearer apprehension of basic economic principles may be expected to 
follow on a widening of practical experience of proprietorship.  But, be these things as 
they may, the party system will disappear only with the decadence of parliamentary 
government.  Of such decadence there are indeed symptoms already in; countries 
                                                  
8    [447/1]  The coining of this phrase is commonly attributed to John Cam 
Hobhouse, and is dated about 1830. where the essentials of party government have never yet been adequately appreciated.  
In England, on the contrary, the portents, despite what has been said above, are 
distinctly favourable.  Even a brief taste of official responsibility has wrought a marked 
change in the attitude of the Socialist Party towards representative institutions.  The 
principles of Syndicalism and of Direct Action still have their apostles, and should those 
principles obtain wide acceptance parliamentary government would obviously be 
doomed; but the signs of the times, so far as it is possible to discern them, do not point 
in that direction. 
 
Extra-Parliamentary Party Organisation. 
The organization of political parties now extends far beyond the walls of Westminster.  
If the development of parliamentary government has carried with it the corollary of party 
organization in Parliament, the extension of the suffrage has necessitated similar 
organization in the constituencies.  The term 'Caucus' - if not the thing itself was, 
however, an importation from a country which, though frankly democratic, has never 
adopted the parliamentary type of democracy.  Party organization was from the earliest 
days of the Republic far more elaborate in the United States than it has ever been, until 
quite recently, in England.  Wheels within wheels have given [begin page 449] impetus 
to the 'machine' which, in turn, has dominated political life in that country.  But the 
history and organization of American parties must not be permitted to detain us.  For 
their detailed operations reference must be made to the great monograph of 
Ostrogorski,
9 and for a general view of the importance of party organization in America 
to the classical works of Bryce. 
 
Recent Development. 
Until after the passing of the first Reform Act (1832) there was little extra-parliamentary 
organization in English politics.  The borough constituencies contained few electors; 
they well knew the market value of a vote, and, where they were free to vote as they 
chose, almost invariably obtained it.  Generally speaking, as we have seen, the 
boroughs were the property of great territorialists or Indian Nabobs.  The forty-shilling 
freeholders in the counties were more independent: but the aggregate number of 
electors was so small as to render elaborate organization superfluous. 
 
Matters changed after 1832, and more rapidly after 1867.  Both parties began, after 
1832, to form local associations to assist in the registration of voters and the conduct of 
elections.  In 1861 the Liberal Party started a central organization known as the 'Liberal 
Registration Association’, and in 1867 the Conservatives established the ‘National 
Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations’, in close alliance with the Party 
Whips and their central Conservative office.  This has continued to be the central 
governing body of the latter party down to the present time, though to meet the 
changing facts of the electoral situation its machinery has been completely 
democratized.  
 
The Birmingham Caucus. 
Party organization, outside Parliament in the modern sense, really dates from the 
success of the Liberal Association organized, on a completely representative basis, at 
Birmingham, in the late 'seventies, by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and his able coadjutor, 
Mr. Schnadhorst.  Never [begin page 450] before had party discipline been so strictly 
enforced; the result was seen in the capture of all three seats - despite the restricted 
vote and 'minority' representation - by the Radical Party.  The success of the 
Birmingham ‘Six Hundred' (as it was locally called), naturally led to imitation, first by the 
Liberal and afterwards by the Conservative Party.  In 1877 a Conference met at 
                                                  
9   [449/1]  Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, by M. Ostrogorski 
(Eng. trans). London, 1902. Birmingham which resulted in the formation of the 'National Federation of Liberal 
Associations’, or 'National Liberal Federation'. For some time this new and 
democratically organized machine existed side by side with the central, Liberal 
Association, but before long the newer virtually absorbed the older association. 
 
Local Organization 
There is now little difference between the organization of the two older parties.  From 
the unit of the Ward or Polling Station, through the local association of the Borough or 
County division, up to the Central Union or Federation, it is throughout on a 
representative basis.  As the ward committee or association sends its elected 
delegates to the local association, so the latter sends them to the central Council and 
Annual Meeting. 
 
In almost every constituency some such organization exists, and generally commands 
the services of a full-time party agent.  Some constituencies have women organizers as 
well as male agents.  The admission of women to the franchise plainly necessitated an 
overhauling of the party machinery: but no uniformity has, as yet, resulted.  Each 
constituency, though amenable to advice from Headquarters, is autonomous, and the 
local arrangements consequently vary.  In some constituencies the associations are 
open to men and women indifferently; in others each sex has its completely separate 
organization; in others the two organizations co-operate and, for certain purposes (as 
for instance the selection of candidates), combine. 
 
Agents. 
With the enormous extension of the electorate the work of the party agent tends to 
become increasingly important, and consequently political agency is rapidly becoming 
a regular and organized profession.  The agent is, as a rule, [begin page 451] the 
servant of the local organization, though occasionally, where local organization is 
embryonic or non-existent, an agent is appointed and paid, wholly or partly, by the 
central organization of the party.  The Labour Party, more frequently than the older 
parties, contributes to the salaries of agents.  The relations of the agent with the 
member or candidate are necessarily close and confidential, and the latter, therefore, is 
frequently consulted as to his appointment, and often contributes, directly or indirectly, 
to his salary.  The party agent commonly acts also as the election agent of the selected 
candidate: but not necessarily; for the latter appointment is a legal one and must be 
made on the sole nomination of the candidate.  The functions of an election agent are 
highly responsible, delicate, and even dangerous: and candidates sometimes refer to 
act as their own agents, as they are legally entitled to do.  Such a course may curtail 
their legal abilities, but it must increase a strain which is, in any case, exceedingly 
severe. 
 
Functions of Local Organisations. 
The primary purpose of all local organizations is, of course, to achieve, and having 
achieved to maintain, a majority in the constituency, and so to return the selected 
candidate of the party to Parliament.  This purpose they seek to attain in three main 
ways: first, by constant attention to the register of parliamentary and local government 
electors; secondly, by the holding of periodical meetings, the issue of 'literature' and 
other means of propaganda; and, not least important, by the selection of suitable 
candidates both for parliamentary and local lections. 
 
Parties and Local Elections. 
With local-government elections - for County, Municipal, District, and Parish Councils -
this chapter cannot concern itself; but incidentally it may be said that there is an 
increasing tendency, despite all protestations to the contrary, to run such elections on 
strict party lines.  This is much less true of rural than of urban districts, but the socialist challenge to the fundamentals of society has greatly emphasized a tendency already 
sufficiently notice- [begin page 452] able.  As a result, the organization of local elections 
tends to fall more and more into the hands of local political associations and their 
professional agents, to whose duties they constitute a serious addition. 
 
The Electoral Register. 
The preparation of the Register is by the Act of 1918 committed to an official 
Registration Officer - the Clerk to the County Council and the Town Clerk for counties 
an boroughs respectively - whose duty it is to prepare an publish a complete register of 
qualified electors in the spring and autumn of each year.  Formerly this duty was 
performed, in some cases rather negligently, by the overseers, whose work was 
revised in periodical courts held by barristers specially appointed for the purpose.  Part 
agents were accustomed to appear before the 'Revising Barrister', and press or resist 
the claims of the partisans of their respective parties.  This, indeed, constituted a 
considerable part of the agent's work, and he still performs it, though under 
circumstances which have greatly diminished both his labour and his responsibility, 
despite the fact that there are two editions of the register in the year instead of one.
10  
The official preparation of the lists is far more thorough and systematic than it used to 
be; yet the agent's function is not, even yet, superfluous. 
 
Propaganda. 
Much more important, however, and much more continuous, is the work of 'educating' 
the electorate in the principles of the several parties.  This work is done partly by 
holding meetings, formal and informal, partly by the circulation of party 'literature', partly 
through the medium of the local press, largely in the local clubs, and in connexion with 
every species of entertainment from a whist-drive to a dance.  All parties have, in this 
last respect, followed the lead of the Primrose League, an elaborate organization, 
founded in 1883 by Lord Randolph Churchill and his colleagues of the 'Fourth Party', to 
perpetuate the memory and the principles of Lord Beaconsfield.  Derided for its 
fantastic revival of neo-chivalry – [begin page 453] its hierarchy of Grand Masters and 
Ruling Councillors, Knights, and Dames, its banners and orders and decorations - the 
Primrose League has nevertheless taught the organizers of all parties lessons which 
they have been quick to learn, namely first to attract an audience, then to amuse it, and 
finally to instruct it.  Easier social intercourse between all classes was one of the 
primary aims of a League which has now a record of forty years' work behind it.   
Denounced by opponents as the' exploitation of snobbery', it has largely justified the 
hopes of those far-sighted Tories who perceived that the rapid extension of the 
electorate necessitated the adoption of new methods of political persuasion. 
 
Auxiliary Political Organisations. 
The Primrose League is, however, only one among many auxiliary organizations which 
have been established to promote one or more of the objects dear to the several 
parties.  The Conservative Party enjoys the help of the 'Junior Imperial League', the 
'Young Conservative Association', the 'Association of Conservative Clubs', and many 
similar associations.  The Liberal Party has the 'Eighty Club' (a counterpart of the 
Conservative 'United Club') the 'Union of University Liberal Societies'; the 'National 
Reform Union'; the 'National League of Young Liberals'; the 'Liberal Research 
Department'; and similar organizations.  The Conservatives have their ‘Philip Stott 
College', a fine country mansion in Northamptonshire, dedicated by the generosity of 
Sir Philip Stott to the political education of Conservative workers.  The Liberals 
organize their peripatetic 'Summer Schools'.  The Socialists have their still more highly 
organized 'Labour Colleges'. 
                                                  
10   [452/1]  Again reduced to one by the Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
1926, 16 & 17 George V, c. 9.  
This rapid, and far from exhaustive, enumeration at least points to the amazing 
increase of educational and propagandist activities, among all political parties, in recent 
years.  The work is done partly by volunteers, partly by paid workers.  It is said - and 
greatly to their credit - that in the Socialist Party every individual member is a voluntary 
propagandist, and their opportunities [begin page 454] for propaganda are in some 
obvious respects vast superior to those enjoyed by the older parties. 
 
Labour-Socialist Party Organisation. 
The organization of the Labour-Socialist Party differs substantially from that of Liberals 
and Conservatives.  It is at once more rigid and less uniform.  Discipline (as, for 
instance, in the selection of candidates and in control over the action of members) is 
much more strictly enforced; but on the other hand local organization is much less 
complete.  Only in about one-fifth of the constituencies is there at present (1925) a 
regular party agent; though in some thirty-five other constituencies there is an agent 
appointed by one or other of the various 'affiliated organizations'.
11  It is proposed that 
candidates for appointment as agents shall be suitably trained and examined and shall 
be engaged under a regularized form of agreement between the Divisional Labour 
Party, as the employing body, and the agent.  The proposed scale of remuneration for 
Labour Party agents is £260 per annum (in addition to necessary expenses), with 
annual increment, of £10 up to £310.  This scale does not materially differ from that 
obtaining in the other parties, though the maximum salary paid to Conservative agents 
is considerably in excess of the latter amount. 
 
Like the older parties the Labour Party has its central office, under a National Agent, 
who is assisted by the chief woman officer and an appropriate staff.  The Central Office 
is in close touch with the party in Parliament, the connexion being maintained by the 
appointment of the Secretary of the Labour Party
12 as Chief Whip in the House of 
Commons.  Great Britain is mapped out into ten Districts (the Universities forming one), 
each under its own organizer, while the base of the pyramid is formed by no fewer than 
1130 divisional and local Labour Parties and Trade Councils.  Out of the 602 
constituencies in [begin page 455] Great Britain there are now only two in which some 
form of Labour Party organization does not exist. 
 
Finance. 
For financial sustenance the party depends not, like the older parties, on the 
contributions of a comparatively small number of wealthy individuals, but on 'affiliation 
fees' paid by societies affiliated to the Labour Party.  In the year ending 31st December 
1924 the fees from local Labour Parties and Trade Councils amounted to £1,189 15s. 
4d., and from Trade Unions and Socialist Societies, £36,079 10s. 1d.  Of affiliated 
Socialist Societies there are only seven, and of these only the Independent Labour 
Party, which claims 30,000 members, has a membership of over 2,000, while three do 
not exceed 500.  It will be seen, therefore, that the Trade Unions are still, as they have 
been from the first, the backbone of the Labour Party.  The membership of the latter 
rises and falls with the membership of the former, and the value of their support may be 
judged from the fact that in fourteen of the largest Trade Unions, with a total 
membership of over 1,800,00, only 43,430 individuals claimed exemption, under the 
Trade Union Act of 1913,
13 from the political levy.  The votes cast for the several parties 
                                                  
11   [454/1]    Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Conference of the Labour Party 
(1925), PP. 327. 
12   [454/2]  At present the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P., late Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs, to whom the writer wishes to acknowledge his obligations for 
information courteously afforded. 
13   [455/1]  2 & 3 George V, c. 30. at Parliamentary Elections compel the inference that there are many thousands of 
Trade Unionists who vote Liberal or Conservative, but who either do not realize, or do 
not think it expedient to exercise, the right to exemption which they possess and might 
enjoy under the Act Of 1913.  Further discussion of this point might, however, lead to 
entanglement in current controversies, such as are quite outside the scope of this work. 
 
Party Whips. 
The immediate object of all political organizations is, as already stated, the return of 
members of Parliament in sympathy with the several parties controlling them.  To this 
end the most important step is the selection of suitable candidates.  In former days this 
selection was, to the last degree, haphazard.  A local magnate or his nominee would be 
the first and most obvious choice.  [begin page 456] Failing such a candidate the matter 
rested largely in the hands of the Patronage Secretary to the Treasury, a minister 
whose office dates significantly from 1714.  This official has, since the eighteenth 
century, acted as the Chief Whip of the party in power, and his multifarious, delicate 
and exacting duties call for personal qualities not always found in combination in 
common clay.  But not out common clay is the ideal Whip made.  He must know all the 
members of his party and all that can be known about them; their idiosyncrasies, their 
habits, their weaknesses (if they have any), and the ambitions (when they exist) of their 
families.  His hand must be of iron, but the velvet glove must be habitually worn and 
rarely doffed.  He must be strong as adamant, but tactful and conciliating; slow to, but 
not incapable of, wrath.  He is the chief liaison officer between the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet on the one side, and the rank and file of the party on the other.  The 
confidant of the former as regards policy and procedure, he must judge how much he 
can safely confide to the latter. 
 
Candidates. 
Formerly master of the machine, both in and out of Parliament the Chief Whip shares 
his extra-parliamentary functions with the Chief Agent or Organizer and the Chairman 
of the Party.
14  Extra-parliamentary organization has, indeed, become so elaborate of 
late that the functions have now been largely differentiated, though the connexion 
must, unless party disaster is to ensue, be both closely and continuously maintained.  
Communications with the constituencies, the direction of propaganda, and the 
arrangement of party meetings are now mainly in the hands of the central office.  In 
particular, 'Head-quarters' is, in the last resort, responsible for the provision of 
candidates.  Central control, in this matter, has been carried farthest by the Labour 
Party, least far by the Conservatives.  Every candidate recognized by the Labour Party 
[begin page 457] must be approved by the National Executive and must formally 
subscribe to the party programme.  'Who pays the piper calls the tune.'  Discipline is 
less difficult to enforce when the party officials control the purse strings.
15  In this, as in 
other parties, some freedom of choice is permitted to local organizations, but only 
within the limits prescribed by the rules of the party. 
 
In the Conservative Party the final selection of the candidates invariably rests with the 
Local Association, except in the few cases where no such Association exists.  If a 
candidate cannot be found locally, application is made to the Central Office, which 
generally submits two or three more or less suitable names.  'Good' seats are, as a 
rule, filled without any recourse to Head-quarters; for 'hopeless' or very doubtful 
                                                  
14   [456/1]  Titles and, to a less extent, the articulation of functions differ in the three 
parties, but not materially, and the above description may be taken to describe all 
three with sufficient accuracy. 
15   [457/1]  Election funds are, in the Labour as in the older parties, locally raised, 
with contributions of varying amounts from the central funds; but it is by the 
Party, local or central, that funds are found. constituencies, the Central Office generally has to find both candidates and funds.  The 
same is true of the Liberal Party, but financial assistance to candidates is more 
common in the Liberal than in the Conservative ranks.  Socialist candidates are 
generally financed by the party either from local or from central funds; in largest part, 
as already indicated, from the funds of the Trade Unions. 
 
Local Associations and the M.P.s 
The relations between Local Associations and candidates by no means cease with the 
election of the latter to Parliament.  The payment of members, first introduced in 1911, 
has undoubtedly produced some change in the status of Members of Parliament, and 
has tended to modify their relations with their constituencies.  The latter not unnaturally 
look for a more assiduous performance of parliamentary duties from stipendiary 
legislators than from their unpaid predecessors; and the independence of members 
has unquestionably been, in some measure, impaired.  But, in this matter, much 
obviously depends upon the financial relations between the member and his Local 
Association.  When a member has won the seat without assistance from local funds, 
and when, as is [begin page 458] common, he also contributes largely to the upkeep of 
the local organization, he need not apprehend much interference from the 'caucus', 
though he naturally maintains a close touch with it and with the local officials of his 
party.  Too frequent indulgence in independent action in Parliament may, of course, 
evoke a protest from the 'caucus', and if persisted in against the wishes of the latter 
may eventuate in a refusal to endorse the candidature of the sitting member at the next 
election, or even, in an extreme case, in a demand for immediate resignation.  The 
doctrine of the 'recall' has not yet, however, been embodied in English political practice, 
and a member is not under any legal obligation to accede to the demand that he should 
forthwith vacate his seat; but he may, under certain circumstances, feel morally 
constrained to do so.  Should he feel obliged, in the course of a Parliament, to ‘cross 
the floor’ or in other words to change his party allegiance, he would ordinarily apply for 
the Chiltern Hundreds, and so vacate his seat.
16  He would then be free to offer or not 
to offer himself for re-election at his discretion.  But, as a rule, such quarrels between a 
member and his Local Association are patched up until the dissolution.  Discipline, it 
should be added, is much stricter in the Socialist Party than in either of the two older 
parties; but even in the older parties a member who is financially dependent upon the 
party is naturally under stricter discipline than a member who is not, though all 
members alike are subject to the discipline of the division lists. 
 
The discipline of Division Lists. 
Those lists were first published in 1836, and their publication has inevitably tended in 
the direction deplored by Burke.  Even now, however, a man of character, who 
maintains cordial relations with his constituents, need not and does not regard himself 
as a mere delegate. 
 
'Faithful watchers', as Burke finely said, 'we ought to be over the rights and privileges of 
the people.  But our duty, if [begin page 459] we are qualified for it as we ought, is to 
give them information and not to receive it from them. . . . I reverentially look up to the 
opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious. . . . but to the detail 
of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough 
of speculation in the closet nor of experience of business to decide upon it.'
17
 
                                                  
16    [458/1]  The Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds (an obsolete office) is 
technically a place of profit under the Crown, the acceptance of which 
automatically renders a seat vacant.  A member cannot technically ‘resign'. 
17   [459/1]    Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliament:  Works 
(ed.1826), x. 76. Cf. Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, vi. 116. ‘if,' he said elsewhere, 'we do not give confidence to [the] minds [of our representatives] 
and a liberal scope to their understandings; if we do not permit our members to act 
upon a very enlarged view of things; we shall at length infallibly degrade our national 
representation into a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency.'
18
 
Such sentiments may sound harshly in the ears of modern electors.  Conditions have 
fundamentally altered since Burke's day; yet, despite increased publicity, despite the 
development of means of communication, despite the regular and almost continuous 
intercourse between members and their constituents, Burke's ideal remains true, and 
the more enlightened the constituency the less will it seek to hamper in the detailed 
discharge of his duties a member to whom it has really given its confidence.  A member 
owes to his constituency something more than assiduity in attendance in Parliament, 
something more than regular participation in local functions; he owes to them the fruits 
of ripe experience, of specialized study, and of balanced judgement.  This, rather than 
the other, wise constituents will look for, and, if forthcoming, will appreciate. 
 
A Paradox. 
Yet the philosopher who was most insistent in his claim A for the personal 
independence of Members of Parliament Paradox was also most emphatic in 
commendation of the system of Party Government.  But that system presupposes, as 
we have already argued, agreement upon fundamentals.  A foreign publicist, writing in 
1907, emphasized this truth in a passage so striking as to justify quotation. 
 
‘To speak paradoxically, England possessed and still [begin page 460] possesses its 
system of Party Government through a Parliamentary Cabinet, by reason of its lack of 
parties in the Continental sense, because it is free from all internal contests which 
threaten national unity or attack the political and constitutional foundations upon which 
the Government of the Kingdom rests.'
19
 
Must we then, take final refuge in a paradox?  Are we to ascribe the success of Party 
Government in England to the relative paucity of parties?  For the converse proposition 
there would undoubtedly be much to be said.  Dr. Redlich would at least seem to be 
justified in ascribing the relative instability of Parliamentary institutions in certain 
continental countries, not merely to the existence of differences too fundamental for 
adjustment in a Representative Assembly, but also to the multiplication of parties and 
groups.  Sir Courtenay Ilbert, a particularly close observer of our own Parliamentary 
Constitution, has declared that the Cabinet system presupposes not only a party 
system but a two-party system.  He is thus in substantial agreement with the 
exceptionally competent foreign critic.  Nor can it be questioned that England has thus 
far been exceedingly fortunate in avoiding the multiplication of Parliamentary groups.  
'Third' parties have, from time to time, appeared upon the Parliamentary stage; more 
than once they have necessitated Coalition Ministries; but England has manifested little 
love for Coalitions, and electoral pressure has operated in favour of coalescence.  Thus 
have the traditions of Representative Government been maintained, and the stability of 
Parliamentary institutions assured. 
 
Success and Stupidity. 
An explanation less flattering to national complacency and was, indeed, suggested by 
Walter Bagehot.  Writing from Paris in 1852 in defence of the coup d'état of Louis 
Napoleon, he raised the question whether Parliamentary institutions were not apt to 
succeed with a stupid people and founder with a ready-witted and vivacious people?  
Take the Romans, he said, 'They are the great political people [begin page 461] of 
history.  Now is not a certain dullness their most visible characteristic?'  Compared with 
                                                  
18   [459/2]  Speech at Bristol, 1780, iii. 360-1. 
19   [460/1]  Redlich, op. cit., i. 129. the nimble-witted Greeks where are the Romans in speculation, in abstract science, in 
literature? 
 
'Why do the stupid people always win and the clever people always lose?  I 
need hardly say that in real sound stupidity the English people are 
unrivalled.  You'll have more wit and better wit in an Irish street now than 
would keep Westminster Hall in humour for five weeks. . . . In fact what we 
opprobriously call stupidity, though not an enlivening quality in common 
society, is nature's favourite resource for preserving steadiness of conduct 
and consistency of opinion.' 
20
 
We may dismiss such sentiments as the mere ebullition of boyish levity, or evoked by 
characteristic love of humorous paradox; yet the youthful heresy hardened, as years 
went on, into something like a settled conviction.  And is there not a grain of good 
sense in the sack of chaff?  Racial characteristics proverbially afford dangerous ground 
for political generalization; but there would seem to be some warrant for the conclusion 
that free institutions have been more successfully worked by peoples commonly 
accounted phlegmatic in temperament than by their more vivacious neighbours. 
 
Be the explanation what it may, the fact remains that Parliamentary Government, with 
its indispensable adjunct of Party organization, has worked most continuously and 
most successfully in the country of origin. 
 
                                                  
20   [461/1]  Literary Studies, i. 329. Bagehot was only about 26 at the time (1852) the 
Letters on the French Coup d’état of .851 were published in The Inquirer.  They 
are republished in vol. i of the Literary Studies, and well repay perusal. Epilogue 
 
‘Consider what nation it is whereof ye are - a nation not beneath the reach 
of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to.' 
 
'Let not England forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live' - 
John Milton. 
 
'We have a form of Government not fetched by imitation from the laws of 
our neighbouring States (nay, we are rather a pattern to others than they to 
us) which, because in the administration it bath respect not to the few but to 
the multitude, is called a Democracy.' - Pericles. 
 
'Many persons in whom familiarity has bred contempt may think it a trivial 
observation that the British Constitution, if not (as some call it) a holy thing, 
is a thing unique and remarkable.  A series of undesigned changes brought it 
to such a condition, that satisfaction and impatience, the two great sources 
of political conduct, were both reasonably gratified under it.  For this 
condition it became, not metaphorically, but literally, the envy of the world, 
and the world took on all sides to copying it.' - Sir Henry Maine. 
 
'The best laws will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and 
education in the spirit of the Polity.' - Aristotle. 
 
Moralising. 
At the close of a monumental work on English Constitutional History a great historian-
ecclesiastic claimed the right to 'moralize'.  The foregoing pages are neither so weighty 
nor so lengthy as those in which Dr. Stubbs traced the origins of the English Polity; yet 
a privilege similar to that claimed by the master may perhaps be conceded to one of 
the least, but not the least loyal, of his disciples. 
 
Excellence of the English Polity. 
The purpose of the present work has been primarily analytical - to expose the 
mechanism by which England is the governed, and to bring into clear relief the 
characteristic features of the English Constitution, and to do this by constant reference 
to different species of the same genus.  The writer has attempted during this process to 
preserve an attitude of scientific detachment and impartiality.  But it would be 
disingenuous to pretend that he has not, throughout a long and arduous journey, been 
sustained by the conviction, deepening as his investigations proceeded, that his own 
countrymen, whether by good fortune or by [begin page 464] following a sure political 
instinct, have succeeded in working out a system of government, admirably adapted to 
attain under the peculiar conditions of the modern State the primary ends of 
government: order, liberty, and progress. 
 
The Truths of Political Science not Absolute but Relative. 
By no means, however, does it follow that the form of government first evolved in 
England, and described throughout the foregoing pages as Parliamentary Democracy, 
is equally well adapted to all other countries whatever be the stage of development, 
economic, social, or political, they may severally have reached; nor, indeed', to any 
other country at any stage.  If there be one aphorism in Political Science which should 
command universal assent, it is that its conclusions are not absolute but relative.   Aristotle shrewdly observed that 'political writers, although they have excellent ideas, 
are often unpractical', and insisted that the 'true legislator and statesman ought to be 
acquainted, not only with that form of government which is best in the abstract, but also 
that which is best relatively to circumstances. . . . There is certainly more than one form 
of democracy and of oligarchy; nor are the same laws equally suited to all'.
1  For the 
average State, however, Aristotle himself inclined to the mean between Oligarchy and 
Democracy; for 'no other is free from faction'.  'It is manifest that the best political 
community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and those States are likely to be 
well administered in which the middle class is large and larger if possible than both the 
other classes.'
2  These observations would seem to point to a mixed form of 
Constitution as best for the average State - 'for the State is better which is made up of 
numerous elements and combines many forms'.  Nevertheless, everything must be 
judged 'relatively to given conditions': absolutely best form there is none. 
 
The truths proclaimed by philosophy have been substantiated by experience.  Were an 
Englishman to suggest that England possesses a monopoly of political wisdom, [begin 
page 465] and that only in the English Constitution can the secret of good government 
be discovered, he would be self-convicted of unpardonable arrogance.  A foreign critic 
has, indeed, declared that only in England has the problem which confronts the modem 
State been satisfactorily solved.  'To restrain and guide democracy, without debasing it,' 
wrote Montalembert, 'to regulate and reconcile it with a liberal monarchy or a 
conservative republic - such is the problem of our age; but it is a problem which has 
been as yet nowhere solved except in England.’
3  Even in 1855, when those words 
were written, the validity of Montalembert's conclusion might have been disputed; it 
would be hotly denied in many countries today, and not only in those which have 
borrowed from England the model of a Parliamentary Democracy. 
 
The Federal Principle. 
Alike in Switzerland and in the United States the principle of Federalism is a vital and 
inseparable element in the Constitution.  In the English Constitution it is only faintly 
perceptible.  On the other hand, the United States has repudiated the system of 
Cabinet Government, which is rightly regarded as a cardinal principle of the English 
Polity; nor has that system been really adopted in Switzerland. 
 
Must we then conclude that Parliamentary Government, as understood in England, is 
incompatible with Federalism?  In the Commonwealth of Australia an attempt has been 
made to combine the two principles; but the path of Parliamentary Democracy has not 
been entirely smooth in Australia, and, in any case, the experiment is too recent to 
justify a general or positive conclusion.  Meanwhile, the federal principle is as deeply 
rooted in the soil of America as is the principle of Parliamentary Government in that of 
England; nor, despite some criticism, in each case, of the existing system, and 
notwithstanding some movements of opinion, mostly academic in origin, towards 
Parliamentary Government in America and towards Federalism in England, each 
country remains firmly, and [begin page 466] as would appear, unalterably attached to 
the principle which respectively dominates and differentiates its own Constitution. 
 
Commentators on the English Constitution. 
If our own Constitution has suffered critics it has not lacked eulogists.  For more than 
four hundred years the English Constitution has been almost as much an object of 
admiration to foreigners as of pride to Englishmen.  Philippe de Comines (1445-1509), 
the famous French historian, declared: 'In my opinion among all the lordships that I 
                                                  
1   [464/1]  Politics, iv. i. 
2   [464/2]  Ibid., iv. II. 8. 
3   [465/1]  The Political Future of England, P. 36. know in the world, England is the one where the public good is best attended to and 
where there is the least violence on the people.'
4
 
Sir John Fortescue. 
Almost contemporary with Comines was Sir John Fortescue (? 1394-1476), Chief 
justice of the King's Bench under Henry VI, and the first Englishman to analyse the 
essential characteristics of the English Constitution.  Sir Edward Coke declared that 
Fortescue's famous dialogue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, written about 1470 for the 
instruction of Edward, Prince of Wales, was worthy of being written in letters of gold.  
More important, however, as a commentary - and the first commentary on the 
Constitution - is the treatise originally entitled The Difference between Absolute and 
Limited Monarchy as it more Particularly regards the English Constitution, but more 
commonly known as The Government of England.  This treatise, which was not 
published until 1714, deals, as its first editor
5 explained, with 'the most excellent and 
curious part of the law, the English Constitution'.  The author, he truly adds, was 'a 
great lover and vindicator of it' and had an ‘exact knowledge in all the parts thereof’.  
The piety of the first Lord Fortescue in no wise exaggerated the erudition or the 
acumen of his ancestor, and the treatise particularly as re-edited by Mr. Charles 
Plummer - still possesses a critical as well as an historical value.
6
 
Sir Thomas Smith. 
Even more significant than Fortescue's work was the [begin page 467] De Republica 
Anglorum; the Maner of Governement or Policie of the Realm of England, written by Sir 
Thomas Smyth or Smith during his embassy to France (1562-6), Smith (1513-77) was 
distinguished both as scholar and statesman, having been at one time Professor of 
Civil Law and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, and at others 
Ambassador in France and Secretary of State to Queen Elizabeth.  Strype, who wrote 
his life (1698), described him as 'the best scholar in his time, a most admirable 
philosopher, orator, linguist, and moralist . . . a very wise statesman, and a person 
withal of most unalterable integrity and justice (which he made his politics to comport 
with), and lastly a constant embracer of the reformed religion'.  A more recent critic has 
pronounced his work on The Commonwealth of England (the title borne by the De 
Republica in the editions from 1589 onwards) as 'the most important description of the 
Constitution and Government of England written in the Tudor age'.
7  It was that and 
much more.  It was the first scientific treatise on Comparative Politics in the English 
tongue.  No fewer than eleven editions of the book in English were published between 
1584 and 1691; four editions of a Latin translation were published between 1610 and 
1641, and the work was also translated into Dutch and German.  The treatise, 
according to Strype, was evoked by certain discourses Sir Thomas had with some 
learned men in France, 
 
‘concerning the variety of Commonwealths; wherein some did endeavour to 
undervalue the English Government in comparison with that in other 
countries, where the civil law took place. His drift herein was . . . to set 
before us the principal points wherein the English polity at that time differed 
from that used in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and all other countries 
which followed the civil law of the Romans ... to see which had taken the 
                                                  
4   [466/1]  Mémoires de Comines, Bk. V, c. xviii. 
5   [466/2]  Sir John Fortescue-Aland (1670-1746), a Justice of the Court of King's 
Bench and afterwards first Baron Fortescue of Credan. 
6   [466/3]  Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. 
7   [467/1]  A.F. Pollard, ap. D.N.B., liii, p. 127.  The most recent edition of the work 
is that edited by L. Alston with preface by F.W. Maitland, Cambridge University 
Press, 1906. more right, truer, and more commodious way to govern the people as well 
in war as in peace.' 
[begin page 468] 
 
'I think,' wrote the author to a learned friend, 'when you have read it over, you will 
acknowledge that I was not carelessly conversant in our Country's Commonwealth.'  
This modest claim has been abundantly conceded by all who have since attempted to 
follow in the path first traced by Sir Thomas Smith.  He was, indeed, conversant in the 
English Constitution.  He describes with accuracy and precision the position of the 
Crown - its 'absolute' authority in peace and war; its functions as the fount of honour 
and the dispenser of patronage; its prerogative of mercy; and the fact that 'all writs, 
executions, and, commandments be done in the prince's name'.  Of still greater 
interest, particularly in view of the period at which the book was written, is his 
insistence upon the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty.
8
 
In respect of this cardinal doctrine of the English Constitution the successors of Sir 
Thomas Smith, from Blackstone to Dicey, have had little to do save to adorn it.  Of 
those successors only brief mention can here be made.  The disturbances of the 
seventeenth century inevitably produced a large crop of political pamphlets, but few of 
them can be said to have made any permanent contribution to political thought, or even 
to a better understanding of English institutions.  James Harrington's Oceana (1656) 
belongs rather to the category of political Utopias than scientific treatises, but it 
contains some remarkable anticipations of reforms, subsequently effected, in 
parliamentary representation, in electoral procedure, and in education.  It was followed 
by a large number of works from the same prolific pen dealing with the science and art 
of Government.
9  But to the latter no permanent value can be attached. 
 
The Poets. 
It is otherwise with the tractates - or some of the tractates - of Milton.  Almost all keenly 
controversial, many of them essentially livres de circonstance, they neverthe- [begin 
page 469] less contain, besides isolated passages of superb and stately eloquence, 
much political speculation of enduring value.  Sir Henry Taylor hazarded the opinion 
that our great poets have been our best political philosophers, and that 'the poetry of 
this country is its chief storehouse of political wisdom'.
10  To that storehouse Milton 
certainly contributed, notably in the Areopagitica, while his essay Of Reformation in 
England contains at least one splendid apostrophe, already quoted, to the 




The moderation of the English character reflected in English institutions is lauded alike 
by the poet of the Restoration and by the most representative of the Victorian poets. 
 
Such impious axioms foolishly they show, 
For in some soils republics will not grow; 
Our temperate isle will no extremes sustain 
Of popular sway or arbitrary reign; 
But slides between them both into the best, 
Secure in freedom in a monarch blest. 
 
                                                  
8   [468/1]  See supra, pp. 29, 30, where the specific passage is quoted. 
9   [468/2]  e.g. The Prerogative of Popular Government, 1659; Seven Models of a 
Commonwealth; Political Discourses, 1660. 
10   [469/1]  Critical Essays, p. xii. 
11   [469/2]  Supra, p. 150. Thus Dryden in his 'Satire against Sedition',  The Medal.  Even more familiar is 
Tennyson's Of Old sat Freedom, which re-echoes the sentiment of Dryden: 
 
Grave mother of majestic works 
From her isle-altar gazing down, 
Who, god-like, grasps the triple forks 
And, king-like, wears the crown: 
.  .  .  .  . 
Turning to scorn with lips divine 
The falsehood of extremes. 
 
The Eighteenth Century. 
Of Bolingbroke and Burke, the outstanding political commentators of the eighteenth 
century, mention has century been made in a previous chapter, and a passing 
reference will suffice for such writers as Nathaniel Bacon, whose Government of 
England (from Selden's notes) appeared in 1760.  De Lolme, however, belongs to a 
different category.  [begin page 470] 
 
Like Rousseau, De Lolme was a native of Geneva, but, unlike Rousseau, he conceived 
a warm admiration for the English Constitution.  De Lolme's once-famous work, The 
Constitution of England;  or an Account of the English Government; in which it is 
compared with the republican form of government and the other monarchies in Europe, 
was, first published in French at Amsterdam, 1771, and four years later in English.  It 
went through at least eight editions in its English dress, besides several in French and 
German.  It is a curious fact that the preface to the Letters of Junius - written not later 
than November 1771 and published in 1772 - concludes with a quotation from De 
Lolme's work (which is there described as a 'performance, deep, solid, and 
ingenious'),
12 verbally identical with the passage as it appeared in the English 
translation, four years afterwards (1775).
13  On the strength of this coincidence was 
based the conjecture that the Letters were written by De Lolme; but, though supported 
in an elaborate argument by Dr. Bushby, the conjecture was never seriously 
entertained.
14  Disraeli described De Lolme as 'the English Montesquieu'; Mr. William 
Hughes, M.P. for the City of Oxford, who re-edited The Constitution of England in 1834, 
extolled it as 'the most approved treatise which has yet appeared on the Constitution of 
England'; while another legislator of the same period, in presenting a copy of the work 
to the youthful Queen Maria of Portugal (September 1833), declared that the work 
'deserved to be written in letters of gold and was worthy the consideration of every 
crowned head in Europe'.
15
 
Whether this ample claim be admitted in its integrity or no, it is certainly true that De 
Lolme's work possesses a value more than merely historical.  His style is vivacious and 
his observation acute.  Writing in the midst of the [begin page 471] contest between the 
Mother Country and the American Colonies, De Lolme can nevertheless extol the 
'peculiar stability of the executive power of the British Crown’, and can appreciate the 
'advantages that result from that stability in favour of public liberty'.  Those advantages 
he summarizes as follows. 
 
(i)   The numerous restraints the governing authority is able to bear and 
the extensive freedom it can afford to allow the subject at its own 
expense; 
                                                  
12   [470/1]  The passage refers to the Liberty of the Press. 
13   [470/2]  D.N.B. s.v. De Lolme, xiv, pp. 325-7. 
14   [470/3]    Arguments and Facts demonstrating that the Letters of Junius were 
written by John Louis de Lolme, Advocate (1816). 
15   [470/4]  I.I. Briscoe, M.P. for East Surrey, ap. Preface to edit, of 1834. (ii)   the liberty of speaking and writing carried to the great extent it is in 
England; 
(iii)   the unbounded freedom of the debates in the legislature; 
(iv)   the power to bear the constant union of all orders of subjects against 
its prerogatives; 
(v)    the freedom allowed to all individuals to take an active part in 
Government concerns; 
(vi)  the strict impartiality with which justice is dealt to all subjects; 
(vii)   the lenity of the criminal law . . . ; 
(viii)  the strict compliance of the governing authority with the letter of the 
law; 
(ix)    the needlessness of an armed force to support itself, and, as a 
consequence, the singular subjection of the military to the civil power. 
 
These advantages, De Lolme justly observed, are peculiar to England; nor was he slow 
to perceive that 'the attempt to imitate them, or transfer them to other countries. . . . 
without at the same time transferring the whole order and conjunction of circumstances 
in the English Government, would prove unsuccessful'. 
 
De Lolme has a further claim to honourable mention as the lineal predecessor of 
Bagehot, Dicey, Boutmy, and Gneist.  His Survey is indeed more comprehensive than 
that undertaken by any of these later commentators, and is hardly less lively than 
Bagehot's.  He anticipates Boutmy in his insistence upon the significance to be 
attached to the precocious centralization of the English administrative system, and he 
emphasizes, hardly less strongly than Dicey, the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
and the importance of the Rule of Law. 'The basis of the English Constitution,' he 
writes, 'the capital principle on which all others depend, is, that the legis- [begin page 
472] lative power belongs to Parliament alone,' but he is carefull to add: 'The 




Sir William Blackstone. 
Here, and elsewhere, De Lolme was evidently indebted in no ordinary measure to 
Blackstone's great work, the first part of which was published in 1765.  Blackstone, like 
other university teachers since his day, appears to have suffered from piracy.  Imperfect 
reports of his lectures had got into circulation and some had fallen 'into mercenary 
hands and become the object of clandestine sale'.
17  Since this piracy determined 
Blackstone to publish his famous Commentaries, we can scarcely regret it, nor could 
Blackstone, as the sale of the book is said to have brought him about £14,000. 
 
The earlier portion of the book, which deals mainly with what we now know as the Law 
of the Constitution, contains a superb vindication of the 'vigour of our free 
                                                  
16   [472/1]  p. 50 (ed. 1834). 
17   [472/2]  I am far from suggesting that De Lolme's hands were mercenary, or the 
sale of his book 'clandestine'.  But still less can I endorse or even understand 
Bentham's sneer at Blackstone: 'It is to a foreigner we were destined to owe the 
best idea that has yet been given of a subject so much our own (the British 
Constitution).  Our author (Blackstone) has copied; but De Lolme has thought.'  
Fragment on Government, c. iii, § xxi. The dates entirely contradict Bentham's 
venomous suggestion; De Lolme's book, as we have seen, was first published in 
French in 1771: Blackstone was lecturing on the subject at Oxford from 1753 
onwards, if not earlier, and the first part of the Commentaries was actually 
published in 1765. Constitution':
18 the executive power lodged in a single person; the origin and nature of 
the Royal prerogative; the legislative sovereignty of Parliament; the distribution of 
legislative power between King, Lords, and Commons; the liberty of the subject and his 
free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property; the 
regular administration and free course of justice in the Courts of Law; the delicate 
equilibrium of the several forces within the State - all this has now become the 
commonplace of criticism and commentary; but to Blackstone belongs the credit of 
having been the [begin page 473] first to analyse, systematically and adequately, the 
legal principles on which the Constitution rested. 
 
Jeremy Bentham. 
Not that Blackstone's analysis remained exempt from criticism.  Of his critics the most 
caustic, perhaps the most captious, was Jeremy Bentham.  Bentham, while admitting 
that Blackstone 'first of all institutional writers, has taught jurisprudence to speak the 
language of the scholar and gentleman', bitterly denounced his intolerance and derided 
his superficiality. 
 
'His hand was formed to embellish and to corrupt everything it touches.  He 
makes men think they see in order to prevent their seeing. . . .  He is 
infected with the foul stench of intolerance. . . . In him every prejudice has 
an advocate, and every professional chicanery an accomplice. . . .  He 




Bentham's specific answer to Blackstone was contained in the treatise entitled A 
Fragment on Government or a Comment on the Commentaries, being an Examination 
of what is delivered on the Subject of Government in General in the Introduction to Sir 
William Blackstone's Commentaries; with a Preface in which is given a Critique on the 
work at large.  The main object of this 'Fragment', first published anonymously in 1776, 
was to expose the capital blemishes of a work which not only showed in substance an 
'antipathy to reformation', but was also distinguished by 'a general vein of obscure and 
crooked reasoning from whence no clear and sterling knowledge could be derived'.  
The tone of Bentham's criticism may be judged from these sentences; but the 
'Fragment' was far from being, in substance, purely destructive.  Without going so far 
as to describe it as 'a model of controversial literature', we may agree that the book 
does mark 'a new departure in jurisprudence'.  As J.S. Mill truly said, Bentham 'found 
the philosophy of law a chaos, he left it a science'.  He was a stern critic of loose 
phraseology, of unverified hypo- [begin page 474] theses, of vague generalizations; but 
he was also constructive.  Everything in Law, in Government, in Ethics, was to be 
brought to the test of utility.  'It is the principle of utility, accurately apprehended and 
steadily applied, that affords the only clew to guide a man through these streights.'
20  
But the primary purpose of the 'Fragment’, was to inculcate a mistrust of authority and 
tradition.  'Let the timid and admiring student place less confidence', in the infallibility of 
great names; emancipate his judgement from the shackles of authority; distinguish 
between shewy language and sound sense.'
21  Such is the adjuration, with which the 
'Fragment' concludes. 
 
The Nineteenth Century. 
The outbreak of the Revolution in France evoked one masterpiece of political literature, 
but to Burke's classical apology for English institutions reference has already been 
                                                  
18   [472/3]  i. 27 (all the references are to the edition of 1844). 
19   [473/1]  Extracts from Bentham's Commonplace Book, Works, x. 141 (ed. 1843). 
20   [474/1]  Fragment, iv. xx. 
21   [474/2]  Ibid., finis. made, and the retorts of Sir James Mackintosh and others do not in the present 
connexion demand notice. 
 
Whig Writers. 
With the return of peace there came a revival of the agitation for parliamentary reform.  
In the forefront of that agitation stood the great Whig statesman who embodied his 
views in books of some political significance if not of great historical value.  Lord John 
(afterwards Earl) Russell's Essay on the History of the English Government and 
Constitution was first published in 1821. 
 
The brief outline of English history from Henry VII to George III has no special 
interest, but the analytical portions of the book, dealing with such topics as personal 
and political liberty, the rise of public credit, party government, the poor laws, are by no 
means without value.  Especially is this true of the concluding chapter appended to the 
edition of 1865, and containing a retrospect of events from 1820 to 1864, as seen by 
one who had grown grey in the service of the State.  Lord Russell's account of the 
circumstances which attended the preparation and enactment of the Reform Bill of 
1832, and his comments thereon, constitute, indeed, an historical document of first-rate 
importance.  [begin page 475] 
 
Two other Whig statesmen of the period also made their contributions to this subject.  
Lord Brougham's book, The British Constitution, its History, Structure, and Working, 
was first published in 1858, as was Earl Grey's Parliamentary Government considered 
with reference to Reform.
22  Lord Brougham's work is more of a treatise in Political 
Science than its title would suggest, and amid the scant literature of this subject in 
English is far from negligible.  The historical narrative is confined to some half-dozen 
chapters and possesses no special value: the bulk of the book is, however, critical and 
analytical, and, containing the reflections of a singularly acute mind, will amply repay 
perusal.  Starting with a discussion of the classification of governments, Brougham 
passes to a consideration of the virtues and vices of mixed government, concluding 
that the balance is wholly in favour of it.  No fewer than eight chapters are thus devoted 
to the history and theory of representative democracy.  The cornerstone of the structure 
of the English Constitution Lord Brougham finds - as befits so pugnacious a politician - 
in the doctrine of 'Resistance' (c. xvii), though he acknowledges that 'the pure 
constitution of Parliament - the extended basis of our popular representation' will 
'always render a recourse to the right of resistance less needful'.  The three principal 
defects in the House of Commons seemed to him to be: its 'preposterously' large 
numbers (658); the want of close boroughs or some substitute for them’, and the 
consequent lack of any means of 'placing great Government functionaries in the House 
of Commons'; and the multiplication of small boroughs - 'the haunts of bribery, hotbeds 
of every species of corruption' - by the Reform Bill of 1832.  To cure this evil he 
advocated the division of the whole country into electoral districts, on the French plan.  
The most interesting and most significant part of the work is contained in three 
appendices  (there is a fourth dealing with the Government of Athens)  [begin page 476] 
devoted to an analysis of Federalism and a survey of the Governments of Holland, 
Belgium, and the United States.  Only at this point does Brougham adopt the 
comparative method in Political Science. 
 
Lord Grey, as befitted the son of his father, devoted his essay to the single topic of 
Parliamentary Government, and a discussion of the means by which further reforms in 
that system could be best effected.  Taking as his text Burke's aphorism: 'The machine 
of a free Constitution is no simple thing, but as intricate and delicate as it valuable', he 
proceeded to explore the advantages and disadvantages of Parliamentary Government 
and to mal his own suggestions for that further reform which, thought admittedly 
                                                  
22   [475/1]  Henry, third Earl Grey - son and successor of 'Grey of the Reform Bill’. inevitable, he evidently regarded with considerable apprehension.  This mood was not 
by any means uncommon, in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, among men of intellect 
and education, and many were the devices suggested to safeguard the Constitution 
amid the multiplying dangers of 'pure democracy'.  Of these devices several - such as 
the cumulative vote, the increased representation of universities, the inclusion of 
life-members in the House of Commons, a method of indirect election - found favour 
with the rather doctrinaire mind of Lord Grey.  A chapter on Parliamentary Government 
in the British Colonies has considerable historical interest. 
 
Homersham Cox. 
Among the Whig writers of this period Homersham Cox deserves a passing reference.  
He was the author of several works on History and Politics, at least one of which, The 
British Commonwealth, or a Commentary on the Institutions and Principles of British 
Government (1854), cannot, in the present connexion, be ignored.  In some respects it 
was the most scientific survey of English Political Institutions which had up till then 
appeared.  He stated, indeed, in his preface that he had been unable, despite careful 
inquiry, 'to discover any book in which the modern principles of the British Constitution 
are systematically discussed an elucidated by reference to the actual state and 
numerous institutions of our Government.'  My own researches have [begin page 477] 
tended to a similar conclusion.  This evident deficiency Mr. Cox essayed to supply, and 
he achieved no inconsiderable measure of success.  Starting with an inquiry into the 
rights and duties of Government, he proceeded to analyse the composition and discuss 
the functions of the Legislature, with special reference to parliamentary procedure.   
Under the general head of the Legislature he included not only the Cabinet and political 
parties, but the whole apparatus of parliamentary representation, public meetings, and 
the Press.  Other portions of the work dealt with the judicature, the Administrative 
System, International Affairs, and Colonial Government.  He concluded with a just and 
temperate appreciation of the British Constitution, the main scheme of which he found 
to consist in 'mutual restraint' and 'reciprocal responsibilities'.  The most obvious 
weakness of the existing system was discovered to lie in the 'overwhelming influence 
of small corruptible or coercible constituencies', and in the consequent corruption of the 
House of Commons itself.  Athens and Rome perished of the same disease.  'By the 
national corruption they wrought their own chains and then the hand of Despotism did 
but fasten them on' (p. 571).  But in the England of the 'fifties the root of the evil 
seemed to him to be economic.'  Incomparably the most momentous question of 
English politics now is the remedy of the pauperism and depravity of the very poor' (p. 
573).  Admirable as the British Constitution was it would be time enough to deem it 
perfect when these social evils were remedied.  The value of Cox's work was much 
enhanced by a copious bibliography, a feature conspicuous by its absence in the works 
of his contemporaries. 
 
Disraeli. 
Disraeli's Vindication of the English Constitution (1835), preceded by about twenty 
years the works of the writers just noticed, and belongs to a somewhat different 
category.  According to Disraeli himself the dissertations upon our Constitution might 
hitherto have been classified either as 'archaeological treatises or party manifestoes'.  
If we are to accept the classification as exclusive the [begin page 478] Vindication must 
be included among the latter.  Like Bolingbroke's Patriot King it was primarily a party 
pamphlet, but a considerable and not unserviceable veneer of philosophy and history 
justifies its inclusion in the present survey. 
  
Disraeli's wrath was directed, primarily, against the utilitarians, with their 
'anticonstitutional' creed, their ‘barren assertions of abstract rights' and their love for ‘a 
priori systems of politics'.  Their tendency was 'to form political institutions on abstract 
principles of theoretic science, instead of permitting them to spring from the course of 
events, and to be naturally created by the necessities of nations'.  Not thus did our forefathers gradually build up our Constitution: 'They set up no new title: they claimed 
their inheritance.  They established the liberties of Englishmen as a life-estate, which 
their descendants might enjoy, but could not abuse by committing waste, or forfeit, by 
ally false or fraudulent Conveyance.  They entailed our freedom.'  Disraeli approved 
this as heartily as Bolingbroke or Burke.  'This respect for Precedent, this clinging to 
Prescription, this reverence for Antiquity. . . .appear to me to have their origin in a 
profound knowledge of human nature, and in a fine observation of public affairs, and 
satisfactorily to account for the permanent character of our liberties' (pp. 15,19,23) . 
  
From criticism of the English utilitarians Disraeli passed on to denounce the French 
republicans, who in 1791 built their fabric upon the abstract rights of man and 'boldly 
seized equality for their basis'.  Not less conspicuous was the folly of that innocent 
monarch, Louis XVIII, who, presented his Countrymen with a free Constitution - drawn 
up in a morning’, thus achieving at one stroke that ‘which in less favoured England has 
required nearly a thousand years for its accomplishment'.  But the 'climax of human 
absurdity was reached when the 'Anglo-Gallic scheme' was 'gravely introduced to the 
consideration of the Lazzaroni of Naples and the Hidalgos of Spain, (pp. 34, 35).  The 
'Revolution' of 1830 in France is next  [begin page 479] contrasted with the Revolution 
of 1688 in England, and with the prudent policy of Frederick William III when 
confronted with the demand for a 'Constitution' in Prussia.  The Constitution of the 
United States seemed likely, Disraeli observed, to exercise over South America the 
same fatal influence as that of England over Europe: all which goes to show that 
'Constitutions' to be of any value must be native-born and not imported. 
 
Upon this there followed a brilliant sketch - of course taken from a special standpoint - 
of the development of English institutions, from the rise of Parliament to the successful 
struggle of George III against the 'Whig Oligarchs'.  Reasons are advanced why the 
Whigs ever have been and ever must be 'odious to the English nation, and why the 
principles of democratic Toryism - first taught by Bolingbroke - can alone save it'. 
 
'Our society', such is the conclusion reached by Disraeli, 'is that of a complete 
democracy, headed by an hereditary chief, the Executive and Legislative functions 
performed by two privileged classes of the community, the whole body of the nation 
entitled, if duly qualified, to participate in the exercise of those functions, and constantly 
participating in them' (P. 204). 
 
To the principles thus enunciated by the young pamphleteer the politician remained 
constant throughout life; but it is only with the exponent of the Constitution that we are 
here concerned.  Beneath the affectation of extravagance, and despite much partisan 
embellishment, there yet lay in the Vindication a large residuum of sober reasoning and 
sound history.  Much of the solid argument was borrowed from Burke's Reflections, 
though Disraeli utilized it to serve an immediate party end: to discredit the Whigs, and 
to vindicate the claim of the Tories to be a truly national party.  But the pursuit of a 
proximate purpose does not really destroy the permanent value of a treatise in which, 
as in the novels yet to come - notably Sybil - the true mind of Disraeli must be sought 
and can be found.  [begin page 480] 
 
Walter Bagehot. 
From the political aspirant to the philosophical publicist may seem to be an abrupt 
transition.  In fact, some thirty years separated the publication of Disraeli's Vindication 
from that of Walter Bagehot's English Constitution.
23  The latter has long been 
accepted as one of the classics of, English literature, belonging, as an acute critic has 
                                                  
23   [480/1]  Fortnightly Review (1865); republished in 1867 (2nd ed. 1872). recently observed, to a small group of books 'in which scientific subjects are endowed 
with literary interest by sheer perspicuity of style and sustained animation of interest'.
24
 
Bagehot's  English Constitution stands apart from all other treatises on the subject 
known to me, not merely by reason of its perspicuity, or its 'objectivity' - though Bagehot 
possessed, in exceptional measure, the Baconian propensity to 'work upon stuff' - but 
rather by reason of its almost uncanny common sense - its resolute determination to 
pierce through time-honoured phrases to concrete realities.  Yet despite his reverence 
for 'reality', Bagehot never undervalued the ‘dignified parts of the Constitution.  Quite 
otherwise.  The use of the Queen in a dignified capacity is incalculable.'  'A 
Constitutional Monarchy has . . . a comprehensible element for the vacant many, as 
well as complex laws and notions for the inquiring few.' 
 
Some aspects of the practical usefulness of the Monarchy Bagehot also perceived, if 
he did not adequately appreciate them: others he could not, in 1867, have been 
expected to know, still less to foresee.  Few people could then realize with what 
splendid devotion and assiduity the Queen, though withdrawn from the public eye, 
'continued to stand sentinel to the business of her Empire'.  From her published Letters 
the world has since learnt that 'the retired widow of Windsor' never for an instant 
relaxed her grip upon public affairs.  But the conditions were very different from what 
they afterwards became.  Disraeli had not yet conferred upon his mistress the new title 
of Empress of India, nor had the nations of the British [begin page 481] Commonwealth 
reached that stage of evolution when they consciously recognized the Monarchy as the 
'golden link' of Empire. 
 
The utility of the Second Chamber, restricted though it was by the Reform Act of 1832, 
Bagehot could and did appreciate.  He was too clear of vision to persuade himself that 
the House of Lords still retained powers co-ordinate with those of the Commons; but 
although 'with a perfect House of Commons' a Second Chamber might be 
unnecessary, in the actual, and still imperfect, political world it had a useful part to play 
as a delaying, revising, and referendal Chamber. 
 
It was, however, on the Cabinet that Bagehot fixed, with sure instinct, as the motive 
power in the complicated machine of State.  His chapters on the Cabinet were, from 
their first appearance, recognized as classical.  No one, up till then, had analysed the 
efficient side of the Constitution with the same pitiless lucidity that Bagehot employed.  
Tossing aside all the old shibboleths and dogmas, ruthlessly rejecting the theory of the 
Constitution consecrated by the genius of Montesquieu and elaborated by Blackstone, 
Bagehot in his very first chapter pierced unerringly to the heart of the mystery.  The 
peculiar genius of the English Constitution was discovered to consist not in the 
separation but in 'the close union, the nearly complete fusion' of Executive and 
Legislative functions, and the connecting link was the Cabinet. 
 
Again, Bagehot was almost, if not quite, the first English publicist to draw out a critical 
comparison between the English and American Constitutions.  Nor was it surprising 
that, having fixed upon the Cabinet as the cardinal feature of the English Constitution, 
he should contrast with it a presidential Executive.  On the whole, the balance of 
advantage seemed to him to lie decidedly with the parliamentary type of democracy.  
The presidential system was not seen at its best in the 'sixties, and Bagehot was quick 
to detect its deficiencies.  Alike from the point of view of the Executive and the 
Legislature the [begin page 482] English system seemed to him to yield better results.  
But with these matters we have already dealt.  Here we are concerned only with 
Bagehot's place in the evolution of political criticism.  That place is in a sense unique 
and is unquestionably secure.  His object was to 'break up obsolete traditions on an 
important subject'; to induce, the critics to treat it 'according to the sight of their eyes 
                                                  
24   [480/2]  Times Literary Supplement, 28 January 1926. and not according to the hearing of their ears'.  The first object he triumphantly 
achieved; in regard to the second he might deserve but could not command success. 
 
Must we add that Bagehot enjoyed an advantage denied to the critics that followed 
him?  Is it true that his survey of Parliamentary Government coincided with its meridian; 
and that, since his day, the perfect equilibrium of forces, on which depends the success 
of that most delicate of political instruments, has been somewhat disturbed?  To this 
point of view some attention has already been given.
25  It must suffice to recall the fact 
that Bagehot wrote at the close of the intermediate period between the overthrow of the 
territorial oligarchy and the advent of democracy.  Disraeli had not yet 'shot Niagara'; 
the Reform Acts of 1884, 1885, 1888, 1894, and 1918 were still farther in the future.  
The publication of a second edition of The English Constitution (1872) did, indeed, 
afford the author an opportunity, utilized in a masterly introduction, of discussing 
Disraeli's astute if audacious 'leap in the dark’, but the ultimate results of the 
experiment thus initiated not even Bagehot could have forecast. 
 
Among Bagehot's successors the one who has followed most closely and most 
successfully in his footsteps is Sir Sidney Low, whose Governance of England (1904) 
was, however, something more than a 'Bagehot up to date'.  Honourable mention 
should also be made of W.E. Hearn's Government of England (1867), and I, at least, 
should be lacking in common gratitude if I did not refer to A. de Fonblanque's How we 
are Governed.  First published in 1858, this little book is, I imagine, almost forgotten, 
but  [begin page 483] desiccated as its pages now seem, it first aroused the boyish 
interest of the present writer in the actual working of English institutions. 
 
In a different category of importance are the works of Maine, Lecky, and Dicey, who, 
with Sir Sidney Low, most nearly reflect contemporary criticism.  Before passing to 




Among these one of the first and one of the greatest was the Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755).  To his famous doctrine of the 'separation of powers' frequent reference 
has been made in preceding chapters, but some words must here be added to 
emphasize the importance of the place he occupies in the history of Political Theory.  
That many of his generalizations have been proved to be inaccurate is of little moment.  
As Buckle justly observed, 'such inaccuracies were inevitable in the case of a 
profoundly speculative genius dealing with intractable materials.  Science had not, in 
his day, reduced those materials to order by generalizing the laws of their 
phenomena.’
26  'Some of Sir Henry Maine's conclusions have been similarly 
contradicted by the progress of sociological research; but both in Maine's case and in 
Montesquieu's the permanent value of their work as pioneers in the application of the 
historical method remains unaffected by subsequent discoveries. 
 
English publicists have special reason to be grateful to Montesquieu for the searching 
analysis to which he subjected political institutions in general and English institutions in 
particular.  Truly did Madison write: 
 
'The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the 
didactic writers on Epic poetry.  As the latter have considered the work of 
the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules 
of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be 
judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution 
                                                  
25   [482/1]  Supra, Book III. 
26   [483/1]  History of Civilization, i. 571 seq. of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, [begin page 484] 
as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of 




Montesquieu may, in some measure, have exaggerated the degree in which, even in 
the England of that day, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial power were 
separated each from the other, but his general meaning is clear and is accurately 
interpreted by Madison.  It amounts, indeed, to no more than this: that 'when the whole 
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole 
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are 
subverted'.  Thus the Executive, in the person of the King, forms a part of the 
Legislature.  The Executive, again, is responsible for the appointment of the judiciary; 
while the House of Lords exercises judicial authority.  It was, however, the supreme 
merit of Montesquieu to have been the first to perceive that the functions are distinct, 
and that in the Constitution, which seemed to him to afford the best guarantee of 
personal and political liberty, the separate functions were, in large measure, entrusted 
to separate, bodies.  Nor has the theory of representative, as opposed to direct 
democracy, ever been more clearly expounded than by Montesquieu.
28
 
Even more remarkable, in view of the fact that he died in 1755, is Montesquieu's acute 
perception of the advantage of the federal form of Government.
29  To his views on 
Federalism sufficient reference has, however, already been made. 
 
Montelambert. 
Less well known as a eulogist of English institutions, but not less fervid than 
Montesquieu, was Charles Forbes René de Montalembert.  The son of an émigré, 
Montalembert was born in London in 1810.  Deeply imbued with liberal ideas, he was 
nevertheless a fervent believer in the value of tradition, and few writers have more 
eloquently [begin page 485] extolled England's unique success in reconciling reverence 
for the past with a passionate zeal for progress and reform.  Particularly was he 
attracted by the spirit of individual enterprise and personal effort which seemed to him 
peculiarly characteristic of the English society of that day (1855).  Not less, however, 
did he approve the public spirit of the English citizen.  'The public business of England', 
he wrote, 'is the private business of every Englishman.'  To him, as to other 
philosophical observers of that period, England seemed to afford the most perfect 
example in the modern world of a State in which liberty was combined with order.'  It is 
in proportion as these two qualities are combined that the merit and value of different 
governments are to be estimated. . . . Of these I have no hesitation in saying England, 
since 1688, is the most perfect.'  Thus wrote Lord John Russell.  Similarly, 
Montalembert: 'No other form of government has ever given to man more opportunities 
of accomplishing all that is just and reasonable, or more facilities for avoiding error and 
for correcting it.' 
 
Montalambert’s The Political Future of England. 
At a time like the present, when the prophets of woe are abroad in the land, and when 
exaggerated apprehensions as to the future of England are frequently expressed, there 
can be no better corrective than to recall the dismal prophecies which have been 
uttered in the past.  In the 1856 middle of the last century the question was very 
generally asked on the Continent - alike by our friends and our enemies - 'What is to 
become of England?'  In some quarters it was inspired by friendly anxiety, in others by 
                                                  
27   [484/1]  The Federalist, No. xlvii.  
28   [484/2]  Livre XI, c. vi, pp. 266 seq. (ed. Bastien, 1788). 
29   [484/3]  Livre IX, cc. i-iii. unconcealed eagerness to see the downfall of the country which was equally a foe to 
despotism and to revolution; which in Montalembert's opinion stood alone in the world 
as an example of rational liberty and was the object of the secret envy of all its 
enemies.  'When', they say to themselves, 'shall the world get rid of this nightmare?  
Who will deliver us from this nest of obstinate aristocrats and hypocritical reformers?  
Men shall we break down the pride of this obstinate people, who, defying the laws of 
[begin page 486] revolutionary logic, have the audacity to believe at once in tradition 
and progress - who maintain royalty while they pretend to practise liberty, and escape 
from revolution without submitting to despotism.'
30
 
To the question asked no less insistently three-quarters' of a century ago than it is 
today, 'Has England run its course?’,  Montalembert's answer was unequivocal: 
 
'England is not on the eve of perishing ... she will not follow the example of 
the Continent, and the enemies of freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, and self-government, both Socialists and Absolutists, will have to 





'It is impossible for any one ever so little acquainted with the political history 
of England not to smile at the futility of the grounds on which we hear 
periodically announced the near and inevitable ruin of this last asylum of 
modern liberty.  Now it is a formidable meeting, where some speakers of 
more or less notoriety have held seditious language against the sovereign; 
then again it is a crash of broken windows in some aristocratic quarter of 
the town; now it is the tumultuous assemblage of a hundred thousand 
individuals, with accompaniments of shoutings, banners, and processions; 
then, again, it is the press teeming with seditious invectives against all the 
views and all the things supposed to be most honoured and revered by the 
British people.  But they forget that all this is no novelty - that it has always 
been so since England has been free.  Since she has accepted the 
inconveniences and distortions of liberty together with its inseparable and 
incomparable benefits. . . . all has passed and will pass like a shower or 
squall, which, however violent, does little or no permanent damage.  But 
with all his affected modesty and with all these ugly appearances and 
alarming incidents, the Englishman is not a whit less persuaded that his 
country is the first country in the world; he does not say so until he is 
contradicted, but he believes it, and for doing so has some very good 
reasons, and it only rests with himself to make these reasons still better'.
32
[begin page 487] 
 
The ‘grounds of better hope.’ 
Nor was Montalembert content with generalizations.  He set forth the specific grounds 
of his ' better hope'.  A Frenchman was naturally struck by the fact that England had 
never become 'the pedantic slave of logic'.  Very striking, too, seemed to him 'the 
admirable mechanism by which the peerage opens its ranks and closes them again.  
The English peerage, while attracting to its ranks ‘all the great notabilities of the nation . 
. . at the same time sends back into the mass of the nation all its collateral branches'.  
Nor was there any other country where a career was so completely open to talent, 
even if talent were handicapped by heterodoxy.  Like others of his countrymen, he was 
also greatly impressed by the strength of the English squirearchy and by the 
                                                  
30   [486/1]  Montalembert, op. cit., pp. 3, 4. 
31   [486/2]  Ibid., p. 8. 
32   [486/3]  Ibid., pp. 29-30. humanitarian spirit of the aristocratic reformers, such as Lord Shaftesbury.  One great 
danger only Montalembert perceived in the political and social structure of England - 
the 'increase of functionaries', and the 'deluge of officials'. 
 
All this should be eminently reassuring to those who imagine that social unrest, the 
growth of bureaucracy, or pessimistic predictions are symptoms peculiar to their own 
day.  Seventy years ago Montalembert was quick to discern similar phenomena, and, 
as we have seen, to estimate at their true value the fashionable jeremiads of the day. 
 
Contemporary with Montalembert and incomparably greater as a political observer was 
Alexis de Tocqueville; but though a sincere admirer of English institutions, and married 
to an English wife, Tocqueville never published any formal treatise upon English 
Government.  His observations thereon, though pregnant, were casual and infrequent. 
 
Rudolf von Gneist, 1816-95. 
Far otherwise was it with the eminent German jurist Rudolf von Gneist.  Gneist-one of 
the pioneers of the science of Comparative jurisprudence - was principally concerned, 
alike as academic teacher and politician, with the contrast between Germany and 
England.  In his Trial by jury (1849) he entered a powerful plea for the more extended 
application to his own country of an insti- [begin page 488] tution which in origin was 
common to both peoples.  The main purpose of his life was, indeed, to make English 
institutions better known and more widely appreciated in Germany, and to lead the 
German people along the path of constitutional evolution so wisely and so profitably, 
as, it seemed to him, trodden in England.  Of his many works dealing with English 
Government the best known are the History of, the English Constitution (translated 
(1886) from his Englische Verfassungsgeschichte (1882), and The English Parliament 
(translated in 1886 from Das englische Parlament 
33), but Gneist had previously written 
widely on English self-government and on English Administrative Law.  The author's 
purpose was throughout twofold: to enlighten and rouse to emulation his own 
countrymen and to publish work which would be accepted by English scholars as 
genuine contributions to original research.  That the latter purpose was achieved more 
completely than the former is rather a matter of congratulation to Englishmen than of 
reproach to Germans.  Gneist himself confessed that an attempt to imitate foreign 




From the other side of the Rhine there came an echo to Gneist in the works of the 
Comte de Franqueville,
35 and, somewhat later, of Emile Boutmy.
36 Boutmy is an 
admirable commentator on English institutions, at once erudite and vivacious.  That he 
should neglect a point here and over-emphasize a feature there is only to be expected 
from a foreigner who attempts the difficult task of analysing a Constitution so elusive as 
our own.  But the instances of misplaced emphasis are wonderfully few, while the 
advantages of seeing English institutions through the eyes of [begin page 489] a French 
publicist, at once singularly competent and unusually sympathetic, are immeasurable. 
 
                                                  
33   [488/1]  Berlin, 1886. 
34   [488/2]  English Parliament, p. xi. 
35    [488/3] Cte de Franqueville, Les Institutions politiques, judiciaires et 
administratives de 1'Angleterre (1863); Le Gouvernement et le Parlement 
Britanniques (1887). 
36   [488/4] Développement de la Constitution et de la société politique en Angleterre 
(1887);  Essai d'une psychologie Politique du peuple anglais au XIXe siécle 
(1901); Ėtudes de droit constitutionnel: France-Angleterre-Etats Unis (1903) Redlich and Ostrogorski. 
Dr. Joseph Redlich of Vienna and M. Ostrogorski are in a somewhat different category 
from the commentators and named above.  Their works are in the nature of 
monographs.  To the Austrian scholar it was left to accomplish a piece of work which, 
as Sir Courtenay Ilbert justly observed, ought to have been undertaken long before by 
some competent Englishman.  With what painstaking thoroughness Dr. Redlich traced 
the growth of Parliamentary Procedure, and with what accuracy he analysed existing 
Procedure, has been indicated in preceding chapters.
37  Reference has also been 
made to M. Ostrogorski's great work on Democracy and the Organization of Political 
Parties.
38  That work, as Lord Bryce, when introducing it, pointed but, is both scientific 
in method and philosophical in spirit. Moreover, it filled a very conspicuous gap in 
political literature.  The machinery of Party Government had not previously been 
treated on an adequate scale, if indeed it had been treated comprehensively at all. 
 
Lowell and Wilson. 
Dr. Redlich and M. Ostrogorski are, however, specialists; Dr. Laurence Lowell surveyed 
the whole field of English Wilson Government; Dr. Woodrow Wilson touched it only 
incidentally in Congressional Government,
39 and sketched it in outline in The State.
40  
American publicists cannot, of course, be regarded as foreigners in the domain of 
'English letters, but both Dr. Lowell and Dr. Wilson were able to survey the working of 
the Parliamentary type of Democracy with a detachment denied to an Englishman.  The 
result in both cases is eminently gratifying to English susceptibilities.  It may, indeed, be 
doubted whether any Englishman has ever produced a more comprehensive, and in 
the main a more appreciative, survey of the political system of this country than Dr. 
Laurence Lowell.
41  [begin page 490] 
 
Dr. Wilson and Dr. Lowell also rendered invaluable service to the comparative study of 
Political Institutions.
42  That subject, as already indicated, has attracted far less 
attention in England than in the United States or Germany.  The truth is that the English 
people are not politically introspective; political analysis and speculation is less 
attractive to them than active participation in public affairs, and as to the details of 
foreign Constitutions an the manner in which their neighbours conduct their public 
business, they have hitherto been singularly incurious.  Indications multiply, however, 
that in this, as in other, spheres, the attitude of aloofness is tending to weaken. 
 
Recent Work in England. 
A group of great scholars have done much, in the last work in forty years, to remove 
the reproach so long, and so justly England levelled at English scholarship.
43
 
                                                  
37   [489/1]  The Procedure of the House of Commons. A Study of its History and 
Present Form, 3 vols., London, 1908. 
38   [489/2]  London, 1907. 
39   [489/3]  Congressional Government-a Study in American Politics, 1885. 
40   [489/4]  The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, 1889. 
41   [489/5]  The Government of England, 2 vols., 1st ed., 1903. 
42   [491/1]  Wilson, more particularly in The State; Dr. Lowell in his admirable work, 
frequently referred to in preceding chapters, Governments and Parties in 
Continental Europe, 1st ed., 1896. 
43   [490/2]  Here, as throughout this catalogic summary, I omit all mention of the 
great text-books of Constitutional History and Law, though no one who has read 
this book will imagine that I undervalue the work of historians like Hallam, 
Stubbs, Erskine May, and Maitland, or of jurists like Anson.  But my concern here 
is not with histories or with legal treatises, but with commentaries. Sir Henry Maine, 1822-88. 
Of these the first in time and not the least in distinction was Sir Henry Sumner Maine 
(1822-88).  With Maine's earlier work in the History of Law and Institutions I am not 
here concerned; but his book on Popular Government 
44 is in the present connexion 
important.  Maine was perhaps the first among English publicists to reflect a real 
reaction against the genial optimism of Bagehot.  Bagehot never sought to conceal his 
conviction that, on the whole, everything in England was for the best in the best of all 
possible Constitutions.  Two Reform Acts - each of much larger scope than the Act of 
1832 - intervened between the first publication of The English Constitution and Popular 
Government, and Maine's tone as to the future of Democracy in general and of English 
Democracy in particular was far less confident than Bagehot's.  His was a refined and 
sensitive spirit, and there was much in the politics of a democratic [begin page 491] 
regime which repelled him.  The Council Chamber at Calcutta was more to his taste 
than either Westminster or Whitehall.  The three criteria of a successful form of 
Government appeared to him to be its ability to preserve the national existence; to 




The political outlook in England in 1884-5 frankly disquieted Maine.  The foundations 
upon which the democratic polity rested looked to him very fragile.  The two dominant 
sentiments in the political life of England, Radicalism and Imperialism - seemed to him 
mutually incompatible.  Moreover, he discerned the growth within the body-politic of 
various associations irreconcilable with the êthos if not with the existence of the 
supreme Association - the State.  He mistrusted, too, the influence of the party wire-
puller whose power, evidently increasing with the growing organization of democracy, 
seemed to rest on the deep-seated instinct of the English people to 'take sides' - an 
instinct we have already noted in connexion with the development of parties.  Again, 
Democracy seemed to be essentially opposed to Science and a fatal impediment in the 
path of Liberalism and progress. 
 
'Let any [competently instructed person] turn over in is mind the great epochs of 
scientific invention and social change during the last two centuries, and consider what 
would have occurred if universal suffrage had been established in any one of them.  
Universal suffrage, which today excludes Free Trade from the United States, would 
certainly have prohibited the spinning jenny and the power loom.  It would certainly 
[begin page 492] have forbidden the threshing machine.  It would have prevented the 
adoption of the Georgian Calendar; and it would have restored the Stuarts. . . . Even in 
our own day vaccination is in the utmost danger, and we may say generally that the 
gradual establishment of the masses in power is of the blackest omen for all legislation 
founded on scientific opinion, which requires tension of mind to understand it and self-
denial to submit to it.'
47
                                                  
44   [490/3]  London, 1885. 
45   [491/1]  Popular Government, pp. 61 seq.  
46   [491/2]  I have hesitated whether or not to include in this 'group' the name of 
Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900).  If 1 have not done so it is not because I fail to 
acknowledge my debt to his Elements of Politics (1891) and his Development of 
the European Polity, posthumously published in 1903.  Quite otherwise.  But 1 
am anxious that the brief summary attempted in this chapter should not be 
regarded as exhaustive, even as a catalogue.  Moreover, Sidgwick must, I suppose, 
be reckoned primarily as an ethical philosopher.  His Politics, though a lucid and 
orderly summary, is mainly abstract in treatment.  It is lacking in historical back-
ground, and does not, as it seems to me, contribute anything pertinent to the 
purpose of the present chapter.  References to his work and to Seeley's Political 
Science will, however, be found in preceding chapters. 
47   [492/1]  Popular Government, pp. 36, 98.  
Two specific dangers he foresaw: tyranny and corruption.  Was there no danger of a 
revival of the fiscal tyranny which once left people in doubt whether it was worth while 
preserving life by thrift and toil?  It makes not the smallest difference, as Maine 
observed, to the motives of the thrifty and industrious 'whether their fiscal oppressor be 
an Eastern despot or a feudal baron or a democratic legislature, and whether they are 
taxed for the benefit of a corporation called Society or for the advantage of an 
individual styled King or Lord’.
48 This danger did not exist in the United States, where 
'Democracy' was purely a matter of politics and had not translated itself into 
economics; in England it seemed to him imminent. 
 
Tyranny would inevitably bring in its train two evils: corruption and slavery.  The only 
practical alternative to economic competition is slavery.  The former system has 
brought under cultivation the Northern States of the American Union: the latter was 
mainly responsible for the progress of the Southern States, as in the old days it 
produced the prosperity of Peru under the Incas.  If corruption was to be apprehended 
it was the corruption not of titles and places but 'the directer process of legislating away 
the property of one class and transferring it to another.'
49  
 
W.E.H. Lecky, 1838-1903. 
In all this Maine was a true representative of the temper of mid-Victorian Liberalism, 
with its robust belief in self-help and laisser faire.  But as the reign drew to a close 
many such men began to lose faith in the quasi-inspired character of the English 
Constitution, and to look with [begin page 493] something of envy on the unquestionable 
rigidity and apparent stability of the American type of Democracy. 
 
Among these disillusioned Liberals was William Edward Hartpole Lecky (1838-1903).  
The tone of his last important work, Democracy and Liberty (1896), contrasts sharply 
with that of the books which first brought him fame - History of Rationalism (1865) and 
History of European Morals (1869).  Lecky's mind was less exact than Maine's; his 
contribution to method was less original and his style far more discursive; but between 
the main argument of Democracy and Liberty and that of Popular Government there is 
a close resemblance.  On the whole Lecky, like Maine, showed himself apprehensive 
as to the effect of Democracy upon Liberty, and upon the future of Parliamentary 
Government.  He quoted with approval Sybil's generalization that universal suffrage 
has invariably meant the 'beginning of the end of all parliamentarism’,
50 and shared to 
the full Aristotle's admiration for the political virtues of the middle class.  Like Maine, 
Lecky discerned in the American Constitution elements of stability which seemed to be 
disappearing from our own, but though he dreaded the growth of class bribery and 
fiscal tyranny he nevertheless recognized the high standard of political integrity in 
Great Britain, and clung to the conviction that on great issues the judgement of the con-
stituencies would seldom be wrong.
51
 
A.V. Dicey, 1835-1922. 
Inferior as a thinker perhaps to Lecky, certainly to Maine, Dicey was superior to both as 
an expositor.  It is indeed questionable whether any work in the language has done 
more to elucidate the fundamental principles of the English Polity than Dicey's Law of 
the Constitution: nor has any jurist ever exhibited a more complete confidence in its 
characteristic virtues.  Yet it has been made clear in previous chapters that the tone of 
the last edition of that classical work (1915) was decidedly less confident than that of 
                                                  
48   [492/2]  Ibid., p. 50. 
49   [492/3]  Ibid., p. 106. 
50   [493/1]  Democracy and Liberty, i, p. 28. 
51   [493/2]  Ibid., i, pp. 114-201. the first (1885).  In particular, as we have seen, Dicey deplored the declining faith in the 
rule of law, [begin page 494] the decreasing respect for law, and the weakening of the 
guarantees for personal liberty.  Recent experience and recent research
52 have still 
further weakened the force of Dicey's too complaisant comparison between the 'rule of 
law' in England and the imperfect protection afforded to the subjects of those foreign 
States where the principles of Administrative Law prevail. 
 
Nevertheless, Dicey, while sharing the anxiety which recent tendencies must excite in 
the minds of all thoughtful and patriotic Englishmen, was no untempered pessimist.  
'Pessimism’, as he justly observed, 'is as likely to mislead a contemporary critic as 
optimism.' 
 
James Viscount Lord Bryce, 1838-1922. 
Lord Bryce, buoyant to the last under the weight off four-score years, never wavered in 
his democratic faith.  He preserved till death the dew of his political youth.  Less 
original as a jurist than Maine, Bryce was greater as a publicist than Lecky, and as an 
expositor not inferior to Dicey.  His last and perhaps his greatest work, Modern 
Democracies, is remarkable not only for the profound erudition and the accumulated 
experience to which it testifies and of which it is the fruit, but even more for the 
sustained fervour of its faith in popular government.  Frankly admitting that less has 
been achieved by Democracy than the prophets of Democracy expected, he still 
maintained that the experiment has not failed, 'for the world is after all a better place 
than it was under other kinds of government, and the faith that it may be made better 
still survives’.
53  Yet, 'shaken out of that confident faith in progress which the 
achievements of scientific discovery had been fostering, mankind must resume its 




‘Chastened' is perhaps the most appropriate epithet for the mood which prevails among 
the publicists of today; if indeed it is possible to detect any prevalence among the 
shifting winds which have been blowing since the subsi- [begin page 495] dence of the 
tempest of war.  To indicate contemporary writers by name might be deemed invidious, 
but it is evident that mistrust of Parliamentary Democracy is common to two schools of 
thought, widely differing from each other in creed and in aim. 
 
There are those, on the one hand, who are, as we have seen, frankly mistrustful of the 
tendencies of popular government in general, but prefer the representative to any other 
type of Democracy.  On the other hand there are those who, while professing complete 
faith in Democracy, mistrust the forms which Democracy has assumed in England and 
in the United States.  To them Representative Government, particularly if it be based 
upon the principle of locality, is anathema; the highly centralized State, even if it is 
ultimately based upon popular election, seems to them to be in its essence hardly less 
tyrannical than that of feudal baron or autocratic monarch.  Like Rousseau they regard 
the citizens of a Parliamentary State as little better than slaves; they believe 
sovereignty to be not merely indivisible but inalienable; they would apply the principles 
of Economic Syndicalism to political organization, and would substitute the direct for 
the representative type of Democracy. 
 
                                                  
52   [494/1]  Cf. in particular, J.E. Robinson, Public Authorities and Legal Liabilities, 
London, 1925, and C.T. Carr, Delegated Legislation, Cambridge, 1923. 
53   [494/2]  Op. cit., ii. 670. 
54   [494/3]  Ibid., p. 665. As steps towards their ultimate end they would welcome the immediate introduction of 
such devices as the Referendum, the Initiative, and the Recall, and would substitute a 
system of Committees of the Legislature for the Cabinet form of Executive. 
 
Is Cabinet Government Compatible with Democracy. 
The Cabinet system has, indeed, been exposed to a crossfire of criticism.  One school 
of critics complains of the weakness of a Parliamentary Executive; another condemns 
the Cabinet system as unduly autocratic.  Can it compatible with survive this cross-fire?  
German critics have particularly insisted upon the transitory character of Parliamentary 
Democracy.  They have pointed out that the English Cabinet system and Party system 
were products of eighteenth-century oligarchy and have predicted that they would not 
survive the advent of Democracy.  It is indeed [begin page 496] undeniable that modern 
developments have greatly altered, the conditions of Parliamentary Government, and, 
in particular, tend to impose a severe strain on the Cabinet.  Such a strain exposes the 
system to many risks: the risk of an overgrown Cabinet delegating its functions to an 
inner body; the risk of insufficient central supervision over departmental work; of 




The force of such criticism cannot be denied, and two further admissions may be made 
and emphasized.  It goes without saying that the Cabinet system is incompatible with 
Presidential Democracy, and I find it difficult to believe that it would be found consistent 
with Referendal Democracy of the Swiss type, still less with the Direct Democracy 
which some desire.  A Cabinet Executive is essentially a product of the Parliamentary 
type of Democracy.  It is the crown and glory of that system; it has grown with its 
growth and strengthened with its strength.  Should that system perish, or in essentials 
be impaired, the Cabinet system may be expected to decay or perish with it. 
 
Is Representative Government compatible with Democracy? 
A more fundamental question must, however, be faced.  Is Representative Government 
compatible with the spirit of 'real' Democracy.  The Swiss publicists, as we have seen, 
hold that it is not.  There are even English publicists who, approaching the problem 
from different angles, concur in the conclusion that some modification of the existing 
distribution of authority is inevitable.  On the one hand they argue with indubitable 
cogency that the increase in the business of government is laying upon the 
Parliamentary Executive a burden which no Cabinet can sustain.  The inevitable result 
is that the Political Heads of Departments must become increasingly dependent upon 
their permanent officials.  On the other hand the critics express the fear lest the 
Legislative body, becoming increasingly dependent upon the Executive, will 'more and 
[begin page 497] more atrophy, until it ceases to attract to its benches the men who 
want to work, and earns more and more the contempt of the nation'.
56  It is undeniable 
that a good deal of the power, knowledge, and experience that are still to be found in 
Parliament are now running to waste, and that no adequate means of stopping the 
waste have yet been devised.  The author just quoted recommends that a series of 
small Select Committees, corresponding, as such Committees invariably do, to the 
distribution of parties in the House, should be set up in connexion with each of the 
great Departments of State - particularly with a view to supervising and checking 
expenditure. 
 
To this and similar suggestions reference has been already made.  The experience of 
the Estimates Committee has proved that it is not in practice so easy as outside critics 
suppose to draw the line between 'policy' and administrative detail.  But if this line be 
not drawn and rigidly respected, what becomes of Cabinet and Ministerial 
                                                  
55   [496/1]  Ilbert, ap. Redlich, op. cit, p. xx. 
56   [497/1]  R. Muir, Peers and Bureaucrats, P, 94. responsibility?  Successive Governments have hitherto looked with jealousy and 
suspicion upon any real approximation to the Committee system.  It may well be that 
their instinct is sound; that any devolution of real power upon Parliamentary 
Committees would gradually undermine Cabinet autocracy, and might even impair 
Cabinet responsibility.  But although instinctively alive to this danger, is not the political 
hierarchy blind to a greater, if less obvious, danger?  Jealous of the encroachments of 
Parliament, may it not be compelled, by mere stress of circumstances, to submit 
(however unconsciously) to the dictation of the Bureaucracy? 
 
Be that as it may, it is evident that there exists a certain section of political opinion 
which is dissatisfied with the existing distribution of power. Familiar with the methods 
which have given to local representative bodies a real (if a diminishing) control over 
local officials, they will undoubtedly insist upon the trial of a similar experiment, though 
perhaps in modified form, in the Central Govern- [begin page 498] ment.  Whether the 
State and the Empire would survive the experiment is a question on which opinions 
differ and which it would be futile to pursue. 
 
Parliamentary Government means, however, something more than the responsibility of 
the Executive to the Legislature.  It means that the Legislature itself should represent 
the electorate.  But, as the Swiss jurists very properly contend, Representative 
Government is one, thing, Democracy (meaning thereby Direct Democracy), is another. 
 
Are the root principles of the two incompatible?  Theoretically they are.  Representative 
Government, as understood and worked out in England, rests fundamentally upon the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty.  The root principle of Democracy is the 
Sovereignty of the People. 
 
The English genius for compromise has to some extent evaded the dilemma by 
distinguishing between 'legal' sovereignty which is vested in Parliament, and 'political' 
sovereignty which is exercised by the electorate.  But a significant question remains.  Is 
the machinery at the command of the political sovereign adequate?  There are those 
who argue that it is not; and that to render it effective recourse should be had to such 
devices as the Referendum, the Initiative, the Mandate, and the Recall.
57  These 
devices have received some attention in preceding chapters.  Reference is here made 
to them only in illustration of contemporary movements of opinion, and of the criticisms 
to which Parliamentary Democracy is now exposed. 
 
Conclusions? 
The main purpose of this work has been expository and analytical; there has been no 
attempt to maintain a thesis or to emphasize conclusions.  Yet certain conclusions 
would seem, unbidden, to have emerged.  Parliamentary Government is, in essence, a 
compromise, combining, by [begin page 499] means of a singularly ingenious, original, 
and effective device - a device which was itself the, product of undesigned if not wholly 
accidental evolution - the best features of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.  The 
core, centre, and crown of Parliamentary Government is the Cabinet - an Executive 
directly responsible to the Legislature; and through the Legislature, of which it forms 
part, respondent to the wishes of the electorate. 
 
In a Constitution so flexible as our own, modifications in machinery are inevitable; but it 
is essential to make sure that the modifications shall tend to strengthen and not to 
impair the êthos of the Constitution.  Proposals, in themselves innocuous and even 
attractive, may nevertheless tend in a direction contrary to the inner spirit of our 
institutions.  An amiable intention may well consist, in politics, with a dangerous and 
indeed destructive programme.  Leadership may sometimes involve, the blindfolding of 
                                                  
57   [498/1]  Cf. e.g. E.T. Powell, The Essentials of Self-Government, London, 1909. followers: but that the leaders themselves should be uncertain of the goal towards 
which they are moving can only bring disaster upon the Commonwealth. 
 
If then it be deemed desirable to abandon the essentials of Parliamentary Democracy, 
it is imperative that the abandonment should be deliberate, and that those who favour 
and counsel a change should be clear themselves as to the alternative they 
recommend and make it clear to others. 
 
The Alternatives. 
The argument has been repeatedly advanced in the present work that, as things now 
are, and putting aside autocracy as a merely temporary expedient, the only practicable 
alternatives to Parliamentary Democracy today are either the Presidential system, as 
best exemplified in the United States of America, or Referendal Democracy as evolved 
in the Swiss Confederation.  It might well be that were the English Constitution 
federalized, either in reference to the United Kingdom or to the British Commonwealth 
of Nations, the Cabinet system would have to be modified in the American direction.  
On the other hand, it is possible that the pressure of economic syndicalism [begin page 
500] may be reflected in a demand for more direct democrat control in the sphere of 
Government.  Arguments, cogent if not conclusive, may be advanced in favour of a 
move either of these directions. 
 
Political Syndicalism. 
The immediate and insidious danger would seem to lie in an unperceived and half-
unconscious approximation towards one or other of these systems.  One such 
approximation was unquestionably arrested by the abrupt restoration of the Cabinet 
system in 1919.  The summer and autumn of 1920 witnessed, on the other hand, an 
unmistakable movement towards political syndicalism - a movement which suffered a 
severe check in April 1921. 
 
In April 1921 the country found itself confronted by a demand which, if conceded, would 
have transferred the control of the government from the King-in-Parliament to a Triple 
Alliance of the Miners, Railwaymen, and Transport-workers.
58  The Miners were called 
out on 1 April, and the executives of the Railwaymen and the Transport-workers 
proclaimed a sympathetic strike to begin on Friday, 15 April.  'Direct action' was to be 
employed with the avowed object of overthrowing the existing Constitution and 
substituting therefore a Government based upon the principles of political and industrial 
syndicalism. 
 
The Government of the day met the crisis with firmness; a large meeting of private 
members of the House of Commons held at the eleventh hour, on the evening of 
Thursday, 14 April, discovered a formula which seemed to afford a basis for further 
negotiation with the Miners;
59 on Friday, 15 April, a rift appeared in the ranks of the 
Triple Alliance; the General Strike was called off less than six hours before it was due 
to begin, and the threatened revolution collapsed.  15 April 1921 is still designated in 
[begin page 501] extreme-Socialist literature as 'Black Friday'.  As a fact it marked an 
escape not only for the community, but more particularly for that section of it which lives 
by manual labour.  The incident is here cited only in illustration of the danger to be 
apprehended from the unperceived and half-unconscious tendencies which lurk in the 
movement towards political syndicalism.  The essence of that movement is mistrust of 
                                                  
58    [500/1]  The evidence for this statement is well summarized by Professor 
Hearnshaw, Democracy and Labour, c. i and Passim. 
59   [500/2] There were in fact two meetings held at the House of Commons on that 
day: one to hear a deputation from the mine-owners; the second to hear 
representatives of the miners.  At both meetings the present writer presided. the principle of Representation, and a desire to replace Parliamentary Democracy by a 
decentralized State, controlled by syndicalized industries. 
 
Men, Citizens, and States. 
At the close of a lengthy treatise devoted to the analysis of machinery one reflection 
almost inevitably obtrudes itself.  If systems of Government are more important than 
Pope's cynical aphorism would suggest, if machinery matters much, it is men 
nevertheless who must work machinery; it is the individual citizen who can make or 
mar the best system of government ever devised by the wit of man.  To that 
commonplace conclusion every philosopher who has given thought to problems of 
government has been inexorably driven.  'Men, not measures' was a delusive and 
perhaps dishonest cry in the mouths of those who in the eighteenth century sought to 
break down the party system: but man nevertheless remains the raw material out of 
which the State must be built. 
 
'The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals 
composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental 
expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or of that 
semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State 
which dwarfs its men, in order that there may be more docile instruments in 
its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great 
things can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to 
which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing for want of 
the vital power which, in order that the machine may run more smoothly, it 
has preferred to banish.'
60
 
So runs the concluding passage in Mill's noble essay On  [begin page 502] Liberty.  
Adam Smith reached the same truth from a different angle when he wrote: 'Upon the 
power which the leading men, the natural aristocracy of every country, have of 
preserving or defending their respective importance, depends the stability and duration 
of every system of free Government.'
61
 
This is true of every State; it is especially true of Democracies; it is above all true of a 
State governed under a democratic Constitution so flexible, so largely dependent for its 
successful working upon convention, custom, and understandings, as our own. 
 
The Education of the Citizen.  
How then may we hope to secure a due succession of fit persons well qualified for the 
service of God in Church the Citizen and State?  We can only look, as Aristotle looked, 
to a system of education devised to that end.  'A great Empire and little minds', as 
Burke reminded us, 'go ill together.'
62  Magnanimity - in the true sense - is the real end 
of education. 
 
The Spirit of the Polity. 
On what lines should the education, designed to effect Spirit of this object, be planned?  
Evidently, education (again to the polity quote Burke) does not consist in reading 'a 
parcel of books'.  'No, Restraint of discipline, emulation, examples of virtues and of 
justice, form the education of the world.’
63  Aristotle is more definite than Burke, and his 
precepts could hardly be bettered.  The prime aim of education is, as he insisted, 
political; the educational system should be designed with the supreme object of 
                                                  
60   [501/1]  On Liberty, p. 207 
61   [502/1]  Wealth of Nations, Bk. iv, c. 7. 
62   [502/2]  Speech on Conciliation with America (Works, iii. 126). 
63   [502/3]  Works, vi. 268. preserving the State in its integrity and purity by forming in its citizens a particular type 
of character. 
 
'That which most contributes to the permanence of the Polity is the 
adaptation of education to the form of government . . . . The best laws, 
though sanctioned by every citizen of the State, will be of no avail unless 
the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the Polity. . . . 
The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which 
he lives.
64  
[begin page 503] 
 
The world is well aware with what thoroughness this principle was assimilated in 
Imperial Germany, and with what skill it was applied in their educational system.  No 
other modern State has, indeed, shown itself more deferential to the precept of 
Aristotle, with the result that there was a coherence and consistency in the political life 
of Germany such as could not be found elsewhere.  In unique measure Imperial 
Germany succeeded in bringing her scheme of education into relation with the spirit of 
the Polity. 
 
Has England been less observant of the Aristotelian precept?  It is true that to the 
German precision the English educational system appears to be disorderly, incoherent, 
anomalous, even chaotic.  But so does the English system of government: so does the 
loose and apparently haphazard connexion between the motherland and the 
Dominions and Dependencies.  Yet the Ordeal by Battle proved, as three centuries of 
Empire-building have proved, that the education of English youth has, with all its faults 
and irregularities, been happily conceived in the 'Spirit of the Polity'.  The English Polity 
is infused with a twofold spirit: that of Liberty and that of Individuality.  Anything which 
tends to the repression of individuality or to the enforcement of a drab uniformity is, 
therefore, alien to the true spirit of the English Polity. 
 
Character-forming. 
A second precept in Aristotle's educational theory is not less important than the first: 
character rather than knowledge is the true end and criterion of education; it is the will, 
even more than the intellect, which must be trained and developed.  To this test also 
English education has satisfactorily reacted.  The educational tree has been known by 
its fruits.  Shortcomings have indeed been revealed; recent events have shown us to 
be lacking in technical knowledge; slow to apply science to the exigencies of industry 
and war; extraordinarily devoid of the foresight which is the product of the scientific 
spirit.  Yet we are proud to believe that, when subjected to the supreme test, character 
told more heavily than technical [begin page 504] skill, and that in qualities of will 
English manhood and womanhood were found not to be deficient. 
 
Body-building. 
In Aristotle's scheme of education there was, however, a third element.  It was to be not 
only moral and political, but physical.  Of the claims of ή γνμαστική' German education 
was not unmindful.  Physical training was there marked by the same scientific precision 
which distinguished the training of the intellect.  In England, on the other hand, ή 
γνμαστική' is pursued in a fashion apparently haphazard and unorganized.  We have 
preferred, half-unconsciously perhaps, character-forming to scientific, muscular 
development.  Gymnastics have been relatively neglected in comparison with 'games', 
and games have been encouraged as much for their moral as for their physical value.  
Yet here again we have perhaps builded better than we knew.  To 'play the game' has 
been held up as the ideal of political as of social life; to learn to give and take, to obey 
and to command, to subordinate the interests of the individual to those of the 'side' 
                                                  
64   [502/4]  Politics, v. 9, and viii passim. these are the lessons which it is the special function of games to inculcate, and these 
we flatter ourselves that Englishmen have learnt. 
 
Finally, Aristotle held that technical training, whether of the body, the hand, or the 
intellect, should never be exalted to a primary place in the curriculum, but that the 
teaching of special crafts and particular professions should be kept in due 
subordination to the idea of a liberal and humane education. 
 
English education would seem, on the whole, to react successfully to the exacting tests 
imposed by Aristotle.  The system is broadly conceived, less of set purpose than by 
happy accident, in the spirit of the Polity.  Technical skill is undoubtedly a great matter, 
and may by no means be neglected.  The citizen who is not master of some craft lacks 
the power to make an essential contribution to the life of the Commonwealth.  Man 
does not live by bread alone, but he cannot live without it; reasonable abundance of 
wealth - in the true sense of the word - is a basic [begin page 505] condition of national 
as of personal well-being and self respect.  Yet the body is more than raiment; good 
citizenship is even more important than high craftsmanship.  As a member of a 
democratic community the individual citizen must not only toil to preserve the material 
existence of the State, he must take his share in government, he must in turn rule and 
be ruled.  Hence his education must be devised to achieve a twofold object: to enable 
him to gain a livelihood; and, still more, to equip him for life - the life of the citizen ruler 
of a world empire. 
 
That individual effort may not be misdirected; that every unit of energy expended by 
man may receive its appropriate compensation; that the co-operative effort of good 
citizens may achieve its purpose in the well-being of the Commonwealth - this is the 
object and this the justification of all machinery.  Tools are less important than the men 
who handle them; yet it is by the perfecting of tools that man has travelled so far from 
that state of nature in which life was 'nasty, brutish, and short'.  A mechanism, perfect in 
every detail, is essential to perfection alike in the individual and in the State. Appendix A 
Form of Summons to a Privy Council 
 
Let the Messenger acquaint the Lords and others of His Majesty’s Most 
Honourable Privy Council, that a Council is appointed to meet at the Court 
of Buckingham Palace, on     the     Day 
 
of this instant,     at  
 
of the Clock. 
 
 
Form of Summons to a Meeting of the Cabinet. 
 
 
A Meeting if His Majesty’s 
 
Servants will be held at 10, Downing  
 






is desired to attend. 
 
 
10 Downing Street. 
 Appendix B 
Orders in Council 
These, Orders are of various types: the following documents are illustrative of several 
of them. 
 
(a) Delegated Legislation. 
 
The Order in Council (25th March 1920) for restrictions upon, aliens is in itself an 
elaborate piece of legislation, of which only, an outline can here be given 
 
Aliens 
Order In Council Made Under The Aliens Restriction Acts, 1914 and 1919 
 
Arrangement of Articles 
 
Part I 
Admission of Aliens 
Article 
1.   Restrictions on landing of aliens. 
2.   Approved ports. 
3.   Inspection and detention of aliens. 
4.   Saving for transmigrants, &c. 
5.   Returns as to aliens by masters of ships. 
 
Part II 
Supervision and Deportation of Aliens 
 
6.   Obligation on aliens to register. 
6A.   Non-resident alien seamen. 
7.   Hotel-keepers and others to furnish particulars. 
8.   Registration authorities and officers. 
9.   Protected areas.  
10.  Power to close clubs and restaurants.  
11.   Power to impose special restrictions on aliens.  
12.   Deportation of aliens. 





14.   Power to grant exemptions. 
15.   Requirements as to documents of identity and supply of information. 
16.   Appointment of officers. 
17.   Powers to make rules. 
18.  Offences and penalties. 
19.  Powers to arrest without warrant. 
20. Interpretation. 
21.  Retention of nationality, &c. 
22.  Saving for diplomatic persons, &c. 23.  Application to Scotland and Ireland. 
24. Amending  orders. 
25.  Date of repeal of Aliens Act, 1905. 
26.   Short title and revocation. 
 Schedules. 
 
At the Court at Buckingham Palace 
The 25th Day of March 1920 
Present, 
 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty In 
Council 
 
WHEREAS by the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914 (in this Order 
called the Principal Act), His Majesty was empowered at any 
time when a state of war might exist between His Majesty and 
any foreign power, or when it appeared that an occasion of 
imminent national danger or great emergency had arisen, by 
Order in Council to impose restrictions on aliens: 




And whereas in pursuance of the powers conferred by the 
Principal Act His Majesty in Council has been pleased by the 
Aliens Order, 1919, to impose certain restrictions on aliens 
1919 No. 
1077 
.   .   .   .   .   .   
And whereas it is provided by the Principal Act that His 
Majesty may by Order in Council revoke or add to any Order in 
Council made thereunder: 




And whereas it is desirable that the provisions of the said 
Aliens Order, 1919, should be amended in certain particulars 
and as so amended should continue in force together with 
certain provisions of the Aliens Act, 1905, after the termination 
of the present war, and that a date may be fixed for the repeal 
of the Aliens Act, 1905: 
 
.   .   .   .   .   .   
Now, THEREFORE, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the 








The Order of 6th February 1925 affords relief in respect of: Colonial Excess 
Profits Duty. 
 
At The Court At Buckingham Palace 




The King's Most Excellent Majesty In Council 
 WHEREAS by Section 23, Sub-section (I) of the Finance Act, 1917, it is provided that 
His Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare 
 
(a)    that, under the law in force in any of His Majesty's possessions, 
excess profits duty is chargeable in respect of any profits in respect of 
which excess profits duty is also payable in the United Kingdom; and 
 
(b)   that arrangements have been made with the Government of any such 
possession whereby, in respect of any profits, only the duty which is 
higher in amount is to be payable, and the amount of such duty is to 
be apportioned between the respective Exchequers in proportion to 
the amount of duty which would otherwise have been payable in the 
United Kingdom, and in that possession respectively: 
 
AND WHEREAS by virtue of the provisions of Article 2 of the Excess Profits Duty 
Ordinance, 1919 (Ordinance No. XXIV of 1919), of the Island of Malta, it was provided 
that there should be charged, levied and paid on the aggregate amount by which the 
profits (thereinafter called 'excess profits') arising each year from any trade or business 
to which that Ordinance applied, in the period between the 4th day of August, 1914, 
and the 31st day of July, 1919, exceeded, by more than one hundred pounds the pre-
war standard of profits as defined for the purposes of that Ordinance, a duty (in that 
Ordinance referred to as 'excess profits duty') at the rates therein set forth: 
 
AND WHEREAS by virtue of the provisions of Article 3 of the said Ordinance, it was 
further provided that a duty at the rates set forth in Article 2 of the said Ordinance 
should be charged, levied and paid on profits (thereinafter included under the name of 
'excess profits') arising from newly started trades or businesses during or within the 
period established in the said Article 2, provided that such rates be chargeable on 
profits made in excess of a margin of ten per cent. per annum on the capital: 
 
AND WHEREAS the Island of Malta is one of His Majesty's possessions: 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf 
by the Finance Act, 1917, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased by and with 
the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered and declared that 
under the law in force in the Island of Malta excess profits duty was chargeable for the 
period between the 4th day of August 1914, and the 31st day of July 1919, in respect of 
profits in respect of which excess profits duty was also payable in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and that arrangements have been made with the Government of the 
Island of Malta whereby in respect of any such profits only the duty which is higher in 
amount is to be payable and that the amount of such duty is to be apportioned between 
the respective Exchequers in proportion to the amount of duty which would otherwise 
have been payable in Great Britain and Northern Ireland or in the Island of Malta 
respectively. 
 
And the Right Honourable Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery, His Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, is to give the necessary directions herein 
accordingly. 




At The Court At Buckingham Palace 




The King's Most Excellent Majesty 
In Council 
 
WHEREAS by the Military Manoeuvres Acts, 1897 and 1911, it is enacted that His 
Majesty may, by Order in Council, authorize the execution of military manoeuvres 
within specified limits during a specified period not exceeding three months: 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, by virtue 
of the power for this purpose given to His Majesty by the said Act, and of every other 
power hereunto enabling, His Majesty doth hereby authorize the execution of military 
manoeuvres within the limits specified in the Schedule to this Order during the period of 
three calendar months, commencing from the 15th day of July 1925. 
 
AND the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the War Department is to 




(d)   An Order giving effect to the Report of the judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council or an appeal from an 
Indian Court. 
 
At the Court at Buckingham Palace 
 
The 25th day of June 1925 
Present, 
 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty 
His Royal Highness the Duke of York 
 
Lord President.  Lord Steward. 
Lord Privy Seal.  Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare. 
Colonel W.G. Nicholson. 
 
WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Report from the judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council dated the 15th day of June 1925 in the words following, viz. 
 
'WHEREAS by virtue of His late Majesty King Edward the Seventh's Order in Council of 
the 18th day of October 1909 there was referred unto this Committee the matter of an 
Appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal: 
. . . . . 
 
‘THE LORDS OF THE COMMITTEE in obedience to His late Majesty's said Order in 
Council have taken the Appeal and humble Petition into consideration and having heard Counsel on behalf of the parties on both sides Their Lordships do this day agree 
humbly to report to Your Majesty as their opinion that this Appeal ought to be allowed 
the Decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in its Appellate 
jurisdiction dated the 5th day of January 1923 set aside with costs and the Decree of 
the said High Court in its Ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction dated the 11th day of 
August 1927 restored.' 
 
'And in case Your Majesty should be pleased to approve of this Report then their 
Lordships do direct that there be paid by the Respondent to the Appellent her costs of 
this Appeal incurred in the said High Court and the sum of £161 7s. 6d. for her costs 
thereof taxed on the pauper scale incurred in England.' 
 
HIS MAJESTY having taken the said Report into consideration was pleased by and 
with the advice of His Privy Council to approve thereof and to order as it is hereby 
ordered that the same be punctually observed, obeyed, and carried into execution. 
 
Whereof the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal for the 






The following Orders were (i) issued in pursuance of a special power conferred by the 
Representation of the People Acts, 1918-22; and (ii) in virtue of general powers 
conferred upon the Crown: 
 
(i) At the Court at Buckingham Palace 
The 25th day of June 1925 
Present, 
 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty 
In Council 
 
WHEREAS by the Representation of the People Acts, 1918 to 1922, power is conferred 
on His Majesty to make provision for various matters by Order in Council: 
 
AND WHEREAS by the Representation of the People Order, His Majesty was pleased 
by Order in Council to make provision for various matters under those Acts: 
 
AND WHEREAS by Section 40 (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 19188, any 
Order in Council made thereunder may be revoked or varied as occasion requires by 
any subsequent Order in Council: 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, His Majesty, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon Him by 
those Acts, and of all other powers enabling Him in that behalf, is pleased, by and with 
the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows: 
 
The Representation of the People Order shall be amended as follows: 
 





‘9. Where the name of any person has been placed on the 
absent voters list in pursuance of a claim in that behalf by 




was such that he might be debarred from voting at a poll, his 
name shall be placed on the absent voters list for each 
subsequent register, so long as he continues to be registered for 
the same qualifying premises and the registration officer is 
satisfied that he continues in such occupation, service or 
employment as aforesaid, unless he gives notice in writing to 
the registration officer that he does not wish his name to be 




(ii) At the Court at Buckingham Palace 
The 24th day of July 1925 
Present, 
 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty 
 
Lord  President.    Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster. 
Duke of Atholl.  Hon. Sir Ronald Lindsay. 
Earl of Crawford and Balcarres. 
 
WHEREAS by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful means His 
Majesty has, power and jurisdiction within Palestine: 
 
AND WHEREAS it is desirable to regulate the grant and acquisition of Palestinian 
citizenship: 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf 
by the Foreign jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise, in His Majesty vested, is pleased by 
and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows: 
 
[There follow (pp. 1-8) detailed regulations as to Palestinian citizenship.] 
 
A distinction in the form of the Orders will be noted as between those which do and 
those which do not indicate the presence of the Sovereign and the names of the 
Councillors present.  The distinction appears to be merely one of convention.  When 
the Order operates outside the United Kingdom the names of those present are 
included; in Orders operating only within the United Kingdom they are omitted. 
 Appendix C 
Provisional and Other Statutory Orders and Rules 
Reference has been made in the text of this work (cf. especially Chapter XXX) to the 




Many of the Orders issued by Government Departments are purely Administrative 
(such as most of those for the Army) and require no sanction from Parliament.  Such is 
the following Order issued by the Ministry of Health: 
(4th July 1925.) 
 
Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1907: 
Confirming order under section 51. 
 
BOROUGH OF GRAVESEND. 
WHEREAS in pursuance of the powers conferred by section 112 in of the Public Health 
Act, 1875, as amended by section 51 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1907 
(which last-mentioned section is in force in the Borough of Gravesend by virtue of an 
order made by the Local Government Board and dated the 5th day of December 1908), 
the Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Gravesend 71 acting by the 
council, have made the order (hereinafter referred to as 'the Council's order ') set forth 
in the Schedule to this order: 
 
NOW THEREFORE, the Minister of Health, in the exercise of his powers in that behalf, 
hereby orders and directs as follows 
 
1.   The Council's order is hereby confirmed. 
 
2.    The Council shall forthwith cause a statement of the effect of this 
order, and of the place where a copy may be inspected, to be 
published once at least in some newspaper circulating in the 
Borough, and in the London Gazette. 
 
3.  This order may be cited as the Borough of Gravesend (Offensive 
Trades) Confirmation Order, 1925, and shall come into operation on 
the 27th day of July 1925. 
  
Other Orders are quasi-legislative and in varying degrees require the sanction of 
Parliament. 
  
(i)   Some Orders require only to be laid on the table of each House; 
  
(ii)   In some cases the Authority is prohibited from taking any action under 
the rule for a prescribed period after laying; 
  
(iii)   In others - Draft Orders - the Order cannot be made until both Houses 
have agreed to it, with or without modification, by resolution; 
   
(iv)   Other Orders come into effect from the date fixed by the Order, but 
may be annulled, wholly or in part, by a resolution of or address from 
either House. 
  Since 1890 a volume of Statutory Rules and Orders, containing all Orders of a public 
and general character, has been annually published by Authority. 
  
Provisional Orders.  
Provisional Orders are completely subject to Parliamentary control, and must indeed be 
regarded as a simplified method of Private Bill legislation.  They proceed from a 
Government Department (or in some instances a local authority), either on its own 
initiative or, more often, upon the application of parties interested, and are, from time to 
time, collected in a Confirming Bill by the Department concerned and submitted to 
Parliament.  The procedure differs from that on a Private Bill only in that the 
Department takes the place of Parliament in the initial stages in protecting interested 
parties, &c.  
 
The Departments now empowered to make Provisional Orders are: the Ministries of 
Health, Labour, Agriculture, and Transport, the Boards of Trade and Education, the 
Post Office, the Home Office, and the Secretary of State for Scotland, with the 
Departments over which he presides. 
  
After the first reading (which must be taken before Whitsuntide) all Provisional Order 
Bills are referred to the Examiners of Private Bills, before whom compliance with 
Standing Orders must be proved, and by whom such compliance must certified or 
dispensed with.  The Bill then proceeds in the manner prescribed for a Private Bill. 
 
The following is a typical Confirmation Bill: 
 
[16  GEO.  5.]            Ministry of Health 





To confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to 
Barnsley Maidstone Port Talbot Rochester and Chatham joint Sewerage 
Dist Wakefield and West Kent Main Sewerage District. 
 
38 & 39 
Vict. c. 55 
WHEREAS the Minister of Health has made the Provisional Orders set 












Be it therefore enacted by the King’s most excellent Majesty by and with 
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and 
Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by the authority of 





1. The Orders set out in the schedule hereto shall be and the same are 
hereby confirmed and all the provisions thereof shall have full validity 
and force. 
 
Short  Title  2. This Act may be cited as the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders 
Confirmation (No. 1) Act 1926. 
 
[Thereon follow sixteen pages of schedules.] 
 Appendix D 
Financial Procedure (Legislative) 
 
The financial procedure of the House of Commons is so complicated that it seems 
desirable to supplement the description in Chapter XX by a series of typical 
documents, illustrative of the financial system and procedure.  By reference to these 
students will be able to follow the precise sequence of events in the financial year. 
 
I 
The ball is set rolling on or about 1st October by a circular addressed by the Treasury 
to the various Civil Departments requiring them forthwith to prepare and submit their 
Estimates of Expenditure for the coming year. 
 
The procedure as regards the 'Fighting' Services is different.  The totals for Army, Navy, 
and Air are generally settled in advance by discussion between the Ministers 
concerned and submitted for Cabinet approval.  The aggregate total for each of these 
three Services having thus been settled, the detailed Estimates for the different votes 
are prepared in the Departments and the Treasury approve the detailed votes or heads 
for the Fighting Services after a general scrutiny. 
 
The terms of the Estimates Circular (which is not a published document) vary from year 
to year.  The following is the Circular (abbreviated) issued on 1st October 1924 for the 
current financial year (1925-6). 
 
(F. 7827.)                            (No. 211/24.) 
ESTIMATES CIRCULAR, 1925-6. 
Treasury Chambers, 
Sir,          1st  October  1924. 
 
The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury command me to transmit to you 
the enclosed forms of estimates for the services to be administered by your 
Department during the year ending 31st March 1926. 
 
Two copies of each form, after insertion of the proper particulars, and with such 
changes as may be necessary, should be returned to the Treasury in due course. . . . 
 
The figures of the past year should be carefully checked, and corrected where 
necessary, in particular in respect of Supplementary Estimates included in the 
Appropriation Act. . . . 
 
Necessity For Economy 
My Lords find it necessary again to urge upon Departments the paramount importance 
of further reductions of public expenditure. 
 
Accurate Estimating 
To the Accounting Officer. 
 
Your particular attention is invited to . . . the subject of the overestimating by 
Departments in recent years. 
 At this stage of progress towards normal conditions a much closer approach to the 
standard of accuracy which obtained before the war can properly be required.  You are 
accordingly requested to prepare your estimates with the utmost care, and to have 
especial regard to the comparison of outturn with estimate in recent years. 
 
The Estimate for 
 
should reach the Treasury not later than 
 
If you anticipate difficulty in complying with this requirement you should communicate 
at once with the Estimate Clerk at the Treasury, explaining the circumstances likely to 
cause delay. 
 
To enable the Estimates to be issued promptly, it is important that as many questions of 
detail as possible should be settled before the Estimates are sent in.  If in any case 
questions are still unavoidably outstanding, the Estimates should not on that account 
be delayed, but should be submitted to the Treasury in as complete a state as possible 
upon the basis of existing rates and authorities, with the understanding that the items in 
question are liable to alteration. 
 
Amendments will be possible up to the 15 January 1925; but after that date only minor 
alterations, not likely to cause delay in the issue of the Estimates, can be considered. 
 
Great inconvenience is caused by any neglect of the foregoing requirements, and I am 
to request that they may be strictly observed in all cases. 
 
Date of Statements of Expenditure, &c. 
 
All statements of actual expenditure on new buildings should be made up to the 30th 
November 1924.  The Estimates should not, however, be kept back on this account, 
but should be rendered, if necessary, with such statements in blank, leaving the omitted 
figures to follow later. 
 
A like rule will govern any other statements of actual expenditure, or of actual receipts, 
or of time actually spent in particular services, &c., that may be admitted into the notes 
to the Estimates. 
 
Explanation of Estimates. 
My Lords desire to impress upon Departments the fact that a sufficient explanation 
should be furnished of the amount included for any given service, even if the figure 
shows a reduction on the previous year. 
 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
 
Vote on Account. 
During March next, Parliament will be asked to grant a Vote on Account sufficient to 
provide for the requirements of each service for the normal period of the Session. 
 
You are required to inform the Treasury of the amount to be included in respect of the 
expenditure for which you account, on the basis of the Proportions which have been 
found sufficient in previous years. 
 
The amounts should he fixed as low as is consistent with safety, and explanations 
should be given in any case where special circumstances indicate a sum in excess of 
one-third of the total of the Estimate. 
 You are reminded that provision for New Services cannot be included in the Vote on 
Account. 
 
The last sheet of this Circular, which is detachable, should accordingly be completed by 
you in accordance with the above paragraphs, and returned to the Accountant, H.M. 
Treasury, not later than the 1st February, 1925. 
 
The annexed regulations should be strictly observed in filling up the forms of Estimates.  
Special attention is called to the additional particulars required in the Explanatory 
Statements referred to in Regulation 3, and to the alteration made in Regulation 8.  
I am, Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 
[Signed by the Parliamentary Financial Secretary to the Treasury.] 
 
[There follow a number of detailed Regulations to observed in preparing the Civil 
Service and Revenue Departments Estimates.] 
 
1.   References to be given to Statutes. 
2.   Unsanctioned Charges to be Excluded. 
3.   Separate Explanatory Statements to be Enclosed. 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
Expenditure during the current year. 
 
4.   In addition to the information required by Regulation 3, the figures of 
actual expenditure under each Subhead should be given for the half-
year to 30th September 1924.  In any case where the expenditure in 
that half-year is not a reliable guide to the probable expenditure in the 
succeeding half-year, an explanation should be furnished and an 
estimate given of the probable expenditure in the second half-year. 
 
5.   Insertion does not convey Sanction. 
6.   Reference to Treasury Letters. 
7.   Progress Reports [on Special Services extending over more than one 
year]. 
8.   Transfer of Charges - (a) between Subheads (b) between Votes. 
9.   Gross Charges to be Provided for. 
10.   Mode of providing for Remuneration of Staff. 
11.   Method of showing the Employer's Contributions under the National 
Insurance Acts. 
12.   Extra Remuneration of Officers to be Noted. 
13.   Personal Salaries. 
14.   Incidental Expenses [to be confined to petty and casual charges]. 
15.   Rates, Taxes, Insurance. 
16.   Receipts in Cash and Stamps to be Estimated. 
17.   Responsibility of Superior Departments. Title of Vote ----------------------------------------------------- 
Subhead.  Explanation of the Estimate for 1925-
26 
A. – Salaries   
   £   
Estimate 1925-26  .   
     “  1924-25  .   
Expenditure      




 Estimate  Expenditure     
  £ £  
1923-24 .     
1922-23 .     
     
1914-15 .     
     
B. - Travelling   
   £   
Estimate 1925-26  .   
     “  1924-25  .   
Expenditure     




 Estimate  Expenditure     
  £ £  
1923-24 .     
1922-23 .     
     
1914-15 .     
     
Receipts or Credit Sub-Head.   
   £   
Estimate 1925-26  .   
     “  1924-25  .   
Receipts     




 Estimate  Expenditure     
  £ £  
1923-24 .     
1922-23 .     
     




The Departmental Estimates having been (a) finally decided in the Department, (b) 
sanctioned by the Treasury, (c) a proved by the Cabinet, are before the close of the 
financial year (ending 31 March) presented to the House of Commons.  The House 
considers the Estimates in Committee of Supply. 
 
There follow: (A) a typical Estimate (for convenience a small service (British Museum) 
is selected, being Class iv. 2 of the Civil Service Estimates); and (B) the corresponding 
Appropriation Account of the same service, signed by the Accounting Officer and 
certified by the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
 
A. The Estimate as presented to the House of Commons 
 
(For year ending 31 March 1925).  
British Museum 
 
I. ESTIMATE of the Amount required in the Year ending 31 March 1925 to 
pay the Salaries the and other expenses of the BRITISH MUSEUM, 
and of the NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM, including certain Grants in 
Aid (26 Geo. 2, c. 22; 41 & 42 Vict. c. 55; 57 & 58 Vic . c. 34; 2 Edw. 
7, c. 12 &c., &c.). 
 
Three Hundred and One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety three Pounds. 
 
Il.   SUBHEADS under which this Vote will be accounted for by the 
TRUSTEES of the BRITISH MUSEUM. 
 
 1924-25 1923-24 Increase  Decrease 
 £  £  £  £ 
A. - Salaries, Wages, and Allowances  131,442 129,476 1,966 -- 
B. - Police.  12,217 21,197 20 -- 
C. - Purchases and Acquisitions (Grant 
in Aid.)  25,000 21,000 4,000
 
-- 
D. - Bookbinding, Preparing, &c.  21,290 19,620 1,670 -- 
E. - Printing Catalogues, &c.  10,047 12,145 -- 2,098 
F. - Fire-extinguishing Apparatus  250 250 -- -- 
G. - Furniture and Fittings  6,000 7,000 -- 1,000 
H. - Incidental Expenses  6,433 6,455 -- 22 
I. - Telephones  485 450 35 -- 
J. -  Annuity in respect of Loan for 
purchase of land (57 & 58 Vict. c. 34) 




Total British Museum                         £  221,027 216,526 7,691 3,190 




(Items similar to above). 
 







Gross Total          £   319,834 310,241 12,783 3,190 
Deduct   
T. Appropriations in Aid.                     £  18,041 18,425 384 -- 
Net Total          £ 301,793 291,816 13,167 3,190 
   
  Net Increase - £9,977 
 
Note - The expenditure out of the Grants in Aid included in this Estimate will be subject 
to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General; but the unexpended balances (if any) 
of sums issued will not be surrendered at the close of the financial year. 
 
[This, though not uncommon in similar types of estimates, is a departure from the usual 
practice - J.A.R.M.] 
 
 
 1924-25  1923-24 
 £  £ 
The total expenditure in connexion with this Service is 
estimated as follows: 
 
Gross Estimate above  319,834 310,241 
Estimated amount (net) included in other Estimates in 
connexion with this Service: Buildings, Furniture, Fuel 
and Light, &c., Class 1, 6  62,600
 
 
66,680 Rates, Class 1, 13  14,000 14,250 
Stationery and Printing, Class II, 30: 
Printing, Paper, &c. 








Superannuation, &c., Class VI, 1  19,356 18,374 
Post Office, Revenue Departments, No. 3  600 600 
Total Expenditure      £ 417,000 411,095 
 
The receipts in connexion with this Service are 
estimated as follows: 
 
Appropriations in Aid above                                            £ 18,041 18,425 
 
 
III. Details of the foregoing. 
 
[Here follow members of staff and the actual salary or remuneration of each official 
from the Principal Librarian with £1,500 and official residence down to three 
housemaids at 21s. a week each.] 
 
A - Salaries, Wages, and Allowances: 
 
Numbers  Total for Salaries &c.  £133,042 £131,476 
1923-
24 
1924-25  Deduct – For Savings by vacancies &c.  1,600 2,000 
413  412  Net Total For Salaries, & c.                 £  £131,442 £129,476 
 
B - Police 
[Here follow details down to whistles.] 
 
Numbers    
1923-
24 
1924-25    
26  26  Total for Police.                                   £  £131,442 £129,476 
 
C - Purchases and Acquisitions (Grant in Aid): 
For the Purchase of Objects for the Collections, and 
Expenditure for Freight, Carriage, Travelling, &c., in 






 1924-25  1923-24 
 
1 These sums are paid into an account which is also credited with receipts from sales of 
duplicates. 
 
D - Bookbinding, Preparing, &c.: 
[Six items follow.] 
Total for bookbinding, preparing, &c.  £21,290 16,620 
 
E - Printing Catalogues, &c.: 
[Eleven items follow.] 
Total for printing catalogues, &c.  £10,047 12,145 
 F - Fire-Extinguishing Apparatus: 
Total for fire-extinguishing apparatus  £250 250 
 
G - Furniture and Fittings: 
Maintenance Staff and materials  £6,000 7,000 
 
H - Incidental Expenses: 
Total for incidental expenses.  £6,433 6,455 
 
J - Annuity in Respect of Loan For Purchase of Land 
(57 & 58 Vict. c. 34) and Expenses of The Property: 
Total for annuity, &c.  £7,863 7,933 
 
Natural History Museum, South Kensington 
[K-R, Subheads and details similar to above.] 
 





    




1 1  Director  (1,200l.)         1,200 1,200 
5 5  Keepers of Departments  (1,000l.)  5,000 5,000 









Assistant keepers (14) (475 .-25 .-800 .)











- 1  Custodian of Siphonaptera (350l. inclusive)
1 350 - 
1 1  Staff Officer (400 l. – 15 l. -500 l.)  445 450 
6 6  Clerks, Higher Grade (300 l.-15 l.-400 l.)  2,070 1,890 





2 2  Hall Clerks (100 l.-5 l.-140 l.)  261 246 
 
 1924-25  1923-24 
 £  £ 
T- Appropriations in Aid: 
  
Dividends on 30,000l. Consols (26 Geo. .2, c. 22, s.48)  750  750 






Receipts from the Sale of Pictorial Postcards and Reproductions  4,500  5,600 
Rents from Houses, &c. (57 & 58 Vict. c. 34)  8,066  7,700 
Contribution from the Bridgewater Fund  175
1 175
1 
                                                  
1   An equivalent sum is received from the Rothschild Trust and is brought to account 
in Subhead T (Appropriations in Aid). 
2   The Superintendent and two Hall Clerks are provided with unfurnished official 
apartments, fuel and light.  The scale of salary is personal to the existing Hall 
Clerks. 
3   The present holder of this post has a personal increment of 7l. 10s. Contribution from the Rothschild Trust to meet the salary of the 





Total for Appropriations in Aid  £18,041  18,425 
 
1. This sum is contributed from the Fund towards the salary of the Keeper of the 
Manuscripts, who acts as Egerton Librarian. Accounts of the income and expenditure of 
the Bridgewater Fund and certain other special trust funds are included in the Return 
relating to the British Museum which is annually presented to Parliament, and are 
submitted to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
 
B. The Corresponding Appropriation Account. 
 
This is signed by the Accounting Officer of the Department (in this case the Principal 
Librarian of the British Museum) and certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General.  
It will be observed that the Appropriation Account refers to the year ended 31 March 
1924, and must be read, therefore, in conjunction with column 2 in the foregoing 
Estimate (i. e. for the year 1923-4).  The Report and Audit are necessarily one year 
behind the Expenditure, and two years behind the Estimate; i.e. the audit for the year 
ended 31 March 1924 reaches the House of Commons at the time when it is 
considering the Estimate for the year ending 31 March 1926.  This is inevitable. 
 
BRITISH MUSEUM 
ACCOUNT of the Sum Expended, in the Year ended 31 March 1924, compared with 
the Sum Granted, for the Salaries and other Expenses of the BRITISH MUSEUM, and 
of the NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM, including certain Grants in Aid. 
 
     Expenditure  Compared 
with Grant. 




British Museum  £  £   s.   d.  £   s.   d.  £   s.   d. 
A - Salaries, Wages, and. 
Allowances  129,476 124,998 -- 10
 
4,477 19 2 
 
--
B. - Police  12,197 12,183  6 11 13 13 1  --
C. - Purchases and Acquisitions 





D. - Bookbinding, Preparing, &c  19,620 19,810 18 7 --  190 18 7
E. - Printing Catalogues, &c.  12,145 13,721 21 4 --  1,576 12 4
F. - Fire-Extinguishing 
Apparatus  250 174 1 10
 
75 18 2 
 
--
G. - Furniture and Fittings.  7,000 6,265 16 - 734 4 -  --
H. - Incidental Expenses  6,455 6,145 10 7 309 9 5  --
I. - Telephones  450 486 1 -  --  36 1 - 
J. - Annuity in respect of Loan 
for Purchase of land (57 & 58 
Vict. c. 34) and Expenses of 









Total, British Museum             £  216,526 212,617 18 1 5,711 13 10  1,803 11 11
 
Explanation of the Causes of Variation between Expenditure and Grant. 
 
A -  Due to reduction in the rate of bonus. 
E -  Additional postcards and reproductions were prepared in readiness 
for the summer of 1924, and the grant for 1924-25 was reduced by a 
sum approximate to this excess. 
F -  The renewals of hose, &c., were less than anticipated. 
G -  Due to the fall in rates of wages and the employment of fewer men on 
maintenance work. 
H -  Glazing work was reduced and the rate of wages for cleaners fell. I -  This was a new subhead and the estimate was based on information 
furnished by the Post Office. 
J.  -  Specifications, &c., for which 100l. had been provided, were not 
required. 
 
T.  -  The estimate of the receipts from the sale of postcards, &c., was 
raised to 5,600l. for 1923-24, as against 4,000l. in 1922-23, and the 
increase was not realized. 
  
  The total amounts received under this subhead were as follows:- 
 Estimated  Realized 
 £  £ 
Dividends on Museum invested funds  750  750 
Receipts from the sale of Museum publications, old 
materials, &c. 
4,200 4,494 






Rents from houses  7,700  8,020 
Contribution from the Bridgewater Fund  175  175 
National Health Insurance-Refund by Ministry of Labour 





 £18,425 17,754 
 
     Expenditure  Compared 
with Grant. 




  £  £   s.   d.  £   s.   d.  £   s.   d. 





      
Total Natural History 
Museum £ 
93,715 91,395 7 4 2,425 19 
11 
106 7 3 








Deduct --  Estimated Realised 
 
Surplus of Gross Estimate 
over Expenditure 
£6,227 14 7 
------- 
Deficiency of 
Appropriations in Aid 
realized 
£670 9 6 
---------- 
T. - Appropriations in 
Aid 
18,425 17,754 10 6 Net Surplus to be 
surrendered 
£5,557 5 1 
Net Total  £  291,816 280,258 14 11  
  
 £  s.  d. 
Subhead C - Purchases and Acquisitions (British 
Museum): 
   
Balance from 1922-23   13,333  1  10 
Grant in Aid 1923-24  21,000  -  - 
Donations 2,005  2  10 
Proceeds of Sales of duplicates, etc.  2,626  4  10 
 £16,391  18  2 
     
Subhead M – Purchases and Acquisitions (Natural History 
Museum. 
   
Balance from 1922-23   9,062  10  7 
Grant in Aid 1923-24  5,500  -  - 
 14,562  10  7 
Expended 1923-24  4,716  -  6 
Balance to 1924-25  £9,846   10  1 
  Frederic  G.  Kenyon, 
Accounting Officer. 
British Museum, 
30 September 1924. 
 
I have examined the foregoing Accounts in accordance with the provisions of the 
Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1921.  I have obtained all information and 
explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my 
opinion these Accounts are correct. 
Malcolm G. Ramsay, 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 
 
C. Votes on Account. 
In order to keep the Civil Services going between the beginning of the new financial 
year (1 April) and the passing of the Appropriation Bill it is necessary to take Votes on 
Account.  The Estimates for these are presented as early as possible after the meeting 
of Parliament, as the Consolidated Fund Bill, embodying these Votes (as well as (a) 
Excess Grants, if any, for the previous financial year, and (b) remaining Supplementary 
Grants for the current year), has to receive the Royal assent before 1 April. 
 
Thus, an Estimate for the Vote on Account in respect of the Civil Services and Revenue 
Departments was presented to the House of Commons ort 23 February 1925. 
 
On P. 5 there is the entry: 
  
Required on account 
for 1925-26 
 
Total estimate for 
1925-26 (Net) 
Total Net estimate for 
1924-25 (subject to 
transfers) 
No. of Vote. Class iv 
2. British Museum 
£120,000 £295,941 £301,793 
 
The last column, it will be noticed, corresponds to A. The Comptroller and Auditor-
General's Report (B) showed in the previous year an over-estimate of over £5,500.  
The Estimate for 1925-6 is reduced by about that amount. 
 
It is important to note that the Estimates are Estimates for individual services, each of 
which require a separate Vote, e.g. the Volume of Civil Service Estimates is made up of 
some 130 separate Estimates or Votes, the Navy Estimates cover 15 Votes plus the 
Vote for Men, &c., &c., each of which requires a separate Resolution in Committee of 
Supply and on the Report stage, whereas a Vote on Account, though it sets out the 
amounts needed for the separate Estimates, all ultimately to be voted in detail, only 
requires one Resolution and one Report for the globular total.  
Votes on Account are not taken or required for the Army, Navy, and Air Services, as 
money obtained for one of the Votes for these services can be temporarily used for 
another.  The custom is to pass cash Votes for each of these services for the ensuing 
year, and this enables the service to carry on without a Vote on Account. 
 
There is also a Civil Contingencies Fund with a fixed capital of £1,500,000, out of 
which, in cases of urgency, advances are made to the Departments in anticipation of 
Parliamentary Votes.  The sums advanced are repaid on the demand of the Treasury 
after Parliament has voted the money. 
 
D. Supplementary Estimates. 
These can be presented at any time to obtain money (a) for a new service, which was 
not included in the original Estimates; (b) for a service which had under-estimated its 
requirements for the current year.  The following is a specimen of a Supplementary 















    £   
   Class  VI     
13a  3  British Empire Exhibition Guarantee 1,000,000 Department  of 
Overseas Trade 
      
   Unclassified  Services   
9  5  Coal Mining Industry Subvention  9,000,000 Mines Department of 
the Board of Trade 
     10,000,000  
 
Whitehall,  Treasury  Chambers,      Ronald  McNeill. 
 25 November, 1925. 
 
The following Supplementary Estimates for 1925-26 have been presented to date: 
 
H.C. Paper  Service.  Amount 
   £ 
145 Colonial  Office  10 
“ Ministry  of  Transport  15,000 
“  Public Education, Scotland  32,703 
“  Diplomatic and Consular Services  60,000 
“ Colonial  Services  8,000 
“  Middle Eastern Services  155,000 
“  Repayments to the Civil Contingencies Fund  94,539 
“  Relief of Unemployment  170,000 
“  Grants for Compensation for Damage by Enemy 
Action 
80,000 
150 Navy  100 
151 Air  10 
159  Coal Mining Industry Subvention  10,000,000 
   10,615,362 
  Amount on this Paper  10,100,000 
  Total  £ 20,715,362 
 
[Details and explanations follow of the Votes of £10,100,000 required.]  
I append the Resolution referring to the Supplementary Estimate-printed above: D. 
 
Supply [10th December], - Resolutions reported; 
 
Civil Services Supplementary Estimate, 1925-26. 
 
Unclassified Service. 
1.   'That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £9,000,000, be granted to 
His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of 
payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1926, for a 
Subvention in Aid of Wages in the Coal Mining Industry.' 
 
Class VI. 
2.   'That a sum, not exceeding £1,100,000, be granted to His Majesty, to 
defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the 
year ending on the 31st day of March 1926, for defraying the liability 
under the Government Guarantee in respect of any loss which may 
result from the holding of the British Empire Exhibition under the 
British Empire Exhibition (Guarantee) Acts, 1920 to 1925.' 
 
These resolutions having been passed in Committee of Supply have to be confirmed 
by exactly similar Resolutions passed in Committee of the whole House on the Report 
stage.  When a sufficient number of separate Estimates have been voted and the 
Resolutions reported, then in Committee of Ways and Means one Resolution is 
proposed to provide Ways and Means for the aggregate of the sums voted on the 
several Estimates. 
 
E. Consolidated Fund Bills. 
Before the issue of money to meet expenditure is authorized this Resolution, having 
been confirmed on Report, is embodied in a Consolidated Fund Bill.  Of such Bills there 
may be several during a Session.  One Consolidated Fund Bill is generally passed just 
before the close of the financial year.  This Act authorizes the issue out of the 
Consolidated Fund of (a) the total sum voted for the complete the service of the year 
just about to end; and (b) votes on account for the ensuing year.  The Act also includes 
borrowing powers for the Treasury. 
 
Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Act for the Session 1925 was passed on 27 March 1925. 
The important clauses were as follows: 
 
CHAPTER 8 
A.D. 1925  An Act to apply certain sums out of the Consolidated Fund of the 
to the service of the years ending on the thirty-first day of March, 
one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five and one thousand 
nine hundred and twenty-six. 
 
  Most Gracious Sovereign [Preamble], 
 
Issue of 8,137,227l. out 
of the Consolidated 
Revenue fund for the 
service of the year ended 
31
st March, 1925 
1.  The Treasury may issue out of the Consolidated Fund of the 
United Kingdom, and apply towards making good the supply 
granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 
thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-
five, the sum of eight million one hundred and thirty-seven 
thousand two hundred and twenty-seven pounds. 
 
Issue of 163,314,200l. 
out of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund for the 
2.  The Treasury may issue out of the Consolidated Fund of the 
United Kingdom, and apply towards making good the supply 
granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the service of the year ending 
31
st march, 1926 
thirty-first day of March one thousand nine hundred and 
twenty-six, the sum of one hundred and sixty three million three 
hundred and fourteen thousand and two hundred pounds. 
 
Power for the Treasury to 
Borrow 
3.  - (1) The Treasury may borrow from any person, by the issue 
of Treasury Bills or otherwise, and the Bank of England and the 
Bank of Ireland may advance to the Treasury on the credit of the 
said sum, any sum or sums not exceeding in the whole one 
hundred and seventy-one million four hundred an the fifty-one 
thousand four hundred and twenty-seven pounds. 
 
 
F. The Appropriation Act. 
The year's cycle of 'Supply' is completed by the passing, the end of the Session (or 
before the summer adjournment as the case may be), of an Appropriation Act which is 
a Consolidated Fund Bill and something more.  It authorizes the Treasury to issue a 
sum equal to the aggregate of the sums granted since the passing of the previous 
Consolidated Fund Bill, and gives the Treasury further borrowing powers.  But by an 
elaborate series of schedules it also appropriates the sum granted for each vote of the 
estimates exclusively to the service of that particular vote.  The total expenditure thus 
authorized must not exceed the total supply granted.  Thus the Appropriation Act of 
1925, passed On 7 August 1925, authorized a total issue of 
 
 £254,772,058   
add  £163,314,200  (authorized by C.F. Act of 27th March) 
 £418,086,258   
 
which corresponds, as will be seen, to the sum demanded in the Budget for the Supply 
Services and certain supplementary estimates since voted.  Should any further supply 
be voted after the Appropriation Act has been passed in August, a further Appropriation 
Act must be passed before the end of the Session.
4  This Appropriation Act completes 
the financial work of the session.
5
 
But long before it is reached the House has had to turn from the business of supply to 
that of 'ways and means'. 
 
G. The 'Budget'. 
At the earliest possible moment in the new financial year - generally on one of the first 
days after the Easter recess a statement of Revenue and Expenditure is laid before the 
House of Commons, by the responsible Minister - as a rule the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, but occasionally the Prime Minister, as First Lord of the Treasury.  This 
includes; 
 
(a)   Statement of actual expenditure for the year just ended (31 March,) 
as compared with the estimated expenditure; 
 
(b)   Statement of actual Revenue as compared with 
 
                                                  
4   A Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) (No. 2) Bill was in fact introduced, to cover 
the supplementary sums (£10,100,000), on 11 December 1925. 
5    The Autumn Session was in 1912-13 prolonged into the New Year, and 
consequently the final Appropriation Act of that Session was not actually passed 
until the 7th of March 1913. 1 The Budget statement is based on Exchequer Issues 
and Receipts, and not on audited expenditure and receipts. (i)   the Budget Estimate; 
(ii)   actual receipts for the previous year; 
 
(c)   Statement of Expenditure to be provided for in the current year (this is 
merely a summary of the Estimates already laid and the Consolidated 
Fund Services, and reveals little not already known); 
 
(d)   Proposals for new taxation. 
 
The interest of the statement culminates naturally in the last item.  Appended is the 











Customs 102,040,000 Consolidated fund Services 
Excise 137,220,000  
Total Customs and Excise  239,260,000 National Debt Services  355,000,000
 Road  Fund  16,900,000
Motor Vehicle Duties 
17,500,000




Estate, &c. Duties  66,500,000 Payments for Northern Ireland 
Residuary Share, &c.  
 
4,000,000
Stamps 24,000,000 Land  Settlement  700,000
Land Tax, House Duty and 
Mineral Rights Duty 




Income Tax  262,000,000  





Excess Profits, Duty &c.  4,000,000  
Corporation Profits Tax  9,000,000 Supply Services 
Total Inland Revenue  429,800,000 Army  44,500,000
 Navy  60,500,000
Total Receipts from Taxes  £686,560,00
0
Air Force  15,513,000






Post office  57,000,000 Post Office Services  52,958,000
Crown Lands  900,000 Total Supply Services  £407,471,00
0
Interest on Sundry Loans  12,600,000  
Miscellaneous:  
Ordinary Receipts  14,000,000 Total Expenditure  799,400,00
Special Receipts  30,000,000 Surplus  1,660,000
  
Total Receipts from Non-
Tax Revenue  114,500,000
 
  





H. Finance Bill. 
 
Most of the taxes are levied under permanent Acts, but new taxes, or variations in the 
rate of old taxes, or continuation of temporary taxes, have to be authorized by fresh 
legislation.  The process is by 'Budget resolutions' in the Committee of Ways and 




Financial Procedure (Executive) 
 
The sequence of the Financial Procedure of the Legislature has been detailed in the 
preceding appendix. 
 
The money for the public services having been voted and appropriated by Parliament, 
it remains to describe the machinery employed by the Executive Departments of 
Government to ensure that the money is spent in precise accord with the intentions of 
Parliament as defined in legislation. 
 
The Treasury is the hub of the machine; its procedure is regulated by the Exchequer 
and Audit Act (1866). 
 
A. The Royal Warrant for the Issue of Ways and Means. 
 
The grant of money is made by Parliament to the Crown. 
 
The first step, therefore, in the elaborate process of disbursement is taken by means of 
a Royal Warrant addressed to the Commissioners of the Treasury.  This order is issued 
under the Sign Manual and is countersigned by two Lords of the Treasury.  Appended 
is the form used in the case of Supply Services.  For payments for Consolidated Fund 
Services no Royal Order is required, because not only are the C.F. charges imposed 
permanently by Statute, but the money to meet them is not expressly granted to the 






A. Supply Services. 
Whereas the several sums mentioned in the Schedule hereunto annexed have been 
granted to Us, by  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  to defray 
the expenses of the Public Supply Services therein specified, which will come in course 
of payment in-the year-ending 31st March 19 ----------- Our Will and Pleasure is, that 
you do, from time to time, authorize the Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England; or the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, to issue or transfer from 
the account of Our Exchequer at the said Banks to the accounts of the persons 
charged with the Payment of the said Services such sums as may be required, from 
time to time, for the Payment of the same, not exceeding the amounts respectively 
stated in the said annexed Schedule. 
 
Provided that such issues or transfers shall be made out of the Credits granted or to be 
granted to you from lime to lime, on the account of Our Exchequer at the said Banks, 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General under the authority of the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act 1866 (29 & 3o V., c. 39, s. 15), and shall not exceed in the whole the 
amount of the Credits so granted out of the Ways and Means appropriated by 
Parliament to the Service of the said year 
 
Given at Our Court at ----------------------------------- this ---------------- 19 ------- 
By His Majesty's Command 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
To the Commissioners 
of Our Treasury, 
 
[Overleaf is a schedule indicating (1) 'Supply Service for which voted or granted; (2) 
Amount (3) Resolutions Reported.'] 
 
B. The Requisition for Credit for Supply Services or Consolidated Fund on the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 
 
The Treasury, having received its warrant from the Crown. then requests the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General to grant credits to the Treasury at the Bank of 
England. 
 
The Requisitions for credit for Supply Services are for sums in bulk, whereas 
Requisitions for credit for C.F. Services are detailed. 
 
The Requisition, signed by two Lords of the Treasury, is in the following form: 
 
Requisition for Credit.  
Supply Services 
Year 19-- 
Treasury, Whitehall.  
----------------------19-- 
 By Virtue of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, I866 (29 & 30 V., c. 39, s. 15) 
We authorize and require you to grant to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's 
Treasury for the time being, on account of the Ways and Means granted for the service 
of the year ending 31st March 19       Credits on the account of His Majesty's 
Exchequer at the Bank of England and Bank of Ireland, or on the growing balances 
thereof for the following sums, vizt.  
 
At the Bank of England £ 
At the Bank of Ireland £  
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   -------------------------------------------------------------------------   
  








C. Credit for (Supply or Consolidated Fund) Services.  
 
The Comptroller and Auditor-General must next satisfy himself that the Requisition is in 
accord with the Grants of parliament, to whom he must in due course report, Having 
done so he issues to the Bank of England the following Order:  
(ENGLAND.)  
 
CREDIT FOR SUPPLY SERVICES  
YEAR    19--  
EXCHEQUER AND AUDIT DEPARTMENT, 
No. -------------        ------------------------------------- 19 -- 
 
By Virtue of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 & 30 V., c. 39, s. 15), 
and of a requisition from the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 
authorizing the same, I hereby grant a credit to the Lords Commissioners of His 
Majesty's Treasury for the time being, on the account of His Majesty's Exchequer at the 
Bank of England, or on the growing balance thereof, to £--------- the amount of -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- on account of the Ways and Means granted 
for the service of the year ending 31st March, 19 -- 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 
      
          .
To the Governor and Company






D. Treasury Order to the Bank. 
 
This is 'the critical measure that releases the credit.  Having had its power to make the 
issue verified by the independent control, the Treasury can now get the money',
1 using 
for the purpose the following form which must be signed by one of the Secretaries of 
the Treasury, or an officer appointed by the Treasury: 
 
[Supply Services [or Consolidated Fund Services]. 




(ORDER FOR ISSUES.) 
No.  -------------         --------------------------  192    . 
 
GENTLEMEN, 
Under the authority of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 
& 30 Vict., cap. 39, sec. 15), and of the Credit granted to the Lords 
Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, on the Account of His Majesty's Exchequer at the Bank of 
England, under the provisions of the said Act: I am commanded by the 
Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to request that you will 
transfer the following sum, on the ----------------------------------- inst., from the 
said Account to the




SUPPLY SERVICE  AMOUNT 
 £  s.  d. 
      
      
 
I am to request that when the sum shall have been transferred accordingly, 
you will transmit this authority to the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
I am, GENTLEMEN, 
Your obedient Servant, 
To the Governor and Company 
of the Bank of England. 
 
The Bank, having transferred the sums as requested, notifies the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General accordingly. 
 
As a system of control on issue nothing more perfect could be devised.  The House of 
Commons having received the Audited Accounts of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, and the comments thereon of its own Select Committee of Public 
                                                  
1   H. Young, The System of National Finance, p. 103. 
2   In C.F. Services this space is blank.  
3   [or Consolidated Fund in Great Britain for the above-mentioned Quarter.] Accounts, may be satisfied that the money voted by it has not been illegally expended.  
But as a check upon departmental extravagance or waste this elaborate system of 
cheeks and counterchecks is, as frequently observed, useless. 
 
E. The Paymaster-General. 
The final cog in the machinery of disbursement is provided by the Paymaster-General. 
It will be noted that in form D the Treasury instructs the Bank of England to transfer a 
certain sum from the Exchequer account not to the account of a particular Department 
in its books but to a single account that of the Paymaster-General.  This is in order to 
avoid having a number of separate drawing accounts for different Departments at the 
Bank and to keep the cash balances there as small as is compatible with the daily 
requirements of the public service and as concentrated as possible.  Generally 
speaking, then, orders (the equivalent of cheques) issued by Departments for the 
public service are drawn against a single official, the Paymaster-General, who acts as 
the banker of, Departments.  Each Department transmits to the Paymaster-General 
from day to day a list of the drafts it has drawn upon him, and he actually cashes these 
drafts through his central account when they are presented by the payees. 
 
To the general rules indicated in the preceding paragraph there are one or two 
important exceptions.  (1) The most important is that of the revenue-collecting 
Departments which have separate accounts at the Bank of England in their own 
names.  They pay their salaries and expenses by cheques drawn on this account and 
into this account they pay the revenue they receive.  Periodically, they adjust matters 
with the Exchequer by drawing from the Exchequer account at the Bank of England the 
amount of revenue they have intercepted to pay their expenses and then transfer the 
equivalent of the gross revenue from their account at the Bank of England to the, 
Exchequer account.  The other Departments have no Banking account, broadly 
speaking, except with the Paymaster-General.  All their cash receipts, which may 
include, besides sums a appropriated in aid, moneys payable to the Exchequer, often 
considerable, must therefore be paid through the Paymaster-General into his account 
at the Bank of England.  These receipts are used for the time being to pay the bills of 
Departments.  So far as receipts are concerned which, under the Estimates, may be 
appropriated in aid, there is an end of the matter, but ultimately the Paymaster-General 
has to pay over to the Exchequer account that portion of these receipts which 
represent payments due to the Exchequer and replaces the money by drawing from 
supply.
4
                                                  
4   It is not easy in so compressed a statement to describe the complicated functions 
of the Paymaster-General at once accurately and clearly.  For a full account 
students of Public Finance should refer to Treasury Minute of 1885 (H.C. 145, 
1885).  This is printed verbatim in the Epitome to the Public Accounts Committee 
Report, p. 174 (ed. 1911). Appendix F 
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Empire Foreign Policy. F.R., May 1923. 
 
Constitutional Problems. 
Cabinet Government or Departmentalism? XIXth, Nov. 1900. 
The House of Lords as an Imperial Senate. F.R., June 1907  
Reform of the House of Lords. XIXth Jan., 1909. 
The House of Lords and the Budget, XIXth, 1909. 
The Constitutional Crisis. XIXth, Jan. 1910. 
The Crown and the Constitution, XIXth, June 1910. 
Is there a Conservative Party ?, XIXth, Dec; 1910. 
The Machinery of Constitutional Amendment. XIXth, Feb. 1911. 
The Crown and the Crisis. F.R., Sept., 1911. 
The Constitution in Suspense, XIXth, Jan. 1914. 
The Problem of a Second Chamber. E.R., July 1917. 
The New Electorate and the New Legislature. F.R., Mar. 1918. 
National Expenditure. E.R., July 1918. 
The Constitution in the Cauldron. XIXth, Sept. 1918. 
Politics and Politicians. I. F.R., Oct. 1918. 
Politics and Politicians. II. F.R., Dec. 1918. 
Parliament and Finance. E.R., Jan. 1920. 
The Problem of Second Chambers (Le Nouveau Monde). 1920. 
Quo Vadis? F.R., Feb. 1920. 
Under which King? F.R., Aug. 1920. 
Soviet v. Parliament. F.R., Oct. 1920. 
President or Premier? F.R., Nov. 1920. 
Machinery of Government. XIXth, Dec. 1920. 
The Party System and Parliamentary Government. E.R., Oct. 1921. 
The Tory Tradition. E.R., Jan. 1922. 
Conservative Principles. XIXth, Mar. 1922. 
The Problem of the Second Chamber. F.R., Mar. 1925. 
Democracy and Syndicalism. F.R., Oct. 1925. 
Whitehall and Westminster. E.R., Jan. 1926. 
Walter Bagehot. F.R., Feb. 1926. 
- And after? (The General Strike). F.R., June 1,926, 
The Irish Problem. 
Ireland under Queen Victoria. F.R., Mar., 1901. 
The Key of the Empire. XIXth, Nov., 1911. The Third Edition of Home Rule. XIXth, May 1912. 
The Fourth Home Rule Bill. F.R., April, 1920. 
The Heel of Achilles. XIXth, June, 1920. 
England, Ireland, and Ulster. F.R., July 1922. 
 
Miscellaneous. 
Modern England. F.R., April 1907. 
The Letters of Queen Victoria. F.R., Dec. 1907. 
English Politics through American Spectacles. F.R., Jan., 1909. 
War and the Theory of the State (Hibbert Journal)., 1915. 
Nationalism, Internationalism, and Super Nationalism (Hibbert Journal). 1917. 
Swiss Democracy. E.R., Oct. 1920. 
 
Note:-  XIXth   =   Nineteenth Century and After (Constable & Co.) 
  F.R.   =   Fortnightly Review (Chapman & Hall) 
  E.R.   =   Edinburgh Review (Longmans, Green & Co.) 
 
 